

P R E F A C E.

SINCE the publication of the *REVISED EDITION OF WEBSTER'S DICTIONARY* in 1817, the purpose has been kept steadily in view to prepare another edition embracing all the alterations and improvements which the progress of the language and the additional facilities for improving its Lexicography might seem to require. The late Professor Goodrich had, from the first, directed his attention to the collection of words not inserted in the previous edition, and to the preparation of definitions of meanings which had been overlooked, or were made necessary by new applications of words in the writings of respectable authors, and by the progress of Science and the Arts.

Many of these words and definitions were given to the public in the *Pictorial Edition* of 1859, together with numerous illustrative wood-cuts. To these was added a large collection of discriminated Synonyms, which had been carefully prepared by Professor Goodrich. This Edition was, however, a provisional one, designed to serve only until the more careful and thorough revision, which had been so long in contemplation, could be perfected.

In preparing for the present revision, the attention of both the Editor and the Publishers was first directed to the Etymology. They were aware that, however valuable the industry and valuable the contributions of Dr WEBSTER in this department, the science of comparative Philology was by no means perfect in his time; if indeed it could be said to exist at all. It is only within a very few years that the true principles on which this science rests have been suggested and confirmed, and the principles have been determined by which future investigations may be successfully prosecuted. It seemed necessary, first of all, that these new principles and methods should be applied in the entire revision of the Etymologies of Dr Webster, by a scholar who had made Etymology his special study. In 1854, arrangements were made with Dr C. A. F. MÜLLER, of Berlin, Prussia, to undertake this task. Dr Müller was recommended by some of the most distinguished scholars in Germany as admirably qualified for the service, and he had been favorably known by special researches in this department. He has employed several years upon the work, and has performed it in a manner worthy of his high reputation. The results are submitted to all persons who are interested in philological studies, with the belief that they will find in them a new and valuable contribution to the stores of linguistic knowledge. This feature of the present edition will, it is thought, be acknowledged by all scholars as one of marked superiority, and will be gratefully welcomed by the now very large number of instructors and studious persons who are interested in acquiring a more thorough knowledge of the English language.

Use the definitions in Geol
completed by him, or has

The work of revising the definitions of the principal words occasioned great and perplexing difficulties to Professor Goodrich and those with whom he conferred. He was well aware of the defective method which had been adopted by Dr JOHNSON, of defining words by enumerating and explaining their special applications rather than by developing their broadly-distinguished meanings, and he knew that in this Johnson had furnished the model for most, if not all, of the defining dictionaries of the English language which have since been published. Dr Webster, in his strictures on Johnson's Dictionary, noticed, as one of its defects, that the author had, in many cases, failed to exhibit full and exact definitions of important significations. This fault Dr Webster endeavored to avoid, and with manifest success. His own definitions are superior to those of Johnson in fullness and precision, as well as in the greater correctness and appropriateness of illustrative phrases. But he had not emancipated himself entirely from the influence of Johnson's

ster's definitions, Professor Goodrich was fully aware. He was also aware that the dictionaries of many other languages, both ancient and modern, had been constructed on a better theory and after better methods. He had formed for himself a conception, more or less distinct, of the proper method of exhibiting and illustrating the definitions of the words. But it seemed to him an Herculean task to undertake to revise the work of Dr Webster, and he

J. HAMMOND TRUMBULL, of Hartford, well known as a learned and accurate student of the aboriginal language of America.

To the *Rev. Professor Goodrich* was committed the very important duty of receiving the mass of material furnished by the most of the assistants who have been named, verifying its accuracy, and then incorporating it into the final copy for the printer. In this work he was assisted for several months by the *Rev. FREDERICK P. BROWN* and the *Rev. JOHN M. MORRIS*. Mr. Goodrich has also revised or prepared many of the definitions in *Agriculture* and *Horticulture*, in *Antiquities* and *Architecture*, in *Biblical matters* and *Ecclesiastical History*, in *Commerce*, *Domestic Economy*, and in the *Fine Arts*, making use of the best and oldest sources in each of these departments. He has also brought to the service the fruits of his own experience while laboring under his father's guidance, and the remembrance of his father's views as well as in respect to many important details.

It was thought desirable, in order to secure the greatest possible accuracy and perfection to the copy, to place the proof sheets in the hands of some scholar of critical habits and long practical experience, who had not been concerned in its earlier preparation. Accordingly, Mr. WILLIAM A. WHEELER was employed for this service, and also to correct the proofsheets, and with him was associated, at a later period, Mr. ARTHUR W. WEAVER. Mr. Wheeler was also employed in various other services I render to be named, and he has furnished especially valuable contributions from his ample literary stores, and given the work throughout the benefit of his exact learning and his nice discrimination. Mr. WILLIAM G. WEBSTER shared with Mr. Wheeler and Mr. Wright the responsibility of correcting the proof sheets; and the Dictionary is much the better for his detection of oversights, and for the alterations he has suggested. Valuable assistance has been received from various persons connected with the Boston Stereotype Foundry, especially from Mr. THOMAS HOLT, the Reader of the establishment, whose taste, experience, conscientious fidelity, and accurate but unpretending scholarship, have materially benefited the work.

The preparation of the Appendix was intrusted almost entirely to the supervision of Mr. Wheeler, who has read every page of it with critical care. The "Pronouncing Vocabulary of Scripture Names" was wholly prepared by him and he constructed the very interesting and valuable "Vocabulary of the Names of Noted Eminent Persons, Places, &c." The full and accurate "Pronouncing Vocabulary of Greek and Latin Proper Names" was prepared with much labor and care by Professor THOMAS A. THACHER, of Yale College. The "Pronouncing Vocabularies of Modern Geographical and Biographical Names" are the work of Dr. JOSEPH THOMAS, of Philadelphia, author of the system of pronunciation in *Exley's Gazetteer of the World*, and his name will be a sufficient guaranty for their trustworthiness and value. The "Etymological Vocabulary of Modern Geographical Names" was prepared by the *Rev. CHARLES H. WHEELER*, of Cambridge, Massachusetts, who also prepared the *Explanatory Vocabulary of Christian Names*, from materials furnished in part by CHARLES J. FLETCHER, Esq., of Philadelphia. The Table of "Arbitrary Signs used in Writing and Printing" was originally prepared by Professor LYMAN, and has been revised for this edition by Mr. Wright and Mr. William A. Wheeler. Mr. William G. Webster, with the assistance of several of the other collaborators, has revised and greatly improved the list of "Abbreviations and Contractions used in Writing" and the list of "Quotations, Words, Phrases, Proverbs, &c., from the Greek, the Latin, and Modern Foreign Languages," which were originally compiled by him. A particular account of the various vocabularies will be found in the general Preface, to the Appendix, and in the special Prefaces to the vocabularies themselves.

The elaborate and learned Introduction to the previous editions has been omitted. It is not without regret that this venerable memorial of the enterprise, the sagacity, and the scholarship of Dr. Webster, has been displaced to make room for new matter more in accordance with the advance of Philological Science and the wants of the present generation. To supply its place, Professor James Hadley has contributed "A Brief History of the English Language," designed to show its philological relations, and to trace the progress and influence of the causes which have brought it to its present condition. Professor Hadley has also contributed his advice in respect to numerous questions, philological and aims that have guided the

to the original edition of 1828, and the Memoir of Dr. Webster by Professor Goodrich, are all retained in this edition, as containing some important details of literary history, and as furnishing a concise statement of the principles which were adopted in the preparation of the successive editions of the work.

The "Principles of Pronunciation," originally prepared by Professor Goodrich for the edition of 1829, have been carefully revised and much expanded by Mr. Wheeler, whose attention has been previously directed to this subject in the preparation of "A Manual of Pronunciation." 261) Mr. Wheeler has also revised "Orthoëpeia," which was originally Webster's "American Dictionary."

Besides the persons already named in connection with the special services which they have rendered, a large number of persons have contributed important materials and suggestions to the principal collaborators. Among these, particular mention should be made of Mr. H. S. DANA, of Woodstock, Vermont, who furnished a large and critically selected list of words and readings from the dramatic and other writers of the age of Queen Elizabeth. For the abundant and varied collection of illustrative passages and citations which were at the service of the Revisers, they are indebted to the zeal and painstaking of many devoted "readers" for the Dictionary, not a few of the most faithful and judicious of whom were ladies.

To the Hon. GEORGE P. MARSH, the Editor is under obligations for some valuable suggestions in respect to the principles which should be followed in the preparation of a popular English Dictionary.

It is not practicable to enumerate here the works contained in the library of authorities furnished to the Editor and his associates by the enlightened enterprise of the publishers. As this Dictionary was designed to be not merely a compilation, but a digest of results obtained by independent research, comparatively few references are made to other Dictionaries and Encyclopedias. But the best works of the kind have been freely consulted, and, among them, the well-known Dictionary of Dr. Joseph E. Worcester, which is so honorable to the industry of the author and the scholarship of the country.

The features of the present Edition which deserve to be specially enumerated are the following:—

I. *The Revised Etymology.* This feature has already been noticed. It is believed that critical readers will acknowledge the learning, the brevity, the sound judgment, the self-explaining order, and the minutely-traced ramifications, which characterize these etymologies, and it is hoped that they will attract the attention and stimulate the studies of all who desire to know more of the varied history of their mother-tongue.

II. *The Revised Definitions.* The definitions of the principal words, not scientific or technical, have been carefully elaborated by Professors Whitney and Gilman, each possessing peculiar qualifications, and each performing his work as thoroughly as was possible within the limits prescribed. Their work was carefully reviewed by the Editor before it was admitted into the copy. The rule which he adopted for his own guidance was freely to accept and make any change in the matter and the language of the previous edition which he had reason to suppose would be desired by Dr. Webster himself, were he now living, and fully possessed of the principles which have been universally accepted by modern philologists and lexicographers, or which Professor Goodrich would have sanctioned, had he been able to give to the work of revision the full measure of his well-known energy and sagacious judgment. In accordance with this rule, great pains have been taken, 1. To contract and condense the definitions into as few general heads, or numbered divisions, as was practicable. In this the example of Dr. Goodrich, in his experimental work, was followed, and the Revisers have sought to avoid all redundancy and tautology, to strike out all mere enumerations of particular applications of meanings, and to reduce the number of illustrative phrases to the actual wants of the reader. While they have been thus bold on the one hand, they have been studiously careful, on the other, to retain the exact language of the earlier edition, in every case possible, esteeming very highly Dr. Webster's plain and clearly-expressed definitions for their own sake as well as for that of the author, and preferring to err on the side of cautious reverence rather than on that of thoughtless innovation. In many cases in which the numbered articles under a word have been diminished, it will be found that the number of real definitions has been materially increased, and that the gathering of them into fewer groups has contributed to their more easy comprehension and more ready use. A single article often includes a group of kindred meanings, and thus enables the reader to view at a glance their close relation and similarity, and to trace out the subtle movement of thought by which one was evolved from another. Often, too, a well-chosen citation from a good author has been preferred, as a means of definition, to an explanatory circumlocution. 2. An effort has been constantly made to develop and arrange the several meanings and groups of meanings in the order of their actual growth and history, beginning, if possible, with the primitive signification, as indicated by the etymology. As this, for many reasons, has now become possible in numerous cases in which it was impossible in the time of Dr. Webster, and as, in many instances, Dr. Webster did not perfect this order when the materials were within his reach, it has been often found necessary, in the present edition, to change the arrangement of the definitions. Special consideration has been given to this point in view of the fact that the study, or even the casual notice, of the order of growth in the meanings of single words, is a stimulant of thought, and the habitual attention to it is of itself an education. 3. Many new meanings have been added, either as they have been brought to light by an extended examination of authors in the earlier and later periods of English literature, or as they have occurred to the Revisers in performing their work, or have been suggested by the kindness of critical and thoughtful friends.

III. *The Illustrative Citations.* Special effort has been made to obtain illustrative passages from classical English passages, and also to discover words and meanings that had been devised by which a large number of words in all competent persons, and a copious collection of illustrative pas-

pages was placed at the disposal of the Revisers. The principal dramatic authors, and various prose writers, of the age of Queen Elizabeth, were read with care by Mr H S Dunn. The plays of Shakespeare and the poetry of Milton were carefully studied by the aid of the excellent Concordances of Mrs Mary Cowden Clarke and Mr Guy Lushington Praeger, with particular reference to any special usage which these poets have sanctioned. The most prominent in the long series of English writers, down to the latest, have been read for the purpose of selecting illustrations, especially those writers whose use of language is particularly idiomatic or classical. Sir Walter Scott, Southey, Coleridge, Lamb, Byron, Washington Irving, Dr Quincey, Macaulay, Tennyson, Hawthorne, and many others, have received as much attention as the older writers. A comparatively small portion only of the passages which were marked and copied has been actually used, it being thought unnecessary to multiply such passages when they were required for no valuable end. In cases where to cite a passage would serve no purpose in illustrating a meaning or justifying the use of a word, the name only of the author has been given, provided, as in the case of words obsolete or not now approved, the authority of some writer was deemed desirable. The free use of this large and varied collection of citations will, it is thought, add greatly to the value and interest of the present edition. It is believed that no dictionary of the language contains so many of illustrations from so large a variety of writers. The citations which have been retained from the preceding editions, as well as those introduced for the first time, have, as far as possible, been verified and copied with scrupulous care. Such passages were preferred as would throw additional light upon the definitions, or as possessed any interest of thought or of language.

IV. *The Vocabulary.* No pains have been spared to introduce additional words, provided they were of such a character as to deserve insertion. At the same time, the Revisers have been actuated by no desire to swell the list to the greatest possible number. Words which were the offspring of the individual conceit of a whimsical or lawless writer, which did not conform to the analogies of the language, and which were never accepted or approved by good writers, of their own or a subsequent generation, have not been admitted. On the other hand, new words which have been acknowledged and approved as good have been carefully garnered, whether used by old authors or new. A great number of obsolete or obsolescent words, which were once accepted and freely used, have been recovered by the readings and researches that were directed in part to this end. Self-explaining compounds have been designedly omitted by hundreds, if not by thousands, while care has been taken to introduce and explain all those which need to be defined. It will be observed, however, that this edition differs from the former editions in following a strictly alphabetical arrangement of all such words. The participles, participial adjectives, and verbal nouns in most cases do not appear in the vocabulary as separate words, but are given under the verbs from which they are formed, and which explain their meaning. But the participial adjectives and verbal nouns have a separate place and treatment, in those cases in which they have obtained a meaning different from that which they derive from the verbs to which they belong. The principal parts of the verbs, regular and irregular, are given together, within brackets, under the verb instead of being entered and defined separately. But the principal parts of the irregular verbs are usually inserted in their proper alphabetical places, with a simple cross reference to the verbs themselves. A similar course has been pursued in regard to the comparative and superlative degrees of many adjectives, and the irregular plurals of nouns. The vocabulary, as a whole, though not constructed for any display of enumerated titles, will be found to be greatly increased and enriched. It comprises an aggregate of upward of 114 000 words.

V. *The Scientific and Technical Definitions* have been carefully revised and elaborated by very able gentlemen, and with the aid of the best authorities. Many of the articles, it is believed, will command confidence and elicit commendation for their scientific value, while their brevity and plain language fit them for the use and instruction of all classes.

VI. *The Collection of Synonyms*, so carefully prepared by Professor Goodrich, has, with a few slight changes, been incorporated into the body of the work for greater facility of reference. The number of the words thus defined and distinguished is far greater than the number of separate articles would seem to indicate. The meanings are thoroughly discriminated in every case, the words being traced from their etymology, and explained by formal definitions, as well as illustrated by contrasted examples of their various use. In addition, copious lists of synonymous or interchangeable terms have been attached to most of the important words, for the convenience of teachers and inexperienced writers.

VII. *The Pictorial Illustrations* more than three thousand in number, have been inserted in the body of the work, for the greater convenience of those who consult it, but the obvious advantages of a classified arrangement have induced the publishers to repeat the greater part of them at the end of the volume, and to these are added many others, which, from their larger size or other cause, were not so well adapted to the body of the work. It will be observed that an entirely new selection of illustrations has been made for this edition, many being taken from original drawings, and the remainder chiefly from works of high authority in their respective departments. For the artistic beauty of these cuts, the work is indebted to Mr JOHN ANDREW, of Boston, who has a distinguished reputation as an engraver on wood. It will be remembered that only a partial selection could be made of objects to be illustrated. Even in all

illustrated works on Natural History, it is customary to represent only a limited number of objects; and, in a work like the present, a still smaller number of such illustrations could be admitted. The general aim has been to illustrate those objects of which a drawing would convey a better conception than a mere verbal description. Those who use the Dictionary will not fail to observe that, to many words which are not themselves illustrated, there are subjoined references to illustrations given in connection with other words; as, under *Withers*, it is said, "[See *Illustr. of Horae*]." VIII. *The Vocabulary in the Appendix* have been re-edited, or expressly prepared for this edition by able scholars, as will appear from the full account of the *Vocabularies* themselves, and of the researches and aims of the authors in the special Introductions which accompany them. The first and most prominent, the "Vocabulary of the English Language," is from the pen of Mr. Noah Porter, of Yale College, and is a work of great value to all who are engaged in the study of the English language.

The remaining *Vocabularies* are all the products of original and laborious research, or are trustworthy compilations from the best sources.

IX. *The Pronunciation* of English words has been carefully attended to in this edition. The principles adopted are stated at length and fully illustrated in the article on the Principles of Pronunciation, which was originally prepared by Professor Goodrich, and has been elaborated by Mr. Wheeler, with suggestions from able scholars, who, as well as himself, have made a special study of the subject. A satisfactory treatment of the Pronunciation of Words Differently Spelled is given in the article on the Pronunciation of Words Differently Spelled. A trustworthy exhibition of the Pronunciation of each word in the Dictionary is indicated by the marked or figured Key which is to be found at the bottom of the page. This Key has been remodeled and arranged with special reference to this edition, and contains some few characters additional to those of the Key previously used. The number of characters now employed is thought to be as large as is desirable. To attempt more is to seem to promise more than it is practicable to perform, and is, besides, open to the objection that a complex notation would not be readily understood.

X. *The Orthography*. In this department no change has been made in the principles adopted and clearly set forth in the Revised Edition of 1847, and so generally accepted by the American public. In a few classes of words the Dictionary recommends and follows the peculiar modes of spelling which Dr. Webster introduced for the sake of carrying out the acknowledged analogies of the language—modes of spelling, which, in every instance, had been previously suggested by distinguished English grammarians and writers on orthography, such as Lowth, Walker, &c., and the propriety of which has been recognized by Smart and other recent English lexicographers. But to remove every reasonable ground of complaint against the Dictionary in regard to this matter, an alternative orthography is now given in almost every case, the old style of spelling being subjoined to the reformed or new. In two or three instances it has been found that the forms introduced by Dr. Webster, or to which he lent his sanction, were based upon a mistaken etymology; and therefore these forms have been set aside, and the old spelling has been restored. Preceding this account are some Observations on the general subject of Orthography, with copious "Rules for Spelling Certain Classes of Words," prepared by Mr. Wright, followed by "A List of Words Spelled in Two or More Ways," compiled expressly for the present edition. These new features give this edition of the Dictionary a great superiority over the former editions.

In conclusion, the Editor desires to express his thanks to all the persons who have assisted in the preparation of the present edition, for the fidelity and perseverance with which they have discharged their duties. It is to their industry, scholarship, and zeal that the peculiar excellences of this edition are chiefly to be ascribed. Though the Editor is more sensible of his deficiencies than any other person can be, yet he does not hesitate to commend it to the public for the improvements which are due to the thorough research and careful attention which have been bestowed by his associates in preparing it. To them the public owe a debt of grateful appreciation, which, he believes, will be cheerfully discharged.

NEW HAVEN, JULY 1854.

NOAH PORTER.

INasmuch as with the progress of science, the invention of art, and the freedom accorded to literature, new words gradually come into use and words already familiar are employed in new applications and significations, it is inevitable that a supplement of new words and new meanings should occasionally be required for the dictionary of every living language. The materials for such a supplement have been slowly accumulated from many sources and at the suggestion and by the assistance of many friends of literature and science. These materials have been carefully revised and greatly enlarged by the collection of new words and significations now presented to the public, together with a greatly enlarged and improved Dictionary. This may, the work of Mr. Lewis J. Campbell, a careful and experienced student and laborer.—N. P.

YALE COLLEGE, 1854.



N. Webster

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NEW HAVEN, July, 1864,

NOAH PORTER.

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COLUMB. 1870.]

AUTHORIZED AND UNABRIDGED EDITION.

WEBSTER'S
COMPLETE DICTIONARY
OF
THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE.

WITH VARIOUS LITERARY APPENDICES AND NUMEROUS ADDITIONAL ILLUSTRATIONS.

THOROUGHLY REVISED AND IMPROVED,
BY CHAUNCEY A. GOODRICH, D.D., LL.D.,
LATE PROFESSOR OF RHETORIC AND ORATORY, AND ALSO PROFESSOR OF THE
PASTORAL CHARGE IN YALE COLLEGE;

AND
NOAH PORTER, D.D.,
PROFESSOR OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY AND METAPHYSICS IN YALE COLLEGE.

ASSISTED BY
DR. C. A. F. MAHN, OF BERLIN,
AND OTHERS.

NEW EDITION OF 1880,

With a Supplement of New Words, and an Additional Appendix of Biographical Names.

LONDON: GEORGE BELL & SONS;

LONGMAN & CO.; SIMPKIN, MARSHALL & CO.; WHITTAKER & CO.; HAMILTON, ADAMS & CO.; KENT & CO.
EDINBURGH: JOHN MENZIES.
DUBLIN: M'GLASHAN & GILL.
MELBOURNE: GEORGE ROBERTSON. LOMBAY: J. C. JUTA.
PARIS: FOTHERINGHAM.

1884.

PREFACE TO THE NEW ENLARGED AND ILLUSTRATED EDITION

PREFACE TO THE REVISED EDITION OF 1861

PREFACE TO THE EDITION OF 1868

MEMOIR OF NOAH WEBSTER

A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE, &c.

LANGUAGES KINDRED TO THE ENGLISH

GENERAL FEATURES OF THE TEUTONIC LANGUAGES

THE ANGLO-SAXON AS A LITERARY LANGUAGE

INFLUENCE OF OTHER LANGUAGES ON THE ANGLO-SAXON

TRANSITION FROM ANGLO-SAXON TO MODERN ENGLISH

THE ENGLISH A COMPOSITE LANGUAGE

THE ENGLISH POOR IN FORMATION AND INFLECTION

DIALECTS

ANGLO-SAXON INFLECTION

SEMI-SAXON INFLECTION

EARLY ENGLISH INFLECTION

SPECIMENS OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE IN ITS EARLIER

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A DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH SUPPLEMENT OF ADDITIONAL WORDS METRIC SYSTEM

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OF THE NAMES OF NOTED FICTITIOUS PERSONS
PLACES ETC.,

PREFACE

VOCABULARY

PRONOUNCING VOCABULARY OF SCRIPTURE PROPHETS
AND NAMES

REMARKS AND RULES

NAMES FROM THE COMMON ENGLISH VERSION

NAMES FROM THE ANGLO-CATHOLIC VERSION

PRONOUNCING VOCABULARY OF GREEK AND LATIN
PROPER NAMES

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PART

AGRICULTURE AND HORTICULTURE,
ANATOMY, PHYSIOLOGY, PHRENOLOGY, &c.
ARTS—DRESS, UTENSILS, &c.
ARMS.
BOOKS.
COINAGE, MEDALS, ORNAMENTS, INSTRUMENTS
CLOCKWORK, OPTICS, PNEUMATICS, PYROTECHNICAL ARTS,
MINISTRY, AND MASONRY,
AND OTHER SHELL ANIMALS.
MATHS.—ALGEBRA, ARITHMETIC, COSMOGRAPHY, UTENSILS, FURNITURE, &c.
METALS, MINERALS, &c.
MILLS, &c.
MUSIC.
NAVIGATION, NAUTICS, &c.
PAPER, &c.
PHYSICS, AND OTHER MATHEMATICAL AGRICULTURE,
POLITICAL ECONOMY, AND RAILROAD MACHINE-
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SCIENCE, INCLUDING ALGEBRA, GEOMETRY, TRIGONOMETRY, CONIC SECTIONS, &c.
STATISTICS.
MECHANICAL POWERS,
MECHANICS, MACHINERY, &c.
MEDICINE, DANCE OF CHIVALRY, &c.—ANCIENT, DANSE

There is no knowledge of things conveyed by men's words without ideas, want meaning in his words, and speaks on the name of any simple idea, is by presenting to his senses that standard for . . . The shape of a horse, or cast-iron.

TERMS—ARMS, PROJECTILES, WEAPONS, &c.,	1812
INSTRUMENTS,	1814
Y, IDOLS, &c.,	1815
PHILOSOPHY, OPTICS, &c.,	1817
OGY,	1817
MOLOGY,	1825
HICAL AND SCIENTIFIC INSTRUMENTS,	1830
SHRUBS, FLOWERS, AND FRUITS,	1827
ENT, MODES OF,	1830
EDS,	1850
Y MEN,	1836
ANIMALS, OF RADIATA,	1836
N—UTENSILS, PRESS, &c.,	1836
S, WORMS, &c.,	1837
ND NAUTICAL AFFAIRS,	1838
Sea ANACHTONANS.	
SED FOR LETTERS BY THE DEAF AND DUMB,	1840
AND IMPLEMENTS, VESSELS, INSTRUMENTS, &c.,	1840
AND THEIR FRUITS,	1841
ES FOR LAND AND AERIAL LOCOMOTION,	1842
OF THE STATES OF THE AMERICAN UNION,	1843
OF VARIOUS NATIONS, ROYAL PERSONAGES, &c.,	1844
OF VARIOUS NATIONS,	1845
NARY AND LOCOMOTIVE STEAM ENGINES,	1846
YTES.	1847

Agree not to the reality of things. . . . He that hath names

The only sure way of making known the signification of the word is in his mind, and make him actually have the ideas that word and imperfectly imprinted on the mind by words, the sight of the that words standing for things which are known and distinguished them . . . Naturalists, that treat of plants and animals, have we reason to confuse that he has a clearer idea of animus or ether, from

rejection of many thousands of words, which may properly find a place in the glossaries of antiquarians, as a curious exhibition of what has been *proposed*, but never *adopted*, as a part of our language, but which, for that reason, can have no claim to stand in a dictionary designed for general use. All words, indeed, which are necessary to an understanding of our great writers, such as Bacon, Spenser, Shakespeare, &c., ought, though now obsolete, to be carefully retained; and in the present revision a considerable number of this class have been introduced for the first time. Other words have likewise been admitted, to a limited extent, namely, the familiar terms of common life in England, which have been much used of late by popular writers in Great Britain. Many of these need to be explained for the benefit of readers in this country, and, if marked as "familiar," "colloquial," or "low," according to their true character, they may be safely inserted in our dictionaries, and are entitled to a place there, as forming a constituent part of our written and spoken language. One of the most difficult questions on this subject relates to the introduction of technical and scientific terms. Most of our general dictionaries are, at present, without any plan as to the extent and proportion in which such words should be inserted, nor can they ever be reduced to order until each department is revised by men of science who are intimately acquainted with the subjects, and who are competent to decide what terms ought to be admitted into a general dictionary, and what terms should be reserved for *special dictionaries* devoted to distinct branches of science. Something of this kind, on a limited scale, has been attempted in the progress of this revision. Lists of words have been obtained from the gentlemen mentioned above, which might properly be inserted in this volume, and very few terms of this class have been admitted except under their direction. In accordance with their advice, a small number have been excluded, but in this respect the Editor has not felt at liberty to carry out his views in their full extent.

In respect to *Americanisms*, properly so called it is known to those who are conversant with the subject, that they are less numerous than has been generally supposed. Most of those familiar words, especially of our older States, which have been considered as peculiar to our country, were brought by our ancestors from Great Britain, and are still in constant use there as local terms. The recent investigations of Forby, Holloway, and Halliwell have thrown much light on this subject, and the names of these authors are, therefore, frequently placed under the words in question, to indicate their origin and their present use in England. Notes have also been added to some words which are peculiar to our country, but their number is comparatively small.

In reference to *Orthography*, some important alterations have been made, but in strict conformity, it is believed, with the Author's principles on this subject. The changes in our orthography recommended by Dr Webster are of two distinct kinds, and rest on very different grounds. These it may be proper for a moment to consider. His main principle was, that *the tendencies of our language to greater simplicity and broader analogies ought to be watched and cherished with the utmost care*. He felt, therefore, that whenever a movement toward wider analogies and more general rules had advanced so far as to leave but few exceptions to impede its progress, those exceptions ought to be set aside at once, and the analogy rendered complete. On this ground, he rejected the *u* from such words as *favour, labour, &c.* Of these we have a large number, which came to us, in most cases, from Latin terminations in *or*, through the Norman French, but encumbered with the silent *u*, as in *empereur, authour, editour, &c.* From this entire class, except about twenty words, the *u* has been gradually dropped, and in respect to these, scarcely any two persons can be found, however strenuous for retaining it, who are in practice consistent with each other, or with themselves, as to the words in which this letter is used. In fact, we have reached a point where, unless we take Webster and the dictionaries which agree with him as our guide, we have no standard on the subject, for Johnson, Walker, and others retain the *u* in numerous words into which no one would think of introducing it at the present day. Public convenience, therefore, demands that we do at once what must ultimately be done. No one can believe that the progress of our language will be arrested on this subject. The *u* will speedily be omitted in all words of this class, unless, from the sacredness of its associations, it be retained in *Saviour*, which may stand for a time as a solitary exception. Nor is it Dr Webster who is the innovator in this case, but the English mind, which has for two centuries been throwing off a useless encumbrance, and moving steadily on toward greater simplicity in the structure of our language. Such, too, is the case with certain terminations in *re*, pronounced like *er*, as, *centre, metre, &c.* We have numerous words of this class, derived from the French, all of which originally ended in *re*, as, *cider (cidre), chamber (chambre), &c.* These have been gradually conformed to the English spelling and pronunciation, till the number in *re* is reduced to not far from twenty words, with their derivatives, and in respect to them also the process is still going on. *Center* is, to a considerable extent, the spelling of the best mathematical writers. *Meter* is the word given by Walker in his Rhyming Dictionary, from a sense of the gross inconsistency of attaching to this word and its derivative, *diameter*, a different termination. Others are gradually undergoing the same change. Dr Webster proposes, therefore, to complete the analogy at once, and conform the spelling of the few that remain to the general principles of our language. *Acre, lucere, and massacre* present the only difficulty, from their liability, if changed, to be mispronounced, and may therefore be suffered to stand as necessary exceptions. Another departure from the principles of English orthography which Dr Webster has endeavored to correct, is one that was pointed out by Walker, in very emphatic terms, nearly fifty years ago. The principle in question is this,—that, in adding to a word the formatives *ing, ed, er, &c.*, a single consonant (if one precedes) is doubled when the accent falls on the last syllable, as in *forgetting, beginning, &c.*, but is not doubled when the accent falls on any of the preceding syllables, as in *benefiting, gardening, &c.* Walker, in his fifth Aphorism, says, "Dr Lowth justly remarks that an error frequently takes place in the words *worshipping, counselling, &c.*, which, having the accent on the first syllable, ought to be written *worshipping, counselling*. An ignorance of this rule has led many to write *bigotted, for bigoted*, and from this spelling has frequently arisen a false pronunciation. But no letter seems to be more frequently doubled improperly than *l*. Why we should write *libelling, lelling, relling*, and yet *offering, suffering, reasoning*, I am totally at a loss to determine, and unless I can give a better plea than any other letter of the alphabet for being doubled in this situation, I must, in the style of Lucian, in his trial of the letter *T*, declare for an expulsion." These were the deliberate and latest opinions of Walker. If he had taken the trouble to carry them into his vocabulary, instead of relying on a mere remark of this kind for the correction of the error,—if he had simply stated, under about forty verbs, how

Fosbroke has been frequently consulted in the recent Dictionary of Smith (1816) the elaborate work of Coleman (1816) has been collated throughout, with reference also of the Roman Catholic and of Landley and Loudon. In natural history Naturalist's Library (1834-43), have Penny Cyclopaedia and similar works. Humble's Dictionary of terms in the respect to mercantile subjects, banking has been collated at every step, as the Dictionary of Manufactures, Arts, and authority. In engineering and mechanics have been carefully collated, with a constant reference to Buchanan, in the editions of 1816. In the Text-Book (1841), has been taken as a guide in connection with the more extended article. In the fine arts, much use has been made of Webster and Parkes on this subject (1841) presented for the first time in a scientific form (1816), as exhibiting much collateral information, are the authorities which have been referred to.

But it is obviously impossible for any one to embrace with accuracy all the various departments of knowledge which are now brought within the compass of a dictionary. Hence arise most of the errors and inconsistencies which abound in works of this kind. To avoid this, as far as possible, especially in matters of science, the Editor at first made an arrangement with Dr. JAMES G. PRATT, who had rendered important assistance to Dr. Webster in the edition of 1828, to take the entire charge of revising the scientific articles embraced in this work. This revision, however, owing to causes beyond the control of either party, was extended to but little more than two letters of the alphabet; and the Editor then obtained the assistance of his associates in office, and of other gentlemen in various professional employments. To these he would now return his acknowledgments for the aid they have afforded. The articles on law have been collated with Blackstone, and with Bouvier's Law Dictionary, by the Hon. ELIZABH GOODRICH, formerly Professor of Law in Yale College; and the errors discovered, which were few in number, have been carefully corrected. The departments of ecclesiastical history and ancient philosophy have been thoroughly revised by the Rev. JAMES MURDOCK, D. D., late Professor in the Andover Theological Seminary, who has furnished, in many instances, new and valuable definitions. The terms in chemistry have been submitted to Professor SILLIMAN, of Yale College; and whatever changes were requisite in the explanations have been made under his direction. In the departments of botany, anatomy, physiology, medicine, and some branches of natural history, Dr. Webster received assistance, in the revision of 1840, as mentioned above, from Dr. WILLIAM TULLY, late Professor in the Medical School of Yale College. Still further aid has been received from the same source in the present revision, and the accuracy of this work, in these branches, will be found owing to the valuable assistance he has thus

On topics connected with Oriental literature, aid has frequently been obtained from Professor GIBBS, of Yale College. A part of the articles on astronomy, meteorology, and natural philosophy, in the edition of 1828, were revised by Professor OLNEY, of Yale College. This revision has now been extended to all the subjects throughout the work, and new definitions have been furnished in numerous instances. The mathematics, after having been compared with those given in the Dictionaries of Hutton and of Barlow, were submitted to Professor STANLEY, of Yale College, and the alterations have, in all cases, been made under his supervision. The sciences of geology and mineralogy, a thorough revision of the whole volume has been made by Mr. W. E. G. Geologist and Mineralogist of the United States Exploring Expedition, and associate editor of the Journal of Science and Arts, to whom the Editor is likewise indebted for assistance on various other points. The greatly enhanced the value of the work. In practical astronomy, and the science of entomology, aid has been received from EDWARD C. HILBURN, Esq., Librarian of Yale College. The articles on painting have, to a great extent, passed under the inspection of NATHANIEL JOCELYN, Esq., Painter, of New York. The definitions have in many cases been furnished.

as likewise been carried on with literary friends in England, and especially with one of the Editors of the *Cyclopaedia*, with a view to obtain information on certain points, in respect to which nothing was to be ascertained by any books within the reach of the Editor. Extended lists of words have been transmitted, and returned with ample notes and explanations. Much obscurity has thus been removed in the English language, which have a peculiar sense in England, especially some of frequent occurrence at the present time, and in the familiar intercourse of life. To the friends who have given their assistance, the Editor would return his cordial thanks. Whatever improvement the work may hereafter be found to require, in respect to clearness, accuracy, and fullness of definition, will be found owing to the assistance which they have thus afforded.

In the course of new words, the Editor has felt much hesitation and embarrassment. Some thousands of new words have been introduced into this revision, and the number might have been swelled to many thousands more, had it not been for the scrupulousness and caution which have been observed. There is, at the present day, especially in England, a boldness of innovation in the use of words, and a hasty introduction into our dictionaries, of new terms, under the name of improvements. Our vocabulary is already encumbered with a multitude of words, many of which are of English literature; and it is a serious evil to add to their number.

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the participle should be spelt (for he did not give participles in his Dictionary), and had altered six or eight words, as *worshipper* into *worshiper*, *traveller* into *traveler*, &c., the error would probably, by this time, have been wholly eradicated from our orthography, and Dr. Webster would have escaped much ignorant vituperation for following in the footsteps of Walker and of Lowth. Walker also says in his Aphorisms, "Why should we not write *dullness*, *fullness*, *skillful*, *vulful*, as well as *stiffness* and *gruffness*?" The principles of our language plainly require us to do so; and Dr. Webster felt that the change might easily be made. The words which need to be reduced to this analogy are only about eight in number, including *installment* and *inthrallment*, which, if spelt with a single *l*, are liable to be mispronounced *instalment*, &c. Again, the words *expense*, *license*, *recompense*, which formerly had a *c* in the last syllable, have now taken an *s*, because the latter consonant is the only one used in the derivatives; as, *expensive*, &c. A similar change is needed in only three words more to complete the analogy, namely, *defense*, *offense*, and *pretense*; and these Dr. Webster has changed. It is sometimes asked, "Why not change *fence* also?" For the simple reason, that its derivatives are spelt with a *c*, as *fenced*, *fencing*; and the word, therefore, stands regularly with others of its own class. Finally, Dr. Webster proposes to drop the *u* in *mould* and *moult*, because it has been dropped from *gold*, and all other words of the same ending. Such are the principal changes, under this head, introduced by Dr. Webster into his Dictionary. In the present edition, the words are spelt in both ways, for the convenience of the public, except in cases where this seemed to be unnecessary, or was found to be inconvenient. These changes, considering the difficulty that always belongs to such a subject, have met with far more favor from the public than was reasonably to be expected. Most of them have been extensively adopted in our country. They are gaining ground daily, as the reasons by which they are supported are more generally understood; and it is confidently believed that, being founded in established analogies, and intended merely to repress irregularities and remove petty exceptions, they must ultimately prevail.

The other class of changes mentioned above rests on a different basis—that of *Etymology*. These will be estimated very differently, according to the acquaintance of different persons with the languages from which the words are derived. When Dr. Webster substituted *bridegroom* for *bridegoom*, *feather* for *feather*, &c., the German critics highly applauded the change. They predicted its speedy and universal reception, because similar improvements, on a much broader scale, had been easily made in their language. But Dr. Webster found the case to be widely different among us. After an experiment of twelve years, he restored the old orthography to a considerable number of such words. In the present edition, it is restored in respect to nearly all that remain, from the full conviction, that, however desirable these changes may be, in themselves considered, as they do not relate to the general analogies of the language, and can not be duly appreciated by the body of the people, they will never be generally received.

On the subject of *Pronunciation*, much labor has been bestowed in the progress of this revision. A careful comparison has been made with the latest authorities, and wherever changes seemed desirable, and could be made in consistency with the Author's principles, they have been here introduced. The Key to Pronunciation has been somewhat enlarged, and placed at the bottom of each page, for greater ease of reference, and the pointed letters have been used to a still greater extent. Many thousand words have been re-spelled, and no efforts have been spared to render the work, in all respects, a complete *Pronouncing Dictionary*. In the progress of these labors, the Editor has been frequently struck with the wisdom of Dr. Webster, in not attempting too much as to marking the pronunciation. Most of the later orthoëpists, as Knowles, Smart, &c., have made their system of notation so extensive and complicated, and have aimed to exhibit so many nice shades of distinction, as in many cases to perplex, rather than aid.

The Publishers, being desirous to make this, in all respects, a complete work of reference, have introduced, at the close of the volume, a list of Greek and Latin Proper Names, with their pronunciation, prepared by Professor THACHER, of Yale College; a list of Scripture Proper Names, prepared by Professor PORTER, of Yale College; and a *Pronouncing Vocabulary of Modern Geographical Names*, prepared also under the superintendence of Professor PORTER. Of these a full account will be found in the several prefaces by which they are accompanied.

In conclusion, the Editor would acknowledge his obligations to the gentlemen who have aided him for more than two years in these labors—MR. SAMUEL W. BARNEY, M. A., of Yale College, and WILLIAM G. WEBSTER, Esq., of New Haven. The intimate acquaintance of the latter with his father's views has made his counsel and co-operation of great value in the progress of this revision.

To the overseers of the mechanical execution of this work, at the BOSTON TYPE AND STEREOTYPE FOUNDRY, the Editor would likewise make his acknowledgments, for many valuable suggestions, during the progress of the revision, and for the watchful care and assiduity with which they have performed the difficult task of giving accuracy to the details of this volume.

NEW HAVEN. September, 1847.

NOTE.—Among the
five and six thousand
a period of forty
added to a small
and Proprietors.

AUTHOR'S PREFACE TO THE EDITION OF 1828.

In the year 1783, just at the close of our vernacular tongue, and for our people of this country soon after the

I considered such a work as very desirable, ting my time to other occupations for obtaining subsistence

About thirty five years ago, I began to think of attempting the compilation of a Dictionary. I was induced to this undertaking, not more from reading modern books of for explaining many new this defect in part, I published a larger work

My original design did not extend to an investigation of the origin and progress of our language, much less of other languages. I limited my views to the correcting of certain errors in the best English dictionaries, and to the supplying of words in which they are deficient. But after writing through two letters of the alphabet, I determined to change my plan. I found myself embarrassed, at every step, for want of a knowledge of the origin of words, which JOHNSON, BAILLY, JUNIUS, SKINNER, and some other authors, do not afford the means of obtaining. Then, laying except lexicons and dictionaries, I endeavored, by a diligent letters, in about twenty languages, to obtain a more correct affinities between the English and many other languages,

that crude

Language me constructed

years before I discovered that I had to unlearn a great deal from the first rudiments of a branch of

principal Words in twenty been to open what are to which these languages are

After completing this *Synopsis*, I proceeded to correct what I had written of the Dictionary, and to complete the remaining part of the work. But before I had finished it, I determined on a voyage to Europe, with the view of obtaining some books and some assistance which I wanted, of learning the real state of the pronunciation of our language in England, as well as the general state of philology in that country, and of attempting to bring about some agreement or coincidence of opinions in regard to unsettled points in pronunciation and grammatical construction. In some of these objects, I failed, in others, my designs were answered

It is not only important, but in a degree necessary, that the people of this country should have an *American*

England, and it is of ideas; and if language. Now, of the two countries found. I can find of all others of hatching and ed, and some of

which now form, a necessary part of the language of this country, are no part of our present language, and they can not be, for the things which they express do not exist in this country. They can be known to us only as obsolete or as foreign words. On the other hand, the institutions and applications of old terms, unknown to the

of these words of be inserted in their dictionary and, consecration of church property, assembly, escheat, &c. are in this country which do not exist the words congress, senate, &c. introduced in this country to express government, escheat &c.

of our civil institutions, even when the words express the same thing

English dictionaries inform us that a *justice* is one deputed by the king to do right by way of judgment; he is a *lord* by his office; justices of the peace are appointed to this office in the United States. So inaccurate in respect to this officer in the United States. So t in this country the distinction between *constitution* and *law* plantation is a very application unknown

quire to be defined in a phraseology accommodated to the condition the people of England must look to an *American Dictionary* for a

d to the people of the United States is obvious; and I should suppose no difference of opinion as to the *time* when such a work ought to

which serve to justify this attempt to furnish an American
 'es. Most of these are too obvious to require illustration.
 n feelings, but which, I trust, will meet with approbation
 be passed in silence. It is this: "The chief glory of a
 this opinion deeply impressed on my mind, I have the
 pressed a wish to give celebrity to BACON, to HOOKER, to

same ambition which actuated that great man when he expressed a wish to give celebrity to BACON, to HOOKER, to MILTON, and to BOYLE.

I do not, indeed, expect to add celebrators, RAMSAY, DWIGHT, SMITH, TRUMBULL, WALSH, LEVING, and many others, to the list of those who will be proud and satisfied that I can place the DRYDEN, ADDISON, RAY, MILNER, COWTER, DAYV, THOMSON, and JAMESON.

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 style and
 with confi-
 by the best
 embellishments
 ASHINGTON.

AMES; of Dr. MASON; of Mr. HARPER; of Chancellor KENT; [the prose] of Mr. BARLOW; of Dr. CHANNING; of Washington IRVING; of the legal decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States; of the reports of legal decisions, or kind.

The United States consists of a vast territory, and a population of more than twenty millions of people. They are a young nation, and with that best gift of God to man, the Christian religion. Their population is now equal to that of England; in arts and sciences, our citizens are very little behind the most enlightened people on earth—in some respects they have no superiors; and our language, within two centuries, will be spoken by more people in this country than any other.

means would enable me to - - - - -

safety across the Atlar
tribute of my most gr
the most profitable use
of it may be graciously forgiven.

MEMOIR OF NOAH WEBSTER.

BY CHAUNCEY A. GOODRICH, D. D.

respectable farmer and justice of the peace in the fourth generation, of John Webster, on who was a magistrate, or member of formation, and, at a subsequent period, his mother was a descendant of William Bradford, the second governor of the Plymouth colony. When he was a young man, he undertook an employment which gave a complexion to his life. He was the compiler of the first American dictionary, and he lived considerably in his eightieth and the

encouraged by the prospect of increasing the daughter of William Greenleaf, cultivated intellect, and of great elo-

the United States. Though conscious of the sacrifice of personal ease which he was called

term of copyright, and thus give a more ample reward to the labors of our artists and literary men. In the year 1800, Mr. Webster published, in the year

his pen in recommending the new system of government to the people. accordingly wrote a pamphlet on this subject, and published it under the title of *The Leading*.

In 1788, M and for one failed of sue gentlemen in a similar undertaking. The country was not yet prepared for | arose, among the physicians of Philadelphia and New York, on the ques-

In 1797, when the adoption of the Ford in the practice with a number of devoted, like himself

the two classmates, Barlow and Wolcott; Trumbull, author of *McFingal*; | ured as a valuable repository of facts; and during the prevalence of the

and mainly east of thought, a simplicity of taste, a directness of state- | produced various discussions respecting the rights of neutral nations in

time of war. Though never once induced Mr. Webster to examine the subject, he said, in 1802, he published a treatise full of minute information and a reasoning on the subject. A gentleman of competent attainments, who was called to read said that he could end on that subject in the English, French, German, and five or six languages, declared that he could produce a treatise as good as he had seen. The same year, he also published *A General View of the Origin and State of Banking Institutions and Intermixture of them* which was well received in Philadelphia by one of the first men of that place, and a part of which, taken from this report, was incorporated in the Philadelphia edition of *Recess* developed.

At the same time Mr. Webster resided at New Haven, to which place he had removed in the spring of 1804. For a short period after his departure from New York he wrote for the papers mentioned above, which, although placed under the care of another editor, continued for a time to be his property. He soon soon succeeded, however, in disposing of his interest in them, and from that time devoted himself entirely to literary pursuits.

In the year 1807, Mr. Webster published *A Philosophical and Practical Grammar of the English Language*. This was a highly original work, the result of many years of diligent investigation. The author's views may be gathered from the motto on the title page, taken from Lord Bacon's *Apophthegms*—"Antitheses being asked what learning was most necessary replied, 'To discern that which is sought.'" He considered our English Grammar as objectionable in one important respect, namely, that of being too much conformed to those of the Latin and Greek languages in their nomenclature and classification. True philosophy, he maintained, requires us to arrange things, and give them names, according to their real nature. In our language is rude and irregular, in comparison with those of the ancients. It can not be reduced to the same orderly system. The several parts of it can not be brought under the same names and classifications. We need, therefore, a nomenclature of our own in some important particulars. Thus the word *pronoun* properly denotes a *substitute* for a *noun*. But, in many cases, words of this class are substitutes for clauses or parts of sentences, and not for single nouns. There are also other words, not ordinarily ranged among pronouns, which act equally as substitutes, that is, perform the office of pronouns. Mr. Webster, therefore proposed to lay aside the word *pronoun*, and apply the term *substitute* to this whole class, as describing their true office. Other changes were proposed of the same nature, and for the same reasons. No one, who examines the subject with attention, can doubt the advantages of Mr. Webster's nomenclature, in itself considered. It enabled him to give an analysis of sentences, and to explain constructions, in a manner incomparably superior to that of the ordinary systems. His intimate acquaintance with the sources of our language prepared him to account, in the most satisfactory manner, for many puzzling forms of expression. Still, the prejudice against a change of nomenclature is so great, that this work has been far less known than it ought to be. It contains much valuable matter found in no other work, and is believed to be the most truly philosophical Grammar which we have of the English language.

After publishing his Grammar, Mr. Webster entered, in the same year (1807), on the great work of his life, which he had contemplated for a long period—that of preparing a new and complete Dictionary of the English language. As preliminary to this, he had published, in 1806, a dictionary in the octavo form, containing a large number of words not to be found in any similar work, with the definitions corrected throughout, though necessarily expressed in very brief terms. From this time, his reading was turned more or less directly to this object. A number of years were spent in collecting words which had not been introduced into the English dictionary; in discriminating with exactness the various senses of all the words in our language, and adding those significations which they had recently received. Some estimate may be formed of the labor bestowed on this part of the work, from the fact that *The American Dictionary of the English Language* contained, in the first edition, twelve thousand words, and between thirty and forty thousand definitions, which are not to be found in any preceding work. The number has been swelled, by subsequent additions, to about thirty thousand new words. Seventy years had elapsed since the first publication of Johnson's Dictionary; and scarcely a single improvement had been attempted in the various editions through which it had passed, or the numerous completions to which it had given rise, except by the addition of a few words to the vocabulary. Yet in this period the English mind was putting itself forth in every direction, with an acuteness of research and a fertility of invention which are without a parallel in any other stage of its history. A complete revolution had taken place in almost every branch of physical science; new departments had been created, new principles developed, new modes of classification and description adopted. The political changes which so signally marked that period,

the excitement of feeling and conduct of opinion resulting from the American and French revolutions, and the numerous modifications which followed in the institutions of society, had also left a deep impress on the language of politics, law, and general literature. Under these circumstances, to make a defining dictionary adapted to the present state of our language, was to produce an entirely new work; and how well Mr. Webster executed the task, will appear from the decision of men best qualified to judge, both in this country and in Europe, who have declared that his improvements upon Johnson are even greater than Johnson himself made on those who preceded him. Still more labor, however, was bestowed on another part of the work, viz., the etymology of our leading terms. In this subject, Mr. Webster had always felt a lively interest, as presenting one of the most curious exhibitions of the progress of the human mind. But it was not till he had advanced considerably in the work as originally commenced, that he found how indispensable a knowledge of the true derivation of words is to an exact development of their various meanings. At this point, therefore, he suspended his labors on the defining part of the Dictionary, and devoted a number of years to an inquiry into the origin of our language, and its connection with those of other countries. In the course of these researches, he examined the vocabularies of twenty of the principal languages of the world, and made a synopsis of the most important words in each, arranging them under the same radical letters, with a translation of their significations, and references from one to another, when the senses are the same or similar. He was thus enabled to discover the real or probable affinities between the different languages, and, in many instances, to discover the primary, physical idea of an original word, from which the secondary senses have branched forth. Being thus furnished with a clue to guide him among the numerous, and often apparently inconsistent, significations of our most important words, he resumed his labors on the defining part of the Dictionary, and was able to give order and consistency to much that had before appeared confused and contradictory. The results of his inquiries into the origin and relation of languages were embodied in a work, about half the size of the American Dictionary, entitled *A Synopsis of Words in Twenty Languages*. This, owing to the expense of the undertaking, has not yet been published, though its principal results, so far as our language is concerned, are briefly given in tracing the etymology of our leading terms.

During the progress of these labors, Mr. Webster, finding his resources inadequate to the support of his family at New Haven, removed, in 1812, to Amherst, a pleasant country town within eight miles of Northampton, Massachusetts. Here he entered, with his characteristic ardor, into the literary and social interests of the people among whom he was placed. His extensive library, which was open to all, and his elevated tone of thought and conversation, had naturally a powerful influence on the habits and feelings of a small and secluded population. It was owing, in part, probably, to his removal to this town, that an academy was there established, which is now among the most flourishing seminaries of our land. A question having soon after arisen respecting the removal of Williams College from a remote part of the state to some more central position, Mr. Webster entered warmly into the design of procuring its establishment at Amherst, as one of the most beautiful and appropriate locations in New England. Though the removal did not take place, so strong an interest on the subject was awakened in Amherst and the neighboring towns, that a new college was soon after founded there, in the establishment of which Mr. Webster, as president of its first board of trustees, had great influence, which he had given to the cause of education in that part of the state.

In 1822, Mr. Webster returned with his family to New Haven, and, in 1823, received the degree of LL.D. from Yale College. Having nearly completed his Dictionary, he resolved on a voyage to Europe, with a view to perfect the work by consulting literary men abroad, and by examining some standard authors to which he could not gain access in this country. He accordingly sailed for France in June, 1824, and spent two months at Paris in consulting several rare works in the *Bibliothèque du Roi*, and then went to England, where he remained till May, 1825. He spent about eight months at the University of Cambridge, where he had free access to the public libraries, and there he finished *THE AMERICAN DICTIONARY*. He afterward visited London, Oxford, and some of the other principal cities of England, and in June returned to his country. This visit to England gave him an opportunity to become acquainted with literary men and literary institutions in that country, and to learn the real state of the English language there.

Soon after Mr. Webster returned to this country, the necessary arrangements were made for the publication of the work. An edition of twenty five hundred copies was printed in this country, at the close of 1825, which was followed by an edition of three thousand in England, under the superin-

MEMOIR OF NOAH WEBSTER.

corresponding passages in other works, until his whole library *Index Herum*, to which he could refer at once for every

which resulted in part from his early pursuits, was that of various and diversified employments at the same time

foreign terms used in books of music.

To men of the present generation, Dr. Webster is known chiefly as

perature of the winter season, in northern latitudes, has suffered a material the interests of the town and county where he lived, its schools and

much fullness and accuracy. In addition to this, the volume contains of topics than perhaps any other author of the United States;—on

on terms of constant and confidential intercourse with the leading members of the cabinet, and the prominent supporters of the country. While he had their respect as a

Energy, self-reliance, fearlessness, the respect he thought right and useful, the strong hope became the great elements of his intellectual

As he was recollection for the immense mass of materials which a publication for original investigation prevented him from building, like Todd, on

for
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mu
of

general religious interest at New Haven, under the ministry of the Rev. Moses Stuart, now a professor in the Andover Theological Seminary. To this Dr. Webster's attention was first directed by observing an unusual

became necessary to inform him that he was in imminent danger. He received the communication with surprise, but with entire composure. His health had been so good, and every bodily function so perfect in

truth in his own experience. He felt that salvation must be wholly of grace. diately; and the interview brought into affecting comparison the beginning

of his death. He made a report then about life, and marriage even in his advanced years, with a light

In his religious feelings, Dr. Webster was remarkably equable and cheerful. He had a very strong sense of the providence of God, as extending to the minutest concerns of life. In this he found a source of continual sup- is married to the Hon. William W. Ellsworth, of Hartford, late governor,

were ended, and that little else remained but to prepare for death. With a the family of her brother.

those precepts of

A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE.

By JAMES HADLEY, LL. D.

PROFESSOR OF THE GREEK LANGUAGE AND LITERATURE IN YALE COLLEGE.

Personal. From this last distinction is to a great extent lost in modern English. § 26 Works of Poetry and Prose Among the longer Anglo-Saxon

modern English to the second thus O Eng *shajc* (pf of *shape*) now *shajc*! O Eng *glode* (pf of *glide*) now *glidol* O Eng *gnao* (pf of *gnaw*) now *gnawed*. The result of these changes is that in modern English the verbs of the first class when compared with those of the second have the appearance of anomalous and capricious exceptions to a general law of inflection.

INFLUENCE OF OTHER LANGUAGES ON THE ANGLO-SAXON

§ 27 The Celtic The Saxons and Angles, when they entered Britain,

ord onstowe
The great, great
ord on bonum
heaven to *hröfe*,
hail scyppend
thā middangeard
monymnes weard
ðe dryhten
After teode
firum foldan
frea blumtig

ord red the origin
He created
for earth a children
Heaven as a high roof
the holy creator
then this mid world
did span a great guardian
the ever living lord
afterward prepare,
for men & man on
the most & almighty

gle *lad* *dun* (color) etc. — in which an early borrowing from the Welsh is

GENERAL FEATURES OF THE TEUTONIC LANGUAGES, PARTICULARLY THE ANGLO-SAXON.

remaining four cases, the nominative, accusative, dative, and genitive, are common to all the older Teutonic languages, and are still distinguished in the modern German. The English distinguishes nominative and accusative only in

unchanged, — but other cases still appear as anomalous. Yet the general validity of the rules admits of no doubt. Illustrations —

Greek	Latin	Gothic			
φράτης	frater	broðar	brother	pruodar	bruder
θύρα	foras	daur	door	tür	
χίς (for χίς-ε)	anser (for anser)		goose		
δύο	duo	twai	two	zwei	
γένος	genus	kuni	kin	chunni	
πούς (for πο-ς) pes (for ped-)		fotus	foot	fuoz	
τρεῖς	tres	threis	three	dri	drei
καρδία	cor (d)	harts	heart	herza	herz
καννάβις	cannabis	kemp	kemp	hanaf	hanf
στάνω	sta re	standan	stand	sta ndan	steh en

definite article, or with a demonstrative or possessive pronoun, the adjective

genitive *thia gōdan naman*, dative *tham gōdan naman*. This distinction of the

§ 20. Voices. The Teutonic verb, when compared with the Indo-European, shows extensive losses. It has but one voice, the active, having given up the middle (or reflexive) voice, and the passive. In the Gothic, indeed, we still find the ancient middle, formed as in the Greek, and used generally in a passive

§ 18. Numbers. The Indo-European inflection distinguished three numbers: reflexive

modern English to the second: thus O Eng. *shyrc* (pf of *shape*), now *shape* is
 O Eng. *glæde* (pf of *glæde*, now *gladed*) O Eng. *gnaue* (pf of *gnaue*), now *granted*.
 The result of these changes is that in modern English the verbs of the first
 class when compared with those of the second have the appearance of anomalous
 and capricious exceptions to a general law of inflection.

INFLUENCE OF OTHER LANGUAGES ON THE ANGLO-SAXON

§27 The Celtic The Saxons and Angles when they entered Britain

tion

And we sceolon ðe rian
 heofon rice weard
 metodes ealre
 and he ðe mid geþene
 sceore ealdr eider
 swa he wundra gehwils
 feoðeð ten
 ord onstealde
 He ærest geacp
 eorðan bearnum
 heofon to hrofe
 Miltig sceppend
 þa middangeard
 moncyne weard
 feoðeð ten
 sifer twode
 firon foldan
 fira blimtig

Now thoust we glorify
 the guardian of heaven a kingdom
 the maker a might
 and his mind a thought
 the work of the worshiped father
 we can of his wonders each one,
 the ever living lord
 ordred the origin
 He erst created
 for earth a children
 heaven as a high roof
 the holy creator
 then this mid world
 did man a great guardian
 the ever living lord
 afterward prepare
 for men a mansion
 the master almighty

<i>Lat.</i>	<i>diabolus</i>	<i>A.S.</i>	<i>diȝol</i>	<i>Eng.</i>	<i>devil</i>
	<i>presbyter</i>		<i>preȝost</i>		<i>priest</i>
	<i>episcopus</i>		<i>læceop</i>		<i>bishop</i>
	<i>monasterium</i>		<i>mynster</i>		<i>ministry</i>
	<i>clericus</i>		<i>cleric</i>		<i>clerk</i>
	<i>prædicare</i>		<i>predican</i>		<i>preach</i>
<i>Gr.</i>	<i>ἐκκλησία, or</i>		<i>kyrko</i>		<i>church</i>
	<i>ἐκκλησία</i>				<i>(kirk, Scotch)</i>
	<i>ἐκκλησία</i>		<i>kyrko</i>		<i>kirk</i>
			<i>kyrko</i>		<i>kirk</i>

clergy, the army, were all Norman. The Anglo-Saxon language was banished from these circles, and the French took its place. The instruction of the schools was given in French alone. There was nothing to stimulate, there was every thing to discourage, the cultivation of the native language.

TRANSITION FROM ANGLO-SAXON TO MODERN ENGLISH.

be to impossible, etc. A judicious revision, with further alterations of anti-j pages, we shall obtain very different ratios. The Saxon words will now be

as to fix (put in order), to guess (think, believe), creep (small river), etc. Some words which once belonged to the common language, but have become obsolete (e.g. *hundred* was still used in the 14th century, e.g. "the hundred of London" was still used in the 15th century).

The following brief sketch of Anglo-Saxon inflection is founded on Moritz Heyne's *Aurea Lani* and *Flurondehre der algermanischen Sprachkunde*, Paderborn, 1902. The outlines of early English inflection are founded on Eduard Fiedler's *Wissenschaftliche Grammatik der englischen Sprache*, Leipzig, 1890.

nest, taken, plus *idenn*; so, also, some others, as *Arfof*, neut., dead, plur. *hofsia*.

§ 61. Masculines and neutrals of one syllable which have the vowel *i*, take *e* instead of *i* in the plural, as *dag*, mase., day, plur. *dagas*; *fil*, neut., vessel.

ANGLO-SAXON INFLECTION.

§ 52. The Anglo-Saxon had seven long vowels, *a, ā, i, ī, ē, ē, ō, ō*. The first five appear to have been sounded as in Eng. *par, prey, caprice, prone, prone* as was probably sounded much like *Lang* as in *fair*. The sound of *ū* apparently, like that of French *u*, corresponded to long *u* in other words, as *hyrde*, shepherd, *ri*, thousand, was often, *ri, ri*.

§ 53. The combinations *en* and *on* are often used for original short vowels, as for *a, o*, for *i, u*, as *beald* for *bold*, *seofor* for *seven*, *silfor*. When they have

sound in Eng. *this breathe*. By a general rule—which some editors make invariable—*þ* is used when the aspirate begins a word, *ð* when it has any other position. In giving Anglo-Saxon words, we shall write *th* for *þ* and *dh* for *ð*.

§ 54. The Anglo-Saxon never uses *p* as a consonant, but, apparently, *g*, and even *þ* alone, were sometimes used to express that sound, as *gwor*, yoke, *gilt*,

same way, but also with *gen* *slig, wuder*, nom. acc. plur. *wudras*. The dat. *slig*, in *a* is seen also in *masse* *winter*, *winter*, *summer*, *summer*, *feld*, *feld*, *fjord*, *fjord*.

DECLENSION.

§ 61. Paradigms *masc. oza* (stem *ozan*), *ox*, f.m. (neut. *stern* *fungan*), tongue, neut. *edga* (stem *edgan*), eye.

	Masc.	Fem.	Neut.
Sing.	Nom. <i>ozan</i>	<i>funga</i>	<i>edga</i>
	Gen. <i>ozan</i>	<i>fungan</i>	<i>edgan</i>
	Dat. <i>ozan</i>	<i>fungan</i>	<i>edga</i>
	Acc. <i>ozan</i>	<i>fungan</i>	<i>edga</i>
Plur.	Nom. <i>ozan</i>	<i>fungas</i>	<i>edgas</i>

§ 57. Masculines. *i* shepherd.

	Sing.	Plur.	Sing.	Plur.
Nom.	<i>fiac</i>	<i>fiacas</i>	<i>hirda</i>	<i>hirdas</i>
Gen.	<i>fiaca</i>	<i>fiaca</i>	<i>hirda</i>	<i>hirdas</i>
Dat.	<i>fiaca</i>	<i>fiacum</i>	<i>hirda</i>	<i>hirdum</i>
Acc.	<i>fiac</i>	<i>fiacas</i>	<i>hirda</i>	<i>hirdas</i>

§ 58. Feminines. Paradigms *gifu* (stem *gifu*), gift; *deaf* (stem *deaf*), deaf.

	Sing.	Plur.	Sing.	Plur.
Nom.	<i>gifu</i>	<i>gifu</i>	<i>deaf</i>	<i>deafas</i>
Gen.	<i>gifu</i>	<i>gifu</i>	<i>deaf</i>	<i>deafas</i>
Dat.	<i>gifu</i>	<i>gifu</i>	<i>deaf</i>	<i>deafum</i>
Acc.	<i>gifu</i>	<i>gifu</i>	<i>deaf</i>	<i>deafas</i>

§ 59. Neuters. Paradigms *scip* (stem *scip*), ship; *rice* (stem *rice*), kingdom.

	Sing.	Plur.	Sing.	Plur.
Nom.	<i>scip</i>	<i>scipa</i>	<i>rice</i>	<i>ricea</i>
Gen.	<i>scipa</i>	<i>scipa</i>	<i>rice</i>	<i>ricea</i>
Dat.	<i>scipa</i>	<i>scipum</i>	<i>rice</i>	<i>riceum</i>
Acc.	<i>scip</i>	<i>scipa</i>	<i>rice</i>	<i>ricea</i>

ADJECTIVES.

§ 62. Indefinite Declension. Paradigms *blind*, blind.

	Masc.	Fem.	Neut.	Plur.
Sing.	Nom. <i>blind</i>	<i>blind</i>	<i>blind</i>	<i>blinde</i>
	Gen. <i>blinde</i>	<i>blinde</i>	<i>blinde</i>	<i>blinde</i>
	Dat. <i>blindum</i>	<i>blindum</i>	<i>blindum</i>	<i>blindum</i>
	Acc. <i>blindas</i>	<i>blinde</i>	<i>blindas</i>	<i>blindas</i>
Plur.	<i>blindas</i>	<i>blinde</i>	<i>blindas</i>	<i>blindas</i>

§ 60. Words of more than one syllable which end in *st, m, r, or, ar* are often syncope before *g* case-ending, as *calder*, mase., rider, gen. *calderes*; *liden*, plur.

§ 70. The following peculiarities extend also to the definite declension. Adjectives of one syllable, which end in a single consonant preceded by *d*, take *a*,

.....

... ..

invariable—*p* is used when the aspirate begins a word, *þ* when it has any other position. In giving Anglo-Saxon words, we shall write *th* for *p* and *dh* for *þ*.

[illegible]

செயல்	பெயர்	பெயர்	பெயர்
செயல்	பெயர்	பெயர்	பெயர்
செயல்	பெயர்	பெயர்	பெயர்
செயல்	பெயர்	பெயர்	பெயர்

shepherd

	Slag	Plur	Slag	Plur
Nom	<i>flac</i>	<i>flacos</i>	<i>hirda</i>	<i>hirdas</i>
Gen	<i>flaces</i>	<i>flaca</i>	<i>hirdes</i>	<i>hirda</i>
Dat.	<i>flae</i>	<i>flacum</i>	<i>hirda</i>	<i>hirdin</i>
Acc.	<i>flac</i>	<i>flacos</i>	<i>hirda</i>	<i>hirdas</i>

§ 67. The fem *nicht*, *nicht*, and *wahr* or *wahr*, creature, thing, make the acc. sing and nom. acc. plur. like the nom. sing. Feminine abstracts in o or u = as *glück*, old age = are indeclinable in the sing.; and so are fem. *Ges.*, *Law*, *ed.*, *water* (*com.* sometimes *sas*, *eds*). nom. acc. plur. *acc.*, *ens.*, *dät sam.*, *com.*

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	Eng.	Fiar.	Eng.	Fiar.
Nom.	gŭt	gŭs	dad	dada
Gen.	gŭs	gŭsŭr	dadŭ	dadaŭ
Det.	gŭt	gŭŭm	dado	dadum
Acc.	gŭt	gŭs	dadŭ or dadŭ	dadam

442504

King.	Thur	King.	Thur
Nom. scip	scipus	rice	ricus
Gen. scipus	scipus	rices	ricus
Dat. scips	scipum	rice	ricum
Acc. scip	scipus	rice	ricum

§ 88. Indefinite Declension. Paradigm - blind, blind.

§ 88. Indefinite Declension. Paradigm - blind, blind.

Sing.	Male.	Fe m	Neut	Plur
Nom	<i>blind</i>	<i>blind</i>	<i>blind</i>	<i>blinde</i>
Gr.	<i>blinder</i>	<i>blinder</i>	<i>blinder</i>	<i>blinder</i>
Vt	<i>blindens</i>	<i>blindre</i>	<i>blindens</i>	<i>blindens</i>
Acc	<i>blindne</i>	<i>blindre</i>	<i>blindr</i>	<i>blinde</i>
In	<i>blinde</i>	<i>blindre</i>	<i>blinde</i>	<i>blindum</i>

place

§ 70. The following peculiarities extend also to the definite declension. Adjectives of one syllable, which end in a single consonant preceded by *g*, take a

as to *is* (not in order), to *guess* (think, believe), *creek* (small river), etc. Some (pompos display), to *fork over* or *shell out* money, etc. A number of words which once belonged to the common language, but have become obsolete in England, are still heard in America, as *fall* (autumn), *gully* (channel worn by rain), and *institution*. But apart from these, it is not probable that Americanisms, the language of east or slang, as to *absquatulate* (abscond), *upurge* (substantial agreement with the common language of literature).

The following brief sketch of Anglo-Saxon inflection is founded on Moritz Heyne's *Aurze Laut und Flexionslehre der algermanischen Sprachstämme*, Paderborn, 1861. The outlines of early English inflection are founded on Eduard Friedrich's *Wissenschaftliche Grammatik der englischen Sprache*, Leipzig, 1891, with much help from Prof. F. J. Child's *Observations on the Language*.

old, etc.

§ 53. The combinations *en* and *eo* are often used for original short vowels, as *for a*, *eo* for *e*, as *deaf* for *bold*, *bold*, *scot* for *as* for *alder*. When they have the character of genuine diphthongs, they are written *en*, *eo*, which stand for primitive Tunican *en*, *eo*, respectively.

for §

§ 55. The Anglo-Saxon never uses *y* as a consonant, but, apparently, *ge*, and

N. DECLENSION.

§ 54. Paradigms masc. *ox* (stem *oxan*), *ox*; *fun*. (*fung* (stem *funan*), tongue, neut. *eng* (stem *engan*), eye.

	Masc.	Fem.	Neut.
Sing.	<i>ox</i>	<i>fung</i>	<i>eng</i>
Nom.	<i>oxa</i>	<i>engan</i>	<i>enga</i>
Gen.	<i>oxan</i>	<i>funan</i>	<i>engan</i>
Dat.	<i>oxan</i>	<i>funan</i>	<i>engan</i>
Acc.	<i>oxan</i>	<i>funan</i>	<i>enga</i>

§ 56. Nom. *oxan*

§ 57. Masculines, the herd.

	Sing.	Plur.	Sing.	Plur.
Nom.	<i>fox</i>	<i>foxas</i>	<i>herd</i>	<i>herdas</i>
Gen.	<i>foxes</i>	<i>foxas</i>	<i>herd</i>	<i>herdas</i>
Dat.	<i>foxe</i>	<i>foxum</i>	<i>herd</i>	<i>herdum</i>
Acc.	<i>fox</i>	<i>foxas</i>	<i>herd</i>	<i>herdas</i>

§ 58. Feminines. Paradigms. *gift* (stem *gifta*), *gift*; *deaf* (stem *daef*), *deaf*.

	Sing.	Plur.	Sing.	Plur.
Nom.	<i>gifta</i>	<i>giftas</i>	<i>daef</i>	<i>daefas</i>
Gen.	<i>gifta</i>	<i>giftum</i>	<i>daef</i>	<i>daefum</i>
Dat.	<i>gifta</i>	<i>giftum</i>	<i>daef</i>	<i>daefum</i>
Acc.	<i>gifta</i>	<i>giftas</i>	<i>daef</i>	<i>daefas</i>

§ 59. Neuters. Paradigms. *scip* (stem *scip*), *ship*; *rice* (stem *rican*), *rice*.

	Sing.	Plur.	Sing.	Plur.
Nom.	<i>scip</i>	<i>scipas</i>	<i>rice</i>	<i>ricas</i>
Gen.	<i>scipes</i>	<i>scipum</i>	<i>rice</i>	<i>ricum</i>
Dat.	<i>scipe</i>	<i>scipum</i>	<i>rice</i>	<i>ricum</i>
Acc.	<i>scip</i>	<i>scipas</i>	<i>rice</i>	<i>ricas</i>

§ 60. Words of more than one syllable which end in *cl*, *en*, or *er*, are often preceded before a case-ending, as *colder*, *masse*, *elder*, *ken* *calder*; *licen*.

place. § 70. The following peculiarities extend also to the definite declension. Adjective of one syllable, which end in a single consonant preceded by *d*, take a

[illegible][illegible]

§ 81. Are Initiators Promoted the day is known or by word the document
sent is or not, that is employee the letter as to the and sometimes calls the
letter to the contrary; as, or the, was the etc

VIII

የገቢት ገቢት	የገቢት ገቢት	የገቢት ገቢት
የገቢት ገቢት	የገቢት ገቢት	የገቢት ገቢት
የገቢት ገቢት	የገቢት ገቢት	የገቢት ገቢት
የገቢት ገቢት	የገቢት ገቢት	የገቢት ገቢት

[illegible]

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115. The Personal Pronouns are declined as follows :—

First Person			Second Person		
Eng	Indl	Plar	Eng	Indl	Plar
Amn	am	are	are	art	are
Amn	am	are	tho	thoe	thoe
Indl	am	are	tho	thoe	thoe
Plar	am	are	tho	thoe	thoe

Third Person				
King	Mane	3 em	Nov	Mar
Queen	Lo	3 em	Nov	Mar
Prince	Lo	3 em	Nov	Mar
Princess	Lo	3 em	Nov	Mar
Prince	Lo	3 em	Nov	Mar
Princess	Lo	3 em	Nov	Mar

Other forms are used (as here) in the acc. dat.; *utro* (as *utro*) in the acc. pl.; *utroque* (as *utro*) in the acc. pl.; *utroque* (as *utroque*) in the gen. pl.; *utroque* (as *utroque*) in the acc. sing. and nom., *utroque* (as *utroque*) in the dat. sing. and pl.; *utroque* (as *utroque*) in the gen. pl.

[illegible]

§ 77 The Demonstrative Pronouns are declined as follows:—
I. *se* and *si* used also as a definite article and as a relative pronoun.

His ₂	His ₂	I m	Neut	Hur
Dom	oe	and	thet	tha
Gen.	thos	thare	thet	thara (thara)
Lat	thom	thare	thom	thom (thom)
Ace	thom	tha	thet	tha
lus			thm tha	

§ 3. Verbs of Primary Inflection (Conjug. etc. These form the perfect without any affix: 1. The personal endings, after the root or stem. Those which bear the vowels *a* or *i* in the perfect show traces of a preterite conjugation and are divided into several classes according to the vowels—*a*, *e*, *i*, *u* in § 2.—which they have in other parts of the verb. In the examples we give 1. The infinitive; 2. The singular of the perfect; 3. The plural of the perfect; and 4. The passive participle.

- 1 Anshun & id anshun anshun bahl
 apansun rulu apansun apansun stretch
 12 Lalan & id lalan lalan bel
 alapan alip al pon alapan alorp
 131 Lalan the throw throw play
 lardun thame, throwun (Arduen, throw
 14 Lalan & id lalan lalan how
 balan bel balon balon best
 15 Lalan & id lalan lalan row
 larpun larp larpun larpun call

Those which do not have *For* in the perfect are likewise divided into several classes according to the vowels—*a* (*For*) before two consonants *a* (*For*) before one consonant *o*, *u*, *ö*—which they have in the singular of the perfect indicative.

- VI *fushin fushon fusden fushn*
dufshn dushf dushon dushn a tre
mushon mushon mushon mushn
lresh orn urshn urshn ursh
 VII *nishon nam nishon nushn tale*
gishn gush gishon gushn gtre
enishon enish enishon enishn knesh
erushn (orn erushn) { omesh emesh
erushn (for erushn) { omesh emesh comesh
 VIII *ashish ashish ashish ashish*
ashish ashish ashish ashish ashish
 IX *breushn breish breushn breishn bresh*
ashish eresh ashish ashish ashish
 X *galash gish galish galish galish*
galash eresh galish galish galish

§ 83 In verbs of primary inflection the vowel *whi* appears in the infinitive, belong, also to the present indicative and subjunctive the imperative and the active participle. The vowel *whiel* appears in the plural of the perfect indicative belongs also to the second person singular and to the whole perfect subjunctive. But in the second and third person singular of the present indicative *u* is changed to *e* *u* to *e* *u* to *ei* of *u* to *ei* and *e* to *e*. It will be enough to say that

isms, the language of cant or slang, as to *obsequatulate* (abscond), *splurge* (substantial agreement with the common language of literature).

sig, 1901, with much help from Prof. F. J. Child's *Observations on the Language of Chaucer* (in *Memoirs of the American Academy*, New Series, Vol. VIII.)

plur. *fatu*.

§ 62. Masculines sometimes have *ena* or *ana*, instead of *a*, in the gen. plur.

alg, eft.

§ 53. The combinations *ea* and *eo* are often used for original short vowels, *ea* for *a*, *eo* for *i*, as *beald* for *bald*, *beold*, *seolfor* for *silfor*, *silver*. When they have the character of genuine diphthongs, they are written *eo*, *eo*, which stand for primitive Teutonic *eu*, *iu*, respectively.

§ 54. The two sounds of the English *th* are represented in Anglo-Saxon by distinct letters, *þ* for the whispered sound in Eng *thin*, *breath*, *ð* for the vocal sound in Eng *this*, *breath*. By a general rule—which some editors make invariable—*þ* is used when the aspirate begins a word, *ð* when it has any other position. In giving Anglo-Saxon words, we shall write *th* for *þ* and *dh* for *ð*.

§ 55. The Anglo-Saxon never uses *y* as a consonant, but, apparently, *ge*, and even *p* alone, were sometimes used to express that sound as in *geþ*, *geþ*.

N DECLENSION.

§ 64. Paradigms masc. *oxa* (stem *oxan*), *ox*, f.m. *tunge* (stem *tungan*), tongue, neut. *enge* (stem *engan*), eye.

	Masc.	Fem.	Neut.
Sing.	<i>oxa</i>	<i>tunge</i>	<i>enge</i>
Gen.	<i>oxan</i>	<i>tungan</i>	<i>engan</i>
Dat.	<i>oxan</i>	<i>tungan</i>	<i>engan</i>
Acc.	<i>oxan</i>	<i>tungan</i>	<i>enge</i>
Plur.	<i>oxan</i>	<i>tunna</i>	<i>engna</i>

	Sing.	Plur.	Sing.	Plur.
Nom.	<i>fisc</i>	<i>fiscas</i>	<i>hirde</i>	<i>hirdas</i>
Gen.	<i>fiscas</i>	<i>fiscas</i>	<i>hirdas</i>	<i>hirdas</i>
Dat.	<i>fiscas</i>	<i>fiscum</i>	<i>hirdas</i>	<i>hirdum</i>
Acc.	<i>fiscas</i>	<i>fiscas</i>	<i>hirdas</i>	<i>hirdas</i>

§ 58. Feminines. Paradigms: *gifu* (stem *gife*), gift; *deaf* (stem *deaf*), deaf.

	Sing.	Plur.	Sing.	Plur.
Nom.	<i>gifu</i>	<i>gifu</i>	<i>deaf</i>	<i>deafas</i>
Gen.	<i>gifu</i>	<i>gifuena</i>	<i>deaf</i>	<i>deafas</i>
Dat.	<i>gifu</i>	<i>gifuem</i>	<i>deaf</i>	<i>deafas</i>
Acc.	<i>gifu</i>	<i>gifu</i>	<i>deaf</i>	<i>deafas</i>

§ 59. Nouns. Paradigms: *scip* (stem *scipe*), ship; *rice* (stem *rice*), kingdom.

	Sing.	Plur.	Sing.	Plur.
Nom.	<i>scip</i>	<i>scipu</i>	<i>rice</i>	<i>riceu</i>
Gen.	<i>scipes</i>	<i>scipu</i>	<i>rice</i>	<i>riceu</i>
Dat.	<i>scipe</i>	<i>scipum</i>	<i>rice</i>	<i>riceu</i>
Acc.	<i>scip</i>	<i>scipu</i>	<i>rice</i>	<i>riceu</i>

§ 60. Words of more than one syllable which end in *el*, *en*, *er*, or, are often truncated before a case-ending, as *caldor*, masc. *elder*, gen. *caldres*, *faten*.

ADJECTIVES

§ 61. Indefinite Declension. Paradigm: *blind*, blind

	Masc.	Fem.	Neut.	Plur.
Sing.	<i>blind</i>	<i>blind</i>	<i>blind</i>	<i>blinde</i>
Gen.	<i>blindes</i>	<i>blindre</i>	<i>blindre</i>	<i>blindra</i>
Dat.	<i>blindum</i>	<i>blindre</i>	<i>blindum</i>	<i>blindum</i>
Acc.	<i>blindre</i>	<i>blind</i>	<i>blind</i>	<i>blinde</i>
Plur.	<i>blindre</i>	<i>blinde</i>	<i>blinde</i>	<i>blindum</i>

§ 62. The instrumental case is like the dative, except in the sing. masc. and neut.

§ 70. The following peculiarities extend also to the definite declension. Adjectives of one syllable, which end in a single consonant preceded by *h*, take *a*.

There are two forms of the verb 'to be' in English, one in the present and one in the past. The present form is 'am', 'are', 'is' and the past form is 'was', 'were'. The present form is used to describe a state of being at the present time, and the past form is used to describe a state of being at a past time. The present form is also used to describe a state of being that is continuing at the present time, and the past form is used to describe a state of being that is continuing at a past time.

The present form of the verb 'to be' is used in the following sentences: 'I am a student', 'You are a teacher', 'He is a doctor'. The past form of the verb 'to be' is used in the following sentences: 'I was a student', 'You were a teacher', 'He was a doctor'.

The present form of the verb 'to be' is also used to describe a state of being that is continuing at the present time, and the past form is used to describe a state of being that is continuing at a past time. For example, 'I am a student' means that I am a student at the present time, and 'I was a student' means that I was a student at a past time.

Eng.	Was	Were	Am	Are	Is
I	was	was	am	am	is
Thou	was	was	art	art	is
He	was	was	is	is	is
She	was	was	is	is	is
It	was	was	is	is	is
We	was	was	are	are	are
You	was	was	are	are	are
They	was	was	are	are	are

The present form of the verb 'to be' is used in the following sentences: 'I am a student', 'You are a teacher', 'He is a doctor'. The past form of the verb 'to be' is used in the following sentences: 'I was a student', 'You were a teacher', 'He was a doctor'.

Eng.	Was	Were	Am	Are	Is
I	was	was	am	am	is
Thou	was	was	art	art	is
He	was	was	is	is	is
She	was	was	is	is	is
It	was	was	is	is	is
We	was	was	are	are	are
You	was	was	are	are	are
They	was	was	are	are	are

The present form of the verb 'to be' is used in the following sentences: 'I am a student', 'You are a teacher', 'He is a doctor'. The past form of the verb 'to be' is used in the following sentences: 'I was a student', 'You were a teacher', 'He was a doctor'.

THE PRONOUNS

The Personal Pronouns are of two kinds, *first person* and *second person*.

First Person	Second Person
I	Thou
Me	Thee
My	Thy
Myself	Thyself
Us	Ye
Our	Yours
Ourselves	Yourselves

Third Person

Third Person	Fourth Person
He	It
She	It
It	It
His	His
Her	Her
Hisself	Hisself
Herself	Herself

The Personal Pronouns are of two kinds, *first person* and *second person*. The *first person* pronouns are *I*, *me*, *my*, *myself*, *us*, *our*, and *ourselves*. The *second person* pronouns are *thou*, *thee*, *thy*, *thyself*, *ye*, *yours*, and *yourselves*.

The *third person* pronouns are *he*, *she*, *it*, *his*, *her*, *hisself*, and *herself*. The *third person* pronouns are used to refer to a person or thing that is not the speaker or the person being addressed. The *third person* pronouns are also used to refer to a person or thing that is not the speaker or the person being addressed.

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THE PRONOUNS

Eng.	Was	Were	Am	Are	Is
I	was	was	am	am	is
Thou	was	was	art	art	is
He	was	was	is	is	is
She	was	was	is	is	is
It	was	was	is	is	is
We	was	was	are	are	are
You	was	was	are	are	are
They	was	was	are	are	are

The present form of the verb 'to be' is used in the following sentences: 'I am a student', 'You are a teacher', 'He is a doctor'. The past form of the verb 'to be' is used in the following sentences: 'I was a student', 'You were a teacher', 'He was a doctor'.

The present form of the verb 'to be' is also used to describe a state of being that is continuing at the present time, and the past form is used to describe a state of being that is continuing at a past time. For example, 'I am a student' means that I am a student at the present time, and 'I was a student' means that I was a student at a past time.

Eng.	Was	Were	Am	Are	Is
I	was	was	am	am	is
Thou	was	was	art	art	is
He	was	was	is	is	is
She	was	was	is	is	is
It	was	was	is	is	is
We	was	was	are	are	are
You	was	was	are	are	are
They	was	was	are	are	are

The present form of the verb 'to be' is used in the following sentences: 'I am a student', 'You are a teacher', 'He is a doctor'. The past form of the verb 'to be' is used in the following sentences: 'I was a student', 'You were a teacher', 'He was a doctor'.

The present form of the verb 'to be' is also used to describe a state of being that is continuing at the present time, and the past form is used to describe a state of being that is continuing at a past time. For example, 'I am a student' means that I am a student at the present time, and 'I was a student' means that I was a student at a past time.

VERBS

The *Primary Inflection* (Strong Verbs) These form the

Eng.	Was	Were	Am	Are	Is
I	was	was	am	am	is
Thou	was	was	art	art	is
He	was	was	is	is	is
She	was	was	is	is	is
It	was	was	is	is	is
We	was	was	are	are	are
You	was	was	are	are	are
They	was	was	are	are	are

- I am a student
- You are a teacher
- He is a doctor
- She is a nurse
- It is a cat
- We are a family
- You are a family
- They are a family

These verbs are used to describe a state of being at the present time, and the past form is used to describe a state of being at a past time. For example, 'I am a student' means that I am a student at the present time, and 'I was a student' means that I was a student at a past time.

- I am a student
- You are a teacher
- He is a doctor
- She is a nurse
- It is a cat
- We are a family
- You are a family
- They are a family

Paradigm - *helpen* (6th class), to help.

Pres.		Perf.	
Ind.	Subj.	Ind.	Subj.
Sing. 1. <i>helpe</i>	<i>helpe</i>	<i>helped</i>	<i>helped</i>
2. <i>helpest</i>	<i>helpest</i>	<i>helped</i>	<i>helped</i>
3. <i>helpeth</i>	<i>helpe</i>	<i>helped</i>	<i>helped</i>
Plur. 1. <i>helpeth</i>	<i>helpen</i>	<i>helped</i>	<i>helped</i>
2. <i>helpen</i>	<i>helpen</i>	<i>helped</i>	<i>helped</i>
3. <i>helpen</i>	<i>helpen</i>	<i>helped</i>	<i>helped</i>
Imp.		Part.	
Sing. 2.	Inf.	Act.	Pass.
<i>help</i>	<i>helpen</i>	<i>helpende</i>	<i>helpen</i>
Plur. 2.	<i>helpenne</i>	<i>helpende</i>	<i>helpen</i>

§ 84 The form *helpenne* is a dative of the infinitive, and is used with the coposition *es*

for *helpen ge*

cfst. for *es at* *es-ik*, from *coosen*, to choose

§ 87 The letter *g* at the end of a root generally becomes *h*, unless it is followed by a vowel, as, *at. hith*, *stith* from *vigen*, to mount. In the classifiable

an old perfect of primary formation came to be used in the sense of a present, after which a new perfect was added with secondary formation. These are

refer to the corresponding classes of primary verbs.

Pres. 1, 3	2 Sing	Plur.	Perf.
VI. (a) <i>an</i>	<i>anne</i>	<i>anne</i>	<i>anne</i>
(b) <i>can</i>	<i>cane</i>	<i>cunnen</i>	<i>cunne</i>
(c) <i>thurf</i>	<i>thurf</i>	<i>thurfon</i>	<i>thurft</i>
(d) <i>dur</i>	<i>durre</i>	<i>durron</i>	<i>dorrie</i>
VII. (e) <i>geman</i>	<i>gemanz</i>	<i>gemanon</i>	<i>gemunde</i>
(f) <i>acul</i>	<i>acul</i>	<i>aculon</i>	<i>aculde</i>
(g) <i>mug</i>	<i>milt</i>	<i>mugon</i>	<i>mugde</i>
VIII. (h) <i>dh</i>	<i>dge, dhet</i>	<i>dgon</i>	<i>dhte</i>
(i) <i>scit</i>	<i>scit</i>	<i>sciton</i>	<i>scite</i>
IX. (j) <i>diuh</i>	<i>dugo</i>	<i>dugon</i>	<i>duhte</i>
(k) <i>nunh</i>	<i>nunht</i>	<i>nugon</i>	<i>nunht</i>
X. (l) <i>mit</i>	<i>mit</i>	<i>miton</i>	<i>mitte</i>

part *geessen*

§ 88 Verbs of Secondary Inflection (*Weak Verbs*) These form the rest by adding *de* to the root of the verb. They are divided into two classes according as *de* alone, or *e-der*, is added to the root. The passive participle is formed by adding *d* and *ed* in the two classes, and often with *ge* prefixed, as, *gelyd*, *lyst*, *gerod*, *ploned*, from *began*, *crun*, *ge* is also used, but not so frequently, in the passive participle of primary verbs

§ 89 In the first of these two classes, *de* after *e, t, h, s*, becomes *de*, and *e* is then generally changed to *h*. Several verbs show a change of radical vowel in the perfect, from *e* to *ea*, and from *e* to *ä*.

Paradigm *dean*, to seek.

Pres.		Perf.	
Ind.	Subj.	Ind.	Subj.
Sing. 1. <i>sece</i>	<i>sece</i>	<i>sohte</i>	<i>sohte</i>
2. <i>secest</i>	<i>sece</i>	<i>sohtest</i>	<i>sohte</i>
3. <i>seceð</i>	<i>sece</i>	<i>sohte</i>	<i>sohte</i>
Plur. 1. <i>seceð</i>	<i>secea</i>	<i>sohten</i>	<i>sohten</i>
2. <i>secea</i>	<i>secea</i>	<i>sohten</i>	<i>sohten</i>
3. <i>secea</i>	<i>secea</i>	<i>sohten</i>	<i>sohten</i>
Imp.	Inf.	Part.	
Sing. 2. <i>sece</i>	<i>secea</i>	Act. <i>seceude</i>	
Plur. 2. <i>seceð</i>	<i>seceanne</i>	Pass. <i>sohte</i>	

§ 90 In the first and 3d and 3d sing., *e* is often omitted from the ending, with euphonic changes, as in verbs of primary inflection. The verb *sece*, to

For *se*, in the subj., are also used *seg, seo, and seþ*. There is also a defective form, to be, the present of which is generally used in a future sense

Pres.		Part.	
Ind.	Subj.	Imp.	Inf.
Sing. 1. <i>beon</i>	<i>bea</i>	<i>bea</i>	<i>beon</i>
2. <i>bea</i>	<i>bea</i>	<i>bea</i>	<i>beon</i>
3. <i>bea</i>	<i>bea</i>	<i>bea</i>	<i>beon</i>
Plur. 1. <i>beon</i>	<i>beon</i>	<i>beon</i>	<i>beon</i>

(b) *Cen*, to go, defective, found in pres. 1. *ge, 2. geð, 3. geð*; *seht*, *geht*, *seht*, *geht*, *seht*, *geht*. From the same root, with added *neah*, come pres. *geþ, perf. geþ, geþ, geþ, geþ*. The defective perf. *ode, went*, comes from a

Instead of *sohte* before a subj. pronoun, we have also *sece*.

§ 91 For the second class, we give as

Paradigm *lufan*, to love.

Pres.		Perf.	
Ind.	Subj.	Ind.	Subj.
Sing. 1. <i>lufe</i>	<i>lufe</i>	<i>lufode</i>	<i>lufode</i>
2. <i>lufest</i>	<i>lufe</i>	<i>lufodest</i>	<i>lufode</i>
3. <i>lufeth</i>	<i>lufe</i>	<i>lufode</i>	<i>lufode</i>
Plur. 1. <i>lufeth</i>	<i>lufon</i>	<i>lufodon</i>	<i>lufodon</i>
2. <i>lufon</i>	<i>lufon</i>	<i>lufodon</i>	<i>lufodon</i>
3. <i>lufon</i>	<i>lufon</i>	<i>lufodon</i>	<i>lufodon</i>
Imp.	Inf.	Part.	
Sing. 2. <i>lufe</i>	<i>lufon</i>	Act. <i>lufende</i>	
Plur. 2. <i>lufon</i>	<i>lufenne</i>	Pass. <i>lufod</i>	

(urenn), to cover

toward, belidden (belies), behind,
short,

motion to a place, the water

the causative, and also the instrument, a

with

dist.
when
plied.
coin-

112. m.
en
t in
dat
t in
on f.
that
idea
takes
door,
n A.
pl of child

Gen	lays		
Dat	lays	lays	idea
Acc	lays	lays	idea

Where the nom. sing. is not origi-
have also the masc.

has become more fixed and regular, just
this way

Substantives

Gen	stoles	stoles	horses
Acc	stoles	stoles	horses

	Sing	Plur		
Nom.	ling	linges	met	met
Gen	linges	linges	met	met
Dat	linges	linges	met	met
Acc	ling	linges	met	met

Not in the gen. pl., the more common ending is *es* (or *es*); as, *linges* (or

and *freod* make in nouns see pl. *foed*, *freod*, or *freodes*,
see *foed* (or *freodes*)

Fader, *moder*, *broder*, *sister*, *duker*, have the same form throughout
and in the gen. pl.; but the gen. pl. sometimes takes *es* or *es*.
The other plural cases have *es* (or *es* in G.). But for *broder*, even, we find
also *broderes*; and in G. *broderes* is the only plural form of *broder*. The *s*
in *broder*, *sister*, *duker*, is often lost before a case ending.

113 The five nouns, *sun*, *moor*, *night*, *hail*, *ice*, have *es* in the gen. sing., while in
the dat. the pl. is regular in A., but in B. is sometimes *hailen*, *mooren*, *ice*,
be *sun*, *moor*, *night*, *hail*, and *ice* (B. *sun*, *moor*, *night*, *hail*, *ice*)
In some cases of nouns the prefix *Cop* has *es* *Cop* has *es*
and in A. *Cop* has *es* in B. that has been in no real sense,
want of any prefix *Cop* has *es* *Cop* has *es* *Cop* has *es*

Paradigm. *helpen* (6th class), to help.

		Pres.		Perf.	
		Ind.	Subj.	Ind.	Subj.
Sing.	1.	<i>helpes</i>	<i>helpe</i>	<i>helped</i>	<i>helpe</i>
	2.	<i>helpest</i>	<i>helpes</i>	<i>helped</i>	<i>helpes</i>
	3.	<i>helpeth</i>	<i>helpe</i>	<i>helped</i>	<i>helpes</i>
Plur.	1.	<i>helpedh</i>	<i>helpen</i>	<i>helped</i>	<i>helpen</i>
	2.	<i>helpedh</i>	<i>helpen</i>	<i>helped</i>	<i>helpen</i>
	3.	<i>helpedh</i>	<i>helpen</i>	<i>helped</i>	<i>helpen</i>
		Imp.		Part.	
				Act.	Pass.
Sing.	2.	<i>help</i>	<i>helpen</i>	<i>helpende</i>	<i>helpen</i>
Plur.	2.	<i>helpedh</i>	<i>helpenne</i>	<i>helpende</i>	<i>helpen</i>

§ 84. The form *helpenne* is a dative of the infinitive, and is used with the preposition *to*.

for *helpen ge*.

ejst, for *ejs st*, *ejs-dh*, from *cestan*, to choose.

§ 87. The letter *g* at the end of a root generally becomes *h*, unless it is followed by a vowel, as, *stihh*, *stihh*, from *stigan*, to mount. In the dissyllabic

refer to the corresponding classes of primary verbs.

		Pres. 1, 3	2 Sing.	Plur.	Perf.
VI.	(a) an	an	anne	anna	anne
	(b) can	can	cunne	cunnon	cunne
	(c) <i>tharf</i> , <i>tharf</i>	<i>tharf</i>	<i>tharfe</i> , <i>tharf</i>	<i>tharfon</i>	<i>tharfe</i>
VII.	(d) dar	dar	durre	durron	durre
	(e) geman	geman	gemant	gemanon	gemante
	(f) sceal	sceal	scealt	scealon	scealte
VIII.	(g) mæg	mæg	mæht	mægon	mæhte
	(h) ða	ða	ðge, ðæt	ðgon	ðhte
	(i) wdt	wdt	wdte	wdton	wdte, wdt.
IX.	(j) dræh	dræh	drægs	drægon	dræhte
	(k) neah	neah	neahs	neahgon	neahhte
	(l) mæt	mæt	mæst	mæton	mæhte

part *geesen*

§ 88. Verbs of Secondary Inflection (*Heol Verbs*). These form the perfect by adding *de* to the root of the verb. They are divided into two classes according as *de* alone, or *o-de*, is added to the root. The passive participle is formed by adding *d* and *ed* in the two classes, and often with *ge* prefixed; as, *geleod*, *leod*, *geleod*, plowed, from *leagan*, *leagan*; *ge* is also used, but not so frequently, in the passive participle of primary verbs.

§ 89. In the first of these two classes, *de* after *c*, *t*, *h*, *z*, becomes *te*, and *e* is then generally changed to *h*. Several verbs show a change of radical vowel in the perfect, from *e* to *eo*, and from *æ* to *ō*.

Paradigm. *secan*, to seek.

		Pres.		Perf.	
		Ind.	Subj.	Ind.	Subj.
Sing.	1.	<i>sece</i>	<i>sece</i>	<i>sæhte</i>	<i>sæhte</i>
	2.	<i>sæcest</i>	<i>sæce</i>	<i>sæhtest</i>	<i>sæhte</i>
	3.	<i>sæceðh</i>	<i>sæce</i>	<i>sæhte</i>	<i>sæhte</i>
Plur.	1.	<i>sæcedh</i>	<i>sæcen</i>	<i>sæhton</i>	<i>sæhten</i>
	2.	<i>sæcedh</i>	<i>sæcen</i>	<i>sæhton</i>	<i>sæhten</i>
	3.	<i>sæcedh</i>	<i>sæcen</i>	<i>sæhton</i>	<i>sæhten</i>
		Imp.		Part.	
				Act.	Pass.
Sing.	2.	<i>sæc</i>	<i>sæcen</i>	<i>sæcende</i>	<i>sæcen</i>
Plur.	2.	<i>sæcedh</i>	<i>sæcenne</i>	<i>sæcende</i>	<i>sæcen</i>

For *st*, in the subj., are also used *sig*, *seo*, and *sþ*. There is also a defective form, to be, the present of which is generally used in a future sense.

		Pres.		Imp.	
		Ind.	Subj.	Ind.	Subj.
Sing.	1.	<i>beon</i> , <i>beo</i>	<i>beo</i>	<i>beo</i>	<i>beon</i>
	2.	<i>bið</i>	<i>beo</i>	<i>beo</i>	<i>beon</i>
	3.	<i>biðh</i>	<i>beo</i>	<i>beo</i>	<i>beon</i>
Plur.	1.	<i>beaðh</i>	<i>beon</i>	<i>beaðh</i>	<i>beon</i>
	2.	<i>beaðh</i>	<i>beon</i>	<i>beaðh</i>	<i>beon</i>
	3.	<i>beaðh</i>	<i>beon</i>	<i>beaðh</i>	<i>beon</i>

hangan, perf. *fung*, *hæng*

(*weon*), to cover.

§ 97. D. The following verbs of secondary inflection are irregular: *thencan*, to think, perf. *thæhte*, *thyncon*, to seem, perf. *thæhte*; *seorcan*, *seorcan*, *seorcan*, as part. *seorcan*, from

Infinitive of *beon* before a subject pronoun, we have also *beo*.

§ 92. In these verbs, *þ* is often written as *sp*, and *ð* as *sp* or *spn*, where *g*

ADJECTIVES.

§ 115 For the Indefinite Declension the normal forms would be:—

Sing.	Plur.	Fem.	Neut.	Plur.
Nom.	god	god	god	gode
Gen.	godes	god(e)re	godis	godre
Dat.	goden	god(e)re	godon	goden
Acc.	godne	gode	god	gode

§ 116 For the Definite Declension they would be:—

Sing.	Plur.	Fem.	Neut.	Plur.
Nom.	gode	gode	gode	goden
Gen.	goden	goden	godin	goden(e)
Dat.	goden	goden	godin	goden
Acc.	goden	goden	gode	goden

For *that*, which is confined to A., we find *thos* and *thes* in both A. and B. For *thasse*, *thassere*, *thassen*, B. has almost always *thasse*. For most of the forms B. has also *this* used as an indeclinable demonstrative, and traces of this use are found even in A.

whan, *van*, *not*. The use of this pronoun as a proper relative begins to appear in B. and O. *Whether* (B. *whether*) is undeclined. *Whic* or *white* is declined as an indefinite adjective: in B. it is written *woche*, and begins to be used as a relative.

§ 124

to this use

to this use

to this use

to this use

to this use

to this use

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§ 125 The definite article is thus declined: the forms in commas are found only in A.

Sing.	Plur.	Fem.	Neut.	Plur.
Nom.	the	'tha', 'the	that	'tha', 'the
Gen.	thes	'thre', 'thre	thes	'thre', 'thre
Dat.	than	'thre', 'thre	than	'thre', 'thre
Acc.	there	'tha', 'the	that	'tha', 'the

I. *holden*, *held*, *helden*, *holden*, *hold*.

fallen, *fil*, *filten*, *fallen*, *fall*.

II. *sliten*, *let*, *leten*, *slen*, *let*.

shopen, *slip* or *slepe*, —, —, *sloup*.

III. *huten*, *het* or *hete*, *huten*, *huten*, *bid*.

cunten, *cun(e)re*, *cun(e)ren*, *cunten*, *know*.

IV. *hæwen*, *h(e)wen*, *h(e)wen*, *hæwen*, *hew*.

V. *wæpen*, *wæp* (O. *wæp*), —, —, *wæp*.

VI. *gaden*, *gand*, *ganden*, *gaden*, *end*.

driften, *draf*, *driften*, *driften*, *drife*.

beginnen, *gan*, *gunnen*, *gunnen*, *begin*.

VII. *nimen*, *n(e)re*, *nimen*, *nimen*, *take*.

giften, *g(e)ft*, *giften*, *giften*, *give*.

beren, *b(e)re*, *beren*, *beren*, *dear*.

cunten, *c(e)re*, *cunten*, *cunten*, *come*.

VIII. *driften*, *draf*, *driften*, *driften*, *drive*.

writen, *w(e)rt*, *writen*, *writen*, *write*.

IX. *lügen*, *l(e)h*, *lügen*, *lügen*, *bow*.

l(e)cu, *l(e)c*, *l(e)cu*, *l(e)cu*, *lock*.

X. *faren*, *for*, *faren*, *faren*, *fare*.

waren, *w(e)re*, *waren*, *waren*, *war*.

In A., *o*, *e*, *i*, are much confounded, as, *holden*,

to help.

Sing.	Plur.	Fem.	Neut.	Plur.
Nom.	thas	'thas', 'thas	this	'thas', 'thas
Gen.	thasse	'thasse', 'thasse	thasse	'thasse', 'thasse
Dat.	thasse	'thasse', 'thasse	thasse	'thasse', 'thasse
Acc.	thasse	'thasse', 'thasse	this	'thas', 'thas

Sing.	Ind.	Plur.	Ind.	Plur.
1.	help	help	help	help
2.	helped	help	help	help
3.	helped	help	help	help
Plur.	helped	help	help	help

§ 137 In O the 2d sing of the perf Ind is sometimes the same as the 1st

	Tres 1 3	2 Sing	2 Plur	Perf	
(d)	<i>dar</i>	<i>darst</i>	<i>durren</i>	<i>durste</i>	dare
(e)	<i>scot</i>	<i>scalt</i>	<i>sculen</i>	<i>acoltu</i>	shall
(f)	<i>ma₁</i>	<i>mih₁</i>	<i>moyen</i>	<i>mih₁e</i>	may
(g)	<i>ah</i>		<i>oyen</i>	<i>ah₁e</i>	own
(h)	<i>scat scot</i>	<i>wast</i>	<i>witen</i>	<i>wiste</i>	know
(i)	<i>dah</i>				swail

		Pres		Iperf	
Sing	1	<i>seche</i>	<i>seche</i>	<i>sohite</i>	<i>sohite</i>
	2.	<i>sechest</i>	<i>seche</i>	<i>sohist</i>	<i>sohte</i>
	3.	<i>sechetha</i>	<i>seche</i>	<i>sohite</i>	<i>sohte</i>
Plur		<i>sechetha</i>	<i>sechen</i>	<i>sohten</i>	<i>sohten</i>
					<i>sohten</i>
		Imj		Part.	
Sing	2.	<i>sech</i>	<i>sechen</i>	Act	<i>sechen te</i>
Plur	2.	<i>sechedh</i>	<i>sechenne</i>	Pass	<i>soht</i>

		Pres.		Perf.	
		Ind	Subj	Ind	Subj
Sing	1	makie	makie	made	mak de
	2	makert	makie	madeest	madee
	3.	maledh	makie	madee	madee
Plur		makidh	maiken	maleden	maleden

	Ind	Subj	Ind	Subj
Aug 1	a n		was	were
" 2	art		[were]	were
" 3	is		was	were
Par	e n de i		were	were
Eng 1	been	been		
" 2	been	been		
" 3	been	been		
Par	been	been		
Eng 1	in	in	Part	
" 2	been	been	Part	been
Par	been			

In B and O *eo* is often contracted to *e* thus O *1 m best for best* and *be ben* both as well as *bee been beeth*. In the perf O writes *were weren* instead of *were weren* but in the ind adding *it has* *were wert*. The plural *sun let* is not found in B, which uses *beoth beith* instead. O has *sun idenn* but uses also *arra* (Eng. *are*). The subj *as* is still found in O.

these roots;
effects *feng*
stolen part

§ 143 Anomalous Verbs A The Preteritives (§ 94) are

	Pres 1 3	- Sing	Plur	Perf	
(a)	an, on		anne i	udhe	grant
(b)	can	canst	cunnen	cudt e	know
(c)	tharf	tharf(f)t	thurfen	thor(f)te	need

ADJECTIVES.

undeclined

§155 Chaucer has a remnant of the old gen pl *indeli in allice or ellice*, of all, as, *at your allice cost, allice best*.

§156 The comparative and superlative are formed as in modern English. Superlatives of one syllable are inflected, as, *the beste man, his beste word*. Change of vowel is seen in *fenger, from yong; stronger, strongest, from strong*; *elder, eldest*, from *col*.

§158
which is
(which are
no longer

Th
so
in the poem
§159
my, thy, he,
§160

section before other consonants they retain it also when used absolutely, as, after the substantive, or without a substantive, in the predicates, in which cases,

VERBS

- I *holden, helet, holden, holden*
fulden, fet, fulden, fulden
II. *liven, let, liven, let*
sleepen, sleep, sleepen, slept
III. *knowen, knew, knewen, knowen*

- IV. *liven, beet, beeten, beten*
V. *wopen, wepen, wepen, wepen*
VI. *fenden, fende, fendra, fendra*
helpen, help, holpen, holpen
kerren, casf, corren, corra to
li ginnen, -gan, -gonnen, -gonne
VII. *gieren, gaf, garen, giera*
heren, bar, beren, boren
spelen, spol, speken, spolen
comen, cam, comen, comen
VIII. *riscen, roos, riarn, risen*
driven, drof, driven, driven
writen, wrot, wrieten, wrieten
IX. *cheesen, chere, chosen, chosen*
crepen, crep, crepen, crepen
X. *shupen, shoop, shopen, shopen*
wrazen, wra, wrazen, wrazen
draxen, drough, draxen, draxen

We also find *sleepen, wepen, crepte*, secondary perfects for *sleep, weep, creep*, also *fend, bigon*, for *fend, bigan*, and *funden* for *funden*. In the forms of *wrazen*, *a* and *e* are much confounded, and a participle *wrazen* is met with. Chaucer and others often use *y* for *i*; as, *yfenden, bygynnen, drygen*; or *e* for *i*; as, *goren*.

§160 Final *n* In the inflection of the verb, the final *n* of the infinitive,

§170 Subjunctive The subjunctive in both tenses has *e* in the future present of the singular, and *en* (or *e*) in the plural

	Pres.		Fut.	
	Ind.	Subj.	Ind.	Subj.
Sing. 1.	<i>helps</i>	<i>holpe</i>	<i>help</i>	<i>holpe</i>
2.	<i>helpet</i>	<i>holpe</i>	<i>help</i>	<i>holpe</i>
3	<i>helpeth</i>	<i>holpe</i>	<i>help</i>	<i>holpe</i>
Plur.	<i>helpen</i>	<i>helpen</i>	<i>helpen</i>	<i>helpen</i>
	Imp.	Inf.	Yarf.	
Sing. 2	<i>help</i>	<i>helpen</i>	Act. <i>helping(e)</i>	
Plur. 2	<i>helpeth</i>		Pass. <i>helpen</i>	

§176 Secondary Inflection: *seken* (*sechen*), to seek

	Pres.		Perf.	
	Inl	Subj	Inl	Subj
Sing 1	<i>seke</i>	<i>seke</i>	<i>sought(e)</i>	<i>soughte</i>
2	<i>sekest</i>	<i>seke</i>	<i>soughtest</i>	<i>soughtis</i>
3	<i>seketh</i>	<i>seke</i>	<i>sought(e)</i>	<i>soughtis</i>
Plur	<i>seke(n)</i>	<i>seke(n)</i>	<i>sought(e)n</i>	<i>sought(e)n</i>
	Imp	Inf	Part	
Sing 2	<i>seke</i>	<i>seke(n)</i>	Act <i>seking(e)</i>	
Plur 2	<i>seke(n)</i>		Pass <i>sought</i>	

§177. Secondary Inflection: *loven*, to love

	Pres.		Perf.	
	Ind	Subj	Inl	Subj
Sing 1	<i>love</i>	<i>love</i>	<i>loved(e)</i>	<i>lovede</i>
2	<i>lovest</i>	<i>love</i>	<i>lovedest</i>	<i>lovede</i>
3	<i>loveth</i>	<i>love</i>	<i>love(e)</i>	<i>lovede</i>
Plur	<i>love(n)</i>	<i>love(n)</i>	<i>loved(e)n</i>	<i>lovede(n)</i>
	Imp	Inf	Part	
Sing 2	<i>love</i>	<i>love(n)</i>	Act <i>loving(e)</i>	
Plur 2	<i>love(n)</i>		Pass <i>loved</i>	

§178 The verb *have* loses its *e* in several forms: thus, Inf *have(n)* or *hau*; pres 1 *have*; 2 *hast*; 3 *hath*, pl *have(n)*; pf *hadde*; pass part *had*. The verb *make* loses its *e* in certain forms: thus, perf *make(e)* or *maie*; pass part *maide* or *maie*.

§179 Anomalous Verbs. A. The Pretoratives (§91) are as follows: in all of them, the form of the pres 1, 3 sing is also used as a plural.

	Pr 1, 3	2 Sing	Plur	Perf
(a)	<i>can</i>	<i>canst</i>	<i>conne(n)</i>	<i>couth(e), counde</i>
(b)	<i>dar</i>	<i>darst</i>	<i>dar, dor</i>	<i>dorste, durste</i>
(c)	<i>shal</i>	<i>shalt</i>	<i>shul(e)n</i>	<i>sholte, shul(e)</i>
(d)	<i>may</i>	<i>mayst</i>	<i>moner(n)</i>	<i>myght(e)</i>
			<i>may</i>	

	Pr 1, 3	2 Sing	Plur	Perf
(e)	<i>owre, owerth</i>	<i>owest</i>	<i>owre(n)</i>	<i>owht(e), augh(e)</i>
(f)	<i>wot</i>	<i>wost</i>	<i>wote(n)</i>	<i>wote</i>
(g)	<i>mot</i>	<i>mote</i>	<i>mo(e)n</i>	<i>moote</i>
(h)	<i>wil</i>	<i>wilt</i>	<i>wile(n)</i>	<i>wilde</i>
	<i>wol</i>	<i>wolt</i>	<i>wol(n)</i>	
(i)	<i>nyl</i>	<i>nylt</i>	<i>yl</i>	<i>nolds</i>

The A-S and S-S *tharf*, *moda*, is represented by the defective *thar*, used only in the pres Ind.

§180 B (a) The verb of existence is thus declined: —

	Pres.		Perf.	
	Ind	Subj	Ind	Subj
Sing 1	<i>am</i>	<i>be</i>	<i>was</i>	<i>were</i>
2	<i>art</i>	<i>be</i>	<i>were</i>	<i>were</i>
3	<i>is</i>	<i>be</i>	<i>was</i>	<i>were</i>
Plur	<i>be(n) or are(n)</i>	<i>be(n)</i>	<i>were(n)</i>	<i>were(n)</i>
	Imp	Inf	Part	
Sing 2	<i>be</i>	<i>be(n)</i>	Act <i>being(e)</i>	
Plur 2	<i>beth</i>		Pass <i>be(n)</i>	

(b) Inf *ge(n)*; pres 1 *go*, 2 *gost*, 3 *goth*, pl *go(n)*; perf *acent(e)*; pass part *go(n)*.

(c) Inf *do(n)*; pres 1 *do*, 2 *dost*, 3 *doth*, pl *do(n)*; perf *dile*; pass part *do(n)*.

§181 C Several verbs of secondary inflection have peculiar vowel changes in the perfect and the passive participle: thus *setten* makes *sette*, *sette* tells *telle*.

From *sechen* (*sechen*) comes an irregular pass part *set*.

SPECIMENS OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE IN ITS EARLIER STAGES.

and brother min i Cristendom
thurrh folliht and thurrh trow the
and brother min i Godd as hus,
yet o the thide wise,
thurrh thatt witt hafenn taken ba
an reyhellboe to follyhean,
wunderr kanunkess had and i, f,
swa sumn haant Awwatin a tte;
lee hafe don swa sumn the bridd

Translation — I will with a flood the folk destroy [quell, kill], and each of-

‡ 187 From Layman's *Ernt* (1-22).

A. Earlier Text

An preost wes on leoden,
 Layamon wes þiote
 he wes Leofnathes sone,
 he hidde him þes driten.
 he wonede at Emleye,
 at æðelweas the clerechen,
 uppen Seurne stæwe.
 se ð þæt him thuhte:
 on first Hadestone,
 ðær he bock radde
 hit com him on mode,
 and on his mern thuhte,
 thet he wolde of Engle
 flia æðelweas tellen,
 wæð heo þioten weoren,
 and woneð heo comen,
 the Engleas londas
 geseaht aften
 æfter than gode
 thes from dritene com,
 the al her a guide

B. Later Text

A prest was in londe,
 a lawer of grette; *illette*;
 he was of Leuene lode,
 k^{ing} him be drehte;
 he wonode at Emrale,
 wið thin gode cunste,
 upon Seaurie;
 marie ther him thohte;
 fistebl iudestone,
 ther he bokes radli
 lift com him on mode,
 and on his thoñke,
 that he wolde of þe agelond
 the rikeste telle,
 wat the men hi hote weren,
 and the name hi comen,
 the Lande ne lond
 wrecst niden
 after than ðode
 that fram god com,
 that al ere geweld

‡ 180. From the same (95-110)

And wase when shall this boc
 eft oter alre writtun,
 himn bidde les that he writ right,
 swa summa this boc himn tæcheth,
 all thowut of afters that it las
 uppo this wrate biþas
 with al æsle riht alre her ses sett,
 with al se he word se;
 and tætt he loke wel that he
 an bocstaf writ twiþyres,
 eyr wher ther sit uppo this boc
 ses writtun o that wase.
 loke he wett that het writen a,
 for he ne may noht elles
 can longlesch writtun riht to word,
 thæt wite he wel to sothe.

§191 *From the Chronicle of Robert of Gloucester.*

§ 188. *From the same* (21725-25741)

3

To there midlætte
 the men wæron aſeope,
 Arður forðu him wende,
 aſeolæd alre kinge
 Biſcored ðar heore ðe eſiht,
 that he wæð ſe ærſta,
 heo liſten of heore ſteda,
 and rihten heore ſweden
 The iſeyen heo na wlit ſcorren
 a muçel for ſmoken,
 uppen ære hulle,
 and ær wode hi ænlicen,
 and an oðer huð the wæð ſwidne heh,
 that ær he biſſede ful neð,
 the men on heo iſeyen a for,
 that wæð muçel and ſwidre ſtor,
 þu eadde the breoweden,
 to whæthere heo færen muçten,
 thet the cotelwæ wæron.

R

To thore mid nite,
tho men were a-sleape,
Arthur forth him wende
baldast kinge
In vore yode hire lod-enht,
for he her day-light
hit lichte of hire stede,
and riste hire wede.
Thio hit scheyn nol vore
on moel for smokk,
uppen one hulle
swil see fode bi-fille;
an oher hulle was thar hch,
the see hie bitoyde awithe neh,
thar he fere he
that was mochel and swithc stor.
Thc culstis tho nuste,
to walchir hire wende miche,
that he want was neore
of this hiege fare.

1 *slmft. standeth* 2 *clined. clent. called* 3 *marcketh. extends*

§ 193. From the Beginning of the Vision of *Piers Ploughman* [The two short lines of the couplet are printed as one]

In a somer season when softe was the sonne,
I shoop me into shroudes as I a sheep I weere,
In hight as an heremite unholy of werkes.

§ 189. *From the beginning of the Ormulum (t-16)*

Nu, brother Wallers, brother ruin
after the Dutchess kind:

I shoon me into shroudes put me into clothes I sleep, shephera,
 I se, but I feyly, strange thing I suryed so murye, sounde so pleasant,
 I evereng, dreame. I seigh, swe. I toff, hill I frische y maked, grandly made.

with depe it hees and derke an l drowfull of white
 A far fowld ful of folk and lither bitwene,
 of alle manere of men, the moene an l the rich,
 wiche were as the wandringe as the world askith
 I overtoke working

§ 104 From *Wycliffe's Translation of the Bible*, the first ten verses of the

an l palmers for to seeken straunge stondes,
 to ferne halwes, kouthes in sondry londes,
 and specially, from every schires ende,
 of Engelond, to Canturbury they wend,
 the holy blisful martir for to seke,
 that hem hath holpen when that they were seke :

§ 107 From the *Thene of the Ship* in *Chaucer's Canterbury Tales*

§ 108 From the *Prologue to Chaucer's Canterbury Tales*

12000

over hearts

KEY

TO THE PRONUNCIATION.

VOWELS.

REGULAR LONG AND SHORT SOUNDS.

<i>Ā, ā, long, as in</i>	<i>Āle, Fāte, Chāamber, Grāy.</i>	<i>Ū, ū, long, as in</i>	<i>Ūid, Nūte, Lūst, Depūse.</i>
<i>Ā, ā, short, as in</i>	<i>Ādd, Fāt, Hāve, Rāndom.</i>	<i>Ū, ū, short, as in</i>	<i>Ūdd, Nūt, Tūrid, Resbluc.</i>
<i>Ē, ē, long, as in</i>	<i>Ēve, Mūte, Plāce, Sēzure.</i>	<i>Ē, ē, long, as in</i>	<i>Ēce, Tūbe, Lūte, Fēdāl.</i>
<i>Ē, ē, short, as in</i>	<i>Ēnd, Mīt, Chēck, Lēopard.</i>	<i>Ē, ē, short, as in</i>	<i>Ēc, Tūb, Mūt, Stūdy.</i>
<i>Ī, ī, long, as in</i>	<i>Īce, Mūe, Mīre, Thīrve.</i>	<i>Ī, ī, long, as in</i>	<i>Īlf, Stīle, Skīf, Edīfy.</i>
<i>Ī, ī, short, as in</i>	<i>Īll, Mīn, Admīt, Trībute.</i>	<i>Ī, ī, short, as in</i>	<i>Cfāt, Nymph, Līle, Alfy.</i>

OCCASIONAL SOUNDS.

<i>Ā, ā, as in</i>	<i>Āir, Shūre, Pāir, Bēar.</i>	<i>Ō, ō, like short u, as in</i>	<i>Ōther, Dōnt, Sōn, Wōn.</i>
<i>Ā, ā, Italian, as in</i>	<i>Ārm, Fāther, Fār, Pālm.</i>	<i>Ō, ō, like long oo, as in</i>	<i>Prōve, Dō, Mīve, Tāmb.</i>
<i>Ā, ā, as in</i>	<i>Āsk, Grās, Dānce, Brānch.</i>	<i>Ō, ō, like short oo, as in</i>	<i>Ōpsom, Wōlt, Wōman.</i>
<i>Ā, ā, broad, as in</i>	<i>Āll, Tālk, Hānl, Swārm.</i>	<i>Ō, ō, like broad o, as in</i>	<i>Ōrder, Fōrm, Stōrk.</i>
<i>Ā, ā, like short o, as in</i>	<i>Whāt, Wānder, Wāllow.</i>	<i>Ō, ō, as in</i>	<i>Mōon, Fōod, Bōdy.</i>
<i>Ē, ē, like ō, as in</i>	<i>Ēre, Thēre, Mīre, Whēre.</i>	<i>Ō, ō, as in</i>	<i>Wōrl, Tōt, Gōod.</i>
<i>Ē, ē, like long o, as in</i>	<i>Ēight, Prēy, Obey.</i>	<i>Ū, u, preceded by r, as in</i>	<i>Ryde, Rymer, Ryral.</i>
<i>Ē, ē, as in</i>	<i>Ēmine, Vāge, Prēfer.</i>	<i>Ū, u, like short oo, as in</i>	<i>Eyfl, Pgt, Eygh, Eyll.</i>
<i>Ī, ī, like long e, as in</i>	<i>Pīque, Māchue, Pōlce.</i>	<i>Ū, u, as in</i>	<i>Ūrge, Būrn, Fūrl, Cōndr.</i>
<i>Ī, ī, like ē, as in</i>	<i>Īksome, Vīrgīn, Thīrty.</i>	<i>ɛ, ɛ, (italic) mark a letter as silent</i>	<i>Fāllēn, Tōkēn, Cōnsūn, Māson.</i>

REGULAR DIPHTHONGAL SOUNDS.

<i>Ōi, oi, or Oj, oy (unmarked), as in</i>	<i>Ōil, Jōin, Mōist, Oyster, Toy.</i>	<i>Ōu, ou, or Ow, ow (unmarked), as in</i>	<i>Ōut, Hōund, Ōwl, Vōwl.</i>
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CONSONANTS.

<i>C, c, soft, like s sharp, as in</i>	<i>Cede, Cite, Mercy, Accept.</i>	<i>Th, th, sharp (unmarked), as in</i>	<i>Thīng, Brēath, Sympāthy.</i>
<i>C, c, hard, like k, as in</i>	<i>Cāll, Cōneur, Succēss.</i>	<i>Th, th, flat or local, as in</i>	<i>Thīne, Smōoth, Wīther.</i>
<i>Ch, ch (unmarked), as in</i>	<i>Chīld, Mūch, Tōuching.</i>	<i>Ng, ng (unmarked), as in</i>	<i>Slng, Slnger, Slngle.</i>
<i>Ch, ch, soft, like sh, as in</i>	<i>Chāise, Mārchlōness, Māchine.</i>	<i>Ū, ū (see § 82), as in</i>	<i>Līnger, Līph, Vēcle.</i>
<i>Ch, ch, hard, like k, as in</i>	<i>Chōrs, Epōch, Dīstīch.</i>	<i>Ū, ū, like g, as in</i>	<i>Ūght, Ūxample, Ūngllary.</i>
<i>C, c, hard, as in</i>	<i>Cēt, Tīger, Bēgīn, Fōggī.</i>	<i>Ph, ph, like f (unmarked), as in</i>	<i>Phāntom, Sylph, Phīlōsophy.</i>
<i>G, g, soft, like j, as in</i>	<i>Gēm, Engīne, Clēgī, Sūggēst.</i>	<i>Qu, qu, like kw (unmarked), as in</i>	<i>Quēen, Cōnquēst, Inquīry.</i>
<i>G, g, sharp (unmarked), as in</i>	<i>Gāmē, Vēt, Dēnēce, Rēst.</i>	<i>Wh, wh, like hw (unmarked), as in</i>	<i>Whāt, Whēn, Awīllē.</i>
<i>G, g, soft or vocal, like z, as in</i>	<i>Gāy, Amūge, Frīgūn, Hēglde.</i>		

they will naturally be pronounced correctly by an English speaker. But in all exceptional, doubtful, or difficult cases, the appropriate respelling is used.

* * * or an explanation of foreign sounds occurring in the Dictionary, see pp. 1514, 1525.

RESPELLING FOR PRONUNCIATION — (1) In respelling the French *gn, en, on, œ, &c.* the letters *gn* are not to be pronounced themselves, being designed simply to mark the vowel as nasal, that is, as pronounced through both the nose and the mouth at the same time. — (2) The respelling of a word, when a number of related words follow, applies to all of them down to some other word which is respelled.

REFERENCES — The figures which immediately follow certain words in the Vocabulary refer to corresponding sections in the Principles of Pronunciation.

NT — The principal accent is denoted by a heavy mark; the secondary, by a lighter mark; as in *Qu'perintendent*. In the division of words into these marks, besides performing their proper office, supply the place of the hyphen, except in some compound and derivative words.

KEY TO THE PRONUNCIATION.

VOWELS.

REGULAR LONG AND SHORT SOUNDS.

<i>Ā, ā, long, as in</i>	<i>Āle, Yāte, Chāmbër, Grāy.</i>
<i>Ā, ă, short, as in</i>	<i>Ādd, Tāt, Hāve, Rāndom.</i>
<i>Ē, ē, long, as in</i>	<i>Ēve, Mēte, Pēace, Sēizure.</i>
<i>Ē, ɛ, short, as in</i>	<i>Ēnd, Mēt, Chēek, Lēopard.</i>
<i>Ī, ī, long, as in</i>	<i>Ice, Fīne, Mīre, Thrīve.</i>
<i>Ī, ɪ, short, as in</i>	<i>Ill, Fīn, Admīt, Tribute.</i>

<i>Ū, ū, long, as in</i>	<i>Ūld, Nūte, Lēaf, Depēce.</i>
<i>Ū, ʊ, short, as in</i>	<i>Ūdd, Nūt, Tōrrid, Resōlve.</i>
<i>Ū, u, long, as in</i>	<i>Cēe, Tābe, Lūte, Tēndal.</i>
<i>Ū, ʊ, short, as in</i>	<i>Ūe, Tāb, Rāt, Stādy.</i>
<i>Y, y, long, as in</i>	<i>Yīp, Sīple, Sūly, Lūdy.</i>
<i>Y, ɪ, short, as in</i>	<i>Cyāt, Nymph, Lpīe, Alfyā.</i>

OCCASIONAL SOUNDS.

<i>Ā, ă, as in</i>	<i>Āir, Shāre, Fāir, Bēar.</i>
<i>Ā, ă, Italian, as in</i>	<i>Āim, Fūther, Tār, Pālm.</i>
<i>Ā, ă, as in</i>	<i>Āsk, Grāss, Dānce, Brānch.</i>
<i>Ā, ă, broad, as in</i>	<i>Āll, Tālk, Hānl, Swārn.</i>
<i>Ā, ă, like short ă, as in</i>	<i>Whāt, Wānder, Wāllow.</i>
<i>Ē, ɛ, like ē, as in</i>	<i>Ēre, Thēre, Hēir, Whēre.</i>
<i>Ē, ɛ, like long ē, as in</i>	<i>Fīght, Pray, Obey.</i>
<i>Ē, ɛ, as in</i>	<i>Ērmīne, Vērge, Prefēr.</i>
<i>Ī, ɪ, like long ē, as in</i>	<i>Pīque, Māchine, Pōllee.</i>
<i>Ī, ɪ, like ē, as in</i>	<i>Īrksome, Vīrgīn, Thīrty.</i>

<i>Ō, ɔ, like short ɔ, as in</i>	<i>Ōther, Dōne, Sōn, Wōn.</i>
<i>Ō, ɔ, like long ɔ, as in</i>	<i>Prāve, Dg, Māve, Tōrb.</i>
<i>Ō, ɔ, like short ɔ, as in</i>	<i>Wōsom, Wōlf, Wōman.</i>
<i>Ō, ɔ, like broad ɔ, as in</i>	<i>Ōrder, Tōrm, Stōrk.</i>
<i>Ō, ɔ, as in</i>	<i>Ōdon, Tōod, Bōoty.</i>
<i>Ō, ɔ, as in</i>	<i>Wōol, Tōot, Gōod.</i>

<i>Y, ɪ, preceded by r, as in</i>	<i>Ryde, Rymor, Ryral.</i>
<i>Y, ɪ, like short ɔ, as in</i>	<i>Pyll, Pūf, Pūsh, Pūll.</i>
<i>Ū, ʊ, as in</i>	<i>Ūrge, Būrn, Tūrl, Cōndūr.</i>

e, i, o, (italic) mark a letter as silent *Fallen, Token, Cousin, Mason*

REGULAR DIPHTHONGAL SOUNDS.

<i>Oi, oi, or Oy, oy (unmarked), as in</i>	<i>Ōil, Jōin, Mōist, Ōyster, Tōy</i>	<i>Ou, ou, or Ow, ow (unmarked), as in</i>	<i>Ōut, Hōund, Ōwl, Vōwel,</i>
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CONSONANTS.

<i>C, c, soft, like s sharp, as in</i>	<i>Cede, Cite, Mercy, Accept.</i>
<i>C, c, hard, like k, as in</i>	<i>Call, Concūr, Success.</i>
<i>Ch, ch (unmarked), as in</i>	<i>Child, Mīnch, Tōuchīng.</i>
<i>Ch, ch, soft, like sh, as in</i>	<i>Chaise, Marchioness, Machine.</i>
<i>Ch, ch, hard, like k, as in</i>	<i>Chorus, Epōch, Mīstīch.</i>
<i>G, g, hard, as in</i>	<i>Get, Tīger, Bēgīn, Tōggī.</i>
<i>G, g, soft, like j, as in</i>	<i>Gem, Engīne, Elēgy, Sūggēst.</i>
<i>H, h, sharp (unmarked), as in</i>	<i>Hame, Yēs, Dēnse, Rēst.</i>
<i>G, j, soft or vocal, like z, as in</i>	<i>Hāz, Amūse, Prīzm, Rēgīde.</i>

<i>Th, th, sharp (unmarked), as in</i>	<i>Thīng, Brēath, Sympāthy.</i>
<i>Th, th, soft or vocal, as in</i>	<i>Thīne, Smōoth, Wīdeth.</i>
<i>Ng, ng (unmarked), as in</i>	<i>Sīng, Sīngēr, Sīnglē.</i>
<i>N, ŋ (see § 82), as in</i>	<i>Līngēr, Līnk, Ūnglē.</i>
<i>X, x, like ps, as in</i>	<i>Exīst, Exāmpel, Anythīng.</i>
<i>Ph, ph, like f (unmarked), as in</i>	<i>Phāntom, Syllph, Phīlosophy.</i>
<i>Qu, qu, like kw (unmarked), as in</i>	<i>Quēen, Cōnquēst, Inquīry.</i>
<i>Wh, wh, like hw (unmarked), as in</i>	<i>Whāt, Whēn, Awthīle.</i>

•• When one letter of an improper diphthong, or of a triphthong, is marked, it is to be taken as representing the sound of the combination, and the letter or letters which are not marked are to be regarded as silent, as in *sim, cīan, cīll, pīople, īgate, sūbl, jōbīnal, tūe*, &c. The combined letters *ce, ci, ac, as, st, or th*, occurring before a vowel in a syllable immediately preceded by an accented syllable, are generally equivalent to *sh*; as in *ocean, octoacous, no'cial, log'ician, suspi'cion, suspi'cious, con'science, nau'seous, contro'versial, dissen'sion, mī'stal, or'fīon, sūct'ious*, &c. Such syllables are not always respelled, as in general, they will naturally be pronounced correctly by an English speaker. But in all exceptional, doubtful, or difficult cases, the appropriate respelling is used.

•• For an explanation of foreign sounds occurring in the Dictionary, see pp. lxxi, 1635.

RESPELLING FOR PRONUNCIATION. — (1) In respelling the French *gn, en, on, &c*, the letters *ey* are not to be pronounced themselves, being designed simply to mark the vowel as nasal, that is, as pronounced through both the nose and the mouth at the same time. — (2) The respelling of a word, when a number of related words follow, applies to all of them down to some other word which is respelled.

REFERENCES. — The figures which immediately follow certain words in the Vocabulary refer to corresponding sections in the Principles of Pronunciation.

ACCENT. — The principal accent is denoted by a heavy mark; the secondary, by a lighter mark; as in *Super'intend'ent*. In the division of words into syllables, these marks, besides performing their proper office, supply the place of the hyphen, except in some compound and derivative words.

Note.—Known in the close of the last century, words of this class were universal y pronounced with the full Italian u. Some especially among the vulgar

§ 7 Sound of broad *a*, marked *A*, *a*, as in *all*, *tall*, *qual*, *swarm*; heard also in *square*, *que*, *pedagogue*, *far*, *great*, *thought*, &c.

NOTE — This has sometimes been called the German *a*, but is a broader and more guttural sound, being formed by a depression of the larynx, and a consequent retraction of the tongue, which enlarges the cavity of the mouth posteriorly.

§ 8 Short sound of broad *a*, marked *A*, *a*, as in *what*, *us*, *where*, *yellow*, &c.; heard also in *knowledge*.

§ 17 Sound of *e* like that of long *e*, marked *E*, *e*, as in *figure*, *machine*, &c. — See § 10.

NOTE — This is appropriately the sound of *e* in all foreign languages of the Latin words in which this sound is represented by this letter as the French.

§ 18 Sound of *i* before *r*, verging toward *u* in *urge*, marked *I*, *i*, as *some*, *virgin*, *thirsty*, &c. identical with that of *e* in *ermine*.

NOTE — *i*, in this case, is sounded by many speakers like *u* in *urge*, as for *circus*. The observations would apply also to *u* in *urge* as in *urge*.

d also in *h*.

§ 9. An exceptional sound of *a* occurs in the words *any*, *many*. It is as if they were spelled *en'y*, *mén'y*, being the regular short sound of *e*.

E

§ 20 This is exceedingly common in some parts of the United States.

OCCASIONAL SOUNDS OF O.

§22 Sound of o like short u marked \hat{O} & as in *other* & *one* heard also

NOTE — All the English orthoepists agree that the u in this case drops the y or i which is generally an element of its vowel & is pronounced as u.

OO.

§23 Regular long or open sound, marked \hat{OO} , \hat{oo} , as in *moon* & *food* heard

§24 Sound of u before r in such words as *urge*, *burn*, *surly*, *concur*, &c. marked \hat{U} , \hat{u} ; heard also in *worm*, *journey* &c

§25 The following words, *room*, *root*, *roof*, *road*, *brook*, and *soon*, have

§26 Regular long sound, marked \hat{X} , \hat{x} , as in *fig*, *etyle*, *ex*, &c

NOTE — This is the same sound as long i — See §13
The word *marionnette* is pronounced *marion- \hat{x} -et*

AL SOUND OF Y

speakers

§27 The sound of *oe* (unmarked) as heard in *oeuf*, *oeil*, &c.

OCCASIONAL SOUNDS OF U.

§28 Sound of u when preceded by r in the same syllable, marked \hat{U} , \hat{u} as in *ryke*, *rumor*, *ruin* &c

(1) That of *oe* in words derived from the Anglo-Saxon as in *oat*, *bound* &c
(2) That of *oe* in words derived from the French as in *soap*, *group*, &c

NOTE — The word *roule* being directly from the French is perhaps more commonly pronounced by our English speakers with the French sound than while

III. VOWELS IN UNACCENTED SYLLABLES

(2) The syllable *ma*
words, as in *ul'ti-mo*
The former of these
No 2. These will now

§ 44 (No 1. See §
as in *Ca'bo, o-musc'*,

E.

sh
sh
sh
sh
sh

I

There is great diversity in the case of this letter Hence it is difficult to lay

IV. SILENT VOWELS.

ices are not to be sounded, as the *e* in
these cases require a more particular

L

§ 57. The letter *e* is always mute when final, except in monosyllables con-

exceptions yet in this country the first and the fourth of these words are commonly pronounced without sounding the *b*. *B* is also silent in *bedelium*.

C

Thus *C* (soft *c*) has the sound of *s* as in *cede trace*,

and this sound whenever it occurs before *e* (even if silent) *i* or *y*.

§ 64 *C* marked thus *C* (hard *c*) has the sound of *k* when it comes before *a* *o* *u* *i* or *e* before *i* *a* or *f* final and when it ends a word or a syllable as in *cell cot cut clot crock black, cat zinc tragic picture fac'cul etl'ics*—See *h* § 78.

§ 65 *C* has the sound of *x* in the words *sacrifice sue suffice, and discern* and in their derivatives. It is silent in the words *cear actuals, indict* and their derivatives and also in the termination *cele* as in *cele corpuscle* &c.

CH

§ 66 *Ch* unmarked (English *th*) has very nearly the sound of *th* as in *child, much richer speedless* &c.

NOTE.—The compound *sch* and signified by this digraph is not precisely equivalent to that represented by *th*. The ordinary sound of *t* is uttered with the *th*.

EN with *E* silent

CONSONANTS

F

§ 71 The sound of *f* (unmarked) as in *same leaf defile softly* &c.

G

§ 72 *G* marked thus, *G* (hard) has the sound of *g* as in *get gear gear, begun, beg sluggish smug* &c.

A *site* or *chire* but in a great many instances it exercises no such influence as in *is able has file mar's fine doe frine an' the granite plait* &c.

and *sch* is a mark of great vulgarity

the word *sch* is a mark of great vulgarity

§ 73 *G* marked thus, *G*, & (*g* soft), has the compound sound of *j*, as in *gem*, *rage*, *engine*, *caged*, &c. — See § 77.

NOTE. — The letter *g* generally takes this sound when it comes before *e*, *i*, or *y*; but there are some exceptions. (See the preceding section.) *G* has also its soft sound before *a* in the single word *gaol* (now commonly spelt *jail*), and in its derivatives and compounds.

§ 74. In a few words from the French, *g* retains the sound of *zh*, which it has before *e* and *i* in that language, as in *rouge* (*roozh*), *sûrprize* (*mî rāzh'*), &c.

G is silent before *m* and *n* final, and also when initial before *n*, as in *phryg*, *sign*, *gnat*.

For the office which *g* performs in such words as *longer*, *stronger*, &c., see § 82.

GH.

nounced like *p*.

Formerly this digraph had the sound of *f* much more frequently than it has at the present day. *Daughter*, for instance, was often pronounced and some-

II.

§ 82 The sound of *s* as heard in *tanger*, *link*, *uncle*, &c. (marked *S*, *U*).

§ 83 The sound of *ng* (unmarked), as in *sing*, *singer*, *singly*, &c.

P.

§ 84. The sound of *p* (unmarked), as heard in *pey*, *ape*, *paper*, *epily*, &c.

in all

§ 02 When the letter has a regularly sharp or hiss or sound follows

— See § 109

(¹⁰) *P* as in *f r f r m t s s r g* & sometimes called *smooch palatal*

In a few words a one-k syllable sound of sh as in nausea Asat c or rat er
the corf in suc c es does double duty un tin with the s to s ou fy t e

21 5 4 115

and generally at the end of French words adopted into English as *chamois*, *corps* *ris-à-tout* &c.

SH

NOTE.—The sound *an* is a nasal breath of *ab* between the tip of the tongue and the upper gum. The tongue being pressed in the proper place on *f* and *g* and *d*. *S* always has a sound at the beginning and the end of a word as *and* and *end* of word.—See § 118

It's when marked us & it has the buzzing sound of (a cat) as in

§ 96 The sound of *t* (unm) is *t* as in *water*.

NOTE - The sound of f in that *ff*...

100

and the s following it either preserve their own sounds part, or exchange them for the sound of *th* in *thus*, as in *question* (kwes'ti'yun or kwes'thun), *mixture* (mikst'i'yun or mikst'i'chun), &c. — See § 65, *NOTE*, and § 63.

TH.

§ 98 *Th* unmarked has its sharp or whispered sound, as in *thing*, *breath*, *author*, *athlete*, &c.

NOTE — This is the sound made in *hushing*. It is produced by putting the point of the tongue between the teeth, or by placing it against the back of the upper front teeth, and forcing out unintonated breath.

Th has this sound generally at the beginning, and at the end, of words; but there are some exceptions.

NOTE — This latter sound usually occurs when the syllable which immediately follows the *x* begins with an accented vowel, as in *auxiliary*, *exert*, *exalt*, *luxurious*, and sometimes also in the derivatives of such words, even though

Y.

§ 105 The sound of *y* (unmarked), as in *yawn*, *year*, *young*, *beyond*, &c.

ZH.

§ 107 This sound is the vocal correspondent of *sh*, and is uttered with the organs in precisely the same position.

NOTE — It has arisen, in all English words, from an attempt to pronounce the sound of *z* in *more* (see § 106) and that of consonant *y* (see § 105) in immediate

ASSIMILATION OF CONSONANTS.

X.

§ 104 This letter has two sounds, viz. its regular sharp sound (unmarked) like *ss*, as in *expect*, and its soft or flat sound (marked *X*, *x*) like *ps*, as in *expect*

But although only one articulation is ever used, or, in fluent speech, possibly can be used, where a consonant is written twice, yet in some words the articulation is dwelt upon for an appreciable space of time, producing an *apparent*

duplication of the sound. This effect takes place in many divided words in which the primitive ends or begins with the same letter as that with which a superadded suffix or prefix of English origin respectively begins or ends, as in *and cast, fault, business, master, extract, manifest*. The same effect takes place in most compound words, in which the second part begins with the same sound as that with which the first part ends, as in *post down, head dress, half fold*—See § 117.

ACCENT.

§ 110. Accent is a particular stress or effort of voice upon certain syllables of words which distinguishes them from the others by a greater distinctness and loudness of pronunciation. Accent is of two kinds, primary, as in *tenet*, where the full force of the voice is on the last syllable, and secondary, as in *superintendent*, where the first syllable is distinguished by a stress greater than that laid on the second and third syllables, though less than that laid on the last.

§ 111. There is in all words a certain tendency to the accent, which is called the natural accent. This is determined by the nature of the syllables, and is not subject to the influence of the mind. The natural accent is always on the last syllable of a word, unless it be a compound word, in which case it is on the first syllable of the compound. The natural accent is always on the last syllable of a word, unless it be a compound word, in which case it is on the first syllable of the compound.

§ 112. We have about a hundred words in which the accent is on the first syllable, and a few in which it is on the second. These are distinguished by the position of the accent on the first syllable, and by the position of the accent on the second syllable.

DIVIDED USAGE.

§ 113. In quite a large number of words, there is a diversity of practice among good speakers as to the place of the primary accent. This arises mainly from a conflict between certain great principles which affect the seat of the accent. A few of these will now be mentioned, with a view to account for this diversity. It is all that can be done in a brief sketch like this.

§ 114. We have a few words in which the accent is on the first syllable, and a few in which it is on the second. These are distinguished by the position of the accent on the first syllable, and by the position of the accent on the second syllable.

END.

PRINCIPLES OF PRONUNCIATION.

... in which the same syllable is periodicum, succeda'neum. A part accent the penult; as, adamant'e'ous, Atlan-

such cases, the nouns have the accent further from the end

Twixt that and reason what a nice barrier!
Forever separate, yet forever near. Pope.

Ye heath'ns! ye that from the mountain's brow
Adown enormous ravines slope again, Coleridge.

-uous; as, mellif'uous, super'fuous.
-gonal; as, diag'onal, hexag'onal
-gony; as, cosmog'ony, theog'ony
-grapher; as, lexicog'rapher, stenog'rapher.
-graphy; as, photog'raphy, typog'raphy
-loger; as, philol'oguer, astral'oguer
-logist; as, entomol'ogist, physiol'ogist
-logy; as, chronol'ogy, mythol'ogy
-logy; as, col'loquy, solil'ogy
-macy; as, logom'achy, theom'achy
-mathy; as, chrestom'athy, polym'athy
-metry; as, barom'eter, hygom'eter.
-metry; as, altim'etry, geom'etry.
-nomy; as, astron'omy, econ'omy
-parous; as, ovip'arous, vivip'arous
-pathy; as, ap'athy, antip'athy
-phony; as, antip'hony, coloph'ony.
-scopy; as, acries'copy, diuteros'copy.
-strophe; as, epas'trophe, calas'trophe.
-tomy; as, anat'omy, lithot'omy
-trophy; as, ant'rophy, hyper'trophy
-tomous; as, flammi'comous, ignis'comous.
-torous; as, carni'vorous, graminiv'orous.

puta'tion, li'en'niol and tri'en'niol, op'pose' and sup'pose', ex'er'cise and ex'ort'cise, al-le'ga'tion and al li'ga'tion; proph'et' and prof'it', do'nor' and do'nce', guar'an'tor' and guar'an'tee'

§128. When separately pronounced, all monosyllabic words have their vowel as distinctly sounded as if under accent. But in connected discourse,

SYLLABICATION.

PRINCIPLES OF PRONUNCIATION.

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

PRINCIPLES OF PRONUNCIATION

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

PRINCIPLES OF PRONUNCIATION

[illegible]

[illegible]

ORTHOGRAPHY.

OBSERVATIONS.

The English language, as being the offspring of two parent languages very different in form and spirit, and having been, in no inconsiderable degree, modified in its growth by influences from various other tongues, contains, as was inevitable, very many anomalies and no particular one, these anomalies more numerous and striking than in its orthography, with the single exception, perhaps, of its etymology. Neither the Anglo-Saxon nor the Norman French could boast of any great regularity in orthography, though the spelling of words in these two languages was far less arbitrary than it is in the modern English. When, therefore, the vocabularies of these two languages, widely different both in their orthographical structure and their phonometrical character, were combined, the result was a language in which the orthography has almost reached the extreme of irregularity. To such an extent, in fact, have the signs representing sounds been multiplied, that many of the letters are pronounced in several different ways, while the letters, or combinations of letters, for a single sound amount, in some cases, to more. Indeed, it is computed that many words of no more than two syllables may be spelled in several thousand different

endowments. To introduce a regular system of orthography; after him, William Bullock brought forward another system, a few years after this, by Mr. Master of St. Paul's School, in London, a teacher of considerable eminence, proposed another scheme, and, still later, Charles Butler devised a new method of spelling, and printed a book in which it was employed. These writers agreed essentially as to the manner in which they sought to attain the end proposed, their plan being to reduce the spelling of words to uniform principles and make it practically phonetic, by the use of new characters, by applying various diacritical marks to the old letters, and by making the letters or their combinations, represent certain definite sounds. It is needless to say that these projects were never carried into practice.

In the time of Charles I., many changes were introduced, and it was very common, even among eminent scholars, to spell words according to their pronunciation, omitting such letters as were deemed superfluous. These attempts at improvement, being made upon no settled or uniform principles, had little or no permanent effect upon the language. Another elaborate plan was proposed,

that the words in respect to which even the most careful writers are at variance are numbered by analogy has been

But as is the case
pared with that of
expect that there

though numerous inconsistencies are to be found in it, and many overights,

tion with more care than any other of the words are found recorded in great multitudes of forms, and several variations being sometimes found in the same word, variety or work. Indeed it states that "I can remember and recall his own name eight different ways" and that "the name of the king is spelled fourteen different

of much confusion. Among the most prominent alterations made by him were the restoration of *i* to many words which had long been written without it, as in *manly*, *rhizomat*, and the like, and the insertion of *u* in the termination of many words which previously ended in *or*, as in *ancientour*, *antour*, *crimur*, and

who. So also, however, more than a century later, partially revised and corrected his own work, and he again upon the same "write more to w" that which was instructed him, writing that he was obliged to it to correct and also to raise and escape. The cause of the negligence and haste with which it had been executed.

The invention of printing commenced a new era, though for a long time even this had little effect to fix the arbitrary form of the language. Indeed, much of the previous orthography of books printed two or three centuries ago is to be

perpetuated, and still exists in the orthography of English writers. In the United States a different practice prevails, as will presently be mentioned.

The scheme of Parker, who, in 1725, under the name of Robert Heron, proposed to render the language more copious by adding vowels to words ending in consonants, and by pronouncing the silent final vowels of others, in a manner perfectly arbitrary, is too ridiculous to deserve further mention. About twenty years later another absurd plan was published by Liphman, who printed a book in order to introduce it, but without success. During the last

each sound is represented by one and only one character. Such a method of class have been received with favor and adopted by a large portion of the

proposed by him chiefly on the ground of etymology and of analogy, from desire on the one hand to make the words correspond, as far as practicable, with their primitive forms, so as to reveal more clearly their etymologic

the Dictionary. It may be remarked further

RULES FOR SPELLING CERTAIN CLASSES OF WORDS,

FOUNDED ON THE ORTHOGRAPHY OF DR WEBSTER, AS EXHIBITED IN THIS VOLUME

Words of this class, in
ed by a single vowel form
e of the consonant as, as,
n quit, quitted, quitted, etc.

small, small, small, etc.

NOTE. The words let, set, and act are sometimes incorrectly
nelt, an let, and some other words which should be
are spelled, by some writers, with it doubled

in a word, or the second of a word ending in
in a syllable than the first
feel, eluck, etc.

F, also
sources, a
written
rich is ac
ly other
mock, all
haroc, arc
written w
f 0 In
beginning

E as woman, woman; goose, goose; fool, fool; tooth, tooth; brother, brother | mutable (Lat. *mutabilis*), potable (Lat. *potabilis*), credible (Lat. *credibilis*);
 goose, tooth, brother, &c. Compounds ending with these words form their plu- | vendible (Lat. *vendibilis*). These *f* words form their plu-

A LIST OF WORDS SPELLED IN TWO OR MORE WAYS.

[illegible]

[illegible]

ABBREVIATIONS USED IN THIS WORK.

[illegible]

“ In this Dept. —

[illegible]

[illegible]

ABBREVIATIONS USED IN THIS WORK.

[illegible]

A


DICTIONARY

OF

THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE.

A

ABAND



2. To banish. [Obs]
 'Tis better far the enemies to abandon

[See ABANDON] (Law) Any thing for-
 confiscated.

of Scots . . . some abated the walls [of the Castle
 Hall,
 ng down or reduce from a higher to a
 number, degree, &c. ; to lessen, to di-
 mit, to deduct, as, to *abate* a demand;
 de, zeal, hope, &c.
 and parishes, *abating* the odd hundreds. Fuller,
 seen the dignity or consequence of by
 , to deprive. [Obs]
 hath *abated* me of half my train. Shak.
 (a) To bring entirely down or put as
 to *abate* a nuisance, to *abate* a writ.
 (a) To diminish, to reduce. Le-
 gible to be *abated* entirely or in propor-
 tion of deficiency of assets
 law, to remit it either wholly or in part.
 [imp & p. p. ABATED, p. pr. & vb. n.]
 cease, or become less in strength or vio-
 lence; a storm *abates*,
 is quieted, or come to naught; to fall, as,
 'To perform well a downward motion,
 said to *abate*, or take down his curves,

statement. [Obs] Brownie.
 [Fr. *abattement*, Fr. *abattement*,

A *ban'don-ee'*, n. (Law) One to whom anything
 is abandoned
 A *ban'don-er*, n. One who abandons
 A *ban'don-ment*, n. The abandonment

[illegible]

If we observe the eye into either corner the object will not duplicate.

Yahya A. M. Al-Sayid, *Ph.D., is an associate professor of statistics at the University of Baghdad, Iraq. He has published several papers in the field of statistics and is currently working on a book on statistical inference.*

At this time, the authors are not aware of any other studies that have examined the effects of a single session of a group-based, self-help, cognitive-behavioral program on the self-efficacy of older adults with arthritis.

Abbe n (Tr nite from nite) An abbe tot

Journal of Management Education 26(7)>

1. The first step is to identify the problem. In this case, the problem is that the system is not working properly.

delivered to the patient. The patient is then asked to perform the same task with the other hand. The patient is then asked to perform the same task with the other hand. The patient is then asked to perform the same task with the other hand.

1. The first step in the process is to identify the problem or issue that needs to be addressed. This involves gathering information and understanding the context of the problem.

2010年12月10日

[illegible][illegible]

the 1990s, the number of people in the United States who are 65 years of age or older is projected to increase from 20 million to 30 million, and the number of people 75 years of age or older is projected to increase from 10 million to 15 million (U.S. Census Bureau, 1997). The number of people 85 years of age or older is projected to increase from 2 million to 4 million (U.S. Census Bureau, 1997). The number of people 90 years of age or older is projected to increase from 500,000 to 1 million (U.S. Census Bureau, 1997). The number of people 95 years of age or older is projected to increase from 100,000 to 200,000 (U.S. Census Bureau, 1997). The number of people 100 years of age or older is projected to increase from 10,000 to 20,000 (U.S. Census Bureau, 1997).

de la

the 1990s, the number of people in the world who are under 15 years of age is expected to increase from 1.1 billion to 1.5 billion. The number of people aged 65 and over is expected to increase from 250 million to 450 million. The number of people aged 15 and over is expected to increase from 3.5 billion to 4.5 billion. The number of people aged 15 and over is expected to increase from 3.5 billion to 4.5 billion. The number of people aged 15 and over is expected to increase from 3.5 billion to 4.5 billion.

the 1990s, the number of people in the world who are illiterate has increased from 1.2 billion to 1.5 billion. The number of illiterate people in the world is expected to reach 1.7 billion by the year 2015. The number of illiterate people in the world is expected to reach 1.7 billion by the year 2015.

the 1990s, the number of people in the world who are under 15 years of age is expected to increase by 1.5 billion, from 1.1 billion in 1990 to 2.6 billion in 2010. The number of people aged 65 and over is expected to increase by 1.1 billion, from 350 million in 1990 to 1.4 billion in 2010. The number of people aged 15-64 years is expected to increase by 1.5 billion, from 2.5 billion in 1990 to 4.0 billion in 2010. The number of people aged 15-64 years is expected to increase by 1.5 billion, from 2.5 billion in 1990 to 4.0 billion in 2010.

Acknowledgments—We thank Dr. J. A. B. Brown for his comments on the manuscript.

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die, $\frac{1}{2}$, $\frac{1}{3}$, $\frac{1}{4}$, $\frac{1}{5}$, $\frac{1}{6}$, $\frac{1}{7}$, $\frac{1}{8}$, $\frac{1}{9}$, $\frac{1}{10}$, $\frac{1}{11}$, $\frac{1}{12}$, $\frac{1}{13}$, $\frac{1}{14}$, $\frac{1}{15}$, $\frac{1}{16}$, $\frac{1}{17}$, $\frac{1}{18}$, $\frac{1}{19}$, $\frac{1}{20}$, $\frac{1}{21}$, $\frac{1}{22}$, $\frac{1}{23}$, $\frac{1}{24}$, $\frac{1}{25}$, $\frac{1}{26}$, $\frac{1}{27}$, $\frac{1}{28}$, $\frac{1}{29}$, $\frac{1}{30}$, $\frac{1}{31}$, $\frac{1}{32}$, $\frac{1}{33}$, $\frac{1}{34}$, $\frac{1}{35}$, $\frac{1}{36}$, $\frac{1}{37}$, $\frac{1}{38}$, $\frac{1}{39}$, $\frac{1}{40}$, $\frac{1}{41}$, $\frac{1}{42}$, $\frac{1}{43}$, $\frac{1}{44}$, $\frac{1}{45}$, $\frac{1}{46}$, $\frac{1}{47}$, $\frac{1}{48}$, $\frac{1}{49}$, $\frac{1}{50}$, $\frac{1}{51}$, $\frac{1}{52}$, $\frac{1}{53}$, $\frac{1}{54}$, $\frac{1}{55}$, $\frac{1}{56}$, $\frac{1}{57}$, $\frac{1}{58}$, $\frac{1}{59}$, $\frac{1}{60}$, $\frac{1}{61}$, $\frac{1}{62}$, $\frac{1}{63}$, $\frac{1}{64}$, $\frac{1}{65}$, $\frac{1}{66}$, $\frac{1}{67}$, $\frac{1}{68}$, $\frac{1}{69}$, $\frac{1}{70}$, $\frac{1}{71}$, $\frac{1}{72}$, $\frac{1}{73}$, $\frac{1}{74}$, $\frac{1}{75}$, $\frac{1}{76}$, $\frac{1}{77}$, $\frac{1}{78}$, $\frac{1}{79}$, $\frac{1}{80}$, $\frac{1}{81}$, $\frac{1}{82}$, $\frac{1}{83}$, $\frac{1}{84}$, $\frac{1}{85}$, $\frac{1}{86}$, $\frac{1}{87}$, $\frac{1}{88}$, $\frac{1}{89}$, $\frac{1}{90}$, $\frac{1}{91}$, $\frac{1}{92}$, $\frac{1}{93}$, $\frac{1}{94}$, $\frac{1}{95}$, $\frac{1}{96}$, $\frac{1}{97}$, $\frac{1}{98}$, $\frac{1}{99}$, $\frac{1}{100}$.

At the same time, the authors note that the results of the study are not generalizable to all populations, and that further research is needed to explore the long-term effects of the intervention on mental health outcomes.

[illegible][illegible][illegible][illegible]

Handwritten signature

the 1990s, the number of people in the United States who are 65 years of age or older is projected to increase from 20 million to 30 million, and the number of people 75 years of age or older is projected to increase from 10 million to 15 million (U.S. Census Bureau, 1996). The number of people 85 years of age or older is projected to increase from 2 million to 4 million (U.S. Census Bureau, 1996). The number of people 90 years of age or older is projected to increase from 500,000 to 1 million (U.S. Census Bureau, 1996). The number of people 95 years of age or older is projected to increase from 100,000 to 200,000 (U.S. Census Bureau, 1996). The number of people 100 years of age or older is projected to increase from 10,000 to 20,000 (U.S. Census Bureau, 1996).

first, rude, push, e, i, v silent, f as s, gh as sh; t, ch, as k, g as j, g as lo get, z as x, i as ex, n as lo ninger, likh, th as lo

state. "The aberrations of youth" Hall "15-1

3. (Late) to encourage, counsel, incite or instigate to commit a crime or assist in a criminal act.

Syn -- To aid assist support encourage instigate, back, connive at

[illegible][illegible]

1 On the exterior part or surface of; on every side of, all over or around, in a circle surround

A *brûler*, v. t. [A B. *abrethau*] To wash, to

around [Obs.]

2 Beyond or out of a house, camp, or other enclosure, as, to walk *abroad*.

3 To go about, to undertake, to prepare one's

self, to endeavor

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He . . . began . . . to blaze abroad the matter

Mark 1. 45

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about
To come about, to occur in the order of things, to take place — *to bring about*, to cause to take place, to accomplish — *To go about*, to undertake, to prepare one's self, to endeavor

A *hough-sledge*, n. The largest hammer used by smiths

W. A. L.

Ab

3 Without notice to prepare the mind for the

that

3 To take up by cohesive, chemical, or any molecular action as when charcoal *absorbs* gases. No heat, light and electricity are *absorbed* or taken up in the substances into which they pass. Alcohol

Syn —To **USE** AN **EXPOSURE**, **SWALLOW UP** **FOOD**

7 (Chem) Pure, unmixed, as, *absolute alcohol*
8 (Gram) Not immediately dependent on the other parts of the sentence in government, as, *the case is absolute*

Lethan gulfs receive them as they fall,
 And dash ob vion soon whorls them all. *Cropper*
 Too long hath love engrossed Britannia's stage,
 And sunk to softness all our tragic rage. *Tickell*
 Wholly and the same

The advantage of his pleasure took the king
2 Want destination "In the absence of con
very local law " Arnt

The element of absolutism and prelaty was controlling

1. To take or with draw to such a distance as to prevent intercourse. — used with the reciprocal

Aggravated assault on a child and a 10-year-old girl.

3 Positive, clear crystals (10%)

4. Promotive of abstinence (Rare) type

Such is the virtue of the abstemious well *Dryden*

13 In early English this word denoted merely ab

g from wine as it does in French
Under his tongue are

Abelmoschus I grew up and curved again. **A/ Mrs.**

für, unde, push, e, f, o, silent, v as u, ch as sh e, ch, as k, g as j g as in get, r as x, x as gx, u as in hinger, hok, th as f

Abstemiously, adv. In an abstemious manner, temporarily.

Abstemiousness, n. The quality of being abstemious.

Abstraction

Abstract

without restriction to any particular time or place

Abstract

Abused' (35), n. [Lat. *abusus*, proceeding from one that is dual, or from that which is dull sounding, consequently giving an empty or harsh sound, offending the ear, incongruous, *ab* and *surdus*, (deaf, not hearing, dull sounding).

1 Separate or disconnected,

The evil one **abstracted** blood from his own evil **Abolition**
 2 Rifled or purged. "Abstracted spiritual **Domine**"
 3 Abstract, difficult, abstract
 4 Inattentive

Abstinence, n. [X Lat. *absterere*, to wipe
Abstinence The act of wiping clean, or n
 The act of abstaining or similar applications

Abstinence, n. [Fr. *absterge*, to wipe
 The quality of cleansing

Abstinence, n. Something clean as [bare]

Abstinence, n. [Lat. *absterere*, to wipe
 The strong abstinence of some heroic magistrates **Absterge**
 The act of abstaining, or the practice of
 especially the refraining from any action,
 or from customary gratifications of animal
 propensities.

The abstinence from a present pleasure that offers itself is a
 pain, say, oftentimes a very great one **Locke**

To punish bodies for the soul's abuse, **Devoles**

Total abstinence, an entire refraining from intoxicating
 liquors

Abstinence, n. Same as **ABSTINENCE** [bare]

Abstinence, n. [Lat. *absterere*, to wipe
 Fr. and fr. abstinent, p. pr. of **absterere**,
 from indulgence, especially in the use of food and
 drink

Abstinence, n. [Eccl. Hist.] One of a sect which
 appeared in France, and Spain in the third century
 and which opposed marriage, condemned the use of
 flesh meat and placed the Holy spirit in the class
 of created beings

Abstinence, n. With abstinence

Abstinence, n. [Lat. *ab, absterere*, p. p. of
absterere, to wipe away

Abstraction, n. [Imp. & p. p. **Abstracted**, p. pr.
Abstracted, to draw from or separate from, **ab, absterere**,
 to wipe away

1 To draw from or separate, as, to abstract an
 action from its evil effects.

It was incapable of forming any opinion or resolution **ab-**
 stracter from his own prejudices

2 To draw off in respect to interest or attraction, **ab-**
 his mind was wholly **abstracted** by other objects

3 To separate, as ideas, by the **ab-**
 mind, to consider by itself,

4 To contemplate, or to reduce
 rarely, as a quality or attribute

5 To take secretly or reduce
 property of another, to purloin

6 (When) To separate, or to **ab-**
 of a part

Abstract

Abstract

Abstract

Abstract

Abstract

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Abstract

Abstract is taken (fish/us), a **Abstracted**, or
 drawn from other substances, particularly from
 vegetables, without fermentation (the)
Abstractive, a [Fr. *abstractif*, fr. *abstractif*,
 having the power of abstracting.]

Syn - Ample, pure, &c.

A-cet'a hie, n. [See ACETANILUM
lum; a measure of about one six
(Obs.)

A-cet'a hie, n.

1. (Dom. Acety.) A vessel of
porcelain, silver, bronze, or gold,
in the form of a goblet or tea-
cup, in which vinegar was
brought to the table, a vinegar
crust, a measure of about one
eighth of a pint among the an-
cients. The cutie of an original,
of fine red clay, in the Museum

2. Causing seedling, ac, acc.

Ac'e-tyle, n. [Lat. *aceticum*, vinegar
substance or base.] (Chem.) A com-
pound radical, composed of four parts
three of hydrogen.

A, e, i, o, u, f, long; A, e, i, o, u, f, short

vgl, arm, plique,

for, dq, welf, fof, fof;

as the result usually of training, as, an accom-
 scholar, an accomplished villain.

1. To reckon, set, or compute, "It was accounted
 to him for righteousness" *Gal. iii. 8.*
 tion; to judge or

superintending ac-
 so, an officer in the
 es the money paid
 ink of England
 [Obs.] *Shak.*
 e or employment

which accounts
Shak.
 none else

Account current, a running or continued account be-
 tween two or more parties, or a statement of the partic-
 ulars of such an account — To make account, to have an
 opinion or expectation, if a sense now obsolete

According as he thinks they b
 and such.

The land which the Lord will
 promised.

Acer-rose (Synop., §120), *n*. [Lat. *aceroseus*, chafy, from *acer*, gen. *acris*, *r*, *us*, *chaff*, and *N*. Lat. *acerosus*, from *acer*, gen. *acris*, *m*, *point*, *needle*; *Fr. acérose*] (*dist*) (*a*) Having the texture of chaff, chafy. (*b*) Having the shape of a needle, as the leaf of the pine. *Gray*.

Acer-rose, *n*. Same as *ACEROSE*.
Acer-rose (14), *n*. [Lat. *acervatus*, from *acervus*, *heap*] Pertaining to a heap [*Rare*].

Acer-rose, *v. i.* To heap up [*Obs*].
Acer-rose, *n*. [Lat. *acervatus*, *p. p.* of *acervus*]

Acer-rose (14) *n*.

Acer-rose (14) *n*. [Fr. *acervus*, *heap*, a little saucer used by botanists, *vinegar*]

Acer-rose (14) *n*. [From *acervus*, a vessel of porcelain, silver, bronze, or gold, in the form of a goblet or tea cup, in which vinegar was brought to the table, a vinegar cruse, a measure of about one eighth of a pint among the ancients. The cut is of an ancient, of fine red clay, in the Museum of Naples]

16

plaint, separation, determination } A state or condition of which no right judgment can be formed
that of which no choice is made }
indiscretion }

ACTINIFORM

to the end of a p
as ACROTERISM.
ing to the acroter
P.
ROTERIA. {Gr.
; extreme; Lat.
red-
and,
ex-

Actinism = (Gr. *aktis* = ray) (Lat. *actis*)

It may be the interest of British nature to deprive us, as

2 (Zool.) Having a sting or prickles

Actinism = (Gr. *aktis* = ray) (Lat. *actis*)

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
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Actinism = (Gr. *aktis* = ray) (Lat. *actis*)



Having acute angles
Herberton



Acute Angle

music
4 (Life) Violence of a disease, which brings it
suddenly to a crisis
Syn - Penetration sagacity, keenness, ingenuity,
shrewdness
A-cu-ti-sh'or (sh'or), n [L. Lat. *acutator*, from

Admission [Lat to the domain? etc. -]

"The addition was to correct
Shal

ʔa ma n̄i ʔa n̄i [Lai aʔamantens] Hard as
 adjacent
 ʔa n̄i ʔa n̄i

Back to the run!

т. е. *взду, тѣрм; plaque, firm; дѣне, фѣр, дѣ, wph, food, foot;*

3 To direct words or discourse to, to apply to | to take, akin to Ger *nehmen*; Fr. *adoption* | 2 That which adheres [Obs] "Verred with its

Tough could not be adduced to satisfy the purpose of illustration
 Syn - To offer; present, allege advance cite
 name; mention; quote
 Ad different n [Lat *adhuc*, p. pr. of *adhere*]

to
 to
 PC

Without any sinister suspicion of any
 thing being ruled or misused. *Adipha*.
 A-dip-si-fion (dip-si-hun), n [Lat. *adipha*, from
adipha to take away, *ad* and *ipha*, to buy, orig

A

Adip, ripe, push, e, f, o, silent, y as e, ch as sh, c, ch, as k, g as j, c as in jet, g as z; k as ge, n as in finger, high; th as in

Adjutant-general (Adj) the principal staff officer of the United States army. -- *Adjutant-general* among the *semita*, one of a special number of fathers, who resided with the general of the order, each of whom had a province or country assigned to his care.

Adjunctive *color* one which requires to be fixed by some word or base to give a permanent color.

Adjunctive *five* *r* / To make an adjective of, to form

2 To counsel against wrong practices to caution

Administrix n. A woman; especially one who administers; a trustee or to whom letters of administration have been granted.

capable of choosing for himself was admitted into

Ad nūb'li *Ited. a.* (Lat. *adnubilis*, to obscure,
from *ad* and *nubes*, cloud; *nubilus*, cloudy } Cloud
ed, obscured, } He
A-do' (23) *a* } *Pre* *u* for *to*, and *do* } *Chewer*, } *He*
} *popan*
} *degen*

If the tuneful Muse affords the sweetest numbers. *Affront*
The quiet lanes of Surrey... afford salient retreat on
every side. *G. Lane*

Syn.—To give; impart; yield; produce.
Affront *v. t.* [L. *affrontare* to and fo-
re—*frons* forehead] to

Fr. affront, affront, N. fr. affront
Fr. affront, D. Fr. affront

—see to quarrel a brow

Affirm *v. t.* [L. *affirmare* to confirm, to affirm]
1. To affirm or assert a judgment, a statute in accordance
of common law
2. Declaration affirmation [True] *Colles*
3. (Law) Confirmation of a volatile act. *H. Burton*
Affirmant, *n.* [Lat. *affirmans*, p. pr. of *affirmare*
to affirm]
1. One who affirms or asserts
2. (Law) One who solemnly affirms, instead of
taking an oath
Affirmation, *n.* [Fr. *affirmation*, Lat. *affirmatio*]
1. The act of affirming or asserting as true,
opposed to *negation* or *denial*
2. That which is asserted; assertion; statement,
opposed to an *affirmation*, by the

1. Affirming or asserting *affirmation*
exists.—opposed to *negation*; as, an *affirmative*
is *affirmative*

3. *n.* Same
[Fr. *affirmation*,
Latin, *affirmatio*,
Latin, *affirmatio*]

—affirmative

Affirm

A

—*affirm* (affirm) *n.* 1. sudden and great leap

Affirm

A

last

the

power

of prophecy

The prophetic *affirmation*

power

of prophecy

The prophetic *affirmation*

3 In return; back, as, bring us word *again*.

Again and again, often, with frequent repetition —
To and again, to and fro, [Old] *D. L. 101* — In old writ-
 ings *again* is sometimes used for *against* — "A candle
ajain you rise" *Massinger*.

1 Abreast of; opposite to, facing, as, *against* the
 mouth of a river, — in this sense often preceded by
over

the early Christians, but at the time of the common
 law, when contributions were made for the poor
 the white man's money was not counted as such.

as in one compound
 images of America
 (Latinally)
 ng power to cause

as a language
 were not and great
 co [Obs] 'Thai
 Spenser.

1000

100

100

100

100

100

1. (Com.) The difference in value between metal-

See *supra*] Any male

Aggressⁿ
Aggression

Aggressive, a [Fr. *agressif*] Tending

agress, making the first attack Cf

Aggressiveness, n. The quality or stat-

ing aggressive

Aggressor, a [Lat. *aggressor*, Fr. *ag-*

ression, he who first commences hostility or a c-

an assaulter, an intruder

Aggression, n. The act of aggression or the state of

aggression


3 A prayer in the office

Agonistic ally, adv. In an agonistic manner.
 Agonistic ally, adv. In an agonistic manner.
 Agonistic ally, adv. In an agonistic manner.
 Agonistic ally, adv. In an agonistic manner.
 Agonistic ally, adv. In an agonistic manner.
 Agonistic ally, adv. In an agonistic manner.
 Agonistic ally, adv. In an agonistic manner.
 Agonistic ally, adv. In an agonistic manner.
 Agonistic ally, adv. In an agonistic manner.
 Agonistic ally, adv. In an agonistic manner.

2. It is so extreme as to cause writing of the
 to the other male in three male in the

the same hope of success

Agonistic ally, adv. [To fight and good] In earnest in
 reality "I make her weep good"
 Agonistic ally, adv. [To fight and good]
 Agonistic ally, adv. [To fight and good]
 In earnest, up agonistic ally, N




us
 li
 ber

1. In

2. In actor's view



Syn.~To help, assist, support, sustain, succor
 at, as, to *aim* at distinction. *"Am at thou at*
 prince's" *scope."*



1. Look | A feathery crown of steel. See ECHER.
 2. A plume or an ornament for the head composed
 of feathers, or of precious stones, in the form of a
 heron's crest

Al-*q'do*, n. [Lat. al-Mohammedanism; Alcoranic. "The *Alcoranish*
Arabic." Parkhurst.

company.

Ale'-cherry, n. A beverage, made by boiling ale
with spice, sugar, and a tops of bread Johnson

Ale'-cra-nia, n. (From ale and crows, to know or
see.) An officer in former times to inspect the
markets used in public houses, to prevent frauds in
selling liquors

Ale'-e-das, n. (*Bet*) A plant sometimes put into
ale to improve its taste, costmary, *Dianthus syl-*
vester London

Ale'-e-pho-pha-she, n. (= Ale) ale in cook and

and the pillar or pilaster which is used to decorate the arch

ἀλεύρο σῦν σῦ, α [*Gr* *Alēpsos*, wheaten flour, and *σῦν*, division] *dissepmentis*, division

ἀλεύρο σῦν σῦ, α [*Gr* *Alēpsos*, wheaten flour, and *σῦν*, division] *dissepmentis*, division

the ancient *Encyc Brit*

ἀλεύρο σῦν σῦ, α [*Gr* *Alēpsos*, wheaten flour, and *σῦν*, division] *dissepmentis*, division

measure } the quantity

ἀλεύρο σῦν σῦ, α [*Gr* *Alēpsos*, wheaten flour, and *σῦν*, division] *dissepmentis*, division

Algerine (al-jeer-en'), *n.* [From *Algiers*]
 1 (Geog) A native or an inhabitant of Algiers.
 2 (Fig) A pirate.
Algerine, *a* (Geog) Pertaining to Algiers, or to its inhabitants.
Al'id (al'id), *a* [Lat *algidus*, cold *algere* to be cold]

the
will

the
is the
surface.

The term was originally applied by the Portuguese to the white negroes they met with on the coast of Africa.

kingfisher. They usually live about rivers, feeding on fish. See



Mohammedanism, Alcoranic, "The Alcoranish Arabic" "The Alcoranish Parkhurst."

company.

[illegible]

The bottom part contains liquor to be distilled is called the *cuerpo* or upper part which receives and condenses the steam is called *Head* the neck of which is fitted to neck of a receiver. The head is properly the *alembic*. This vessel of now used having been superseded by the water still and retort.

Journal of Interpersonal Violence 28(10) 2069–2087
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A Who can not have been altogether an alien from the re-
members of your journey into the history of the two state
1948.
A 1. *alien*-a bl'i' /y/, n The quality of being alienable;
 o state or capacity of being alienable; o trans-
 ferred "The alienability of the domain." Ferde,
 1
 alien-a bl'e/, n [Fr *aliénable*] Capable of being
 transferred, sold or transferred to another; o land
 o alienable according to the laws of the state
 1
 alien -age (45), n The state of being an alien.

Who can not have been altogether an alien from the researches of your lordship into the history of the two late irons.

1 **alien-ability**, *a.* The quality of being alienable;
2 the state or capacity of being alienated or trans-
3 ferred. *"The alienability of the domain."* *Furber*.
4 **alien-able**, *a.* [*Fr. alienable*] Capable of being
5 alienated sold or transferred to another as, land
6 alienable according to the laws of the state
7 **alien-ee** (43). *n.* The state of being an alien.

Why restore returns forthwith on account of shewage? Stop.

f as in *forl*, *rude*, *rush*; *c, d, o*, silent; *ç* as *s*, *ch* as *sh*; *c, ch*, as *k*, *ç* as *j* *ç* as in *jet*; *g* as *g*, *x* as *gs*; *y* as in *liger*, *high*; *th* as in

37

and some one and all {Ole} "Displeased all and
some" fairer - A! And/or entirely completely; as
to beat any one all hollow {Ole}
All = The whole number quantity, or amount,
the entire thing every thing included or concerned,
the aggregate, the whole, the total, totality, etc.
Our all at stake.
And Lohas said, All that thou seest is mine. Gen. xxi. 31.
A! is all a phrase which a man says.

3 (Common Law) The statement of a party of what he can prove
4 (Civ. Law) A formal complaint, or declaration of charge. The defendant's statement of circumstances in his defense is called his defensive allegation

God. See JEHOVAH and HALLELUJAH } Praise
Jehovah, -- hence, a song of ascription of praise to
God.
I heard a great voice of much people in heaven saying *Al-
li-lu-lu-ha!*

3 To make less by representation, to lessen in respect to magnitude or value *Sp Horsey*

3 To make less by representation, to lessen by

de Bro infrn } One
legory as allegor }
} Some
} ALLEGORIZED
} Lat allegorize are

Alayment, n. A state of being alayed or rest after disturbance, that which allays, a palliative, a ment, ease



ultra reaching to the middle
of the thigh, and sometimes
below the knees Fairholt
Allee (tation), n. [Lat al-
lectio, allocate, verb fre-
quently of allures to ni-
lure, from ad and lacere to
entice.] Enticement, al-
lurement. {Ox} Cales
Allee'tive, a. Alluring
{Ox} Chaucer
Allee'tive, n. Allurement.
{Ox} Bp Trilator
A 322

1 *Allegre* See *Allegre*, *Allegre* Actor A. D. 1802
 2 *Allegre* This speaking corresponding to *allegre* was once
 the prevail game
 3 *Allegre* A kind of Epn
 4 *Allegre* [Gls]
 5 *Allegre* [Gls] n [Lat *alleg*
 6 *tion* See *in/n*
 7 1 Positive assertion or dec
 8 2 Erroneous allegations of fac
 9 3 That which is alleged, a
 10 that which is offered as a rea
 11 *tion*

fact, rude, push; e, d, w = , l, no s, sh as of e ' as h d as ' as e, q as n, d as g; u as in bigger, like; sh as in

3 The persons or parties allied.

I would not boast the greatness of my father,

But point out new advances to Cato

Addition.

Syn.—Connection; affinity; union; confederacy.

Allo-cution, n. [Lat. *allocutio*, from *alloqui*, to speak to; *ad* and *loqui*, to speak, Fr. *allocution*.]

1 The act or manner of speaking to, or of ad-

pare, L. Lat. *allocare*; Lat. *ad* and *locare*, to place, see ALLOCATION.)

The process of whom his masters had no right know when

Amphipoda, n. pl. (Zool.) A certain tribe of crustaceans. See AMPHIPOD.

Amplexifilium, n. An embrace. (Obs.)



act of operation of amputating or cut-

rests finally
has come in the
Johnston

AMPEL

In form
Amphitetrastria, n. [La]
resembling an amphitetrastria
Amphitetrastria, n.

Amplexant, a. [Lat. *amplexant*, to embrace]
(Bot.) clasping the stem of a plant, as, *amplexant*
tendrils. Gray

of the semicircular canals of the ear.
Amplexion.

Ampullaceous, a. [Lat. *ampullaceus* from *ampulla*.] Like a bottle or inflated bladder, swelling. *Ampulla*.



Amplex, n. The state of being ample, large
ness, capacity.

first, unde, p, sh, e, t, e, silent, s as s; ch as sh, e, ch, as k, k as k; g as in get; f as f, b as in bigger, h as h

by means
[Pare]

Optive

Fracture
look of a
fracture
anly on
description
Johnson
11 before
circle of



carry 2
carry 1
self train

Anciently, ad-
since past.
Ancientness

In and of times In times long | The truth is, a great deal must be an inscription. to a size |

In an
of

of the, of, about, f as s; ch as sh, e, ch, as k, f as j, g as in get, z as x, y as in finger, ligk, th as in thine

pertaining to the persons who settle in England; also said to draw the breath from across the water.

2 In a more limited sense, an irrational being as

3 Consisting of the flesh of animals, as, animal food.

Whence sh
3 Showing
4 Hence
5 Fasting
6 God had power
the forwardness
8 Stimulat

Syn - Trans
provided hot
electric influx
Ang sh'na
A 1 =

Is
An
bl
X
pa
na
deu
di
Gru
na
A
Ac

He dismissed their commissioners with severe and sharp
condemnation.
Syn - Sciretore, criticism, censure (remark to

Lander

1 VERTEBRATES having
an internal jointed bony
skeleton a brain and a spi
nal cord along the back

1 MAMMALS; as Man Quad
rupeds
2 FISHES
3 REPTILES; as Lizards Tur
tles Snakes Frogs
4 BIRDS

ANIMATE

a plant; a species of hymenoptera, the Linnaean genus *Formica*, a family of several genera.
 as among bees, there are neuters or he makes and females, the former
 a. They live together in swarms.
 as of earth, variously chambered
 maintain a perfect system of order,
 and nurture their young



Let another praise thee, and not thy own mouth.
 From XVII. 2.

XX This word is often used without a noun, becoming

1 One who contends with another, especially in combat, an adversary, an opponent, a competitor.
 "Our antagonists in these controversies" Hooker.
 Antagonist of heaven's Almighty King Milton
 2 (Anat.) A muscle which acts in opposition to another, as a flexor, which bends a part, is the antagonist of an extensor, which extends it.
 Byn.—Adversary, enemy, opponent. See ADVERS.

They were distinct, adverse, even antagonistic Milton.
 An tãg'o nize, v. t. [Gr. *antagonistês*.] See

II, M. [from *anti*, q. v., and
 A remedy for the purpose of
 r of counteracting an alkaline
 m.
 or lin), a. Of power to cause

[Gr. *antarkhês*, from *anti* and *arkhê*.]
 ding back and breaking. See

Ante, M. I. [from *anti*, q. v., and
 Ante, M. I. [from *anti*, q. v., and

damages
 Will any man argue that he can not be justly pun-
 ished, but is answerable only to God?
 3 Correspondent, conformable. Hence, compe-
 rable
 "What wit and policy of man is answerable to their discreet
 and orderly course?"
 This revelation . . . was unanswerable to that of the apostle to
 the Thessalonians

A p^{er}ty, *adv* Openly. [Rare.]
 A p^{er}t^{ness}, *n* Openness. [Rare.]
 A p^{er}t^{or}, *n* [Lat. *aperitor*, one who opens, from
aperire] (*dwit*) A muscle that raises the upper
 eyelid.
 A p^{er}t^{er}, *n* [Lat. *aperitor*, one who opens, from
aperire] (*dwit*) A muscle that raises the upper
 eyelid.

Aphrodite, the goddess of love, Venus. [Mod.] Exciting
 venereal desire; increasing the appetite for sexual
 connection.
 A p^{er}ty, *adv* Openly. [Rare.]
 A p^{er}t^{ness}, *n* Openness. [Rare.]
 A p^{er}t^{or}, *n* [Lat. *aperitor*, one who opens, from
aperire] (*dwit*) A muscle that raises the upper
 eyelid.

New Testament, containing the revelation delivered
 to St. John, in Patmos, near the close of the first
 century.
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 eyelid.

trai line on
 the swordfish.
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 A p^{er}t^{ness}, *n* Openness. [Rare.]
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 A p^{er}t^{or}, *n* [Lat. *aperitor*, one who opens, from
aperire] (*dwit*) A muscle that raises the upper
 eyelid.

plaque, firm; done, for, dg, wqis, food, sdot.

...and the latter the apostle
 ...the same respectable grammarians, this distinc-

...reason of what appears to others wrong or unjustifi- continuous part of the body of the bone, in distinc-

...the earth is in
 ...the centre of the sun, it is name was given to flat
 ...post in the orbit of the sun, or of a planet which is at

...the earth is in
 ...the centre of the sun, it is name was given to flat
 ...post in the orbit of the sun, or of a planet which is at

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 ...the centre of the sun, it is name was given to flat
 ...post in the orbit of the sun, or of a planet which is at

[illegible]

A. 1981

2 (Low
inferior 1
cause and
charge
state crim.
of nat.

第 1 章 绪论
 第 2 章 电路的基本概念和基本定律
 第 3 章 电阻电路的分析和化简
 第 4 章 正弦稳态电路的分析
 第 5 章 非正弦周期电流电路和功率计算
 第 6 章 动态电路分析
 第 7 章 耦合电感电路
 第 8 章 耦合电容电路
 第 9 章 磁耦合电路
 第 10 章 二端口网络
 第 11 章 电路的暂态分析
 第 12 章 非线性电路
 第 13 章 电路的计算机仿真
 第 14 章 电路实验

APPEND I

1000
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visible

2 T
tion or
tried
Wap

3 T
mind
compr
or mar

4 T
They
fast.
Syn
App en
App en
Lat. *ap*

38

* = closely; to engage and employ diligently
 * in attention, to incline.

applied myself to him for help. *Johnson*
 • I kept at work; to ply. [*Obs*]
 • • skillful in *plying* his "humors." *Swine*
 • [*Obs*] "And he *plied* each place
 Chaucer

ἄρπυιες, *ar'pyi'es*, *n* Something which creates or whets an appetite.

The court evince the medical to hinder in person

Учредитель:

Abstract

2 To praise by words,
of, to commend

By the gods, I do expect:

Syn -- To praise, extol
fully. See PRAISE.

Applauder, *v* One who applauds, praises, or commends.

As a result

to make fast

2 To fix by a decree, order, command, resolve, decision, or mutual agreement, to constitute, ordain, to prescribe

15100

Apple-tree, n. The tree which bears apples. A

To Hatan, first is a

E, ē, ȳ, ū, ū, ȳ, long, A, ē, ȳ, ū, ū, ȳ, short, care, fār, lāst, fāll, wĥat, thĥere, vĥll, tĥrm, pĥque, fĥrm; dōne, fōr, dg, wōlf, fōdd, fōet

Noted

1. (Logic) Reasoning *a priori* is that which deduces consequences from definitions formed or principles assumed or which infers effects from causes previously known. This is the reverse of a *posteriori*.

2. (Philos) knowledge and conceptions *a priori* are those which are not gained from experience.

Similar to
a river
edge
s of the
nglison
water
Jonson
is, from

ounding
I say
tous de
Danu

4. (Anatomy) The *apron* is the part of the body which is the seat of the *apron*.

Learn 'An apron' Johnson

Learn 'An apron' Johnson

Water, a *water* is a *water* from *aqua*, q. v. It is the *water* bearer, a sign in the zodiac which the sun enters about the 21st of January, — so called from the rains which prevail at that season in Italy and the East.



Aquarius.

furl, ryde, pash, e, d, o, silent, f as s, th as sh, c, ch, as k, k as j, g as in get, g as s, x as in ugger, h as in that

To hear and decide, as arbitrators, as to
 outh.
 Pr.

Like the insects, and unlike the crustacea, they are air-breathing, but like the crustacea, and unlike the insects they have no distinction of head and thorax, the two being united into what is called a cephalo thorax. They undergo no metamorphosis, and have no antennae, and no wings. The order includes, with spiders, the scorpions, and mites, of which



Dana Mygale foliosa

As *herb*, it is a *herb*, and in its first sense it has been changed from *herb*, q. v. In Chaucer *herber*, *herbere*, is equivalent to

in ancient Athens.

1st The first was properly the *archon*, the second was

2. Having the appearance or quality of fire; fierce, as, *ardent eyes*.

sun's rays.

2 Warmth, or heat of passion or affection; eagerness, as, he pursues study with *ardor*; they fought with *ardor*.

3 Milton uses the word for person or spirit, bright and effulgent ("celestial ardors"), but by an unusual license.

Syn.—Fervor; warmth, eagerness. See Fervor.

Ar-du'i-ty, n. Height, difficulty; arduousness [Obs.]

Ar-du-ous (20, 32), a. [Lat. *arduus*, steep, high, akin to *Ir. ard*, high, height.]

1. High or lofty, in a literal sense. "Arduous paths" Pope.

place
 Arēnā'ceous (-nāshus), a [La
 from arena sand] Having the proper
 sandy, easily disintegrating into sand
 arenaceous limestone
 Arēnā'rius a [Lat. arenarius,
 sand] Sandy, composed wholly,
 sand as arenaceous soil.


Arēnā'rius a [Lat. arenarius,
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 sand] Sandy, composed wholly,
 sand as arenaceous soil.

Arēnā'rius a [Lat. arenarius,
 sand] Sandy, composed wholly,
 sand as arenaceous soil.



Argonauta

to reason
 I argue not
 Against Heaven's hand or will

Al. Ron

many laws argue so many sins
 to reason
 Against Heaven's hand or will

and expressions which can be truly argue
 profoundness, or it merely
 reason, or it merely
 as here compared suppose a contest be
 the statements or arguments of it opposing
 to argue in dispute yet loud
 not caution without license proud
 at the desert friends to raise debate
 One who argues, a reasoner; a die
 to argue [For Eng] Halliwell
 to [For Eng] Halliwell
 to [For Eng] Halliwell
 to [For Eng] Halliwell

to make a judge of it and an argument of
 to make a judge of it and an argument of
 to make a judge of it and an argument of
 to make a judge of it and an argument of

The argument is not about things but names.
 3 The subject matter or an abstract of

Arēnā'rius a [Lat. arenarius, sand] Sandy, composed wholly, sand as arenaceous soil.

not right & of a vigorous writing style. Author's name is

Argumentative ness, n. The quality of being
argumentative

Argumentativeness,
[dia]
[dia] = 177

Fight not our quest in this, I will protest there
To all the world, no democracy

3. (Jug) Power; might, strength, puissance,
as, the secular arm
To whom is the arm of the Lord revealed? See H3 L.

AR. (Jug), A. L. (Jug)
cori, eri, Gosh. arie,
D. ari, Ger. arch
See ARCANUM
L. A small, close
vessel, chest, or cof



X.

Argumentativeness, n. The quality of being argumentative.

There arose a new king, which knew not Joseph. *Ex. i. 8.*
The doubt that in his heart arose. *Mat. 23.*
3 To proceed, to issue, to spring
the having together from single

1 A small, close
vessel, chest, or cof-
fer, such as that which
was the repository of
the tables of the cove-
nant among the Jews



Might not our quest in this, I will protest them
To all the world, no armistice. *I. 2. 1. 1.*

3. (Fig.) Power; might, strength, puissance;
as, the secular arm.
To whom is the arm of the Lord revealed? *Isa. 54. 1.*
4 (Mil) (a) A branch of the military service;
as, the cavalry arm. (b) A weapon of offence or
defence, an instrument of warfare, — commonly in
the pl. See ARMS

Armadillo, n.; pl. *Armadillos*. (Sp. *armadillo*, dim. of *armado*, armed; p. p. of *armar*, to arm. It is called from being armed with a horse shell.)



[Lat. *armilla*, a bracelet from *armus*, ancient astronomical instrument, when of iron ring placed in the sign of the]



1. A maker of armor or arms, a manufacturer of instruments of war.

Fig. 1. A with armilla of iron and blith. Hardware.

Arise^v. The past or preterit tense of the verb *arise*, *q v*
Around^v, *prep*. [Prefix *a* and *round*, *q v*]
 1 On all sides of, about, encircling, encompassing

in the East. Gen. xli. 2.
 a gloom arounded, *Hamlet*,
 or, as a jury, for the trial
 them man by man
Lincoln *Court*,
 forth the men impetred,
Court, *Tomlin*

Arise thee, with the ramped song on arise. Mat.
Arpeggio (or *arpeggio*) *n* [It *arpeggio*, *arpeg-*
giamento, harping, *arpeggiare*, to play on the harp,
 from *arpa*, harp.] (*Arise*) The production of the
 arpeggio sound in rapid succession, and not simply

at practice or study as our arrival.

3 Any taking by power, physical or moral

The old stories of Eve from heaven, the burning of his sheep,
were not arrests to his troubled spirit. *Ly. Taylor*

The arrestation of the English reading in France was de-

Simon

arrestion

Archie, v. t.
to laugh.
1 To laugh.
2 To please.
Above all thy re
and below thy are

Articulation, n. [fr. articulus, n., L., joint.]

some cannon and mortars in 1

for the purpose

for the purpose of the throat

in usual dexterity in son
or trade, a handicraft

Artificer, n. (From the
artificius)

FIGURE

1 Made or contrived
and labor, in opposition
to it or to it, an artificial
skill, or minerals

Lives in those tools
2 Hence (figured); the
of the text "Shal."
Mentioned

The act of ascertaining;

ascertainment

ascertainment

ascertainment

ascertainment

ascertainment

{Gr. seeds, a pouch, and Lat.
colic shaped; ascidia like *Dana*.
{Gr. seeds, a bladder, and Lat.
cool & tracing seed. London.

1. A violent onset or attack with physical means,
2. A violent onset or attack with physical means,
3. A violent onset or attack with physical means,

1. One who sits by another, as next in dignity, or as an assistant and adviser; an associate.

Whence to his Son.

The assessor of his throne, he thus began.

Milton.

To point out the supremacy of conscience as the judge and

the fluid or solid substance of the body, whether in plants or animals.

Not conserving the body, not repairing it by assimilation.

Locke.

12. A similar system exists in Scotland where municipal magistrates in the larger towns have the aid of pro-

Ass

[illegible]

1. Closely connected or joined with some other
as in interest purpose employment or otherwise as a
associate judge

f₃₄
 3
 another
 The one [dɪə] no sooner comes into the underlive | ng

[illegible]

2 To confirm to make certain or secure
And it shall be ascribed to him Lev xxvii, 19
And hereby we know that we are of the true h and sha t

And Caro 2 To take or tak 10 one . . . f

ning

1. *Journal of Management Studies*, 1996, 33, 1, 1-14.

[illegible]

Astron. [Prefix *a-* and *strut*, q v.] In a strutting manner

first, rye, push. c, d, o, silent; g as u ch as chi; e, eh, aa hi; s as f s as so set, g as w, g as gt, n as lo higger, high, th as so thine.

'Aθῆναια, in Homer *'Aθῆνη*, *'Aθῆναια*, Athens, called *Minerva* by the Romans, the tutelary goddess of Athens.]

At lān'le, a. [Lat. *Atlantici* from *Atlas* or *At* ? (*Cher*).] The greatest number of

minute.

A collection of maps in a volume, — supposed to be so called from a picture of Atlas supporting the heavens, prefixed to some collections. This name is said to have been first used by Mercator, the celebrated geographer, in the sixteenth century.



Athlētē, a. [Lat. *athleticus*, C

Athlētē, a. [Lat. *athleticus*, C

Athlētē, a. [Lat. *athleticus*, C

Athlētē, a. [Lat. *athleticus*, C

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Athlētē, a. [Lat. *athleticus*, C

Athlētē, a. [Lat. *athleticus*, C

an entablature; — *Atlantes*, called also *Telamones*. *Orig. Gloss*

A, ā, ū, ū, ū, long, ā, ū, ū, ū, short, care, far, last, fall, what, there, well, terms, pique, firm, done, for, do, wolf, food, good,

A tōp, ede. [Tōp is an lōp, q t] On or at the top. *Attached* (200-210) m. 100-110 m. 100-110 m.

top.
At ra bi lō'et m
At ra bi lō'et m
stupid, lō
melancholy,
black bile
At ra bi lō'et m

At ra bi lō'et m

At ra bi lō'et m

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200, ryde, puch, e, i, o, silent, q as a, ch as sh, o, ch, as k, c as j, g as in get, x as k, z as ga, th as in tiger, lōk, th as in thine.

One thing I must entreat, your leave is:
See ACCOMPANY

At tēmp'ra-āte, v. t. To attemper, to proportion,
to regulate. [*obs*] *Larroue*

It may with me

At tēmp'ra, t. t. To make an effort or end
an attack

Attemperate, a [Lat] *attemperatus*, p. p. of

attemperare, *temperare*; Tempered; proportioned; suited, adapted

Hope must be proportioned and attemperate to the promise

of heaven

A

in, "Attend on Milton

It may with mine

h accompanes or is co: s

g ac

land

ac-

it is

lay

and

the Athenians, or to subscribe the

as

[Lat] *attinere*, from *attinere*,

ATTAIN.] touching, reaching,

2]

to touch

See

1 To clothe, to adorn with trappings, to array
 , to catch] To entrap, to in-
 graft

in [Lat. *affiduum*]
is a tribute that will be con-
tributed to or in rent in a person or
all or necessary property or char-

(Gram) (a) A word, a
an actively verb or participle
bute of a substance or an adverb
bute of an attribute (b) A mol
to a noun. *It was*
a to (Gram) In an attributive
t attri tus p p of attrere from
rub Gr re p v the hair
e r e l l m M i t m

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31.1011

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a i n s

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11

ret r int formare to turn
formare. Or rōpus a turner a wheel or chis l b e
LARN

other And will have no authority but my own. Shak
 A man is legally appointed by another

ple of a π - π interaction

Syn All cement + trem + charm
 Quantity + ^{as a fact} Fe attr. lit

r yes
 That which attracts or inclines
 l e" *Parler*
 nothing but attraction in nature
 ndr In an attractive manner
 attracting
 as in The quality of being attractive
 So th
 One who or that which attracts
 Attracting drawing a reactive
 Lat attracts a pair of attractors

Antho. n Anal. [Ch] See ALN Fut
 *du bérge (o bar) n [tr] Anal n [Ch] B t f f
 *du bérgeist n [tr] = ergiste One who kee
 a n of taver [I are] Tho a ber geist
 a n Smollett

A power letter or warrant
authorizing from a person empow
ered to sign

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11 new (4QR) r f To
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2 Composed of, or containing, augite as a principal constituent; as, *augitic rocks, augitic porphyry*.

2 (*Gr. from*) A sign of past time. It is either a syllable prefixed to a word, or an increase of the vowel, called, in the former *augment*, and in the latter, the

Capable of augmentation or
[Fr. *augmentation*, L. Lat. *ifultu*.

spect, mingled with the veneration inspired by grand
and sublime objects, impressing awe, grand mag-
nificent. "Forms august" "request in visage"
"Pope Dryden" "By shaping some august de-
vice" "Tennyson."

Aur
N
nly
J
all

pyrites from pyrites (or blanchet) of iron
no gold disseminated through it. Dana

Auld, a. [See Old] Old, as, auld clock

Auld, a. [See Old] Old, as, auld clock

Auricle

Auricle, a. [Lat *auriculus* Gr *auris*, ear
auris, Gr *auris*, ear, court, royal court]
ing to a royal court

External ear, and ear of ear

Lat *auricularis* Fr *auricu*
ear, or to the sense of hearing

Auricular, a. [See Auricle] Auricular, a.
Auricular, a. [See Auricle] Auricular, a.

Auricular, a. [See Auricle] Auricular, a.
Auricular, a. [See Auricle] Auricular, a.

Auscultation, a. [Lat *auscultatio* from *aus-*
cultus to listen *cultus* from *auscultare* from
auscultare to listen *auscultare* from *auscultare*
Gr *auscultare* to listen *auscultare* from *auscultare*
1 The act of listening or hearkening to. *Hicks*.
2 (Med) A method of distinguishing diseases.

They asperate all their proceedings

Enrico

2 Protection extended; favor shown; patron

Which by his name they will hold, make

Enrico

1 Hour with setting out, rough to the taste

having acidity, ha

which is under, 2

2 hours in mod-

ing, rigid, stern, a

lit

From whom the a

Syn.—It is, you

figures

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An aspre's, end is

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ave, n. [Lat., hall] An Ave Mary, a halting

Such this

2 (*Low*)

AVE

Syn.—

associate

ave—*ave*

avert a tion, n. [Lat. *avertio*, from *avert*],
a turn away, v. Intrans. of *avert*. See *AVERT*.
Averting from with disgust or dislike, hatred,
aversion. [*ave*]
Some poets have a natural aversion to some verse or vic-

3 An immedial estimate of general statement de

Thus shalt not overstep, nor bear grudges against the child in a
of thy people

Let it be

(He) is dumfounded

Averse of nothing arduous in a task
They never undertake.

Compare

2 Ungraceful in manner, inelegant, unpolite.
"An awkward courtesy"

Dryden

18 gr

And with ridiculous and awkward action

Shak

Spencer

He presents us

Source traced.

22 This word was originally spelt with e - ize - and

Awaken 10 letters (10 gr)
Awake 10 letters (10 gr)

As, the sun is at
 the front of the axle box
 and the axle box is at the front of the axle
 The journal box of an axle, especially

Y-22

Syn. - Upper Motor Assembly, Axle Assembly

The axle guard with the supports

Let the axle be moved A, axle B, journal B, of axle B, with cotton waste to clean the axle around the axle

Wash-oil
 (oil-box)

B.

B

word
bible
1 to a

And.

[100]

[100]

salon madness has its charms. Currier
is *ly, ade*. In the manner of Leo

His seven thousand whole, knees were not supplied
Bachman of that age.

Bailed in (1) for (2) for (3)

vulgarity to be avoided by every one who does not

Bailed in (1) for (2) for (3)
 food See (4) for (5)
 food See (6) for (7)

to balance or to bail out to counter
 to (1) for (2)
 to (3) for (4)

to (1) for (2)

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2 Something that gives prominence or distinct
iveness

[bag and pipe]
and instrument
in Scotland and

its of a leather
cups the air for a
stopped by a valve



1. Destitute of the natural or common covering, } *h&h'ing-ny&g&g* .

3. Destitute of dignity or value: mean: base

3 Destitute of dignity or value: mean: base

Bol'der dash, *n* [A case of

Befragung

1. A worthless mix
Honor.

Induced beer, by a mixture

maize, and is called *bulghur*.

2 A senseless jargon

0000, trash

Bal'der-dash, t t T
Horn. (Cob.)

words. [Obs.]

The wind-meringue of L

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Horne & Irwin

1. See BILLARD.

$$I(M) \in \mathbb{Z} \quad \text{if } M \in \mathcal{T}_1$$

ing office or firm,
viable at a bank, as bills; or

America, a promissory note
the bearer on demand, and
tendency, a bank note,
e, or a bill of exchange, of a
and usually at some future
date are negotiable, but form,
he term, no part of the cur-

bank in which the officers of a
and credit of a customer.

Courtesy,
credit by which, on proper

band, g. v. j.

Band and *banders* are now superseded by the cartridge-
box, and *bander-look*.

We bandh you our termment.

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outward
Band (light), a. Having crooked
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Band

Band In this sense a man may be a bankrupt and not
insolvent, or insolvent and not a bankrupt.

Band A disease in sheep, more commonly
the red

Band Syn.—Pest, ruin, destruction, injury

Band, v. t. To be the bane of, to poison,
to destroy [O.E.]

For misers have not only toad families, but run-

Band

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Band

Barometrograph, n. [*Gr. βάρος, weight, μέτρον, measure*] **Barra-quin, n.** [*From barra, a v. sp. bar.*] **Barren tract (wört), n.** [*See WORT.*] (E-4) A tract | A slave warehouse, or an enclosure where | plant of the barbers. (*with a reference to a bar*)

Bar
B
B

B A fortress or fortified town on the frontier of a country. *Bar.*

B Any obstruction; any thing which confound or which hinders approach or attack. "Constitutional *Bar*"

change — *see* *change*
 for away go
Barter *n*
 exchange of
 2 The thl
 Syn. — Ex
 change

Barter *er, v*

Barter *n*

barter (Oh)

Barth *n* A

2nd

Bar *chil'or*

St. Bartholomew

Bar *ti* *n*

overhanging

which gives

the angles of

the parapet

parts of the

Bar *ti* *n*

1 A bare

few court yard, grange,

from bare, barley, and

few, an enclosure

1 The domain lands of a manor

2 The manor itself

3 A

Bar *ti* *n*

1 A

Bar *ti* *n*

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the bridge rises

f the *Simu*

Base, *n* (U)

base by & Fr *ba*

bazo, *ba* *bazo*

balzo, low *I*

bazus thick,

short, humble

W *baz* shallow

Anise *I*

1 Low in p

(Oh) *I* *Spe*

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from which to compute the distances an
 of any points or objects connected with it
 of triangles *Sym*
 starting place or goal from which starts or
 start

[*imp* & *p p* *BASED* (*bas*), *p pr* &
 "ING"] (*see* *BASE*, *n*, and *BASE*, *n*, and
 from *base* or *bas* & *base*, *n*)

1 A main line taken as a base of
 ad on the correctness of which the
 as in surviving, in military oper
 active &c
 need round a cannon at rear of the

Base *ly, adv* 1 In a base manner, meanly, die
 honorably

Base [*Fr* *bas*, *Fr* *bas* *It* & *Sp* *bas* *base* *It*
Gr *bas* *step* *g* *step* *a* *base* *p* *l* *el*

Base *ring* *n* (*Vul*) A projecting band of meta
 adjoining the base of a breech engine [*see* *Illustr*
 of *Cann* *n*]

Bas *n*

Bas *n*

Bas *n*

Bas *n*

Bas *n*

Bas *n*

Bas *n*

Bas *n*

Bas *n*

Bas *n*

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Bas *n*

Bas *n*

Bas *n*

Bas *n*

tion with be. The case is the same with the sub- j B

BEASTLIHEAD

The air that breathes and polishes life
 Syn — To adorn, grace, ornament, embellish, deck;
 Beacalm

to make

vanquish or conquer

He beat them in a bloody battle

Prevalent

Q. To exercise severely, to vanquish

plex

to make

1. To pronounce or regard as happy, or as confer-
 ring happiness.

Q. A beautiful person, especially a beautiful wo-
 man.

All the admired beauties of Verona.

Shel.

Freely we serve because we freely love

Alham,

[be and dark] To make dark,

bed roll gi (going to the moon tide sun) Another

(bēk/n), e f [See BECK] To make a

11.0.1.0.0

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Bēd'ouīn, *n.* Pertaining to the Bedouins.

Bēd'ouīn, *n.* [bed and right or rule] The rite
Bēd'ouīn, *n.* or the privilege of the marriage
 bed. *Shak.*

Bēd'ouīn, *n.* [bed and room]
 1. A room or apartment intended or used for a
 bed, a lodging room.

2. Room in a bed. [Obs.]
 Then by your side no bed-room me deny. *Shak.*

Bēd'ouīn, *v. i.* [be and drop] To sprinkle, or
 cover as with drops. "Scalps bedropped with
 gold." *Pope.*

Bēd'ouīn, *n.* The side of the bed.

Bēd'ouīn, *n.* A recess in a room for a bed.


Bēd'ouīn, *n.*

Bēd'ouīn, *n.*

Bēd'ouīn, *n.*

Bēd'ouīn, *n.*

Bēd'ouīn, *n.*



1. 2. shaking-place; 3. chine; 4. rib; 5. clod; 6.
 left; 7. flank; 8. back; 9. collar; 10. rump; 11. neck;
 12. foot; 13. udder; 14. skin; 15. cheek
 he flesh of an ox, bull, or cow, or of bovine
 generally, when killed. [In this sense, the
 no no plural]

Beer has different names, as *small beer*, *ale*, *por-
 ter*, *brown-stout*, *lager beer*, &c., according to its strength,
 or other qualities.

The term is some-
 times restricted to the
 largest species, as those of the Scarabaeus family.

A prominent
Shak.
 ng prominent
Shak.

Bēd'ouīn, *v. i.* [be and dust]
 cover with dust

Be game, u i 1000 & p p BEGRIMED n pr &

Be have r f [imp & p p BEHAVED, p pr &

He be
He be

r materials
s not grow Dyeless

men
A gentleman that is very singular in his behavior. Seele
2 Acting in a representative character. [Obs.]
Thus after greeting speaks the king of France,
In my debt we in this theory;
The borrowed majesty of England here
To be or to be put upon one's good behavior to be in
state of trial, in which something important depends on
propriety of conduct — During good behavior, during the
integrity and fidelity of official conduct.
BYN — PERATION, CONDUCT. Behavior is the mode
in which we have or bear ourselves in the presence of

r f [imp. BEGOT, BEGAT, p. p. BEGOT
TEN, p. pr. & to BEGETTING] [be and
] B

made

l, ryde, push; e, é, o, silent, c as a, ch as sh, c, ch, as k, & as j g as in get, g as x, z as ge, t, as in tiger, h, k, as in thine.

He *be* f^r e^t, v. t. [be and face]He *h* e^t, v. t. To row. [*Ob*]P^{er} son

A small part of what he left behind him.

P^{er} son

calcareous fossil, about as large as the finger, tapering to a point at the lower extrem-



Bryozoan

at] to migrate into

able] To throw into

from b^{er} to

In this also (draw) the country are very much *be* head
 This word like a *be* also *be* head an (several)

He *be* head (draw) v. t. i. to be an
 He *be* head (draw) v. t. i. to be an
 He *be* head (draw) v. t. i. to be an

A man
He was
puts up
ful and
of his
both in

10140 & 10141
belle to bark. beld hant

Belling'er oids, e [Lat. belling'er] the same as
BELLIGRENT

and brast



low-land.
the red pepper of

Bell-rope, n.
 Bell-shaped
 and shaped]

mer-houses on an eminence in a park or

See BELL.

r. *Bepa*, step, from *Baivis*, to go,

q) A stage or kind of pulpit on

The bell-shaped
 belly-shaped, n. f.
 belly-shaped, n. f.
 belly of a horse and
 a girth

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11/11/1941

^c ~~This~~ This word though radically the same as *bedle* as a corruption of it ought not to be confounded with

forl, rye, push; e, i, o, silent, s as s, sh as sh, t, ch, as k, g as j g as in . z as z, x as gz, u as in linger, lipk; th as in thine,

2 To put trappings on, to clothe, to deck [See
ATTRAP]

3 In a higher or greater degree, more, as, to

2 Hence, morally distorted, not upright. [Obs]
ple Any angle other than one of 45° or 90°

adjacent pla es, as
an edge, having its
edges replaced as



adict to their betery drinkings or suppers
Deus & p

He tray'er, n One who betrays a traitor
He tray'ment, n Act of betraying, breach of
trust betrayal
He trim' r f [be an i trim] To set in order, to

Bēt'ū līne, n [Lat *betula* birch tree] {*Cher*
A substance of a resinous nature obtained from the
bark of the black birch (*Betula nigra*),—called a
birch camphor

He trust'ment, n The act of intrusting, or the
thing intrusted
He

p & p **BEWAILED**, p vr &
[be and wail]
ep sorrow for, as by wailing, to

and unchilled many a one,
scur beyond the injury *Shak*
myase [Obs and very rare]

worthy of being be-

s or lament
enting *Laligh*
ritual manner
ewailing
To keep awake.

AS beware, n
beware, Sw *bewara*, Ger *bewahren*
ARY

sis or guard one's self, hence to be
ike care to take heed — followed by
hing that is to be avoided
e of all, but most beware of man *Fare*
s special regard [Rare]

as as yet before thee, ... beware of him and
rt is a compound from be and the (Chi

furl, rude, rush, e, f, e, silent, f as s, ch as sh, e, ch, as k, g as j, g as in get, z as z, z as ge, u as in longer, ligh, th as in

Went. It grows in wet places and is used for
 making paper. It is also used for making
 paper. It is also used for making paper.
 It is also used for making paper.

Billingsgate, n. [From a market of this name
 in London celebrated for fish and foul language]
 Foul profane language, r. bad language.
 These words are therefore kept out of the ground.

and two] (Not) Being double or
 in couples, growing in pairs, as, a
 Linoleum leaf. Gray
 It is a leaf which grows in pairs.



1. *striped n.* [Fr. *double*, Lat. *bipes*; *bis*, twice, and
1 animal having two feet, as

Biscuit *n.* (It comes out from its tail and comes out) A vessel with two tanks or tiers of ore.

Biscuit *adj.* (It comes out from its tail and comes out) A vessel with two tanks or tiers of ore.

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ning to blismuth
mineral composed of bis-
the sulphuret of blismuth
A native oxide of blismuth
metimes containing a small



One who bites, that which bites, a
 bait. "Great barkers are no (bit-
 "A bold biter" Hutton,
 beats or defrauds. Spectator
 (From Lat. bit, twice, and Eng
 (bit) Doubly ternote, as when a
 ternote leaflets.

Gray
 A
 id.
 ng
 id
 id

[From better]

usually spirituous, in
 steeped

and sweet (Not) A
 demora, a slender,
 hen chewed, produces
 S. 2. Bird
 genus of
 ital pe-
 cles to
 v. high
 dry, to
 foudon.
 endrous

(Not)

applied in the lower.

Bit-ter-apple, } n. (outer skin of a
 bit-ter-cum ber, } (Not)
 A plant, a species of C.

anted mechanism

1 The female of the canine kind, as of the dog,
 wolf and fox

Pope. B

2 To cause hurt, pain, or injury
 "Filing fashion" Shak.

3 A morsel, as much as is wanted

4 The bolt which the short end of a lever has

5 A morsel, as much as is wanted

6 The bolt which the short end of a lever has

7 A morsel, as much as is wanted

8 The bolt which the short end of a lever has

9 A morsel, as much as is wanted

10 The bolt which the short end of a lever has

fall, what, there, with, stem; pique, firm, down, 2

Bitt'er Ness, n. [From *bitt'er*.]

- I will complain in the bitterness of my soul. Job vii. 11.
 2 A state of extreme impurity or enmity to God.
 These art in the gall of bitterness, and in the bond of iniquity. Acts viii. 23.
 3 Dangerous error, or schism, tending to draw persons to apostasy.

The penultimate bit and curve to headstrong screw. John
 Bitt, v. t. [imp & p p BITTEN, p pr & id n, BIT-
 TING.] To put a bridle upon; to put the bit in the
 mouth of
 Bitt, four & p. p. of bite Bitten or confined by
 the teeth
 Bitt, n. [A B bit,

BT This word is
 simplest degree, as

BT
 1 The female
 wit, and fox
 2 A name of
 Bitt, v. t. [imp
 id n BITTING]
 To bite than
 N H Ger because
 1. To not, cry

Like w's

mouth
 2 To exhort
 "Lifting fashion"

BT

4. the butt which is the short end of a [creeper line]

sting beer.

Cooley (London.

B, b, t, d, g, y long; B, b, t, d, g, y short, care, far, last, fall, what; there, well, there; plique, firm; done, for, d, w, if, food, foot.

to speak ill, to slander, to blaspheme, See **BLAS-
PHEMER.**

1 Easter Monday, so called from the

SYN.—BLANFLISS, SPOTLESS, FACILIASS, STAIN-

Simmonds

Black'smith, n [black and smith] A smith who

Black-stripe, n 1 A
mixture of spirituous
liquor and molasses
2 Any, dark, or blackish to light, swatch or



Black snake (Cobra)
COBRA (NAR)

Black-stripe, n 1. Having a blade or blades. It may
be used of blade in the sense of a leaf, a spine, or
the cutting part of an instrument, as, a two bladed
knife.

2 (Min) Composed of long and narrow plates,

*Blatant beast" Spenser. "Harsh and blatant
tone." R. H. Dana.
Glory, that blatant word which heats some military minds*

horse

litened, made white,
"unbleaching stain,
lous are *Epon.*
is, or whose occupa-
establishment for

1. To lose blood, to run with blood, by what

For me the helm shall bleed Pope
4. To pay or lose money, to have money drawn
or extorted, as, to bleed freely from an object,
[Colony]
The heart bleeds a phrase used to denote extreme pain
from sympathy or pity

BLAZE


BLAZE
1. To shine with flame as, the fire blazes
2. To send forth or show a bright and expand
ed light "And far and wide the joy summit
blazed"
Horatius

Blaze, n [See BLAY] (bth) A

BLAZE, P. BLEND, P. P. &
BLAZE, P. BLEND, P. P. &

headed
By the noble heads which have been brought to the West
3 The wooden mold on which hats, bonnets, &c.

directions, formerly
much used in America
and Germany. The
slide and ends are
sometimes much like a
stockade, and the top
covered with earth. Black house (U. S. F. S.)
there may also be a
ditch around it.



Syn.—Blessedness, felicity, beatitude, happiness,
joy, enjoyment. See *BLISSFULNESS*.
Blissful, *a*. Full of joy and felicity, happy in the
highest degree.

Ever as these blissful creatures do I live *Wardsworth*
Blissful *ly*, *adv*. In a blissful manner, happily,
joyously.
Blissfulness, *n*. Exalted happiness, felicity,
fullness of joy. *Barrow*

Blister, *v t* [*imp & p p BLISTERED, p pr &*
to BLISTERING]
1 To raise blisters upon "My hands were *blis-*
tered" *Franklin*
2 To give pain to, as if by a blister
Whose sole name blisters my tongue *Shel*
Blister-*rip*, *v m* The Spanish fly, *Cantharis*

12

Boat's hire, a Navigable for boats, or small river
craft. "The boatable waters of the Alleghany."
Hart.

AL HAM & FISH-

REASONABLE

Dög-trotter, n. [Dög
in a hoggy country, —] *See*

Dög The name is applied
to, or to black tea in gene
Dög *See* **Opas**. *See* **Opas**

Bolster, n. A place and apparatus for bolting, as

Bolster, n. A place and apparatus for bolting, as

What subdued

Bo
er

Now the ship *borers* the moon with her mainmast. *Shal*
 2 To weary by tedious iteration or by dilliance,
 vex. "He *bores* me with some *Shal*.
 'o trick. {*Ode and rare*}
 rered; I am laughed at, worned.
 f, is worned. *Shal* 2 27

ward {*Ode*} "Boring to the
 Drifted
 carry the nose to the ground, =

from bottom, a
designated, 500



Botany,
Heraldic

Butcher, *n* A clumsy workman at mending, a mender of old clothes, whether a tailor or cobbler, a bungler.
Let the butcher mend him, any thing that's mended is but mended by him. *Stat*

contains
A bottle of hay, a bundle or package of hay. *[Local or Short]*
Numerous, and *obscure*

Cross bottom (*Her*), a cross having each arm terminat- in three buds, knits, or buttons resembling, in some manner, the *burk* (tulip, *Bot*)

B

B

B

B

B

B

How often

My ventures are not in one bottom trusted *Stat*
Not to sell the teas but to return them to London in the same bottom in which they were shipped *Longest*
5 Power of endurance, stamina, as, a horse of good bottom
6 Dregs or grounds, lous, sediment. "The bottom of beer"
7 A butt or skein of thread.

And beat me to death with a bottom of brown three

Bottom, *v. t* [imp & p p. BOTTOMED,

to *bottom*]

1 To found or build upon, to fix upon port, followed by *on* or *upon*.

Power to judge both quick and dead *Bottom*

Butcher, *v. t* [imp & p p. BUTHERED, p p. & to *butthering*] to tease or perplex. See *Former*

Butcher, *n* One who or that which bothers, state of perplexity or annoyance as, to be in a *butcher*, [*Collog*]

Butcher's-tion *n* The act of bothering, or state of being bothered, cause of trouble, perplexity, annoyance [*Lat*]

Butcher's-hand, *n* Putotum, indispensable add. [*Obs an Irate*]

Butcher's

or thump, so as to make a sudden

Soured his head at every post. *Butch*

B, F, T, S, G, F, long, B, F, T, S, G, F, short, care, far, last, fall, what, there, well, turn, plique, firm, done, for, do, well, food, foot;

The faded hue of my face betrays me. *Applaud*
Brackish *v* *(Naut)* To wear as a ship, in a par-

For that it stands not in such worklike brace. *Shel*

1 Act of bracing or state of being

2 Any system of braces on the bracing

English stat.

I shall see

Some speaking Cleopatra too her greatness. *Shel*

Boy's *n* A nobleman of Russia, Transylvania

See BOYAR

Boyan (boy's), *n* *pl* *BOYARS* or *BOYARS*
 (for *boyar*, but, a long and narrow place, and of

4 (Naut) To move around by means of braces
 as to brace the yards

1 (Arch & Engin) A piece
 or combination of pieces of
 wood stone or metal, trian-
 gular in general shape and
 either plain or ornamented,
 usually projecting from or
 fastened to a wall or other
 surface to support shelves,
 stairway or other object,
 and to strengthen angles,
 —in medieval architecture
 usually called a corbel

2 (Naut) Short crooked
 timbers, resembling knees
 fixed in the frame of a ship's
 head to support the gratings



He said not for broke, and he stopped not for none. If Scott
Cane-broke a block of cane. [L.S.]


Bräke, n. [L. Ger. *brake*, an instrument for breaking flax, H. Ger. *breche*, id., from the root of *break*; Ger. *brechen*.]

- 1 An instrument or machine to break flax or hemp.
- 2 The handle by which a woman is—

A gentleman enveloped in mustachios, whiskers for collar, and bowdler.

Thackeray

Yarn of the car, winds up the chain and pulls the



Conch, more rich in matter than in wit
Lampard his substance

Syn—To swagger, boast upon the
suntuck, talk big.

Bräk, n. 1 A boast or boasting

2 A game at cards
Bräk, n. Bräk, full of splints. [Old] "A brög
young fellow" [In London]
Bräg-ga-dö'el (brög us dö'ahf o), n. [From *Brög*
goudoio, a beautiful character in Spenser's Faery
Queen]

- 2 The org
understandin
in this s
- 3 The side

A wheel to which a brake is ap
Brak.

Brä, and from

Brög, and

Brög, and

infused, polar
black.

B. Jenson

2. Gallant, jolly, excellent, beautiful, grand,
noble, dignified

1. The act of breaking, or state of being broken;
fracture

2. The gap or opening made by breaking, the
space between the parts of a solid body parted by
violence, a break, a rupture.


like natural
2. Splendor, my
exaltation
With earth and sea,
like
With all her trees
Another layer, all
wounds are welded by

Bread-fruit (C. a.)
(For) The fruit of a
tree (*Artocarpus* spp.)



I will break it open." *Break* — To break out to take or
come out by breaking; as, to break out a pane of glass —
to break out of a prison.

to break out



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2. The premium or commission of a broker; the gain or profit derived from transacting business for other men, as brokers.

Then a soldier

in tier lochen,
to beat.



2. To enter upon some labor or contest; to struggle, to contend

1. To enter upon some labor or contest; to struggle, to contend



Building n 1. The act of constructing, erecting, or establishing

2. The art of constructing edifices, or the practice of civil architecture.

Use of civil architecture.
The execution of works of architecture necessarily includes building, but building is frequently employed when

3 A fabric or edifice constructed, a thing built,
as a house, a church, &c.

The sumptuous buildings and the wife's attire have cost a mass of public treasury. Siam

Build (bilt), n. 1 Form, shape; general figure of a structure: build. (U6a)

And as the hand is different to the other:

■ ■ ■ ■



1500
 1500
 1500

Hum The arts and practices of a buffoon, low jays, ridiculous pranks, vulgar tricks and postures.
 Not that it will ever contribute a wit to
 piece of buffoonery with a' What makes you th'.

Hum Buffon'ing, n. Buffoonery

1. *Chlorophyll *a** and *Chlorophyll *b** were determined by the method of Arar and Collins (1971) using a Shimadzu 1601 UV-Visible Spectrophotometer.

1. *Chlorophyll a* and *Chlorophyll b* were determined by the method of Lichtenthaler and Whistler (1973).

Abstract

H **R**

species of loads
Baffon It is [Pr] [infante] [room] [at] [inf]

1. *Chlorophyll a* and *Chlorophyll b* were determined by the method of Arar and Collins (1971) using a Shimadzu 1601 UV-Visible Spectrophotometer. The concentration of chlorophyll was expressed in $\mu\text{g mL}^{-1}$.

214.

1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17. 18. 19. 20. 21. 22. 23. 24. 25. 26. 27. 28. 29. 30. 31. 32. 33. 34. 35. 36. 37. 38. 39. 40. 41. 42. 43. 44. 45. 46. 47. 48. 49. 50. 51. 52. 53. 54. 55. 56. 57. 58. 59. 60. 61. 62. 63. 64. 65. 66. 67. 68. 69. 70. 71. 72. 73. 74. 75. 76. 77. 78. 79. 80. 81. 82. 83. 84. 85. 86. 87. 88. 89. 90. 91. 92. 93. 94. 95. 96. 97. 98. 99. 100. 101. 102. 103. 104. 105. 106. 107. 108. 109. 110. 111. 112. 113. 114. 115. 116. 117. 118. 119. 120. 121. 122. 123. 124. 125. 126. 127. 128. 129. 130. 131. 132. 133. 134. 135. 136. 137. 138. 139. 140. 141. 142. 143. 144. 145. 146. 147. 148. 149. 150. 151. 152. 153. 154. 155. 156. 157. 158. 159. 160. 161. 162. 163. 164. 165. 166. 167. 168. 169. 170. 171. 172. 173. 174. 175. 176. 177. 178. 179. 180. 181. 182. 183. 184. 185. 186. 187. 188. 189. 190. 191. 192. 193. 194. 195. 196. 197. 198. 199. 200. 201. 202. 203. 204. 205. 206. 207. 208. 209. 210. 211. 212. 213. 214. 215. 216. 217. 218. 219. 220. 221. 222. 223. 224. 225. 226. 227. 228. 229. 230. 231. 232. 233. 234. 235. 236. 237. 238. 239. 240. 241. 242. 243. 244. 245. 246. 247. 248. 249. 250. 251. 252. 253. 254. 255. 256. 257. 258. 259. 260. 261. 262. 263. 264. 265. 266. 267. 268. 269. 270. 271. 272. 273. 274. 275. 276. 277. 278. 279. 280. 281. 282. 283. 284. 285. 286. 287. 288. 289. 290. 291. 292. 293. 294. 295. 296. 297. 298. 299. 300. 301. 302. 303. 304. 305. 306. 307. 308. 309. 310. 311. 312. 313. 314. 315. 316. 317. 318. 319. 320. 321. 322. 323. 324. 325. 326. 327. 328. 329. 330. 331. 332. 333. 334. 335. 336. 337. 338. 339. 340. 341. 342. 343. 344. 345. 346. 347. 348. 349. 350. 351. 352. 353. 354. 355. 356. 357. 358. 359. 360. 361. 362. 363. 364. 365. 366. 367. 368. 369. 370. 371. 372. 373. 374. 375. 376. 377. 378. 379. 380. 381. 382. 383. 384. 385. 386. 387. 388. 389. 390. 391. 392. 393. 394. 395. 396. 397. 398. 399. 400. 401. 402. 403. 404. 405. 406. 407. 408. 409. 410. 411. 412. 413. 414. 415. 416. 417. 418. 419. 420. 421. 422. 423. 424. 425. 426. 427. 428. 429. 430. 431. 432. 433. 434. 435. 436. 437. 438. 439. 440. 441. 442. 443. 444. 445. 446. 447. 448. 449. 450. 451. 452. 453. 454. 455. 456. 457. 458. 459. 460. 461. 462. 463. 464. 465. 466. 467. 468. 469. 470. 471. 472. 473. 474. 475. 476. 477. 478. 479. 480. 481. 482. 483. 484. 485. 486. 487. 488. 489. 490. 491. 492. 493. 494. 495. 496. 497. 498. 499. 500. 501. 502. 503. 504. 505. 506. 507. 508. 509. 510. 511. 512. 513. 514. 515. 516. 517. 518. 519. 520. 521. 522. 523. 524. 525. 526. 527. 528. 529. 530. 531. 532. 533. 534. 535. 536. 537. 538. 539. 540. 541. 542. 543. 544. 545. 546. 547. 548. 549. 550. 551. 552. 553. 554. 555. 556. 557. 558. 559. 560. 561. 562. 563. 564. 565. 566. 567. 568. 569. 570. 571. 572. 573. 574. 575. 576. 577. 578. 579. 580. 581. 582. 583. 584. 585. 586. 587. 588. 589. 590. 591. 592. 593. 594. 595. 596. 597. 598. 599. 600. 601. 602. 603. 604. 605. 606. 607. 608. 609. 610. 611. 612. 613. 614. 615. 616. 617. 618. 619. 620. 621. 622. 623. 624. 625. 626. 627. 628. 629. 630. 631. 632. 633. 634. 635. 636. 637. 638. 639. 640. 641. 642. 643. 644. 645. 646. 647. 648. 649. 650. 651. 652. 653. 654. 655. 656. 657. 658. 659. 660. 661. 662. 663. 664. 665. 666. 667. 668. 669. 670. 671. 672. 673. 674. 675. 676. 677. 678. 679. 680. 681. 682. 683. 684. 685. 686. 687. 688. 689. 690. 691. 692. 693. 694. 695. 696. 697. 698. 699. 700. 701. 702. 703. 704. 705. 706. 707. 708. 709. 710. 711. 712. 713. 714. 715. 716. 717. 718. 719. 720. 721. 722. 723. 724. 725. 726. 727. 728. 729. 730. 731. 732. 733. 734. 735. 736. 737. 738. 739. 740. 741. 742. 743. 744. 745. 746. 747. 748. 749. 750. 751. 752. 753. 754. 755. 756. 757. 758. 759. 760. 761. 762. 763. 764. 765. 766. 767. 768. 769. 770. 771. 772. 773. 774. 775. 776. 777. 778. 779. 780. 781. 782. 783. 784. 785. 786. 787. 788. 789. 790. 791. 792. 793. 794. 795. 796. 797. 798. 799. 800. 801. 802. 803. 804. 805. 806. 807. 808. 809. 810. 811. 812. 813. 814. 815. 816. 817. 818. 819. 820. 821. 822. 823. 824. 825. 826. 827. 828. 829. 830. 831. 832. 833. 834. 835. 836. 837. 838. 839. 840. 84

316

... ..

Sir spare your throats
 The bug which you would fright me with I seek. Sha
 To the world, no haberdashery is so great
 As want of flowers, and a small estate The

Take you ahead! In lead not I,
For all the business to fight ye
Bug-bear, & causing needless fright
buckram thoughts."

phantoms, To alarm or frighten with id
46p 419

1. *Journal of the American Medical Association*, 1997; 277: 1039-1043.

■ ■ ■

Keywords: child sexual abuse; disclosure; self-blame; social support

inferred

Position of objects beneath the water, as anchors, shoals, rocks, &c.

For names of various kinds, see page 174.

3 To fix buoys to, to mark by buoys, as, to buoy an anchor, to buoy or buoy of a channel.

buoy, or buoy, v. t. To float, to rise by specific lightness.

buoy must will buoy up at last. Page

buoyant

3 buoyant

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buoy-belt, n. A bird belt. [One] For L.

buoybot, n. [Fr. barbote, from barbe beard]

(fish) A fish of the genus *Zeus* shaped like an eel, but shorter and thicker with a flat head, having on the nose two small beards, and another on the chin.

a place
be a pool



1 A thickset, or a place abounding in trees or shrubs

2 This was the original sense of the word, as in the Dutch *bosch* a word and was so used by Chaucer. To

The egg that soon,
Pouncing with kindly rapture forth disclosed
Their callow young

M. T. 100

Tears, such as angels weep, burst forth.
You burst at once, burst forth.

M. T. 100

1 A dry measure, containing four pecks, eight gallons or thirty two quarts

1. Let *burnoose*, from *burn*, *burn*, *burn*
2. *burnoose* See *burn*

Lord, suffer me first to go and bury my father Matt. xiv. 7.
I'll bury thee in a triumphant grave

Shel

1 A purse, a vesicle; a pod, a hull [Obs.]
Hollant

— sometimes called a bush
ation of fitting bushes into holes or
wear is to be received, or friction
as pivot-holes &c
[D. *bosch*, *man*, *boschjes*, *man*,

forl, ryde, push, e, d, o, silent, q as a, th as sh, e, ch as k, & as f, & as

2 The business or employment of a butcher
 Butcher's mess, n. A cruel, savage, butcherly
 manner. *Johnson*
 Butcher's eye, n. [From butchery] Greatly cruel
 and barbarous. *Blount*, *murderous*. "The victim
 of a butcherly murder." *D. Webster*.
 What stratagems, how ill, how butchery.
 The deadly quarrel do ly deck bereft. *Shak*
 Butcher's meat. *See* The flesh of a butcher's slaughter.

Butcher's y, n. 1 The business of a butcher
 2 Murder, especially murder committed
 with barbarity, great slaughter. "The
 tion of human butchery."

Can be a son in self-renewed birth,
 Whom pain, and blood, and butchery delight. *Dequise*

3 The action of being butchered; *see* kill.

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
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[Faint, mostly illegible text covering the right half of the page, likely bleed-through from the reverse side.]



* of secret uses. See Encut

sining to or derived

1. Yielding; pliable or compliant, ready to obey;
obedient, meek. [Obs.]

For with a heart, no longer taught to be,
And given to his hands, to joy to see,
I thank myself unto this holy church of Christ, to be given.

Blay (bl), v.

Blay'er, n.

Blay, v. t.

Blaying //

or ruder

To make a

been, hence

with a low,

Blay, v. t.

blaying

low was

Blayard-et, n. (Or)

C.

C the third letter in the English alphabet, and the second of the consonant letters, has two sounds which are produced by two very different positions of the organs, one hard like X, which occurs before a, u, i, r, s, t and when final the other a soft one as in c, p, s, c, and when final the

Latin's theology" Ep Bull "Cabalistic deposit
 test a" Herford
 Cab a flat'le-ally, ade In the manner of the cab
 allea
 Cab's like r i Herbert

1. A small room: a

Philip passed some hours every day in his father's cabinet.
 French

{Her cabinet} translation to

Cabinet

Cabinet of a
 -ch
 Heron
 wall
 work
 Pan
 the
 the
 the

Ca. 1811, n. (Fr. cadet the younger or youngest son - "Cadet" is a title)

(a) (usu. 100) A chest containing ammunition at so the wagon or tumbril in which military stores are conveyed (b) A chest filled with explosive material



Caisson and Limber

Simmonds | The Ca. 1811, n.

Cable-tier, *n* (*Naut*) (*n*) That part of a vessel where the cables are stowed. (*b*) The coils of a cable.

Cabbing, *n* (*Arch*) (*n*) The lining of a round molding like ing frequently worked in plaster, &c., nearly 4.

Ca bbb, *n* (*Per. codic*)

1 A small piece of a

2 A low

3 A low

4 A low

5 A low

6 A low

7 A low

8 A low

9 A low

10 A low

11 A low

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72 A low

73 A low

74 A low

charia, and cholon, a Calmuc word for stone. (*Min*) An opaque or milk-white stone.

Cackling, *n* (*Arch*) (*n*) The lining of a round molding like ing frequently worked in plaster, &c., nearly 4.

Cackling, *n* (*Arch*) (*n*) The lining of a round molding like ing frequently worked in plaster, &c., nearly 4.

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Cackling, *n* (*Arch*) (*n*) The lining of a round molding like ing frequently worked in plaster, &c., nearly 4.

spines; for having 6 w. If any, branches, but 2 often of grotesque shapes (as C. pedunculata), for having flowers often of great beauty and tines (as C. grandiflora). It is a native of tropics.

test white, v. f. [Lat. *concinna*, from *con*, extreme end or point.] To make sharp or

[An abbreviation of rail, f. v.]

A person who stands at the door of an omnibus to open and shut it, and to

passage.

wing the qualities of a dandelion.

In a cadaverous form or

The quality of being ca

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the aristocrats to the lantern] The ba-
of a famous song during the French revo-
Brande.
[Le coard, a tinker] A tinker, usually
travels to find work, hence, a vagrant or
Hollisell
as of pipes, fiddles, or catdies for by all these de-
na were these hand till known H. Scott.
[Le, Gael, & W. earn heap]
cap of stones of a rounder for conical form,
by the early inhabitants of the British
parently as a sepulchral monument
let us place the gray stone of her soul Campbell

as a chest

(a) A
staining
lon, al
igon or
switch
storia



are conveyed
(b) A chest
load with ex-
plosive materi

Caisson and Limber

Simmonds

he
prisoner [Ols] 'Avarice doth
cut f and slave' Hollisell
splicable person, one in whose
as and wickedness meet
I am not sure that a can - H. Scott

means of coxing

elder
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Ca-dil'el ty, r
ductus from
Tendoney to
ty. [Pore]

long ago dit
myers, when I
Ca dil'el ty
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Ca-dil'ke, a
fleeting. [Ol
condula
Cud'y, n [E
burgh
Cud'el (n. ka
bag with one
trouity of a c
Cud'el ore, n
east wind]

Bove
And
Ca'ewm

idea. ShaL
t in a form rather

pages, to make a
[Lx] To cackle
fly
fram, an ore of
Simmonds.
p calabaza, Cata-
on, i.e. calabaza
a kind of gourd,

containing a gelatinous substance of a light yellowish color
 Cal'ipers (kāl'i-pers), n. pl. Com-
 pass with

used as a measure from circulation; as to call for

5 A name or character 1087

that calling Shak-
 siness; trade;



man

the.

hard

frag.

oroy

pres-

Dependence is a perpetual call upon humanity
 3 A divine vocation or summons that is, or is
 supernatural.

sacred by kneeling too
 Lender,
 and indurated, insen-
 sible to Obedience
 s, hardened, or un-
 quality of being cal-
 "A calmness of
 Ep Taylor.

Direct
 led or ex-
 Milton,
 peaceful,
 ed; placid,
 calmness,
 s, burning
 eat, either
 ally also a
 obliges us
 motion,
 stillness;

Direct
 s man's own
 death
 s. 3c 16, 17

Produce
 s in the land

He makes his stoopy but wanting breath, is forced
To march

Marcher

Don't see,

ambles, ingeniousities

1 (Not) A plant of



Out went the candle, and we were left darkling
How far that little candle throws his beams!
So shines a good deed in a naughty world.
2 That which gives light, a luminary
By these blessed candles of the night.

Shal

Shal

Shal

1 Ressembling a crab tortling to the sea.
evolved, i
lone of en
2 (No
evolved
Cán de lá
24-25
DE L'ÉP
Gruen, etc
conclude
1 (And
stick off
(8) A sta
supporter
broad d
branches
2 A
mental
her

2 (Bot) A genus of reeds of large size, *Arundo donax*.
Canned, a. Made white, filled with white matter, mothery, — said of vinegar when containing mother.

twice, &c.
 2 A small box or case for holding tea, coffee, &c.
Cán/ster-shót, n. (Mil) A kind of case shot in which a number of small iron balls are inclosed in a



Lat. or an
 reed, pipe,
 tube See
CANE see
CAN 1
 1 A mill
 stary engine,
 of which the
 general form
 is that of a
 hollow cylin



A cannon
 A barrel B breech C second
 re-enforce D vent E base of the muzzle
 F breech on G gun base a, base-ring b
 base of the breech

America when
 they first men
 tion the word,
 give an expla
 nation of it



At
 Q1
 VC
 RL
 U

Cán/on n. [A S canon, rule, prebendary Fr, Pr,
 bp, & i g canon It canon from Lat canon, a
 measuring line rule, model, list, roll, Gr canon]
 1 A law or rule

council

Various canons which were made in councils held in the
 second century

5 A catalogue of saints acknowledged and canon

of O. Fr. can't, It. & Sp. can'to, else, corner. See
CANT, n.]

Cap'able, n. [Fr. & Pr. capable, from supposed re-
publicans capacious, capable, from Lat. co-
take, contain.]

1 Possessing ability, qualification or capacity

Burnet

Canton of the Burnet

Ce

Ce

Ce

Ce

Ce

Cant

The capacity of the exhausted cylinder
2 The power of receiving ideas, knowledge,
or the comprehensiveness of the mind, the re-
ceptive faculty

Captain is now commonly used to these

Can't-see-back n.
(Ornith.) A species
of sea duck, *P. lagotis*
salicetratus, high-
ly esteemed for the
delicacy of its flesh
found in the rivers
of the Chesapeake
Bay and adjoining



Cap'ability, n. The quality of being capable,
capacity, capableness.

A capableness to take a thousand views of a subject is to be
reconciled with it is necessary of judgment. H. Taylor

I am capableness like a man

Cap'-case, n. A small traveling case or hand box.

A cap-case for your lawn and your plate
With a strange lock that opens with a key

1 To sift, to strain to examine thoroughly, to
search or scrutinize, as, to canvass the votes for
senators

fair, unde, push, e, s, o, silent, c as s; ch as sh; c, ch, as k, g as j, k as in get, g as x; x as ex, o as in bigger, thick, th as in thine.

En rids!
En rids!
eggsen
-to a car
oath of

$$e_{\text{S}}(t) = 1 - \exp(-\lambda_{\text{S}} t) \quad (1)$$

Cap'ital, n [Cf. Lat *capitellum*, and *capitulum*, a small head, the head, top, or capital of a column, dim of *caput*, head, Fr. *chapiteau*, O Fr. & [Fr. *capitel*]

1 (Arch) The head or uppermost part of a column, pilaster, &c.

In classical architecture, the orders have each their respective style.

2 [Pr. copy]
tule, f, se. velle]
(Goon) The chief



Gratias



Compass



Tucum



Code: 0124



Trade

**Topic**

discrete-time

There is no reason why the reducing of any age certain heads or capitula should not be called to equate

3 To surrender on stipulated terms, as an ar
ranger

■ *is* = *isolated* *Monera*

^a at concentrations from 0.01

- *Hallare* music from the
- *of extinction*
- *of motion*

3 A cluster of ...

3. To overpower with excellence
charm

Small ...

9
8
7
6
5
4
3
2
1

Cap. ...
cherry
Lat

boil or coal

" *Lloyd*
" *cardi*
" *malitus*]

2 Having a malignant boil called carbuncle, hence, having red or inflamed spots. *A carbuncled face* " *from*
Car būn'en lar, n Belonging to a carbuncle, resembling a carbuncle, red inflamed
Car būn en lā'tion n (Lat *carbunculatus* from

How thy care must be to find
2 Attention or heed, caution, regard, heedful
ness, watchfulness
They shall not heed by weight, and with care *Ezek* lv 16.

[Obs.] *Fort.*


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| 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10 | 11 | 12 | 13 | 14 | 15 | 16 | 17 | 18 | 19 | 20 | 21 | 22 | 23 | 24 | 25 | 26 | 27 | 28 | 29 | 30 | 31 | 32 | 33 | 34 | 35 | 36 | 37 | 38 | 39 | 40 | 41 | 42 | 43 | 44 | 45 | 46 | 47 | 48 | 49 | 50 | 51 | 52 | 53 | 54 | 55 | 56 | 57 | 58 | 59 | 60 | 61 | 62 | 63 | 64 | 65 | 66 | 67 | 68 | 69 | 70 | 71 | 72 | 73 | 74 | 75 | 76 | 77 | 78 | 79 | 80 | 81 | 82 | 83 | 84 | 85 | 86 | 87 | 88 | 89 | 90 | 91 | 92 | 93 | 94 | 95 | 96 | 97 | 98 | 99 | 100 |
| 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10 | 11 | 12 | 13 | 14 | 15 | 16 | 17 | 18 | 19 | 20 | 21 | 22 | 23 | 24 | 25 | 26 | 27 | 28 | 29 | 30 | 31 | 32 | 33 | 34 | 35 | 36 | 37 | 38 | 39 | 40 | 41 | 42 | 43 | 44 | 45 | 46 | 47 | 48 | 49 | 50 | 51 | 52 | 53 | 54 | 55 | 56 | 57 | 58 | 59 | 60 | 61 | 62 | 63 | 64 | 65 | 66 | 67 | 68 | 69 | 70 | 71 | 72 | 73 | 74 | 75 | 76 | 77 | 78 | 79 | 80 | 81 | 82 | 83 | 84 | 85 | 86 | 87 | 88 | 89 | 90 | 91 | 92 | 93 | 94 | 95 | 96 | 97 | 98 | 99 | 100 |

Сѣрпъ, n
(Fr. *carpe*,
Sn *carpa*,
i " "
l e



Common Carp (*Cyprinus carpio*)

(1 of) Belonging to



The shepherds at their feasts,
and her goodness. *M. Mon*
[See supra] To sing in joy or fear
arise
The gray lincks caw'd from the hill. *Brattle*

Jongqila, curmofana, pikke, and tulipe rice.

2 A smooth soft covering, resembling a carpet
"The grassy carpet of this plain" *Shak.*

the Carnivora

All that have serrate teeth are

für, ryde, push, e, é, ø, silent, ç as s, çh as sh, c, ch, as k, ç as j, g as in get, g as z, x as gu, u as in lunge, hok, th as in thine.

1 (Paint) A design drawn on strong paper, to be afterward calked through, and transferred to the fresh plaster of a wall, to be painted in fresco.

1 To cover with a case, to surround with any

lon of
hank
1 train
and, a
ditch
1 wheel



Case-wheel.
a tree; a dance
a disk, a hub.
for the
in account with

public use.

only 1

as in

product

— calculation of the whole will check



C.

Stuff is said to cast or warp when it alters its fibres a straightness. *Abacus*
 4 (Naut) To fall off or incline, so as to bring the side of a ship to the wind. *Totten*
 Cast, n 1 The act of casting, a throw.
 2 The thing thrown. A cast of . . . dust.
 Dry ten

5 The act of casting in a mold. Daily cast of brass cannon. *Shal*
 6 The form or shape into which any thing is cast or inc.
 An
 bath
 7
 bronze
 8
 air s
 nunc

9
 vantage As, to have the cast of a cart, this is an opportunity of riding. *W Scott*
 10 The assignment of parts in a play to the actors.

3 A stand to contain a number of such phials or cruris, — plural

Castie-buill er (käs't bld er), n One who

Castigation, n
 by whipping, correction
 castigation of her sin.
 Syn.—Punishment

castor, or
 castoreum
 kin to skr
 lasturi,
 kasturid,
 musk.
 1 (Zo-
 ol) A ge-
 nus of an
 female in
 which the
 beaver is
 included
 see BEAVER



Castor Beaver

C.

EW This instrument is used by the Spaniards and Moors as an accompaniment to their dances and gait.
 Cast's wry, n 1 That which is thrown away, an abandoned person

furl, rude, push, e, f, o, silent, c as s, ch as sh, c, ch, as k, g as j as to get, g as x, z as ex, n as in logger, link, ch as in

a cataphract

Causidical, *a* [Lat *causidicus*, pertaining to an advocate, from *causa*, a cause in law lawent]

Cautionary, *n* (Scots Law) The act of giving security for another suretyship, the obligation of suretyship

CAVING [*Fr. caver, Pr. cavar, It. & Lat. cavare*] [*See supra*] To make hollow. "The mouldered Apennine,
To devil in a cave, "Such as we had,

There

Extraneus *sterni* *sterni*

Extraneus *sterni* *sterni*

talizing to, cement, as of a
R. Onem.

Syn.—Fault-finding; carping; cavilling; captious,
severe, condemnatory.

Wood perched on edges of the cellarage. *B. B. Browning*

(composition of the [LAL] conference from LAL, over
from, hundred, and names year)

1. Belonging to the hundredth anniversary, as
proposed by the

2. Happening once in a hundred years as a result of the

{ *in'ter* { n. (Fr & Ly centre, sp. 1 s, & 1 l. row
 { *in'ter* { n. (Lat centrum, from 1st steppe an)
 sharp point, the point round which a circle is de
 scribed, from *esse* s to prick to goad }

2 The middle or central portion of any thing
the middle

[illegible]

Hundred, and follow, leaf } Having a hundred
leaves } *Bible*

En'tig grāde a [Fr centigrade from Lat cen-
tum hundred and gradus degree] (consisting of
a hundred degrees graduated into a hundred di-
visions of equal parts.

Cool-water thermometer: a thermometer having the range 0 to 100 degrees F and the distance between 1 at and the boiling point of water divided into 100 equal divisions.

Trilligramme *n.* [*Tr. centigramme*, from *Lat. centum* hundred and *tr. gramme*, *Lat. gramma* New Greek (*GRAMMA*) a measure of weight being the 10th part of a gramme, equal to 1/100 of a grain Troy and 1/24 of a grain avoirdupois. *Neo-*

Tendency toward the center

Mach's a process invented for the
in area or the volume generated
in or surface about a fixed axis
hypothesis that every figure formed by



drachm part of a franc

Our hopes must center on ourselves alone.



[Cere monialism, n. Adherence to external

are, in themselves very silly things, but yet
I should know them. *See* Cereophyl.
mp or state, ceremonial ornament,
[ob]

Direct the houses, and them decked with ceremonies. *Stat*
monia, an officer who superintends the
ved by the company, or attendants, etc.

obtained by
dissolving it in hot alcohol,
formerly supposed to be a
neutral fat in the impure

WED



Chair (i), n. (Fr. *chaire*, pulpit, in U. S. chair, contracted from Lat. *cathedra*, chair, arm-chair, a teacher's or professor's chair, U. S. *sedes*. See CATHEDRA.)
 1. A movable seat with a back, intended for one person.

4. (CHIEF), A

10 The position of a weapon fitted for attack;
 as, to bring a weapon to the charge.
 11. (*sur.*) A sort of plaster or cement. *Wals.*
 12. (*Her.*) A bearing or emblem on a field. *Barb.*
 13 A weight of lead of uncertain quantity, but
 supposed to be 36 lbs, each pig containing 8 stone
 lacking 2 pounds, a stone being 12 pounds. [Witness
 also *charge*.]

Charge and discharge (*Equity Practice*). The mode or
 form of accounting before a master in chancery.

Byn.—Care; custody; trust; management. *Law.*

CHARITY

1 To lay on or impose, as a load or burden.
 2 To lay on or impose, as a tax, duty, or trust,
 —followed by *with*.

He never seemed to charge his manner or to trouble his
 thoughts with a sense of any of the services that had been
 done. *Sp. Sermon.*

3 To command, request, or exhort in an earnest
 or authoritative manner. *Sp. Sermon.*

(*Law.*)

1. To mark with a peculiar stamp or figure.

Example: Adamic, Chinese, African, and Grecian faces are
 characteristic. *Art without*

2 To engrave or imprint. (*Obs.*) *Idem*

3 To give a character or an account of the per-
 sonal qualities of a man, to describe by peculiar
 qualities.

upon any piece of appar-
 antly it is intended and fit

or that which, charges

Give me here John Baptist's hand in a charge. *Matt. xiv. 1*

3 A horse used in battle.

And follows every charge. *Chapman.*

4 (*Scotts Law*) One in whose favor a decree sub-
 jects. *Idem.*

(*Law.*)

1. The load or burden which is laid upon a per-

10. The position of a weapon fitted for attack;
 11. (Par.) A sort of plaster or ornament. *Wallo*.
 12. (Her.) A bearing or emblem on a field. *Barb*.
 13. A weight of lead of uncertain quantity, but
 supposed to be 20 pigs, each pig containing a stone
 lacking 2 pounds, a stone being 12 pounds. [Written
 also *charge*.]

Charge and discharge of Property Possessed by...

CHARITABLE

as, a. Destitute of any per

as, but it was, in fact, the perfection;
 1. Manner or means of ex

8. The possessor of a certain character;
 — usually with an attributive word or phrase
 the characters in a story, play, &c., a disti


Account, description

children. An action in personae, on the part of the law, regarding a piece of money which represents something from nature, great.

1. (H) A law which represents something from nature, great.
2. (H) The principal of marks on the surface of a stone, which are not one.
3. (H) An ornament in the form of a sign.



Chivroned (v)
 past, a Having a chevron on one's material face of a flag.



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Chivroned (v)
 past, a Having a chevron on one's material face of a flag.

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Cir
lab
Cir
ell
C

Of all past ages, to the general doom
shall hark, n.

Alfred

mation of,
cited "Syn.—See

Cit'een, n. 1. One who
other.

Cit'een, n. {See *Cit'*} A city woman. {Rare}

Cit'een, n. Same as *CIT'ERN*.

Cit'een, n. {From *cit'*} The manners of a city or
citizen. *H. Johnson*

Cit'een, n. A person born and bred in a city.

Chapman



not take which did his arms dispose
as suitable to a civilized state. {Rare}
{Crimes against} *Alfred*
reclaimed from savage life and
trained in arts, learning, and civil
society; cultivated.
conscience and duty in open market is not
the present state of civilized society. {Rare}

1. One who civilizes, one who re-
claims others from a wild and savage life, and
teaches them the rules and customs of civilized
life

1 Any thing that causes a clacking noise; as, the ratchet of a pump, pressing.

2 Continuous, pressing, pressing.

3 To make a clacking noise.

Clack-box, *n.* (See **CLACK**.) (a) The box containing a clack valve, and in which it works. (b) A box attached to the boiler of a locomotive engine, where a ball valve is placed, to cause the escape of the feed pipe, and keep the steam or hot water from reaching the pumps.

Clack-valve, *n.* A dash with a movable ball, by the motion of which a clacking noise is made, commonly used by engineers.

Clack'er, *n.* (See **CLACK**.) That which clacks.

Clack-valve, *n.* (See **CLACK**.) A valve with a single flap, which, when raised, is with a clacking sound.

Clack, *v.* To clack. (See **CLACK**.)

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Clack, *v.* To clack. (See **CLACK**.)

Clack'm'ness, *n.* (See **CLACK**.) The state of clacking or clacking.

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Clack'm'ness, *n.* (See **CLACK**.) The state of clacking or clacking.

Mother of science! now I feel thy power
 In this no clear not only to discern
 In eyes in their course, but to trace the ways
 Of highest agents. *With*
 4 Not clouded with passion; serene, *With*
 calm aspect an i clear *Million*
 5 Easily or distinctly heard, audible,
 Its all the numbers soft and clear, *Faye*
 Gently steal upon the ear
 6 Free from impurities without mixture, en-
 tirely pure, as clear water, clear as air

cost. *It*
 Eek when they clear, soothe up, and batter; the pure they
 confirm and deliver *Shalland*

2 To get off or escape

With closely powder dry their hair

I rose

charges to net

He clears but two hundred tho sand crowns a year after
 having delivered a the charges of work up the salt. *At home*
 8 To remove so as to leave something unob-
 structed, as to clear away rubbish

To become free from clouds or fog,
 — often followed by up, off, or away
 as sky clear not without a storm. *Black*
 9 To stay (1) the weather clear up. *Eight*
 engaged from incumbrances distress,
 to become free or disentangled. *Loose*
 10 To make exchanges and settle bal-
 ances adopted among bankers
 to depart. *Colley*
 The act of removing any thing;
 to clear. *Toll*

2 To purify and whiten with clay, as sugar

Clay/-be/line a Stupid dull *filovilla*
 Clay/-cold, a Cold as clay or earth, lifeless. *Shad*
 animate *Love*



10: 4

11. The ben-
Lackstone.
An ordained

12. A clerk,
Horsley,
see supra 1.

13. A relation of the city.

14. A narrow strip of wood nailed to
something for the purpose of affording strength or
of securing a piece of work in its proper
position.



The earth that creaks up from the plow & Great cloud, is not
so good as that which creaks up a smaller cloud
Two mazy clouds of iron and brass
Milton.

onl
That diago-
Cloak (20), { n. [L. Lat. clore, a kind of garment
horsemen and travelers;
ic, cloochel, cloochin. See

1 To encumber, as with a burden, to embarrass, to

3 To hinder, to embarrass, to confuse; to perplex.

You'll see the time

Chit

a which a cloak or other
elementary
covered manner
of concealing any thing
dissembling and cloac.
Strophe
ich cloaks are made, cloth

1000, 200, 300, 400, 500, 600, 700, 800, 900, 1000

All the ancient, honest, juridical principles and institutions
of law are so many cloaks to cloak and retard the head-
long course of violence and oppression. Burke

2 A weight tied to an animal to hinder its mo-
tions.

As a dog, by chance breaks loose
And quits his dog

Ilusion

That Neptune's sons, who whisper
there about

52 The phrase what a cloak? it is mine a cloak, etc.
are contradicted from what of the cloak? it is mine of the
cloak. etc.

For
log,
mole,
2 m-

Sp
stret,
stret,
di res

stis
mer
rous

They laid it on their club, and this they called having a
 trade. We found it at a French house, but paid her nothing for our
 of the club.
 1 To form a club, to combine for the promotion
 of some common object.
 The next the seven and the last.
 (Twined for a further to his last.)
 2 To pay an equal proportion of a common reck
 oning.

The drudging part of life is chiefly owing to cleanliness and 2 To clot or congregate together. (See also) (Holland)

club-house, *n*. A house belonging to, or occu-
 pied by a club.
 club-law, *n*. Government by clubs, or violence;
 the use of arms, or force, in place of law, an
 archy.
 club-men, *n*. One who carries a club.

One with the r. populous youth about the
 in clusters.
 cluster *v* *t* (imp & p p) CLOSTERED.
 p p & c *n* CLUSTERING to grow in
 clusters, to gather or unite in a bunch or
 mass.



1 A large, close,
 four wheeled car-
 riage having at least
 two seats will in, an
 capable of holding
 four persons — used
 for purposes of state,
 for pleasure, and for
 traveling.



2 A special tutor, who assists in
 examinations [Cant Cambridge Univ.]

3 (Naut) An apartment in a large ship
 near the stern the roof of which is formed
 poop. (Nutch also cover.)
 The command is come on board and the canoe is
 coxswain.

Coachman's coat a coat kept for hire — Mad
 a coach that carries the public man is — Coach
 a coach that carries the public man is — Coach

clack'ing
 her chicks.

— *scriptura* (Lat. *scriptura*, from *scribere*,

vine of
Lucan.
Ery.

collected,
a. continued

2472

Sinf.

To copy, in my coarse English, his beautiful expressions,
Lumina

α. Having a coarse grain, as
 ing in refinement
 Without fineness or refinement.
 ly, uncivilly; meanly, without

1. Approach
 at it justly,
 ask to the city
 1. and by or near the

navigation, *Arctostaphylos*
in the same country,
note, *N. Fr. cote*, hill,
hill on a sled upon
Battell
or to, to keep by the
Arctostaphylos

compass, was full to coast
long a coast or river

27948 fuyd

COAST-WAITER

1 The net work spread by a spider to catch its prey

The spider all presently in her net-work of drawing cobwebs up and down

2 The spider all presently in her net-work of drawing L. Extrange

red with loose hairs, as if with cob-
Louden

Covered with cobwebs

1 A station which enlists attention

Black countenance either reason the

7 One of the figured cards on

1 A station which enlists attention

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1 A station which enlists attention

Black countenance either reason the

7 One of the figured cards on

A large public, a cob, as a pavement of cob-
ble stones

Their hands shook swords, & the slugs held cobble round

The slugs held cobble round

The slugs held cobble round

The slugs held cobble round

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1 A large public, a cob, as a pavement of cob-
ble stones

Their hands shook swords, & the slugs held cobble round

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1 A large not
game played by children with nuts
slung out in the game

But (Cannon)



Cobra de Capello

Same as COBBLER

A large swan

[From cob T. and well q v] A wall

not clay, mixed with straw

[From cob T. and well q v] A wall

not clay, mixed with straw

[From cob T. and well q v] A wall

not clay, mixed with straw

[From cob T. and well q v] A wall

not clay, mixed with straw

COCKLE-SPIN (Red) Spoon

COCKLE-SPIN (Red) Spoon

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COCKLE-SPIN (Red) Spoon

furi, ryde, pugh; e, i, o, silent; g as s, th as sh, c, ch, as k, s as j, z

st, z as s, s as z, u as inigger, iigk, th as

A tale in the shape of a cock, a weathercock.

Till you have drenched our serpents, downed the cocks' gall.

3 A chief man, a leader [Humorous]

For Andrew is the cock of the club since he left us.

4 The time when cocks crow in the morning:
He begins to crow.

con

apartment, situated near
r the lower gun-deck, ap-
wounded men. Tullen.



Cockroaches

* The respondent

April

14 10 17 come, Sp coca, It
a small vessel from ...

4 The body or fire-pit of an insect.

Cock *kok* (k), *n*. {See **Cock**}. The top lo-
upper room in a house or other building; a
room
Cock-māster (b), *n*. One who breeds game
Drover
Cock-māch, *n*. A match of cocks; a cock
D.L. et.
Cock-nōw, *n*. A cock; a cock

Cock'-mā'tch, n A match of cocks; a cock
Cock'-n-ē — — — — —

Cock'new = match of cocks; a cock



... and, of the genus *Columba*, characterized by a very short, strong and much curved bill and easily having the hind orfeathered with a tuft of the bill, or erect as in the case of the bird can raise or depress its pleasure.

Cock's tail (*Quap* 179),
dile, *N. Fr. coccyz croco-*
rog. croc. L. Lat. coccyz,
hailik.) The basilisk,
fabled serpent, said to be
produced from a cock's egg
is fabled to be fatal. Its breath
that dare mortal

COFFEE-mán, n.

COFFEE-mill, n.

ing coffee

COFFEE-pot, n.
baked, or in which it is brought upon the table for
drinkingCOFFEE-pot, n. A small pot, usually of earthen-
ware, in which coffee is brewed.COFFEE-pot, n. A small pot, usually of earthen-
ware, in which coffee is brewed.out of the inclosed space, leaving the bottom dry
COFFEE-er, n. 1 One who puts something into a
coffeeCOGG, v. t. (Cogn. & p. p. COGGED, n. pr. & v. b. n.)
COGGING, n. (Cf. W. cognate, cognon, to make
cog, from cog, empty, vain, fool)COAX, v. t. 1. To seduce, or draw from, by adulating
flattery, to wheedle2. To coax their hearts from them
3. To coax or thrust in, by falsehoodCOAX, v. t. To coax their hearts from them
COAX, v. t. To coax or thrust in, by falsehood

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COAX, v. t. To coax or thrust in, by falsehood

a, e, i, b, g, long, a, e, i, b, g, short, care, far, last, sell, what, there, sell, term, pique, firm, done, for, do, well, food, foot;

Coherence
Coherence

either as in the parts of a discourse or of any system consisten y A great organic whole of which every part is in vital coherence with the whole

Coherence
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Eccl.) To place in a benefice, as by

letis to refuse within six months, the right
the archbishop. *Eccl. Let.*

[L. Lat. *collateralis*, from con and
from *latere*, hide.]

of; adjacent, immediately or

A collateral relation or kind-

addition to a principal prom-

1. Side by side, by the

Either withdrew into some private place
the reason really of your presence.

Stat.

CO'lt'ure n [O H Ger *col, chal*, N H Ger *lohl*, D

CO'lt'ure n [O H Ger *col, chal*, N H Ger *lohl*, D

eye formed in the night or blind of
over the mast head, also a strap
to which certain parts of rigging,
secured *Yates*.
The colored ring round the neck of

Craig.
to escape or get free, to disentangle
suddenly, later, or escapement. — *Cutter*
entirely bound up in one parcel *Johnson*.

mp & p n, COLLARED, p, pr & td,

r the collar

slar on

or other meat, to roll it up, and bind it

[*Im*]

officers

EC' This also obtains in the civil law, and is found in
the code of Louisiana *Bouvier*

8 An unceremonious repast or lunch; as, a cold
collation.

Collation of seals (*Civil Law*) a method of ascertaining
the genuineness of a seal by comparing it with another
known to be genuine *Bouvier*.

Collation, v. i To partake of a collation, to
lunch. [*Obs*] *Et. d'hy.*

CO'lt'ure n [O H Ger *col, chal*, N H Ger *lohl*, D

CO'lt'ure n [O H Ger *col, chal*, N H Ger *lohl*, D

CO'lt'ure n [O H Ger *col, chal*, N H Ger *lohl*, D

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CO'lt'ure n [O H Ger *col, chal*, N H Ger *lohl*, D

CO'lt'ure n [O H Ger *col, chal*, N H Ger *lohl*, D

1 To gather into one body or place, to assemble or bring together.

A band of men

Collected closely from each society. And
The servery alone that each has the mind by preserving
what our labor and industry daily collect.

2 To gather from premises, to infer as a consequence.

Which consequence, I conceive, is very ill collected. Lewis
To collect one's self to prevent from surprise, or a dis-
concerted state, to regain self-control.

Syn. — To gather; assemble, aggregate, amass in-
fer; deduce.

Col'lect, v. t. 1. To be assembled together, to ac-
cumulate, as, sand or snow collects in tanks.

2 To infer, to conclude. "Whence some collect
that the former word imports a plurality of per-
sons." South

Col'lect, n. [L. Lat. & Lat. collecta from coll-

to him, in common with one or more other per-
sons.

Col'liq'ua ble (kol'lik/wa bl) a (From Lat. com-

(kol'lik un), n. [Lat. colliso See
act of striking together a striking to

ered, or inferred
Col'lection, n. [L.
1 The act of col-

¹ Col lāte', r. l. (Eccl.) To place in a benefice, as by a bishop.

If the bishop neglects to collate within six months, the right

^{supra} }
deprivation of warmth; privation of heat.

[illegible]

E* Linear descendants proceed one from another as a
series of mathematical relations springing from a common

Cold-heartedness, n. Want of feeling or sensibility.
 "— somewhat cold.

addition to a principal prom-
I. Elide by side; by the
cor subordinate manner; in-
on the conscience collaterally and
Jon; not in a direct line, not
The state of being collat-

Čile, n. [O. H. Ger col, chol, N H Ger lohl, D
lat Dan Laal, A S concl, cawel, cawli-

eye formed in the bight or bend of
over the mast head, also a strap
to which certain parts of rigging,
secured Totten
he colored ring round the neck of

to escape or get free; to disentangle
 faculty, labor, or engagement. — Collar
 tightly bound up in one parcel. Johnson
 22 & 23 COLLARED. P. PR. & 13.

§ An unceremonious repast or lunch; as, a cold collation.

Collation of seeds (Old Law), a method of ascertaining the genuineness of a seed by comparing it with another known to be genuine. *Bowser.*

Col·la'tion, r. i. To partake of a collation; to lunch. [*Obs.*] *Exclm.*

Chilapichthys maculata
Chil'-perch, *n.* A small fish, less than the common perch
Chil'-less-er, *n.* [to and lessee, *q. v.*] A partner in
 n. b. taken
Chil'-less-er, *n.* [to and lessor, *q. v.*] A partner in
 giving a lease
Chil'-staff (*Ch.*) *n.* A strong staff or pole on which
 two men carry a burden
see **car**
Chil'-et, *n.* [Corrupted *f*
 of **Chil'-et**, church *see* **car**
Chil'-et (*Ch.*) *n.*

ollatitus,
is by the
Laidy
together
livings of
same per-

compares manuscripts of
Addison.
collates to a benefic
Amie.

COLLECTED, p. pr. &
colligere, collectum.

*glt, fctd, fctt

1 To gather into one body or place, to assemble
or bring together.

A load of men

A band of men
Collected a harvest of furs and a country

144

to him, in common with one or more other persons

Col liq'ua ble (kol lik'wa bl), *a*

[From Lat com

Col 1 Pet', v. 4. 1. To be assembled together, to accumulate, as, sand or snow *collects* in banks.
2 To infer, to conclude. "We once some *collect* that the former word imports a plurality of persons."

Almost in Christendom

Stal

Ice will dissolve in any way of heat
in water or warm

It will roll quite

Col lēct'or shī
Col lēct'or nī
2 Thō
Col lēg'atū
ATARI I

fûrl, ryde, pûsh, e, t, o, silent, ç as s; ch as sh, c, ch, as s, ç as j, h as sh, t as z, x as gr, n as in finger, link, th as in thine.

ie are come to you to do a good office
2. To arrive at some state or condition, to be
to happen

The strols and other comber are removed when the aster
by use

Comber, n [N Lat *lobrus comber*] (*hkh*) A
long, slender fish, with a red back, found in Corn
wall, England

Combinable, a, [Fr *combinable*] Capable of
combining (*Oba*)

Resources are very combinable both with business and study
(*Oba*)

Combinable, n State of being combin-
able

Combinate, n [S. Co. Computer] n—
trochil, (*Oba*)

In the coming or sprouting of small, as it must not count too
high, so it must not count too much

4. To become (*Oba*) n Ro. come to

5. Come to pass

Comet (*hkh*), n [comet] n—
COMET (n) n—



2 Lightly belonging falling with in the com
pensation of instant having adequate power of
fall - flower by so

A poetry L with which one of Tiffan's could not come in
range of form.

10 plus log that to compare to some
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Com'pla cential, *a.* Marked by complacence; accommodating. "*Complacential regards.*" *Cogan*
Com'pla cential-ly, *adv.* In a complacential or accommodating manner.
Com-pli'cent, *y, adv.* In a complacent manner
p p & v n. COMPLACENT

Com'pla cential is in working proportions by longish
G (Mus) The interval wanting to complete the octave, the fourth is the complement of the third, the sixth of the third.

Men are every now and then put by complacency of affairs into strange situations.
Com'plex, *y, adv.* In a complex manner

Co

Co of [Rare] capable of being con-
Com plai'ant, *n* [Fr *complaignant*, *p*
complaignere See *supra*]
 1 One who makes complaint. "Eager com-
 plaints"
 2 (Law) (a) One who commences a legal pro-
 ceedings by a complaint (b) The actor or party in
 equity, answering to the plaintiff at con-
 law.

He shall forfeit one moiety to the use of the town, and
 other moiety to the use of the complainant. *Stat of*
Com plai'ner, *n* One who complains or laments
 one who finds fault, a murmurer. *See*
Com plai'nful, *a* Full of complaint [Rare]
Com plai'nful, *n* [Fr *complaigner*, *p* *complaignere*
 complaints, *n.* complaints, complaints. See C
 PLAIN]

1 Expression of grief, regret, pain, censure
 re-entment, lamentation, murmuring
 I have and must unwillingly of late
 received many grievous complaints, my lord,
 General complaints of you

2 Cause or subject of complaint or murmuring
 The poverty of the clergy in England hath been the com-
 plaint of all who wish well to the church. *South*

3 The cause of complaint, a
 cause in the body

4 (Law) 1 form of legal pro-
 ceedings or a formal allegation or charge
 made or presented to the appropriate
 court for a wrong done or a crime
 committed, usually under oath

Syn — Lamentation, murmuring
 (see *supra*)

Com plai'nful, *n* Full of complaint. (Obs)
Com plai'nful, *n* [Fr *complaignant*, *p* *complaignere*
 complaints, *n.* complaints, complaints. See C
 PLAIN]

to entwine around, to comprise, from *com*, for *con*,
 and *plectere*, to twist

Com plai'ant (plai'ant) *n* *See supra*

Com plai'ant (plai'ant) *n* *See supra*

Com plai'ant (plai'ant) *n* *See supra*

Com plai'ant (plai'ant) *n* *See supra*

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Com plai'ant (plai'ant) *n* *See supra*

Com plai'ant (plai'ant) *n* *See supra*

p fr. & b n. compromising] [Lat. compromitt.
serv. See COMPROMISE]
1. To bind by mutual agreement; to agree; to
accord. [OED]
[aban and himself were compromised.
[ban, all the soldiers who were struck and fled. [OED]
[ban should fill as Jacob's have
2. To adjust and settle by mutual concessions, to
compound.

of painter and witness. We speak of the drawings of re-
mains of remembrance at the remembrance of some act
of transgression, of deep conviction in view of our past
lives.

compagnie less a Without compaction
compagnie less a Trying the conscience, at-
tended with compaction

That no ~~compunctious~~ visitings of nature
Shake my firm purpose

Compassionately, and With compassion,

... ..

1. That which is conceived, imagined, or formed in the mind: idea, thought, image, conception.
In laughing there ever precedeth a conceit of somewhat ridiculous.

best thou a man wise in his own conceit: there is more hope

conceive to imagine,
as if they really were so
To form an idea, to think, to judge.

vulgar apprehensions conce / but low of
poets Milton
* but wed with fancy on forest

Con-E're (Eker), v f To underlet a portion of,
for a single crop — said of a farm

from observation, cover from sight.
The cleft tree

SYN - 7. ...

für, unde, pŭsh, s, ſ, e, silent, p as s, għ as sh, c, ch, as k, ħ as j, ġ as in get, z as x, ʒ as jr, u as in igger, iſk, sh as =

Conchometer (kŏn'chŏ-mĕ-tĕr) n. [Gr. kŏn'chŏ-mĕ-tĕr, shell, and] 1 A cutting off, hence, a division; a faction.

correct, to ripen
repare as a scheme, to devise,
to plot
th e to co sact any great forth ne
H e ward,

Syn — Laconic terse; brief; short; compendious
comprehensive, summary, succinct. See LACONIC and
TARSE
Concise'y, adv. In few words, comprehensively,
briefly
Conciseness n. Brevity in speaking or writing
"The conciseness of Demosthenes" Dryden
Concission (kŏn-sĭ-sh'ŭn) n. [Lat. concisio, Fr.
concision, It. concisione Fr. conciso See supra]

5 (Lenc) (a) The end or close of a pleading
(b) An estoppel or bar by which a person is held
to a position which he has taken

fŭrl, ryde, pyah; e, d, o, silent, c as n, ch as sh, e, ch, as k; g

as in get, g as g, g as g

[imp & p p. CONCLUDED p p
 idere, to elut, it conchiuere, p p
 1r concludere, concludere, 1r con

al to revolution for their creation

July

city

P. con

It is supposed that the...
 mischievous to any submission on the part of

Con-*clud*tor, n [Lat. *concluditor*] <

clear [Obs.]

SYN.—Laconic; terse; brief; short; compendious;
 comprehensive, summary, succinct. See *Laconic* and
Yacht.

Con-*clude*ly, ade. In few words, comprehensively,
 briefly.

Con-*clude*ness, n. Directly in speaking or writing
 "The consciousness of Demosthenes" *Demosthenes*

Con-*clusion* (kon-si'zhun), n. [Lat. *conclusio* Fr.
 conclusion, it. *conclusione*, 1r *conclusio* See *supra*]

Liberty

Darius

421, ryde, rysh; c, f, o, silent, t as s; ch as sh; c, ch, as k; g as j g as in get, x as x, y as y, n as in linger, ngk, ch as in chine.

Confirmation *n* [Lat *confirmatio*, Fr *confirmation* *on* 'sp *confirmacion* It *confirmazione*]
1 The act of confirming, the act of producing
evidences or confirming the state of being con-
firmed
true

3 Theory of comparison

arrangement of its parts firm, make

Con frò
fronte

Varieties are found in the different natural shapes of the

It is also the rule that
Confession on the Sabbath was

Gray | 1 The process of passing or the act of
ing from a fluid to a solid state, by the ab-

fŭrl, ryde, pash, e, t, o, silent; ç as s, çh as sh, c, ch, as k, ğ as j, Ğ as in Get, y as u, z

119k, the 2012

ponably.
Consequen'tly (in 1888
was noted)

trial.
entrate

Com sign* (con sign), v. t. 1. To submit, ...
One's self up, to surrender or yield one's self.
[Obs.]

All lovers young, all lovers, most
Comes to thee, and come to thee
[Obs.]

Slak

superin-
is, Bee
Section.

Consequen'tly, n. [In
at]

The water which they

the class of
the class of
the class of

e, for, dg, wqit, fdbd, fdbt;

Con-sim'lar n [Lat con ailing similar q v]

d A church tribunal

1. Consider the differential equation $y'' + p(x)y' + q(x)y = r(x)$ on the interval $[a, b]$. Suppose y_1, y_2, y_3 are solutions of the homogeneous equation $y'' + p(x)y' + q(x)y = 0$. Show that y_1, y_2, y_3 are linearly independent if and only if the Wronskian $W(y_1, y_2, y_3) \neq 0$ at some point in $[a, b]$.

fūrī, rŭde push, e, i, o, silent, ç as s, çh as sh, c, ch, as k, ğ as j

Get, t as x, z as gu, n as in finger.

cōn'so'nōus, a. [Lat. *consonus*. See *supra*] the body of
 Agreeing in sound, symphonious
 Con'sō'pi'āte, v. a. [See *CONSPICUE*.] To fall
 asleep. {Obs} Cocleorum
 A lulling asleep {Obs}

I had forgot that foul conspiracy
 Of the great Caliban and his confederates,
 Against my life. Shal
 2 A concurrence or general tendency, as of
 to one event

Con'so nōds, a. [Lat. *consonus*, *Res Supra*] Agreeing in sound; symphonious.
 Con'so nōt ate, v. h. [See CONSONITE.] To fall asleep. [*Obs.*] A falling asleep [*Obs.*]

I had to fight that evil enemy
 Of the least fallen and less moderate,
 Against my life.
 A concurrence or general tendency, as of

of certain deities in a conspiracy, if
 only every part had a necessary sympathy
 and all to great ends, by their harmonious
 thy whole.
 n. [Lat.] One who conspires

by oath, covenant, or otherwise, to

Con'sort, v. [Lat. *consonare*] To unite or to ally
 company, to associate

Con'sort
 bar
 3-4

the manner of a conspire.
 Milan.

Con'sta bility (kōn'sta bility), n. The body or

sting of constabular
 stability. [*Obs.*]
 Con'stance, n. [*Obs.*]

person] 3 Regulated by, dependent on or secured by, a | C

Contaminant, *v. t.* [*imp. & p. p. CONTAMINATE*
in p. p. & c. o. n. t. a. m. i. n. a. t. i. n. g.] [*Lat. con-*
taminatus p. p. of contaminare from con + taminare
feminine, to violate & p. contaminare, it contamin-
are] To soil, stain or corrupt by d. filling con-
 tact, to tarnish, to sully, to taint, to pollute

Contaminant our finger with base bribes? Did
 I would neither have simplicity imposed upon nor vice
 contaminated, Goldsmith.

Contaminant

taint.

Information contemplated by these resolutions

Information

Information, push, e, s, o, silent, r as s, th as sh, c, ch, as k, g as j, k as in get, z as n, x as gx, y as in slyer, likk, sh as in

o quality of being
 h s p r l

Information and content, let as be the with content.
 Content and not content terms used as in the
 English House of Lords to say that as to or about
 from any motion

con, tra, sp, & p, contrast, it, contrastive
See CONTRASTANT. To contradict or oppose, to
thwart. (O.E.)

You must contrast me!

Anti

Contrast' r. l. (imp. & p. CONTRASTED, p. pr.)

or restrains one that is
to govern or control

master of our fate and i red in low estate. Dred n

The office of a controller

he power or act of control

is restrained, control, re

striction. Shakes

Disputatious controver

in Hall

as by contrastable. If I am I

Contributory a. Laying tribute to the same
sovereign, contributing and

It was a trest on the Ganges at the place where this river

Contributor

2. Also act of contributing, or of lending aid and
assistance.

Contr, rude, p, ch; c, d, e, silent; c as s; sh as sh, e, ch, as h, & as j; c as in get; g as x; x as g, q as in finger, h, ch, as in shine.

Cum
 con
 ta
 di

 Co
 R
 I
 C

62184.
mass of lodging, living (a)
kōn'tu-mā'elōis (kōn'tu-mā'elōis), a. (a)
tumax, gen. contumacis. See CONTUMACY.
1. Exhibiting contumacy; contumacious authority,
obstinate, perverse, stubborn, unyielding
... another mode of subduing the most obstinate con-
tumacious

[illegible][illegible]

The oppressor's wrong the proud man's contumely
 the oppressor's wrong the proud man's contumely

beating ^(toos)
Consume, e f [any & p p consume]
is a consuming } [See supra]
1 To heat, pound, or bray together
bricks, and acids consumed together
2 To bruise or injure by beating, as flesh
and making in open wound
4

1. *Chlorophyll a* and *Chlorophyll b* were determined by the method of Arar and Collins (1971) using a Shimadzu 1010 spectrophotometer. The concentration of chlorophyll was expressed as $\mu\text{g mL}^{-1}$ of the sample.

after which
 he (the king) found the queen somewhat

2 (*Physics*) A process of union, as of heat or electricity, by means of currents in liquids or gases, resulting from changes of temperature and other causes.

Liquids are generally heated by convection — when heat is applied from below.

Convection, *n.* Motion or accomplished by continuous action, or the motion of particles, as in liquid, &c., or, as, a coelectric discharge of electricity, &c., as, a convective discharge of electricity, &c.

In a convective manner; by currents.

con vee'liv 17, -
conviction.
Con's've n s ble, a. [Fr. conrenable, from consens
to consent.] Consistent with, according to,
in accordance with.
He was con'sistent in his views.
His actions were con'sistent with his words.

1 To come together the rays converge and scatter. *Acron.*
In shortness of time the eyes before they come at the bottom
2 To come together, to meet in the same place, *Acron.*
to assemble, as persons. "The parliament of crooks
land now convened!" *Linker*
Syn. - To meet, to assemble, to join, to unite
together, v. l. To cause to assemble, to call
together, to convoke. *Page*
And now the mighty Father of the gods
council in the blest abode. *Acron.*

Conven'er. " {One} with other {One} who calls an assembly together, hence, the chairman of an organized body, as a committee {Scott} stamp in {Lat convention, Fr. Ep. & Pg convention, li. come

ance }
 being convenient, fitness of sub-
 stance, &c. & adaptedness
 18 19 life, if I can meet him with any com-
 mended of God, yet lawful, what Eph
 necessity which one hath above another? Hooker

2 Freedom from discomfort, difficulty, or trouble,
 commensurations, ease
 Every man must want something for the convenience of his
 for which he must be subject to others
 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 100 101 102 103 104 105 106 107 108 109 110 111 112 113 114 115 116 117 118 119 120 121 122 123 124 125 126 127 128 129 130 131 132 133 134 135 136 137 138 139 140 141 142 143 144 145 146 147 148 149 150 151 152 153 154 155 156 157 158 159 160 161 162 163 164 165 166 167 168 169 170 171 172 173 174 175 176 177 178 179 180 181 182 183 184 185 186 187 188 189 190 191 192 193 194 195 196 197 198 199 200 201 202 203 204 205 206 207 208 209 210 211 212 213 214 215 216 217 218 219 220 221 222 223 224 225 226 227 228 229 230 231 232 233 234 235 236 237 238 239 240 241 242 243 244 245 246 247 248 249 250 251 252 253 254 255 256 257 258 259 260 261 262 263 264 265 266 267 268 269 270 271 272 273 274 275 276 277 278 279 280 281 282 283 284 285 286 287 288 289 290 291 292 293 294 295 296 297 298 299 300 301 302 303 304 305 306 307 308 309 310 311 312 313 314 315 316 317 318 319 320 321 322 323 324 325 326 327 328 329 330 331 332 333 334 335 336 337 338 339 340 341 342 343 344 345 346 347 348 349 350 351 352 353 354 355 356 357 358 359 360 361 362 363 364 365 366 367 368 369 370 371 372 373 374 375 376 377 378 379 380 381 382 383 384 385 386 387 388 389 390 391 392 393 394 395 396 397 398 399 400 401 402 403 404 405 406 407 408 409 410 411 412 413 414 415 416 417 418 419 420 421 422 423 424 425 426 427 428 429 430 431 432 433 434 435 436 437 438 439 440 441 442 443 444 445 446 447 448 449 450 451 452 453 454 455 456 457 458 459 460 461 462 463 464 465 466 467 468 469 470 471 472 473 474 475 476 477 478 479 480 481 482 483 484 485 486 487 488 489 490 491 492 493 494 495 496 497 498 499 500 501 502 503 504 505 506 507 508 509 510 511 512 513 514 515 516 517 518 519 520 521 522 523 524 525 526 527 528 529 530 531 532 533 534 535 536 537 538 539 540 541 542 543 544 545 546 547 548 549 550 551 552 553 554 555 556 557 558 559 560 561 562 563 564 565 566 567 568 569 570 571 572 573 574 575 576 577 578 579 580 581 582 583 584 585 586 587 588 589 590 591 592 593 594 595 596 597 598 599 600 601 602 603 604 605 606 607 608 609 610 611 612 613 614 615 616 617 618 619 620 621 622 623 624 625 626 627 628 629 630 631 632 633 634 635 636 637 638 639 640 641 642 643 644 645 646 647 648 649 650 651 652 653 654 655 656 657 658 659 660 661 662 663 664 665 666 667 668 669 670 671 672 673 674 675 676 677 678 679 680 681 682 683 684 685 686 687 688 689 690 691 692 693 694 695 696 697 698 699 700 701 702 703 704 705 706 707 708 709 710 711 712 713 714 715 716 717 718 719 720 721 722 723 724 725 726 727 728 729 730 731 732 733 734 735 736 737 738 739 740 741 742 743 744 745 746 747 748 749 750 751 752 753 754 755 756 757 758 759 760 761 762 763 764 765 766 767 768 769 770 771 772 773 774 775 776 777 778 779 780 781 782 783 784 785 786 787 788 789 790 791 792 793 794 795 796 797 798 799 800 801 802 803 804 805 806 807 808 809 810 811 812 813 814 815 816 817 818 819 820 821 822 823 824 825 826 827 828 829 830 831 832 833 834 835 836 837 838 839 840 841 842 843 844 845 846 847 848 849 850 851 852 853 854 855 856 857 858 859 860 861 862 863 864 865 866 867 868 869 870 871 872 873 874 875 876 877 878 879 880 881 882 883 884 885 886 887 888 889 890 891 892 893 894 895 896 897 898 899 900 901 902 903 904 905 906 907 908 909 910 911 912 913 914 915 916 917 918 919 920 921 922 923 924 925 926 927 928 929 930 931 932 933 934 935 936 937 938 939 940 941 942 943 944 945 946 947 948 949 950 951 952 953 954 955 956 957 958 959 960 961 962 963 964 965 966 967 968 969 970 971 972 973 974 975 976 977 978 979 980 981 982 983 984 985 986 987 988 989 990 991 992 993 994 995 996 997 998 999 1000 1001 1002 1003 1004 1005 1006 1007 1008 1009 1010 1011 1012 1013 1014 1015 1016 1017 1018 1019 1020 1021 1022 102

We are rich
own convenience
which is convenient; that will
t, ease, enjoyment, or advantage, a
are the convenience to speak with his majesty
if (-yent) (Smyon, p. 130), a (Lat. con-
of convenience, it & Ep convenience

[illegible]

"association or community of religious life, a body of monks or our convent, and his [the duke's]

[illegible]

... One who supports or fre-
[Lat. *conferre*, Fr. *conférence*,
cion, it *conference*. See LO-

coming together, or assembling;
... associations of several parties of mat-
Logis
... conference, arbitrary

2 General agreement of conventions, conventions
custom, usage, conventionality, conventions. *Frangosa.*
There are thousands now
such women, but otherwise brain these down. *Frangosa.*
An assembly of delegates or representatives to
represent some specific object, still, political, or
scientific.
set at himself to the making of good law in a grand court-
case. *Frangosa.*
He sent himself of delegates from all the States, to
meet in Philadelphia, for the main and express purpose of
a convention, for the sake and for correcting its defects.
The federal system, and for correcting its defects.
The extraordinary assembly of the
king's writ;

4. (The *High*) The *High* without the *High* to the
 estates of the realm held without the *High* to the
 the the assembly which restored the throne to be
 the throne, and that which declared the throne to be
 indicated by James II.

Our gratitude is due to the Long Parliament in the
 Convention, and to William of Orange.

5. An agreement or contract is formal than, an
 an agreement, a treaty or understanding here, an
 formal compact, as between commanders of armies
 in respect to suspension of hostilities, or between
 states, also a formal agreement.

I think from now on it is nothing but a
 abuse without a substance.

[illegible]

Conventionalist 1. a. One who adheres to a convention or treaty.
2. One who is governed by conventionalism.
Conventionalist, n. The state of being conventional, that which is established by conventional use, adherence to social formalities or usages.
Conventionalist 1. a. One who adheres to a convention or treaty.
Conventionalist, n. The state of being conventional, that which is established by conventional use, adherence to social formalities or usages.

[illegible]

Can vFrge', r i [imp & p p covzme
, plique, firm; dōne, fōr, dq, wqfz, fēod, fēoi;

COOK, v. t. (imp. & p. p. COOKED (kôkt), p. p. COOKED) [A. S. *proccosan*, Icel. *lôkin*, Sw. *koka*, Dan. *koke*, D. *kochen*, G. *kochen*, A. S. *coocian*]

to degree of cold. "The refreshing coolness of the waters" Prescott

Co-ordinates are of several kinds, consisting in the different A. S. *coocian*

1. S. cool, D. cool, Ger. *kalt*, Sw. *kylig*, to be cold, Icel. *kala*, and *kylla*.]

2. Moderately cold, warmth, approaching cool winds

3. Producing or promoting a shelter and a interposition

4. Calm or free from exercising self control, in lower and modern languages, such as the instances, more than cool reason

In this high court of parliament, there is a rare co-ordination of power Maxwell

2. To moderate the heat or excitement of to at

Bring all your lutes and harps of heaven and earth to have a concert at the house of the Lord

COO, v. t. (imp. & p. p. COOED) from *coo* a short bob tailed bird, rump tail } 1. (Ornith.) A water fowl of the genus *Fallco* frequenting lakes and other still waters



cooed about fifteen inches

as, a silly cool Maltwell

on } [Obt]

all Drayton

med on the spin

Sp. & P. from Med. A. H. A.

COOP, v. t. The act of cooping or of a manner

the trunk of a tree with



perly; heartiness.

Three hundred professors had been received into the
 Cardinal at the, or Cardinal the, v. r. To replace
 Cardinal at the, or Cardinal the, v. l. To grow cor-
 dially, or express cordiality, to harmonize.

Corinthian. The same as CORINTHIAN.
 Corinthian, n. [Lat. Corinthus,
 or Corinth] } (Geog.) A city of Greece.
 } A small fruit, a corrant.
 (Foss.)

dog like
 it. A th.
 roundum
 ng smelt
 achio and



which sometimes corn when growing

Cardinal
 leather, 1000



Cornucopia

D. Lark, Ep.
 ark hind
 a tree (Cornucopia
 and casks are

preparate and season with a
 with salt, to cure by salting; as, to corn
 form into small grains; to granulate; as, to
 impowder.

supply or feed with grain; as, to corn
 Wright

To render fertilized; as, also strong enough
 to corn one (Chillog)

Cornea, n. (Bot.) Pertaining to the genus
 Cornus, or to the plants included in it.

Cornucopia, n. [D Fr. from Fr. cornu, Lat. cornu,
 a horn] (Law) An ancient scour of land, which
 obliged the tenant to give notice of an invasion by
 blowing a horn.

Cornucopia, n. A cornucopia. [Obs.] Dryden.

Cornucopia, n. A dealer in corn. [Eng.] See
 Bazaar.

Cornucopia, n. (Bot.) A species of Polygona; [Eng.]

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Cornucopia, n. (Bot.) A species of Polygona; [Eng.]

Cornucopia, n. (Bot.) A species of Polygona; [Eng.]



blaze (100)

He was in a core of people whose affections he sought

Core, n. A core of people whose affections he sought

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Core, n. A core of people whose affections he sought

striking a wo
 a cork mold.
 Sugar
 jacket having
 enclosed within



tions of the skin

2 A machine for reaping

corn, or for cutting up stalks of corn for food of

cattle

Cornucopia, n. A cake made of the meal of

Indian corn wrapped in a covering of husks or pa-

perilla.

Cornucopia, n. A cake made of the meal of

Indian corn wrapped in a covering of husks or pa-

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perilla.

Cornucopia, n. A cake made of the meal of

Indian corn wrapped in a covering of husks or pa-

Corneon-piston *n*
[Fr.] (*Max*) A brass
wind, musical instru-
ment like the French
horn or the trumpet
furnished with valves
moved by small pistons
or sliding rods

Corn-flower *n* A flower or plant growing
among corn, as the blue bottle, wild poppy, &c

Corne *n* A little horn

Corneled (*Cor-nel*) *a* Having a cornice *Exclm*
Cornele (*Cor-nel*) *n* (*Lat corniculum*, dimin-
utive of *cornu*, horn) A little horn *Brown*

A cornucopia of plenty from
which fruits and flowers are rep-



Cornucopia
horned from
upon to make a

to be used to make a

Coronal (*Bynop*, §133) *a* [Lat *coronatus*, Fr

coronatus] 1 Relating to the kingly crown, or to corona-
tion

1 A tiara or a crown seated on the top of the
head or placed as a crown

2 (that) bearing likeness to a crown or cir-
cle — applied to certain ligaments, arteries, veins,
&c *DuRoi*

Coronary *n* A small bone in the foot of a horse

Coronate *a* [Lat *coronatus* *n* *n* of *corn-*

[illegible]

1. Who corrects one who amends faults reaches error, and renders conformable to truth or propriety, or to any standard, as, a corrector of the press, a corrector of abuses.

the 1990s, the number of people in the world who are illiterate has increased from 1.2 billion to 1.5 billion. The number of illiterate people in the world is projected to reach 1.7 billion by the year 2015. The number of illiterate people in the world is projected to reach 1.7 billion by the year 2015. The number of illiterate people in the world is projected to reach 1.7 billion by the year 2015.

Cor rēl'a tīve, n 1
stands in a reciprocal re- l'at'v
Espīritūal things and spīritual
2 (from) The antec
Cor rēl'a tīve ly, adv
Cor rēl'a tīve ness, n
sive
Cor rēp'si'tiōn n [Lat.
to seize upon to repress
retie] Chastity, re- pro-
tion (Goe)
Cōr re-spond' rē s'pōnd'

Answering, conform
by letters
society one residing at
intercourse with the soci
designs
In a cor- -
erable, adaj
in a cor

1. 1990年12月，在《中国环境报》发表署名文章《中国环境状况令人担忧》，指出中国环境状况令人担忧，呼吁全社会关注环境问题。

ne or wear away by degrees, to prey
 at every thing whom once diffuse
 every thought, and blasting all
 machine

siker gnaw rust waste wayward
 (Lat corrodero, p. w of corrod-
 the power of corroding or wasting
 are)

Any substance or medicine that
 tor rudi l e f (See CORRODE.) By long
 by degrees to corrode, (dis)
 Corrods ball ty, N. The quality of being corro-
 dible [rare]

Corrudi-tle n Capable of being corroded, cor-
 rodible

Corrody n The same as -

Figure 1 is a scatter plot illustrating the relationship between the number of children in the household (X-axis) and the number of children in the neighborhood (Y-axis). The X-axis ranges from 0 to 10, and the Y-axis ranges from 0 to 10. The plot shows a positive correlation, with data points clustered around a diagonal line. The legend indicates that the number of children in the household is represented by the size of the dot and the number of children in the neighborhood is represented by the position of the dot.

[illegible]

—

[illegible]

How to get the sign on a second set, i. e. to know when

COIN
COIN
COIN
COIN

COIN is coin, hardening with the sun and

COIN is coin, hardening with the sun and

COIN is coin, hardening with the sun and

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COIN is coin, hardening with the sun and

COIN is coin, hardening with the sun and

1. a sign for you to know a coin is a coin
requires to be borne or suffered
for his other name when he entered
in his name on their necks he is
a coin we don't see who cost them won.
dear to require a large outlay

BLITZ (DE)

COIN, a See COIN
C

COIN, a See COIN
C

We cost them on the way and either as they come

COIN, a To quote [Obs] See QUOTE
COIN, a To quote [Obs] See QUOTE

COIN, a To quote [Obs] See QUOTE
COIN, a To quote [Obs] See QUOTE

1. Retaining local matter in the bowels; having

The moment had arrived when it was thought that the

COIN, a To quote [Obs] See QUOTE
COIN, a To quote [Obs] See QUOTE

2. To lie down for concealment, to hide, to be concealed.
 We'll couch in the castle ditch, till we see the light of day.
 The half hidden, half revealed wonders, that yet couch beneath the words of the scripture.
 3. To lie spread abroad, "The deep that coucheth beneath."
 4. To bend the body, as in reverence, pain, labor, &c.
 An axel equine
 are for rest or sleep, a bed or seat, and


1. *Coturnate*, n. *Coturnate*, n. [From *cot*, a small house, & *turn*, to turn.]

2. *Coturnate*, n. [From *cot*, a small house, & *turn*, to turn.]

the *Coturnate* *Coturnate*

1. *Coturnate*, n. [From *cot*, a small house, & *turn*, to turn.]

2. The cut shows a section of a strap head.



1. *Coturnate*, n. [From *cot*, a small house, & *turn*, to turn.]

2. *Coturnate*, n. [From *cot*, a small house, & *turn*, to turn.]



2. To compose to rest, — to rest.

Coturnate, n. [From *cot*, a small house, & *turn*, to turn.]

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18. *Coturnate*, n. [From *cot*, a small house, & *turn*, to turn.]

19. *Coturnate*, n. [From *cot*, a small house, & *turn*, to turn.]

20. *Coturnate*, n. [From *cot*, a small house, & *turn*, to turn.]

Counter-battery, *n.* (Mil.) A battery which
opposes another battery.

False pretence.
Counterfeitly, *ad-*
verbally.
Counter-termen-
ment.

Change
the flowers
the flowers

the flowers

the flowers

To make a counter mine or
mine against an opponent by se-
cretly opposing measures;
God. Chances
being motion; a
long motion
one in a contrary
movement in oppo-
sition to another.
A wall raised behind another to supply
when breached or destroyed. [Lore] One
mine of a mine. [Lore] A p p counter
mine. [Lore] To for

No
No
which
sent on

or dead,
or called
a counter-
mine, Johnson
a mine to any
body.
ending to

part; any thing a mine, or counter-
mine, a copy, a duplicate.
mine things the laws of harmony agreed with the laws
and, so that they seem to be, as it were, copies or counter-
copies of another.
[Lore] One of two corresponding copies of an
instrument, a duplicate.
A thing that may be applied to another thing
to fit perfectly, as a seal to its impression.
A thing which is adapted to another thing, or
its supplement; that which serves to com-
plete any thing, hence, a person or thing having
nothing lacking to another, an opposite.

Counterpoise
of counterpoise well as you make your beds.
[Lore] The part to be arranged or used in con-
junction with another, as, the base is the counter-
poise to the treble.
Counterpoise, *n.* (Her.) Facing or going
opposite ways, — said of two armies represented
in a coat of arms.

Counterpoise, *v.* (Trans.) To oppose, to be in
opposition to another.
[Lore] A replication to a pho-
tograph.

To plead the contrary of,
to deny.
To oppose, as another plot,
tempt to frustrate, as a stratagem,

and another, every plot had been coun-
terpoised.

A plot or artifice opposed to
another.

[Lore] Fr. counterpoise, now

point. [Lore] Sandys
a cover for a bed, stretched or woven
w corrupted into counterpoise, from
a square opening, such as were
ed in some parts of dress.
[Lore] or counterpoise of purple silk. [Lore]
not point. Fr. counterpoise, it con-
sists of the art of composing music in
parts or of disposing the several parts in conform-
ity with the laws of harmony; — often used as
synonymous with harmony.

Counterpoise, an invention equivalent to a new method of
weighing.

Counterpoise, *v.* (Trans.) To oppose, to be in
opposition to another.
[Lore] A replication to a pho-
tograph.

To act against with equal weight, to equal in
weight, to counterbalance.

The force and distance of weights counterpoising each other
so as to be in equilibrium.
To act against with equal power or effort, to
balance.

As near Frenchology of English will be able to heard and
counterpoise the rest.

To prohibit, to forbid.
Countermand, *n.* A contrary order, to revoke
of a former order or command.

Have you no countermand for Claudio yet,
But he must die to-morrow?

Capable of being coun-

with a piece.
Countermand, *v.* (Trans.) To carry out, to execute,
to fulfill, to provide.

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
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Countermand, *v.* (Trans.) To carry out, to execute,
to fulfill, to provide.

The matter being brought
was only an act of self preservation
countermand, *v.* (Trans.) To carry out, to execute,
to fulfill, to provide.
[Lore] To oppose by means of a counter mine;
[Lore] To oppose by means of a counter mine;

far, last, still, what; there, yet, then; please, then; done, for, do, well, good, to;



1 A tract of land, a region — as distinguished

Counterpoise (poise)

same country

2 A position in which two
illustrate each other by oppos

see Conc
cution or
by death

(Mid) A

e) A and

gle time

(2) A statement of rapid observation by
which an officer, by a glance at a part of a

Counterpoise net

ASIAN OL DOL

1 Other than

1. To overspread or encase, the whole body of, to lay or set over, to enwrap, to unfold.

And with the majority of darkersound (above the house hood or all on.

6 To put on the usual head dress, as

Cover-suit, n. Something to cover or as a cloak.

Cover-suit, n. In Fr. cover, p. p. of cover.

Cover-suit, n. 1. A place which covers and protects.

Cover-suit, n. 2. A cow-shaped esp. for the top of chimney, often movable with the direction of the wind.

Cover-suit, n. 3. A cow-shaped esp. for the top of chimney, often movable with the direction of the wind.

Cover-suit, n. 4. A cow-shaped esp. for the top of chimney, often movable with the direction of the wind.

Cover-suit, n. 5. A cow-shaped esp. for the top of chimney, often movable with the direction of the wind.

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Cover-suit, n. 14. A cow-shaped esp. for the top of chimney, often movable with the direction of the wind.

Cover-suit, n. 15. A cow-shaped esp. for the top of chimney, often movable with the direction of the wind.

(Fort) The same as

For who but a person, possessed with fear, can bear?

with, nor is desire,

as if toward it mess, n. Want of courage, timid.

coward, n. The cowardly rashness of those who dare not look gentle.

Cow'-pā'sāy, n (Bot) An umbelliferous plant; **Cō'sā'ch** (kō'sā'n) *see* *filon* *q* *n* = *anemone* = *n*

with sorrow, to distress, hence, to disorder, to derange

© madam my old heart is cracked shot

Crack v t 1 To open in chinks to become fissured, to be fractured without quite separating into parts, to burst



use to be bitter, morose, or a f

• how age of a chess player or combination

a crab stick

from crab)
by or manifesting sourness

41543
42501

track nel, n {from *craci*. Cf Fr *croquelin* D
krakeling} A certain kind of hard brittle cake or
biscuit *Evensen*

modesty basiffulness.

Coya'trel, n. Sea Otter.

Éoa (kū), n. A contraction of cousin.

One vial full of Edward's sacred blood . . .

It is cracked, and all the precious liquor spill.

2 To rend with grief or pain, to affect deeply

No sooner was I crept out of my cradle
Than I was made a king at a months old. That

3 The condition of infancy, or very early life

They should severely depart from a form of worship in which they had no part, and from those practices of freedom.

which they had been educated from these grades. Characteristically

Cow'-parsley, n. (Bot.) An umbelliferous plant of the genus *Therophyllum* (*C. frutescens*).
COW'-PÁRS: f

with sorrow, to distress, hence, to disorder, to derange

O madam my old heart is cracked Shot
He thought none could till their brains were cracked Shot
3 To cause to sound abruptly and sharply, with noise like that of rending, to snap, as, to crack a whip Suddenness
4 To utter smartly and sententiously, as, to crack a joke
5 To cry up, to extol, to puff, — followed by up [Low]



COW'-PÁRS: f
COW'-PÁRS: f
COW'-PÁRS: f

Shot

One vital full of Edward's sacred blood
Is cracked, and all the precious liquor spilt Shot
2 To rend with grief or pain to affect deeply

furk, ryde, pysh, e, d, o, silent, c as u, th as th, e, ch, as k, g as j, f as th, t, z as z, x as sh, u as in bigger, hgh; th as in thine,

To brag; to boast, to crack. [Ola.]
 Spenser
 [Ice] kraka, crow, and krakr, raven, &c.
 Dan krag, D kroat, O H. Per. krala
 N H. Ger krake.

iron, having the ends turned up, and used for binding things together, as large stones in masonry, a cramp

Cramp *n.* [See *supra*.]
1. A piece of metal at the tip of a sword-sheath;

¹ {Fe} (Her.) Having a cramp
the end; — said of a cross so far.

pl (Gr. crumpon, from O. H.
 ooked Koe CRAW, a)
 es of iron, something like double
 ng stones, lumber, and other heavy

- n Instruments with sharp points
- " " " " in gaining or keeping a storming party about to *ignite*
- " " " " is formerly supposed to curing cramp, as saving rain ceremonies on Good

* 1 with stamp.
" abounding in, cramps.
" ff. 11

crane } A quantity
of a barrel; as, a
H. Miller.

Lat cranes |
ran at a wharf for
for the use of a crane.



(Grewen),
eight bill, and

Ant. Erw. Zögern,



Crash, 1984

(b) A similar arm turning on a vertical axis or support, in a fireplace for supporting kettles, etc., over a fire.

3 Siphon, or bent pipe, for drawing liquors out of a cask.

4 (Name) A piece of wood
two arms, used, in pairs, in stone
caves, &c. To cause to rise.

crane, — with up [stare]

An upstart crowd up to the bright

Crane-fly, *n* (*Entom*) A s
Insect, of the genus *Tipula*.

Trane's-bill, n. 1 (Hol.) The bill of many species, — so named from the red nasal web which resembles

2 A pair of long-beaked pl

Trang, n. Sea KREVO

Cramp'-fish, *n*
(*ichtk*) The tor-
pedo, or electric
ray, the touch of
which affects a
person with a
slight shock of elec-
tricity.

**Cramp's-Iron (V-
eta) n. A piece**



Crayfish (*Decapoda vulgaris*)

Cră'nul-o măt'rie-al, a Pertaining to

22- 22, 22, 22, 22

[A S *crayon*, Icel *læga*, Sw *laga*,
 k with earnestness or importunity to
 submission or humility, as a dependent,
 entreat, to beseech, to implore
 y nobler friends, I crave their pardon *Stal*
 went to boldly unto Plute, and era *nd* the body *Stal* v
 ll for as a gratification, to long for, to
 demand, as, the stomach *craves* food
 verb is sometimes used with *for* before the
 Once as a may *crave* for love " *Seeking*
 ask, seek beg beseech implore entreat

[Probably from *crave* one who craves
 his life when vanquished] [Formerly

crave, O *by* *crave*
 else which is it
 self derived from
 O H Ger *krebt*]

Craw Zali.

de what it searches after only by feeling as it
 ething to another *Grove*
 re or advance in a feeble, slow or awk
 w
 and y able to *crawl* about the room *Arbuthnot*
 once slowly and slyly to insinuate
 o advance or gain influence by servile
 is conduct

Again there is sprung up
 an arch one *Crestler* *and*
 vied into the favor of the king *Stal*
 rd opinions *crawl* about the world. *South*

cray of a gentle

manner
 tinaceous birds,
 America, the
 !) A small sea

Crestler
 flower

made with a pencil or
 CRAYONED (krs/and).
 To sketch, as with a

loose, conformable to the
 he act or art of drawing

ch as in thine.

CRAVING [*A. S. cragan, Icel. kraga, Sw. kräva, Dan. kræde*]

Verb This verb is sometimes used with *for* before the thing sought. Once one may *crave for love*. *Asking*
Syn. — To ask, seek, beg; beseech, implore, entreat; solicit.

Craven [*crāven*]

Syn. — Coward, poltroon, dastard. See **COWARD**.
Crāven, *a* Cowardly with meanness. *A. crāven*

Shak

a word W. Scott

CRAYONED

also **crayent**,

Shak

Craving ly, *adv.* In an earnest or craving man-
ner

Smith



*to do what it searches after only by feeling, as it
seems to itself or* *Crave*
ve or advance in a feeble, slow or awk-
ward

as hardly able to crawl about the room *Archaic*
ance slowly and slyly to insinuate
to advance or gain influence by servile
us conduct

as he *Archaic* *there is spring up*
c an arch o. e. Craven *one*
into the favor of the king *Shak*
rd opinions crawl about the world *South*

rawing or design made with a pencil or

Crayon-painting *n.* The art or art of drawing
with crayons

Craze, *v. t.* [*imp. & p. p. CRAZED*; *p. pr. CRAZING*] [*O Eng. cras, from Fr. cras to crush, shatter, from Ital. crisan, to gri*
cras; to crush, break to pieces]

1. To break into pieces; to crush, to powder, as, to cras the ore. "The crased"

God, looking forth, will trouble all his host,
 And cras their throned wisest

2. To put out of order, to confuse; to impair.

"... hath crased my wits.

Craze, *n.*
 one that is crazed.

She would weep and he would cras
 in hostility.

forming very beautiful from the crased brand
 ... around the

Craze

over production
 2. A Malay dagger. See **CRAKE**

[*Use.*]

God was alone
 And crased as he

Craze (*cras*) *v. t.* Having the qualities of a creature.
 creator. [*hart.*]

A created entity... merely creaturely and distinguishable
 from the craser
 ... state of a creature [*Flare*]
 ... like a creature, to loved

Creight (*krīt*), *n.* [*Ir & Gael. gratidh, gratidh, akin to Lat. greg, gregis, herd*] A drove of cattle.
 [*Use.*] Halliwell

Cre ... hands [*Obs.*] **Discre**

Crease me to use

[Lat. creatus, *p. p.* of creare See
 ... [*Obs.*] **Shak**

credere. See **infra**
 ... article of faith, - distinguished from
 ... duty
 ... *p. pr.* of credere, to
 ... *Ep. credere, Ep. credere, Ep.*
 ... *Ep. credere, Ep.*

Cre

Cre

Cre

where
 ... we claim

... that he is indeed God's embas-
 ...
 [*Fr. credibilis, *Ep. credibilis*
 See **infra**] The quality or
 ... credibleness. "The credi-
 ... of witnesses"*

Creant, *v. t.* [*imp. & p. p. CREATED, *p. pr. & to u.*
CREATING] ... to be skimming as creant.*

... ship, *n.* State or condition of ...
 ... *at creant* from creator] **She**

cre

cre

Credit *n.* ... Worthiness of belief, ...
 claim to credit, creditability
 ... in a manner that deserves belief,
 ... belief

that is

... Lat.
 ... to

... truth of

an omission of a date which is commented on the

And thorough edged intellect, so part
Layst from crime

Tennyson.

3 That which occasions crime [*I dare*]
The tree of life the crime of our first father's fall
Capital crime - a crime punishable with death
Renaiss.

Symonds.

Crime'ful a Criminal wicked, partaking
wrong, contrary to law, right or duty [Obs.]

Why you proceeded ¹¹¹¹not against these feals
So ~~crim~~ ^{crim} ~~inal~~ ^{inal}

Crim¹less, a Free from crime, innocent. }
Crim¹inal, a [Lat *criminalis* from *crime*,
Fr, Fr, Sp & Pg *criminal*, It *criminale*, N
crim¹nal See CRIME }

until I was in tears at the services to being with
 bare humping to have been to the court in a
 low and degrading manner to have

Who more than thou
saw'st, and serv'st y^e adored
arch
rile civility a mean bow
Far from me
ing cringe? A100m
F47 p
a who strings melody
do cringes or bows and flut-

For all use of water
Water supplies are being used by the state

This hour's the very crux of your file. *Drives*

cap a {Lat. *crispus*, fr *crisp*, *creep*, *sp*, *fig*,
 & *crispus*}

The nature of his life short and tragic
 Crop loss followed among the poor and
 4. Possessing a certain degree of education and
 5. (Inferred) has been started since marriage and has been a
 6. is a good step to it if it would not result in a
 7. is a bad step to it if it would not result in a
 8. is a bad step to it if it would not result in a

fūrī, ryde, push; c, f, w, silent; p as s; ch as sh, v, wh, as x; g as in get; q as x, x as g, p as in finger high, sh as in shute.

dge, from *crispus*, to separate, distal-
lge, *Fr. crispus*.] Relating to or
[*Fr. crispus*, see supra.]
as the critic [Obs.]

mainly unreasonably; one who habitually *crisp*
[Obs.]

Crisp, *v. t.* To form little curls or undulations on
the surface or edges.

shil, *n.* [*Fr. crocon*, *crocon*].
A kind of netting made by means
of the material being worked, cotton.

To perform the kind of netting
as in *crocon* a shawl.

Crison

[Obs.]
[Obs., important as *Crison* is]

Crison

large reptile of
the genus *Cro-
codilus*. It
grows to the
length of six-
teen or eight-
teen feet and
swims on the
land, but does
not easily turn
itself. It in-
habits the large
rivers in Africa and Asia.



Crocodilus

Crystalline

ing of crocodiles; as, the crocodile

Crystalline [*Crystalline* *n.* (Chem.) A salt formed by the

Crystalline, *n.* long; *Crystalline*, *n.* long; *Crystalline*, *n.* long;

Cross-bill, *n* (Ornith.)
A bird or a genus of
birds of the order *Proser-*
res and family *Fringilli-*
da, the *Loxia*, the man-
dibles of whose bill curve
in opposite directions,
and cross each other.
Bartr.
Cross-birth, *n* (Ob-



Crotch-bug

not I stand and crouch
and of CROUCH and
cross; to cross, to
Chaucer's

is, food, food;

This most cruel usage of your guests...

garden
Shak
anner; with cruelty;
Inhumanely, barbarous
ha
Shelter

torture
1 Having the form of a cross.
cross, transverse, intersecting.
criston
2 A cross, either on anything or

ation
1 A chemical vessel or melting pot, capable of enduring great heat without injury and used for melting ores, metals, &c.



gestion
2 That which is in a crude or indigested state.

of gravel.
The bones deprived of its principal supports and so
concept

Crucible, a. (L. Lat.
fer, from cruz, cross, and fe-
fers)

1 Bearing a cross.

1 Disposed to give pain to others, without being
pleased to torment, vex, or afflict, destitute of sym-
pathetic kindness and pity; savage, barbarous.

(L. Lat.)
Crumple, a. (Cf. Crows, Crum, a) A crumple
kind of soft bread cake, not sweetened, and baked

CULT EX

... the meridian; transit, — said of a

role; as, a cultivator of the mind, or of good man-

ners. C. who ———— enlightens, or promotes.

barrow. [Cultivate,] a [Lat. *cultivatus*,into East
to the end

faint. {Obs.}

without any of Hall.

We ought to blame the ————

2 The state of being cultivated, result of cultivation, physical improvement, enlightenment and discipline acquired by mental training, civilization; refinement.

——— culture as which the French people ———— which was ————

LARD, p. 10 &
e. "cultured
Shenstone,
ag cultured people
remains. 2 Taylor[Cultivate] a Having no culture,
[Rare.]on's first "Speaker
anciently in use.see
to be shown. W. Scottte, Ep. *cubbing*, it
So *cubbing* is *cub*.

That which was the

cult of the religion of China.

Alch, a The spawn of the oyster.

Alch, a [Lat.] A color. See COLTER.

[Cultivate] a Having no culture,
[Rare.][Cultivate] a Having no culture,
[Rare.][Cultivate] a Having no culture,
[Rare.][Cultivate] a Having no culture,
[Rare.][Cultivate] a Having no culture,
[Rare.][Cultivate] a Having no culture,
[Rare.][Cultivate] a Having no culture,
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[Rare.][Cultivate] a Having no culture,
[Rare.][Cultivate] a Having no culture,
[Rare.]cult mill or ois, a [Lat. *cultus*, stalk or stem, and *ferre*, to bear]

1 Bearing culms, or producing straw, related to wheat, rye, &c. which produce straw, and are culmiferous plants

2 (Alch) Containing, or abounding in, culm or glance-coal

Cultivated, a. Being vertical, or at the highest point of altitude, hence, predominant [Rare]

Cultivated, a. [Comp & p. p. CULMINATED; p. pr & vb n. CULMINATING.] (From Lat. *cultus*, cultivated, & *culmen*, See

cult for agricultural purposes, by tillage

or attention for self improvement, cultivating care, civi-

lization, &c.

Cultivated, a. [Comp & p. p. CULMINATED; p. pr & vb n. CULMINATING.] (From Lat. *cultus*, cultivated, & *culmen*, SeeCultivated, a. [Comp & p. p. CULMINATED; p. pr & vb n. CULMINATING.] (From Lat. *cultus*, cultivated, & *culmen*, SeeCultivated, a. [Comp & p. p. CULMINATED; p. pr & vb n. CULMINATING.] (From Lat. *cultus*, cultivated, & *culmen*, SeeCultivated, a. [Comp & p. p. CULMINATED; p. pr & vb n. CULMINATING.] (From Lat. *cultus*, cultivated, & *culmen*, SeeCultivated, a. [Comp & p. p. CULMINATED; p. pr & vb n. CULMINATING.] (From Lat. *cultus*, cultivated, & *culmen*, SeeCultivated, a. [Comp & p. p. CULMINATED; p. pr & vb n. CULMINATING.] (From Lat. *cultus*, cultivated, & *culmen*, SeeCultivated, a. [Comp & p. p. CULMINATED; p. pr & vb n. CULMINATING.] (From Lat. *cultus*, cultivated, & *culmen*, SeeCultivated, a. [Comp & p. p. CULMINATED; p. pr & vb n. CULMINATING.] (From Lat. *cultus*, cultivated, & *culmen*, SeeCultivated, a. [Comp & p. p. CULMINATED; p. pr & vb n. CULMINATING.] (From Lat. *cultus*, cultivated, & *culmen*, SeeCultivated, a. [Comp & p. p. CULMINATED; p. pr & vb n. CULMINATING.] (From Lat. *cultus*, cultivated, & *culmen*, SeeCultivated, a. [Comp & p. p. CULMINATED; p. pr & vb n. CULMINATING.] (From Lat. *cultus*, cultivated, & *culmen*, SeeCultivated, a. [Comp & p. p. CULMINATED; p. pr & vb n. CULMINATING.] (From Lat. *cultus*, cultivated, & *culmen*, SeeCultivated, a. [Comp & p. p. CULMINATED; p. pr & vb n. CULMINATING.] (From Lat. *cultus*, cultivated, & *culmen*, See

3. To deck as with curls to ornament.

The curly locks
That curled Niagara.

Milton.

4. To raise in waves or undulations to ripple
That would be parts without the brushing air
To curl the waves.

Dequien.

Curled, v. t. 1. To contract or bend into curls or ring
lets, as hair.

Those good little curls will not curl by nature.

Shelton.

3. To play at the game called *curling*. [Scot.]

Curled, n. 1. A curl, Dan. *Curle*. See *supra*.
2. A ringlet, especially of hair, or any thing of a
like form.

I saw a comber, his flowing hair

Is curled on either cheek.

Milton.

2. An undulating or curving line in any substance,
as wood, glass and the like, figure sinuously
If the glass of the prism be without those numberless
waves or curls which usually arise from the sand below.

3. A disease in potatoes, in which the leaves at

the extremities, and the young shoots are, pro-
gressive and connected movement, as, the current
of time, of events of opinion, &c.

Syn.—Stream course. See *STREAM*.

In a current manner, gener-

1. The quality or condition of

curst, execrable.

Let us fly this curst place.

Milton.

2. Producing trouble or vexation

This curst quarrel be no more renewed.

Dryden.

Curst, v. t. In a curst manner, miserably,
in a manner to be curst or detested, enormously.

[Low]



Curst, imp & p of curst

(1111)

4. To cook with curry, as rice, &c.

To curry favor to seek to gain favor by flattery

Hadrian.

His eldest sister is so curst and shrewd.

Shelton.

Be not so curst, his tongue is kind.

Overton.

Curst, v. t. & p. & p. of curst, c, d, e, silent, c as s, th as sh, e, ch,

as in get; g as k, x as g, y as in linger, h, th as in thine.

The } 1. To furnish with cushions, as,
 2. To furnish with cushions, as,
 as under a cushion.

cuspidated, a Ending in a point. (100)
cuspidate (a), a Furnished with a cusp or cusps.
Cusp'ed, a (From Lat. cuspis.) End-
ing in a point.
Cusp'ed-sharp, v t To make
pointed, to sharpen (104)
 (104) (Lat.)



cuspidate leaf.

a cuspidate leaf
arp end.
t. A minor cusp.
A dish compound
baked or boiled.

turned; fr. cur-
a bending in a
Halter

bird you
, oval, 201
ash, 11,
m, from 10
cushion, m

some soft at
cline upon
nest or hole.

.., cell, term, plaque, firm, cone, for, de, wels, food, 1011

W
h
2
oft
to s

DAL
am

Dalning off the time with often said words.

Dal m'ic, n. See DAL-

MATRA.

Dal m'ic-a, n. [L. Lat.

dalination]

1. (Eccl.) A long white gown with sleeves, worn over the alb and stole, by deacons in the Roman Catholic church, and imitated from a dress originally worn in Dalmania.

2. A similar robe worn by kings in the middle ages on solemn occasions. (Written also dalma-tic.)

3. (Eccl.)

Dal'mic, n. (Geog.) One of a tribe of people formerly inhabiting a part of Scotland.

Dal'mic, n. Pertaining to the Dalriada.



Dalmanic.

Damask color, a color like that of the damask rose —
Damask plum, a small dark-colored plum, generally called

3 To condemn as bad, or displeasing, by open expression, as by blasing, &c.

You are not so great a critic as to damn them (the works of modern poets) without hearing.

Damn with fatal pains, assent with civil bow,
And without entering teach the rest to sever.
Damp'n-damp'ing, n. The state or quality of de-

repared, to meet the death,
is in the mind by it.

de, or pernicious [Lam.]

leave thy damnable facts.

The state or quality of de-

Dam'ask, v. t. [Imp & p DAMASKED (dam'askt);

dam'm-to-s, n. [Lat. damnsaturus, from dnm, to condemn, from damno, See DAMN]

condemnatory
discourse, dam'ed,

ent in a future state.

Damp'n-damp'ing, n.

F
F

332
of

332, to share, to go, equivalent to Lat. 332

to condemn to decide to be wrong or worthy

of damp-
furnace

right

The dappled pl

fürst, rade, push, e, f, e, allent, e as s, ch as sh, e, ch, as k, & as j, & as in &et, g as z, x as gz, n as in linger, lipk; th as

We have tried too long already; it is madness to dally any longer.

2 To interchange careers, especially with one of the opposite sex, to use fondling or wantonness; to sport.

She dalled with the wind, and scorned the sun. *Shel*
Dally, v. t. To dally; to defer; to put off, to amuse. [Rare]

Dalliance, the time with often skirmishes. *Russek*
Dalliance, n. See DALL.

Dalliance, n. [L. Lat. dallinatio.]

1 (Lat.) A long white gown, worn over the alb and stole, by deacons in the Roman Catholic church, and imitated from a dress originally worn in Bologna.

2 A similar robe worn by kings in the middle ages on solemn occasions. [Written also damoise.]

Dalliance, n. [Fr.] One of the pleasures of society, particularly a part of merriment.

Dalliance, n. [Fr.] A certain kind of dalliance.

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Dalliance, n. [Fr.] A certain kind of dalliance.

1 (Geog.) A portion of the country of Syria, of which Damascus was the capital.

2 A particular kind of plum, usually called damson. See DAMSON.

Damask, a. 1 Pertaining to, or originating at, the city of Damascus, resembling the products or manufactures of that city.

2 Having the color of the damask-rose.

While dreaming on your damask cheek
The dewy sunset eyelids lay. *Trueman*

Damask cloth, a color like that of the damask rose.

Damask plum, a small dark-colored plum, generally called damson. — Damask rose (Bot.), a variety of rose (Rosa damascena) native to Damascus and brought to this country.

Damask silk, a kind of heavy, rich, figured silk, usually called simply damask. — Damask steel, a fine quality of steel originally made at Damascus, and formerly much valued for sword-blades, from its great flexibility and tenacity.

Damask, n. [It. damasco, damasco, damasco, from damasco, Fr. damas, Ger. damast, from Damascus. See DAMON.]

1 A kind of suit with raised figures in various patterns, as flowers, &c., woven in the loom. It was originally made at Damascus, and was composed of rich silk. It is now made of silk interwoven with flax, cotton, or wool.

A bed of ancient damask, with a tassel sufficiently long to grace a couch of state. *Br. Bay*

2 Woven in imitation of the figures in damask silk.

Damask, n. [Imp. Fr. p. DAMASKED (d'maskt), p. pr. & t. in DAMASKING.] To decorate with ornamental figures, as silk or other stuff with raised flowers, &c., or steel with various devices, to adorn; to embellish, to variegate.

Mangled velvet damasked all over with gold. *Dryden*

The soft, downy back, damasked with flowers. *Keats*

Damask, n. [Fr. damasquier, It. damas, damas, Ger. damas, from Damascus. See DAMON.]

1 A kind of linen manufactured in Flanders, so called because woven in flowers and figures imitating those of damask.

Damask silk, (d'mask, p. 120, n.) [Fr. damassine, from damas. See DAMASK.] A kind of damask with gold and silver flowers woven in the warp and weft.

Damask, n. [Fr. damas, It. damas, damas, p. pr. & t. in DAMASKING.] A kind of damask with gold and silver flowers woven in the warp and weft.

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Damask, n. [Fr. damas, It. damas, damas, p. pr. & t. in DAMASKING.] A kind of damask with gold and silver flowers woven in the warp and weft.

3 To condemn as bad, or displeasing, by open expression, as by blaming, &c.

You are not just a critic as to some things (the works of modern poets) without hearing.

Dance with first person present with first person.

Dance with first person present with first person.

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Dance with first person present with first person.

Dance with first person present with first person.

- 4 Without motion; inactive; as, a *dead calm*; *dead weight*.
 5 Unproductive; bringing no gain; unprofitable; as, *dead capital*, *dead stock* in trade.
 6 Lacking spirit, dull, as, *dead coloring*, a *dead eye*, *dead fire*, &c.
 7 Monotonous or unvaried, as, a *dead level* or *dead wall*.

If our doctors do not keep their eyes.

I must with patience all the terms attend. *Dr. P.*

4. Day of battle, hence, successful combat or contest, victory.

— *was the day* *Monomachus*

Those heavenly signs
 saw the earth, with their blaze
 bright.

— *with brilliancy, to excite*

Milton

Dead, *not* to mean
 or vigor. [Obs.]

Heaven's stars decreed.

— *in the hall mounted and decaying me. Chapman*
— of a

Dead-point.

— *(Arch)* *the*

of the two oppo-


sible points in the

orbit of a crank,

and the connecting rod in the

Dead-center

Dead' for line



THE

2010 年 1 月 24 日

12. $\frac{1}{2} \pi$ or $\frac{3}{2} \pi$

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1. *Introduction*

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Key words: *Chlamydia trachomatis*; *Neisseria meningitidis*; *Neisseria gonorrhoeae*; *Haemophilus influenzae*; *Streptococcus pneumoniae*

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Abstract

as sh, e, th, as k

1 An attempt or disposition to deceive or lead into error, any declaration, artifice or practice which misleads another or causes him to believe what is false, a contrivance to entrap, stratagem, artifice, fraud.

Friendly to man far from deceit or guile.

2 (Last) Any tri k, w lusion cos

u as in *lupper*, *lilk*, the

push, e, e, silent, c as s, ch as sh, e, th, as k, g as j, g as in get, g as j, as in

ishment of mutiny, to decimate a collection of pris-
oners by way of vengeance

3 To destroy a certain portion of, to devastate;
as, to decimate a country

Decimation *n.* [Lat. *decimatio*, Fr. *décimation*]

1 A killing [the] State Trials

2 A selection of every tenth by lot, as for pun-
ishment, &c.

Decimator *n.* One who selects every tenth man
for punishment.

Decimeter *m.* [Fr. *décimètre*]
from Lat. *decimus* tenth, and *tr. metre* See **ME-
TRE**] A French measure of length equal to the

tenth part of a meter, or nearly four inches

Decimeter (dék-mé'tr), *n.* [Fr.] Same as
DECIMETER

Decimimillia *m.* [Lat. *decimus* tenth and
millia sixth] The size of one 111 of a sheet of

paper

1 One who or that which, decks or
adorns, a coverer, as, a lat *le-decker*

2 A vessel which has a deck or decks, — used
especially in composition, as, a two-decker; a
three-decker

De-clam' *v. t.* [imp. & p. p. **DECLAMED** p. p.]

1 To utter in public, to deliver
in a rhetorical or set manner, to speak in a rhetor-
ical manner

2 To speak in favor of, to advocate, [Obs.]

3 To utter in public, to deliver
in a rhetorical or set manner, to speak in a rhetor-
ical manner

4 To speak in favor of, to advocate, [Obs.]

5 To utter in public, to deliver
in a rhetorical or set manner, to speak in a rhetor-
ical manner

6 To speak in favor of, to advocate, [Obs.]

7 To utter in public, to deliver
in a rhetorical or set manner, to speak in a rhetor-
ical manner

8 To speak in favor of, to advocate, [Obs.]

9 To utter in public, to deliver
in a rhetorical or set manner, to speak in a rhetor-
ical manner

10 To speak in favor of, to advocate, [Obs.]

11 To utter in public, to deliver
in a rhetorical or set manner, to speak in a rhetor-
ical manner

12 To speak in favor of, to advocate, [Obs.]

13 To utter in public, to deliver
in a rhetorical or set manner, to speak in a rhetor-
ical manner

14 To speak in favor of, to advocate, [Obs.]

15 To utter in public, to deliver
in a rhetorical or set manner, to speak in a rhetor-
ical manner

16 To speak in favor of, to advocate, [Obs.]

17 To utter in public, to deliver
in a rhetorical or set manner, to speak in a rhetor-
ical manner

18 To speak in favor of, to advocate, [Obs.]

19 To utter in public, to deliver
in a rhetorical or set manner, to speak in a rhetor-
ical manner

20 To speak in favor of, to advocate, [Obs.]

21 To utter in public, to deliver
in a rhetorical or set manner, to speak in a rhetor-
ical manner

22 To speak in favor of, to advocate, [Obs.]

23 To utter in public, to deliver
in a rhetorical or set manner, to speak in a rhetor-
ical manner

24 To speak in favor of, to advocate, [Obs.]

25 To utter in public, to deliver
in a rhetorical or set manner, to speak in a rhetor-
ical manner

26 To speak in favor of, to advocate, [Obs.]

27 To utter in public, to deliver
in a rhetorical or set manner, to speak in a rhetor-
ical manner

28 To speak in favor of, to advocate, [Obs.]

29 To utter in public, to deliver
in a rhetorical or set manner, to speak in a rhetor-
ical manner

30 To speak in favor of, to advocate, [Obs.]

31 To utter in public, to deliver
in a rhetorical or set manner, to speak in a rhetor-
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32 To speak in favor of, to advocate, [Obs.]

33 To utter in public, to deliver
in a rhetorical or set manner, to speak in a rhetor-
ical manner

34 To speak in favor of, to advocate, [Obs.]

35 To utter in public, to deliver
in a rhetorical or set manner, to speak in a rhetor-
ical manner

36 To speak in favor of, to advocate, [Obs.]

37 To utter in public, to deliver
in a rhetorical or set manner, to speak in a rhetor-
ical manner

38 To speak in favor of, to advocate, [Obs.]

39 To utter in public, to deliver
in a rhetorical or set manner, to speak in a rhetor-
ical manner

40 To speak in favor of, to advocate, [Obs.]

41 To utter in public, to deliver
in a rhetorical or set manner, to speak in a rhetor-
ical manner

42 To speak in favor of, to advocate, [Obs.]

43 To utter in public, to deliver
in a rhetorical or set manner, to speak in a rhetor-
ical manner

44 To speak in favor of, to advocate, [Obs.]

45 To utter in public, to deliver
in a rhetorical or set manner, to speak in a rhetor-
ical manner

46 To speak in favor of, to advocate, [Obs.]

47 To utter in public, to deliver
in a rhetorical or set manner, to speak in a rhetor-
ical manner

48 To speak in favor of, to advocate, [Obs.]

49 To utter in public, to deliver
in a rhetorical or set manner, to speak in a rhetor-
ical manner

50 To speak in favor of, to advocate, [Obs.]

Fr. declamer, Tr. & Sp. d'clarar, It. dichiarare See
CLAR

1 To free from obscurity, to make plain; to
clear [the] "To declare this a little" Style

2 To make known by language, to manifest or
communicate plainly in any way, to publish, to
proclaim

This day I have begun when I declare

My only son

The heavenly declaration of the glory of God

3 To make declaration of, to assert, to affirm

4 To make declaration of, to assert, to affirm

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48 To make declaration of, to assert, to affirm

49 To make declaration of, to assert, to affirm

50 To make declaration of, to assert, to affirm

1 To translate from a cipher into intelligible
terms, as, to decipher a letter written in secret char-

acter

2 To translate from a cipher into intelligible
terms, as, to decipher a letter written in secret char-

acter

3 To translate from a cipher into intelligible
terms, as, to decipher a letter written in secret char-

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20 To translate from a cipher into intelligible
terms, as, to decipher a letter written in secret char-

acter

21 To translate from a cipher into intelligible
terms, as, to decipher a letter written in secret char-

acter

Decorative, n. Quality of being decor-

ate. One who deco-

nd religious

in the decline of literature

no action

no action (in the sense of composition)

Decline

n.—Declive, Decay, Conspicuous

in a downward progress, decay

to which was

some others into

These ornament, decor, etc.

[I. Lat. *decoratus*,
in, it, decorations]
adorning, embellishing, or honor-
ing, adorns, enriches, or
glorifies by way of
ornament.

These simple sentences are
before the word *decor* in the sense of

Decorate, n. 1. A becoming less, gradual dis-
tinction, decay, as, a decrease of resonance, a decrease
of strength.

Capable of being deduced or
is a result or consequence
whole are deductible from the complex
ing a space
ng brought down or deduced.
] deductible to human intellect
State Trials, 1660.

furl, ryde, push, e, e, e, silent; e as e ch as sh e, eh, as h' e as j e as to get e as x' e as ga, to as in linger, link; eh as in thin-

De-dū'gible ness, n. The quality of being deducible.
De-dū'give, a. Performing the act of deduction.
De-dūct', v. t. [imp & p p DEDUCTED, p pr & s n DEDUCTING] [Lat. *deducere*, *deductus* See DEDUCE] *to* or *from*; to deduce [Obs.] "A *deductio*" Udal.

of the foreign story.
 3. To reduce; to diminish. [Obs.]
De-dūct'ible, a. 1. Capable of being deducted or subtracted: able to be withdrawn or separated. Not one found honestly deductible. From any use that pleased him. E. B. Browning.
 2. Capable of being deduced or derived by inference, consequential, inferential.
De-dūct'ion (de-dūk'shun), n. [Lat. *deductio*, Fr. *deduction*, Fr. *deductio*, Sp. *deducción*, It. *deduzione*.] *to* or *from*; to deduce [Obs.] "A *deductio*" Udal.

1. The act or method of deducing, inferring, or concluding. "The deduction of one language from another."
 2. The act of deducting or taking away, as, the deduction of the subtrahend from the minuend.
 3. That which is deduced, an inference, a conclusion.

to or *from*; to deduce [Obs.] "A *deductio*" Udal.
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We receive the due in *due*.
 2. Illustrious act, achievement, exploit. "A knightly deed."
 3. Power of action, agency; efficiency. With will and deed created free.
 4. (Law) A sealed instrument in writing, on paper purchased, duly executed and delivered, containing some transfer, bargain, or contract.
 5. The term is generally applied to conveyances of real estate.

De-dūct'ion (de-dūk'shun), n. [Lat. *deductio*, Fr. *deduction*, Fr. *deductio*, Sp. *deducción*, It. *deduzione*.] *to* or *from*; to deduce [Obs.] "A *deductio*" Udal.

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Deer, n. [Lat. *caprea*, (Zoll.) A ruminant quadruped of the males of the group.] *to* or *from*; to deduce [Obs.] "A *deductio*" Udal.

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contradicted by the evidence of *H*, proving the statements made by *J* to *H*, it could not under s 155 (3) of the *Indian Evidence Act*, be contradicted by, 'what the Police Sub-Inspector recorded as the first information of *H*' 8 C. W. N. 218 'The first information is a document of great importance and in the practice it is always and very rightly produced and proved in criminal trials. But it is not a piece of substantive evidence and it can be used only as a previous statement admissible to corroborate or contradict the author of it.' *PER* CARNDUFF, J in 17 C. W. N. 1213 = 14 Cr. L. J. 642 See also 15 C. W. N. 198 = 11 Cr. L. J. 557; 16 Cr. L. J. 62. (Sind)

5 Actual words of complainant to be taken down in recording first information.—What the law requires is not a first information drawn up by a Police-officer and finally settled by an attorney, but the statement of the person himself giving the first information, 16 C. W. N. 143 = 13 Cr. L. J. 65 It is of the utmost importance, in recording the first information that the actual words of the complainant should be used and not an (Urdu) translation of them. The recorder should take down the complaint as it is made, and not merely his own impression of what the complaint meant to say. Some Police-officers have been dismissed for falsely entering a report made at the station such falsification would have been impossible if the actual words of the complainant had been taken down, read over to him, and signed by him in token of their being correct.—*Reg and Ord N-W P*, p 268

6 Desirable that the informant should be questioned and all information obtained.—If a Police-officer makes an investigation, he is entitled to examine the person giving the information and the latter is bound to answer all questions other than those the answers to which would have a tendency to expose him to a criminal charge or to a penalty or forfeiture, 8 B. 216 If the information be tendered in writing, it will be endorsed with the date of presentation and the person tendering it will be required to sign it (if he has not already done so) If the written information relates to facts with which the person tendering it is acquainted and which he is able and willing to state orally, the mere incident that a written report is presented does not make it unnecessary to take down the information from the reporter's own lips. If the person who brings the written information knows nothing of the facts to which it refers, he should be required to state the circumstances under which he brought it. The written information will, in any case, be kept on record and acted on or not, as may seem proper When the information relates to the theft of property, the informant must be asked to give a detailed list of the articles stolen, and should be closely questioned as to any noticeable mark or marks or other peculiarities of the articles which may afford hope of recognition. For instance an ornament may have been broken or repaired a brass vessel may have been dented or scratched by a blow or by a fall, a shawl torn and mended. Some individuality of construction is often to be found in the work of certain craftsmen The complainant will be required, too to state the value of each article and the weight and name of maker (if he can give them) of any gold or silver ornament stolen.—*C P Pol Man*, p 147

7 Special instructions for recording.—If the information be given orally, it must be recorded in plain and simple language as nearly as possible in the informant's own words. The use of technical or legal expressions, or high flown language or of lengthy and involved sentences, is forbidden. If the information, whether given orally or presented in writing, be not complete in itself, the Police-officer should elicit by interrogation such further information as may be necessary. If a particular person be charged or suspected, the facts on which the suspicion is based should be clearly set forth. The informant should be required to distinguish what he professes to know personally from matters of which he has heard only second hand. Police-officers are strictly forbidden to make merely a note of the information and to defer drawing up the first information report until they have made further inquiries into the complaint. The informant's statement, when complete, should be read over to him, and he must sign it. The report should show that this has been done. In heinous cases the statement should be read over to the informant in the presence of one or more respectable and uninterested witnesses, who should also be asked to sign it.—*Beng Pol. Code*, p 371 But a so-called information, that is, one recorded in the course of an investigation not being the first information, need not be signed and would, if signed, be contrary to the provisions of s 162

8 Information not a complaint.—No Court-fee.—Information to the Police is not a complaint in the strict technical sense of s. 4 (h) and it is not chargeable with any Court fee under Act VII of 1870. See s. 19, cl. xxi of the *Court Fees Act*

9. Punishment for making a false entry.—Where a Station House Officer refused to enter in the Station Diary a report made to him concerning the commission of an offence and entered instead in the diary a totally different and false report as that which was made to him he was found liable under s. 177 I P C, 20 A. 131-

II—FALSE INFORMATION

10 Prosecution for false information to Police.—As to the liability for prosecution for giving false information to the Police see 5 C. 231; 8 C. L. R. 255; 7 C. 87; 8 C. L. R. 337, 25 W. R. 10; 8 C. L. R. 289, 27 M. 127; 6 C. 496 = 7 C. L. R. 467; 6 C. 552. *See contra* 7 M. 292. Even if the statement made to the Police-officers is not reduced to writing as required by this section the informant may be convicted of preferring a false charge under s. 211, I P C. 27 M. 127. But the mere despatch of a telegram falsely stating that a dacoity has been committed without mentioning any names does not constitute a false charge under s. 211 1914 M. W. N. 382 = 15 Cr. L. J. 622.

11 Prosecution for false information to Village Magistrate who forwards complaint to Police.—When a person gives information or makes his complaint to the Village Magistrate who in accordance with his duty under s. 45 submits the complaint to the Police, the complainant sets the criminal law in motion just as effectually as an informant given under this section and is liable to be convicted under s. 211 32 M. 253 (31 M. 505 *dissented from*). *Contra* SANKARAN NAIR J., *following* 31 M. 506 *held* that such an informant to the Village Munsiff cannot be regarded as one legally under s. 104 but was one really under s. 161. In 20 M. L. J. 132 = 11 Cr. L. J. 236, it was *held* that if the law had already been set in motion against the complainant when the accused made the statement to the Police, the basis of the charge under s. 211 the proceedings could not be said to have been instituted by the statement of the accused and so 32 M. 253 did not apply. Such a statement was one under s. 162 and the accused could not be convicted under s. 211 I I C. 31 M. 506 *followed*.

12 No compensation when information given to Village Magistrate.—It has been *held* in (1914) 2 M. W. N. 558 = 10 M. L. T. 550 = 13 Cr. L. J. 29 *follo. citat.* 25 M. 667 that compensation cannot be granted under s. 204 to an accused when the information was given to a Village Magistrate who forwarded it to the Police.

13. Composition of offence no answer.—The fact that an offence alleged to have been committed has been compounded is no conclusive answer to a charge made against the prosecutor under s. 211 I I C. 11 C. 79.

14 Sanction for prosecution for giving false information.—No sanction is necessary for prosecution for giving false information to the Police 24 W. R. 41, 5 C. 184, 3 A. 322, 7 M. 292.

15 Punishment for giving false information.—Giving false information to a public servant in order to cause him to use his lawful power to the injury or annoyance of any person is punishable with imprisonment for six months or fine of Rs. 1000 or both—S. 182 I P C. *See also* s. 203 I P C.

III—COGNIZABLE OFFENCES

16 Under the Indian Penal Code

(1) All offences under Chapter XII (*Coin and Government stamps*) are cognizable.

(2) All offences against the human body (Chapter XI) are cognizable excepting—

(a) Those relating to miscarriage and unborn children (ss. 312 to 316). (b) Simple hurt s. 323 (c) Simple assault ss. 322, 355, 358. (d) Buying a person as slave s. 370. (e) *Keeping a person in confinement* after writ of release has been issued s. 345.

(3) All offences against property (Chapter X) are cognizable excepting—

(a) Extortion ss. 384, 389. (b) Criminal misappropriation ss. 403 and 404. (c) Criminal breach of trust by a public servant or a banker, s. 409. (d) Cheating ss. 417 to 420. (e) Fraudulent deeds and disposition of property. (f) Mischief generally, and mischief by removing a land mark ss. 426, 427 and 434.

(4) The offences of rioting and being a member of an unlawful assembly (ss. 143 to 148). Personating a public servant (ss. 170 and 171). Resistance to apprehension, escape from custody (ss. 224 to 226) and harbouring offenders (ss. 212 to 216).

17. Under the Railway Act IX of 1890.—S. 100—Railway servants drunk on duty. S. 101—Railway servants endangering the safety of persons. S. 119—Male persons entering carriage or other place reserved for females. S. 120—Intoxication or indecency on the part of any person, or interfering with the comfort of passengers or extinguishing a lamp. S. 121—Obstructing Railway servant in his duty. S. 126—Maliciously wrecking or attempting to wreck a train. S. 127—Maliciously hurting or attempting to hurt persons travelling by rail. Ss. 128, 129—Endangering safety of persons travelling by Railway by (a) wilful act or omission, (b) rash or negligent act or omission. S. 130 (1)—Persons guilty of offences noted in ss. 126 to 129.

IV.—SHALL BE SIGNED.

18 First information must be proved only by the written record—Having record to the provisions of this section and s. 91 of the *Evidence Act*, the only legal proof of the terms of a complaint of a cognizable offence to the Police is the written record of the same, excepting where secondary evidence of its contents is admissible. It would be most unsafe if in cases under s. 211, I. P. C., a Policeman's report of what a complaint contained could be accepted as sufficient proof of its contents without insisting on the production of the document itself if it were in any way procurable. **1 Bur S R. 572**

19 Refusal to sign is punishable—Refusal to sign a statement made to a public servant when required so to do is punishable with simple imprisonment for three months, or fine of Rs. 500 or both.—**S 180 I P C**

V.—FIRST INFORMATION REPORT.

19-A Report of first information not part of a judicial record—Neither a Judge nor a Magistrate can direct that a complaint which the Police are required by this section to reduce to writing, shall be retained as part of the judicial record of the investigation before the Magistrate. But the substance of the complaint is to be entered in the Police-officer's diary, and the Magistrate can call for and inspect the same. The record would be more conveniently retained in the custody of the Police-officer than filed in the Magistrate's office.

20 First Information Report.—This report is drawn out and submitted under this section and s. 157, whereby the officer in charge of a Police-station is ordered, upon information received, to send a report to the Magistrate empowered to take cognizance of such offence upon a Police report. *See* s. 190. This section directs every complaint or information preferred to an officer in charge of a Police-station shall be reduced to writing and entered in a book. When in the absence of the Sub-Inspector or Head Constable a station or outpost is left in charge of a constable he cannot accept any complaint or prepare and submit the first information report of any crime reported to him unless the Local Government shall have given powers to such officers under s. 4 (f). He will, however, enter in the Station Diary an abstract of the complaint for the information of the District Superintendent, and will report the complaint to the officers in charge of the station or outpost, as the case may be by sending the complainant or informant with a note of the same to him.

Heinous crime—Whenever a report is received of the occurrence of heinous crime during the absence of the Sub-Inspector or other officer above the rank of constable, the writer (or other) constable competent to make the entry in the Station Diary, will also arrange to send immediate information to the Sub-District Inspector, or if the facts of the case as may occur in dacoity, murder, etc., require the immediate apprehension of the accused he will make arrangements accordingly. When the report of heinous crime relates to an occurrence outside the jurisdiction of the officer to whom the report is made, he will at once send information to the Police-station within whose jurisdiction the occurrence took place and if circumstances of the case warrant it will effect the apprehension of the accused. The instructions regarding early apprehension in the cases alluded to above apply equally to all officers receiving information of the occurrence of heinous crime. In dacoities where the scene of occurrence is within reasonable distance of the line of rail, the officer, Sub-Inspector, Head Constable or Writer Constable, to whom the report is made at the station will ascertain and note in the Station Diary whether information was conveyed through the Station Master to the nearest Railway Police.

Cognizable cases—Every cognizable complaint preferred before the Police, whether *prima facie* false or true whether serious or petty, whether relative to an offence punishable under the Indian Penal Code or any Special or Local law shall ordinarily be reported in the above form. Police-officers should not when complaints of grievous hurt or other cognizable offence are made at Police-stations, await the result of the medical examination of the injured person or of any injury before recording a first information under this section. No general order to the contrary must be allowed to exist in any district. A first information report must be sent in immediately after intimation of a cognizable case is given whether it be given by the complainant in person by a person not personally interested in the case, by a Chowkidar through the Magistrate on complaint or by petitioner in any other way whatever. It is not optional with an officer in charge of a Police-station to defer the submission of the first information report till he has made a preliminary inquiry into the truth or otherwise of the complaint.

Vague rumours of crime—The informant's statement as to such a rumour should find place in the Station Diary and if on inquiry the rumour prove well founded a first information report should be at once submitted.—*Peng Pol. Code* p. 368

21 Form and Contents of report.—For the form (*memorandum of crimes and other occurrences*) prescribed by the Local Government of Madras see *Mad. Pol. Man. Vol II Form No 44*. The report should

As an ascertained banker. [Take to obtain the jerk by de-
livering his hand straight forward upon it. *pl. Cast.*
8 To free from or d burden of young, to re-
lieve of a child in child birth. *Quar.*
This was delivered with and upon.

liable to be imposed on "Him whose cognition is
no way deludible." *Arcon.*
The tide, *et. (imp. & p. DELIVERED, p. pr. &
ed. a. DELIVERING)* [Lat. *delevere*, from *de* and
ludere to play, to make sport of, to mock, *lit. de-
ludere*]

[leading from *dever*, to lead, *Fr. démagogue*] A
leader of the people especially one who controls
the multitude by specious or deceitful arts, a per-
ducer to popular prejudices, an artful political
orator.

Demagogue, *n.* Demagogism.

He See *DELEVER*
or *delevere*, *n.*

give in charge, to intrust, from *de* and *man lere*, to
commit to one's charge, to commission, order, com-
mand.]

1 To ask or call for, as one who has a claim,
right or power to enforce the claim, to call for or
gently or peremptorily, to press or sue a claim to,
to make requisition of, *at*, to demand a debt, or
obedience.

This is our *Demagogue* Father's holy name.
1 He innocent, I do demand of thee. *Shak.*
2 To inquire earnestly or authoritatively, to ask,
to question. *Of him I do demand what news.* *Shak.*

Delever, *n.* Capable of being, or about to
be delivered, necessary to be delivered. *Hile.*
Deleverance, *n.* [Fr. *délivrance*, from *délivrer*
See *DELIVER* & *l.*]
1 The act of delivering or freeing from restraint,

preserver.
2 One who relates or communicates. [Lat.]
Delever, *adv.* In a deliver or free manner,
simply. [Obs.]
Swim with your head on.
And carry in security and de-very. *Lucan & Pl.*
Delever means *n.* The state of being deliver or
free untrammelled, as *lit.* [Obs.]

shall deliver all

Pope

[He that has confidence to turn his when into demands will
be but a little way from thinking he ought to obtain it. *Locke*
2 Earnest inquiry, question. *query*
3 A diligence seeking or search, manifested want,
request, as a demand for certain goods, a person's
company is in great demand.]

of goods.
3 The act or style of utterance manner of
speaking, as *a good delivery*, a clear *déliv*,
4 The act of giving birth, *parturi*, *an*
5 The act of exerting one's strength or limbs
[Obs.] "What will she and treat *déliv*?" *Hud.*
6 The state of being delivered, freedom, pres-
ervation.
DELI *n.* [See *DALE* and cf. *DE* *dell*, and *tor* *clef*
from *Gr. dale*, *lit. a*] the hollow.
1 A small, retired valley, a ravine. "In *dalle*
and *dalle* conceal'd from human sight." *T. Tell*
2 A young woman, a wench. [Obs.] *Sweet*
doxies and de le *B. Jonson*
Delph *n.* See *DELE*
Delphian *n.* [Lat. *Delphicus*, from *Delphi* *n.*
Delphic, town of Delphi in Greece, now
Antiky [Gr. *Antiky*] Relating to Delphi, and to

Delphinus *n.* [Lat., from Gr. *delphis*, dolphin.]

Let all *de*, *et. (imp. & p. DELIVERED, p. pr. &
ed. a. DELIVERING)* [Lat. *delevere*, from *de* and
ludere to play, to make sport of, to mock, *lit. de-
ludere*]

Demagogue *n.* matter by stopping it of every thing which

[*de* *delever*, from
upon people, and *delever*,]

They answered that they should demand themselves so
coming to their instruction. [Corruption]

forl, rude, pysh; e, d, o, silent; g as s, ch as sh, c, th, as k, & as j & as in "as is; x as gr, o as in ligger, hly; sh as in shine,

contain the following particulars—(1) date and hour of receipt at Police-station of first information (2) nature of information and parties concerned, (3) crime reported and value and details of property stolen if any, (4) date of occurrence of the crime (5) place of occurrence, direction and distance from Police-station taken by officer in charge of station

22. The Code contemplates two distinct records—This section appears to provide for two distinct records the former of which may be called for and made use of by the Magistrate or other judicial officer trying the case to which the record relates whilst of the other judicial cognizance can be taken only so far as the matter of inquiry affects the conduct of the Police-officer who prepared the record

(a) *First record*—The first record should simply contain the plain statement or deposition of the person making the complaint or giving information to the Police-officer, without any additional matter elicited by interrogation or comment on the part of the officer receiving the complaint, and there is nothing in the law to prevent such complaint or statement being brought to the Police-station in written form. The law requires that before action is taken upon the complaint it shall be placed upon record either by the complainant himself or by the officer before whom the complaint is lodged. That judicial cognizance may be taken of this record in the trial of the case to which it refers is plainly to be inferred from the absence of any proviso to the contrary

(b) *Second record or report*—The second record provided by this section is purely for Police purposes, for the information of the superior officers of Police and the future guidance of the officer in charge of the Police-station. This as other subjects of record in Police Diary is expressly declared to be excluded from judicial cognizance except in so far as the subject of inquiry relates to the conduct of the Police-officer in connection with the case to which this record has reference. Ordinarily, it ought not to be sent to the Magistrate trying the case but if at the trial, the Magistrate requires the production of the diary it must be produced. The Government cannot impose any limit upon the discretion of Magistrates in calling for evidence or in judging what is or is not evidence according to law. Although the diary kept by a Police-officer is not evidence of the facts stated therein except against that officer, it may be evidence of other facts.—*Eng Pol Man 2nd Ed p 376*

VI—GENERAL DIARY.

23. "Book to be kept by such officer"—This book is the *General Diary* also known as the *Station Diary* or *Station House Register*. The entries in this diary are *prima facie* proof that such complaints as are therein contained were actually made and recorded though of course they prove nothing as to the truth or falsity of the information. Under s. 44 of Act V of 1861 (*Police*) the Station House Officer should record in this diary all complaints, and charges preferred, the names of the persons arrested the names of the complainants the offences charged the weapons or property that may have been taken from their possession or otherwise and the names of witnesses who shall have been examined. The Magistrate of the district is at liberty to call for and inspect such diary. As to their evidentiary value. See 8 C. 154 = 10 C. L. R. 51 and 11 B. H. C. R. 120. In recording the substance of information names of persons accused must be given in full but not the list of stolen property.—*C. I. Pol Man p 148*. This diary is to be distinguished from the Special Diary referred to in s. 172 and which contains *proceedings in the investigation*

VII—MISCELLANEOUS

24. Copies and production of Police records.—No document precept or official paper of any kind or any copy of such paper belonging to or in the custody of the Police will be furnished to any private individual or other person not authorized by law to require it unless on receipt of a competent Court or order of a competent authority requiring him to give it be presented to the Superintendent of Police.—*Mad Pol Man p 118*

25. Complaint against a refugee in British Territory by Feudatory Chief—When a Feudatory Chief or his agent or subject lodges a complaint at a Police post that any person has committed an offence cognizable by the Police and has taken refuge in British territory the Police-officer in charge of the post will receive and deal with the complaint precisely as if it had been made recording a crime committed within his jurisdiction. Having satisfied himself that there are reasonable grounds for suspicion against the accused he will proceed against him as directed by law. If he arrests him he will transmit him to the headquarters station with a full report to be disposed of as the District Magistrate may direct.—*C. P. Pol Man p 186*

26. Powers of superior Police-officers.—Under s. 531 any Police-officer superior in rank to an officer in charge of a Police-station may exercise the same power throughout the local area to which he is appointed as may be exercised by Station House Officer within the limits of his station. See 35 M. 247 at p. 359 for the powers of officers of the Criminal Investigation Department to investigate offences

27. Maps and plans to be sent in murder and other heinous cases—In all cases of murder or culpable homicide the Police-officer shall prepare and send with the special diary a plan showing the position

IV—SHALL BE SIGNED

18 First information must be proved only by the written record—Having record to the provisions of this section and s 91 of the *Evidence Act* the only legal proof of the terms of a complaint of a cognizable offence to the Police is the written record or the same excepting where secondary evidence of its contents is admissible. It would be most unsafe if in cases under s. 211 I P C a Policeman's report of what a complaint contained could be accepted as sufficient proof of its contents without insisting on the production of the document itself if it were in any way procurable. **1 Bur S R 572**

19 Refusal to sign is punishable—Refusal to sign a statement made to a public servant when required so to do is punishable with simple imprisonment for three months, or fine of Rs 500 or both—S 180 I P C

V.—FIRST INFORMATION REPORT.

19 A Report of first information not part of a judicial record—Neither a Judge nor a Magistrate can direct that a complaint which the Police are required by this section to reduce to writing shall be retained as part of the judicial record of the investigation before the Magistrate. But the substance of the complaint is to be entered in the Police-officers' diary, and the Magistrate can call for and inspect the same. The record would be more conveniently retained in the custody of the Police-officer than filed in the Magistrate's office

20 First Information Report—This report is drawn out and submitted under this section and s 157 whereby the officer in charge of a Police-station is ordered, upon information received to send a report to the Magistrate empowered to take cognizance of such offence upon a Police report. See s 190. This section directs every complaint or information preferred to an officer in charge of a Police-station shall be reduced to writing and entered in a book. When in the absence of the Sub-Inspector or Head Constable a station or outpost is left in charge of a constable he cannot accept any complaint or prepare and submit the first information report of any crime reported to him unless the Local Government shall have given powers to such officers under s 4 (f). He will however, enter in the Station Diary an abstract of the complaint for the information of the District Superintendent and will report the complaint to the officers in charge of the station or outpost as the case may be by sending the complainant or informant with a note of the same to him.

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Din'tale by ade
as dentally ciliate
Din'tale-ain'gate
intermediate between
Dentation a T
flowed it (M)
Dint'd a (real)
Dint'it's

Denting er-offs a

contain the following particulars—(1) date and hour of receipt at Police-station of first information (2) nature of information and parties concerned, (3) crime reported and value and details of property stolen, if any, (4) date of occurrence of the crime (5) place of occurrence direction and distance from Police-station, taken by officer in charge of station

22. The Code contemplates two distinct records—This section appears to provide for two distinct records, the former of which may be called for and made use of by the Magistrate or other judicial officer trying the case to which the record relates whilst the other judicial cognizance can be taken only so far as the matter of inquiry affects the conduct of the Police-officer who prepared the record

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(b) *Second record or report*—The second record provided by this section is purely for Police purposes, for the information of the superior officers of Police, and the future guidance of the officer in charge of the Police-station. This, as other subjects of record in Police Diary is expressly declared to be excluded from judicial cognizance except in so far as the subject of inquiry relates to the conduct of the Police-officer in connection with the case to which this record has reference. Ordinarily, it ought not to be sent to the Magistrate trying the case, but if at the trial, the Magistrate requires the production of the diary, it must be produced. The Government cannot impose any limit upon the discretion of Magistrates in calling for evidence or in judging what is or is not evidence according to law. Although the diary kept by a Police-officer is not evidence of the facts stated therein except against that officer, it may be evidence of other facts.—*Leg Pol Man 2nd Ed* p 376

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VII.—MISCELLANEOUS.

24. Copies and production of Police records—No document precept or official paper of any kind or any copy of such paper, belonging to or in the custody of the Police will be furnished to any private individual or other person not authorized by law to require it, unless a precept of a competent Court or order of a competent authority requiring him to give it, be presented to the Superintendent of Police.—*Mid Pol Man* p 118

25. Complaint against a refugee in British Territory by Fendatory Chief—When a Fendatory Chief or his agent or subject lodges a complaint at a Police post that any person has committed an offence cognizable by the Police and has taken refuge in British territory, the Police-officer in charge of the post will receive and deal with the complaint precisely as if it had been made recording a crime committed within his jurisdiction. Having satisfied himself that there are reasonable grounds for suspicion against the accused he will proceed against him as directed by law. If he arrests him he will transmit him to the headquarters station with a full report to be disposed of as the District Magistrate may direct.—*C P Pol Man*, p 186

26. Powers of superior Police-officers.—Under s 551 any Police-officer superior in rank to an officer in charge of a Police-station may exercise the same power throughout the local area to which he is appointed as may be exercised by Station House Officer within the limits of his station. *See* 35 M. 247 at p 359 for the powers of officers of the Criminal Investigation Department to investigate offences

27. Maps and plans to be sent in murder and other heinous cases—In all culpable homicide, the Police-officer shall prepare and send with the special diary a plan shew-

De pō'nent, a [Lat. *deponent*, laying down (its
To bear witness, to testify by depo
I was he that made you to depo
your oath, my lord, he felonious and vain. Shaks

De pop'n lacy, s Depopulation [Rare] | 1

ing being limited to the loss of inhabitants as an army or a famine may depopulate a country. It rarely expresses an entire loss of inhabitants but only a great diminution of the same. The A. was a word denoting the

The deposit already formed affording to the succeeding portion of the charged fluid a base.

2 That which is placed anywhere or in any

2 The act of laying down or bringing before, presentation

2 (Mil) (a) A military station where stores and
3 A railway station, a building for the accom-
modation and protection of railway passengers or
freight
4 station
5 for apt, without a time limit
6 rav, degrading, or defaming,
7 sing depraved or degenerated
8 station or profligacy

1 To speak ill of to pervert to misrepresent
[Obs] Golden Book
2 To make bad or worse, to impair, to vitiate,
to corrupt
Whose pride depraves each other better part Spencer
2 To def me so much (c)

of the body when found and the premises or neighbourhood in such detail as to render the relative position of all the important features of the locality apparent and his plan will be sent up to the trying officer with the charge-sheet. In other cases of dacoity or robbery or heavy larceny plans of the locality shall be sent in the same manner. (The Bengal Police Code requires plans or maps also in the cases of serious riot and mail robbery p 344.) In every case when a plan is sent the name of the person who is prepared to prove its correctness must be noted upon it so that when the case is sent up the Magistrate may summon him to give evidence to the accuracy of the plan if he thinks it necessary—*Reg and Ord N W P*, s 10 p 269. The map should if possible be drawn to scale but this is not essential it should show all particulars calculated to be of use to the Court trying the case such as the place of occurrence, the surrounding rooms or houses, the houses of witnesses etc. etc. with their relative positions and distances, the number of the case and the name of the accused should be given at the top and the signature of the draftsman should be at the foot. The draftsman should also be produced as a witness at the trial and evidence should be elicited to show who pointed out to him the various places marked in the map. Ordinarily maps will not be required in cases other than those mentioned above but the investigating officer may in his discretion prepare and send up a map in any other case. Police-officers should be careful to see that all important places position of houses and of witnesses are marked as far as possible.—*Peng Pol Code* p 384. See also *Ord and Rul Punj* p 384 and *Punj Cr*, Chapter I IV para 43 *Oudh Cr Dig* p 9 which make similar provisions.

28 Maps and plans must be properly proved.—When a map of the scene of an offence, which has been prepared by or under the direction of the investigating officer is produced in Court it should be properly proved. The witnesses should be asked Did you show the Investigating Police-officer the spot where the murder was committed? Did you show him the spot where you were standing when you saw the murder committed? And the Police-officer should ask Are the spots indicated by you in the map the spots shown to you by the witnesses as the spot where the murder was committed and the spots where they said they were standing when they saw the murder was committed? The answers to these questions will connect what the map tells about the spot referred to with the evidence of eye-witnesses who speak from their own knowledge. Police-officers should indicate distances in maps by *Kadams* or paces a *Kadam* being understood to mean one ordinary step—*C P Pol Min* p 206.

29 Medical examination of persons to be with their consent.—In all criminal cases in which the examination of a person by a medical officer is deemed expedient the Police are warned against sending him or her for examination without consent first obtained or if the person so to be examined is a minor without the consent of the guardian or other person having lawful charge of that person. The consent, when obtained shall be recorded in the presence of witnesses and embodied in a report which shall be forwarded to the Civil Surgeon along with the person who is to be examined by him—*Reg and Ord N W P* s 10 p 278 *C P Cr Cir Part V* No 13.

Under instructions from the Local (Punjab) Government Police-officers are informed that no examination by a medical officer of a living woman's person whether she be a complainant or accused can be made without her consent and a written order from a Magistrate addressed to a medical officer directing him to make such examination. In all cases therefore when the Police may consider such an examination necessary the woman must be taken before a Magistrate for orders *Rul and Ord Punj* p 390. See also *Punj Cr Chapter LII* para 6.

When in cases of alleged rape etc. the examination of the person of the complainant by a medical officer appears desirable Police-officers should clearly understand that cases of this kind require to be investigated with great care and judgment. Statements made at the time should be accurately noted.—*Dom Pol Man* p 93.

30 Magistrate to determine sanity of lunatic offenders.—It is not a part of the duty of the Police to determine whether the person charged with the cognizable offence was insane or not when he committed the offence though the fact of such apparent insanity should be mentioned in the Special Diary the investigating officers shall deal with the case in the ordinary way and send up the accused for trial if the offence be proved against him. The Magistrate will determine any doubts as to the accused's sanity in accordance with the procedure laid down in Chapter XXXIV of the Criminal Procedure Code.—*Reg and Ord N W P* s 10 p 376.

31 Rules as to arrest and detention of accused.—The Government considers that the provisions of Chapters X and XIV of this Code supply ample facilities to the Police for a thorough inquiry into every class of crime and for the detection and arrest of offenders. District Superintendents of Police are thereto

[illegible]

and [Obs] More
S *dyman* to hide] To hide, to
seared them by deriding himself in a *Pro*
H *Mier*
ad mournful [Obs] "Turn Out
Spenser,
Fr, *Dr derelain dernier* from Lat
ride behind, *Ir derrey, d'reire*
O *Fr mere, rier, Ir reire, be*
retro backward, back, behind]
[Fr] Last resort.

called upon to impress upon their subordinates the absolute necessity of instructing themselves and of acting in conformity with the law and are warned that should they pass over irregularities on the part of the latter they will themselves be held responsible.—*Reg. and Ord. N. H. P. s. 10 p. 78.*

32. Police-station Officers not to be frequently transferred.—An officer in charge of a Police-station shall be retained in such charge for at least two years except for good reasons which shall be reported through the Commissioner to the Inspector General of Police his removal when necessary, shall if possible be timed so as to come in at the end of the year or half-year. It is obviously impossible for a Station Officer to become acquainted with the circle to become familiar with its evil characters, to earn the confidence of the *Clowdiss* and extract effective aid from them if he is not left at a station for a space of two or three years.—*Reg. and Ord. V H. P. s. 10 p. 24.*

155. 1 When information is given to an officer in charge of a Police-station of the commission within the limits of such station of a non-cognizable offence, he shall enter in a book to be kept as aforesaid the substance of such information and refer the informant to the Magistrate.

(2) No Police-officer shall investigate a non-cognizable case without the order of a Magistrate of the first or second class having power to try such case or commit the same for trial or of a Presidency Magistrate.

(3) Any Police-officer receiving such order may exercise the same powers in respect of the investigation (except the power to arrest without warrant) as an officer in charge of a Police-station may exercise in a cognizable case.

Notes—1 Application of section to Police of Bombay and Calcutta.—This section so far as it relates to the Police in the town of Bombay is repealed by s. 2 (1) and Schedule to the *City of Bombay Police Act* Bom. Act IV of 1902. Its application to the Calcutta Police is due to the reference to *Presidency Magistrate* in sub-sec. (2). See Note 1 to section 164.

2. Powers of Police and Magistrates in non cognizable cases.—This section deals only with the powers of Police-officers. It confers no power or authority on Magistrates to direct a local investigation by the Police or call for a Police report 12 B 161. But in 8 Bom. L. R. 539 = 4 Cr. L. J. 183 it was held that a Magistrate was empowered under sub-sec. (2) to refer cases of non-cognizable offences to the Police for investigation and report and under s. 156 (3) cases of cognizable offences. See also 4 L. B. R. 137 = 7 Cr. L. J. 414, 10 W. R. 49, 16 C. W. N. 1049 = 13 Cr. L. J. 691, 1914 U. B. R. 19 = 16 Cr. L. J. 87, and Note 4 to s. 156. Upon information given of the commission of a non-cognizable offence a Police-officer can instead of merely referring the informant to a Magistrate under s. 155 (1) report the case to Magistrate under s. 155 (2) who can under such circumstances order an investigation without first taking cognizance of the offence under s. 190. Section 155 (2) read with s. 229 (b) and Schedules III II (2) leaves no doubt on the point 6 M. L. T. 259 = 11 Cr. L. J. 156. See also 16 C. W. N. 1049 = 13 Cr. L. J. 691, 1914 U. B. R. 19 = 16 Cr. L. J. 97.

The object of the Legislature being to allow aggrieved parties direct access to justice without the intervention of the Police the Calcutta High Court in its circular dated 20th July 1871 cautions Magistrates especially in summons-cases and non-cognizable cases against the indiscriminate use of the Police agency for ascertaining facts regarding which the Magistrate is bound to form his own conclusion on evidence given before him.

3. What Magistrates empowered.—The powers contained herein are exercisable only by Magistrates of the second class and upwards.—Sch. III cl. 2 and in addition they must have power to try the case or to commit it for trial. If a Magistrate not empowered erroneously and in good faith orders a Police investigation in a non-cognizable case his proceedings shall not be void. See s. 229 (b).

4 Delegation of duty to other Police-officer.—It is questionable whether a Police Inspector ordered by a Magistrate to investigate a non-cognizable offence can legally delegate the duty of making the investigation to a Chief Constable Ratanlal 438.

5 Police Report of non-cognizable offence if a "complaint" ?—The officer receiving information cannot submit a report. If of his own motion as where he has himself seen the alleged offence committed he makes a formal report or complaint, that will amount to a complaint as defined in s. 4 (b) 26 B 150. The person who gives the information may himself be a Police-officer. See Note 11 to s. 4 and Notes to s. 190.

Syn → To abandon; forsake; leave; relinquish; exit

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E-mail: graham.hughes@ncl.ac.uk

1. *Chlorophyll a* and *Chlorophyll b* were determined by the method of Arar and Collins (1971).

Depart. _____

1. *Pharmaceuticals*. The pharmaceutical industry is a major contributor to the U.S. economy, with sales of over \$200 billion in 1997. The industry is highly concentrated, with the top 10 firms accounting for over 50% of total sales. The industry is also highly innovative, with a large number of new drugs being developed each year.

Diagnosis—The diagnosis of this disease is based on the clinical signs and the results of the laboratory tests. The laboratory tests include the following:

19. The Commission has also been informed that the Government of the Republic of Serbia has been asked to provide information on the situation in the region of the Danube, particularly in the area of the Danube Delta, and on the impact of the war on the environment and the population in the region.

[illegible]

$2\theta = 20^\circ$ $2\theta = 25^\circ$ $2\theta = 30^\circ$ $2\theta = 35^\circ$ $2\theta = 40^\circ$ $2\theta = 45^\circ$ $2\theta = 50^\circ$ $2\theta = 55^\circ$ $2\theta = 60^\circ$ $2\theta = 65^\circ$ $2\theta = 70^\circ$ $2\theta = 75^\circ$ $2\theta = 80^\circ$ $2\theta = 85^\circ$ $2\theta = 90^\circ$

[illegible]

the 1990s, the number of people in the world who are under 15 years of age is expected to increase from 1.1 billion to 1.5 billion. The number of people aged 65 and over is expected to increase from 250 million to 450 million. The number of people aged 15 and over is expected to increase from 3.5 billion to 4.5 billion. The number of people aged 15 and over is expected to increase from 3.5 billion to 4.5 billion. The number of people aged 15 and over is expected to increase from 3.5 billion to 4.5 billion.

[illegible][illegible]

the 1990s, the number of people in the world who are undernourished has declined from 1.1 billion to 800 million. The number of people who are malnourished has declined from 1.5 billion to 1 billion. The number of people who are obese has increased from 100 million to 300 million. The number of people who are overweight has increased from 100 million to 300 million. The number of people who are obese and overweight has increased from 100 million to 300 million. The number of people who are obese and overweight has increased from 100 million to 300 million.

It is not clear whether the observed differences in the response of the two groups are due to differences in the underlying disease process or to differences in the response to the treatment. The results of this study suggest that the response to the treatment is different in the two groups, but the underlying disease process is the same. The results of this study also suggest that the response to the treatment is different in the two groups, but the underlying disease process is the same.

6 Consequence of entering false report in Station Diary—A Police-officer at a Police-station who, being as such officer bound to enter all reports brought to him of cognizable or non-cognizable offences in the Station Diary refused to enter a report made to him concerning the commission of an offence and entered instead in the diary a totally different and false report as that which was made to him is guilty of the offence mentioned in s 177 I P C 20 A 151

7 Improper use of statement made to Police—In 10 C 256 it was held that statements of witnesses or confessions taken at a Police investigation are not *as far as their subject-matter is concerned* any more the property of the Police than the property of the prisoners and that a pleader was not guilty of misconduct in making use of copies of such documents for the benefit of his client when delivered to him by the client however improperly the client may have become possessed of them provided the pleader was neither a party nor privy to the obtaining of them

8 Police procedure where investigation ordered—If an order is given by a competent Magistrate for an investigation by the Police (under s 202) into the truth or falsehood of a complaint of a non-cognizable offence a Police-officer may institute and carry through an investigation into the offence just as if it were a cognizable one—with this exception that he cannot arrest and *challin* the accused or any other person in the event of his investigation leading him to believe any particular individual to be guilty. All that he can do is to report the result of his investigation. If however the investigation reveals that the offence is really a cognizable one it is the duty of the Police-officer at once to bring the offence on the Crime Register, to report to the Magistrate that he is dealing with the offence under s 157 and to act accordingly—C P Pol Man, p 163. See Note 9 to s. 156

9. Duty of Police to send report to Magistrate after investigation—Police cannot independently institute proceedings under s 211, I P C—Information of the commission of a non-cognizable case was given to the Police who obtained the authority of a Magistrate under s 155 to investigate the case without submitting any report to the Magistrate under s 173 the Police after some investigation instituted proceedings against the informant under s 211 and obtained a conviction. *held* the conviction was illegal. The case had not come to an end and could not come to an end without an order of the Magistrate. This being so it is contrary to the method and the spirit contrary indeed to the whole system of our criminal procedure that the Police should be allowed to prosecute in the way they have done without even having the case disposed of by a Magistrate. The point is one of technicality but of very great importance. One need say little to show how absolutely contrary to our system things would be if the Police were allowed independently of the Magistrate to take proceedings as they have done here in cases which had never been disposed of by Magistrate 17 Bom L R 69 = 16 Cr L J 161

10 Statements made to the Police under sections 154 and 155 cannot be used as evidence or made the foundation of a charge of defamation—Statements made to the Police as the result of action taken under section 154 or section 155 of the Code of Criminal Procedure are privileged statements and as such cannot be used as evidence or made the foundation of a charge of defamation. Further inasmuch as a statement in order to be defamatory within the meaning of section 499 I P C must be made with a certain intention a statement made primarily with the object that the person making it should escape from a difficulty cannot be made the subject of a criminal charge merely because it contains matter which may be harmful to the reputation of other people or hurtful to their feelings 41 A 311

156. (1) Any officer in charge of Police station may without the order of a Magistrate investigate any cognizable case which a Court having jurisdiction over the local area within the limits of such station would have power to inquire into or try under the provisions of Chapter XV relating to the place of inquiry or trial

(2) No proceeding of a Police-officer in any such case shall at any stage be called in question on the ground that the case was one which such officer was not empowered under this section to investigate

(3) Any Magistrate empowered under section 190 may order such an investigation as above-mentioned

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allied to O Slav. *gospodj*, *gospodary*, *gospodin*,
master, lord;
1 One who exercises or possesses absolute power
over another a master, a lord especially a sover-

Notes.—1. Investigation not a judicial proceeding.—Having regard to s. 4 (m), the investigation by a Police-officer is not a stage of a judicial proceeding, because the Station House Officer has no power to record evidence on oath and though persons examined by him are bound to answer under sub-sec. (2) to s. 161, all questions put to them, they are no longer bound to answer *truly*. See definition of "judicial proceeding" and Notes thereunder.

2. Powers of superior Police-officers to investigate.—Under s. 551 Police-officers superior in rank to an officer in charge of a Police-station may exercise the same powers throughout the local area to which they are appointed, as may be exercised by such within the limits of his station. An Inspector of a Provincial Criminal Investigation Department has jurisdiction to investigate in any part of the Province, as a Presidency or Province may well be held to be the local area to which he is appointed. It was so held by the majority of the Judges in 35 M 397. The minority was of opinion that the Criminal Investigation Department was created to assist the ordinary Police force in the detection of certain crimes and an Inspector of that department was not entitled to exercise the same powers as the officer in charge of a Police-station under s 156. See (1919) M. W. N. 199.

3. Effect of application of Chap. XV.—The effect of applying the provisions of Chap. XV, relating to the place of inquiry or trial, to Police investigations in cognizable cases is to give the Station House Officer power to investigate cases over which more than one Court has jurisdiction, as *e.g. murder in dacoit* under sub-section (1) of s. 181. In 1893 A. W. N. 124 it was pointed out that the reference to Chap. XV, in this section did not limit the application of s. 156 to offences only, but the investigation may extend to cases within the scope of s. 53. See also 15 A 11.

4. Is a Magistrate competent under this section to order investigation by Police when complaint made to him.—It is the duty of a Magistrate on presentation of a complaint of any offence, to immediately proceed in the manner laid down in Chap. XVI and the Magistrate has no option of referring it to the Police for investigation under sec. 156 (3). If an alternative procedure to that laid down in sec. 200 had been intended it would have found place in Chap. XVI and not in Chap. XIV which deals with the procedure and powers of Police in which information of an offence is given to a Police-officer. 10 M L T. 120 = 1911 (2) M W N 74 = 12 Cr. L. J. 463, 30 C. 923 was referred to and distinguished on the ground that their Lordships in that case pronounced no opinion on the legality of the Magistrate's action in omitting to proceed as laid down in s. 200 but merely considered the effect of such omission on orders subsequently passed by him as it under

the offence was cognizable or non-cognizable and then L. made his representation to the Magistrate who then sent it to the Police to investigate and it was contended that the Magistrate could only proceed under Chap. XVI and that he had no power to direct investigation. Held that the Magistrate had power to direct investigation by the Police. If it was a cognizable offence he had power under s. 156 (3) and if it was non-cognizable he had this power because he had taken cognizance of the offence under cl. (c) s. 190 and not upon a complaint. Chap. XVI did not apply. See also Note 3 to s. 153. As to whether a Magistrate can refuse

which has been duly made to him on the ground that it relates to an offence therefore have been made to the Police, it was held by the Punjab Chief Magistrate, 57, that a Magistrate cannot refuse when properly called on to do so on the ground that the complainant might reasonably have had recourse to the Police instead of to the Magistrate. The question remains as to whether a Magistrate after having taken cognizance may not properly call on the Police to assist in investigating the case. It seems to the Judges that a Magistrate who has taken cognizance under s. 190 of an offence cognizable by the Police may, after complying with the provisions of s. 200 and issuing his process (if he sees no reasons for doubting the truth of the complaint and otherwise find sufficient ground for proceeding), give information of the case to the Police-officer having jurisdiction with a view to his further investigating its facts and circumstances in the manner laid down in s. 157. In such a case as is contemplated, the Police-officer would not have to take measures for the discovery and arrest of the offender, as the supposed offender would be known, and a process would have been issued by the Magistrate to compel his appearance but in other respects it would rest with him to take steps to secure the case being properly brought before the Court, and he would be responsible that the witnesses named by the complainant to the Magistrate were supplemented by any others who might be necessary to complete the case for the prosecution.

| | |
|---|---|
| n. See DETORTION. |] De tryp'sion, n. [Lat <i>detrusio</i> See DETRUSZ] |
| {imp & p p DETORTION' p pr & rtino } [Lat <i>detorqueere detortum</i> , 'orqueere to turn about twist & rt'] | |
| | 1 The act of thrusting or driving down |
| | 2 The slipping of one portion of a substance |

The above remarks proceed on the assumption that the complainant to the Magistrate knows or thinks he knows who has injured him. In cases of complaint of a cognizable offence against an unknown offender the Magistrate would have to record under s 203 that there were in his judgment no sufficient grounds for proceeding. It would also be open to him to communicate to the Police the information supplied to him or to leave it to the complainant either to apply to the Police or to take such other measure as he thought proper for discovering the offender—*Punj Cir, Vol II p 163 et seq*

5 Sessions Judge cannot direct investigation by Police—Section 156 only empowers Magistrates to direct investigation and a Court of Sessions therefore has no power to direct investigation **11 P R. 1910 = 16 P W R. 1910 = 11 Cr L J 330**

6 Scope of clause (3)—Cl (3) enables a Magistrate to direct an investigation even when he has received no report or complaint

7 Duty of Magistrate where there is delay in investigation—Where there is great delay in the investigation by the Police it is the duty of the committing Magistrate and failing him of the Sessions Judge to enquire fully into the circumstances of the delay, and to consider its bearing on the prosecution story **2 Bom L R. 1902**

8 Police inquiry need not be exhaustive, but it must be impartial.—A Police-officer would not discharge his duty if he declined to listen to or call for information tendered by the accused, which went directly to negative the charge against him. But if the evidence was of a nature which if adduced and believed would still leave the accused under such a degree of suspicion as would justify his transmission before the Magistrate then the Police are not bound to delay the inquiry with a view to such investigation.—*Mad Pol Man, p 90*

9 Police procedure.—The following tabulated form (taken from the *Madras Police Manual* shows the proper procedure under this Code on receipt of a complaint or information of the commission of a cognizable offence and on receipt of an order from a Magistrate to investigate a non-cognizable offence—

Cognizable Cases

| CIRCUMSTANCES | PROCEDURE |
|--|--|
| 1 The facts appear to constitute a cognizable offence. No person accused or if accused not arrested Station House Officer determines to enter on an investigation either at the scene of the alleged crime (sec. 157) or at the station house [s. 157 proviso (a)] | Send original information whether it be the Village Magistrate's Report or the information written or dictated by complainant or informant with Occurrence Report (Form No 44, Vol II) to the Magistrate having jurisdiction |
| 2 The facts do not appear to constitute an offence or in cases of petty nature there is no chance of procuring any evidence so that the Police think that there is no necessity for entering on an investigation [s. 157 proviso (b)] | Send original information whether it be the Village Magistrate's Report or the information written or dictated by complainant or informant with Occurrence Report to the Magistrate having jurisdiction explaining reasons for not investigating |
| 3 Accused arrested on sufficient grounds. Investigation cannot be completed within 24 hours | Send accused at once to the nearest Magistrate with Crime Occurrence Memo containing in exact copy of entries regarding the case in Station House Report. |
| | Note—If the accused is forwarded to a Magistrate other than the Magistrate having jurisdiction Occurrence Report as in Case I must be sent to the latter |
| (a) On completion of the investigation the case is found to be true | Send Charge-sheet (Form No 45 Vol II) to the Magistrate having jurisdiction |

Cognizable Cases—(continued)

| CIRCUMSTANCES | PROCEDURE |
|---|--|
| (b) On completion of the investigation the case is found to be false. | Send Referred Charge-sheet (Form No. 46 Vol. II) to the Magistrate having jurisdiction through Divisional Inspector |
| 4 On completion of the investigation the case is found to be true, the Police have done all in their power to find the offender or offenders and have failed. | Send Form No. 47 through the Inspector of the Division to the Magistrate having jurisdiction. |
| 5 The accused arrested. Inquiry likely to be completed within 24 hours | Detain the accused. Send Occurrence Report as in Case I |
| (a) On completion of investigation the case is found to be true | Send the accused (or in bailable cases bail bond) with Charge-sheet to the Magistrate having jurisdiction. |
| (b) On completion of investigation the case is found to be false or evidence is insufficient to justify transmission of the accused to Magistrate. | Release the accused on bail and send bond with Referred Charge-sheet through Divisional Inspector or to the Magistrate having jurisdiction |
| 6 The accused not found but after investigation, the case is found to be true and such facts elicited as would justify his arrest | Send Charge-sheet to the Magistrate having jurisdiction asking for warrant |
| 7 The accused not arrested or no person accused. After full investigation it is found that no offence has been committed | Send Referred Charge-sheet through Divisional Inspector to the Magistrate having jurisdiction. |
| 8 After investigation it is found that the facts constitute an offence of a less grave nature than at first alleged <i>e.g.</i> charge of robbery found to amount in fact only to theft | Send Referred Charge-sheet through Divisional Inspector to the Magistrate having jurisdiction asking for authority to correct the record |
| 9 The parties conciliated in a compoundable cognizable case request the Police to stop investigation on the ground that a compromise has been effected | Send Referred Charge-sheet through Divisional Inspector to the Magistrate having jurisdiction for orders. |

Non Cognizable Cases

| | |
|---|--|
| 1 After investigation ordered by Magistrate case found to be true | Send Charge-sheet to the Magistrate by whom the case was referred |
| 2 After investigation ordered by Magistrate case found to be false | Send Referred Charge-sheet to the Magistrate by whom the case was referred, through Divisional Inspector |
| 3 The accused arrested under s. 57, name and residence not ascertained within 24 hours. | Send the accused with Occurrence Report to the Magistrate having jurisdiction |
| 4 The accused arrested under s. 57, name and residence ascertained within 24 hours. | Release the accused and send bond with Occurrence Report to the Magistrate having jurisdiction. |

Notes—(1) Station House Officers should endeavour to ascertain the truth and real nature of the case from the complainant and get the charge put up in its true character

(2) A report will be made to the Magistrate under s. 173 in all cases investigated by the Police irrespective of results.

(3) An investigation is held to be completed—(a) When the Police have done all in their power to find the offender or offenders and have failed. (b) When the Police arrest and charge an offender. (c) When the Police refer a false charge that they have investigated.

chief for command devolved upon the next officer in rank; on the death of the prince, the crown de-

De vout' n [Lat] devoted

powers; quickness and skill in managing any complicated or difficult affair

He wisdom... was turned... into a dexterity to deliver himself

He had conducted his own defense with singular boldness and dexterity

SYN - skill; address; aptitude

Devotes a great formation that next above the King

We must be constant and devoted

2 Expressing devotion

3 Warmly devoted, as devout wishes

Syn - If pure; real, solemn, sincere

De vout' n 1 A devoted

De vout' n [Lat] devoted

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Devotee, n [Lat] devoted, as a devotee

Devotee, n [Lat, from devotee] See DEVOTE

Devotee, n [Obs] One who reverences or worships, one given to devotion [Obs]

Devotee, n [Obs] One who reverences or worships, one given to devotion [Obs]

Devotee, n [Obs] One who reverences or worships, one given to devotion [Obs]

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Devotee, n [Obs] One who reverences or worships, one given to devotion [Obs]

see in physical activity, skill

use or control of the mental

Diabrosis, n [Obs] A disease of the mind, a disease of the mind, a disease of the mind

Diabrosis, n [Obs] A disease of the mind, a disease of the mind, a disease of the mind

Diabrosis, n [Obs] A disease of the mind, a disease of the mind, a disease of the mind

(4) The results of Police investigation into cases connected with other Government departments or establishments, should be communicated at once by the Police-officer making the investigation, to the local head of such department or establishment.

157. (1) If, from information received or otherwise, an officer in charge of a Police-station has reason to suspect the commission of an offence which he is empowered under section 156 to investigate, he shall forthwith send a report of the same to a Magistrate empowered to take cognizance of such offence upon a Police report, and shall proceed in person or shall depute one of his subordinate officers "not being below such rank as the Local Government may by general or special order, prescribed in this behalf" and to proceed, to the spot, to investigate the facts and circumstances of the case, "and if necessary, to take measures for the discovery and arrest of the offender

Procedure where cognizable offence suspected.

Where local investigation dispensed with

Where Police-officer in charge sees no sufficient ground for investigation.

Provided as follows —

(a) When any information as to the commission of any such offence is given against any person by name and the case is not of a serious nature, the officer in charge of a Police-station need not proceed in person or depute a subordinate officer to make an investigation on the spot,

(b) If it appear to the officer in charge of a Police-station that there is no sufficient ground for entering on an investigation, he shall not investigate the case

(2) In each of the cases mentioned in clauses (a) and (b) of the proviso to sub-sec (1), the officer in charge of the Police-station shall state in his said report his reasons for not fully complying with the requirements of that sub-section, "and in the case mentioned in clause (b) such officer shall also forthwith notify to the informant, if any, in such manner as may be prescribed by the Local Government, the fact that he will not investigate the case or cause it to be investigated"

Note.—The addition made to sub-section (2) makes it obligatory on the Police to inform the complainant if the complaint is not investigated.

Notes 1—The difference between s 154 and s 157—is this, that whereas every information covered by the former section must be reduced to writing as provided in that section, it is only information which raises a reasonable suspicion of the commission of a cognizable offence within the jurisdiction of a Police-officer to whom it is given which compels action under the latter section, although, of course, a report would be sent to the Magistrate—*Punj Cr Chap XLV, p 171*

2 From information received.—The words "from information received" refer to the information given in s. 154, 44 C. W. N. 326 = 11 Cr. L. J. 201, 1914 M. W. N. 382 = 15 Cr. L. J. 622

REPORT.

3. First report of an offence.—"Occurrence Report."—The report required by this section is the first report of an offence, which an officer in charge of Police-station is required to make to a Magistrate as soon as he receives information of an offence and before entering on its investigation. It is to be made direct to the Magistrate in order that he may have an early information and be in a position to act, if necessary, under s 159 of the Code. A certified copy of the original crime report made by the *Police patil* to the officer in charge of a Police-station should be attached to the latter's first report.—*Bom. Pol. Man*, p 91. The report under this section is the preliminary report before investigation commences. 3 C. W. N. 351, 33 A. 30, 1899 A. W. N. 87

4. Necessity for report.—Responsibility of Magistrates.—Failure to send the report required by this section is a serious breach of duty which may lead to failure of justice 4 S. L. R. 38 = 11 Cr. L. J. 498. This section requires that immediate intimation of every complaint or information preferred to an officer in charge of a Police-station of the commission of a cognizable offence shall be sent to the Magistrate having jurisdiction. The object of this provision is obvious and it involves more than a mere technical compliance with the law

* The words in the inverted commas, viz "not being below such rank as the Local Government may by general or special order, prescribed in this behalf" and "and if necessary, to take measures" and "and in the case mentioned in clause (b)" were added by Act XLIII of 1921.

The Magistrate is primarily responsible for the condition of the district as regards repressible crime, and he is not at liberty to divest himself of that responsibility, or to relax that supervision over crime which the law intends that he should exercise. It is his duty to know and consider each cognizable case as soon after its occurrence as possible. He should not rest content with reading the *challan* when the case comes up for trial, but he should watch the various steps taken by the Police and advise them in all cases whenever it may be necessary. Moreover, it is for the Magistrate, by the continuous study of diaries, to acquaint himself with what is going on of the salient and special kind referred to in the Code, as matters for his attention and possible interference. It is for the Police to keep the Magistrate constantly informed of them, Smyth, p. 83.

5. Intimation of offences to Magistrates.—District Magistrates should keep District Superintendents of Police informed as to the offences which each Magistrate in the district is (according to the class of the Magistrate and the general arrangements for the distribution of cases) to enquire into or try, in order that Police-officers may always know who is the Magistrate empowered to take cognizance of a particular offence to whom the report referred to in this section is to be sent. *C P Cr Cr, Part II, No 10*

6. Transmission of the Report in Burma.—In Burma, reports of the nature referred to in this section must be submitted to the Magistrate having jurisdiction through the District Superintendent of Police, or, if no such officer be resident at the station through the Assistant Superintendent of Police, or, if there be no Assistant Superintendent in the station, through the Inspector. If no District Superintendent, Assistant Superintendent or Inspector is resident at the station the report must be submitted to the Magistrate having jurisdiction.—*Bur Gazette, 1879 Part II, p 189*

INVESTIGATION.

7. Investigation under s. 157 does not include every inquiry which a Police-officer may make.—Most investigations are initiated on information recorded under s. 154 and vouched for by the informant. But the Police must frequently hear of alleged offences from less reliable sources, e.g. village gossip, or the receipt of telegram, which, so far as authenticity goes stands in no better position. In such cases it is discretionary with the officer to take action or not before deciding as to the course to adopt, he may frequently deem it well to make a few preliminary and informal inquiries as to whether there is anything in what he has heard to render a formal investigation desirable. 1914 M W N. 382 = 15 Cr. L. J. 622.

8. Does this section empower the Police of one circle to investigate an offence in another?—In 12 P. R. 1915 = 16 Cr. L. J. 551, it was held that in s. 157 there was no provision preventing the Police of one Police-station from acting under that section in the jurisdiction of another Police-station.

9. Investigation to be conducted on the spot if possible.—Police-officers, when inquiring into cases under this Chapter, should not ordinarily send for persons who appear to be acquainted with the facts and circumstances of cases under enquiry to the station house for examination. It is true that Police-officers have the power to require attendance of witnesses. But this should never be done, save as a last resource or when circumstances render it necessary. Police-officers should always bear in mind that they are mere detective officers going about, noting (in their note-books) such information as they may be able to obtain with a view to future proceedings, that this will be far better obtained by going from house to house, and conversing with persons in the manner least likely to rouse their fears and cause reluctance to make disclosures that may result in their being obliged to appear before a Court of Justice to give evidence publicly, a public examination at a station house will always have this effect and therefore should be avoided as far as possible. Whereas if the convenience of the people be studied and enquiry conducted in a conciliating and judicious manner, people will more readily disclose what they know. At the same time, it is obvious that private enquiries must be very carefully watched, and men so employed be closely and constantly supervised.—*Mid Pol. Man, p 90*

10. Investigation in petty cases of theft in Madras.—The Police will record and report, but not investigate cases of petty thefts not exceeding one rupee. Such cases are cognizable by heads of villages. If complaints of such offences are made to the Police they will refer the complainant to the Village Magistrates. Heads of villages are required by cl. 2, s. 6, Reg IV of 1821 to report to the Police, after disposal, all such cases of petty thefts in which they shall have exercised the power of punishment granted to them. The Police will of course investigate such cases and prosecute them before the regular Magistrates under the sections of the Penal Code, if attended with aggravating circumstances, or if committed by old offenders or by professional thieves. They will similarly prosecute before the regular Magistracy all cases of salt in which the value of the salt involved (cost price plus duty) amounts to more than four annas, and also all cases of petty thefts,

1. A book containing the words of a language, as

We'll never differ with a crowded place.
 SYN. — To vary, to change, to differ.

First and second senses: the plural is *Differences*.
 near the word *harsh*, a sense of a plural is *Differences*.

See *DIFFERENCE* and *DIFFERENTIAL*.

QUALITY

4. (*Her.*) A figure added to a coat of arms to distinguish the persons or families who bear the same arms, and to indicate their nearness to the principal bearer.

5. (*Logic*) The quality or attribute which is added to those of the genus to constitute a species.

6. (*Moth*) The space between the wings.

'ereone gods from men. Chapman
 is and undergoing trial, are not *differ*
 and *ind* *valued*
 and *ind* *valued*
 of *differ*

no matter how small is the value of the property lost which occur in Railway trains or on the premises attached to Railway lines or stations *Mad. Pol Man Vol I pp 74 and 75*

11 Rules to guide Police-officers to use their discretion in taking up investigation of cognizable offences.—**Abstention from investigation—Bengal**—The discretion to be exercised regarding this matter is vested in the Police-officer and the responsibility of properly exercising it rests with him. As a guide however to the manner in which this discretion might be exercised the following broad principles are laid down—

I: Every reported cognizable offence should be investigated when an investigation is asked for

II No investigation should ordinarily be made into the following classes of cases unless an investigation is asked for—

- (1) Cases of house-breaking or attempted house breaking when there is no theft and no clue to the offender
- (2) Theft cases where the property reported to be stolen is—
 - (a) less than Rs 5 in value and
 - (b) of such a nature as not to be easily identifiable such as grain or fruit and
 - (c) the informant has no suspicion as to the offender
- (3) Assault cases when other charges such as theft are superadded and the latter appear to be more than doubtful
- (4) Cases in which the criminality of the act charged depends upon the decision of a question in dispute such as a question of title or possession which it is within the province only of a Civil Court or of a Criminal Court under Chap VIII or Chap XII of this Code, to decide

Police-officers must understand these are not *hard and fast rules to be blindly followed* in every case. These instructions indicate only general principles and Police-officers are bound by law to exercise their discretion in every cognizable case that is reported to them—*Beng Pol Code pp 374 and 375*

United Provinces.—In the United Provinces of Agra and Oudh no investigation can be made *without the request of the injured person* in cases of *theft* under ss 379 and 380 of the Penal Code in which the value of the stolen property is less than Rs 10 in cases of *house-breaking by day* under s. 453 and 454 and *attempt at house-breaking* of this nature unless there has been theft of property to the value of Rs 10 or upwards and in case of *attempt at house-breaking by night* under ss 456—459 of the Penal Code—*Pol Man A II P and Oudh Sec A p 139*

Madras.—Investigation as a rule should never be refused unless it is clear that (a) there will be no evidence forthcoming (b) the case is so trivial that it is best for all parties to leave it alone (c) the case is clearly a civil one (d) the case is really a petty assault to which theft may have been added. It must be remembered that investigation does not necessarily mean an investigation at the spot. Under provision (a) a Police-officer in trivial cases may decline to go to the spot and very often should do so. But refusal of investigation is a different matter and when there is a definite complaint of a serious crime even if the complaint appears at first sight false the complaint should almost always be registered and investigation held. It is difficult to lay down any rule on the subject but the following rules may perhaps be of some assistance—

- (a) As a rule *every complaint* of a cognizable offence should be investigated either at the station or by visiting the scene of the alleged crime.
- (b) As a rule there should be only two reasons for refusing investigation—
 - (i) the triviality of the offence
 - (ii) the absence of any procurable evidence in cases of a petty nature

Under (i) in this (Madras) Presidency all cases of theft where the value of property is under one rupee may and should be as a rule *refused investigation* and the parties referred to the Village Magistrate. In all other cases the Police should investigate.

Under (ii) it must be remembered that it is only the *absence* of evidence and not the fact that the Police think it *false* that should be a reason for non investigation. Such cases would be complaints of attempts at house-breaking, where no theft is alleged to have taken place and the complainant is unable to give any reason for suspecting anybody—petty thefts of property under Rs. 3 in value where there is no clue whatever and the property is perishable and unidentifiable

4. To bear with patience or submission

(DIGEST) The act of digesting, or the state of being digested

1 of two written characters to express related sound, as *ea* in *lead*, or *ih* in *thine*

an i moisture, gradual solution

1. Digestive, or (lit., &c.)
2. Digestive, or (lit., &c.)
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4. Digestive, or (lit., &c.)
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99. Digestive, or (lit., &c.)
100. Digestive, or (lit., &c.)

DIGNIFY The act of dignifying, exaltation

Dihedral angle the angular space included between

In such cases as these last, however the action of the Police should be most carefully watched and any tendency to refuse investigation in cases other than those which strictly come under cl. 2 immediately checked.

It must be remembered that the mere suspicion that the evidence offered is false is no reason for non investigation and whenever the complainant alleges the existence of any evidence the case should be enquired into.

Practically the only cases in which much doubt can arise about the proper action of the Police are those in which the complaints are of attempted house-breaking and in such cases if the complainant alleges that he has reasons for suspecting any particular person or it is the case that there have been more attempts than one in the same village within a short time or that there have been suspicious characters seen near the village recently the Police should not refuse to investigate—*Mid. Pol Man Vol I p 311*

12 Where one Police-officer sees no ground, another Police officer cannot investigate—When no sufficient ground for investigation has been found by an officer in charge of a Police station no other officer is competent to make such investigation unless he is authorized by a Magistrate so to do—*Ct H C Cir O dated 20th July 1871*

158. Every report sent to a Magistrate under section 157 shall if the Local Government
Reports under s 157 so directs be submitted through such superior officer of Police as the Local
how submitted Government by general or special order appoints in that behalf

(2) Such superior officer may give such instructions to the officer in charge of the Police-station as he thinks fit and shall after recording such instructions on such report transmit the same without delay to the Magistrate

Note.—As to Burm see Note 7 to s 157

159. Such Magistrate, on receiving such report may direct an investigation or if he
Power to hold inves- thinks fit at once proceed or depute any Magistrate subordinate to him to
tigation or preliminary proceed to hold a preliminary inquiry into or otherwise to dispose of the
inquiry case in manner provided in this Code

Note.—1 **Magistrate may proceed under this section only when preliminary report under s. 157 is sent**—An inquiry can be made under this section only on a Police report submitted within the terms of s 157 i.e. a report made before the completion of the Police investigation or inquiry but where such report is submitted after investigation the Magistrate has no jurisdiction to act under this section **4 C. W N 331** In this case information was laid before the Police charging a person with criminal trespass into a house with intent to have improper intercourse with one of the female inmates thereof and the Police reported that they did not believe that the object was to commit the offence stated but that they were not disinclined to believe the charge of trespass held that the report was not one under s 157 and the Magistrate in such a case had no jurisdiction to act under this section and his action not being a judicial proceeding the direction of the Magistrate to prosecute the complainant for an offence under s 211 was set aside This case was followed in **32 A 30**

(1) **Magistrate has no power to make further inquiry when Police report is made after final inquiry**—It is only on receiving a report under s 157 that a Magistrate is competent to hold a preliminary inquiry under this section. Where therefore a report of the commission of an offence has been made by the Police after final inquiry into the truth of the information given them as to the commission of an offence the Magistrate to whom such report is made has no jurisdiction either under the section or under s 20 to make a further inquiry into the same matter, **1899 A. W N 87**. The object of inquiry (or investigation) is to ascertain whether there are grounds for believing the accusation to be well founded. The section does not authorize a further inquiry. See also **32 A 30, 17 C. W N 824**.

(2) **Section not applicable when complaint made direct to Magistrate**—If a complaint is made to a Magistrate himself he is bound to proceed under s. 200 **30 G. 923, 10 M. L. T 120 = (1911) 2 M. W N 74 = 12 Cr. L. J 463 and Note 4 to s. 156**

2. Magistrate conducting inquiry must not try the case himself.—When a Magistrate took an active part in the capture of parties charged with the commission of an offence and tried them himself on that charge it was held that he was bound to state to the accused so far as he could what were the facts he himself

observed and to which he himself could bear testimony and the prisoner in such a situation had a right, if he thought it desirable, to cross-examine the Judge whose evidence should be recorded and form part of the record in the case. The proper course however, for the Magistrate to have taken in such a case would have been to decline to try the case, and to ask that it should be taken by some other Judge, **20 W. R. 76**. See also **20 C. 857** and Notes under s. 556. It is one of the general principles which govern the conduct of an English Court of criminal justice that a person is not necessarily disqualified from presiding as a Judge or acting as a jurymen upon an inquiry into or investigation of facts because he may have been himself a witness of some of the facts which are the subject of inquiry or investigation, and it is quite erroneous to suppose that a Magistrate is bound to keep out of sight altogether the part which he has played in the matter and to pretend that he knows nothing about the facts excepting so much as the witnesses tell him in Court. It is always dangerous for any man in whose right conduct others are concerned to set up and endeavour to carry out a fiction such as this. It is most specially dangerous for a Judge who is under the grave responsibility which attaches to the office of a Criminal Judge, to attempt anything of the kind **20 W. R. 76**.

3. Otherwise dispose of the case.—*e* by dismissing the complaint. If the Police send a report that there is no sufficient ground for entering on an investigation the Magistrate may dismiss the complaint. He may take cognizance of the offence under s. 190, but he is not bound to take action, nor is he bound to examine the complainant first.—*M H C Pro of 5th February 1878*

4. After disposal of report, Magistrate is functus officio—The Police reported the cognizable offence to be false on information being given both of a cognizable and a non-cognizable offence and the Magistrate accepted the report and passed orders accordingly. The Magistrate cannot subsequently order the Police to send up a charge-sheet and if the charge-sheet is sent accordingly, and proceedings are taken against the accused the proceedings so commenced are bad and ought to be quashed **11 C. W. N 832 = 6 Cr. L. J. 34**.

5. Power of Magistrate to order prosecution of persons not arrested by the Police—*A* was sent up by the Police for an offence of criminal trespass before a Magistrate. *A* Magistrate acquitted *A* and directed the Police to take action against *H*, who in his opinion committed the trespass. *H* was thereupon sent up by the Police and convicted. *held* that though the Magistrate was not empowered under s. 190 (1) (c) of the Code to take cognizance of the offence of his own motion he had the power, on receipt of information from the Police to order the prosecution of any person, who in his opinion ought to be put upon his trial *a fortiori* he can after taking evidence know whom the Police ought to put up before him and order accordingly **4 L. R. R. 137 = 7 Cr. L. J. 414**. See Notes under s. 190.

160. Any Police officer making an investigation under this Chapter may, by order in writing, require the attendance before himself of any person being within the limits of his own or any adjoining station who from the information given, or otherwise appears to be acquainted with the circumstances of the case at such person shall attend as so required.

Police-officer's
power to require at
tendance of witnesses

Notes.—**1. Order to attend must be in writing**—*A* constable was sent by a Police Inspector to fetch some persons from whom the latter wished to make inquiries regarding a theft. The order to attend was not in writing. While the constable was accordingly, taking two persons with him *P* came up and threatened both of them and the constable with the Chief Constable's vengeance and in consequence the two persons refused to accompany the constable who had to go without them. On these facts *P* was convicted under ss 186 and 189, I P. C., *held* that as an order under this section must be in writing and a person summoned under such order cannot be forcibly compelled by the person serving the order to attend, the presence of the constable with the two persons (who were not under duress) was an ordinary circumstance, and not a discharge of duty and that therefore *P* was not guilty of an offence under s. 186 which does not apply to a rescue from illegal custody **Ratanlal 850**. Non-attendance is not punishable under s. 174, I P. C., where the order is not in writing **Weir I, 88; Weir II, 123**. The order may be in a prescribed form and lithographed but it is not a summons.

WHO MAY BE REQUIRED TO ATTEND.

2. Only persons supposed to be acquainted with facts and circumstances.—It appears to have become the practice of Police-officers in the mofussil to hold a regular investigation of quasi-judicial character in the presence of the accused and their agents but this is not contemplated by the law which lays down that the Police-officer may examine orally any person supposed to be acquainted with the facts and circumstances of the case **33 C. 1073**.

Pr direct means "What is direct to, what slides

by the question "What is direct to, what slides

sanctioned by the authority of careful writers and must

3
foss

3 (Ornith) A small bird (*Hydrobata aquatica*), resembling the blackbird in form and plumage, and seeking its food by diving.



Pr direct means "What is direct to, what slides

3 Straightway without delay immediately

See DIRECT [Groom] [The] [Pr] of dirigere

4 Instantly without delay immediately

See DIRECT [Groom] [The] [Pr] of dirigere

Pr direct See infra.

See DARK, a.] Dark [Obs] Spenser.

dir, rye, push, e, i, o, silent; p as s, ch as sh, c, ch as k, k as j, g as in get, z as z, x as ex, u as

th as in thine.

3. No power to compel a surety to attend.—A Police-officer cannot require a surety to attend the Police-station to be examined and to give information as to the person for whom he stands surety 1885 A. W. N. 40.

4. No power to compel the attendance of accused.—This section was intended to apply only to the summoning by Station House Officer of witnesses or possible witnesses and not to compel the attendance of accused persons. Where an accused person refused to obey an order in writing improperly issued by a Police-officer under this section and the Police thereupon took her into custody, because she refused to obey the written order, *held*, that the Police constables concerned were rightly convicted of wrongful confinement notwithstanding that the offence of which the person thus arrested was accused was a cognizable offence Weir II, 221. This section does not authorize a Police-officer to require the attendance of an accused person with a view to answer the complaint made against him. The intention of the Legislature seems to have been only to provide a facility for obtaining evidence and not for procuring the attendance of the accused, 7 M. 274 (F B).

FAILURE TO ATTEND.

5. Witness bound to attend—Remedy against defaulting witness.—If a witness fails to attend before a Police-officer making an investigation under this Chapter the proper course is to prosecute him under s. 174, I P C., 24 C. 320.

DUTIES AND PRIVILEGES OF WITNESSES.

6. No power to call an accused to produce documents.—*See 4 Bom. L. R. 844*, where it was *held* that a Police-officer has no authority to call on the accused to produce any documents before him.

7. Witness not bound to answer questions.—A refusal to answer questions asked by a Police-officer under this section is not punishable under s. 176 or s. 179 or s. 187 I P C., as under the present Code there is no obligation to speak the truth as there was under the 1882 Code, 23 M. 544. *See also* 12 W. R. 23, Weir I, III and Weir II, 123; 23 M. 544 (*foot note*), 27 P. R. 1905 = 9 Cr. L. J. 105; 6 S. L. R. 277 = 14 Cr. L. J. 302.

8. Witness not bound to state truth—Witness cannot be prosecuted for giving false evidence under s. 193, I P C.—Witnesses cannot be prosecuted for giving false evidence, 1908 A. W. N. 22, 23 M. 544. "We have amended this clause by reverting to the law as it stood under the Codes of 1861 and 1872. Under those Codes a person examined by a Police-officer was bound to answer all material questions, but was not liable to be prosecuted for giving false evidence in respect of his answers under s. 193 I P C. *See* 7 C. 121 and 10 C. 405. It

officer. They bear no resemblance to a deposition and ought to have no weight as such attached to them. We are aware that there are inconveniences in abolishing the direct liability for giving false evidence to the Police, but the balance of expediency seems to us to be in favour of the old law. The provisions of ss. 202 and 203, I P C., appear to us to afford a sufficient safeguard against false information. —*See Com. Rep.* The omission of the word 'truly' in paragraph 2 supersedes the cases in 20 W. R. 41, 8 C. L. R. 236; 8 B. 216; 10 C. 405; 11 B. 659, and follows the ruling in 7 C. 121 (F.B.) = 8 C. L. R. 300; 7 P. R. 1896. In 11 B. 659, it was *held* that sanction was not necessary to prosecute a witness under s. 193 for giving false evidence before the Police. In 16 C. 349 and Ratanlal 455, the facts necessary to prove before a person could be prosecuted for giving false evidence before the Police were discussed. These cases are no longer of any importance.

9. Privileges of witnesses.—

A person examined under this section by the Police and convicted is not bound to speak the truth, and would be illegal, Ratanlal 619. A witness is not bound under this section to answer those questions put to him by a Police-officer, the answer to which would have had a tendency to expose him to a criminal charge, Ratanlal 518 and 488. When there is no liability imposed on the accused to inform the Police *proprio motu* of any offence mentioned in s. 44 he is bound to answer all questions put to him by the Police during Police investigation. His admission of failure to give information would not expose him to criminal prosecution under s. 176, I P C., when Police have information already from other sources, Ratanlal 674. *See also* cases cited in 26 C. 852.

[illegible]

Dis ap prö, prösh a. [Precis dis and opposi-

(ii) *Not liable to a charge of defamation*—A statement made in answer to a question put by a Police-officer under this section in the course of an investigation made by him is privileged and cannot be made the foundation of a charge of defamation 16 M 235

(iii) *Not liable in damages*—Nor will a suit lie for damages for words spoken in answer to question put by the investigating officer 28 C 794

(iv) *Cannot be prosecuted under s 182 I P C*—A statement made by a witness in answer to question put by the Police-officer investigating the case cannot be made the basis of a charge under s 182 I P C To give information in s. 182 I P C means to volunteer information (1903) U B R I P C 13 = 2 Cr L J 474 referred to 35 P W R, 1914 = 227 P L R, 1914 = 15 Cr L J 650 See also Ratanlal 124

(v) *Cannot be prosecuted under s 211 I P C*—A witness answering questions put to him by the Police cannot be convicted of an offence under s 211 I P C Weir L, 193, 31 M 506, 6 M L T 133.

10 *No power to take security bond to appear before the Police.*—There is no provision in the Code authorizing a Police-officer to take security bond for the production of any person before the Police Such a bond *ab initio* void and the Magistrate has no power to alter it and impose fresh conditions thereunder 11 C 77.

RECORDING OF STATEMENT

11 *Not bound to reduce statement into writing*—It is not obligatory on the Station House Officer to reduce to writing any statement made to him during an investigation. Neither s 162 nor s 91 of the *Evidence Act* renders oral evidence of such statements inadmissible though if the statements be actually reduced to writing the writing itself cannot be treated as part of the record or used as evidence except for the purpose of refreshing memory 11 Bom H C R 120, 36 C 281

12 *When desirable that statements should be recorded*—The provisions of this section should not be utilised in any but heinous cases "Heinous cases" include cases exclusively triable by Court of Sessions and those cases in which special reports are submitted through the Magistrate either to the Commissioner only or both to the Commissioner and to the Deputy Inspector General or Inspector General of Police *See* *Pol Code* p 432.

13. *Mode of recording answers.*—It is not necessary that the statements of witnesses recorded under this section should be elicited and recorded in the form of question and answer 7 P R, 1896 It is sufficient if such a statement is substantially an answer to one or more questions addressed to the witness before the statement is made Ss 164 and 364 do not apply to examination of witnesses. Nor can they be put on oath or affirmation 15 A 11

14 *Statements of witnesses must not be recorded in the Special Diary merely to prevent the accused to have access to them*—In 33 C 1023 the practice of Police-officers to incorporate oral statements made to them by witnesses in the Special Diary under s 172 in the belief that by so doing those statements could be kept from the knowledge of the accused is strongly condemned Such statements whether recorded in a diary under s 172 or not fall under the provisions of s. 162 and are liable to be produced under the conditions laid down therein. Ss 161 and 145 of the *Indian Evidence Act* do not apply to those statements of witnesses

15 *Attestation unnecessary*—It is not illegal though unnecessary for a Police-officer recording a statement to obtain the signatures or by standers to authenticate his record of such statement 15 A 11

16 *Right of accused to inspect record and get copies of statement.*—*See* s. 162 and Notes thereto

17 *Answers elicited not property of the Police.*—There is no prohibition against any person present at the time when depositions are being taken or confessions made to take down in writing what either a prisoner or a witness says 10 C 256 See Note 8 to s. 153

ADMISSIBILITY IN EVIDENCE OF STATEMENTS MADE TO POLICE

18 *When not reduced to writing*—The statement is always admissible subject to the provisions of the *Indian Evidence Act* and s 162 does not deal with such statements 11 Bom. H C R, 190; 36 C 281 It is not illegal to examine a Police-officer for the purpose of impeaching the credit of a witness who gives evidence in favour of the accused 27 A 469 See 19 C. W. N 217 = 16 Cr L J 313, as to the danger of relying on statements made to the Police which are not judicially recorded.

19 *When reduced to writing*—(a) Oral evidence of the statement may be given. S 162 does not override the general provision of the *Indian Evidence Act* 36 C 281; 35 M 267 and 1397, 39 B 88—(b) *But the writing containing statement not to be used in evidence*—except under s 162

(2) Such person shall be bound to answer all questions relating to such case put to him by such officer, other than questions the answers to which would have a tendency to expose him to a criminal charge or to a penalty or forfeiture

2. Section confined to investigation under this Chapter.—See 16 C. 349 This section is applicable to an investigation under s 156 (1) consequent on an arrest under s 55 (c) 1893 A. W. N., 124.

***162.** (1) No statement made by any person to a Police-officer in the course of an investigation under this Chapter shall, if reduced into writing, be signed by the person making it, nor shall any such statement or any record thereof, whether in a Police diary or otherwise, or any part of such statement or record, be used for any purpose (save as hereinafter provided) at any inquiry or trial in respect of any offence under investigation at the time when such statement was made

Statements to Police not to be signed, use of such statements in evidence.

Provided that, when any witness is called for the prosecution in such inquiry or trial whose statement has been reduced into writing as aforesaid, the Court shall on the request of the accused refer to such writing and direct that the accused be furnished with a copy thereof, in order that any part of such statement, if duly proved, may be used to contradict such witness in the manner provided by section 145 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 When any part of such statement is so used any part thereof may also be used in the re-examination of such witness, but for the purpose only of explaining any matter referred to in his cross-examination

Provided, further, that, if the Court is of opinion that any part of any such statement is not relevant to the subject matter of the inquiry or trial or that its disclosure to the accused is not essential in the interests of justice and is inexpedient in the public interests, it shall record such opinion (but not the reasons therefor) and shall exclude such part from the copy of the statement furnished to the accused "

(2) Nothing in this section shall be deemed to apply to any statement falling within the provisions of section 32, clause (1) of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872

Note.—This section has been much amended.—The effect of the amendment appears to be clearly to control the general provisions as to evidence contained in s 157 of the Evidence Act It is submitted that the words 'nor shall any such statement or any record thereof be used for any purpose (save as hereinafter provided)' nor shall any statement or any record thereof be used for any purpose (save as hereinafter provided). From this the intention of the Legislature is quite clear that the general provisions of s. 157, Evidence Act are controlled by the special provisions contained in this section. So the statements or the record thereof are limited in their use as evidence to the specific purpose mentioned in the

a defence witness.' (See *Sel Com Rep*, clause 33) The whole scheme of the section seems to be that section 162 as amended is only to be used for the benefit of the accused. It is submitted that the Legislature has approved the reasoning in 7 A. L. J. 468 = 11 Cr. L. J. 235. See also 34 B. 599; 33 C. 1023.

In light of the above view it is submitted that 36 C. 231; 35 M. 247; 39 B. 58 are no longer good law

Notes.—1 Corresponding sections of the old Codes.—S 145 of Act XXV of 1861 read.—'Any statement so reduced into writing shall not be signed by the person making it nor shall it be treated as part of the record or used as evidence' S 119 of the Code of 1872 read "No statement so reduced to writing shall be signed by the person making it nor shall it be treated as part of the record or used as evidence."

* Sub-section (1) was substituted for the original sub-section (1) by Act XVIII of 1925.

The 1882 Code enacted "No statement other than a dying declaration made by any person to a Police officer in the course of an investigation under this Chapter shall, if reduced to writing be signed by the person making it or be used as evidence against the accused."

By Act V of 1886 the word "and Madras High Courts that the writing must have been deliberated Council to indicate why the change was introduced"

See s. 63 of the Bombay City Police Act which corresponds to this section 32 B. 111

2. Scope of the section.—This section does not override the provisions of s. 27 of Indian Evidence Act so that confessional statement or statements to the Police made by accused persons leading to the discovery of relevant facts must not be excluded if the statements are recorded by the Police 6 N L R. 180 = 12 Cr L J 60 The provisions of this section must be taken to modify the general provision of s. 157 of the Indian Evidence Act 13 O C. 7 = 11 Cr L J. 117 A Police-officer may examine any person acquainted with the facts of the case and he is not bound to reduce into writing any statement made by that person though if he wishes to do so he may reduce it into writing If he does so the written statement though it may be used by the Police-officer to aid him in his investigation is not to be used as evidence in the trial of the accused (subject to the proviso). When the person makes a statement to a Police-officer which is not reduced to writing by him such statement is not inadmissible in evidence under this section since it does not profess to provide for such a case. The Police may therefore be questioned as to such statement by the Counsel for the defence as also any other person who may have heard it made. So also when it is reduced to writing the section does not say that the Police-officer or such other person shall not be liable to be questioned as to it or bound to state the truth when so questioned but that the writing shall not be used as evidence 11 Bom. H. C. R. 120; 35 C. 281

3. Want of power to investigate immaterial.—If it should happen that the Police-officer was not authorized to hold the investigation his want of authority is immaterial having regard to s. 156 (2) 2 C. W. N. 702 at p. 112

4. Evasion of this section by sending witnesses to a Magistrate having no jurisdiction.—A Police-officer has no authority to place witnesses before a Magistrate unless they appear voluntarily It is highly irregular and the policy of the law as embodied in this section is defeated if a Police-officer with a view to fix the witnesses down to a particular statement should cause persons to appear before Magistrates not having jurisdiction to deal with the case and thus get their statements recorded because the Police-officer may be of opinion that the witnesses may be gained over 29 C. 433, see also 7 C. W. N. 220, 27 C. 295 and Notes 22 23 to s. 164

ADMISSIBILITY IN EVIDENCE OF STATEMENTS OF WITNESSES TO POLICE

5 Admissibility of written statement in trial.—(a) The record may be used only for the purpose mentioned in the section i.e. the accused may at the time the witness for the prosecution appears before the Court use the record for impeaching his credit 33 C. 1023, 32 B. 111 (F.B.) 34 B. 599, 13 O C. 7 = 11 Cr. L. J. 117 See also 26 M. 191, 8 C. W. N. 218, 15 P. W. R. 1913 = 171 P. L. R. 1913 = 14 Cr. L. J. 190, 1 P. W. R. 1914. But in 35 C. 281, 35 M. 247 and 397 it was held that oral evidence of the statement may be given to corroborate a prosecution witness. Under the old Code of 1882 the record could be used in favour of the accused

(b) The person making the statement may be questioned about it and with a view to impeach his credit the Police-officer or any person in whose hearing the statement was made can be examined on the point under s. 155 of the Indian Evidence Act 11 B. 657 and 659, 9 C. 455 = 11 C. L. R. 269; 17 A. 57; 33 C. 1023.

(c) In 11 B. H. C. R. 120, it has been held that under the Code of 1872 the writing may be used for the purpose of refreshing memory But in 33 C. 1023 it is laid down that it is very doubtful whether a witness could refresh his memory as to such statements unless the writing is already in and had been read to the witness

6. Inadmissibility of writing containing statement against the accused.—The statement taken down in writing of a witness for prosecution and recorded by a Police-officer cannot be admitted in evidence against the accused, 32 B. 111 (F.B.) 17 P. R. 1884, 4 B. L. R. 38 = 12 C. L. J. 495 = 12 Cr. L. J.

& cō n. DISINTERESSING] [Prefix *dis* and *inter*,
q v]

- 1 To take out of the grave or tomb; to unhury, to exhume, to dig up
- 2 To bring out as from a grave or hiding place

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Dis In'ter-ess ment n Disinterestedness im

partialit

Dis In'te

Dis In'ter-est, a. Disinterested [Obs] *Exham*

The measures they shall walk by shall be *disinterested* and even.

Dis In'ter-est ed, *By Taylor*

Dis In'ter-est-ed ly, adv In a disinterested man

ner

Dis In'ter-est-ed ly, adv

See 1 To drive from a lodge or place of rest, to re-
move from a place of quiet or repose as, shells
resting in the sea at a considerable depth are not
dislodged by storms

de

It is illegal for a Magistrate trying an accused person to use as evidence against him, the statements made by the prosecution witnesses before the Police by comparing them with their depositions and as a result of the comparison to convict the accused, 9 Bom. L. R. 895 = 6 Cr. L. J. 224; 9 Bom. L. R. 366 = 5 Cr. L. J. 333. (b) The statement cannot be used to impeach the credit of a defence witness whose statement may have been recorded by the Police, 15 A. 25. *Per BEAMAN, J.*, in 32 B. 111. (c) Not to make up for the deficiency in the evidence of the prosecution witnesses, *Ratanlal* 935; 28 C. 348. (d) It cannot be used as corroborative evidence of the prosecution witnesses against the accused, 22 B. 596; 13 O. C. 7 = 13 Cr. L. J. 117.

7. Inadmissibility of writing in favour of the accused—Statement to Police cannot be used in favour of the accused—From the mere saving clause in this section (1882 Code) on behalf of accused persons, the

A Police-officer under it may be used

A saving clause cannot properly be and different effect to the previous

A Police-officer for the purpose of

impeaching the credit of a witness who gives evidence in favour of an accused at his trial, having previously given a statement to the Police-officer different from, and inconsistent with, his subsequent statement at the trial, 1905 A. W. N. 64, which follows 11 B. 657; 15 A. 25. The law now adopts the Full Bench view in 19 A. 390. See also 17 A. 57.

8. Inadmissibility of statement reduced to writing by the Police for other purposes.—(a) *In a subsequent case*—There is nothing in this section which limits the prohibition of the use of such document, viz., the statement taken down in writing as evidence to a matter of the charge which is actually under investigation by the Police-officer when the statement is made. It extends also to the use of such a document against the person who is alleged to have made the statement, 28 C. 348 and see Notes 21 and 19 below. Such a statement is not admissible under s. 35 of the *Evidence Act*, because it is not a public official record within the meaning of the section, it being not necessarily part of the official duty of the Police-officer to prepare such a document at all, 28 C. 348. In 35 M. 397, *SUNDARA IYER, J.*, dissents from 28 C. 348, and is of opinion that under s. 35 of the *Evidence Act* the prosecution may simply put in the record without calling the officers when it is desired to prove a statement made by a witness because it is quite sufficient under s. 35 that the entry is made in the discharge of official duty.

(b) *For prosecution under s. 193, I P C.*—The written statement cannot be made the basis of an order for the prosecution under s. 193, I P C., of the person making the statement, 1908 A. W. N. 22. See Note 8 under s. 160.

(c) *For prosecution under s. 211, I P C.*—A statement under s. 161 made in answer to questions by the investigating Police-officer cannot be made the basis of a prosecution under s. 182, I P C., 15 Cr. L. J. 650 = 25 In. Ca. 978; 2 Cr. L. J. 476 (Bur.). See also 20 M. L. J. 132 = 8 M. L. T. 87 = 11 Cr. L. J. 288, noted under s. 161 where it was held following 31 M. 506, that a statement under s. 162, is not a complaint or a charge and cannot be made the basis of a prosecution under s. 211, I P C. But see Note 21 below.

9. Is oral evidence of a statement to the Police reduced to writing admissible?—Under s. 157 of the *Indian Evidence Act*, an oral statement made to the Police during a Police investigation by a witness may be reduced to writing. But these cases suggest that if any such refinement is that

of the Madras High Court are unanimously of opinion that the law as interpreted by 36 C. 291 is correct, 35 M. 247 and 397. In 39 B. 58, the Bombay High Court too held that under s. 162 the writing only is excluded from evidence, but the right to prove any statement to the Police by oral evidence to corroborate the testimony of any witness is not taken away by the section. But in 34 B. 599 it was laid down that it is contrary to the plain intention of this section to allow an investigating Police-officer to be questioned in examination-in-chief about what the various witnesses said to him during the investigation. It opens an undesirably wide field for cross-examination and leads to the attention of the Court being directed and distracted from the true issues. In 33 C. 1023, it was held that it would be quite unfair to accept the Police-officer's perfunctory readings of his diary as proof of the statement when he could not remember what had been said. In 7 A. L. J. 468 = 11 Cr. L. J. 235, *KNOW, J.*

А ебъ м. ДИСТУРБИУМЪ] (Trecks das and later,

91 To take out of the grave or tomb; to unbury;
to exhumate, to dig up.

2 To bring in a form a page or 2.120 or 1.0

1r *disjuncti* v, 11. *disjunctivo*, 1p *disjunctivo*. See

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    } Tending to disintegrate generating 312 5- -

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1 To drive from a lodge or place of rest, to rd

move from a place of quiet or repose

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Die Befragten sind in Deutschland geboren und wohnen in Deutschland.

part 1 = 100%

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refused to follow 36 C. 281 while KARAMAT HUSAIN, J., dissented from him and approved of the ruling. / See also the judgment of SUNDER LAL, J., in 13 O. C. 7 = 11 Cr. L. J. 117 who is of opinion that the reasons for excluding from evidence the written record of such statement, apply with equal force to a *viva voce* recital of such statement from memory by the Police-officer, 17 A. 57. But see 6 Pat. L. J. 241 approving 36 C. 281. See also 25 Bom. L. R. 965 overruling 39 Bom. 58 and 22 Bom. 595.

10. How far is the rule as to corroboration by former statements under s. 157 of the Evidence Act modified by this section?—The general provisions of s. 157 of the *Indian Evidence Act* must be taken to be controlled by the special provisions of s. 162, 7 A. L. J. 448 = 11 Cr. L. J. 235. The rule contained in s. 157 of the *Indian Evidence Act* is modified in the following respects, viz (1) as a general rule, the written records of statements previously made by witness to a Police-officer which is referred to in the section as 'such writings,' in the course of an investigation cannot be used as evidence, (2) such written record of the statement cannot be used (a) to corroborate the statement of a witness for the prosecution or (b) to corroborate a statement for the defence or (c) to impeach the credit of a witness for the defence, and (3) it may be used to impeach the credit of a witness for the prosecution if (a) the accused person requests the Court to inspect the written record of the deposition and (b) the Court thinks it expedient in the interests of justice to allow a copy of such statement being granted to him. Per SUNDER LAL, J., in 13 O. C. 7 = 11 Cr. L. J. 117. Oral evidence of such statements may be given by the Police-officer, 36 C. 281; 35 M. 397; 39 B. 58. See Note above.

Bombay.—In a Bombay case it is now held as the result of the latest amendment of s. 162 of the Code, that a Police statement can only be used for one purpose, and that is for the accused to contradict a prosecution witness in the manner provided in s. 145 of the *Indian Evidence Act*, and it is quite clear also that it is not permissible for Police statements, whether oral or written, to be put in evidence in order to corroborate a prosecution witness or to contradict a defence witness. To this extent the rulings in 22 B. 595 and 39 B. 58 are superseded by the enactment of the Legislature. 26 Bom. L. R. 965.

Lahore.—The decisions in 6 L. 24 and 6 L. 171 support the Bombay view and disapprove of 5 L. 324, 7 L. 264 upholds the decisions in 6 L. 24 and 6 L. 171.

Calcutta.—The decision in 30 C. W. N. 142 agrees with the above Bombay case and holds that s. 162 of the Code is clear enough to exclude any statement made by any person and directs that such statement shall not be used for any purpose not provided for by the section itself. So a map prepared in a criminal case should not have thereon any statement made by a witness to the person preparing the map noted thereon. Such statements in a map prepared by a Police-officer are inadmissible under s. 162 and as hearsay evidence. 30 C. W. N. 503 agrees with 30 C. W. N. 142.

Lahore.—In 7 L. 84 it was further held that s. 162 of the Code applies to the statements of persons as witnesses examined by the Police in the course of an investigation and not to the statement of an accused person, and that it does not over ride or modify the provisions of s. 27 of the *Indian Evidence Act*.

Patna.—In 5 P. 63 it was also held that the main object of the amendment of the section is to prevent the use of the statement of prosecution witnesses as corroboration under s. 157 of the *Evidence Act*. Sections 161 and 162 of the Code do not over ride the general provisions of the law with regard to the admissibility of statements made by accused persons as laid down in ss. 27 and 28 of the *Indian Evidence Act* of 1872.

Contrary to the above Bombay decision it has been now held in 48 M. 640 = 48 M. L. J. 195 that the provisions of s. 162 of the Code either as amended or as it stood before the amendment, were not an absolute bar to the use of such oral statements at the trial for any purpose admissible under the *Indian Evidence Act*.

11. Effect of wrongly admitting statement in evidence.—Where a Judge admitted in evidence a document recorded under s. 162 and referred in his address to the jury, the High Court set aside the conviction as in the circumstances of the case it may have misled the jury, 13 Cr. L. J. 244 (M).

PRODUCTION, INSPECTION AND COPIES OF WRITTEN STATEMENTS.

12. Procedure for production and use of record of statements.—Records of statements are liable to be produced only under the conditions laid down under this section, i.e., the accused may, at the time the witness appears before the Court, ask the Court to refer to them, and the Court may, if it thinks expedient in the ends of justice, furnish him with copies of such statements for the purpose of impeaching the credit of the witness.

It is illegal for a Magistrate trying an accused person to use as evidence against him, the statements made by the prosecution witnesses before the Police by comparing them with their depositions and as a result of the comparison to convict the accused, 9 Bom. L. R. 895 = 6 Cr. L. J. 224; 9 Bom. L. R. 365 = 5 Cr. L. J. 353. (b) The statement cannot be used to impeach the credit of a defence witness whose statement may have been recorded by the Police, 15 A. 25. *Per* BEAMAN, J., in 32 B. 111. (c) Not to make up for the deficiency in the evidence of the prosecution witnesses, Ratanlal 935; 28 C. 348. (d) It cannot be used as corroborative evidence of the prosecution witnesses against the accused, 22 B. 596; 13 O. C. 7 = 13 Cr. L. J. 117.

7. Inadmissibility of writing in favour of the accused—Statement to Police cannot be used in favour of the accused.—From the mere saving clause in this section (1882 Code) on behalf of accused persons, the general principle cannot be inferred that statement made by any person to a Police-officer under it may be used as evidence for an accused person, though it cannot be used against him. A saving clause cannot properly be looked at for the purpose of extending an enactment, nor can it give a new and different effect to the previous sections of the enactment, 11 B. 657. It is not illegal to examine a Police-officer for the purpose of impeaching the credit of a witness who gives evidence in favour of an accused at his trial, having previously given a statement to the Police-officer different from, and inconsistent with, his subsequent statement at the trial, 1905 A. W. N. 64, which follows 11 B. 657; 15 A. 25. The law now adopts the Full Bench view in 19 A. 390. See also 17 A. 57.

8. Inadmissibility of statement reduced to writing by the Police for other purposes.—(a) *In a subsequent case*—There is nothing in this section which limits the prohibition of the use of such document, viz., the statement taken down in writing as evidence to a matter of the charge which is actually under investigation by the Police-officer when the statement is made. It extends also to the use of such a document against the person who is alleged to have made the statement, 28 C. 348 and see Notes 21 and 19 below. Such a statement is not admissible under s. 35 of the Evidence Act, because it is not a public official record within the meaning of the section, it being not necessarily part of the official duty of the Police-officer to prepare such a document at all, 28 C. 348. In 35 M. 397, SUNDARA IYER, J., dissents from 28 C. 348, and is of opinion that under s. 35 of the Evidence Act the prosecution may simply put in the record without calling the officers when it is desired to prove a statement made by a witness because it is quite sufficient under s. 35 that the entry is made in the discharge of official duty.

(b) *For prosecution under s. 193, I P C.*—The written statement cannot be made the basis of an order for the prosecution under s. 193, I P C., of the person making the statement, 1908 A. W. N. 22. See Note 8 under s. 160.

(c) *For prosecution under s. 211, I P C.*—A statement under s. 161 made in answer to questions by the investigating Police-officer cannot be made the basis of a prosecution under s. 182, I P C., 15 Cr. L. J. 630 = 23 In Ca. 978; 2 Cr. L. J. 474 (Bar.). See also 20 M. L. J. 132 = 8 M. L. T. 87 = 11 Cr. L. J. 286, noted under s. 154 where it was held following 31 M. 506, that a statement under s. 162 is not a complaint or a charge and cannot be made the basis of a prosecution under s. 211, I P C. But see Note 21 below.

9. Is oral evidence of a statement to the Police reduced to writing admissible?—Under s. 157 of the Indian Evidence Act, an oral statement made to the Police during a Police investigation by a witness may be admitted at the trial by way of corroborating that witness's deposition. But this section enacts that if any such statement is taken down in writing, the writing cannot be used as evidence. If it be said that it is a refinement to hold that the writing cannot be admitted, but that the statement if not reduced to writing can, the answer is that the Legislature has chosen to alter its language in this section of this Code drawing a distinction between the statement and the writing. There is nothing therefore, in the special provision of the existing Code to override the general provisions of Evidence Act as to the proof by oral evidence of former statements 2 C. W. N. 702 which is decided under the old Code (1882), and this point was not decided in 32 B. 111 (F.B.); 36 C. 281. All the Judges of the Madras High Court are unanimously of opinion that the law is interpreted by 36 C. 281 is correct, 35 M. 347 and 397. In 39 B. 88, the Bombay High Court too held that under s. 162 the writing only is excluded from evidence, but the right to prove any statement to the Police by oral evidence to corroborate the testimony of any witness is not taken away by the section. But in 56 B. 599 it was held down that it is contrary to the plain intention of this section to allow an investigating Police-officer to be questioned in examination-in-chief about what the various witnesses said to him during the investigation. It opens an undesirably wide field for cross-examination and leads to the attention of the Court being directed and distracted from the true issues. In 33 C. 1023, it was held that it would be quite unfair to accept the Police-officer's perfunctory readings of his diary as proof of the statement when he could not remember what had been said. In 7 A. L. J. 468 = 11 Cr. L. J. 235, KNOX, J.,

ing & prevalent and constituting a great danger

1 The act of disputing a reasoning or argumen-
tation in opposition to something or on opposite
sides controversy in words verbal contest respect-
ing the truth of some fact, opinion, proposition, or
argument

2 A rhetorical aversion to which

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Therefore *disputed* he in the synagogue with the Jews

2 *disputed* he in the synagogue with the Jews

1 *disputed* he in the synagogue with the Jews

1 To dispute of the anathema

refused to follow **35 C. 281** while **KARAMAT HUSAIN J.**, dissented from him and approved of the ruling. See also the judgment of **SUNDER LAL J.**, in **13 O. C. 7 = 11 Cr. L. J. 117** who is of opinion that the reasons for excluding from evidence the written record of such statement, apply with equal force to a *vide voce* recital of such statement from memory by the Police-officer, **17 A. 57**. But see **6 Pat. L. J. 241** approving **36 C. 281**. See also **26 Bom. L. R. 965** overruling **39 Bom. 58** and **22 Bom. 596**.

10. How far is the rule as to corroboration by former statements under s. 157 of the Evidence Act modified by this section?—The general provisions of s. 157 of the *Indian Evidence Act* must be taken to be controlled by the special provisions of s. 162, **7 A. L. J. 468 = 11 Cr. L. J. 235**. The rule contained in s. 157 of the *Indian Evidence Act* is modified in the following respects, *viz.* (1) is a general rule, the written records of statements previously made by witness to a Police-officer which is referred to in the section as 'such writings', in the course of an investigation cannot be used as evidence, (2) such written record of the statement cannot be used (a) to corroborate the statement of a witness for the prosecution or (b) to corroborate a statement for the defence or (c) to impeach the credit of a witness for the defence and (3) it may be used to impeach the credit of a witness for the prosecution if (a) the accused person requests the Court to inspect the written record of the deposition and (b) the Court thinks it expedient in the interests of justice to allow a copy of such statement being granted to him. *Per SUNDER LAL J.*, in **13 O. C. 7 = 11 Cr. L. J. 117**. Oral evidence of such statements may be given by the Police-officer, **36 C. 281; 35 M. 397; 39 B. 58**. See Note above.

It is not permissible for Police statements whether oral or written, to be put in evidence in order to corroborate a prosecution witness or to contradict a defence witness. To this extent the rulings in **22 B. 596** and **39 B. 58** are superseded by the enactment of the Legislature. **26 Bom. L. R. 965**.

Lahore.—The decisions in **5 L. 24** and **5 L. 171** support the Bombay view and disapprove of **5 L. 324**; **7 L. 264** upholds the decisions in **6 L. 24** and **6 L. 171**.

Calcutta.—The decision in **30 C. W. N. 142** agrees with the above Bombay case and holds that s. 162 of the Code is clear enough to exclude any statement made by any person and directs that such statement shall not be used for any purpose not provided for by the section itself. So a map prepared in a criminal case should not have thereon any statement made by a witness to the person preparing the map noted thereon. Such statements in a map prepared by a Police-officer are inadmissible under s. 162 and as hearsay evidence. **30 C. W. N. 503** agrees with **30 C. W. N. 142**.

Lahore.—In **7 L. 84** it was further held that s. 162 of the Code applies to the statements of persons as witnesses examined by the Police in the course of an investigation and not to the statement of an accused person, and that it does not over-ride or modify the provisions of s. 27 of the *Indian Evidence Act*.

Patna.—In **5 P. 63** it was also held that the main object of the amendment of the section is to prevent the use of the statement of prosecution witnesses as corroboration under s. 157 of the *Evidence Act*. Sections 161 and 162 of the Code do not override the general provisions of the law with regard to the admissibility of statements made by accused persons as laid down in ss. 27 and 28 of the *Indian Evidence Act* of 1872.

Contrary to the above Bombay decision it has been now held in **43 M. 640 = 48 M. L. J. 195** that the provisions of s. 162 of the Code either as amended or as it stood before the amendment, were not an absolute bar to the use of such oral statements at the trial for any purpose admissible under the *Indian Evidence Act*.

11. Effect of wrongly admitting statement in evidence.—Where a Judge admitted in evidence a document recorded under s. 162 and referred in his address to the jury, the High Court set aside the conviction as in the circumstances of the case it may have misled the jury, **13 Cr. L. J. 244 (M)**.

PRODUCTION, INSPECTION AND COPIES OF WRITTEN STATEMENTS.

12. Procedure for production and use of record of statements.—Records of statements are liable to be produced only under the conditions laid down under this section *sc.* the accused may, at the time the witness appears before the Court, ask the Court to refer to them, and the Court may, if it thinks expedient in the interests of justice furnish him with copies of such statements for the purpose of impeaching the credit of the witness.

Where after all the prosecution witnesses had been examined the accused applied to the Court to summon a prosecution Police witness with his diary as a witness for the defence held that the application could not be granted. But in such a case the Court ought to send for and peruse the statements recorded in the diary and if on such perusal it thinks that it would be expedient in the interests of justice to allow the accused to use such statement for the purpose of impeaching the credit of the witness, it would be open to the Court to furnish the accused with a copy of the statement.

further cross-examination of justice would

33 C. 1023

13 Proof of and essential formalities for using the statement—A Police-officer's notes of statements made to him in the course of an investigation and recorded by him under this section should if used at all at the subsequent trial be used only after proper proof of them and of the circumstances under which they were recorded and under the direct sanction of the presiding Judge **16 A 207**. The Police-officer who recorded the statements cannot be cross-examined under s 145 or s 161 of the *Indian Evidence Act* with regard to such statements such cross-examination being allowable only in regard to entries properly recorded under s 172 if the Police-officer refers to such entries for the purpose of refreshing his memory. It is doubtful if the Police-officer can refer to statements recorded by him under this section unless the writing is already in and has been put to the witness who is alleged to have made the statement **33 C. 1023**. But see Note 8 above. The law directs that the written statements cannot be used as evidence unless they are admitted in accordance with the provisions of this Code and the *Indian Evidence Act* **9 Bom L R. 695 = 6 Cr L J 224**. See **17 A 57, 28 C. 348, 11 B 657**. See **18 Cr L J 844**.

14 Proviso—Right of accused to production and getting copies of statements—(a) *Before commencement of preliminary inquiry—not entitled to production*.—Before the commencement of the preliminary inquiry against an accused person under remand he is not entitled either under the general principles of the common law or under this Code to copies of statements of various persons recorded under this section or by a Magistrate under s 164 [20 M 189 (F B) referred to]. The question whether he is entitled to such copies cannot be determined with reference to the question whether the statements are public documents as defined in s 74 *Indian Evidence Act* because whether any person has a right to inspect any particular public document is a question not dealt with by the *Evidence Act* and altogether outside its scope **30 M 466**.

(b) *After commencement of inquiry—entitled to production but getting copies discretionary with Court*.—The accused may at the time the witnesses appear before the Court ask the Court to refer to the statements and the Court may if it thinks expedient in the interests of justice furnish him with copies of statements for impeaching the credit of the prosecution witnesses **33 C. 1023**. The accused can only get access to written statements made by the prosecution witnesses at the discretion of the Court. It is no longer a matter of right (*Per BEAMAN J*) **32 B 111, 13 O C. 7 = 11 Cr L J 117**. It is only if the Magistrate considers it expedient in the interests of justice to grant such copies that the accused can obtain or use such copies. It is not necessary for the Magistrate to say that it is not expedient to grant copies **26 M L J 182 = 15 Cr L J 239**. See **16 C. 610, 20 C. 842, 15 A 25, 16 A. 207 and 17 A 57**, decided under the old Code.

(c) *After close of prosecution evidence application might be refused*.—See **33 C. 1023**, Note 12 above.

(d) *Conviction without disposal of an application for copy illegal*.—Where the trying Magistrate at the trial of an accused person has recorded the statements of the witnesses recorded by the Police and the accused has been convicted by the Magistrate without recording an order for the production of the statements to the accused and the conviction was confirmed on appeal by the Sessions Judge the High Court set aside the conviction and directed the Sessions Judge to re-hear the appeal and send for the statements recorded by the Police and if he found anything in them of advantage to the accused to also summon the witnesses who made them and allow cross-examination after supplying the accused with a copy of their statements **36 C. 560**.

15 Accused not entitled to inspect the record but only to the copy.—This section debars the accused person from inspecting the record of the statement of the witness to the Police. If the ruling in **36 C. 281** is correct then under s. 161 of the *Evidence Act* the accused may be entitled to inspect the writing if it is used to refresh the memory of the Police-officer giving oral evidence of the statement. *Per SUNDER LAL, J* in **13 O C. 7 = 11 Cr L J 117**.

3 Violent tumultuousness or disturbance; contumaciousness.
4 Slight illness, indisposition; distemper.

A hare-lip throaty rump.
Of pale distemperance and low in life.

by heat and its subsequent condensation in a separate vessel by cold, as by means of an alembic, or still and refrigeratory, or of a retort and receiver, the operation of extracting spirit from a substance

None *dist* separates the causes of the food into those that belong to the heavens and those that belong to the earth. *Dist* 3 To recognize or discern by characteristic quality or qualities, as, to distinguish the sound of a

dis and *endere* to stretch,
Hence it is *dis* and *endere* to stretch.

What means those colored streaks?

2 To stretch or extend
late, to enlarge, to expand,
a bladder.

The warmth *distends*

Eyes - To dilate, expand

Dis *find*, *r* *i* To become

to swell

And now his heart *distends* with pride.

Dis *tem* *st* *ility*, *m*. The quality or capacity of

being distensible.

Dis *tem* *st* *ible*, *a* Capable of being distended or

distended.

Dis *tem* *st* *ion* (*tin* *shon*), *m*. The same as *Disten*

tion.

Dis *tem* *st* *ive*, *a* Distending or capable of being

distended.

Dis *tem* *st*, *a* [*Lat. distensus*, *p* *p* of *distendere*

See *Distend*] Distended [*For*] Thomson

Dis *tem* *st*, *m* Breadth [*Obs*] Holton

Dis *tem* *st*, *m* Breadth [*Obs*] Holton

Dis *tem* *st*, *m* Breadth [*Obs*] Holton

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Dis *tem* *st*, *m* Breadth [*Obs*] Holton

Dis *tem* *st*, *m* Breadth [*Obs*] Holton

Dis *tem* *st*, *m* Breadth [*Obs*] Holton

Dis *tem* *st*, *m* Breadth [*Obs*] Holton

STATEMENTS OF ACCUSED PERSONS.

16. Does the section deal with the statements of accused persons made to the Police and recorded by them?—S 162 of the 1882 Code contained the following proviso "nothing in this section shall be deemed to affect the provisions of s 27 of the *Indian Evidence Act*" This provision has been omitted in this Code, and it must only be because it was unnecessary. It has never been held or contended that, under the present law s 162 overrides s 27 of the *Evidence Act*, so that the confessional statements made by person in Police custody, or to the Police leading to the discovery of relevant facts must be excluded if the statements have been recorded by the Police. Such a result would render nugatory the provisions of s. 28 of the *Evidence Act* and the omission of the former proviso leads one to conclude that s 162 was considered to refer to statements of witnesses 6 N. L. R. 180, 12 Cr. L. J. 60. Statements of accused to the Police though reduced to writing not being confessions were held to be properly admitted in evidence, on being proved by oral evidence. See also 15 P. W. R. 1913 = 171 P. L. R. 1913 = 14 Cr. L. J. = 190 and Note 19

17. Incriminating statements of accused made to Police is not admissible.—A statement made by an accused person to Police-officer is not admissible in evidence against him when he is on his trial for the offence he is charged with, 11 P. L. R. 1905. This rule must be limited to confessions or admission of directly incriminating circumstance. See ss. 25 and 26 of the *Indian Evidence Act*, and 41 C. 601. In 26 C. 569, it was held that s 25 of the *Evidence Act*, applies to every Police-officers including Police-officers of the Native States and is not restricted to the officers of the regular Police. As to *Police Patels* in Bombay, see 17 B. 435; 19 B. 353. See also 1 C. 207 at p 215; 1 C. L. R. 21; 26 C. 569. A Police-officer should not be allowed to depose to confessional statements, 15 Cr. L. J. 474 (Sindh). In 35 M. 397 five Judges of the Madras High Court, held that previous statements of an approver being confessions made to a Police-officer are inadmissible at the trial against an accused person under s 25 of the *Evidence Act*, while the other five were of opinion that the statements of approvers to the Police though inculpatory and confessional in their nature are not inadmissible under s. 25 of the *Indian Evidence Act* when it is not sought to use them against the persons making them. S 25 does not preclude them from being given as evidence of a fact which goes to show that the statements of the approvers at the trial were true. See also 13 A. L. J. 1077 = 17 Cr. L. J. 8 and (1917) M. W. N. 875.

18. Statements of accused to Police-officer not amounting to admission of guilt.—An admission made by an accused person may be proved if it does not amount to a confession, 3 N. L. R. 51 = 5 Cr. L. J. 434. An admission made by an accused person to a Police-officer before arrest is admissible in evidence, 6 C. 530 = 7 C. L. R. 541. See also 10 B. L. R. App 2; 5 Bom. L. R. 312; 37 C. 467; 41 C. 601, 72 P. L. R. 1916 = 17 Cr. L. J. 193 = 33 In Ca. 823.

19. Accused's statement may be proved though writing containing it cannot be admitted.—It is not a correct interpretation of the meaning of this section that statements made by an accused person to a Police-officer holding an investigation under this Chapter cannot be proved against him, whether they be reduced to writing or not. The true meaning is that a statement reduced into writing under s. 161, *etc.*, the document containing such a statement shall not be used as evidence against the accused but not that the statement made by an accused person shall not be proved, 15 P. R. 1886; 5 P. R. 1891.

20. Confessional statements leading to discovery of facts.—S 27 of the *Evidence Act* is not intended to let in confessions generally, and no judicial officer dealing with that section should allow one word more to be deposed by a Police-officer detailing a statement made to him by an accused, in consequence of which he discovered a fact than is absolutely necessary to show how the fact that was discovered is connected with the accused, so as in itself to be a relevant fact against him, 6 A. 509; 11 C. 635; 4 A. 193; 33 P. R. 1900 at p 39; 12 M. 153; 11 B. H. C. R. 242; 10 B. 595, 25 C. 413, 14 B. 260; 28 P. R. 1894, 15 P. W. R. 1913 = 14 Cr. L. J. 190; 8 P. W. R. 1914 = 33 P. L. R. 1914 = 15 Cr. L. J. 6; 15 Cr. L. J. 633 (M).—While a statement forming part of a narrative made to the Police is not admissible in evidence, if it amounts to a confession that the accused himself committed the offence, 31 M. 127; a statement that stolen property would be found in a certain place is admissible, 26 M. L. J. 332 = 15 Cr. L. J. 533. The exception contained in s 27 to the general rule in s. 25 must be very strictly confined within its legitimate limits. When, therefore, the accused stated to the Police 'I will point out the place where I committed the murder' and pointed out the place, held the words 'I committed the murder' were inadmissible, 11 P. R. 1915. Where there are several accused and it is not possible to say which or them gave the information leading to the discovery of facts, the whole of the evidence of the joint discovery is inadmissible, 9 P. W. R. 1914 = 63 P. L. R. 1914 = 15 Cr. L. J. 499.

21. Statements as to ownership of property admissible.—Statements made by accused persons to Police-officers as to the ownership of property, which is the subject-matter of the proceedings against them

Journal aberration (astron) the aberration of light
 from distant stars

Syn — See Daily

Dis'junct *v* *t*
 come separate
 The joints of the body pol. do separate and *disjunct* *Swiss* *D*
Dis'junct *v* *t* *disjunct* *Swiss* *D*

Dis'worship (*wôr'ship*) *n* [Prefix *d-*
worship *q* *v*] A deprivation of honor,
 credit [Obs]

although inadmissible as evidence against them at the trial for the offence with which they are charged, are admissible in evidence with regard to the ownership of the property in any inquiry under s. 523 held by the Magistrate, 9 B. 131. See also 6 C. 530 = 7 C. L. R. 541; 1 C. L. R. 21; 1 C. 207; 3 B. 12; 11 B. H. C. R. 242; 15 C. 587; 6 B. 34 and 6 B. 298 at p. 291.

DYING DECLARATIONS.

22. Instructions regarding dying declarations.—When a person whose evidence is required is in imminent danger of death, his statements should be recorded by a Magistrate exercising judicial functions. If this cannot be arranged for and it becomes necessary for some other person to record this dying declaration it should, if possible, be made in the presence of the accused or of attesting witnesses. A dying declaration, made to a Police-officer should, under the provisions of this section, be signed by the person making it.—*Beng. Pol. Code*, p. 377. It is advisable where a dying declaration is elicited by questions to set out the questions and answers and, if possible, it should be taken in the presence of the accused who should then be allowed to cross-examine if he likes, 6 C. W. N. 72.

22-A. Dying declaration, its evidentiary value.—In the case of a dying declaration which by the law of this country assumes a character widely different from what it is under the English Law, which is relevant under the *Indian Evidence Act* whether the person who made it was or was not at the time, when it was made under the expectation of death, and the weight to be attached to which depends not upon the expectation of death which is a guarantee of its truth, but from the circumstances under which it was made and upon the nature of the record that has been made of it, it becomes almost always a question of fact as to whether it should be relied upon or not. 52 C. 987 = 29 C. W. N. 738. (*R v Mitchell*, 17 Cox C. C. 503 and 507 referred to.)

23 Preliminaries to be ascertained when a man is in a dangerous condition and his statements are necessary.—When a Police-officer making inquiry in any case has reason to believe that a person whose statements may have an important bearing on the case, is in a dangerous state and likely to die before the completion of the proceedings, or before his deposition can be taken on oath in the presence of the accused before a Magistrate, he should be most careful first to ascertain in the presence of respectable witnesses, the apparently dying man's impression of his own condition, and next to take down his statement *verbatim*.—*Beng. Pol. Man.*, p. 379.

24 Signs might be treated as verbal statements.—In 7 A. 335 (F.B.), it was held by the Full Bench, that where the deceased at the time of questioning was conscious and able to make signs in response to questions asked the questions put and the signs taken together, might properly be regarded as *verbal statements* made by a person as to the cause of her death within the meaning of s. 32 of the *Evidence Act* and therefore evidence to prove the questions put and signs made was admissible. In such a case it is essential that the statement should be a true record of what actually took place and should show on the face of it the questions put and the nature of signs made in reply, 2 P. R. 1886, 9 P. R. 1900.

25 Dying statement made in absence of accused—admissibility.—The dying statement of a deceased person must be taken in the presence of the accused, if not so taken the *writing* cannot be admitted to prove the statement made. The statement may, however, be proved in the ordinary way by a person who heard it and the writing, may be used for the purpose of refreshing the witnesses' memory, 8 C. 211 = 10 C. L. R. 11; 6 C. W. N. 72 and 921, 13 P. R. 1886; 6 Bur. L. T. 68 = 14 Cr. L. J. 398. In 6 C. W. N. 921, where a dying declaration had been recorded by a Police Sub-Inspector and attested by certain witnesses and the record of such statement was made, evidence, held, the writing could not be made evidence, but that the statements made by the deceased might be proved by persons who heard them. See, however, 16 Cr. L. J. 759 (M.), 7 L. 91, 49 C. 353.

26. To render dying statements admissible, the accused must be on his trial for causing death.—In 25 B. 45 a statement made by the deceased to and recorded by a Police *yem idar* to the effect that the accused who was concerned with dacoity, had stabbed him on the right side of the chest, was rejected on the ground that it was not shown that the death of the deceased was caused or accelerated by the dacoity. See also 7 L. B. R. 33 = 6 Bur. L. T. 183 = 14 Cr. L. J. 510.

27. Dying statement must be duly proved.—A dying statement which had been proved by taking evidence of the Magistrate who recorded it should not be accepted in evidence without such proof. The fact that the Magistrate who recorded the statement is the same as the committing Magistrate is legally insufficient to prove the dying declaration, 17 P. R. 1911 = 13 Cr. L. J. 223.

28. Dying statement how proved.—Where the document containing the dying declaration was not signed by the deponent and the Police-officer was not bound by law to take it down in writing; held, that the

Divid'nal, *a*. [*Lal. dividere* divisible, divided from *dividere* *See supra*] Divided shared, or participated in common with others [*Rare*]
It is religious, it becomes a ritual movable. M. 100
Divid'nal, *ly*, *adv*. Dividing
Divid'nal, *o*. Divided, divided [*Rare*]
He was when substantiated & directions late divisions, self
Divid'nal, *o*. *See supra*

mostly of hard, with forked branches, used by those who pretend to discover water or metals under ground
Divid'nal, *o*. *See supra*

1 (*Law*) (a) A legal dissolution of the marriage contract by a court or other body having competent authority. This is properly a divorce and called, technically, divorce a vinculo matrimonii — from the ban of matrimony (b) The separation of a married woman from the bed and board of her husband — a *mensa et thoro* (from board and bed)
2 Separation, division of things closely united.
Dear d. rove
Twist natural son and sin. *Shak.*
3 The sentence or writing by which marriage is dissolved
4 The cause of any penal separation.
The long d. rove of steel falls on me *Shak.*
Divid'nal, *o*. (*imp* & *p* p. *divid'nal*)

2 An indication of what is future or secret

They say there is d. really in odd numbers *Shak.*
0 Two inspiring character, supreme dignity
There's such a d. by both hedge a king *Shak.*

10 To take away, to put away

Divine, *a*. [*compar. DIVINE* a perfect DIVINE] (1) Attributed to divine divinely inspired from *divinus* belonging to a deity, *Gr. divi, It., sp., Fr. divin* *See & Div. supra*
1 Belonging to God, as *divine* perfect
The immensity of the divine nature
2 Proceeding from God, as, *d. rule* judgment
A man reareth and sowerth himself upon d. seed
Shak.

D

D

Syn — Supernatural superhuman gradile
Divine, *o*. 1 A minister of the gospel, as a *clergyman*
The d. d. d. of New England were surprised
He extends the seed tree *d. M. 100*

D

D

1 To foresee or foreknow, to predict, to sage, to detect "A sagacity which *divine* evil designs" *Bancroft*
2 To render divine, to deify [*Old*] Like *Spem* or *Syn* — To foretell, predict, presage, prognosticate, conjecture
Divine, *o*. 1 To use or practice divination
2 To afford omens or auguries, to impart presages of the future, to utter prognostications
The prophetic d. rule for money *M. 100*
3 To have presage or forebodings
Suspect but truth to my d. many thoughts *Shak.*

7 Separation of the members of a deliberative body for the purpose of ascertaining the vote
The motion passed w. d. out d. sense *Macaulay*

2 To indicate publicly to proclaim [*Rare*]
Did wisely to conceal and not d. value *Milton*
He secrets
God marks
im through heaven *Milton*
indicate
could not be
unknown and divulged *Milton*
se. d. d. d. d. reveal
publicly known [*Rare*]
black
act of divulging, reveal

Is rarely set apart *to be a preacher of right* *Macaulay*

12 (*Rhet*) The distribution of a discourse into a part so distinguished

D

Divid'nal, *a*. [*Sp. divisional* Fr. *divisor*]

1 Marking expressing or making divisional line

D

2 Belonging to a division or distinct

Divid'nal, *o*. [*Sp. divisional* Fr. *divisor*]

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Divid'nal, *o*. [*Sp. divisional* Fr. *divisor*]

Divid'nal, *o*. [*Sp. divisional* Fr. *divisor*]

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Divid'nal, *o*. [*Sp. divisional* Fr. *divisor*]

Divid'nal, *o*. [*Sp. divisional* Fr. *divisor*]

D

proper method of proving the oral statement of a dying man was by the oral testimony of any person who heard it he being allowed to refresh his memory by reference to the notes he made or read at the time, 10 N. L. R. 19 = 15 Cr. L. J. 243. See Note 25

163. (1) No Police-officer or person in authority shall offer or make, or cause to be offered or made, any such inducement, threat or promise as is mentioned in the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, section 24.

(2) But no Police-officer or other person shall prevent, by any caution or otherwise, any person from making in the course of an investigation under this Chapter any statement which he may be disposed to make of his own free will

Notes.—1. Evidence Act, s. 24.—Confession caused by inducement, etc., irrelevant in criminal proceedings.—A confession made by an accused person is irrelevant in a criminal proceeding if the making of the confession appears to the Court to have been caused by any inducement, threat or promise, having reference to the charge against the accused person, proceeding from a person in authority and sufficient, in the opinion of the Court to give the accused person grounds which would appear to him reasonable, for supposing that by making it he would gain any advantage or avoid any evil of a temporal nature in reference to the proceedings against him. No confession made to a Police-officer shall be proved as against a person accused of any offence.—S. 24, *Evidence Act* See 1 B. L. R. O. Cr. 15; 1 P. R. 1899; 9 B. H. C. R. 353; 20 B. 165; 20 W. R. 33. See *Amir Ali* and *Woodroffe*, Indian Evidence Act, ss. 24 to 29 for a discussion of the Law on the subject of confessions.

2. Police-officer does not include a Village Magistrate.—A Village Magistrate is not a Police-officer, and therefore a confession made to him is not inadmissible in evidence, 7 M. 237. As to village headmen in Madras, see *Explanation* to s. 26 of the *Evidence Act* and *Id.*, *Pol Man*, Vol. I, p. 96. See Note 17 to s. 162.

3. Who are "persons in authority."—A too restrictive meaning should not be placed on the words, 9 C. W. N. 474. According to SERGEANT, C. J., "the test would seem to be, had the person authority to interfere with the matter, and any concern or interest in it would appear to be sufficient to give him that authority." 9 Bom. H. C. R. 338. So a Travelling Auditor in the service of a Railway Company, 9 Bom. H. C. R. 353, a Police Patel, 3 B. 12, an Honorary Magistrate, 1 W. R. 24; a Magistrate recording a confession, 10 C. 775; 2 A. 260, Thugly or village headman, 15 Cr. L. J. 631 (Bar), 6 Bar. L. T. 109; 14 Cr. L. J. 417. Village Magistrate, 26 M. 33, members of a *panchayat* 11 C. W. N. 904 = 6 Cr. L. J. 154; 9 C. W. N. 474, have been held to be persons in authority, but see 4 A. 46 and 4 Bom. L. R. 785. A *Zaidaris* is a person in authority, 17 Cr. L. J. 226 = 34 Ind. Ca. 642 (Pan.) members of a *salish* (*panchayat*) are persons in authority, 20 C. W. N. 512 = 23 C. L. J. 477 = 17 Cr. L. J. 188

English Law.—See 9 Bom. H. C. R. 358 as to applicability of English cases. An inducement to confess does not render the confession inadmissible unless it was held out by a person in authority or by person acting in the presence of and without the dissent of a person in authority, *R v Pountney* 7 C. and P. 302. All who are engaged in the arrest, detention, prosecution or examination of a prisoner are considered as persons of such authority that their inducements will exclude any confession thereby obtained. Thus an inducement held out by the prosecutor, the prosecutor's wife, or his attorney, or by a constable or other officer, or by some person assisting a constable, or assisting the prosecutor in the apprehension or detention of the prisoner, or by a coroner or a Magistrate acting in the case or other Magistrate a Magistrate's clerk or by a gaoler, or by a person having authority over the prisoner as the master or mistress of a servant in the case of an offence as against the person or property of either or by a person in the presence of one in authority with his assent whether direct or implied will be sufficient to exclude a confession made in consequence of such inducement, *Russell on Crimes*, p. 2158. See also *Ibrahim v. King*, 10 C. W. N. 703 (P. C.)

4. What inducement, threat or promise will exclude confessions?—The inducement must have reference to the charge against the accused, that is, the charge or an offence in the Criminal Courts, 4 A. 46. The inducement must have been made for the purpose of extorting a confession of the offence, the subject of that charge. It must reasonably imply that the prisoner's position with reference to it will be rendered better or worse according as he does or does not confess. And if the inducement be made as to one charge, it will not affect a confession as to a totally different charge. An inducement relating to some collateral matter unconnected with the charge will not exclude a confession. The inducement need not be expressed but may be implied from the verdict of the person in authority, the declarations of the prisoner or the circumstances of the case, nor need it be made directly to the prisoner. It is sufficient if it may be reasonably presumed to have

come to his knowledge. *Woodroffe and Amir Ali's Evidence Act* 5th Edn., p. 258. Saying to the prisoner that

nothing will happen to you,' 3 N. W. P. 86; 'tell me what 3 B. 12. 'If you confess to the Magistrate you will get off,' truth,' 8 W. R. 13; if he made a full confession, the Court of punishment, 1 Bom. L. R. 239. An admission obtained by the Police ought not to be received in evidence also 17 Cr. L. J. 226 = 34 In. Ca. 642 (Pun)

5. To use oppression and trickery to obtain trickery in regard to obtaining confessions are to be avoided and the practice of employing private individuals to obtain confessions from accused persons is strictly prohibited. Nothing so clearly shows want of detective Police-officer as the resort to foul means to obtain confession case if he can torture the culprit till he tells him all that he knows and himself in patient and unremitting industry in the case and damning circumstances gathered from a variety of sources. 7 W. R. 55; 9 W. R. 18; 20 W. R. 33, 9 B. H. C. R. 338

6. Pressure on Subordinate Police-officer. Police-officers are particularly warned against putting pressure on accused persons in cases generally. When enrolled Police-officers fail to act with integrity in their investigations, it shall be the duty of the inspecting officer, to point out the clues that ought to be taken the places that ought to have been visited and the conduct that should have been adopted or avoided, as may be necessary for the punishment of neglect.

7. Nominal presence of Magistrate not sufficient. That the confession of an accused can be received by a Magistrate when the confession is being made in the presence of a Magistrate. 33 P. L. R. 1914 = 15 Cr. L. J. 6

* 164. (1) "Any President Magistrate of the Local Government may record any statement or confession made by or at any time a

Power to record statements and confessions

(2) Such statements shall be recorded for recording evidence as is, in his discretion, and such confessions shall be recorded and statements or confessions shall then be inquired into or tried

(3) "A Magistrate shall not make any statement or confession against him and no Magistrate shall make any statement or confession against him, he has received any confession, he shall make a record of it.

* "I have explained to the person making it that he is not bound to make a confession and that, if he does so, any confession he

is reprehensible.—All oppression and trickery under pain of the severest penalties is strictly prohibited. Confessions from accused persons is strictly prohibited. A resource, and of patient industry in a case of ignorant and clumsy can make out a detective talent and sagacity manifest in the culprit such a network of undoubted facts cannot escape.—*Mad Pol Man*, p. 95

is forbidden.—Gazetted Police-officers are prohibited by injunction to detect particular case or persons owing to want of intelligence, industry, or District Superintendent of Police, or other persons followed the steps that ought to have been taken that ought to have been interrogated, and the such investigations, and to take such steps. See Ord and Rul, Punjab, s 10 A, p 234

only when properly made to the Magistrate against him. The mere standing by of the Magistrate is not sufficient. 12 W. R. 82; 8 P. W. R. 1914 =

by Magistrate of the first class and any Magistrate specially empowered in this behalf by the Government or a Police-officer," record any statement or confession in the course of an investigation under this Chapter from the commencement of the inquiry or trial

such of the manners hereinafter prescribed for the circumstances of the case. Such manner provided in section 364 and such statement to the Magistrate by whom the case is to be

making any such confession explain to the person making it that he is not bound to make a confession and that if he does so it may be used against him any such confession unless, upon questioning him, he states that it was made voluntarily, and, when he records the foot of such record to the following effect — "I am not bound to make a confession and that, if he does so, any confession he makes may be used as evidence against him and I believe"

that this confession was voluntarily made. It was taken in my presence and hearing and was read over to the person making it and admitted by him to be correct, and it contains a full and true account of the statement made by him

(Signed) A B,
Magistrate

Explanation—It is not necessary that the Magistrate receiving and recording a confession or statement should be a Magistrate having jurisdiction in the case

Note.—The section as amended confines the recording of confessions only to the superior Magistrates mentioned therein.—The Select Committee in this connection says that it is intended that under the section third-class Magistrates should have no power to record confessions and that second-class Magistrates should not do so unless specially empowered. The amendment makes it obligatory upon the Magistrate to record the fact that warning had been given by the Magistrate to the accused as provided by sub-section (3).

1—SCOPE AND OBJECT OF THE SECTION

Notes—1 Section applicable to Presidency towns of Calcutta and Bombay.—In the amended section a Presidency Magistrate is specifically mentioned. Therefore it is clear that the section applies to the Presidency towns of Calcutta and Bombay as the specific mention of a Presidency Magistrate in the amended section would be construed as a provision to the contrary under sub-section 2 of section 1 of the Code. So the decisions in 15 C. 595 and 21 B. 495 lose force so far as this section is concerned.

But it is now held by the Calcutta High Court that s. 164 of the Criminal Procedure Code does not apply to a confession recorded in Presidency towns in the course of a Police investigation not held under the orders of a Presidency Magistrate under ss. 155 and 156 in spite of the alteration that the section has undergone by the amendments by Act XVIII of 1923, 52 C. 67 (*Emp v Panchowari Dutt*)

In 30 C. W. N. 454 where at the request of the Burdwan District Police the Calcutta Police arrested the accused and brought him before the Presidency Magistrate in Calcutta and the Presidency Magistrate did not warn the accused and did not even inform him that he was a Magistrate. Held although the investigation under Chapter XIV was being held by the Burdwan Police still the accused's arrest in Calcutta and his production before the Magistrate must be regarded as something in the course of that investigation under Chapter XIV and the Presidency Magistrate was therefore bound to record the confession strictly in compliance with s. 164 of the Code.

In 50 B. 111 it was held that s. 164 does not apply to the Police in Bombay as the Bombay Police do not carry on their investigations under Chap. XIV of the Criminal Procedure Code. Therefore a confession recorded in Bombay of an accused brought before the Magistrate by the Bombay Police need not have the formalities and the certificate under s. 164 of the Code

But the Patna High Court has held contrary to the Calcutta and the Bombay view. In 5 Patna 171 it is held that s. 1 of the Code bars the application of the Code to the Police in Presidency towns and not to a Magistrate and since the amendment of s. 164 in 1923 the Presidency Magistrate is empowered to record a confession in Calcutta in the course of a Police investigation.

Per BUCKNILL J.—Even though the Police in Calcutta may not conduct their investigations in precise accordance with the provisions of Chapter XIV the construction of s. 164 which would exclude its utilisation in Calcutta during a Police investigation or at any time afterwards before the commencement of the enquiry or trial, is to read it in a strained and unnatural sense. *Panchowari Dutt*, 52 C. 67 and 15 C. 595 (F.B.) disapproved.

2 Object of the section—The object of Police proceedings is to collect information as a preliminary step to the production of evidence in a judicial proceeding against an accused person. For this purpose any person may be examined and any statement may be reduced to writing by the Police but no statement made to the Police (with the exception specified in the proviso to s. 162) can be used as evidence against the accused. To these provisions s. 164 seems to be supplementary. The Magistrate may prepare what the Police may not, a record of any statement be it confession or not, which is made to him before judicial proceedings commence. Proof of such statements is not prohibited on the contrary express provision is made for proving the document in s. 80 of the Evidence Act (where it is distinguished from a record of evidence), and in s. 533 *infra*. It is not expressed nor is it implied in the text of this section or in the context, that the statement of an accused person cannot be recorded unless it is a confession. It is easy to understand that the interests of justice may require that there should be some means of preparing a documentary record which shall be

Gier d'Amos, d'Amos] A long cascade worn by the Turks.

Dolore a [Pain] A man of great sorrow.

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
See supra

1 Full of dolor or grief, sorrowful, dismal, as a dolorous object, and of your region
You take me in too dolorous a sense
I speak to you for your comfort.

2 Overwhelming pain or grief, impressing sorrow, painful, distressing
Their death is quick and less dolorous than the grief of the heart or both of the soul.

Dol'or-ous-ly, a le In a dolorous manner, sorrowfully

Dol'phin w. [Lat. *dol*]



domestic [Dol] Johnson

[Lat. *dominare* p. pr. of *domo*]
[Ruling prevailing governing]
the *dom* is not patty or faction
[*dom* was rare in his dwelling with the
judicial tribunal, but in private in
of causes]
[If *dom* the chief lived upon the
of *dom* or *dominant* (*dom*) the
at the *dominant* is it from the
or which the *dominant* extent is being
state or *dominant* at *dominant* in *dominant*
is rule or prevailing predominant]

[*Dom*] The fifth tone of the scale,
the syllable not of the gamut
[*dom* &] p. *dominant* p.

worship

ing upon the limitations of
domestic will animals
[*Domestication*] The

Go to the *dom*, *dom* and *dominant*
If *dom* does tend abroad to roam,
And here to *dominant* at home.

Shak

Prior

forl, rye, push, e, f, e, silent, r as s ch as sh, e, ch, as k, & as j, & as in get; g as x, z as gr, o as in f, k, th as in thine

available as evidence of information elicited during Police investigation, and that the power of preparing such record, which is withheld from the Police as to statements made to them, should be conferred upon a Magistrate, as such, as to statement made to him. The distinction that is made in this section is between statements that are confessions and statements that are not, and not between the persons by whom statements of either character are made, and it is made for the purpose of prescribing different modes of record. The section certainly is not intended to make Magistrates the instruments of Police, for the purpose of recording statements at the desire of the Police, irrespective of the desire of the persons produced for the purpose of making statements, and it is easy to conceive circumstances under which a Magistrate would be fully justified in refusing to record the statement of a person accused or not accused who was produced by the Police for the purpose, although the statement was not a confession, *per* FLOWERS, J., 2 P. R. 1893.

3. Section applies to 'statements of witnesses' as well as to 'confessions' of persons who may be charged.—This section authorizes a Magistrate to record the statement of a person who appears before him as a witness, as well as the confession of a person accused of an offence, 2 B. 543. The section provides for the recording both of statements of persons proposed to be called as witnesses and of persons whom it is proposed to charge with an offence. The former are called statements of persons and are recorded on oath, and the latter are called confessions and not recorded on oath, but in the manner prescribed by s. 364, 5 S. L. R. 174 = 13 Cr. L. J. 33. The word 'statement' here means the statement of a witness, as opposed to the confession of the accused. The method prescribed for recording such statement is strongly confirmatory of this view, *per* MACLEAN, C.J., 2 C. W. N. 702. If the term 'statement' was intended to include statements of accused persons as well as those of witnesses, it must have directed the former class of statements to be recorded in the manner prescribed in s. 364, instead of directing as it does, that statements within the meaning of the section are to be recorded in the manner in which evidence is recorded while confessions are to be recorded in the manner prescribed in s. 364. The reason why this section provides only for recording that class of statement of the accused which are or purport to be confessions and does not provide for the recording of statements of accused persons other than confession is that the section relates to a stage of the case namely, the Police investigation stage, at which statements of the accused which are other than voluntary confessions, and which are to be elicited by this examination are not intended to be obtained from him. *per* BANERJEE, J. 2 C. W. N. 702 at p. 715. But this view has not been generally accepted. See 8 C. W. N. 22; 5 S. L. R. 174 = 13 Cr. L. J. 33, 9 M. 224. Section 164 distinguishes sharply between statements of witnesses and confessions of accused persons. The same utterance might be regarded as a confession from one point of view and as a statement from another point. It all depends on the connection in which and the purpose for which it is sought to be recorded its use in s. 164 of the Code is not limited to a statement by a witness, but includes that made by an accused and not amounting to a confession. Such statements must be recorded under the section, and cannot be proved orally by the recording Magistrate when not so recorded, 49 C. 167.

Where an accused person makes a statement before a Magistrate under s. 164 and the statement is not a confession, but is of a self-exculpatory character, it is still admissible in evidence against him at his trial as evidential of a fact relative to the prosecution case, 4 P. 327.

II.—AT WHAT STAGE STATEMENTS, ETC., MAY BE RECORDED.

6. Section applies only to confessions made during investigation or after investigation but before inquiry or trial.—A confession under s. 164 must be made either in the course of an investigation under Chapter XIV or after it has ceased and before the commencement of the inquiry or trial. The condition requiring the confession to be prior to the commencement of the inquiry or trial is only imposed when the investigation has ceased, and not when it is made in the course of the Police investigation. Where a number of persons were arrested on the 1st May, and the confessions of some of them were recorded on the 4th and 5th, while others were brought in subsequently and their confessions taken while the Police investigation was then actually going on, and on the 17th an order under s. 196 was obtained and the Police report sent in, and on the next day the examination of the prosecution witnesses began. *Held*, that the Magistrate did not take cognizance under s. 190 of the Code, nor did the inquiry commence on the 4th and that the confessions were taken in the course of an investigation under Chapter XIV, 5 C. 954 and 5 A. 253 are no longer law, 32 C. 1085 distinguished 37 C. 467 at pp. 494—497.

copy See DOOM.

Sutton.

See DOOMER

4. An entrance way, and the apartment or house to which it leads.

Martin's office is now the second door in the street. *Arbitrator*
In doors or within doors within the house, under cover
of — *next door to* near to bordering on
A riot unspanked is but next door to a tumult. *L. Exchange*
— Out of doors or without doors and colloquially out
doors, out of the house in open air, abroad hence
away but

His imaginary title of fatherhood is out of doors. *Locke*
— To be at one's door to be imputable or chargeable to
If I have failed, the fault lies wholly at my door. *Dryden*

2 (Her) In a sleeping posture,
as, a lion dormant

Dormant partner (Com) a partner
who takes no share in the active busi-
ness of a company or partnership, but
is entitled to a share of the profits
and subject to a share in losses — called
also sleeping or silent partner — *Der*
mauer window, a dormant window — See
DOORMER.



Dormant

Dormant n [L. Lat. dormitor, a large beam or
sleeper] (Arch) The large beam lying across a
room — a joist — called also dormant tree, *dormant*,
and *longer* well

Dormant n [Lat. back of a man or beast, ridge
of a hill]

1 The ridge of a hill *Walton*
2 (Couch) The upper surface of the body of a
shell when it is so held that the aperture is down-
ward

I am for curing the world by gentle alterations, not by vio-
lent doses. *H. Clay*

FR The
name is L
John-dore
well known
ruption of
L a golden yellow
See JOHN
Dor-dhawk n The
Dove

farl, ryde, push, e, i, o, silent, c as s, th as sh, c, ch, as k, g

in Set, g as z, z as g, g as k, k as g

5. Section applies only to statements recorded before inquiry or trial commences.—Where during an inquiry under s. 202, the Magistrate recorded a statement made by a person against whom the complaint was filed, *held*, that the statement cannot be considered as having been recorded under this section or s. 364, and being a statement made when the deponent was in the position of an accused person, cannot be evidence, 32 G. 1085. See also 15 P. R. 1894.

III.—ADMISSIBILITY IN EVIDENCE OF RECORD MADE UNDER THIS SECTION.

6. Admissibility of statements made in the absence of the accused.—Statement of witnesses recorded under s. 164 in the absence of the accused cannot be used as evidence against him. They are admissible only for contradicting the statements made by the witnesses at the trial and not for any other purpose. 17 O. C. 363.

7. Applicability of s. 91, Evidence Act discussed.—It is not clear how s. 91 of the Evidence Act can apply to a confession recorded under this section, for, an extra judicial confession to a Magistrate is not a matter required by law to be reduced to writing, it is merely a matter which a Magistrate is authorized to reduce to writing. In this respect it differs from an examination of an accused person under s. 364 which is a matter required by law to be reduced to writing. A confession recorded in due conformity with this section is liable to be excluded if it appear to be irrelevant under s. 24 of the Evidence Act and a *fortiori*, one irregularly recorded should be so liable, 52 P. R. 1887; 21 P. R. 1831. See also 33 M. 413. Statements made by the accused in a departmental inquiry are not confessions within the meaning of s. 164 and are therefore not matters required by law to be reduced to the form of a document. They are legally admissible in evidence although they are wanting in the formalities and safeguards prescribed by this section, 36 A. 222. See 3 P. R. 872.

8. Effect of s. 21, Evidence Act—Relevancy of admission of accused.—S. 21 of the Evidence Act, no doubt lays down the general rule that admissions are relevant and may be proved as against the persons who make them, but that rule must be taken subject to the special provisions relating to confessions and statements of accused persons, enacted in ss. 24, 25 and 26 of the Evidence Act, and ss. 164 and 364 of the Criminal Procedure Code. Were it otherwise, confessions and statements of accused persons which are not recorded in accordance with the requirements of ss. 164 and 364 of the Criminal Procedure Code might nevertheless be proved as admissions by the accused, and the wholesome provisions laid down in those two sections practically reduced to a nullity. This could never have been intended. *Per BANERJEE, J.*, 2 C. W. N. 702 at p. 714; 8 C. W. N. 22; but in 37 C. 467 it was *held* that sections 164, 342 and 364 of the Code are not exhaustive, and do not limit the generality of s. 21 of the Evidence Act as to the relevancy of admissions, Ratanlal 779 referred to and *doubled*.

9. Court may reject confession duly recorded and purporting to be made voluntarily.—It is open to any Court under s. 24 of the Evidence Act to reject a confession tendered by the prosecution. If any ground of exclusion specified in that section is made to appear, notwithstanding that it has been duly recorded under this section, and notwithstanding that at the time of recording, it appeared to be a voluntary confession, but the circumstance that confession purported to be made voluntarily is one to be taken into account, and is a fact of which the accused person may reasonably be expected to give some satisfactory explanation, 51 p. R. 1887. See also 9 C. L. J. 663. But a confession under this section made to a Magistrate other than the committing Magistrate, if tendered on the part of the Crown, cannot be rejected on the sole ground that the accused had been a long time in the hands of the Police, Ratanlal 720.

10. When prisoner does not cease to be in Police custody.—When a prisoner in Police custody is brought before a Magistrate for the purpose of having his confession recorded, he does not cease to be in the custody of the Police, even though no Police-officer is in the room while the confession is being recorded, Ratanlal 855; but the confession is none the less admissible if it is taken in conformity with the strict provisions of the law by a Magistrate, 24 P. W. R. 1909 = 10 C. L. J. 584; Ratanlal 720.

IV.—COMPETENCY OF MAGISTRATES TO RECORD CONFESSIONS, ETC.

11. Only Magistrates not being Police-officers can record.—Police-officers having magisterial powers are not competent to record statements or confessions under this section, 1 C. 207; 17 B. 463. But it was *held*, in Burma that a Magistrate exercising Police powers and possessing the title of a Police-officer, can record a confession, but a Magistrate so doing should be exceedingly careful to record fully the circumstances under which he records the confession, both in order to show that the confession was voluntarily made and also that he has, so far as possible, divested himself for the time being of his Police authority and of his Police surroundings or other signs of such authority before proceeding to record such confession, 7 Bur. 100.

12 Honorary Magistrate cannot record unless specially empowered.—An Honorary Magistrate who is a member of an independent Bench with third-class powers and who is not specially authorized in that behalf cannot act independently (*sc* when not sitting on the Bench) and record statements or confessions under this section 29 C 433

13. Village Magistrates not to record confessions.—Village Magistrates are absolutely prohibited from reducing to writing or taking the signature of an accused person to any confession or statement whatever made by him. *Madras G O No 2883 J dated 17th Decr nber 1887 as amended by G O No 1881 dated 1st Nove nber 1909*

14. Confessions may be recorded by a Magistrate subsequently conducting inquiry or holding trial.—The cases in 5 C 954 and 10 Bom H. C. 166 were decisions based on the Code of 1872 and are no longer law. It is now provided that *every* Magistrate may record a confession the word *every* being substituted for *any* and the explanation has also been added. These alterations make it clear that it can no longer be contended that a confession recorded by a Magistrate who afterwards holds the inquiry is outside the provisions of s 164 37 C 467 at p 498. Howsoever a confession may have been recorded whether under an investigation or during a judicial inquiry it is no longer material because this Code (of 1898) has placed them all on the same footing in regard to the means of providing a remedy for a defect in recording such a statement. At any rate in whatever stage of the proceedings the statement may have been recorded if it was admissible as evidence it would not become inadmissible because the Magistrate may have thought proper to conduct the subsequent proceedings in the case 30 C W N 385 at p 391. A Magistrate is not debarred from recording the confession of an accused person by the circumstance that it may afterwards be his duty to hold a preliminary inquiry Ratanlal 121

15 Confession before a Magistrate not having jurisdiction in the case.—The practice of taking prisoners before Magistrate not having jurisdiction in the case for the purpose of getting a confession recorded is not generally desirable but such a confession legally admissible in evidence when duly proved 7 B H C R. Cr Ca 56, 24 P W R. 1909 = 153 P L R 1909 = 10 Cr L J 584. But such a confession cannot be used without evidence being given as to the identity of the person who made the confession. There is no presumption under s 80 of the Evidence Act 11 C 380. Compare 8 P W R 1914 = 15 Cr L J 6

16 Magistrate directing Police investigation not disqualified from recording statement under this section.—It is the duty of the Magistrate who directs a Police investigation or who holds a preliminary inquiry under this Code to record statements under s 164. It is his duty to see that accused confesses voluntarily and to record his confession truly. The Magistrate is not disqualified from performing those duties merely because he took part in the Police investigation. On the other hand the Magistrate's personal relations with the investigating Police should not be such that an accused who had been forced to make a false confession by the Police would think it of no avail to tell the truth to the Magistrate 5 B. L. R 31 = 12 Cr L J 489

17 Confession before a foreign Court.—A confession made before a foreign Court cannot be used against an accused person unless it is sworn to like confessions made to private persons Weir II, 125. A confession made by an accused before a Magistrate in a Native State cannot be admitted into evidence under s 80 of the Evidence Act. The Magistrate recording the confession must be examined to prove the confession before it can be used as evidence 16 Bom L. R 261 = 2 Bom. Cr Ca 197 = 15 Cr L J 433. *See, however* 12 A 595, 22 B 235, 2 P R. 1909. In the last case it was held that a confession made to a Magistrate in a Native State was admissible in evidence in a trial in British India if it is duly recorded in proceedings under and in the manner required by the Code. Such a confession is none the less admissible even though the provisions of the Code have not been in every respect strictly observed *provided* the accused has not thereby been prejudiced on the merits and the fact that he made the statement is proved by evidence. The mere fact that the statement was actually written not by the Magistrate himself but by the *Mumhi* does not in any way injure the accused as to his defence on the merits. But a confession so recorded is not entitled to the same weight as a confession recorded by a British Magistrate in strict conformance with the term of the Code and Courts should hesitate to convict the accused upon such a confession standing alone 8 P R 1907

17-A Confession recorded outside British India by a Magistrate having jurisdiction in British India.—It is very doubtful whether a Magistrate having jurisdiction within a district in the United Provinces who takes down a confession in a place outside British India (*eg* in the State of Gwalior) in connection with an offence committed in that district does thereby record or has power to record a confession within the meaning of s 164 of the Cr. Pro. Code 19 A. L. J 338

V.—DUTIES AND POWERS OF MAGISTRATES IN RECORDING STATEMENTS AND CONFESSIONS.

18. Nature of Magistrate's function under the section.—A Magistrate acting under this section is neither taking part in the investigation by the Police, nor acting judicially (*See 1899 A. W. N. 39*) This Chapter gives him no power either to require the attendance of any person or to examine any person, nor is there any obligation imposed upon persons making statements to a Magistrate corresponding to that imposed by s. 161 upon persons interrogated by the Police. It seems that a Magistrate has no power to administer an oath or affirmation to any person whose statement he records. His function is simply to prepare a record in the manner and subject to the conditions prescribed in this section. A Magistrate before whom any person is brought up by the Police with a view to exercising his magisterial powers under this section is at liberty to endeavour to ascertain from him whether he is 'disposed to make a statement of his own free will, and until it appears that he is so disposed, the Magistrate is at liberty to bring to his notice that he is not under any obligation to make a statement, and that any statement he does make may be used against him. A statement may of course, be *voluntary*, though it is not spontaneous to the extent that the idea of making a statement has been suggested by some person, as for instance, by the Police-officer *Per FLOWDEN, J, 2 P R 1893*. But as regards administering oath to witness, *see Note 28 below*.

19 Duty of Magistrate before recording confessions or statements—Notifications—No Magistrate should record any confession or statement under this section, until he has first recorded in writing his reasons for believing that the accused is going to make such statement voluntarily and until he has explained to the accused, that he is under no obligation to answer any question at all and warned him that it is not intended to make him an approver and that anything he says will be used against him. If the Magistrate has a doubt as to whether the accused is going to speak voluntarily, he should remand him to the sub-jail before recording the confession or statement, such confession or statement should not in any case be recorded nor the warning abovementioned given in the presence of the Police-officers who have arrested or produced the accused, and if in any case the Police desire to use against others the information given to them by a person in custody, they should apply for sanction to make that person an approver and a statement under this section should not first be taken from him.—*Mad GO No 2883, Judicial dated 17th December, 1887 [the whole of the GO from which the above is an extract and the representation of the High Court which led up to it, are worth careful study]* It is desirable that Magistrates should act with deliberation in examining persons brought before them for the purpose of making confessions, and should, as far as possible satisfy themselves that the confession is voluntary, and this, not merely from the declaration of the accused, but from an attentive observation of his demeanour *Wilkins, p. 2*. In cases sent to Magistrates, in order that the confessions of accused persons may be recorded under this section the Magistrates should invariably satisfy themselves that the confessions are voluntary, by all means in their power, including the examination of the bodies of the accused whenever feasible and should the accused persons consent to such examination. The record of confessions should distinctly show whether the bodily examination has been made or not and if not made whether the omission was due to reluctance on the part of the accused. In the event of such examination revealing *prima facie* grounds for suspecting violence, the Magistrate should have such accused persons examined by a medical officer *Bom Govt. Gaz 1900, Pt I, p 919, Bom. H C Cr Cr., p 19*.

20 Voluntary character of confession should be first ascertained.—No hard and fast rule can or should be laid down as to the procedure which should be adopted when an accused person is placed before the Magistrate for the recording of a confession, but it is not sufficient to put one comprehensive question as to the nature of the confession or to make a note at the commencement of the record that the accused has been warned not to confess through any fear or inducement and that the Police have been removed. A Magistrate ought, by putting questions which occur to him to make himself conscientiously satisfied that the man is a free agent and that the confession he makes is a voluntary confession and that he has not been forced or deceived into making it, *15 Cr. L. J. 633 (Oadh), 25 B. 543. See also 18 Cr L. J. 721*. Where a Magistrate recorded a confession of the accused under this section without first satisfying himself about its being voluntary and then at the end of it put one comprehensive question as to the nature of the confession, it was *held* that he had not complied with the provisions of this section, which clearly denote that the Magistrate should not proceed to record any confession unless he first had reason that the person was about to make it voluntarily and that he should therefore, have begun by enquiring into that point. The unjustifiable violence used to the accused before his arrest, the illegal detention of the accused in

Police custody for more than 24 hours after his arrest and the marks of violence on his person unexplained are sufficient to vitiate the voluntary character of the confession of the accused and to make it admissible in evidence 1 Bom L R 357 Unless the Magistrate has made a real and substantial inquiry as to the voluntary nature of a confession a confession even before him is inadmissible in evidence, 3 L B R 173 = 4 Cr L J 198 The omission of the Magistrate to question the accused before recording his confession is a fatal defect rendering the confession inadmissible 3 L B R 213 = 4 Cr L J 358 See also 3 L B R 1. In 40 C 878 it was, however, held that the fact that the Magistrate instead of asking the accused about the voluntary nature of the confession at the commencement of the confessional statement asked him at the end was merely a defect of form that did not alter the character of confession In 8 Bom L R 950 it was laid down that the questioning need not precede the taking of the confession

21 Duty of Magistrate recording depositions of witnesses sent up by the Police—A Magistrate should abstain from recording the evidence of witnesses sent up by the Police unless he has some assurance from them that they attend voluntarily and are making statements to him voluntarily In the case of an accused the Magistrate is bound to make a certificate to that effect In the case of witness too it is important there should be equal safeguard although they are not required by law 7 C W N 345 See also 4 C W N 49 A Magistrate ought to be so satisfied before he proceeds to record the statement or confession 5 A 253; 3 C W N CIII

22 Impropriety of taking down statements of witnesses with a view to fix them to those statements—Where a witness made a statement before the Police incriminating the accused and the Police-officer without attempting to expedite the completion of the investigation or sending up the whole case to the Magistrate sent only that witness to be examined by the Magistrate under the section and the Magistrate examined her and recorded her statement as that of a witness and added a note that the statement was taken in the presence of the accused who had an opportunity to cross-examine her but did not do so Held that this section was not intended to enable the Police to obtain an incriminating statement by some person and as it were to put a seal on that statement by sending in that person to a Magistrate practically under custody to have her examined before the judicial inquiry or trial and therefore compromised in her evidence when judicial proceedings are regularly taken It may be observed that the law does not require that in the case of a witness so examined there should be a certificate after proper inquiry that the statement has been voluntarily made but the law also expressly protects a witness from unnecessary restraint or inconvenience at the hands of the Police A statement thus obtained always raises suspicion that it has not been voluntarily made 27 C 295 See also 7 C L J 246 = 7 Cr L J 315 where it was held that in a trial by jury the Judge ought to tell the jury that the evidence of witnesses taken under this section for the purposes of pinning them down to certain statements must be accepted with a great deal of caution It is highly improper for a Magistrate to take during the investigation by himself of a criminal case the statements of certain witnesses on solemn affirmation out of Court and in the absence of the accused with the avowed object of proceeding criminally against the witnesses should they subsequently in open Court deviate from the statements formerly made Ratanlal 66 See also 4 C W N 49

23. Magistrate not to examine or question the deponent—Under this section a Magistrate is entitled in the course of a Police investigation to record any voluntary statement made by the accused person but he is not entitled to examine him in respect of the facts of the case That power is only given by s 342 under which he may examine the accused in respect of the evidence recorded against him for the purpose of explaining such evidence It is improper to cross-examine the accused 5 C W N 866, 2 P R 1893 The examination of the accused must not be made with a view to elicit the truth out of his mouth by constant questions as though he were a witness 5 C P Cr 13 But the mere fact that a statement was elicited by a question does not make it irrelevant as a confession under this section or s. 29 of the Evidence Act though such fact may be material on the question of its voluntariness 37 C 467 at p. 498; 15 W R 71 referred to

24 Must not hold out any inducement—In Weir II, 137, the conduct of a Magistrate in holding out to a prisoner who had already confessed the inducement that in case he made a further confession he will be admitted as an approver was held to be most improper See Note 4 to s 163

25 Magistrate ought to be careful of the interests of accused as of prosecution—He should endeavour to ascertain the truth—In recording confessions or incriminating statements of accused persons in preliminary inquiries the Magistrate ought to be as much careful of the interests of the accused as of the prosecution to ascertain the truth of the case and endeavour that the innocent may not be convicted or the

dresser, dresser, O Ep dresser now ender-dress!
It *drizzles, drizzle*. Lat as if *directure* from

1 to pierce or bore with a drill, as, to *drill* a

8 To exhaust or waste away by degrees, to occupy inactively

This article has been *drilled* by the whole of the

pulse

A bad man being under the *drift* of any passion will follow the impulse of it his something interpose.

3 A small stream a rill [Obs]

Springs through the pleasant meadows near their drills.

Drizzle

laundry " *I use*
Drēs'-e-dā n A coat with narrow or pointed skirts as distinguished from a frock coat
Drēs'-er, n 1 One who dresses one who puts in order or makes ready for use, one who puts on

He has made the *drift* of the whole poem a compliment on his country in general.

Add now.

Now thou knowest my *drift*

W Scott

word

Cutter drill or traverser drill a machine tool for boring fits

Drill-press n A contrivance mounted on

The pewter plates on the *dresser*
Caught and reflected the flame as shields of armor the sun shine

Longfellow


Drēs'-ing n 1 Dress attire regiment *W Johnson*

[ump & p p DRIFTED, p pr & rō n
lost or be driven along by a current of
the ship *drifted* astern, a raft *drifted*

wind *drifts* snow or sand

drifted, and so

DRILL-PRESS
sort of plow for sowing
in drills, a drill barrow.



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guilty escape with impunity. He should always therefore, record whether the accused has been brought up from the Police custody or from the jail and whether the Police-officers who made investigation in the case were present in Court while the accused was making his statement 1 G P Cr 115

26 Magistrate bound to warn prisoner—The Select Committee say we consider that a statutory obligation should be laid on a Magistrate acting under this section to warn an accused person about to make a confession that the same may be used against him and we think that the certificate prescribed by sub-section (3) should record the fact that the warning had been given. It is now obligatory on every Magistrate acting under this section to warn the person making a statement to him that it might be used against him and that he is not bound to make a confession.

27 Statements of witnesses should be recorded by Magistrate when fresh—In some districts it is the practice with the Police to wait for the Chemical Examiner's report before sending up a case to the Magistrate for trial. It is however of the greater importance in serious charges that the statements of witnesses should be recorded by the Magistrate when fresh. It is contrary to the wish of the Government to wait for the Chemical Examiner's report in such cases but the other evidence should be placed before the Magistrate as soon as it appears that *prima facie* case is made out.—*Beng Pol Code p 383*

28 Magistrate can administer oath—Prosecution for false statement—A Magistrate acting under this section has power to administer an oath and a charge of perjury can be framed with regard to such statements when he is so acting 16 M 421 A Magistrate acting under this section is a Court acting in the discharge of a duty imposed upon him by law and is therefore authorized to administer oath under s 4 of *the Indian Oaths Act* (X of 1873), 29 M 89, 5 B L R 174 = 13 Cr L J 33, 22 A 115 even to a suspected person 8 Bom L R 589 = 4 Cr L J 183, but see 82 C, 1085

But no oath can be administered to an accused under s 341 (4) and a confession recorded on oath is not a confession and is inadmissible in evidence 10 C P Cr 16 He cannot be examined as a witness but can be questioned only to the extent and for the purpose specified in s 342. But see 3 P R 1880 See also 27 C. 455, where it was held that it was illegal for a Magistrate to administer an oath to an accused person for the purpose of obtaining information on which to take proceedings

29 Is recording a statement under this section a judicial proceeding?—By the Full Bench decision in 45 B 834 = 23 Bom L R. 1, it is held that a statement recorded by a Magistrate in the course of a Police investigation under s. 164 of the Cr Pro Code is not evidence in a stage of a judicial proceeding within the meaning of explanation 2 to s. 193 I P C The decisions in 8 B 216, 16 M 421 and 29 M 89 laying down to the contrary were dissented from

30 Magistrate must not allow others to intervene in examining witnesses—There is no warrant or justification for the intervention of a third party as a questioner directly or indirectly of a confessing prisoner 9 C. L J 663, 13 C. W N 861.

VI—CONFESSION SHOULD BE VOLUNTARY.

31 Confession must be free and voluntary—A confession to be admissible must be free and voluntary that is must not be extracted by any sort of threat or violence nor obtained by any direct or implied promise however slight nor by the exertion of any improper influence by persons in authority because under such circumstances the party may have been induced to say what is not true. A simple caution to the accused to tell the truth if he says anything it has been decided not to be sufficient to prevent the statement being given in evidence and although it may be put that when a person is told to tell the truth he may possibly understand that the only thing true is that he is guilty that is not what he ought to understand. He is reminded that he need not say anything but if he says anything let it be true. *R v Finley* 1 Cox. 75 It is not part of the duty of a Magistrate to tell the accused that anything he may say will go as evidence against him 10 C. 775 See Note *6

It is not legal to use either as against the person making it or against his co-accused a confession which is the direct outcome of the confessing accused being given to understand that, if he confessed there was a reasonable prospect of his receiving a pardon. Such confession is not admissible in evidence 43 A 300 and 45 A 633.

32. On whom does the onus lie to prove that confession was voluntary?—In English law the burden of proof lies upon the prosecution *R v Thomson* (1893), 2 Q B. 12, *R v Rose* 67 L J Q B 289 The prosecution must prove affirmatively that the confession was free and voluntary. *Russell on Crimes p. 457*

See also *Ibrahim v. The King*, 18 C. W. N. 705 = 15 Cr. L. J. 328 (P.C.) where all the cases are reviewed. It is submitted that the law in India ought to be the same. See 2 Bom. L. R. Journal 197. But in 25 B. 168, it has been held that in this country a confession is *prima facie* admissible unless the accused proves that the confession was not voluntary, disapproving of Bom. H. C. Cr. Ruling 3 of 1898. See also 2 C. W. N. CXXY and *Amir Ali's Evidence Act* p 250

33. Duration of Police custody is an important element in determining the voluntary character of the confession.—Confession after an accused person has been in Police custody for some time is always open to grave suspicion 9 A. 528 at p 566; 6 C. W. N. 380. The fact and duration of Police custody is very properly regarded as having a material bearing on the question whether confession is voluntary or not, 13 C. W. N. 861. When a Magistrate records the confession of a person who had been in detention by the Police he must ascertain and record, for the purpose of satisfying himself that the confession was voluntary, how long the accused has been in the custody of the Police. Where there is no record of such questioning, it is the duty of the Sessions Judge to whom the case has been committed to send for the Magistrate and satisfy himself on the point before holding the confession to be relevant, 25 B. 543. When it appeared that an accused person was illegally confined in solitary confinement for about a fortnight that the Police had access to him that pressure was brought to bear upon him through his father, mother and brother, that the desirability of a confession was pressed upon him by the District Magistrate as a means of saving himself and his relatives from threatened pains and penalties, that his father was illegally arrested and detained in *hajat* for a long time without any charge, that he then made a confession which was recorded without legal precautions and in the immediate presence of an officer who was the head of the Police and was officially and personally interested in the case and who put incriminating questions to accused and helped in amplifying the confession, and finally that the confession was retracted as soon as the accused was produced in Court. *Held* such confession was not voluntary and not admissible in evidence, 9 C. L. J. 663, 15 Cr. L. J. 633 (O), 1885 A. W. N. 59

34. Voluntariness of confessions should appear at the beginning of a statement.—The fact that confession is made voluntarily, and that the accused was warned that he was not bound to make it, should appear at the beginning and not at the end of the statement, *Weir II*, 136. The only questions permissible are as to whether or not the confession is made voluntarily 10 B. H. C. R. 166 at p. 175, 17 C. 862 at p. 871. Incriminating questions are highly improper

35. Duty of Appellate Court when voluntary nature of confession is impugned.—The Court of Appeal is not precluded from inquiry into the nature of a confession to see whether it was voluntary or not because the recording Magistrate attached at its foot the memorandum prescribed in s 164. It is a duty clearly incumbent on the Court of Appeal when the spontaneity and voluntary nature of the confession is impugned, 9 C. L. J. 663

VII.—FORMALITIES TO BE OBSERVED AND OMISSIONS THEREOF.

36. Formalities to be observed in recording confessions.—Whenever a statement or confession is made by any person in the presence of a Magistrate under this section the Magistrate, in order to make it admissible as evidence against such person, should specially record the circumstances under which the statement or confession is made, and in whose custody the person is at the time, and he should carefully observe the following formalities—

(1) Every question and every answer must be recorded in full (s 364).

(2) The signature or mark of the accused person must be affixed (s 364).

(3) The Magistrate must make a memorandum at the foot of the confession as stated at end of this section—*Bom. Cr. Cir. p 1*. See 1 B. 219 and 25 B. 168.

37. Provision as to the mode of recording confessions are mandatory.—The provisions of this section read with s. 364 are imperative and s 533 *infra* will not render a confession admissible where no attempt at all has been made to conform to its provision. *Per PARKER, J.*, 9 M. 224. That section does not contemplate to provide for any non-compliance with the law in this respect. S 533 would only come into operation when a confession or other statement of an accused person recorded under this section and under s. 364 was tendered but a confession tendered in direct violation of those sections would not be a confession recorded under them, and the recorded statement to be proved must mean a statement recorded in accordance with the provisions of the Act and not in violation of them. It may be argued that, if the Magistrate recording the confession records it in a language other than that directed by law there is on his part a non-compliance with

the provisions of the law which is cured by s. 533 as much as non-compliance with any other provision but there is a difference between non-compliance, an omission to do something which a person is directed to do and a direct violation of the law and the section seems to assume that the confession has been recorded in accordance with the provisions of the law. It is a section which provides a remedy in cases in which certain provisions of the law have not been fully complied with by the Magistrate and operating as it does against the accused person and not in his favour, it must be strictly construed. It would we think be extremely dangerous so to construe it as to include not only omission to comply with the law but infractions of it. *Per MACPHERSON and HILL, JJ.*, in 17 C. 862 at p. 871, *doubled in 18 C. 549 and dissented from in 21 B. 493 and 23 B. 221*. But failure to comply with the rules prescribed by Government which have not the force of law does not preclude admission of evidence to prove the character of the confession but such a failure might be a circumstance to be considered in deciding the question whether the confession is made voluntarily or not, 33 M. 413. See also 4 C. 696.

The record of a confession did not show that the accused was warned by the Magistrate that he was not bound to make a confession and did not in clear terms show that the accused had been asked whether the statement was made voluntarily. The Magistrate was examined and he deposed that he had cautioned the accused and explained to him that he was not bound to make a statement but that if he did so it might be used in evidence against him. *Held* that the confession was admissible. 3 P. 872 (2 L. 323 dissented from.) See also 6 L. 58.

33 Police officers not to be present at confessions or statements.—A confession or statement should not in any case be recorded nor the warning that anything he says will be used against him be given in the presence of the Police-officers who have arrested or produced the accused. *Madras G.O. No 2883 J, dated 17th December 1887 as amended by G.O. No 1481 J dated 1st November 1909*. It is not desirable that the Police-officer making an investigation under this Chapter should be present when a confession is recorded under this section nor should any Police-officer remain in the Magistrate's Court, except such as may be necessary to secure the safe custody of the accused person which however can usually be done by the Magistrate's attendants other than Policemen. The record of the circumstances should include a statement that these requirements have been complied with.—*Bom. H. C. Cr. Cr. p. 2*. A Police-officer should not be allowed to suggest questions to be put. Though a confession so taken would not be inadmissible as evidence the Court would not attach much weight to it as such a course would suggest that the Magistrate is not conducting the inquiry himself. See 9 C. L. J. 663. It is highly irregular for a Magistrate recording a confession to obtain from the Police a report of what the accused is alleged to have stated to them before he begins to record the confession. In 11 C. L. J. 273 = 11 Cr. L. J. 247, it was *held* that a confession taken in jail by a Magistrate with the Police-officer in the next room and subsequently retracted could not be acted upon unless supported by very good corroboration.

39 Confession recorded in a different language.—It seems that the provisions of this section as read with s. 364 would not be complied with where answers made by an accused to a Magistrate in one language are taken down in another unless it could be shown that it was impracticable to have taken down the answers in the language in which they were given and further that there would be grave doubt if such a defect could be cured by s. 533. 15 C. 595. See 17 C. 862; 18 C. 549, 2 C. W. N. 702, 9 M. 224, 8 C. 818 (Note) = 1 C. L. R. 1, 14 C. 539, 21 B. 405 at p. 501, 23 B. 221, 1892 A. W. N. 60, 10 O. C. 112 = 6 Cr. L. J. 84; 22 C. 817. A Magistrate when recording a confession put the question to the accused in *Marathi* and the accused gave his answers in the same language but the Magistrate recorded the confession in English. After the examination was concluded the Magistrate read out the confession sentence by sentence and the *Sheristadar* translated it into *Marathi* and then the accused admitted it was correct. *Held* having regard to the provisions of s. 533 and the prior evidence of the Magistrate and the *Sheristadar* at the trial that the confession was admissible and that the error had not prejudiced the accused as to his defence on its merits. 4 Bom. L. R. 783, where 9 M. 224 is distinguished.

40 Translation of confession should be filed with record.—Whenever a confession recorded under section 33 is translated into English, the translation should be filed with the record.

41 Confession recorded by Magistrate's clerk.—Although the terms of ss. 164 and 364 are to be strictly observed by the Magistrate actually taking down the confession himself the defect of a confession

DATA-4 α_1 (L. Lat. data from Gr. $\delta\epsilon\lambda\tau\alpha$, *deletis*)

1 To make dull stupid or sluggish, to stupefy as the senses, the feelings, the perceptions, and the like.

Those drugs also as
Will stupefy and dull the senses a while Not
Lose and custom have so dulled our eyes Few

Meloutha vulgaris —

D 1 n' m e n e n \bar{e}
D 1 n' r e s \bar{e} \bar{e} \bar{e}

1. 1. 1. 1. 1.

show windows

5 A locomotive with condensing engines, and hence without the noise of escaping steam

6 The fourth or exposed hand when three persons play at cards.

20 fingers down y to hold two hands at cards one repre
senting an absent person

Dām'my a 1 Silent mute (Charles
3 Fictitious or sham feigned as a dummy.
match. 15mbs.

Dū'mōds, } a [Lat *d* mouse from *d* mouse thorn
Du mōse' } bush bramble [i *d* mouse]

1 Abounding with bushes and briars, thicket

er; *dun* cloud comes thundering up *Purple*
ark gloomy obscure In the *dun* air
Milton.

To cure as col fish in a manner to give
an color. This is effected by laying them
after salting in a lark apartment covered

grass or some like substance. In two or three days they are opened and then piled again in a compact mass for two or three months longer, and are fit for use. (11, 8.)

{is p & } p DUNNED (dū id), p pr &
 VNING { \ s d j re, l el dyi, duna di i,
 under \ s dynin icel dyu in, to make a

To ask or beseech, as a debtor for
 to urge importunately Hath she sent
 o den? Swif.
 I One who I ne To be pill'd by it.

I never knew this town without traces of figure. Sayt
the place is called by John to be a word of unknown

and the other two are the same as in the previous case. The results are shown in Table 1. The results show that the model is able to predict the results of the experiment with a high degree of accuracy. The model is able to predict the results of the experiment with a high degree of accuracy.

Dün'ger y, h Dullness stupidity Sir T. Smith
Dün'ci-eal a like a dunce dunceah "The most
dull and dunceful gentleman."

Ben'etiff *e t* [Eng *dunce*, and Lat *facere*, to make] To make stupid in intellect (*idiot*)

Dūn'ish a Like a dunce, scottish (Hurburton, 1859)

having been recorded by the Magistrate's clerk can be cured under s 533 by examining the Magistrate, 2 P. R. 1909. See also 14 C. 539; but a Police-officer ought not to be employed, 9 C. L. J. 55.

42. Statement made through an interpreter in a language other than the Court language.—When the statement or confession is made through an interpreter in a language other than that of the Court, it is not necessary that it should be recorded in that language. The language in which it is conveyed to the Court by the interpreter is the language in which it should be recorded, 5 C. 826.

43. Refusal of accused to sign confession.—An accused person who refuses to sign a statement made at his trial in answer to questions put by the Court commits no offence punishable under s 180, 1 P. C., 4 B. 15; 3 L. B. R. 199. See 10 B. H. C. R. 166 at p. 177 as to the object of requiring the accused to sign. See also 9 C. L. J. 55. The signature is unnecessary when the confession is made to the trying Court, 3 C. 756.

44. Thumb-impression is not signature.—Where a document purporting to be a confession of an accused person who was able to write, bore a thumb-impression close to the printed words '*signature or mark of the accused*' in the place where if he had signed, he would have placed his signature, *held*, that the thumb impression was not a signature within the meaning of s 3 (52) of the *General Clauses Act* X of 1897 and therefore the provisions of this section had not been complied with, 32 C. 550.

45. Signature of Magistrate essential.—The record of the confession as well as the memorandum must be signed by the Magistrate, 3 C. W. N. 387. The section does not require a memorandum that a *statement* as distinguished from a confession was made voluntarily, 27 C. 295. Having regard to s 533, the following decisions are no longer law, 10 B. H. C. R. 497; 5 C. 934 = 6 C. L. R. 297; 5 C. 958 = 6 C. L. R. 353, 4 C. 696; 5 C. L. R. 209.

46. Irregularity in making memorandum.—A confession does not become inadmissible merely because the memorandum required by the law to be attached thereto by the Magistrate has not been written in the exact form prescribed, 3 A. 333, but see 6 B. 283. But such a confession cannot be admitted under s 80 of the *Evidence Act* without proof of its having been properly made, 7 C. W. N. 220. See also 9 M. 224; 18 C. 549, 12 A. 595; 8 O. C. 395, 2 P. R. 1909; 15 N. L. R. 19 = 15 Cr. L. J. 243 following 7 C. P. L. R. 14 and 40 C. 873. See also 6 L. 58. See also Note 37 above.

47. Omission to record the circumstances under which confession is made.—The omission of the Magistrate before whom the confession of an accused person was made to record the circumstances that the accused was not in the custody of the Police at the time does not invalidate the confession, if the requirements of the Code were complied with by the Magistrate when he recorded the confession, *Ratanlal* 534; 5 C. 938.

48.—Recording confession in narrative form.—The confession of an accused person was recorded in a simple narrative form instead of in the shape of question and answer as required by s 364. There was nothing in the character of the confession, or in the circumstances of the case to lead to the inference that the accused had been prejudiced by the error. *Held* that the error did not affect the admissibility of the statement in evidence, 8 C. 616; 4 Bom. L. R. 785 at p. 787; 9 C. L. J. 55; 14 C. 539 and 23 B. 221; 12 C. L. R. 420. See *contra* 10 B. H. C. R. 168 and 497. See also 1909 U. B. R. 1 Ex. 3 = 11 Cr. L. J. 41.

49. Omission to record that confession was voluntarily made.—Where in reply to the questions of the committing Magistrate, the accused made confessional statements which the Magistrate recorded and subscribed thereto the following declaration—"The statement made by this prisoner in my presence and hearing is taken down fully. It is read over to him and acknowledged to be correct." *Held*, the statements, were not admissible in evidence, the provisions of this section not having been followed, *Weir* 11, 180 where observations are made as to the duty of the magistracy in recording confessions. In 12 Cr. L. J. 15 (A), however, where the accused was convicted on his confession recorded by a Magistrate who omitted to make the memorandum at the foot of the record to the effect that he believed that the confession was voluntarily made, the Judges of the High Court before whom the case came on appeal sent for the Magistrate who deposed that he believed that the confession was voluntarily made and that he inadvertently omitted the words. The Judges *held* that though ordinarily such a statement made by the Magistrate would be received with full confidence, in the circumstances of the case they would not act on the confession. See also 8 O. C. 395; 2 P. R. 1909; 6 L. 183.

50. Memorandum referred to in s. 364 not necessary.—Under the present amendment it is obligatory on the Magistrate to certify that the warning was given to the accused that if he makes a confession the same would be used against him. Therefore, omission to record such certificate would be illegal.

2 A color partially black or dark

Whose dust set off the whiteness of the skin Dryden.

Dark, v t To make dusky [Ols]

After the sun is up, that shadow which darkens the light of the moon must needs be under the earth. El Hand

3 A low condition

Du'ry n [From due Fr dñ]

1 That which is due from one person to another

First v t [imp & p p DURESS, p pr & vb n]

They stand at a distance, dwell up on his looks and language fixed in amazement. Luchanator

Syn - To inhabit really sojourn continue stay; res.

Dwell v t To inhabit [Pare] 'We who dwell this will Milton

Dweller n An inhabitant a resident of some continuance in a place Dryden

Dwelling n Habitation, place of residence, abode domestic

Here shall be a dwelling for dragons. J. R. x. 12. 5

To visit the dwellings of just men Milton

Dwelling-house n A house where one dwells

51. **Recording Magistrate may be examined to prove statement voluntary.**—Where a District Magistrate refused to make the memorandum referred to in this section, because it appeared to him that the statement was not the accused's free and spontaneous statement, but was made by him in consequence of certain hopes which a constable held out to the accused, which he thought might probably be realised, the Appellate Court directed that the District Magistrate might be examined under s. 533 as to the statement made by the accused before him and on the District Magistrate proving that the statement was made voluntarily, the same was admitted in evidence, 8 O. C. 395; but see 17 Bom. L. R. 898 = 3 Bom. Cr. C. 110, and also 2 P. R. 1909; 12 Cr. L. J. 15 (All)

52. **Confessions used in evidence, how quoted.**—Whenever a statement or confession is recorded under this section, the Magistrate recording the statement or confession should indicate thereon the section of the Code under which it is recorded, and the Judge or Magistrate who afterwards makes use of the document as evidence should quote, at the head thereof by its name and serial number, the case or proceeding in which such document is recorded.—*Bom. H. C. Cr. Cr.*, p. 3.

VIII.—RETRACTED CONFESSIONS.

53. **Effect of confession subsequently retracted.**—It is unsafe for a Court to rely and act upon a confession which has been retracted unless upon a consideration of the whole evidence in the case the Court is in a position to come to the unhesitating conclusion that the confession is true, i.e., to say, usually unless the confession is corroborated by credible independent evidence, 18 A. 78; 27 C. 295; 23 C. 629; 6 S. L. R. 34; 3 P. W. R. 1907; 10 M. 295; 12 M. 123; 19 M. 432. Retracted confessions are always open to suspicion, 22 C. 164. But it is not illegal to base a conviction upon the uncorroborated confession of an accused person, provided the Court is satisfied that the confession was voluntary and is true in fact 30 P. R. 1914 = 264 P. L. R. 1914.

54. **Corroborative evidence not absolutely necessary, but generally required.**—A retracted confession, if proved to be voluntarily made, can be acted upon along with the other evidence in the case. There is no rule of law that a retracted confession must be supported by independent reliable evidence corroborating it in material particulars. The use to be made of such a confession is a matter of precedence rather than of law, 19 B. 728; 23 B. 316; 20 A. 133; 29 A. 434. See also 1885 A. W. N. 221; 6 W. R. 73; 8 W. R. 40; 11 Bom. H. C. R. 137; 11 W. R. 20; 12 W. R. 49; 16 C. W. N. 1105; 30 P. R. 1914 = 50 P. W. R. 1914 = 264 P. L. R. 1914 = 15 Cr. L. J. 626; 15 P. W. R. 1915, 11 P. W. R. 1915. It cannot be laid down as an absolute rule of law that a confession made and subsequently retracted by a prisoner cannot be accepted as evidence of his guilt without independent and corroborated evidence. The weight to be given to such a confession must, it is clear, depend upon the circumstances under which the confession was originally given and the circumstances under which it was retracted including the reasons given by the prisoner for his retraction. It is obvious that a confession in itself reasonable and probable must, if repeated more than once and retracted only at a late stage in the proceedings, have greater weight attached to it than a confession made once only and retracted after a short interval. There are other circumstances which may go to diminish or to increase the weight that should be attached to a confession, 21 M. 83 at p. 83; 23 B. 316, 2 C. W. N. 637, 16 P. R. 1903 and 24 P. W. R. 1909 = 10 Cr. L. J. 534, 24 P. R. 1910 = 38 P. W. R. 1910 = 11 Cr. L. J. 604; 30 P. R. 1914 = 15 Cr. L. J. 626. "If a Judge believes that a confession made by a prisoner, although subsequently withdrawn, contains a true account of that prisoner's connection with the crime, the Judge is bound to act, so far as that prisoner is concerned on that confession which he believes to be true. Where a confession is not supported by the evidence of witnesses, a Judge must examine very carefully to see whether it gives those details which indicate that it is a natural narrative of what took place in the presence of the man making it and is not at variance with any evidence in the case which is believed, and is not merely a parrot like repetition of a story put into the man's mouth," 20 A. 133 at p. 134; 10 M. 295; 16 Cr. L. J. 179 (Bar), 30 P. R. 1914 = 15 Cr. L. J. 626. See also 6 P. W. R. 1916, where 30 P. R. 1914 was followed.

55. **Magistrate must inquire into all material points.**—Where a confession is retracted, it is the duty of the Court that is called to act upon it, especially in a case of murder, to inquire into all the material points and surrounding circumstances and satisfy itself fully that the confession cannot but be true, 3 Bom. L. R. 441. Where confessions are retracted, allegations are frequently made of ill-treatment or other improper inducement on the part of the Police. Such allegations should be carefully inquired into and considered, 8 B. H. C. Cr. C. 126.

56. **Mere retraction is no proof of unlawful inducement—English practice different.**—In this country a confession duly recorded and certified under this section is admissible in evidence against the person making it (even though it is subsequently retracted), unless shut out by the provision of s. 24 of the Evidence Act

E.

E. The second vowel and the fifth letter of the Eng

most noted species are the golden eagle (*Aquila* the imperial eagle of Europe) *A. imp.* the bald eagle of America (*Haliaeetus leuco-* the great hairy eagle (*Harpyia destruc-* re is commonly used as an heraldic em- o for standards and emblematic devices



herve

Take each man's measure but reserve thy judgment. *Shak.*

E Info milk. **E** 2 Sharp, keen biting, severe [*Pare*] *Shak.* nipping and an *ey* r air *Chas.*

3 Excited by desire in the pursuit of any object ardent to pursue perform or obtain, earnest

4 Brittle, indissoluble, not ductile

Gold will be smelt mee to *super* that it will as little on *Locae* during the hammer of glass

Syn — Earnest ardent vehement; hot impetuous

Syn — Ardent vehement earnestness im petuosity heartiness, fervor, avidity, greediness

Eagle (*Egl*) *n* [*Fr.* *aigle*, *Fr.* *aigle* *Sp.* *aguija*, *It.* *aquila* from *Lat.* *aquila*]



1 The organ of hearing In man and the higher animals it is composed of three portions the *external* *ear* which is a cartilaginous funnel covered by the integument serving to collect sonorous vibrations and determine their direction the *middle ear*, or *drum of the ear* which is a cavity lined by mucous membrane separated from the exterior by a delicate membrane (*the membrana tympani*) and containing a mass of small bones which transmit vibrations of the latter to the *auditory*

unabashed Defiance [*See in/ra*] The state

stir, rye, pyth, e, i, o, silent, e as e, ch as ch, e, ch, as k, e as j e as la e e as e, x as x, u as in finger, link, th as in thin

A mere subsequent retraction of a confession which is duly recorded and certified is not enough in all cases to make it appear to have been unlawfully induced. The law in England is not quite the same as to the relevancy and admissibility of confessions [L. R. (1893), 2 Q. B. D. 12]; as the Court there has to decide whether it has been proved *affirmatively* to be free and voluntary, 25 B. 168; 6 L. 415.

57. Retracted confessions should carry practically no weight against persons jointly tried with the maker.—It is not made on oath, it is not tested by cross-examination and its truth is denied by the maker himself who has lied on one or other of the occasions. The very fullest corroboration would be necessary in such a case, far more than would be demanded for the sworn testimony of an accomplice on oath, 28 C. 689. As to the value of confession in joint trials, see 6 B. 288; 6 C. 279; 10 B. L. R. 453 = 19 W. R. 67; 10 B. L. R. 455 (Note) = 19 W. R. 16; 15 C. W. N. 593 = 12 Cr. L. J. 258. Such a confession cannot stand higher than accomplice testimony, which generally requires corroboration, 4 C. 493 = 3 C. L. R. 270; 10 B. 231; 2 C. W. N. 749; 17 A. 824; 23 M. 151, 19 M. 482; 15 B. 66; 22 A. 445, 11 O. C. 328 = 8 Cr. L. J. 393; 12 O. C. 418 = 11 Cr. L. J. 71; 11 A. L. J. 73 = 14 Cr. L. J. 112; 264 P. L. R. 1914 = 50 P. W. R. 1914 = 30 P. R. 1914 = 15 Cr. L. J. 626; 163 P. L. R. 1915 = 22 P. W. R. 1915, 6 Bur. L. T. 47 = 14 Cr. L. J. 179; 29 A. 434. As to the proof of confessions made in the absence of the co-accused. See 6 B. 124; 7 C. 65 = 8 C. L. R. 352 = 10 C. 970. See also 17 Cr. L. J. 226 = 34 In. Ca. 642 (Pun.). But see 6 L. 415.

58. Self-exculpatory statements.—A statement was taken from a woman under this section to the effect that another person had murdered the deceased and had deposited the dead body in a certain place. She pointed out the place where the dead body had been buried and delivered up the jewels which the deceased had been wearing at the time of the murder. This statement was put in evidence at the trial of the deponent and the other person for murder. *Held*, the statement was inadmissible against the co-accused, because though when it was made the deponent was a witness she was no longer a witness at the trial and the co-accused had no opportunity of cross-examining her as to the facts and allegations contained therein. Further, it was inadmissible on the charge of murder against the deponent herself, who withdrew the same at her trial alleging that she was coerced into making the same, because it was no confession of guilt on her part and she did not implicate herself as a participator in the murder, 2 A. L. J. 100 = 2 Cr. L. J. 59. See also (1911) 2 M. W. N. 375. But see 4 p. 327.

IX.—POWERS AND DUTIES OF THE POLICE.

59. Police-officer cannot compel witness to go to a Magistrate or to make statement.—There is no provision of law which empowers a Police-officer to require a witness to go before a Magistrate not having jurisdiction over the offence to have his statement taken under this section, *Ratanlal* 468. S. 164 was not intended to enable the Police to obtain an incriminating statement, by some person and as it were to put a seal on that statement by sending in that person, practically under custody, to a Magistrate, 27 C. 295. The object of s. 162 which declares that a Police-officer shall not record a statement made to him by a person under examination is to enable the Police to deal with the person who has reason to send the accused and his witness to the Magistrate having jurisdiction without delay. A Magistrate having no jurisdiction can, however, record the statement of a witness under this section, if the witness appears *voluntarily* before him. See also 7 C. W. N. 345.

60. Experience of Mr. Justice Straight as regards confessions in this country—Reprehensible conduct of Police in directing their attention to secure confession.—"My experience in this Court has conclusively satisfied my mind of two things: first, that in almost every case of serious gravity or difficulty, the primary object towards which the Police direct their attention and energies is, if possible, to secure a confession; secondly, that such confessions, if subsequently retracted, is, an item of judicial proof, unless corroborated by strong and independent evidence, positively worthless. It requires no very vivid imagination to picture what too often takes place when two or three of these not very intellectual or highly paid Police officials are called away to a village to investigate a grave crime of which there are no very clear traces. Naturally it is much the easier way for them to begin by endeavouring to obtain a confession from the suspected person or persons instead of by searching out the clues to the evidence from independent sources, and seeing what extraneous proof there is. But, as I have more than once been constrained to remark from this Bench, the effect of this sanction given by s. 164 of the Criminal Procedure Code to a Magistrate recording in the course of the investigation the confessions of accused persons thus obtained, not from the hands of the Police, is not so beneficial to the

True ease in writing comes from art, not chance. *Joseph*

At ease In a condition of ease; free from pain trouble

East, a Toward the rising sun; or toward the point where the sun rises when in the equinoctial

ment — said especially of food not liquid, as, to eat bread

They shall make thee to eat grass as oxen. *Dea. iv. 25.*
With steel's cold of many a fest. *Macb.*
How busy blab the jockets out.

E To corrode, as metal by rust, to consume gradually as a cancer, the flesh, to waste or wear away to prey upon, as the health or spirits, to cause to eat, to use up

one's words to take back what has been ut-
tered, retract one's assertions — *To eat out* to com-
pletely *eat out* the heart and comfort of
Philoson

— To consume, devour, gnaw, corrode

1 To take food, to feed, especially to feed in distinction from should food to board

elucidation of guilt as is supposed, for it continually happens that, while the Police have been occupying themselves in getting the confession many of the traces of the crime which if at once followed up would have produced valuable proof have disappeared. To repeat a phrase I used on a former occasion instead of working *up to* the confession they work *down from* it with the result that we frequently find ourselves compelled to reverse convictions simply because beyond the confession there is no tangible evidence of guilt. Moreover I have said and I repeat now it is incredible that the extraordinarily large number of confessions which come before us in criminal cases disposed of by this Court either in appeal or revision should have been voluntarily and freely made in every instance as represented. I may claim some knowledge of, and acquaintance with the ways and conduct of persons accused of crime and I do not believe that the ordinary inclination of their minds which in this respect I take to be pretty much the same with humanity all the world over is to make any admission of guilt. I certainly can add that during fourteen years active practice in the Criminal Courts in England I do not remember half-a-dozen instances in which a real confession once having been made was retracted. In this country on the contrary the retraction follows almost invariably as a matter of course and though I am well aware how this is sought to be explained by a suggestion of the influence brought to bear upon the confessor by other prisoners in *havalat* the fact remains as an endless source of anxiety and difficulty to those who have to see that justice is properly administered. I say it in no harsh sense of disparagement but it is impossible not to feel that the average Indian Policeman with the desire to satisfy his superiors before and the terms of the Police Acts and Rules behind him is not likely to be over nice in the methods he adopts to make a short cut to the elucidation of a difficult case by getting a suspected person to confess. 6 A 509 at p 542

61 Caution in relying upon confessions or admissions—Precautions to be observed in the investigation of crime—It is necessary to warn Police-officers against the practice of unduly relying upon confessions or admissions made by persons suspected of the commission of an offence and thereby failing to place before Courts cases fully investigated and at the same time complete and supported by the best evidence which can be procured. Experience shows that a person guilty of serious crime rarely gives an account of his acts and motives in accurate detail. Even while admitting the commission of a crime he will resort to various devices whereby he hopes to lessen his criminality in the eyes of the Court. The inaccuracy may consist in putting forward false and plausible motives for his act in exaggerating or extenuating as he thinks more expedient the surrounding circumstances in introducing other persons against whom he entertains a grudge as participants in his act or in any other expedient which may at the time commend itself to his brain. The Police may be and often are led first into adopting one of the inaccuracies and next into supporting it by evidence as to motive or surrounding circumstances and this evidence having no foundation is easily shown at the trial to be worthless. The prisoner then has only to retract his confession and the Court has no alternative but to acquit. A still more reprehensible practice is that in which an officer neglects to collect evidence and adopts a confession blindly in order to save himself the trouble and worry of a protracted investigation.—C P Pol Man p 168 Reg and Ord N-W p 363

The Inspector-General expects officers in cases investigated by them to look out vigilantly for and to work throughout upon evidence of a reliable character. The crimes are few in number which are not accompanied by traces which can be linked together and formed into a chain of reliable proof. All clues should be carefully followed up patient inquiry must be made from everyone who is likely to have been connected with events which the investigation shows did precede or which may in the ordinary course of things be presumed to have preceded the crime. The same treatment should be applied to events which may appear to have accom-

for and the true value of the confession is established only when it is proved false or is capable of being corroborated in whole or in part by good and independent evidence.—Reg and Ord N II P s 10 A 363

62 Evidence to corroborate confessions must be obtained—Prosecution must not be launched on confession alone—It should be clearly realised that the successful recording by a Magistrate of the confession of an accused person is not a final, but is rather an initial stage of the investigation. The next step is to obtain the corroborative evidence without which confessions ordinarily are discredited by the Courts. If the confession be true evidence in support of some portion of it will be forthcoming and should be collected. When in

his search for corroborative evidence the investigator satisfies himself that the statements in the confession are false he then realises that an attempt is being made to wreck his inquiry, and that it is his business to defeat this attempt by collecting independent evidence. If on the other hand, the statements are true he should be prepared with evidence to support them so as to secure against the not improbable contingency of the confession being subsequently retracted. All the rulings of the Courts are to the effect that it is incumbent upon the Police-officers to test the truth of confessions in every possible way—*Beng Pol Code* p 377. The Police are directed never to prosecute upon a confession alone, however spontaneously given. The only use they should make of admissions made by an accused person is to follow up every clue so given and to establish every fact and circumstance so indicated from other unquestionable sources. It will then make little odds whether the admission is repeated or not. Frequently, it is far better, when convincing proof can otherwise be produced not to allude in the judicial prosecution to admissions made before the Police only, but to rest the case entirely on the facts established by other testimony—*Mad. Pol Man.*, p 95. A Superintendent present at the spot would attach no weight to a confession but would, as far as possible, make the evidence for the prosecution complete independently of it. A confession may lead to such evidence but should not be accepted as a substitute for it—*Bom Pol Man.*, p 19.

X.—MISCELLANEOUS.

63. Confession before Village Magistrate whether admissible?—A Village Magistrate is not a Police-officer and therefore a confession made to him is not inadmissible in evidence, 7 M. 287, but if the accused is in Police custody, his confession to a Village Magistrate is inadmissible see the explanation to s 26 of the *Evidence Act*.

64. Prosecution for false evidence—There is no legal objection to framing a charge in the alternative under s 193, I P C. against an accused for making contradictory statements one under this section and the other before the Court 1908 A. W. N 73 = 7 Cr. L. J. 302, 22 A. 115. See Notes 28 and 29 under Heading V.

65. Right of accused to have copies of statements.—Before the commencement of the preliminary inquiry against an accused person, he is not entitled either under the general principles of common law or under the Code to copies of statements of various persons recorded by a Magistrate under ss. 162 and 164, 30 M. 466. See Note 14 at p 356.

66. Oral confessions—There is nothing in the law to support the proposition that in order to make an oral extra-judicial confession admissible in evidence, it must be recorded 11 P. R. 1918 (Cr). But in 21 Bom L R. 1065, SHAI, J., held that oral confession before a Magistrate was not admissible and HAYWARD J. held it otherwise when it was proved by the testimony of the Magistrate.

¶ **165. (1)** 'Whenever an officer in charge of a Police-station, or a Police-officer making an investigation has reasonable grounds for believing that anything necessary for the purposes of an investigation into any offence which he is authorized to investigate may be found in any place within the limits of the Police station of which he is in charge, or to which he is attached, and that such thing cannot in his opinion be otherwise obtained without undue delay, such officer may, after recording in writing the grounds of his belief and specifying in such writing so far as possible, the thing for which search is to be made, search, or cause search to be made, for such thing in any place within the limits of such station

(2) A Police-officer proceeding under sub-section (1) shall, if practicable conduct the search in person

(3) If he is unable to conduct the search in person and there is no other person competent to make the search present at the time, he may after recording in writing his reasons for so doing require any officer subordinate to him to make the search, and he shall deliver to such subordinate officer in order in writing, specifying the place to be searched and so far as possible the

* Sub-sections (1) and (2) were substituted for the original by Act XVIII of 1923 s 26. Sub-section (3) was added by Act XVIII of 1923 s 34.

† The words in inverted commas are "after recording ...

... as doing" in sub-sec (3) were inserted by Act XVIII of 1923 s 34. The words in inverted commas are "specifying ... to be made" in sub-sec (3) were substituted by Act XVIII of 1923 s 34.

These have an est

Environ Monit Assess (2008) 142:111–120
DOI 10.1007/s10661-008-9402-2

I, _____
 do hereby certify that _____

Человек и его творчество

Echluus (Arch).

The woods shall grow

2 The loss usually terminates

re darken or extinguish the beauty
or life of, to sully to cloud to
stale My joy of liberty is hal-
lowed His eccl's I state "Dixien
To suffer an eclipse to become

While the falling moon

Elliptic *n* [*Fr elliptique* *f* *Lat linearis* *plura*
See *infer*]
1 (*Astron*) *a* - - - - -

¹ Elliptic, σ (Fr. elliptique) γ .

2 The art of constructing
technica
E-1818-7-22 - 1 - 1

In the Greek poets, we see the economy of poems better observed than in Terence.

Syn — FOLYOMY FALCALITT PIRE M V

fûrl, ryde, ryck, e s, e silent, e as e, sh as sh, e, eh, as h, k as j, k as in ket, y as n, y as

thing for which search is to be made' and such subordinate officer may thereupon search for such thing in such place

(4) The provisions of this Code as to search warrants and the general provisions as to searches contained in s 102 and s 103 shall so far as may be apply to a search made under this section

* (5) Copies of any record made under sub-section (1) or sub-section (3) shall forth with be sent to the nearest Magistrate empowered to take cognizance of the offence and the owner or occupier of the place searched shall on application be furnished with a copy of the same by the Magistrate

Provided that he shall pay for the same unless the Magistrate for some special reason thinks fit to furnish it free of cost

Note—Referring to the amendment of this section the Select Committee say Suggestions have been made that section 165 as redrafted by the bill goes too far and that it should only permit a search to be made for something specified. We think the utility of the section would be largely impaired if effect were given to these suggestions but we have provided a safeguard by requiring that an officer acting under sub-section (1) or sub-section (3) shall record in writing his reasons for making a search or requiring a search to be made

Safeguards to protect the individual from unnecessary trouble have been introduced by the amended section by requiring the Police-officer to record in writing the grounds of his belief and the thing of which search is to be made and sub-section (5) it is obligatory to send a copy of the record to the nearest Magistrate and a copy to be supplied to the owner on application.

Notes—1 **Provisions for searches**—See ss 96—99 The Court can issue a search warrant under s. 96 or *in loco* of that the Magistrate may himself search under s. 105 s. 165 deals with searches by a Police-officer and not by a Magistrate **35 C. 433 at p 448**

2 **At what time house search to be made.**—*United Provinces Rules*—House-search may be made at any time House-search by night is neither illegal nor contrary to orders still when the search can be delayed without danger to the chance of recovering property it should be postponed till sunrise. In *excise cases* however search should only be made between sunrise and sunset. In *excise* and other cases the senior Police-officer with the search party shall always enter the premises himself and not allow the informer to enter the premises without first searching irregularities in this procedure lead to oppression false charges and frequent acquittals.—*Reg and Ord N W P s 10 p 273 See 27 C. 692*

Bengal Rules—Search must be made between sunrise and sunset though it is not illegal if made by night under special circumstances rendering delay dangerous to the chance of recovering property etc. In such a case the fact must be reported to the District Superintendent of Police for the information of the Magistrate having jurisdiction. If a search is required in any place within the limits of another station it can only be made through the officer in charge of the latter on the requisition oral or written of the former—*Ben Pol Man 2nd Ed pp 222 and 402.*

Madras Rules—Though the law does not require searches to be made by daylight yet great circumspection is required and as a rule daylight should be awaited precaution being taken to get inmates out of the house if the case is a grave one—*Mad Pol Man Vol I p 114*

3. **The conduct of searches.**—Before entering the premises the exterior of the place to be searched will be examined and it will be ascertained whether there is easy access or opportunity of introducing articles without the knowledge of the inmates precautions will be taken to prevent this being done while the search is in progress The Police-officer or other persons who are to make the search will submit to be searched in the presence of the witnesses before he and they go in. No one else should be allowed to enter and the search should be carried through from beginning to end in the presence of the witnesses.—*C P Pol Man. p 164*

Madras Rules—(a) The Law requires that search be made in the presence of two or more respectable persons. If possible the head of the village should be present. Care must be taken that these persons observe every part of the search. Great attention must be paid to getting respectable witnesses and to seeing that they

Of such
 Out of these magazines I shall supply the town with what
 may lead to their *edification*.

pline, as an *edification* for the bar or the pulpit,
 he has finished his *eduction*.

properly to destroy the face or form. Fr *face*,
 fr *forma*, *facin*, Lat *facies*, face form Cf De
 FACIL

- 1 To remove from the surface, to erase or scratch
 out, to render illegible. as, to *effect* the letters on
 a monument, or the inscription on a coin
- 2 To remove from the mind, to wear away

2 To instruct and in

which con
 stitute a con
 atmosphere

3 Power to produce consequences or results of
 efficacy force importance, account, as, to speak
 with *effect*

4 Consequence intended, purpose, general in
 tent — with to

They spoke to her to that *effect* 3 Chron xxiv 2

5 (pl) Goods, movables personal estate, as,
 the people escaped from the town with their *effects*

For *effect* is exaggerated in press and excitement
 — if to effect or wait for *effect* instance of results
 val the first and the like — To give *effect* to, to make
 val to carry out in practice — to push to its results — in
 effect is fact

Syn — EFFECT CONSEQUENCE RESULT These words

The following is the *effect* persons as seen
 We may be the *effect* of the *effect*
 The *effect* produced
 When the *effect* of the *effect* for know
 The day thou satest thereof thou shalt die.
 Then of their reason ended they had rep.
 With the *effect* of the *effect* toward the *effect* result

Message

M. J. J.

M. J. J.

M. J. J.

actually enter the places searched and stand over the searching officer observing every part of the search (b) Before entering the premises care will be taken to examine minutely the exterior of the place to be searched and to observe whether there is easy access or opportunity of introducing articles without the knowledge of the inmates. A note of this point will be then and there made. The persons or the Police-officers who are to enter will be scrupulously examined before the witnesses, before going in, not more than two should be allowed to enter and they should search together and in the presence of the witnesses (c) Should anything be discovered care will be taken to observe with great minuteness all facts and appearances relating to it—whether it would be possible for the article to be placed where found without the knowledge of the inmates etc. and a note of the fact should be made then and there. The witnesses should be invited to give their opinions freely on these points. These opinions should be noted down. Police-officers will be carefully instructed as to the utter futility of this kind of evidence when the article found is some small common article of no great value easily concealed about the clothes of the searcher or easily thrown into the place where found and bearing no proportion to the property lost. District officers will vigorously enquire into every case in which there is the slightest suspicion of foul play and prosecute every man connected with a case in which these practices have been resorted to—*Mad Pol Man, Vol I, p 113*

4 Search to be in the presence of witnesses.—See s. 103 which provide that search should be made in the presence of witnesses. The Advocate-General has given as his opinion that a respectable inhabitant of the locality is under an obligation to attend and witness a search when called upon to do so by a Police-officer about to make the search and that if he departs without lawful excuse before the completion of the search without signing the search list he would be guilty of the offence described in s. 187 I P C. The offence would fall under the first portion of s. 187, in case of searches under ss. 163 and 166 Cr P C and in the case of searches instituted upon a search warrant, under the second paragraph of the section—*M P O No 23 of 1900*

5 Search list should be prepared.—A list of all seized things in the course of a search and of the places in which they are respectively found should be prepared by the officer superintending the search and be signed by the witnesses called upon to witness the search. Such lists will be carefully prepared in trifoil at the scene of search immediately after the search has been completed, the original being sent with an Occurrence Sheet to the Magistrate having jurisdiction the counterfoil being attached to the Station house report of the day and the trifoil kept at the station. The Police-officer conducting the search must have in his note book a list of all articles found with full particulars of how and where each article was found—*Mad Pol Man Vol I p 114*

6 No house should be searched unless search will result in finding things sought for.—It is a common practice when a theft or burglary has been committed and for some reason or other the Police suspect a particular person search this person's house in the hopes of finding the stolen property and to carry off to the Police post anything found in the house though it is not the property of which the Police were in search and is of an everyday description e.g. pots and pans knives jewellery of trifling value clothes and so forth. The articles seized are exhibited at the station house and claimants are invited to come forward. The result naturally is that many of the things are claimed and the person whose house was searched is charged on most unsatisfactory evidence with theft of being in possession of stolen property. This procedure is wholly incorrect. Before a Police-officer can seize any property he must have reason to believe it to have been stolen or that some offence has been committed with reference to it. No house should be searched unless there is some reason to believe that the search will result in the finding of the things sought for—*C P Pol Man p 108*

7 House search not to be made on mere suspicion of complainant, but on inquiry into circumstances of the case.—The indiscriminate search of houses should be discouraged as much as possible. The spirit of this section should be strictly observed. Frequently houses are searched on the mere assertion of the complainant that he suspects the owner, without any inquiry into the circumstances of the case or the grounds upon which the assertion has been made. By such procedure the feelings of respectable persons are wantonly outraged.—*Bom. Pol. Man p 96*

Superintendents of Police and their assistants will bring to the notice of their District Magistrates instances of search-warrants being issued to the Police on sufficient grounds by Sub-Magistrates—*Mad Pol Man Vol I p 114*

8 Reasons for search to be recorded beforehand.—In every case in which an officer in charge of a Police-station exercises the powers vested in him under this section he will record concisely but explicitly

1,1589, -

1. The first is a general statement of the purpose of the study.

[illegible][illegible]

[Faint, illegible handwritten notes]

...the ...

2 That which is poured out
 Wash me with that precious *effusion* and I shall be white
 than snow. *Any Choir*

1. *Chlorophyll a* (Chl *a*)
 2. *Chlorophyll b* (Chl *b*)
 3. *Chlorophyll c* (Chl *c*)
 4. *Chlorophyll d* (Chl *d*)
 5. *Chlorophyll e* (Chl *e*)
 6. *Chlorophyll f* (Chl *f*)
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 9. *Chlorophyll i* (Chl *i*)
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 21. *Chlorophyll u* (Chl *u*)
 22. *Chlorophyll v* (Chl *v*)
 23. *Chlorophyll w* (Chl *w*)
 24. *Chlorophyll x* (Chl *x*)
 25. *Chlorophyll y* (Chl *y*)
 26. *Chlorophyll z* (Chl *z*)
 27. *Chlorophyll aa* (Chl *aa*)
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[illegible]

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 time. [tʌm]

$\left[\begin{array}{c} \text{C}_{10}\text{H}_8 \\ \text{C}_{10}\text{H}_8 \\ \vdots \\ \text{C}_{10}\text{H}_8 \end{array} \right]_n$

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[illegible]

the 1990s, the number of people in the world who are illiterate has increased from 1.2 billion to 1.5 billion. The number of illiterate people in the world is expected to increase to 1.7 billion by the year 2015. The number of illiterate people in the world is expected to increase to 1.9 billion by the year 2020. The number of illiterate people in the world is expected to increase to 2.1 billion by the year 2025. The number of illiterate people in the world is expected to increase to 2.3 billion by the year 2030. The number of illiterate people in the world is expected to increase to 2.5 billion by the year 2035. The number of illiterate people in the world is expected to increase to 2.7 billion by the year 2040. The number of illiterate people in the world is expected to increase to 2.9 billion by the year 2045. The number of illiterate people in the world is expected to increase to 3.1 billion by the year 2050. The number of illiterate people in the world is expected to increase to 3.3 billion by the year 2055. The number of illiterate people in the world is expected to increase to 3.5 billion by the year 2060. The number of illiterate people in the world is expected to increase to 3.7 billion by the year 2065. The number of illiterate people in the world is expected to increase to 3.9 billion by the year 2070. The number of illiterate people in the world is expected to increase to 4.1 billion by the year 2075. The number of illiterate people in the world is expected to increase to 4.3 billion by the year 2080. The number of illiterate people in the world is expected to increase to 4.5 billion by the year 2085. The number of illiterate people in the world is expected to increase to 4.7 billion by the year 2090. The number of illiterate people in the world is expected to increase to 4.9 billion by the year 2095. The number of illiterate people in the world is expected to increase to 5.1 billion by the year 2100.

1990

in the Station-house Register his reasons for deciding to search or cause search to be made in any house. This should, as a rule, be done before the S H O proceeds himself to the search, or issues his order in writing to his subordinates. Inspecting officers will carefully look into this matter when examining Crime Registers and Note Books and ascertain if the reasons for searching were recorded before the search was made—which should always be done if possible—*Mad. Pol Man*, Vol I, p 114

Where the search was conducted by a Sub-Inspector without recording any order in writing and giving his reasons under s. 165 and on the threats of the Sub-Inspector the accused, on being assaulted struck two blows on the forehead of the Sub-Inspector which proved fatal. *Held*, that the accused had a right of self-defence against the assault on his person and could not be said to have voluntarily caused death and was entitled to an acquittal 23 A. L. J. 1037.

9. **Persons empowered to search**—Under s. 12 of Act V of 1861 it has been declared that the Extra Assistant Superintendents of Police, attached to a detective department shall have the powers of officers in charge of Police-stations for the purpose of searching houses in each district where they may be employed. They, Extra Assistants, while exercising these powers can, under the terms of this section, by written order in any particular case, direct the Head Constables in the detective department who are subordinate to them to make search in any house or place—*Beng Pol Man*, 2nd Ed., p 402.

10. **District Magistrate cannot search under this section**—This section deals with searches by a Police-officer, and not by Magistrate, 38 C. 433 at p 448.

11 **Deputation of Subordinate Police-officer by the S. H. O. must be by an order in writing**—7 N.W. P. H. C. R. 209, the conviction of the accused under ss. 143 and 303, I P C., for resisting a search was quashed on the ground that the subordinate Police-officer conducting the search was not empowered by an order in writing. A subordinate Police-officer is not empowered without a warrant to enter a house in search of property, though he may certainly do so in search of a person who is charged with having committed an offence for which he is liable to be arrested without a warrant, 7 B. H. C. R. Cr. Ca 50; 8 S. L. R. 1 = 16 Cr. L. J. 15; but see 1892 A. W. N 1. If a constable goes for search without any written authority, he does not under subsec (3) of this section lawfully exercise the power of a public servant. To such a case s. 99, I P C., has no application 6 C. L. J. 753 = 6 Cr. L. J. 439. See as to the question of private defence, 18 A. 246 and 8 S. L. R. 1 = 16 Cr. L. J. 15.

12. **Police-officer must conduct search in person**—In 17 M. L. J. 323 = 6 Cr. L. J. 105, where an Inspector acting under this section seated himself outside the house of the accused and sent a constable into the house to conduct the search. The accused asked the constable for a list of the articles he had come to search for and when none was produced he objected to the search being carried out by the constable and pushed him out, it was *held* distinguishing 19 M. 349, that the accused could not be convicted under s. 353 I P C. The Inspector himself should have personally conducted the search and he was not justified in sitting outside and directing a subordinate to search without giving a written order specifying the articles to be searched for. This ruling was *dissented from* in 23 M. L. J. 445 = (1912) M. W. N 1111 = 13 Cr. L. J. 783, and it was *held* that all that was intended by this clause was that the officer should be present on the spot and exercise a general supervision over the search in contradistinction to the cases where he is unable to go to the spot and therefore deputes a subordinate by a written order to conduct the search in his place.

12-A. **Place must be within the local limits of the circle**.—A Station-house Officer has no power to search any place beyond the local limits of his circle 8 S. L. R. 1 = 16 Cr. L. J. 15. The procedure under s. 166 must be adopted. See, however 12 P. R. 1915 = 16 Cr. L. J. 551. A Police-officer conducted a search in a house not situate within the local limits of his circle accompanied by a Police constable of the circle in which the house was situate but the constable had no order from his own officer. While engaged in the search they were assaulted, *held* the search was illegal and the conviction under s. 353 was set aside, 16 Cr. L. J. 599 (A). But see Note 1 to s. 166.

13. **Search without warrant for stolen property**—No house should be searched without warrant merely because the occupier is a registered bad character. Such a search should only be made under the circumstances mentioned in this section and when the Police-officer has reason to believe that the thing searched for will be found in the house to be searched. Police-officers should record in their diaries the reason for such search though they are not obliged to give the name of the person upon whose information they act. When suspected property is found in a house, all the property in the house is not to be seized. Property seized

external pressure or altering force,
bound, as, the *elasticity* of caoutch
2 Power of resistance to, or re
pression or overwork
Elastic mass, *n* The quality o
elasticity
L-*élite*, *n* (Lat *élitus*, p. p. of *élire*)
1 Lifted up, raised, elevated
élite

select or take for an office or employment,
from among a number to select by vote,
of a representative, a president, or gov
of) To designate choose or select, as an
mercy or favor
To choose prefer select appoint. See

to have every 1

must be either alleged or suspected to have been stolen or found under circumstances which created suspicion of the commission of an offence and nothing can justify the seizure of the whole of a man's property because he is suspected of having stolen some particular article or articles—*Beng Pol Code* p 380

14. Does section authorize a general search?—This section does not authorize a general search (e.g., for stolen property). It speaks of a specific document or thing which may be the subject of a summons or order under s 94, 38 C, 304. *Seem* the section is confined to the production of something which is considered necessary for the conduct by the Police-officer of an investigation into an offence which he is authorized to investigate and does not cover e.g., a search for arms generally, 36 C 433 at pp 440, 443, 452. The law does not empower a Police-officer to search an accused's house for anything but the specific article which has been or can be made the subject of summons or warrant to produce. A general search for stolen property is not authorized and law cannot be got over by using such an expression as 'stolen property relevant to the case'. Such expressions are vague and misleading and the terms of the law are extremely specific, 16 C W, M 1078 = 13 Cr L J, 764. This section does not prevent a Police-officer from making a search of an accused's house for a specific stolen property relevant to the case. It only prohibits making a search for stolen property generally. 38 C, 304 and 16 C. W N 1078 distinguished. 41 C 261. This section does not authorize a general search on the chance that something may be found the things searched for should be specified. 13 A L J, 979 = 38 A, 14. See also 35 M, L J 127.

15. Power of search under other Acts.—(a) Under s 23 of Act V of 1861 it is lawful for every Police-officer for the purpose mentioned in that section without a warrant to enter and inspect any drinking shop, gaming house or other place of resort of loose and disorderly characters, as to searches for contraband salt, see s 28 of Bengal Act VII of 1864 ss 21 and 23 of Madras Act I of 1882 s 8 of Bombay Act VII of 1873 and ss. 15 and 18 of Act XII of 1882. (b) as to excise articles see Bengal Act XII of 1873. (c) under s 7 of Act XX of 1859 for stamped paper not bearing the proper distinguishing mark and not authenticated as having been purchased from Government, (d) searches under s 30 of the Indian Arms Act VI of 1878, may in Bengal be conducted only in the presence of a Magistrate or Police officer not below the grade of Inspector—*Cal Gaz* 1878 Pt II, p 850. (In the Chittagong division this has been extended to Police-officers not below the grade of Sub-Inspector—*Cal Gaz* 1889 Pt I p 73.) See p 138.

See s. 153 as to the inspection of weights and measures.

16. Police not bound to disclose source of information.—No Police officer shall be compelled to say whence he got any information as to the commission of an offence. See s 125 of the Evidence Act.

17. Action for damages on account of illegal search.—The power of search given under this section is incidental to the conduct of investigation into any offence which a Police-officer is authorized by law to investigate. Therefore if he makes investigation into a non-cognizable offence he has no right to enter into a house to make search under this section. If he does so he acts illegally and an action for damages will lie against him for illegal search. 24 C 691. See also 36 C 433.

18. Penalty for vexatious search is imprisonment for two months or fine of Rs 500 or both—*Bom. Dir. Pol Act*, s. 63.

19. The consequences of an illegal search.—See Notes to s 537 on illegalities in summonses, warrants, etc., Note 24.

166. (1) An officer in charge of a Police station * or a Police-officer not being below the rank of Sub-Inspector making an investigation may require an officer in charge of another Police station, whether in the same or a different district, to cause a search to be made in any place, in any case in which the former officer might cause such search to be made within the limits of his own station.

When officer in charge of Police-station may require another to issue search-warrant.

(2) Such officer, on being so required shall proceed according to the provisions of section 165 and shall forward the thing found if any, to the officer at whose request the search was made.


* The words in inverted commas are of a Police-officer. They were inserted by Act XVIII of 1921.

f vents supposed by some physiologists to circulate
in the nerves of animals

Electrum, *n* [Lat., from Gr *ἤλεκτρον*]

1. Amber See ELECTER

novel song a poem or a song expressive of sor | **Ele's mīse**, *n* (Chem) The crystallized and puri.



some
Ele's mīse *etc* In a manner to please, with

the elements first principles and
primary ingredients, or to the four supposed ele
ments of the material world

All substances by elemental stuff.

For

a (Or *Elephantis*, *fr* *Ele*
for elephant, and *etc*,
an elephant in appearance or

ing paper of the largest size, be-
to the 1000.

ther high, or to a greater de-
for, high; etc as to rhyme.

* (3) "Whenever there is reason to believe that the delay occasioned by requiring an officer in charge of another Police-station to cause a search to be made under sub-section (1) might result in evidence of the commission of an offence being concealed or destroyed it shall be lawful for an officer, in charge of a Police-station or a Police-officer making an investigation under this Chapter to search, or cause to be searched, any place in the limits of another Police-station, in accordance with the provisions of section 165, as if such place were within the limits of his own station

* (4) Any officer conducting a search under sub-section (3) shall forthwith send notice of the search to the officer in charge of the Police station within the limits of which such place is situate, and shall also send with such notice a copy of the list (if any) prepared under section 103 and shall also send to the nearest Magistrate empowered to take cognizance of the offence, copies of the records referred to in section 165, sub-sections (1) and (3)

* (5) The owner or occupier of the place searched shall on application be furnished with a copy of any record sent to the Magistrate under sub-section (4)

Provided that he shall pay for the same unless the Magistrate for some special reason thinks fit to furnish it free of cost "

Note—Search conducted by Police-officer of another circle.—It should be noticed that under s 166, as amended by the addition of sub-clause (3), an officer in charge of one Police-station under circumstances mentioned in that sub-section is authorized to search or cause to be searched any place within the limits of another Police-station in accordance with the provisions of s 165 as if such place were within the limits of his own station.

167. (1) Whenever † any person is arrested and detained in custody and it appears that the † investigations cannot be completed within the period of 24 hours fixed by section 61 and there are grounds for believing that the accusation or information is well founded the officer in charge of the Police-station § or the Police-officer making the investigation if he is not below the rank

Procedure when investigation cannot be completed in 24 hours

of Sub-Inspector † shall forthwith transmit to the nearest Magistrate a copy of the entries in the diary hereinafter prescribed relating to the case, and shall at the same time forward the accused || to such Magistrate

(2) The Magistrate to whom an accused person is forwarded under this section may whether he has or has not jurisdiction to try the case, from time to time, authorize the detention of the accused in such custody as such Magistrate thinks fit, for a term not exceeding 15 days on the whole. If he has not jurisdiction to try the case or commit it for trial, and considers further detention unnecessary, he may order the accused to be forwarded to a Magistrate having such jurisdiction

* | Provided that no Magistrate of the third class and no Magistrate of the second class not specially empowered in this behalf by the Local Government shall authorize detention in custody of the Police

(3) A Magistrate authorizing under this section detention in the custody of the Police shall record his reasons for so doing

(4) If such order is given by a Magistrate other than the District Magistrate or Sub-divisional Magistrate, he shall forward a copy of his order, with his reasons for making it, to the Magistrate to whom he is immediately subordinate

* Subsections (1) to (5) were added by Act XVIII of 1923 s. 37

† The words "under this Chapter have been omitted" by Act XI III of 1923

‡ The words "any person" appear that the "were substituted for the words" it appears that any " by Act XI III of 1923

§ The words "or the Police-officer" Sub-Inspector " were inserted by Act XVIII of 1923

|| The words "(any)" have been omitted by Act XI III of 1923.

* The proviso was inserted by the Cr. P. C. (Amendment) Act, 1923

1. Pertaining to an ellipse, having the form of an *Elliptical* (loin') r t To remove {Obs} *Howell*, {*Elliptical* where ade 1 In any other place, as, these



4 (*Astron*) The angular distance of a from the sun, as the elongation of Venus or Mercury

Whose taste at first essay gave elevation to the music, and taught

side avoid escape slun flee mock
Capable of being eluded or evaded
from *slun*, to gather reap harvest
orn grain The twelfth month of
year and the sixth of the ecclesiastical
ending nearly to the month of Aug

Elliptical {*See ELLIPSE*} The praise be to him who is a person of thing true

Elliptical = The rock of an elvan vein intermediate between porphyry and granite, also, the vein itself - called also *elvan course*.
Elliptical = The same as *ELF*.
Elliptical = The same as *ELF*.
Elliptical = A young eel, a young conger or sea eel.
Elliptical = pl. of *ELF*.
Elliptical = 1. Pertaining to elves. See *ELFISH*.
2. Mischievous as if done by elves. *mischievous*, *venations*.
Elliptical = 1. In an elvish manner is a way to leave or vex, mischievous, especially. She had been heard to say, and named. Used chiefly, 1823 the last volume of

The shield may return that the goods or hearts are obscured.

fool, rude, pash, e, d, e, silent; e as o, th as ch, e, ch, as h, g as j as in get, g as x, g as ge, m as in bigger, high,

Notes.—1. Referring to the amendment to this section, the Select Committee say : “In s. 167, however, which confers a power to ask for a remand we would confine the operation to investigating officers not below the rank of Sub-Inspector

We consider that the bill does not go far enough in its restriction of the Magistrates who should be authorized to remand to Police custody. We would confine the power to first-class Magistrates and second class Magistrates specially empowered

S 61 provides that persons arrested shall not be detained by the Police for more than 24 hours. S 344 provides for remand during inquiry or trial. See Notes to s 61

2 Detention and remand defined—s 167 and s 344—For the purposes of Police rules *detention* means detention in Police custody in a Police lock up or otherwise and *remand* means remand to custody in a magisterial lock up or to a Magistrate's camp guard or under bail or recognizances, during a postponement or adjournment of an inquiry or trial. The broad distinction between this section and s 344, that this section applies to cases which have been instituted on a Police report and are still under investigation, whereas s. 344 refers to cases already on the file of the Magistrate in which the inquiry or trial has begun or is about to begin. Section 344 relates to proceedings in inquiries or trials and has nothing to do with Police investigations and it contemplates a remand to jail, not to Police custody, 23 B 32

3 When order for detention may be applied for—When in the investigation of a cognizable case it is necessary to arrest the accused person at an early stage of such investigation and it is apparent that such investigation cannot be complete within 24 hours after such arrest the investigating Police-officer may apply to the nearest Magistrate for a special order authorizing such further detention as may be reasonable and necessary upon any one of the following grounds *ie* to say—

(a) To compare the accused's footprints with the tracks to and from the scene of the offence when the distance renders it impossible to make such comparison by daylight within the first 24 hours after arrest.

(b) When the accused persons offers to point out stolen property, or property taken in the offence or weapons or other articles with which the offence was committed, or evidence of value in the case and there is reason to believe that such offer is made *bona fide*, and it is impossible to proceed to the place and obtain such property weapons, articles or evidence within the first 24 hours after arrest

(c) When it is necessary to ascertain whether persons along the supposed route taken by the accused or injured person recognize the accused person and when by reason of distance it is unreasonable to expect persons to come forward upon the chance of being able to give evidence and it becomes essential to take the accused along such route and it is impossible to do so by daylight within the first 24 hours after arrest.

(d) And other good and sufficient reason for such detention.

Explanation—Except for valid reasons similar to those stated above applications for detention shall be discouraged and no such application shall be made on the ground that an accused person is likely to confess—
Rul and Ord. Punj, p 387

4 Remand under what circumstances allowed—Special orders for the detention of accused persons under this section must not be granted to the Police without good and sufficient cause shown as a general rule, accused persons should be brought before the Magistrate having jurisdiction, who if further investigation seems necessary, can adjourn his inquiry from time to time under s 344, Cr P C. When, however a prisoner is brought before a Magistrate under this section, the Magistrate before granting an order for his detention must be satisfied that—

(a) there is substantial ground for suspecting that the prisoner had committed a definite offence such as to warrant his arrest and detention, and that

(b) his remaining in the hands of the Police is really necessary, such detention may often tend to defeat justice rather than further it and should not be ordered without evidence sufficient to warrant it on the principles above stated. The High Court will regard as a serious dereliction of duty any failure on the part of any Magistrate to exact and enforce strict compliance of the law on the part of the Police.—*Don H C Cr Cir p 2*

5 Right of Magistrate to remand—Under this section a Magistrate on the mere perusal of the entries in the Police diaries relating to the case to which the accused have no access may from time to time authorize the detention of the accused in custody for a term not exceeding 15 days on the whole. Thereafter he can

under s. 344 by a warrant remand an accused for any term not exceeding 15 days at a time, if sufficient evidence has been obtained to raise a suspicion that the accused may have committed an offence and it appears likely that further evidence may be obtained by such remand 36 C. 166.

6. **Further remand how obtained**—When in the course of a Police investigation, inculpatory facts against the accused have come to light but the case is not in a state for submission to the Magistrate having jurisdiction the accused should be forwarded under this section to the nearest Magistrate, for the purposes of remand. A copy of the entries in the diary directed to be kept under s. 172 should be forwarded at the same time. No detention of the accused is justifiable on account of delay in preparing the diary or copy thereof—*Ibid* p. 3 19 A 390 at p. 404. The nearest Magistrate may be a Magistrate having jurisdiction or not. In the town of Madras the Commissioner of Police is a Magistrate within the meaning of the section.

7. **Accused must be forwarded to Magistrate**—Before a Magistrate remands an accused person to Police custody the accused must be produced before him, 16 C. W. N. 145 = 13 Cr. L. J. 65. It is illegal to remand on the application of the Police, an accused not produced in Court 89 P. R. 1867.

8. **Remand to be granted in cases of real necessity**—A remand to Police custody ought only to be granted in cases of real necessity, and when it is shown in the application that there is good reason to believe that the accused can point out property or otherwise assist the Police in elucidating the case. The Police are too often desirous of retaining the accused in their custody for a longer period than 24 hours merely in the hope of extracting some admission of guilt from him. This is contrary to s. 163 etc. and to the spirit of the Code generally and Magistrates must be careful not to facilitate this object by too great a readiness in granting remands.—*Punj Cir* p. 176.

9. **Reasons for remand must be given and must show necessity**—Reason must be given 16 C. W. N. 145 = 13 Cr. L. J. 65. A Magistrate has no authority to further detain the accused in custody without some reason made manifest to him either in the shape of sworn testimony given before him or in some other form, 20 W. R. 25. Magistrates in recording their reasons for the detention or remand should set forth all the information they are able to obtain on the subject, 1885 A. W. N. 59. The reasons which are to be recorded must be reasons showing the particular necessity which exists in each particular case for leaving the prisoner in the hands of the Police. Under no circumstances should an accused person be remanded to Police custody unless it is made clear that his presence is actually needed in order to serve some important purpose connected with the completion of the inquiry. In all other cases in which time is required by the Police to complete the inquiry, the accused person should be detained in magisterial custody—*Ibid*, p. 177 23 B. 32. Sub-sec. (3), by requiring a Magistrate to record his reason for authorizing detention in Police custody, contemplates that the Magistrate shall consider whether on the facts placed before him, there are good grounds for allowing such detention. There should be at least something to satisfy the Magistrate that the presence of the person arrested while the Police investigation was being held would assist in some discovery of evidence, and that his presence was indispensable for this purpose, as for instance when he had confessed before the Magistrate and had pointed out some of the properties stolen and was waiting to do more but was unable to do so because the Police were by law unable without a special order to detain him. In ordering further detention in Police custody when there are good reasons for such an order, a Magistrate should invariably limit the terms as much as possible to what may be necessary, for the object in view, 11 C. W. N. 554 = 9 Cr. L. J. 85. That the accused will have to be taken to the place of occurrence for individually pointing out the places of their action and journey in committing a dacoity and also for their identification is not a sufficient reason for their remand 7 C. W. N. 457. A person cannot be detained on a mere expectation that time would show his guilt, 17 P. R. 1872; 43 A. 186 = 18 A. L. J. 1114.

10. **Remand for indefinite period illegal**—Remand should always be for a fixed period and in no case is it legal to grant a remand *sine die*—*Punj Cir*, p. 177. The intention of the Legislature is that an accused person should be brought before a Magistrate competent to try or to commit for trial with as little delay as possible 5 M. 63.

11. **Procedure for obtaining remand in N. W. P.**—When the accusation or information is not well founded, and when inquiry is *per contra* so imperfect as to leave it doubtful whether the 'reasonable suspicion' on which the accused was arrested will be capable of confirmation or not, and yet that reasonable suspicion has not been removed at the expiry of hours it is incumbent on the officer in charge of the station to forward his prisoner to the nearest Magistrate with a copy of the entries in the diary relating to the case stating

To riden the best, and the evil to embrace

To please the Lord, and the will be evoked. Answer
 The Lord will be evoked, and the will be evoked. Answer
 The Lord will be evoked, and the will be evoked. Answer

Emballage en carton

The act of a torn

Symbolism *n* To represent or suggest by similitude

The following table shows the results of the regression analysis for the dependent variable "Number of children in the household" (N = 1,000). The independent variables are "Age of the head of household" and "Marital status of the head of household". The table includes the coefficient estimates, standard errors, t-statistics, and p-values for each variable.

| Variable | Coefficient | Standard Error | t-statistic | p-value |
|---|-------------|----------------|-------------|---------|
| Age of the head of household | 0.001 | 0.000 | 1.2 | 0.23 |
| Marital status of the head of household | 0.002 | 0.000 | 1.5 | 0.13 |

which is a true messenger but ambidexter vessel a dependent upon a lord among the Haule (see do on, and cf. Aukakakak) (the who is and/or is 1 to represent of art r another in the fullest

They are indeed very calm and very when they feel a permanent and a few are even an extraordinary nature. They are very calm and very when they feel a permanent and a few are even an extraordinary nature.

1. $\lim_{n \rightarrow \infty} \frac{1}{n} \sum_{k=1}^n f\left(\frac{k}{n}\right) = \int_0^1 f(x) dx$

$\frac{1}{2} \pi$ and $\frac{3}{2} \pi$ are the only solutions of the equation $\sin x = 1$ in the interval $[-\pi, \pi]$.

1. The first step is to identify the problem or question that needs to be answered. This involves understanding the context and the specific requirements of the task.

1990年12月15日

2. *How do you think the world will be different in 20 years?*

1. The first step is to identify the problem or question that needs to be answered. This involves understanding the context and the specific requirements of the task.

1 To arrange in order of battle to draw up in

[illegible]

Order of battle
 Formatted as 1 (Her) Day

2 Having been the place of bat-

An indented
 (em ba), & t (imp & p p ENBAYED.

1. To inclose in a bay or inlet, to landlock, to include between capes or promontories, as an

embroidered a) on of feet

$$L_{\text{eff}} = \frac{1}{2} \int d^3x \left[\frac{1}{2} (\partial_t \phi)^2 - \frac{1}{2} (\nabla \phi)^2 - \frac{1}{2} \mu^2 \phi^2 - \frac{\lambda}{4} \phi^4 \right]$$

a bay
The apple room will be illuminated by the light of North

[illegible]

and

1. *Journal of the American Medical Association*, 1997; 277: 1033-1038.

1. *Journal of the American Medical Association*, 1990; 263: 1025-1028.

Syn.—To adorn, beautify; deck, decorate, enrich, ornament, grace, illustrate. See *Adorn*.

I'm bēi'lish-er, n. One who embellishes

[illegible]

1. To adorn with glittering embellishments
No weeping orphan saw his father's stores

22 To form or collect into a body or united mass
to collect into a whole, to incorporate, to concen-
trate, as to *embody* troops, to *embody* detached
sentiments



Syn — To adorn beautify; deck decorate enrich,
ornament grace illustrate See ADORN
I'm bē'līsh-er, n One who embellishes

Syn - Figure type align symbol ad abbreviation

74 and

Syn — To adorn beautify; deck decorate enrich,
 embellish grace, illustrate. See *Adorn*.

Em bellish-er, n One who embellishes

fari, rude, push, e i, o, silent, ç as n, çh as sh, c, ch as k, g as j, g as in get, .

the charge and the grounds of suspicion on which arrested and which are under investigation. The District Superintendent, or Head Police-officer in attendance on the Magistrate, will draw up a remand sheet with which to adduce the prisoner before the Magistrate, and on which he should obtain an order for the detention of the accused, pending the completion of the investigation.—*Reg and Ord., N-W P, s 19, p 362*

12. Procedure for obtaining remand in Bengal.—The grounds upon which the application to the Magistrate is based must be distinctly stated and be at once communicated to the District Superintendent. Every application for remand shall be made personally by the Chief Police-officer present to the Chief Magistrate officer present. Thus at a headquarters station the District Superintendent and at a sub-division the officer in charge of the sub-district should appear before the Magistrate of the district or sub-divisional officer, as the case may be, to make such an application, unless it is impossible, owing to the absence of one of the officers concerned, or to some other exceptional cause.—*Beng Pol Code, pp 379—388, 15 C. W. N. 145 = 13 Cr. L. J. 65.*

13. Period of remand not to exceed 15 days.—The right construction of this section is that in Police investigations the period of remand cannot exceed in all 15 days including one or more remands, *11 M. 98; 23 B. 32; 1 W. R. 5, 19 W. R. 36, 5 B H C R. Cr. Ca. 31.* See Notes to s 61 at pp. 96 and 97. See *24 P. R. 1902*, where a person was kept in custody for ten months. As to place of detention, see *7 W. R. 3* at p. 6.

14. Magistrate to take notice of accused's detention for more than 24 hours.—Every Magistrate should on an accused person being brought before him under this section, because the Police investigation has not been completed note when the accused was first sent for by the Police and when he arrived at Court, and how long he has been under the surveillance or influence of the Police. If, making due allowance for time spent in travelling, the 24 hours detention allowed has been exceeded, notice should invariably be taken of the matter, and the Magistrate of the district should call the Police to account. Subordinate Magistrates should not fail to bring every known instance of unauthorized detention to the notice of the Magistrate of the district. The whole period of detention by the Police under this section cannot exceed 24 hours plus 15 days, exclusive of the time occupied in travelling to the Magistrate's Court after the arrest of the prisoner. When this time has expired any further order of remand must be passed under s 344, after the case has come before a Magistrate having jurisdiction for trial.—*C. P. Cr. Cr., Part II, No 12, see also 1885 A. W. N. 59.*

15. Practice—Copies of remand order to be submitted to Divisional and District Magistrates.—Copies of all orders of remand together with reasons for such orders shall be transmitted by Subordinate Magistrates to the Divisional and District Magistrates within 24 hours from the date of the same.

16. Custody under order of Magistrate, lawful custody.—While a case was being investigated under this Chapter by A, a Police-officer, I presented a petition to the Magistrate having jurisdiction to try the case accusing W of being concerned in the commission of the offence and prayed that he might be arrested and sent to the Police-officer investigating the case. W was accordingly arrested and brought before the Magistrate who, having examined I on oath and taken W's statement, made an order on the petition to the following effect:—As no Police report has been made on this matter, and the petitioner only has presented this petition ordered that these papers of W be sent to the District Superintendent of Police, and if a report of the matter be made, the case may be sent up according to rule with the papers. In accordance with his order, W was taken to the Superintendent and was sent by the officer to A who, on negligently allowing W to escape, was tried and convicted under s 222, I P. C., it being held that the order of the Magistrate might be taken to have been passed under this section and therefore that W was lawfully committed to the custody of A, *6 A. 129.*

17. Arrests under Chapter VIII not governed by this section.—Where a person dealt with under Chapter VIII was arrested and on the application of the Police was remanded to Police custody to enable the Police to arrest others jointly accused with him, held that the order of remand was illegal as this section applies only to investigations under Chapter XIV and gives no authority to a Magistrate to remand an accused person in custody under Chapter VIII. *5 Bom. L. R. 27, 8 C. W. N. 779; 36 A. 262.*

Report of investigation by subordinate Police-officer

168. When any subordinate Police-officer has made any investigation under this Chapter, he shall report the result of such investigation to the officer in charge of the Police-station

Note.—Evidence to be sent in as found.—A preliminary inquiry before a Magistrate is not the same thing as a trial before a Judge. The evidence should be sent in as found not kept by the Police till they have made it all complete. **5 W R 6**

169. If upon an investigation under this Chapter, it appears to the officer in charge of the Police-station or to the Police-officer making the investigation * that there is not sufficient evidence or reasonable ground or suspicion to justify the forwarding of the accused to a Magistrate such officer shall, if such person is in custody release him on his executing a bond with or without sureties as such officer may direct to appear, if and when so required, before a Magistrate empowered to take cognizance of the offence on a Police report and to try the accused or commit him for trial

Note.—Referring to the amendment of the section.—The Select Committee say We see no cogent reason for the first amendment of ss 169 and 170 which substitutes the words upon the completion of an investigation for upon an investigation. In the case of s. 169 we agree that the power contemplated by the section should be exercisable by investigating officers and we see no reason in this case to restrict the power to officers not below the rank of Sub-Inspector. With regard to s. 170 however we consider that the direct responsibility for sending up case should rest with the officer in charge of the Police-station. S 168 undoubtedly contemplates that the officer in charge is to assume responsibility and to enable all investigating officers to send up cases under s 170 without reference to the officer in charge would tend to make s 168 of no effect.

The words to the officer making the investigation give power to such an officer to release on bail an accused person if there is not enough evidence against him. This agrees with para 156 of the report of the Police Commission.

Notes—1 Forms—For forms of bonds to be executed under this and the next section see Bch. V, Nos 25 and 26

2 Deposit of cash or Government promissory notes.—Under s. 513 a Police-officer has discretion to permit the deposit of a sum of money or Government promissory notes to such amount as he thinks fit in lieu of bond or sureties.

3 Rules regarding bail.—It should be noted that the bail or recognizance bond taken from persons in a case reported in Form B differ from the bonds taken in cases reported in Form A. Persons executing the former need not appear in Court unless their attendance is required by the Magistrate but those executing the latter must appear on the day fixed by the Police-officer and mentioned in the bond. The first are taken under s 169 and the second under s. 170 of the Code.—*Beng Pol Code p 383*

4 Application for withdrawal of complaint.—A Police-officer is not authorized to entertain an application for withdrawal of a complaint. The permitting a complainant to withdraw is a judicial act, the exercise of which is vested in the Magistrate by ss 248 and 343 and the Police have no authority to interfere in such matters. *Ratanlal 91.*

5 Action of Police subject to control of Magistrate.—The admission to bail by the Police under this section being a purely provisional arrangement when the Magistrate determines that there is a *prima facie* case of a non-bailable offence the accused should be re-arrested and forwarded to the Magistrate in custody. *Ratanlal 121*

6 Police to fix date in bond—Where a security bond is taken by the Police for the appearance before Magistrate of an alleged offender under the Railway Act, Police-officer shall fix a date in the bond and warn witnesses to appear on the date. They shall at once inform the Magistrate concerned of the nature of the crime charged the date fixed and the number of witnesses to be heard.—*Oudh Cr Dig., p 6*

170. (1) If, upon an investigation under this Chapter, it appears to the officer in charge of the Police-station that there is sufficient evidence or reasonable ground as aforesaid such officer shall forward the accused under custody to a Magistrate empowered to take cognizance of the offence upon a Police report and to try the accused or, commit him for trial or, if the offence is bailable and the

* The words "or to the Police-officer making the investigation" were inserted by Act XVIII of 1923

$\Gamma_{\text{eff}} = \Gamma_0 + \frac{\alpha}{2} \ln \left(\frac{m}{m_0} \right)$

1. *Chlorophyll a* and *Chlorophyll b* were determined by the method of Arar and Collins (1971).

Discussion

1. *Staphylococcus aureus* (100%)

⁶ The good of P is not a lack of lack of x .

1. *Journal of the American Medical Association*, 1997; 278: 1039-1044.

1. *Journal of the American Medical Association*, 1990; 263: 1025-1028.

Director • (408) 296-2101 • 900

1. Introduction

1. *Journal of the American Medical Association*, 1997; 277: 1033-1037.

1. *Journal of the American Medical Association*, 1997; 278: 1039-1044.

If α is a general $1, 1$ -p. & β is a general $1, 1$ -p. then

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P. (Proof) 4.1 to 4.7 In case between two

ly Am

Emerson

Figure 1. The effect of the concentration of the solution on the rate of the reaction.

Figure 1. The effect of the number of trials on the mean number of correct responses for the 100% condition.

1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014, 2015, 2016, 2017, 2018, 2019, 2020, 2021, 2022, 2023, 2024, 2025, 2026, 2027, 2028, 2029, 2030, 2031, 2032, 2033, 2034, 2035, 2036, 2037, 2038, 2039, 2040, 2041, 2042, 2043, 2044, 2045, 2046, 2047, 2048, 2049, 2050, 2051, 2052, 2053, 2054, 2055, 2056, 2057, 2058, 2059, 2060, 2061, 2062, 2063, 2064, 2065, 2066, 2067, 2068, 2069, 2070, 2071, 2072, 2073, 2074, 2075, 2076, 2077, 2078, 2079, 2080, 2081, 2082, 2083, 2084, 2085, 2086, 2087, 2088, 2089, 2090, 2091, 2092, 2093, 2094, 2095, 2096, 2097, 2098, 2099, 2100, 2101, 2102, 2103, 2104, 2105, 2106, 2107, 2108, 2109, 2110, 2111, 2112, 2113, 2114, 2115, 2116, 2117, 2118, 2119, 2120, 2121, 2122, 2123, 2124, 2125, 2126, 2127, 2128, 2129, 2130, 2131, 2132, 2133, 2134, 2135, 2136, 2137, 2138, 2139, 2140, 2141, 2142, 2143, 2144, 2145, 2146, 2147, 2148, 2149, 2150, 2151, 2152, 2153, 2154, 2155, 2156, 2157, 2158, 2159, 2160, 2161, 2162, 2163, 2164, 2165, 2166, 2167, 2168, 2169, 2170, 2171, 2172, 2173, 2174, 2175, 2176, 2177, 2178, 2179, 2180, 2181, 2182, 2183, 2184, 2185, 2186, 2187, 2188, 2189, 2190, 2191, 2192, 2193, 2194, 2195, 2196, 2197, 2198, 2199, 2200, 2201, 2202, 2203, 2204, 2205, 2206, 2207, 2208, 2209, 2210, 2211, 2212, 2213, 2214, 2215, 2216, 2217, 2218, 2219, 2220, 2221, 2222, 2223, 2224, 2225, 2226, 2227, 2228, 2229, 2230, 2231, 2232, 2233, 2234, 2235, 2236, 2237, 2238, 2239, 2240, 2241, 2242, 2243, 2244, 2245, 2246, 2247, 2248, 2249, 2250, 2251, 2252, 2253, 2254, 2255, 2256, 2257, 2258, 2259, 2260, 2261, 2262, 2263, 2264, 2265, 2266, 2267, 2268, 2269, 2270, 2271, 2272, 2273, 2274, 2275, 2276, 2277, 2278, 2279, 2280, 2281, 2282, 2283, 2284, 2285, 2286, 2287, 2288, 2289, 2290, 2291, 2292, 2293, 2294, 2295, 2296, 2297, 2298, 2299, 2300, 2301, 2302, 2303, 2304, 2305, 2306, 2307, 2308, 2309, 2310, 2311, 2312, 2313, 2314, 2315, 2316, 2317, 2318, 2319, 2320, 2321, 2322, 2323, 2324, 2325, 2326, 2327, 2328, 2329, 2330, 2331, 2332, 2333, 2334, 2335, 2336, 2337, 2338, 2339, 2340, 2341, 2342, 2343, 2344, 2345, 2346, 2347, 2348, 2349, 2350, 2351, 2352, 2353, 2354, 2355, 2356, 2357, 2358, 2359, 2360, 2361, 2362, 2363, 2364, 2365, 2366, 2367, 2368, 2369, 2370, 2371, 2372, 2373, 2374, 2375, 2376, 2377, 2378, 2379, 2380, 2381, 2382, 2383, 2384, 2385, 2386, 2387, 2388, 2389, 2390, 2391, 2392, 2393, 2394, 2395, 2396, 2397, 2398, 2399, 2400, 2401, 2402, 2403, 2404, 2405, 2406, 2407, 2408, 2409, 2410, 2411, 2412, 2413, 2414, 2415, 2416, 2417, 2418, 2419, 2420, 2421, 2422, 2423, 2424, 2425, 2426, 2427, 2428, 2429, 2430, 2431, 2432, 2433, 2434, 2435, 2436, 2437, 2438, 2439, 2440, 2441, 2442, 2443, 2444, 2445, 2446, 2447, 2448, 2449, 2450, 2451, 2452, 2453, 2454, 2455, 2456, 2457, 2458, 2459, 2460, 2461, 2462, 2463, 2464, 2465, 2466, 2467, 2468, 2469, 2470, 2471, 2472, 2473, 2474, 2475, 2476, 2477, 2478, 2479, 2480, 2481, 2482, 2483, 2484, 2485, 2486, 2487, 2488, 2489, 2490, 2491, 2492, 2493, 2494, 2495, 2496, 2497, 2498, 2499, 2500, 2501, 2502, 2503, 2504, 2505, 2506, 2507, 2508, 2509, 2510, 2511, 2512, 2513, 2514, 2515, 2516, 2517, 2518, 2519, 2520, 2521, 2522, 2523, 2524, 2525, 2526, 2527, 2528, 2529, 2530, 2531, 2532, 2533, 2534, 2535, 2536, 2537, 2538, 2539, 2540, 2541, 2542, 2543, 2544, 2545, 2546, 2547, 2548, 2549, 2550, 2551, 2552, 2553, 2554, 2555, 2556, 2557, 2558, 2559, 2560, 2561, 2562, 2563, 2564, 2565, 2566, 2567, 2568, 2569, 2570, 2571, 2572, 2573, 2574, 2575, 2576, 2577, 2578, 2579, 2580, 2581, 2582, 2583, 2584, 2585, 2586, 2587, 2588, 2589, 2590, 2591, 2592, 2593, 2594, 2595, 2596, 2597, 2598, 2599, 2600, 2601, 2602, 2603, 2604, 2605, 2606, 2607, 2608, 2609, 2610, 2611, 2612, 2613, 2614, 2615, 2616, 2617, 2618, 2619, 2620, 2621, 2622, 2623, 2624, 2625, 2626, 2627, 2628, 2629, 2630, 2631, 2632, 2633, 2634, 2635, 2636, 2637, 2638, 2639, 2640, 2641, 2642, 2643, 2644, 2645, 2646, 2647, 2648, 2649, 2650, 2651, 2652, 2653, 2654, 2655, 2656, 2657, 2658, 2659, 2660, 2661, 2662, 2663, 2664, 2665, 2666, 2667, 2668, 2669, 2670, 2671, 2672, 2673, 2674, 2675, 2676, 2677, 2678, 2679, 26

1. *Journal of the American Medical Association*, 1997; 277: 1033-1038.

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— *Journal of the American Medical Association*, 1997

1. *Chlorophyll a* and *Chlorophyll b* were determined by the method of Lichtenthaler and Whistler (1973). The total chlorophyll content was determined by the method of Arar and Cook (1980). The carotenoid content was determined by the method of Lichtenthaler and Whistler (1973). The total phenolic content was determined by the method of Singleton and Rossi (1965). The total flavonoid content was determined by the method of Singleton and Rossi (1965). The total protein content was determined by the method of Lowry et al. (1951). The total carbohydrate content was determined by the method of Dubois and Gilles (1950). The total lipid content was determined by the method of Folch et al. (1957). The total ash content was determined by the method of AOAC (1990). The total acid content was determined by the method of AOAC (1990). The total base content was determined by the method of AOAC (1990). The total nitrogen content was determined by the method of Kjeldahl (1900). The total sulfur content was determined by the method of AOAC (1990). The total phosphorus content was determined by the method of AOAC (1990). The total potassium content was determined by the method of AOAC (1990). The total calcium content was determined by the method of AOAC (1990). The total magnesium content was determined by the method of AOAC (1990). The total iron content was determined by the method of AOAC (1990). The total zinc content was determined by the method of AOAC (1990). The total copper content was determined by the method of AOAC (1990). The total manganese content was determined by the method of AOAC (1990). The total cobalt content was determined by the method of AOAC (1990). The total nickel content was determined by the method of AOAC (1990). The total boron content was determined by the method of AOAC (1990). The total selenium content was determined by the method of AOAC (1990). The total iodine content was determined by the method of AOAC (1990). The total bromine content was determined by the method of AOAC (1990). The total fluorine content was determined by the method of AOAC (1990). The total chlorine content was determined by the method of AOAC (1990). The total oxygen content was determined by the method of AOAC (1990). The total hydrogen content was determined by the method of AOAC (1990). The total carbon content was determined by the method of AOAC (1990). The total nitrogen content was determined by the method of Kjeldahl (1900). The total sulfur content was determined by the method of AOAC (1990). The total phosphorus content was determined by the method of AOAC (1990). The total potassium content was determined by the method of AOAC (1990). The total calcium content was determined by the method of AOAC (1990). The total magnesium content was determined by the method of AOAC (1990). The total iron content was determined by the method of AOAC (1990). The total zinc content was determined by the method of AOAC (1990). The total copper content was determined by the method of AOAC (1990). The total manganese content was determined by the method of AOAC (1990). The total cobalt content was determined by the method of AOAC (1990). The total nickel content was determined by the method of AOAC (1990). The total boron content was determined by the method of AOAC (1990). The total selenium content was determined by the method of AOAC (1990). The total iodine content was determined by the method of AOAC (1990). The total bromine content was determined by the method of AOAC (1990). The total fluorine content was determined by the method of AOAC (1990). The total chlorine content was determined by the method of AOAC (1990). The total oxygen content was determined by the method of AOAC (1990). The total hydrogen content was determined by the method of AOAC (1990). The total carbon content was determined by the method of AOAC (1990).

1. *Journal of the American Medical Association*, 1997; 277: 1033-1036.

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1. *Chlorophyll a* and *Chlorophyll b* were determined by the method of Arar and Collins (1971).

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1. *Journal of the American Medical Association*, 1997; 277: 1039-1043.

1. *Journal of the American Medical Association*, 277, 1996, 1033-1037.

1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17. 18. 19. 20. 21. 22. 23. 24. 25. 26. 27. 28. 29. 30. 31. 32. 33. 34. 35. 36. 37. 38. 39. 40. 41. 42. 43. 44. 45. 46. 47. 48. 49. 50. 51. 52. 53. 54. 55. 56. 57. 58. 59. 60. 61. 62. 63. 64. 65. 66. 67. 68. 69. 70. 71. 72. 73. 74. 75. 76. 77. 78. 79. 80. 81. 82. 83. 84. 85. 86. 87. 88. 89. 90. 91. 92. 93. 94. 95. 96. 97. 98. 99. 100. 101. 102. 103. 104. 105. 106. 107. 108. 109. 110. 111. 112. 113. 114. 115. 116. 117. 118. 119. 120. 121. 122. 123. 124. 125. 126. 127. 128. 129. 130. 131. 132. 133. 134. 135. 136. 137. 138. 139. 140. 141. 142. 143. 144. 145. 146. 147. 148. 149. 150. 151. 152. 153. 154. 155. 156. 157. 158. 159. 160. 161. 162. 163. 164. 165. 166. 167. 168. 169. 170. 171. 172. 173. 174. 175. 176. 177. 178. 179. 180. 181. 182. 183. 184. 185. 186. 187. 188. 189. 190. 191. 192. 193. 194. 195. 196. 197. 198. 199. 200. 201. 202. 203. 204. 205. 206. 207. 208. 209. 210. 211. 212. 213. 214. 215. 216. 217. 218. 219. 220. 221. 222. 223. 224. 225. 226. 227. 228. 229. 230. 231. 232. 233. 234. 235. 236. 237. 238. 239. 240. 241. 242. 243. 244. 245. 246. 247. 248. 249. 250. 251. 252. 253. 254. 255. 256. 257. 258. 259. 260. 261. 262. 263. 264. 265. 266. 267. 268. 269. 270. 271. 272. 273. 274. 275. 276. 277. 278. 279. 280. 281. 282. 283. 284. 285. 286. 287. 288. 289. 290. 291. 292. 293. 294. 295. 296. 297. 298. 299. 300. 301. 302. 303. 304. 305. 306. 307. 308. 309. 310. 311. 312. 313. 314. 315. 316. 317. 318. 319. 320. 321. 322. 323. 324. 325. 326. 327. 328. 329. 330. 331. 332. 333. 334. 335. 336. 337. 338. 339. 340. 341. 342. 343. 344. 345. 346. 347. 348. 349. 350. 351. 352. 353. 354. 355. 356. 357. 358. 359. 360. 361. 362. 363. 364. 365. 366. 367. 368. 369. 370. 371. 372. 373. 374. 375. 376. 377. 378. 379. 380. 381. 382. 383. 384. 385. 386. 387. 388. 389. 390. 391. 392. 393. 394. 395. 396. 397. 398. 399. 400. 401. 402. 403. 404. 405. 406. 407. 408. 409. 410. 411. 412. 413. 414. 415. 416. 417. 418. 419. 420. 421. 422. 423. 424. 425. 426. 427. 428. 429. 430. 431. 432. 433. 434. 435. 436. 437. 438. 439. 440. 441. 442. 443. 444. 445. 446. 447. 448. 449. 450. 451. 452. 453. 454. 455. 456. 457. 458. 459. 460. 461. 462. 463. 464. 465. 466. 467. 468. 469. 470. 471. 472. 473. 474. 475. 476. 477. 478. 479. 480. 481. 482. 483. 484. 485. 486. 487. 488. 489. 490. 491. 492. 493. 494. 495. 496. 497. 498. 499. 500. 501. 502. 503. 504. 505. 506. 507. 508. 509. 510. 511. 512. 513. 514. 515. 516. 517. 518. 519. 520. 521. 522. 523. 524. 525. 526. 527. 528. 529. 530. 531. 532. 533. 534. 535. 536. 537. 538. 539. 540. 541. 542. 543. 544. 545. 546. 547. 548. 549. 550. 551. 552. 553. 554. 555. 556. 557. 558. 559. 560. 561. 562. 563. 564. 565. 566. 567. 568. 569. 570. 571. 572. 573. 574. 575. 576. 577. 578. 579. 580. 581. 582. 583. 584. 585. 586. 587. 588. 589. 590. 591. 592. 593. 594. 595. 596. 597. 598. 599. 600. 601. 602. 603. 604. 605. 606. 607. 608. 609. 610. 611. 612. 613. 614. 615. 616. 617. 618. 619. 620. 621. 622. 623. 624. 625. 626. 627. 628. 629. 630. 631. 632. 633. 634. 635. 636. 637. 638. 639. 640. 641. 642. 643. 644. 645. 646. 647. 648. 649. 650. 651. 652. 653. 654. 655. 656. 657. 658. 659. 660. 661. 662. 663. 664. 665. 666. 667. 668. 669. 670. 671. 672. 673. 674. 675. 676. 677. 678. 679. 680. 681. 682. 683. 684. 685. 686. 687. 688. 689. 690. 691. 692. 693. 694. 695. 696. 697. 698. 699. 700. 701. 702. 703. 704. 705. 706. 707. 708. 709. 710. 711. 712. 713. 714. 715. 716. 717. 718. 719. 720. 721. 722. 723. 724. 725. 726. 727. 728. 729. 730. 731. 732. 733. 734. 735. 736. 737. 738. 739. 740. 741. 742. 743. 744. 745. 746. 747. 748. 749. 750. 751. 752. 753. 754. 755. 756. 757. 758. 759. 760. 761. 762. 763. 764. 765. 766. 767. 768. 769. 770. 771. 772. 773. 774. 775. 776. 777. 778. 779. 780. 781. 782. 783. 784. 785. 786. 787. 788. 789. 790. 791. 792. 793. 794. 795. 796. 797. 798. 799. 800. 801. 802. 803. 804. 805. 806. 807. 808. 809. 810. 811. 812. 813. 814. 815. 816. 817. 818. 819. 820. 821. 822. 823. 824. 825. 826. 827. 828. 829. 830. 831. 832. 833. 834. 835. 836. 837. 838. 839. 840. 84

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— *Journal of the American Medical Association*, 1997

1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014, 2015, 2016, 2017, 2018, 2019, 2020, 2021, 2022, 2023, 2024, 2025, 2026, 2027, 2028, 2029, 2030, 2031, 2032, 2033, 2034, 2035, 2036, 2037, 2038, 2039, 2040, 2041, 2042, 2043, 2044, 2045, 2046, 2047, 2048, 2049, 2050, 2051, 2052, 2053, 2054, 2055, 2056, 2057, 2058, 2059, 2060, 2061, 2062, 2063, 2064, 2065, 2066, 2067, 2068, 2069, 2070, 2071, 2072, 2073, 2074, 2075, 2076, 2077, 2078, 2079, 2080, 2081, 2082, 2083, 2084, 2085, 2086, 2087, 2088, 2089, 2090, 2091, 2092, 2093, 2094, 2095, 2096, 2097, 2098, 2099, 2100, 2101, 2102, 2103, 2104, 2105, 2106, 2107, 2108, 2109, 2110, 2111, 2112, 2113, 2114, 2115, 2116, 2117, 2118, 2119, 2120, 2121, 2122, 2123, 2124, 2125, 2126, 2127, 2128, 2129, 2130, 2131, 2132, 2133, 2134, 2135, 2136, 2137, 2138, 2139, 2140, 2141, 2142, 2143, 2144, 2145, 2146, 2147, 2148, 2149, 2150, 2151, 2152, 2153, 2154, 2155, 2156, 2157, 2158, 2159, 2160, 2161, 2162, 2163, 2164, 2165, 2166, 2167, 2168, 2169, 2170, 2171, 2172, 2173, 2174, 2175, 2176, 2177, 2178, 2179, 2180, 2181, 2182, 2183, 2184, 2185, 2186, 2187, 2188, 2189, 2190, 2191, 2192, 2193, 2194, 2195, 2196, 2197, 2198, 2199, 2200, 2201, 2202, 2203, 2204, 2205, 2206, 2207, 2208, 2209, 2210, 2211, 2212, 2213, 2214, 2215, 2216, 2217, 2218, 2219, 2220, 2221, 2222, 2223, 2224, 2225, 2226, 2227, 2228, 2229, 2230, 2231, 2232, 2233, 2234, 2235, 2236, 2237, 2238, 2239, 2240, 2241, 2242, 2243, 2244, 2245, 2246, 2247, 2248, 2249, 2250, 2251, 2252, 2253, 2254, 2255, 2256, 2257, 2258, 2259, 2260, 2261, 2262, 2263, 2264, 2265, 2266, 2267, 2268, 2269, 2270, 2271, 2272, 2273, 2274, 2275, 2276, 2277, 2278, 2279, 2280, 2281, 2282, 2283, 2284, 2285, 2286, 2287, 2288, 2289, 2290, 2291, 2292, 2293, 2294, 2295, 2296, 2297, 2298, 2299, 2300, 2301, 2302, 2303, 2304, 2305, 2306, 2307, 2308, 2309, 2310, 2311, 2312, 2313, 2314, 2315, 2316, 2317, 2318, 2319, 2320, 2321, 2322, 2323, 2324, 2325, 2326, 2327, 2328, 2329, 2330, 2331, 2332, 2333, 2334, 2335, 2336, 2337, 2338, 2339, 2340, 2341, 2342, 2343, 2344, 2345, 2346, 2347, 2348, 2349, 2350, 2351, 2352, 2353, 2354, 2355, 2356, 2357, 2358, 2359, 2360, 2361, 2362, 2363, 2364, 2365, 2366, 2367, 2368, 2369, 2370, 2371, 2372, 2373, 2374, 2375, 2376, 2377, 2378, 2379, 2380, 2381, 2382, 2383, 2384, 2385, 2386, 2387, 2388, 2389, 2390, 2391, 2392, 2393, 2394, 2395, 2396, 2397, 2398, 2399, 2400, 2401, 2402, 2403, 2404, 2405, 2406, 2407, 2408, 2409, 2410, 2411, 2412, 2413, 2414, 2415, 2416, 2417, 2418, 2419, 2420, 2421, 2422, 2423, 2424, 2425, 2426, 2427, 2428, 2429, 2430, 2431, 2432, 2433, 2434, 2435, 2436, 2437, 2438, 2439, 2440, 2441, 2442, 2443, 2444, 2445, 2446, 2447, 2448, 2449, 2450, 2451, 2452, 2453, 2454, 2455, 2456, 2457, 2458, 2459, 2460, 2461, 2462, 2463, 2464, 2465, 2466, 2467, 2468, 2469, 2470, 2471, 2472, 2473, 2474, 2475, 2476, 2477, 2478, 2479, 2480, 2481, 2482, 2483, 2484, 2485, 2486, 2487, 2488, 2489, 2490, 2491, 2492, 2493, 2494, 2495, 2496, 2497, 2498, 2499, 2500, 2501, 2502, 2503, 2504, 2505, 2506, 2507, 2508, 2509, 2510, 2511, 2512, 2513, 2514, 2515, 2516, 2517, 2518, 2519, 2520, 2521, 2522, 2523, 2524, 2525, 2526, 2527, 2528, 2529, 2530, 2531, 2532, 2533, 2534, 2535, 2536, 2537, 2538, 2539, 2540, 2541, 2542, 2543, 2544, 2545, 2546, 2547, 2548, 2549, 2550, 2551, 2552, 2553, 2554, 2555, 2556, 2557, 2558, 2559, 2560, 2561, 2562, 2563, 2564, 2565, 2566, 2567, 2568, 2569, 2570, 2571, 2572, 2573, 2574, 2575, 2576, 2577, 2578, 2579, 2580, 2581, 2582, 2583, 2584, 2585, 2586, 2587, 2588, 2589, 2590, 2591, 2592, 2593, 2594, 2595, 2596, 2597, 2598, 2599, 2600, 2601, 2602, 2603, 2604, 2605, 2606, 2607, 2608, 2609, 2610, 2611, 2612, 2613, 2614, 2615, 2616, 2617, 2618, 2619, 2620, 2621, 2622, 2623, 2624, 2625, 2626, 2627, 2628, 2629, 2630, 2631, 2632, 2633, 2634, 2635, 2636, 2637, 2638, 2639, 2640, 2641, 2642, 2643, 2644, 2645, 2646, 2647, 2648, 2649, 2650, 2651, 2652, 2653, 2654, 2655, 2656, 2657, 2658, 2659, 2660, 2661, 2662, 2663, 2664, 2665, 2666, 2667, 2668, 2669, 2670, 2671, 2672, 2673, 2674, 2675, 2676, 2677, 2678, 2679, 26

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40-2 code book and a client case study.

Buzzing everywhere all the time
Of bustling crowds with jealousies and fears. *Drives*

accused is able to give security, shall take security from him for his appearance before such Magistrate on a day fixed and for his attendance from day to day before such Magistrate until otherwise directed

(2) When the officer in charge of a Police-station forwards an accused person to a Magistrate under this section, he shall be bound to produce before the Magistrate all persons who appear to such officer to be acquainted with the circumstances of the case as he may think necessary, to execute a bond to appear before the Magistrate as thereby directed and prosecute or give evidence (as the case may be) in the matter of the charge against the accused.

(3) If the Court of the District Magistrate or Sub-divisional Magistrate is mentioned in the bond such Court shall be held to include any Court to which such Magistrate may refer the case for inquiry or trial, provided reasonable notice of such reference is given to such complainant or persons

(4) The day fixed under this section shall be the day whereon the accused person is to appear, if security for his appearance has been taken, or the day on which he may be expected to arrive at the Court of the Magistrate, if he is to be forwarded in custody.

(5) The officer in whose presence the bond is executed shall deliver a copy thereof to one of the persons who executed it and shall then send to the Magistrate the original with his report

Notes.—1. On a day fixed, i.e., on a particular day, 11 W. R. 47; but not after a long interval, 6 W. R. 52. This is the only section under which a Police-officer can take recognizances from an accused person for his appearance before a Magistrate. He can exercise this power only after the investigation is complete.

2. Evidence should be sent in as found.—In a preliminary inquiry before a Magistrate, the evidence should be sent in as found and not kept by the Police till they have made it all complete, 5 W. R. 6.

3. Accused to be sent to Magistrate when substantial case is made out.—When the facts brought to light constitute a case which can properly be submitted to the Magistrate having jurisdiction, the accused should be sent immediately to such Magistrate according to the provisions of this section. If the first step of the Police investigation discloses a substantial case against the accused, he should at once be forwarded as contemplated in this section, *B. H. C. Cr. Cr., p. 3*

4. Case must be sent to the Magistrate who ordered the Police inquiry.—When a Magistrate having cognizance of a case refers it to the Police for inquiry and report, the Police have no power to prefer a charge-sheet before another Magistrate and the latter has no jurisdiction to take cognizance of the case, *16 Cr. L. J. 465 (M.)*

5. Binding over witnesses for prosecution.—When a District Superintendent in looking into the case finds that any witnesses have been unnecessarily sent in, he should at once report the circumstances to the Magistrate, in order that the witnesses might be discharged before the trial, should the Magistrate think proper. When such witnesses are dismissed, the Superintendent should inform the Police-officer who sent up the case and point out the reasons of their not being required, thereby instructing him in his duty.—*Beng. Pol. Man., 2nd Ed., p. 382.*

6. Police not to bind defence witnesses.—It is not the duty of the Police to bind over and produce before the Magistrate the witnesses for the defence. This section and s. 173 refer to witnesses in support of the complaint, and it cannot be supposed that the power of detaining witnesses in custody which is given by s. 171 was intended to apply to the prisoner's witnesses. It is true that when the case comes on before the Magistrate, the witnesses for the defence may sometimes arise. But considering the qualifications of the witnesses, it is not anxious to adduce, it is probable that grave inconvenience would arise, if the Police were instructed to bind over their witnesses.—*Mad. Pol. Man., Vol. I, p. 90*

7. Payment to witnesses.—For rules in Bengal see *Calcutta Gazette, 1895 Pt. I, p. 621*. See also Notes to s. 544

8. In case of an offence under the Railway Act when case should be sent as cognizable.—When an arrest is made under the *Indian Railway Act* of a person who there is reason to believe, will abscond or whose name and address are unknown and he refuses to give them, or when given are reasonably believed to be incorrect, the case should be sent to the Magistrate in accordance with this section as a cognizable case as defined in cl. (f) of s. 4, although the offence alleged against the accused be not itself cognizable.—*Bom H C Cr Cir, para 10-a, p 4*

9. When copy of bond to be sent to Commanding Officer.—If the complainant or other person is a soldier in His Majesty's Army, the officer in charge of Police-station should immediately after taking such bond, send a copy thereof to the Commanding Officer of the Regiment in which he is serving.—*Bom Pol Man, p 90*

10. Copy of Police charge-sheet cannot be given at the beginning of trial.—At the beginning of a trial in a Presidency Magistrate's Court, an application was made on behalf of the accused for a copy of the Police charge-sheet, which contained the whole of the prosecution evidence as set forth by the Police, and extracts from, if not copies, of the Police diaries. The application was rejected by the Magistrate; *held* that the Magistrate was not wrong in refusing the application at the stage of the proceedings and the High Court would not interfere in revision, **19 M. 14**. In commenting on this, the *Madras Law Journal* observes (**6 M. L. J. 154**) 'We think this decision is likely to work considerable mischief. The learned Judges no doubt expressed themselves somewhat guardedly that at the stage of the proceedings they would not in revision set aside the order of the Magistrate refusing a copy of the charge-sheet. The Subordinate Magistrate is apt to extend the scope of this decision to all cases. It seems to us that the Police charge-sheet corresponds to the complaint of the private individual on which criminal proceedings are initiated. S 191 of the Cr P C. specifies the modes in which criminal proceedings are started, the complaint of a private individual and the report of the Police being the modes in which the jurisdiction of the Magistrate is invoked. The accused is entitled to a copy of the complaint and for the same reason to a copy of the charge-sheet. The fact that the charge-sheet may contain matters which are also in the diary is no argument in favour of refusing a copy. For as we have more than once pointed out, s. 161 places the result of the Police investigation on a footing entirely different from the diary under s. 172.' It is to be borne in mind that from the description given by the Magistrate of the Police charge-sheet, it more resembled a brief for the prosecution prepared for Magistrate's information than a mere complaint.

Complainants and witnesses not to be required to accompany Police-officer

171. No complainant or witness on his way to the Court of the Magistrate shall be required to accompany a Police-officer,

Complainants and witnesses not to be subjected to restraint.

or shall be subjected to unnecessary restraint or inconvenience, or required to give any security for his appearance other than his own bond

Recusant complainant or witnesses may be forwarded in custody

Provided that, if any complainant or witness refuses to attend or to execute a bond as directed in section 170, the officer in charge of the Police station may forward him in custody to the Magistrate, who may detain him in custody until he executes such bond, or until the hearing of the case is completed

Notes.—1. No objection to complainant or witness accompanying Police of his own accord.—Under the

2. Restraint exercised upon witness by Police illegal.—Where a witness was kept under surveillance for four days by the Police and the Sessions Judge considered that under the circumstances of the case they were perfectly justified in keeping her in this state. *Held* that there is no warrant for the Police to subject a witness to any unnecessary restraint whatsoever, and the control exercised over the witness being unnecessary her evidence cannot be accepted as that of a witness speaking voluntarily, **4 C. W. N. 49 at p. 54**. Disobedience of the provisions of this section will be punishable under s. 166, I P C.

I would even lose the diamond. That
 I will with.
 I live to excel ambitious, emu

a sulfon heats your breast, *Dryden*
contest contention, strife
a lone emulous shall arise *Shak*

172. (1) Every Police officer making an investigation under this Chapter shall day by day enter his proceedings in the investigation in a diary, setting forth the time at which the information reached him the time at which he began and closed his investigation the place or places visited by him and a statement of the circumstances ascertained through his investigation

Diary of proceeding
in investigation

(2) Any Criminal Court may send for the Police diaries of a case under inquiry or trial in such Court and may use such diaries not as evidence in the case, but to aid it in such inquiry or trial Neither the accused nor his agents shall be entitled to call for such diaries, nor shall he or they be entitled to see them merely because they are referred to by the Court, but if they are used by the Police officer who made them, to refresh his memory or if the Court uses them for the purpose of contradicting such Police-officer the provisions of the Indian Evidence Act 1872 section 161 or section 145 as the case may be shall apply

Notes—1 Provisions of the Indian Evidence Act.— Any writing referred to under the provisions of the two last preceding sections must be produced and shown to the adverse party if he requires it such party may, if he pleases cross-examine the witnesses thereupon s 161 A witness may be cross-examined as to previous statements made by him in writing or reduced to writing and relevant to matters in question without such writing being shown to him or being proved, but if it is intended to contradict him by the writing his attention must before the writing can be proved be called to those parts of it which are to be used for the purpose of contradicting him s. 145 See also ss 159 and 160

2 Sample of Case Diary—

Police-station

*Number of intimation under
s 157 Cr Pro Code }*

Case Diary No

Offence—Murder s 302 I P C

January 12th 1891 8 a.m.—Budhu complainant, resident of Dharampet came to the station and reported that his brother Sukhlall had left his house on the previous evening to visit a neighbour and as he did not return during the night a messenger was sent to enquire about him. The messenger (Ramlall Gorait) came back and reported to Budhu that the body of Sukhlall was lying by the side of the road between M Dharampet and M Paldi with the head laid open by a sword cut. Therefore the complainant demanded enquiry

8-30 a.m.—I Narain Lall Sub-Inspector started for the spot.

9-30 a.m.—I arrived in the village of Dharampet and commenced enquiries I found the body of Sukhlall lying at the place indicated by the complainant Life was extinct and the corpse which had three sword cuts on it was first made the subject of an inquest under s 174 Cr P C (the *Anchayalnama* duly signed has been forwarded to the Magistrate having jurisdiction) and then sent in the custody of constable Asgar Ali to the Civil Surgeon for examination The usual descriptive roll was sent with the corpse

10 a.m.—Ramlall Gorait was despatched in search of Hira a man suspected by complainant.

10-25 a.m.—Inspector Mohamed Hussein arrived and under express orders from headquarters took over the investigation.

(Sd) NARAIN LALL

Sub-Inspector

On arriving I Mohamed Hussein Inspector in accordance with express orders given to me took charge of the case. In the course of enquiries I found that deceased had an intrigue with the wife of Devidin Brahmin living in a hamlet about 600 yards from the village where deceased resides and that deceased left his house last evening with the intention of meeting Devidin's wife.

4 p.m.—Ascertained from Dadu Kahar that Devidin and Nain Sukh were seen following deceased towards the village of the latter and that these two men were armed—one with a sword the other with a *gherrasa* I therefore searched the house of these two men in the presence of themselves and Jadab Chander Mukerji and Mohan Singh—two respectable inhabitants of the place The arms indicated by Devidin were found buried in

an inner room in Devidin's house both of them stained with blood. A blood-stained dhoti was also found hidden in the thatch of the same building. Both Devidin and Nain Sukh were thereupon arrested. Ramlall Gorait identifies the *gurrasa* as belonging to Nain Sukh. He also recognized the sword. Bihari dhoti stated that he had frequently washed the dhoti for Devidin. Carefully wrapped paper round the sword and *gurrasa* head to preserve the stains of blood.

5 p.m.—Nain Sukh volunteered to state that Devidin had committed murder in his company that they took two silver *karas* from the body of deceased that it might appear that he had been killed by robbers and that these ornaments had been buried by him and Devidin under a bush in Devidin's field.

5.30 p.m.—The Inspector taking the prisoners and Laljee Srikishna and Thakur Pershad Malguzars and residents of Gooma made search in the field and found the two *karas* buried as indicated. The ornaments were identified by the complainant and they were then carefully labelled and numbered. An accurate list of them will be found in column 10 of the trial-sheet. Devidin's wife admits that deceased came to see her on the evening of his death. She said her husband returned home suddenly and found them together. Deceased then left her house and her husband after digging up his sword from the ground (where he had buried it for concealment) followed deceased attended by Nain Sukh his servant. The latter carried a *gurrasa*.

6 p.m.—Inquiry completed. Prepared trial-sheet and despatched it with the two prisoners the two *karas* the sword *gurrasa* and blood-stained cloth in custody of constables Puran Singh and Sudhan Khan. The constables were instructed to lodge the prisoners at the station for the night and proceed to headquarters in the morning. Security bonds for appearance before the Court on the 13th instant have been taken from complainant and witnesses and are attached to the trial-sheet.

(Sd) MAHOMED HUSSEIN

District Inspector

NB—The case diary should contain only such information as will indicate clearly what is being done in order to complete the case. It should contain only facts. No hypothesis or theory should be entered.—C. P. Pol. Man. p. 159. In addition to the particulars required by this section the diary should show (a) date of despatch (b) constable in charge (c) number of the constable and his rank (d) beat or duty (e) number of constable met and of what station and (f) information obtained.

3. Proper use of the special diary.—In 19 A 390, the Full Bench laid down the following rules as to the use of the special diary—

(a) *Extent of its use*—If the special diary has been used by the Court to contradict the Police-officer who made it or by the Police-officer who made it to refresh his memory the accused person or his agent has a right to see that portion of the diary which has been referred to for either of these purposes that is to say, the accused person or his agent is entitled to see the particular entry which has been referred to and so much of the diary as in the opinion of the Court is necessary in that particular matter to the full understanding of the particular entry so used but no more. See 8 G. 739.

(b) *Court cannot make a standing order for their production*—A Sessions Judge although he has power in any particular case which is before him to send for the special diaries connected with the case if he thinks it necessary to peruse them, has no authority to issue a general order that in every case committed for trial to the Court of Session and in every criminal appeal the Police diaries shall be submitted to the Court simultaneously with the Magistrate's record of the case. Such an order was said to be illegal.

(c) *Accused not entitled to copy*—In no case is an accused person entitled as of right to a copy of any statement recorded by a Police-officer in the special diary prepared under the authority of this section (though under the new proviso to s. 162, *supra* he can be furnished with a copy if the Court thinks it expedient in the interests of justice).

(d) *How the Court might use the special diary*—(i) The special diary might be used by the Court to assist it in the inquiry or trial by suggesting means of further elucidating points which need clearing up and which are material for the purpose of doing justice between the Crown and the accused but the entries in the special diary cannot by themselves be taken as evidence of any date fact or statement therein contained.

(ii) The special diary might also be used by the Court for the purpose of contradicting the Police officer who made it and the special diary might be used by the Police-officer who made it but by no witness other than such officer for the purpose of refreshing his memory.

4 When accused entitled to inspect diary.—The proper procedure is for the accused at the time the witness whose statement is recorded appears before the Court to ask the Court to refer to such writing and furnish them with copies, 33 C 1023 and see Note 14 to s. 162. The accused may look at the particular writing before or at the time the witness uses it to refresh his memory, 8 C 739.

5 Special diary is a privileged record—Statements of witness examined not to be entered in the special diary.—The proceedings in case of investigation subsequent to information will be recorded in a special diary which is a privileged record, only to be referred to as evidence by the Court for its own information. The statements of witnesses for the prosecution, recorded by an investigating Police-officer, form no part of the diary, such statements therefore shall not be entered in the special Police diary, but shall be separately recorded.—*Reg and Ord, N-W P, s 10 p 268*. In 33 C 1023 the practice of incorporating such statements in the special diary was severely condemned. The privilege given by this section does not extend to statements taken under s 161 and entered in a diary kept under this section, 20 C 642. The diary must contain everything material heard or done by a Policeman in the course of the day with reference to his work, and for obvious reasons is not subject to inspection by the parties. It is not necessary to enter into the diary the statements made by witnesses on an oral examination made by a Police-officer. The fact that a Police-officer examined certain witnesses is a part of his proceedings, but the actual statements of the witnesses are not proceedings of the Police-officer, but he may lawfully reduce into writing in the special diary the full and unabridged statement made by a person whom he is examining or has examined, and if he does so, his record of such statement is part of the special diary, and is just as much privileged as any other entry in the diary, 19 A 390 (F.B.)

6 Statements of circumstances ascertained in investigation.—These should be as brief as is consistent with clearness and need not include statements or report, *in extenso*, or copies of Panchanamas or other proceedings. When statements are taken separately, the diary need contain only a brief reference to the recorded statements. The fact that the Panchanamas have been recorded or reports made should be entered as part of the history of the investigation, but a statement of their contents should appear, if at all only as a portion of the narrative of results.—*Bom Pol Man, p 89*

The case diary must contain only such information regarding the results of investigation as will indicate clearly what is being done in order to complete the case. It shall record facts only, no hypothesis or theories of the officer making the investigation will be entered.—*C P Pol. Man, p 159*.

7. District Magistrate must see that the diary is regularly kept.—The Magistrate of the district should see that the diary is regularly kept up and that each day's diary has been forwarded to, and has regularly reached, the District Superintendent in course of post, this being the only security against the contents being ante-dated.—*Punjab Cir, p 174*

8 Neither Police diaries nor reports are evidence.—Neither Police diaries nor Police reports are evidence of the matters stated therein. The facts stated therein must be proved by examining the writer as a witness, Weir II, 143; 1893 A. W. N. 145; Weir II, 142; 19 A. 390 (F.B.) In 10 C. W. N. 600, it was held that facts and statements written in the Police diaries cannot be used as materials to help the Court in a criminal trial to come to a finding on the evidence in the case, and that where the Court should do with the Police diaries is to discover out of them any matter of importance bearing upon the case and then call for the necessary evidence to have the matter legally proved. See also 15 C. W. N. 47, 1 P. W. R. 1914. The provision any criminal Court may send for Police diaries to aid in such inquiry or trials etc., does not authorize a Court in making a summary of their contents part of its judgment and apparently making the statements contained therein virtually evidence in the case, 1894 A. W. N. 155. Diary ought not to be referred to as corroborative evidence when the witness who made it did not use it to refresh his memory, 45 Cr. L. J. 256 (M). A diary made by the investigating Police-officer under s 172 Cr. Pro Code, may be used under that section to assist the Court which tries the case by suggesting means of further elucidating points which need clearing up and which are material for the purpose of doing justice between the Crown and the accused, but not as containing entries which can by themselves be taken to be evidence of any date, fact, or statement contained in the diary. The Police-officer who made the diary may be confronted with it, but not any other witness. 33 M. L. J. 553 (P.C.) = 15 A. L. J. 475 approving 19 A. 390 (F.B.)

9. When used for refreshing memory may be made part of record.—Notes of Police-officers of seditious speeches in a trial for offences under s 124 of I. P. C. may be allowed to become part of the record in the case if they are used for refreshing the memories of Police-officers, 32 M. 3 at p. 13. It is only the officer who made the special diary that can refresh his memory, 19 A. 390 (F.B.)

due a college. *Endowing* hospitals and almshouses.
 2 To enrich or furnish with any gift, quality, or faculty; to induce, as man is *endowed* by his Maker with reason.
Endower, *s. f.* To enrich with a dowry or portion. *to endow*. *(Obs.)* *Endowment*.
Endower *s.* one who endows.
Endowment *s.* a gift.

His early endowment had fitted him for the work he was to do.
Endow *v. t.* (Trans.) To furnish, to make a dowry or slave. *(Obs.)*
Endowed *s. f.* [Lat. *inductus*]

Answering with an evasive answer the question concerning the endow of his own provision.
 2 A bearing or suffering a continuing unrelieved distress without resistance, or without finally yielding to the pressure, endurance, patience.
 Their fortitude was most admirable in their patient endurance of all evils of pain and of death.
 3 Delay, a waiting for. *(Obs.)*

Syn.—Suffering patience, stoical resignation.
Endure, *s. f.* 1 To remain firm under trials, to undergo, to support without breaking, yielding, as metals *endure* a certain degree of heat.
 2 To put up with, to bear, to suffer.

Therefore I *endure* all things for the elect's sakes. *2 Tim. ii. 10*
Syn.—To last, remain, continue, abide, bear, brook, submit.
Endured *s. f.* *Endurance* *s.*

2 Lower efficiently and forcibly exerted, vigorous or effectual operation, as, the *energy* of a machine.
 3 Strength of expression, force of utterance, life, spirit, emphasis, as, language remarkable for its *energy*.
 4 (*V. A.*) Capacity for performing work, or

1 To put force upon, to force, to constrain, to compel, as, to *enforce* obedience to commands.
 2 To make or gain by force, to force, as, to *enforce* a passage.

4

Spenser

10. Police-officer cannot be compelled to refresh his memory by referring to his diary.—A prisoner on his trial is not entitled to insist that a memorandum made by a Police-officer shall, in the course of the examination of such officer, be referred to by the latter for the purpose of refreshing his memory. The right is the right of the Court, *8 C. 134 = 10 C. L. R. 51*. In this case *Wilson, J.*, remarked "I know of no authority for saying that a witness can be compelled to refresh his memory from any document unless the document is either in the possession of the party who desires to put it to the witness or is at least such as we can insist on having produced." See also *9 C. 335* and *8 C. 739*.

11. Court has no power to make a general order for production of diaries.—A Sessions Court has no power to make a general order for production of Police diaries in all criminal appeals before it but only to summon the diaries when and as required in each particular case, *1894 A. W. N. 181*.

12. Police diaries cannot be placed before the Jury—They are useful, not as evidence but to aid the Court in trial so as to enable it to make a thorough inquiry on all material points and to elicit in the examination of witnesses and especially of Police witnesses the real facts of the case. A Sessions Judge cannot rely on Police proceedings or put the same to the jury without examining Police-officers as witnesses so as to explain such proceedings, *27 C. 295*.

13. Mode of using statements in Police diaries—Statements contained in the Police diaries may be used, e.g., for the purpose of assisting the Court in the examination of witnesses, but no statements in the diaries can be used as evidence, *1894 A. W. N. 135, 10 C. W. N. 600 = 3 Cr. L. J. 408*.

14. Object of maintaining diaries.—The early stages of investigation which follow on the investigation of a crime must necessarily in the majority of cases be left to the Police and until the honesty, the capacity, the discretion and judgment of the Police can be thoroughly trusted it is necessary for the protection of the Police against criminals, for the vindication of the law and for the protection of those who are charged with a criminal offence that the Magistrate or Judge before whom the case is for investigation or for trial should have the means of ascertaining what was the information, true, false or misleading, which was obtained from day to day by the Police-officer who was investigating the case and what were the lines of investigation upon which the Police-officer acted, *19 A. 390; 16 C. W. N. 145 = 13 Cr. L. J. 65*. The Police diaries are generally useful in the inquiry or trial as suggesting means of further elucidating points which need clearing up and which are material for the purpose of doing justice between the Crown and the accused. The diaries are often, when regularly kept, of the very greatest use in enabling Criminal Courts to test the value of the testimony of witnesses especially those belonging to the Police, to establish dates and to ascertain particulars which enable such a Court to judge of the weight to be attached to the evidence given at the trial. Moreover, being indicative though not of probative effect they may furnish the means of directing appropriate questions or supply the basis of a cross-examination. It requires the utmost discrimination and discretion to make a proper use of such records and while they may fairly be appealed to for the history of the several stages through which the Police investigation into a crime has passed they afford no safe or certain material from which conclusions of guilt can be drawn, *1 Leg. Rem. 26*. See also *1 P. W. R. 1916*.

15. Statements taken in absence of accused.—Although under s 145 previous statements made by witnesses may be used for the purpose of contradicting statements made by them subsequently at the trial of the accused person, yet they cannot, if they have been made in the absence of the accused, be treated as independent evidence of his guilt or innocence. S 288, will not avail anything for this purpose, *23 C. 351*.

16. Mode of submitting station diaries.—Station-house reports will be sent from the station house to the Divisional Inspector who will check and verify the information contained in them and will then forward them to headquarter or sub-division office, as the case may be. Inspectors will send *lekids* at once to their station-house officers when anything in their reports calls for explanation or remark, noting in red ink thereon what they have done for the information of the office, and, if necessary, the office can return through Inspectors, the station-house reports for further remarks. In the office a general supervision will be maintained in order to secure due attention of Inspectors, and to check register.—*Nid. Pol. Man., Vol. I, p. 82*.

17. Production of other Police records.—When other Police records are required in a case, the officer in whose custody they are, should be summoned to produce them or certified copies of them subject to the provisions of the *Evidence Act*. No document, precept or official paper of any kind or any copy of such paper, belonging to or in the custody of the Police, will be furnished to any private individual or other person not authorized by law to require it, unless a precept of a competent Court, or order of a competent authority requiring him to give it, be presented to the Superintendent of Police.—*Nid. Pol. Man., Vol. I p. 118*.

18 Privy Council's observations—On the use of Police diaries to test the credibility of witnesses, 19 Bom L. R. 510.

Report of Police officer **§ 173.** (1) Every investigation under this Chapter shall be completed without unnecessary delay, and, as soon as it is completed the officer in charge of the Police-station shall—

(a) forward to a Magistrate empowered to take cognizance of the offence on a Police report a report in the form prescribed by the Local Government setting forth the names of the parties the nature of the information and the names of the persons who appear to be acquainted with the circumstances of the case, and stating whether the accused (if arrested) has been forwarded in custody or has been released on his bond and, if so whether with or without sureties, and

(b) communicate, in such manner as may be prescribed by the Local Government the action taken by him to the person, if any, by whom the information relating to the commission of the offence was first given

(2) Where a superior officer of Police has been appointed under section 158 the report shall, in any cases in which the Local Government by general or special order so directs be submitted through that officer and he may, pending the orders of the Magistrate direct the officer in charge of the Police-station to make further investigation

(3) Whenever it appears from a report forwarded under this section that the accused has been released on his bond the Magistrate shall make such order for the discharge of such bond or otherwise as he thinks fit

† (4) A copy of any report forwarded under this section shall on application be furnished to the accused before the commencement of the inquiry or trial

† Provided that the same shall be paid for unless the Magistrate for some special reason thinks fit to furnish it free of cost.

Notes—1 The number of investigations into a crime is not limited by law and where one has been completed by the submission of a report another may be begun on further information being received **35 M. L. J. 127**

2 No investigation is complete until the report is submitted—See Note 9 to s. 155

3 Order to strike off case is not judicial—The Magistrate's order directing a case reported to him by the Police under this section to be struck off is not a judicial order dismissing a complaint or discharging an accused which can be reviewed by the Sessions Judge under s. 437, **Ratanlal 521** See also **Ratanlal 91** and **121**, referred to in Notes 4 and 5 to s. 169

4 Right of accused to copies of report before trial—Under the new sub-section (4) an accused is entitled on application to a copy of any report forwarded under this section before the commencement of the inquiry or trial.

Note—Under the amended section it is the duty of the Police-officer under sub-clause (1) (b) to communicate the action taken by him to the person if any by whom the information relating to the commission of the offence was first given. Under the new sub-section (4) an accused person is entitled on application to have a copy of any report forwarded under this section, before the commencement of the inquiry or trial.

5 Three kinds of reports contemplated—This Chapter contemplates three kinds of reports at three different stages of the Police investigation. The *first* is a preliminary report under s. 157 from the S. H. O. to the Magistrate. The *second* is under s. 168 from a subordinate Police-officer to the S. H. O., and the *third* or final report is the one referred to in this section. In all cases coming under Chapter XVI I P. C.—Offences affecting the human body—arrest must be made and charge-sheets submitted as in all other cases with all reasonable promptitude. The want of medical officer's certificate will not justify any delay. Medical officers can be examined orally like other witnesses and their statements must be recorded and made use of—*Mad. Pol. Man. Vol. I, p. 84*

* Sub-section on (1) has been substituted in the place of the old sub-section by Act XVIII of 1923

† Added by Act XVIII of 1923

ENGRAIN

419

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6 Report in the form prescribed—The final or completion report under this section is what is known as Charge-sheet.* The superior Police-officer making an investigation is the proper person to prepare and submit the charge-sheet.—*Mad Pol Min. Vol I, p 83* It is special report bearing upon a particular case coming up for investigation and must be submitted to the Magistrate. It should contain all necessary information and Police-officers must pay particular attention to the preparation of the same. In Municipal cases the charge-sheet, in which offences should be consecutively entered, will be a duplicate of the Case Register the word 'Charge-sheet' being prefixed to the form. The book containing the charge-sheets must when full be deposited in the Magistrate's record room.—*Mad Pol Min., Vol. I p 83*

The High Court have directed that, when it is necessary to put in evidence the substance of a report the report itself should be called for and not the Crime Register and that the register should be called for only in cases in which it is shown that its production cannot be dispensed with and the purpose for which it is required cannot be effectively answered by the production of an office copy.—*Mad Pol Min. Vol. I p 118*

7 Police report must set forth nature of information—The Police report referred to in s 190 (1) (d) is the report made by the Police under this section. *5 B. L. R. 1 = 12 Cr. L. J. 92; 5 B. L. R. 82 = 13 Cr. L. J. 752* Having regard to the language of s. 190 (1) (b), a Magistrate should not act on a Police report which does not set forth the nature of the information. If he does take cognizance of an offence on such a report his proceedings are liable to be set aside. *37 C. 49*

8. Can a Magistrate ignore a Police report and order further inquiry by Subordinate Magistrate?—Where a Magistrate who might have under s. 190 (c) taken cognizance of the case on a Police report did not do so but proceeded to make over the case to Subordinate Magistrate for inquiry and report as though the matter he was dealing with was on a complaint under s. 200, held that the proceedings of the deputed Magistrate so far as they bore on the case based on a Police report were not in consonance with the provisions of law. *17 C. W. N. 1001.*

***174.** (1) The officer in charge of a Police-station or some other Police-officer specially empowered by the Local Government in that behalf on receiving information that a person—

- (a) has committed suicide or
- (b) has been killed by another, or by any animal, or by machinery or by an accident or
- (c) has died under circumstances raising a reasonable suspicion that some other person has committed an offence

shall immediately give intimation thereof to the nearest Magistrate empowered to hold inquests and unless otherwise directed by any rule prescribed by the Local Government or by any general or special order of the District or Sub-divisional Magistrate shall proceed to the place where the body of such deceased person is and there in the presence of two or more respectable inhabitants of the neighbourhood shall make an investigation and draw up a report of the apparent cause of death describing such wounds fractures bruises and other marks of injury as may be found on the body and stating in what manner, or by what weapon or instrument (if any) such marks appear to have been inflicted

(2) The report shall be signed by such Police-officer and other persons or by so many of them as concur therein and shall be forthwith forwarded to the District Magistrate or the Sub-divisional Magistrate

(3) When there is any doubt regarding the cause of death or when for any other reason the Police-officer considers it expedient so to do he shall subject to such rules as the Local Government may prescribe in this behalf, forward the body with a view to its being examined to the nearest Civil Surgeon or other qualified medical man appointed in this behalf by the Local Government if the state of the weather and the distance admit of its being so forwarded without risk of such putrefaction on the road as would render such examination useless

* For the form in which ss 174 175 and 176 should be read in their application to the area comprised within the local limits of the ordinary original jurisdiction of the High Court at Madras see s 4 (2) of Act V of 1893 (*Mad as Coroner's Act*) printed in the *Madras Code Ed 190 Vol I p 188*

an ill oiled. (12 s)
 1 To grasp or close with an other
 [12 s] *Interst*

1 To grasp, *p p* [imp & p p IN GRASPED grasp] *Interst*
 p p & r b w ENGRASPING [12 s] *Interst*
 q v] To seize with a clamping hold to tightly
 including or embracing to grip *Interst*

1 To engrave, *p p* [imp INGRAVED p p ENGRAVED
 ENGRAVING p p & r b w ENGRAVING] [12 s]
 s v m and p p q v [12 s] *Interst*

1 To cut in to make by incision [12 s]
 Full many wounds in his corrupted flesh
 He d d engrave *Interst*

2 To cut with a graving instrument in order to
 form an inscription or pictorial representation to
 carve figures, letters or devices upon to mark with
 incisions *Interst*

These shall engrave the two houses with the names of the
 children of Israel *Interst*

3 To form or represent by means of incisions
 upon wood stone, metal, of the like, as, to engrave
 an inscription *Interst*

keys

CONCEALING ALL

1 To see with satisfaction, to
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 son. XXVI B.

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ic to kindle, as
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 iction to inflame,
 war or discord or

ENLARGED: p p
 n and hard, q v
 enb other, to put
 to rub with grease
 or grease, 12 s

mp & p p ENLARGED, p p
 [12 s] *Interst*

r to increase in quantity or
 d in limits to e. and
 y nutrition a good man as
 re of his benevolence
 be capacity of to expand
 So they to a tale
 ke, as, knowledge, as with
 Enlarg.

ypa
 12 s
 12 s

Syn - To increase to extend to expand So

(4) In the Presidencies of Fort St George and Bombay investigations under this section may be made by the head of the village who shall then report the result to the nearest Magistrate authorized to hold inquests

(5) The following Magistrates are empowered to hold inquests viz any District Magistrate * Sub-divisional Magistrate or Magistrate of the first class and any Magistrate, specially empowered in this behalf by the Local Government or the District Magistrate

1—INQUEST REPORTS

Notes.—1 Powers of village headmen in Bombay—S 11 *Bombay Village Police Act VIII of 1867* authorizes Police patels to hold inquests in cases of sudden or unnatural deaths. The law empowers them to take evidence on oath and is obviously intended to make justice effectual by means of prompt inquiry in the face of all villagers and by delivery of a verdict of men not open to the suspicions of undue zeal often alleged against the District Police

Like any other Coroner's inquest it saves the innocent from false charges as people are not likely to bring such charges against an innocent man when they have kept silence at the inquest. But the inquest under s 11 of the Act must be *held forthwith* so that all the circumstances of the murder might be reported forthwith to the District Police **Ratanlal 740**

Refusal to serve on an inquest when called on by a Police patel specially empowered under s 15 of the *Bombay Village Police Act VIII of 1867*, is not a refusal to obey a lawful order of a Police patel punishable by the Police patel himself under that section **Ratanlal 614**

2 Power of village headmen in Madras—A village headman acting under s 174 has only the powers of a Police-officer acting under s 175 1910 **M W N 356 = S M L T 198** Under the 1861 Code it was the duty of village headmen in Madras and Bombay to make the inquiry and report and apparently it was intended that the Police should not hold inquests where a head of the village was at hand. Now the word 'may' in sub-sec. (4) indicates that the village headman and the Police-officer are to hold each a separate and independent inquiry—See s 13 of *Mad Reg XI of 1816*

3. Inquest in the Presidency towns of Bombay and Calcutta—See *the Coroner's Act IV of 1871* printed in the Appendix That Act was framed on the principles and on the forms of a regular inquiry by a Magistrate Evidence is given on oath before a jury who may question the witnesses and evidence on behalf of the accused must also be received. Also confessions made to a Coroner are to be considered as confessions to a Magistrate. The evidence is recorded in writing and submitted to the High Court and the Coroner has also the power to arrest the accused after verdict The Act also gives the Coroner power of commitment Historically this power is a relic of the larger jurisdiction at one time held by that officer **18 B 159 at p 160**

4 Coroner's Court not an open Court—In England it has been held that the Coroner though nowhere expressly ordered to hear witnesses on both sides is bound by the rules of justice to hear one side as well as another seeing that his sole object is the truth (2 *Hale P C 60, Reg v Ingham 5 B & S 237*). As the inquiry is wide and indeterminate and no individual is charged and it may end in no accusation being made at all there is good ground for holding that the Coroner's Court is not an open Court and that the Coroner has a discretion as to admitting persons not interested or not closely connected with the inquiry Cases may occur in which privacy may be requisite for the sake of decency others in which it may be due to the family of the deceased and the propriety of the Coroner's decision on the subject cannot be questioned *Garnett v Ferrand 6 B & C 611*

5 Magistrates empowered to hold inquests—District Magistrate should inform District Superintendents of Police which of the Subordinate Magistrates have been authorized under s. 37 read with this section to hold inquests The District Superintendent of Police will thus be enabled to instruct his subordinates as to the particular Magistrates to whom the intimation required by this section is to send and the intimation will give those Magistrates the opportunity of proceeding under s 176 *post* when it may be desirable to do so—*C P Cr Code Part II No 10*

* The words 'Sub-divisional Magistrate or Magistrate of the first class' were substituted for the words 'or Sub-divisional Magistrate' by Act XVIII of 1921

In the Punjab, all Magistrates of the first and second class have been specially empowered to hold inquests under this section.—*Punjab Gazette*, 1883, p. 23.

6 There can be no inquest unless the body is forthcoming.—It seems necessary to point out that where the body is not found or has been burned, there can be no investigation under this section. In such cases, if there are reasonable grounds for suspecting that a cognizable offence has been committed, the Police-officer should make an ordinary investigation without summoning persons to be associated with him. It has been the practice for Police-officers in charge of stations and superior Police-officer, *mero motu*, and also under departmental orders, to hold a second or further investigation in one and the same case. There is no writ in the Punjab or *melius inquirendum* and as, in the Coroner's Act (*see s. 11*), it is assumed that Coroners have the power to make further inquisitions the practice seems perfectly good. *See also 27 P. R. 1908 = 9 Cr. L. J. 103.*

7. Inquest reports must be distinguished from final reports under s. 173.—A *verbatim* report of the statements of witnesses examined at the inquest may often be of great use to the Court in testing the value of the evidence subsequently given (1911) M. W. N. 133. **Madras Rules.** Inquest reports must be distinguished from final or completion reports referred to in s. 173. Inquest reports are to be written up and completed on the spot where inquest over corpse is being held. Immediately the inquest is closed, the report thereof will be put into a cover and handed over in the presence of *Punchayaldars* to the constable about to take the corpse to the medical officer's station for examination.—*Mad. Pol. Man., Vol. I, p. 85*

8 **Bengal Rules.**—The Lieutenant-Governor does not think that special diaries are intended or necessary in all cases of inquiry into unnatural deaths. The report prescribed in s. 174, Cr. P. Code, is very much the same in character as the special diary of s. 172. If the Police-officer investigating see reason to suspect crime, the inquiry becomes one under s. 172 and special diaries become as a matter of course necessary, but, in ordinary cases, in which the inquiry is made and completed in a few hours there seems to be no necessity for reporting the facts, first, in a special diary and then in the report prescribed by s. 174. When, however, the inquiry is prolonged or lasts over more than one day, the diary should be sent to inform the District Superintendent and Magistrate of what is going on.

The Lieutenant Governor would therefore rule that in cases of any complexity, or in which the inquiry lasts over one day, or in which crime is suspected, special diaries should be sent in anticipation of the final report which will be made under s. 173 if a crime is detected and under s. 174 if the death is from accident or unnatural causes. It is to be understood that in the station diary everything done by the Police will be entered.—*Beng. Pol. Cir.*, 1872, p. 107

9 Form of Inquest Report.—

MADRAS POLICE

District _____ Division _____ Station. Inquest report on the body
of a person found dead at _____ on _____

| | |
|---|--|
| 1 Deceased's name sex age, caste calling, father's name and residence | |
| 2 By whom first found dead and when | |
| 3 By whom last seen alive, where and when and in whose company | |
| 4 Height, colour and descriptive marks | |
| 5 Married or single, if female, was she the only wife? | |
| 6 State of the corpse if any wounds, particulars thereof and list of all property found on the corpse | |
| 7 Minute description of exact spot where the corpse was found, if water, depth thereof. | |

| | | |
|-------|--|--|
| 7 (a) | Is the well public or private property? If the latter to whom does it belong? | |
| 7 (b) | Is it near a public road or pathway? | |
| 7 (c) | Has it a parapet wall and float? | |
| 8 | By what relatives body is recognized and their statement shortly given
Blood relatives always to be examined if there be any | |
| 9 | Abstract of evidence of other persons examined | |
| 10 | Apparent cause of death | |
| 11 | If by violence apparently by what weapon? | |
| 12 | If any persons are suspected who and why? | |
| 13 | If corpse is not sent for medical examination why? | |
| 14 | If corpse is sent for what purpose and by whose order and No. of constable who went with it. | |
| 15 | By whose orders the corpse was buried? | |
| 16 | Verdict | |
| 17 | Name caste calling and residence of persons composing inquest. | |
| 18 | Signatures of Panchayatdars | |
| 19 | Station House Officer's signature | |
| 20 | If name and residence of deceased be unknown state what steps have been taken to ascertain the same and secure identification To what stations have proclamations been sent? | |

10 Apparent cause of death—It is not proper to enter in column 10 of the Inquest Report any mere suspicion of foul play or any mere opinion. In case of doubt the officer conducting the inquest should proceed under sub-sec. (3). In all cases evidence of the condition of the body when first discovered and of the surrounding circumstances should be recorded.—*Oudh Cr Dig* p 9. But the personal opinions of the persons called upon to attend the inquest and of the Police-officer regarding the supposed facts of the case *ie* as to who struck the blows or killed the deceased or for what reasons must on no account be entered in the Inquest Report. These are matters which will find entry in the special diary of the investigation. The Inquest Report must be confined to the points specified in the section.—*Reg and Ord N W P* p 275

11 Death in Jail.—See ss 15 and 17 of the *Prisons Act* IX of 1894 as to the course to be taken on the death of any prisoner in jail

12. Sudden or suspicious death of an European.—Whenever information of the sudden or unnatural death of an European is reported at a Police-station, the officer in charge of the station shall send an urgent immediate information to the District Superintendent, and the Inquest Report, required by s. 174 of Act X of 1882, shall be taken by an European officer, and unless death has been caused by violence, the marks of which are apparent, no native officer shall have the right of examination of the body. Under no circumstances shall any examination be taken when the deceased is of the female sex. In such case a Police-officer, not below the rank of Head Constable, will remain with or accompany the body till receipt of orders from the Magistrate.—*Reg. and Ord., N. W. P., s. 10, Art. 158, p. 275*

13. Unnatural death of Soldiers.—"It appears to the Government of India that it will be better, if inquiries into cases of sudden and unnatural deaths of soldiers, are made by Magistrates and not by the Police. The Police should however report all such occurrences to the Magistrate."—No. 1398, dated 10th October, 1878

14. Rules in force in the N.-W. P. as to holding inquests.—The inquest should be held before the body is touched or removed, and the 'report' should state the apparent cause of death, describing such wounds, fractures, bruises and other marks of injury as may be found on the body, and stating in what manner or by what weapon, or instrument if any, such marks appear to have been inflicted, the position, length, breadth and depth of wounds being accurately described. The report shall be signed by the Police-officer and other persons or by so many of them as concur therein.

The personal opinions of the persons called upon to attend the inquest and of the Police-officer, regarding the supposed facts of the case, *i.e.*, as to who struck the blows or killed the deceased, or for what reasons, must on no account be entered in the 'report' of inquest, these are matters which will find entry in the special diary of the investigation, but the "report of inquest" must be confined to the "apparent cause of death," to the existence of marks of violence or otherwise, and as to manner, or by what weapon or instrument such mark seem to have been inflicted.—*Reg. and Ord., N. W. P., p. 275*

15. Procedure to be observed in inquests in cases of death caused by poisoning, etc.—In order to obtain as much important medico-legal evidence as is possible in cases of poisoning or death, the following rules are laid down for the guidance of officers investigating —

A—In cases of suspected poisoning

(1) Any food, especially flour and sweetmeats, drink, tobacco or drugs, and especially the food and drink last partaken of by the deceased, should be carefully brought away and sealed and forwarded

(2) Any vomited matter which may be on the person or bed should be carefully swabbed up, with a rag which should be put into a packet and sealed up and forwarded

(3) Any clothing, matting, wood, mud flooring or manure or dirt heap into which any vomited matter has soaked, should be forwarded under a sealed cover

(4) The contents of any vessel containing vomited matter should be carefully put into a bottle, and sealed up and forwarded

Information on the eight following points will be elicited as early as possible, and entered in the special diary in due order —

(i) the interval between the last time—that the person, who is supposed to have been poisoned, ate or drank anything, or took any medicine, and the first appearance of symptoms of poisoning,

(ii) the interval between the last time of eating or drinking either food or medicine and the occurrence of death (if death occurred),

(iii) whether the person moved from the place where the first symptoms were noticed, and, if so, how far he went,

(iv) what the first symptoms of poisoning were,

(v) whether vomiting or purging occurred

(vi) whether the person became drowsy or full asleep,

(vii) whether any cramps or twitching of the limbs were observed or tingling of the skin or throat complained of,

(viii) any other symptoms noticed.

In the pursuit of an object. "Enthusiastic" rap-
tures." Colamy

A young man of a visionary and enthusiastic character.
E. young

Enthusiastic, n. An enthusiast;
[Obs.]

In the pursuit of an object. "Enthusiastic" rap-
tures." Colamy

3 To attribute, to ascribe [Obs.]
The ancient proverb ent this was
God himself.

From the "entreat"

Enthusiastic, n. of any thing, un-
der the name of a king of Aragon. Enthusi-
astic, n. to the king. Enthusiastic
is irregularity or defect,
a single piece, as a corolla,
as, an entire leaf
d RADICAL
ch is whole and unmingled,

to withdraw conscious-
ness or sensibility from, to make insensible to pres-
ent objects

will cause the enemy to retreat there well in the time of

From entreat and delay
d in the sentence of the entreat
Dano

at which I shall have further occasion to entreat. Enthusi-
Alexander was the first that entreated of peace with them.
2. To make an earnest petition or request.
The fanatics entreated for them at various times. Enthusi-

as in Get, as in, as in, as in, as in, as in, as in, as in

B—In cases of hanging, or strangulation.

(1) If possible, before the body is cut or removed, the strangulating medium should be noted, and any lividity of face, especially of lips and eyelids, any projection of the eyes, the state of the tongue, whether enlarged and protruded or compressed between the lips, the escape of any fluid from mouth and nostrils, and the direction of its flow

(2) When the body is cut down, or the strangulating medium removed, particular note should be made of the state of the neck, whether bruised along the line of strangulation.

(3) The direction of the mark must be noted, whether it is circular or oblique.

(4) The state of the thumbs should be noted, whether crossed over the palm.

(5) The materials by which hanging or strangulation has been affected should, if possible, be brought away and forwarded

C—On finding a body in a tank or well

(1) Any marks of blood around the mouth, or on the sides of the well or tank, should be noted.

(2) When the body is removed any external marks of injury, especially about head and neck should be examined for and noted.

(3) The state of the skin should be noted whether it is smooth or rough.

(4) The hand should be examined, and anything they may hold should be carefully removed

D—In the case of a body found murdered in an open field.

(1) The number, character and appearance of any injuries should be noted

(2) If a weapon is found it should be covered with paper, and any marks of blood should be sealed, and any adherent hairs should especially be noted and preserved

(3) In the case of an exposed infant the state of the cord, especially if tied, and any marks of violence should be noted

E—In the case of a presumed murder and burial of the remains (exhumed body).

(1) Any marks of violence, especially about the skull should be examined for and noted.

(2) Any indications of sex should be noted, and a jaw and the bones of the pelvis at least brought away

(3) If there are any suspicions of poisoning, the earth from whereabouts the stomach was, should be carefully taken up and sent in

(4) If a body, presumed to have been murdered, has been burned, any fragments of bones which may be found among the ashes should be collected and sent in—*Reg. and Ord., N W P., s 10, page 276, Beng. Pol Code p 415*

F—In cases of suspected cattle poisoning

(Addition in the Bengal Police Code, p 413)

(1) The carcass should be first carefully examined, especially about the genitals and soft skin of the thighs and neck. If any puncture is found, it is possible that *Sulari*—poisoning [Chap. XXI, Rule 5, *Chamars (a)*] has occurred. The spike or *Sulari* should then be sought for, if anyone be found, it should be wrapped in paper, and be sealed and be labelled.

(2) The mouth should be examined and anything found in it should be preserved and labelled.

G—In rape or unnatural offences

Send in the lower garments worn by the persons when assaulted

16 Punjab Rules regarding investigation into the case of death—The following rules relate to the investigation by the Police of the cause of unnatural or sudden death of a human being under circumstances creating a reasonable suspicion that an offence has been committed.

ment, and distinguished from an ambassador or ori-
Educa the god of the water; it is said—[illegible]

Or elope like that the started him to share. Gray

Thronged to the lists, and eared to behold
The names of others, not their own, enrolled. Dryden
Them who envy at the prosperity of the wicked. Sp. Taylor

q v) To plunge into, or immerse or roll in, slith,
to wallow

It is not possible to determine the exact date of the first publication of the book, but it is known that it was published in the early 19th century.

T. .

• • •

References

1. *Chlorophyll a* (Chl *a*)

E

furi, rufe, push; *r* *f*, *o*, silent, *c* as *s*, *ch* as *sh*, *e*, *eh*, as *k*,

in *Get*, *g* as *z*, *z* as *gz*, *n* as in *finger*, *ink*.

UNNATURAL OR SUDDEN DEATH OF A HUMAN BEING.

(A)—Investigation by whom to be made

(a) *When officer in charge of Police-station to hold investigation*—Except in the cases hereinafter excepted, the officer in charge of every Police-station, on receiving notice or information of the unnatural or sudden death of any person, when the body of such person is within the local jurisdiction of such Police-station shall immediately give intimation thereof to the nearest Magistrate duly authorized to hold inquests, and shall proceed to the place where the body of such deceased person is and hold the inquiry in the manner provided by s. 133 (now s. 174) of the Code.*

(b) *Exceptional cases*—The cases mentioned in the last preceding paragraph, excepted from the ordinary rule, shall be as follows—that is to say—

(1) When notice or information is received by the officer in charge of a Police-station of the unnatural or sudden death of a person in a military cantonment or of a person who has met his death by injuries unlawfully inflicted by a military person or camp follower, the Cantonment Magistrate or the nearest competent Magistrate (in the event of the office of the Cantonment Magistrate being filled by an Assistant Cantonment Magistrate who has not been specially empowered to hold inquests, and in places beyond cantonments), as the case may be shall without delay, be specially invited to hold an inquest, under the provisions of s. 135 (now s. 176) of the Code

(2) if in the cases mentioned in sub-sec. (1), the Magistrate in question fails to hold such inquest the District Superintendent of Police, or, in his absence, the Assistant District Superintendent of Police, shall hold an investigation under combined provisions of ss. 133 and 137 (now ss. 174 and 176) of the Code,

(3) in the case of soldiers an inquest under the Criminal Procedure Code shall be held whether Military Courts of inquest are held or not. If the case mentioned in sub-sec. (2), neither the District Superintendent of Police, nor the Assistant District Superintendent of Police is available, the officer in charge of the Police-station concerned shall hold the investigation,

(4) on occasion of a death by violence in a military prison, when an inquest has been held by a Magistrate duly authorized to hold inquests, the Police shall not make investigation into the cause of death, †

(5) in the case of the unnatural or sudden death of an European soldier, non-commissioned or commissioned officer, the Police shall confine their action to an immediate report to the nearest Magistrate duly authorized to hold an inquest, and to an entry in the station diary. In such a case the inquest shall be held under the provisions of s. 135 (now s. 176) of the Code and not under those of s. 133 (now s. 174), ‡

(6) on occasion of an unnatural or sudden death within the walls of a prison, § and

(7) in cases in which a Magistrate duly authorized to hold an inquest has held an inquest in substitution for the Police inquiry

(c) *Deaths in prisons*—(1) Officers commanding prison guards shall, for the purposes of s. 133 (now s. 174) of the Code possess the powers of an officer in charge of a Police-station.

(2) On occasion of an unnatural or sudden death within the walls of a prison, it shall be the duty of the jailor to report the facts forthwith to the officer commanding the prison guard.

(3) On receipt of such report, such officer shall proceed to the spot and place a guard over the body with orders not to allow the body or anything which may have moved to and cause the death of the deceased to be touched until the arrival of a Magistrate, and such officer shall, at the same time, send immediate intimation to the senior Magistrate present at the station, with a view to an inquest being held. ¶

* Cf s. 8 of Act IV of 1871 and s. 1 of 6 and 7 Vict., c. 1*

† Sect on 133 (3) (4) of Statute 44 and 45 Vict., c. 38 (*The Army Act 1881*) provides for an inquest being held in a military prison by the nearest Magistrate duly authorized to hold inquests in the case stated in the text. It further provides that where there is no competent civil authority available the commanding officer shall convene a Court of Inquest.

‡ This rule has been framed under the orders of the Government of India. It governs sub-sec. (3) and (4)

§ See J. Circular Memo 4 of 1881 forbidding Magistrates in charge of jails to hold such inquests in such cases unless it is unavoidable

¶ Such inquests are to be held whenever a prisoner dies from the effects of punishment or within 30 days of receiving such punishment or with any injuries or marks of such punishment on him or whenever there is any possibility of any doubt or complaint, or question concerning the cause of death arising or whenever a prisoner dies from the receipt of any injury or within 30 days of the receipt of any injury whether inflicted by himself or by anyone else or incurred in the performance of any labour or work, from the attack of any animal or in any way whatsoever. S—24, *Jail Manual*

(d) *Deaths from railway accidents*—(1) On occasion of an unnatural or sudden death, apparently caused by a railway accident other than an accident arising from an unavoidable mechanical failure, the Police investigation shall ordinarily be held, when the body is within railway limits, by the Assistant Inspector General of Railway Police, and in his absence by the District Superintendent of Police or Assistant District Superintendent of Police in whose district such body is. Until the arrival of one of such officers, the officer in charge of the Railway Police-station concerned shall take all necessary measures to facilitate such investigation.

(2) If such body is beyond railway limits, such investigation shall be held by the District Superintendent of Police or Assistant District Superintendent of Police, and until one of such officers arrive, the officer in charge of the Police-station concerned shall take all necessary measures to facilitate such investigation.

(B)—Investigation how to be made

(a) *Persons summoned to assist*—In summoning the respectable inhabitants who are to take part in an investigation, the Police officer concerned shall, if possible, select fit persons with reference to the nature of investigation.*

Illustrations

(1) The question is what was the apparent cause of the death of A? A died of an injury caused by a carpenter's tool whilst working at the trade of carpenter. One of the persons summoned, shall, if possible, be a person acquainted with the use of such tools.

The question is what was the apparent cause of the death of B? B was found dead close to a broken railway gate which had apparently been broken open by the passage of a train. One of the persons summoned, shall, if possible, be a person acquainted with the working of the railway.

(b) *Invitation to Civil Surgeon*—When an important investigation is held, or when an investigation is held at a place near the residence of a Civil Surgeon or other Medical Officer appointed by Government for examination, the Police officer shall, with an invitation to examine the body, by the officer in charge of the investigation, add a request in English.

(c) *Duty of officer making investigation*—On arrival at the place where the body of the deceased is lying the Police-officer making the investigation shall do the following things, that is to say—

(1) he shall prevent the destruction of evidence as to the cause of death

(2) he shall prevent the crowding round the body and the obliteration of footsteps

(3) he shall prevent unnecessary access to the body until the investigation is concluded

(4) he shall cover up foot prints with suitable vessels so long as may be necessary,

(5) he shall draw a correct plan† of the scene of death, including all features necessary to a right understanding of the case,

(6) if the Surgeon or other officer or a superior Police-officer is expected to arrive, he shall leave the body for a reasonable time until such arrival, or, if the body is lying in a thoroughfare and cannot be left he shall cause it to be moved to a suitable place, and the posture shall, as far as possible, not be altered until such arrival or until the investigation is completed,

(7) if no Surgeon or other officer or superior Police-officer arrives he shall, together with the other persons conducting the investigation carefully examine the body and note all abnormal appearances,

(8) he shall remove, mark with a seal, and seal up all clothing not adhering to or required as a covering for the body, all ornaments, anything which may have moved to and caused the death of the deceased and make an inventory thereof, describing the position in which each thing was found any blood stain, mark,

* Cf 34 and 39 Vict., c 78 s 8

† The plan should be drawn by the Police-officer himself or by some person who is likely to be available as a witness in the event of future criminal proceedings. If the plan is put in as a subsequent judicial proceeding the maker must depose to its accuracy. 11 B H C R 242. See also Beng Pol Code p 384 Oudh Lr Dg p 11

7. State of being honest and true: honest person

cia and its large swimming in grasslands — 3° 45' N, 108° 15' W

† *and* *subsequent* = *then* & *after* = *thereafter*.

One whose all not equals Edward's moiety Stet

2 To make equal return to, to recompense fully
He recovered all her name, and equaled all her loss. Dryden

3 To make equal or equal to, to cause to be com-
mensurate with or unsurpassed by, to equalize
hence, to compare or regard as equals
equality (ækw'äl'itē), n. [Lat æqualitas from

4. (M11A) } exact agreement between two ex-
pressions or magnitudes with respect to quantity, —

3 Pertaining to the time when the sun enters the equinoctial pole is as an *equinoctial gale* or storm, that is one happening at or near the equinox in any part of the world.

quæstio est in [Verequinoctial line] (As-
tron) The celestial equator — so called because
when the sun is on it, the nights and days are of

start, ride, push, e, i, o, silent, f as s, th as sh c, ch, as k; g as j, s as in set, p as z, x as gz, u as ininger, like; th as in thine.

rent, injury or other noticeable fact in connexion with such thing and enter in such inventory a counterpart of the mark and seal attached to such thing or to the parcel in which it has been enclosed such inventory shall form part of the report hereinafter prescribed

(d) *Rules for disinterment of bodies*—If at the time of receiving information of an unnatural or sudden death or if at any time before or after he arrives at the place where the body of the deceased person is said to be the officer in charge of a Police-station or Police-officer concerned learns that such body has been buried such officer shall be guided by the following rules that is to say —

(1) an officer in charge of a Police-station and any superior officer of Police lawfully making an investigation into the unnatural or sudden death of any person may cause the body of such person to be disinterred for the purposes of such investigation

(2) no such disinterment shall be caused or effected until the respectable inhabitants required to take part in the investigation under the provisions of s 133 (now s. 174) of the Code, are present, and unless and until the Police-officer lawfully making the investigation shall have recorded in writing the information which has reached him and the ground on which he considers it necessary to proceed to such investigation

(3) when such investigations are made by an enrolled Police-officer and there is a Magistrate authorized to hold inquests in the immediate neighbourhood either of the grave or the Police-station in which such grave is situate, it shall be the duty of such Police-officer to guard the grave and ascertain whether such Magistrate will attend at once at the disinterment. The disinterment of the body shall be postponed pending such Magistrate's reply if such Magistrate is unable to attend the disinterment at once such Police-officer shall proceed in manner hereinbefore prescribed to disinter body

(4) in all cases Police-officers shall examine witnesses to prove the identity of disinterred bodies with the persons supposed to have died unnatural or sudden deaths before commencing their investigation on such bodies

(5) in every case in which a body has lain in the grave for a period exceeding three weeks no disinterment shall be caused or effected by any Police-officer until the opinion of the Civil Surgeon has been obtained and then only with the concurrence of the District Magistrate

(6) in cases in which the body has not been identified a careful descriptive roll should be prepared for publication in the *Vernacular Police Gazette*

(e) *Procedure after disinterment*—When a competent Police-officer has disinterred a body under the last preceding paragraph he shall proceed to hold the investigation in the manner provided in paragraph 8

OPINION OF GOVERNMENT ADVOCATE REGARDING EXHUMATION OF BODIES

In my opinion no alteration has been made in the new Criminal Procedure Code (Act X of 1982) in reference to the power of the Police to exhume bodies when making investigations under s 174. I am not prepared to say that under the rule of *expressio unius est exclusio alterius*, the last paragraph of s 176 would preclude the Police acting under s. 174 from disinterming a body and the former section it is to be observed refers exclusively to cases where persons die while in the custody of the Police. On the whole I am of opinion that no amendment of the law was intended or has been made—*Letter of Government Advocate, Punjab No 1228 dated 2nd July, 1883*

The Hon ble the Lieutenant Governor concurs in the opinion expressed by the Government Advocate
Circular No 16 of 1883

(f) *Report of investigation*—(1) When the investigation has been completed the Police-officer conducting it shall draw up a report stating the apparent cause of death of such deceased person and any marks of violence which may be found on the body and stating in what manner or by what weapon instrument such mark appears to have been inflicted.

(2) Such report shall be drawn up in one of the forms given in Appendix I *see* pp. 367 and 368, *infra* or to the like effect.

(3) The report shall be signed by such Police-officer and other persons making the investigation, or by so many of them as concur therein, and shall be forthwith forwarded to the Magistrate of the district, or, when the Magistrate of the district as so directed, to the Magistrate of the division of the district in which such investigation was made.

(4) The plan of the scene of death, the inventory of clothing, etc., and when bodies or articles are sent for medical examination a list of the things on and with the body and the particulars as to things sent for medical examination shall form part of such report.

(5) In cases of death by hanging, the report shall state particulars as to the height of the support and the sufficiency of it, and the things used to bear the weight of the body.

(6) A copy of every such report shall be made in Police-station Book No VI.

(g) *Reports how sent*—(1) Reports forwarded to the Magistrate of the district under the last preceding paragraph shall ordinarily, unless such Magistrate direct to the contrary, be forwarded through the District Superintendent of Police who shall read and pass them on without delay.

(2) A District Superintendent of Police shall when reading an investigation report, record on it any orders he may make in reference to further investigation.

(h) *Information in poisoning cases*—(1) The ordinary symptoms caused by common poisons are described in Appendix II *see* p. 371, *infra*.

(2) Police-officers making investigations in cases where poison has been administered shall record in their reports all information likely to be of value in assisting Civil Surgeons or the Chemical Examiner to form an opinion as to the precise poison employed.

Explanation—As the tests used for the discovery of different poisons vary with the poison and as the substance available for analysis is often very limited it is very important that none should be destroyed by the use of wrong tests. For these reasons full information shall be carefully sought for and supplied.

(i) *Making over of property*—When the Police-officer has concluded the investigation, he shall make over to the proper persons all property which he may have taken into his charge in the course of the investigation and which is not required for the ends of justice. A receipt shall be taken for property so made over in Police-station Book No VI (Miscellaneous).

(j) *Where cognizable offence disclosed*—If the facts disclosed on the investigation disclose the commission of a cognizable offence, and the person who appears to be guilty of such offence is arrested the Police-officer concerned shall, when he has completed the investigation of such offence take recognizances from the witnesses as provided by law.

(k) *Correspondence with Chemical Examiner*—Police-officer shall not correspond with the Chemical Examiner direct in matters relating to human bodies. Any necessary reference in relation to such subject shall be made to the Civil Surgeon.

(l) *Chemical Examiner not to be referred to on insufficient grounds*—No case of human poisoning, with regard to which the Civil Surgeon does not recommend investigation by the Chemical Examiner, shall be referred to that officer without a special order from the Magistrate.

(m) *Language of reports—Copy to be sent to Assistant Inspector General*—(1) Report submitted by Police-officers ignorant of English shall be in Vernacular, but in all cases of death caused by a railway accident, an English translation shall be made.

(2) A copy of all report relating to deaths caused by railway accidents shall, when made by a Police-officer other than a Railway Police-officer, be forwarded to the Assistant Inspector General of Railway Police.

APPENDIX I

DEATH REPORT NO

FORM NO 1

POLICE-STATION (Name)

Dated

(When in Vernacular to be prepared on 1 sheet of native paper)

SUDDEN DEATH FROM NATURAL CAUSES

| | |
|---|---------------------------------|
| 1 Name of the place where death occurred. | |
| 2 Distance and direction from the Police-station in whose jurisdiction it is | |
| 3 Date and hour of discovery of the death. | |
| 4 Names parentage and residence of two or more persons who identify the body as that of the deceased person named in this report. | son of resident son of resident |
| NOTE.—Relatives of deceased or two respectable witnesses to identification should be obtained, if possible | of of |
| 5 Name of deceased
Parentage
Caste
Residence
Condition in life | |
| 6 Age and sex. | { Age
{ Sex. |
| 7 Condition of the clothes, ornaments etc., as not indicating an unnatural death. | |
| 8 Position of the limbs eyes and mouth | |
| 9 Expression of the countenance | |
| 10 Injuries or marks of violence the body may have received
Wounds and Bruises—Position length and breadth | |
| 11 Blood liquid or clotted? where oozed from and to what amount? | |
| 12 In what manner, or by what weapon or instrument such marks of injuries or of violence appear to have been inflicted? | |
| 13 Is the body well nourished and vigorous or emaciated and weak? | |
| 14 Apparent cause of death. | |
| 15 Any signs of death having been caused by violence or poison or any rumours of such being the case? | |

(Entries to be made on reverse of Form I)

1 Description of each article of clothing ornaments covering weapons etc, found on or near the body

2 Sketch plan of the scene of death

3 Brief history of the case

Date _____ } (Signatures of two or more respectable inhabitants of the neighbourhood present at the investigation) } (Signature of officer conducting the investigation)

192 _____ } A _____ Name

_____ } B _____ Rank

_____ }

DEATH REPORT NO

FORM NO 2

POLICE STATION (Name)

(When in Vernacular to be prepared on 4 sheet of native paper)

UNNATURAL DEATH BY VIOLENCE

1 Name of place where the death occurred or where body was found (state which)

2 Distance and direction from Police-station in whose jurisdiction it is.

3 Date and hour of discovery of the death

4 Name parentage and residence of two or more persons who identify the body as that of the deceased person named in the report.

(NOTE—Relations of the deceased or two respectable witnesses to identification should be obtained if possible)

5 Name parentage caste residence and condition in life of the deceased.

6 Age and sex

7 Condition of the clothes ornaments etc and marks of either having been forcibly removed or of being stained with blood or other matter

NOTE—If the Civil Surgeon or other Medical Officer is expected to attend to examine the body this information should be filled in so far as can be seen and without touching or removing any clothes and, if such case it should be completed after he has finished his examination of the body

8 Position of the limbs eyes and mouth

9 Expression of the countenance.

10 Injuries or marks of violence the body may have received

Wounds and Bruises—Show position length and breadth

NOTE.—Note depth be careful not to probe wounds If the Civil Surgeon or other Medical Officer is expected to attend to examine the body this information should be filled in after he has completed his examination

11 Blood liquid or clotted? where oozed from and to what amount?

12 In what manner or by what weapon or instrument such marks of injuries or of violence appear to have been committed?

13 Was there any rope or other article round the neck or any mark of ligature on it?

14 Had such rope or article apparently been used to produce strangulation? And if the body had been suspended by it could it probably have supported the body?

In what mode was the other end of the rope attached to the support?

15 Were there any foreign matters such as weeds straw etc. in the hair or clenched in the hands of the deceased, or attached to any part of the body?

- 16 Is the body well nourished and vigorous or emaciated and feeble?
- 17 Is it stout thin or decomposed?
- 18 Height by measuring from head to feet?
- 19 Distinguishing marks.—*Position and appearance of moles scars et*
- 20 Apparent cause of death.
- 21 Are there any circumstances or rumours tending to show that deceased killed himself?

(*Entries to be made on reverse of Form II*)

1 Description of each article found on or near the body

I found actually on the body
Each article labelled, numbered and sealed

Found near the body
Each article labelled
numbered and sealed

Sent 1: attached to body

Sent in separate packet

Description of superscription or device of the seal used on above

2 Sketch plan of the place where the body was found

- 3 Description of surrounding ground marks of footsteps or of a struggle Marked peculiarity in the foot prints Marked peculiarity in the shoes found or in feet of accused or suspected parties *corresponding* with the same noted peculiarities in the foot prints.

4 Brief history of the case.

| | | |
|-----------------------------|--|---|
| Date _____

192 _____ | (Signatures of two or more respectable inhabitants
of the place present at the investigation) | (Signature of officer conducting the investigation) |
| | A _____ | Name _____ |
| | B _____ | Rank _____ |

FORM NO 3

(When in Vernacular to be prepared on 1/4 sheet of native paper)

UNNATURAL DEATH BY poisoning

Particulars relating to the case in addition to those given in Form II

- 1 Was deceased in good health previous to the attack?
- 2 If not in good health what was he suffering from?
- 3 What medicine was he taking?
- 4 What did the last meal consist of?
- 5 What was the interval between the last meal and the commencement of the symptoms?
- 6 What did the deceased last eat or drink before the commencement of the symptoms?
- 7 What was the interval between the very last time he ate or drank and the commencement of the symptoms?
- 8 What were the first symptoms?
- 9 Was he thirsty?
- 10 Did he become faint?

- 11 Did he complain of headache or giddiness ?
- 12 Did he appear to have lost the use of his limbs ?
- 13 Did he sleep heavily ?
- 14 Was he at any time insensible ?
- 15 Did convulsions occur ?
- 16 Did he complain of any peculiar taste in his mouth ?
- 17 Did he notice any peculiar taste in his food or drink ?
- 18 Was he sensible in the intervals between the convulsions ?
- 19 Did he complain of burning or tingling in the mouth and throat, or of numbness and tingling in the limbs ?
20. Was there vomiting ?
- 21 Was there purging ?
- 22 Was there pain in the stomach ?
- 23 Mention any other symptoms
- 24 Had the deceased ever suffered previously from a similar attack ?
- 25 How many other persons partook of the meal, or food or drink, by which the deceased is supposed to have been poisoned ?
- 26 How many were affected by it, and in what way ?
- 27 Did the deceased move from the place where the first symptoms were noticed, if so, how far ?

Dated _____ 192 _____

(Signatures of two or more respectable inhabitants of the place present at the investigation)

A _____

B _____

(Signature of officer conducting the investigation)

Name _____

Rank _____

APPENDIX II

MEMORANDUM OF THE SYMPTOMS PRODUCED BY THE MORE COMMON POISONS

| POISONS | NATIVE NAMES | USUAL SYMPTOMS |
|------------|---|---|
| Arsenic | <i>Sammulfar Sankha Hartal and Mansil</i> | Vomiting, burning pain in the stomach, great thirst sometimes cold skin, cramps in the limbs and sleepiness |
| Opium | <i>Afium, Afu</i> | Sleepiness, pupils small, complete insensibility skin |
| Aconite | <i>Bish (Bachanag)</i> | |
| Dhatura | <i>Dhatura</i> | |
| Nux Vomica | <i>Kuchila</i> | pasms and time and it causes it |

NOTES.—Any one of the above symptoms may be absent, though the poison by which they are caused has been administered

The pompos
tooth.

[Ghe]

ler aling

Effect of common poisons

| Poison. | Ordinary interval between taking the poison and the appearance of symptoms. | Ordinary time before death. |
|------------|---|-----------------------------|
| Arsenic | ½ to 1 hour | 6 to 12 hours |
| Opium | ½ 1 | 6 12 |
| Aconite | 15 minutes | 1 8 |
| Diatrum | 5 to 10 minutes | 6 12 |
| Nux Vomica | ½ 1 hour | 6 12 |

17 Inquest report must be proved to be admitted in evidence.—It is necessary if a *Panchanama* is to be put in that it should be legally proved for it does not prove itself as apparently is sometimes supposed
7 Bom L R. 978

18. Verdict at inquest not subject to revision by the High Court.—It is not open to the High Court to revise under s 435 inquest proceedings held by a Magistrate under this section 3 C. 742 followed in *Ratanlal 843*.

II.—POST-MORTEM AND CHEMICO LEGAL EXAMINATIONS

Notes.—1 Disposal of body on conclusion of inquest.—When the investigation is concluded and it is unnecessary to send the body for medical examination or to keep it for identification the Police-officer conducting the investigation shall make over the body to deceased's relatives or if there are no relatives or friends to receive the body shall have it decently buried or burned as may be proper under such rules as may be made by the Magistrate of the district in this behalf

When there is no reason to doubt the cause of death despatch of the body to the nearest medical officer is uncalled for.—*Mad. Pol Man*, Vol I p 85

2 Preservation of body for identification.—(1) When it is necessary to keep a body for the purpose of identification it shall be placed in the coolest room available and the doors and windows shall be closed and watched. Carbolic acid powder shall (if available) be freely used in such room.

(2) If no identification can be obtained within the period during which such body can be safely kept the Police-officer concerned shall before it is buried or burned record a careful description of it giving all marks peculiarities deformities or distinctive features which might lead to recognition.

(3) When the case is one of importance and photographs or casts can be taken of the face a photograph or cast shall be taken

(4) When for sanitary reasons it is necessary to bury or burn the body the course prescribed in the last preceding paragraph shall be adopted.

3. Bodies to whom sent for medical examination.—Bodies for medical examination shall be sent to the nearest Civil Surgeon. In Madras all Commissioned Medical Officers all Warrant Medical Officers and also Hospital Assistant Medical Officers are authorized to examine bodies forwarded to them for that purpose.—*Fort St George Gazette Notification 11th December 1874 p 1834*

4. When body to be so sent.—In cases where there is any doubt regarding the cause of death and in cases where the bodies of persons who have been apparently run over by railway engines or trains are not identified the body shall be sent for medical examination if it is likely to arrive in a sufficiently sound state to admit of such examination.

Explanation.—Poisoners have been known to place the bodies of their victims across the line of rails with a view to its being thought that death was caused by a railway accident

Mode of sending bodies.—With respect to the sending of bodies for medical examination the following regulations shall have effect that is to say —

(1) a light and strong *doosie* (litter) with a covering to protect it from sun and rain shall be supplied and maintained at the expense of the Judicial Department at every Police-station,

(2) the clothing left on the body shall be properly secured round it any instrument likely to have caused death remaining in or on the body shall be left there if it can be secured,

(3) a layer of charcoal two inches deep shall be placed in the *doolie* the body shall be covered with charcoal freely dusted with carbolic acid powder and some leafy branches placed over all

(4) *Police-officers along the route shall be bound to assist in obtaining men to carry such doolies so that the body may be sent in as rapidly as possible*

(5) two *Police-officers* who were present at the investigation shall accompany the body and if necessary suitable means of conveyance shall be provided for them

(6) expenses for charcoal and portorage of *doolies* shall be recovered from the Sheriff

(7) on the arrival of the body at district headquarters, it shall be at once placed and watched in the dead house and intimation shall be sent through the District Superintendent of Police to the Civil Surgeon as quickly as possible

(8) when forwarding such intimation the District Superintendent of Police shall give the Civil Surgeon all available information as to the supposed cause of death

(9) after depositing a body in the dead-house the Police shall have nothing to do with its disposal either by sending portions to the Chemical Examiner or ultimately by burying or burning it.

6 Things sent for medical examination.—Things for medical examination shall when bodies are so sent be sent with the body under charge of the same escort, and when bodies are not sent in with an escort which shall take them to the Civil Surgeon without relief

7 Rules regarding things sent for medical examination—With respect to things sent in for medical examination the following provisions shall have effect that is to say—

(1) liquids vomit excrement and the like shall be placed in clean wide-mouthed bottles or glazed jars and the stoppers or corks shall be tied down with bladder leather or cloth and the knots of the cords shall be sealed with the seal of the *Police-officer* who made the investigation such bottles or jars shall be tested by reversing them for a few minutes to see whether they leak or not

(2) supposed medicines or poisons being dry substances shall be similarly tied down in jars or made up into sealed parcels

(3) blood-stained weapons articles or cloths shall be marked with a seal and shall be made up into sealed parcels

(4) on each bottle jar and parcel shall be a label describing the contents and stating where each was found and on such label shall be impressed a counterpart of the seal used a copy of each label and a counterpart impression of the seal used shall be given in the report hereinafter prescribed

(5) if the things are to be despatched by post the precaution described in the resolutions given below shall be taken.

Precautions to be taken in Despatching substances for Chemical analysis by post

The Governor General in Council has resolved to prescribe the following rules for experimental adoption in regard to the mode of packing substances of the nature above described

(1) The suspected *viscus* or other portion of the body to be sent for examination should be enclosed in a glass bottle or jar fitted with a stopper or sound cork.

(2) If liable to decomposition it should be immersed in methylated spirits of wine which should be used in the proportion of one-third of the bulk of the material.

NB—The use of spirits of wine in packing *viscera* should be invariable whether the season is hot or cold and care should be taken that common bazaar spirit is not used.

(3) The stopper or cork should be carefully tied down with bladder or leather and sealed To ascertain that it has been securely closed the bottle or jar should be placed for some minutes with its mouth down

(4) The glass bottle or jar should then be placed in a strong wooden or tin box which should be large enough to allow of a layer of raw cotton at least three-fourths of an inch thick being put between the bottle or the jar and the box

(5) The box itself should be encased in common *gurah* cloth, which should be sealed in accordance with usual rules of the Post Office as to parcels.

(6) Despatching officers will be held personally responsible that these instructions are carefully followed. Whenever practicable, such parcels should be packed under the immediate supervision of the District Civil Surgeon.

(7) At all stations where there is a District Civil Surgeon the parcels should invariably be sent to the Post Office by that officer, and not by a subordinate officer, but where there is no Civil Surgeon, they may be sent through the sub-divisional officer.

(8) A declaration of contents to the officials of the Postal Department is unnecessary and should not be made.

See also Postal Guide for January, 1915, para. 78

A—BOMBAY.

8 Rules for the Guidance of Medical Officers in conducting Post-mortem examinations and examining Wounded persons.—See *Cir No 1353*, dated 23rd April 1868 and *Bombay Gazette*, 1873 p 338, 1874, p 947

Extract from "Bombay Government Gazette, dated 20th November, 1873"

The following rules for the guidance of Medical Officers in conducting *post mortem* examinations and examining wounded persons are published for general information—

(1) The Medical Officer shall, immediately on receiving from any person for examination a corpse or any other substance, inquire and note down the name and residence of such person, and if he be a District Police-officer, his number and rank, and shall without delay grant to such person a receipt for the corpse or other

(2) In cases where the body is sent to him, the Medical Officer should note the time of its arrival, the date and hour of the *post mortem* examination, and sex and height and apparent age of the deceased the state of the body, whether well nourished or otherwise, the existence or absence of any caste or other marks not of recent origin, such as cicatrices and deformities and the like, and whether the marks upon it correspond with those mentioned in the Police report

(3) In cases where he has been taken to the place where the body lies besides the above, he should note the place and nature of the soil (if out in the open country) where he found the body also its position and the state of the clothes if any. He should also note in cases of death from violence the position of the body in reference to surrounding objects such as sharp stones and the like contact with which, it may be alleged, has produced the injury also whether any blood stains are visible on such objects or anywhere near the corpse, and whether any weapons are lying near it. In case of suspected death from poisoning, he should note whether any appearance as it of vomited matters etc., is present in the neighbourhood of the body

(4) In every case he should describe the condition in which he found the body, noting the degree of coldness warmth, rigidity and putrefaction and the amount and nature of the clothing or covering on it.

(5) Commencing at the skull and terminating at the feet, he should examine the bones to determine whether any of them are fractured or dislocated, and inspect the vertebral column throughout, also the teeth, hair, orifices of the body and general surface, and also note the state of the pupils whether contracted or otherwise, and whether any substances are grasped in the hands.

(6) If there be any wound or contusion on the body, he should describe its position length and breadth. He should note the depth and direction of all wounds whether there are any cuts on the clothes corresponding to them, and examine the wounds carefully for the presence of foreign bodies, preserving such as are found. He should also state whether in his opinion the wound was mortal, giving his reason for such opinion and he should be specially careful to examine the neck for marks of compression.

(7) He should state his opinion as to whether the wounds, if any, could have been self inflicted, or whether they might have been the result of accident, giving reasons for his opinion.

(8) He should carefully examine any gun sword blood-stained instrument, stick or stone, by which the wounds may have been inflicted and mark such instrument, so as to be able to recognize it if asked to do so. He should also compare the weapon with the wound alleged to have been caused by it, and state whether in his opinion, it was possible for the wound to have been produced by it.

(9) He should commence his dissection of the body by removing the top of the skull in the usual way with a saw and note anything that may appear unusual.

(10) He should make an incision from the chin down to the pubes, so as to be able to examine the wind pipe, heart lungs liver, stomach, spleen kidneys and intestines, also the urinary bladder, and note whether any of these organs appeared diseased and whether any wound on the outside of the body communicates with the contents of the chest or abdomen.

(11) In making his examination he should disturb as little as possible any organ which may communicate with an external wound, if he has reason to think that the body may be re-examined by another medical man.

(12) In the case of females, he should examine the ovaries and uterus, bearing in mind that abortion is sometimes caused by the introduction in the uterus of pointed instruments which may cause death. He should note the presence or absence of pregnancy, the probable period to which pregnancy had advanced, and examine the external generative organs for marks of violence.

(13) In the case of infants he should note the condition of the umbilicus and cord if any of the latter remain, he should also remove the lungs and try whether they sink or nearly sink in or float in water.

(14) In case of suspected poisoning he should not neglect to examine every organ of the body and should pay special attention to the rules issued by the Inspector General Indian Medical Department.

(15) He should bear in mind that death may possibly have been the result of starvation, exposure to cold or heat smothering, drowning, lightning, strangulation poisoning or disease, and see whether death was due to any of these causes, giving his reasons. He should also bear in mind the instructions already published for the guidance of Police officers in cases of death from drowning hanging and the like.

(16) He should keep all his original notes even though he may make a fair copy of them afterwards, and should not lend them to anyone to read.

(17) In all cases the examination of the body should be thorough and the notes of the appearance discovered should be as minute as possible.

(18) Full notes should be made in cases of examination of wounded persons.

(19) When summoned to give evidence in any case in which he has made a *post mortem* examination or examined a wounded person, the Medical Officer should bring with him to Court the original notes made by him at the time of conducting such examination.

(20) The notes of the examination in all cases or a fair copy of them in the hand writing of the Medical Officer should be at once made in a book kept at the hospital or dispensary for the purpose and should be signed by him.

B—PUNJAB

For similar Rules in Punjab see *Punjab Gazette 9th July, 1874 Pt III p 274 Punjab Gazette 1883 p 52 and Punjab Cir Vol II pp 173-179*

A.—The following instructions* issued by the Chemical Examiner on 11th January, 1883 as amended subsequently are divided into two sections *viz* —Section 1—Containing rules for the guidance of Magisterial and Police-officers. Section 2—Containing rules for the guidance of Medical Officers. Neither section is complete by itself, the two sections being complementary to one another.

* These instructions are issued as an Appendix to G.O. No. 218 Public dated 21st February 1889 to show the arrangements in force regarding examination by Medical Officers of corpses sent to them by Police-officers or heads of villages under s. 174 Cr. P. C. Commenced Medical Officers and Medical Subordinate rates down to Hospital Assistants (now styled Sub-Assistant Surgeons) that is to say Native Surgeons Assistant Surgeons Warrant Medical Officers &c. Another Provision: Passed Hospital Apprentices and Hospital Assistants are authorized to

Examiner the rules regarding packing should be observed. At a station where there is no Civil Surgeon substances may be sent and forwarded direct to the Chemical Examiner by the subordinate-officer in charge of the hospital or dispensary.

SECTION I—RULES FOR THE GUIDANCE OF MAGISTERIAL AND POLICE-OFFICERS

Notes.—1 Instructions for guidance of Magistrates, Superintendents and Assistant Superintendents.—

The following instructions are issued for the guidance of Magistrates Superintendents and Assistant Superintendents of Police with regard to the transmission of substances to the Chemical Examiner for examination in cases of suspected poisoning or other cases in which the aid of the Chemical Examiner may be required.

2. Substances to be forwarded to Chemical Examiner only under orders of Magistrates, Superintendent or Assistant Superintendent.—In future substances will not be forwarded by Medical Officers to the Chemical Examiner except upon receipt of an order to that effect from a Magistrate Superintendent or Assistant Superintendent of Police. It will therefore be necessary that orders for the transmission of substances to the Chemical Examiner for analysis should be issued with promptitude. And an order should invariably be granted if the Medical Officer considers it advisable to obtain the opinion of the Chemical Examiner whilst on the other hand Magistrates Superintendents and Assistant Superintendents of Police should issue an order for examination, if they consider it desirable to consult the Chemical Examiner although the opinion of the Medical Officer be adverse to such a proceeding.

* (1) Should it at any time be found necessary to forward suspected substances from the Native States under his Government to the Chemical Examiner Madras for examination the order for the transmission of the substance should be issued by the officials designated below

(1) *Travancore*—the substance will be forwarded to the Chemical Examiner Madras under the orders of the Diwan.

(2) *Cochin*—the order may be issued by the Superintendent of Police Cochin or by the District Magistrate Anjankamial or by the District Magistrate Trichur

(3) *Pudukottai*—the order may be issued by the Chief Medical and Sanitary Officer of the State or by the Chief Magistrate or by the Diwan.

(4) *Sandur State*—by the Diwan.

(5) *Banganapalle*—by the Assistant Political Agent.

(ii) In the case of Medico-legal analysis required by the Hyderabad State the Chemical Examiner will recognize any requisition of a Medical Officer of the Nizam's service which purports to be made under the specific authority of His Highness's administration. The Resident in Hyderabad will be also acquainted for the information of the Durbar

(iii) The foot notes at pages 254 and 258 of the Civil Medical Code should be cancelled and the rules in the Code should be amended in accordance with the orders now issued.

3. Forwarding officer to furnish a brief history of the case.—Magistrates Superintendents and Assistant Superintendents of Police on instructing Medical Officers to forward articles for analysis to the Chemical Examiner to Government should at the same time address the latter officer quoting the number and date of their order to the Medical Officer and should furnish the Chemical Examiner with a brief summary of the history of the case.

4. Points on which information should be furnished in cases of suspected poisoning—The principal points on which Magistrates Superintendents and Assistant Superintendents of Police in cases of suspected poisoning should furnish information to Chemical Examiner are as follows—

(a) What interval was there between the last eating or drinking and the first appearance of symptoms of poisoning?

(b) What interval was there between the last eating drinking and death (if this occurred)?

(c) What were the first symptoms?

(d) Were any of the following symptoms present? If so state which—

(1) Vomiting and purging

(2) Deep sleep.

(3) Tingling of the skin and throat.

(4) Convulsions or twitchings of the muscles

(5) Delirium and clutching at imaginary object

(e) Were any other symptoms noticed?

(f) Did any other persons partake of the suspected food or drink, and did they also suffer from similar or other symptoms of poisoning?

5. **Other available information.**—Any other information available, likely to prove serviceable as a guide to the class of poison administered, should at the same time be furnished

6. **Certificate of chemical analysis by Medical Officers.**—Certificates of chemical analysis are not to be accepted from Medical Officers, as these officers are not in a position to conduct analysis as they should be carried out for judicial purposes. But any Medical Officer who may be provided with a suitable microscope should be able to recognize recent blood stains and to conduct examinations of suspected seminal stains

7. **Procedure in cases of suspected human or cattle poisoning.**—In every case of suspected human or cattle poisoning, it is desirable that all the substances requiring analysis should be packed and forwarded to the Chemical Examiner by the nearest Medical Officer. If special circumstances should render it desirable to forward any articles directly to the Chemical Examiner, the instructions given in section 2, paragraphs 4—12, must be carefully attended to

8. **Rules for forwarding suspected blood stains—Suspected blood stains.**—Articles requiring examination for the presence of blood stains may, if desirable (vide paragraph 6), be forwarded direct to the Chemical Examiner, the following rules being strictly attended to —

(1) When clothes are sent up any stains considered to be suspicious should be indicated by means of pencil marks or pins. Stains on walls floors the ground, or articles of furniture, etc., are not to be scraped off. But the stained area is to be carefully cut out, and when the material is brittle, as in the case of earth or chunam it should be carefully wrapped in cotton wool and packed in a box, so that the surface may be preserved from injury

(2) All articles requiring examination should be carefully labelled, and each label should bear the signature of the forwarding officer and the number and date of the letter of advice addressed to the Chemical Examiner. All parcels should be carefully sealed by the despatching officer and packed in such a manner that they cannot be opened without destroying the seal. The seal used should be the same throughout, and a private seal or an official seal which is kept in safe custody. A letter of advice should be separately forwarded to the Chemical Examiner. This letter should contain—

(a) An impression of the seal used in closing the packets and description hereof.

(b) A list of the articles forwarded and a statement as to how the articles have been forwarded

(c) Information as to whether any of the weapons, cloths, etc., are to be returned after examination.

9. **Miscellaneous examinations.**—Magistrates, on forwarding coins, documents, salines, liquors etc., to the Chemical Examiner, should follow the instructions laid down in paragraph 8, clause 2, and in section 2, paragraph 11, so far as they may be applicable, and should be careful to include in their letter of advice to the Chemical Examiner's information as to the nature and object of the examination required, and to furnish any other information likely to assist the Chemical Examiner in making the required examination.

SECTION II—INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE GUIDANCE OF MEDICAL OFFICERS

Notes. 1.—Medical Officers to maintain supply of unmethylated spirit and suitable bottles.—Medical Officers in charge of Hospitals and Dispensaries are required to maintain a supply of unmethylated spirit and suitable bottles, etc., in readiness for the transmission of viscera and other matters to the Chemical Examiner when occasion may arise. In cases of suspected poisoning, it is exceedingly important that viscera and other suspected matters liable to rapid decomposition should be placed in spirit as soon as practicable. And every care should be taken lest doubt may be raised in Court as to the identity of articles likely to require examination, or as to the possibility of their having been accidentally contaminated or improperly interfered with

2. **Post-mortem examination to be made thoroughly.**—Post-mortem examinations are to be made as thoroughly as circumstances will permit whenever desired by Magisterial or Police-officers. Attendance upon midwifery cases or other similar excuses will not exempt Medical Officers from the performance of the too

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frequently unpleasant though most important duty of making a *post-mortem* examination. Advanced decomposition does not prevent the detection of metallic poisons in the body. Hence remains of viscera may be forwarded for examination when the condition of the body as such is to render any attempt at dissection useless.

3. Contents of the stomach how secured for transmission.—On making a *post-mortem* examination whenever there is any suspicion of poisoning, the stomach should be tied at both ends (a double ligature being applied at the pyloric extremity, so that the contents of the intestines may not escape) and removed from the body in such a manner that its contents may be retained, after removal it should be opened, the contents received into a perfectly clean bottle and the mucous surface of the stomach carefully examined, its appearance noted, and any suspicious particles found adherent thereto should be picked off with a pair of forceps and placed in a separate small phial for transmission. And the mucous membrane of the mouth, pharynx and œsophagus should be examined and any unusual appearance of marks of corrosion thereon carefully noted.

4. Articles to be forwarded in case of death from presumed poisoning.—In all cases of death from presumed poisoning, the following articles should be forwarded for analysis each in a separate bottle, unless otherwise indicated. It will, however, be understood that other matters should be forwarded if, in the opinion of Medical Officer, the special circumstances of any case render such a proceeding advisable—

(a) Stomach.

(b) Contents of the stomach which may, if it be convenient be put in the same bottle with the stomach.

(c) Suspicious particles (if any have been found) removed from the mucous membrane of the stomach.

(d) A portion of the liver, not less than 16 oz. in weight or the whole liver if it weigh less than 16 oz., and one kidney.

(e) The vomited matter, if any. The earlier and the later vomits should, when practicable, be sent up in different bottles. And the labels should state at what period the matters were vomited. Special directions are given in paragraph 6 for the disposal of vomited matters mixed with earth etc.

(f) A specimen of the spirit used, 4 oz. is sufficient.

When it is suspected that a vegetable poison has been used the following matters should also be forwarded—

(g) The contents of the small intestines.

(h) Any urine which may have been separately collected after the commencement of symptoms, or found in the bladder after death.

5. Strong unmethylated spirit to be added.—Strong unmethylated spirit should in all cases be added, as laid down in the rules for the transmission of articles for analysis, detailed in paragraph 11, to the contents of bottles *A, D, G, H* and also to the contents of bottles *B* and *E*, unless it be suspected that alcoholic poisoning has been the cause of death. No spirit need be added to the contents of bottle *C*. Care should be taken that no vessel containing fluid matters is quite filled.

6. Packing of vomited and purged matters in metallic poisoning.—Vomited and purged matters are frequently received by Medical Officers mixed with earth etc. If the admixture of earth be sufficient to render the evacuated matters dry and inoffensive they may be packed without spirit in any convenient manner, other wise they must be packed with spirit. Vomited and purged matters if they have, as frequently happens, been allowed to fall on the ground should be carefully scraped up, not taking more earth than is necessary. The superficial scrapings should be packed separately. It is rarely necessary to remove the earth to a depth greater than half inch, even in cases of suspected metallic poisoning, unless the soil be of a very loose character. Except when a metallic poison is suspected, it is very rarely necessary to forward purged matters.

7. Poisonous food, medicine and fruits how preserved and sent up.—If articles of food, medicine, etc., suspected to have been the vehicle by which poison has been admitted, require examination they should each be packed up separately and spirit invariably added, as in the case of viscera, to such as are liable to decomposition. Fruits, such as plantain and custard-apple, if suspected to contain poison, should be carefully inspected and if it should appear that some resin substance has been inserted, this should be picked out and sent up for examination. If one suspicious substance can be discovered, the fruit should be forwarded.

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8. **Report by Medical Officer of the result of post-mortem examination of Magistrates, etc., to obtain order for transmission to Chemical Examiner.**—After having made a *post mortem* examination in a case of suspected poisoning, and having preserved in spirit all articles liable to rapid decomposition, which are likely to require examination, the Medical Officer should report the result of his examination to the Police, and on receipt of an order from a Magistrate, or from a Superintendent or Assistant Superintendent of Police, but not before, forward the viscera of the deceased and such other articles as may require analysis to the Chemical Examiner to Government for examination. In cases where no death has occurred, but where it is suspected that poison has been administered, the Medical Officer having preserved in spirit all articles liable to rapid decomposition which are likely to require examination, should similarly report the case to the Police, and on receipt of an order from a Magistrate, Superintendent or Assistant Superintendent of Police, forward the vomited matter or contents of the stomach removed by the stomach pump of the affected individual, or other matters requiring analysis, to the Chemical Examiner to Government. Though Magistrates, Superintendents and Assistant Superintendents of Police are required to grant an order for analysis, should the Medical Officer consider such an examination necessary, they can, if they consider it advisable, order viscera, etc., to be sent to the Chemical Examiner when in the opinion of the Medical Officer, such a proceeding may be quite unnecessary.

9. **Letter of advice by Medical Officer to Chemical Examiner what to contain.**—When on receipt of the necessary order of a Medical Officer forwards articles to the Chemical Examiner for examination, he should address at the same time a letter to the Chemical Examiner advising him of their despatch. This letter should contain—

- (a) An impression of the seal used in closing in the bottles and a description thereof
- (b) A list of the articles forwarded, and a statement as to how the articles have been forwarded
- (c) The name of the officer from whom the order has been received to forward the articles, and the number and date of such order.
- (d) A detailed account of the *post mortem* appearances observed.
- (e) If he has seen the case during life, an account of the symptoms observed and a statement of the treatment, if any, adopted

10. **Packets to be carefully sealed.**—All bottles and packets should be carefully sealed by the Medical Officer, and closed in such a manner that they cannot be opened without destroying the seal. The seal used should be the same throughout, and a private seal, or an official seal, which is always in safe keeping. Each bottle or packet should be labelled and each label should bear the number and date of the letter of advice to the Chemical Examiner relative to the case as well as a short description of the contents, and should be signed by the Medical Officer.

11. **Rules for transmission of suspected substances for analysis.**—Rules for the transmission of substances for analysis—suspected substances may be forwarded by post carriage bearing by passenger train, or steamer or in charge of a constable. The latter method is recommended in all cases in which wealthy or influential parties are implicated. Officers forwarding viscera, etc., by post, by rail, or steamer, or by constable to the Chemical Examiner will be held personally responsible that the following instructions are carefully followed,—

Transmission by post.—When viscera etc., are forwarded through the post, the following rules are to be observed —

- (1) The suspected *viscus* or other material to be sent for examination should be enclosed in a glass bottle or jar fitted with a stopper or sound cork.
- (2) If the material sent is liable to decomposition it should invariably be preserved by one of the following methods —
 - (i) In case of suspected poisoning in man other than alcoholic poisoning, the material sent should be covered by a layer of dry earth or lime to cover the material immersed in it bear a less proportion to the bulk of spirit is not used.

(11) In cases of suspected alcoholic poisoning in man the contents of the stomach and its washings in pure water should be placed in a bottle with a sufficient quantity of clean table salt to saturate the solution and leave a little salt undissolved. The stomach itself, after being washed in pure water, as above, may be preserved in alcohol as in (1). * A sample of the water and of the table salt so used should also be invariably forwarded for examination.

(3) Great care should be taken that the stopper or cork of the bottle fits tightly. This precaution is especially necessary when alcohol is used as a preservative, in such cases a ring of bees or candle-wax should be placed round the lip of the bottle so as to cover the shoulder of the stopper. The stopper should be carefully tied down with bladder or leather and sealed.

(4) The glass bottle or jar should then be placed in a strong wooden or tin box which should be large enough to allow of a layer of raw cotton at least three-fourths of an inch thick being put between the vessel and the box.

(5) The box itself should be encased in common *gurah* cloth which should be securely closed and sealed. The seals should be at intervals not exceeding three inches long each line of sewing. All the seals must be of the same kind of wax and must bear distinct impressions of the same device. The device should ordinarily be the office seal of the officer despatching the parcel. The device must in no case be that of a current coin or merely a series of straight, curved or crossed lines.

(6) Despatching officers will be held personally responsible that these instructions are carefully followed. Whenever practicable such parcels should be packed under the immediate supervision of the Civil Surgeon.

(7) At all stations where there is a Civil Surgeon the parcels should invariably be sent to the Post Office by that officer and not by a subordinate officer, but where there is no Civil Surgeon they may be packed and forwarded direct to the Chemical Examiner by the subordinate officer in charge of the hospital or dispensary.

(8) A declaration of contents to the officials of the Postal Department is unnecessary and should not be made.

Transmission by Rail or Steamer—When viscera etc. are forwarded by rail or steamer, it is unnecessary to encase the box in cloth but with this exception the rules for forwarding articles through the post must be observed in forwarding articles by passenger train or steamer.

Transmission by Constable—When viscera, etc. are forwarded in charge of a constable it will not be necessary to pack the bottles etc., in a strong box in order to protect them from rough handling during transit. But it is desirable that glass bottles containing viscera etc. should be wrapped in cloth or paper so as not to be offensive to other passengers.

In every other respect the same rules should be observed as in the transmission of viscera, etc. by rail.

12. Suspected Blood stains.—Medical Officers are in many instances expected to deal with these cases themselves—*vide* section 1 paragraphs 6 and 8.

13. Suspected Seminal stains.—*Vide* section 1 paragraph 6—As the cloths requiring examination in these cases are usually exceedingly dirty it is advisable, when practicable to cut out any suspicious stains pack them in cotton wool and forward them only for examination instead of the whole garment. In cutting out stains about half an inch of the surrounding cloth should be removed also. In any case cotton wool should be used and every precaution taken to prevent the stains being damaged in transit. For information regarding packing and despatch of letter of advice see instructions under head of Blood stains—*vide* section 1 paragraph 8.

14. Cattle Cases.—

(1) Some precautions should be taken to ensure that viscera etc. are not sent for examination in cases where death obviously occurred from causes other than poison. A careful search should be made for any indications of the presence of a suit when this mode of poisoning is suspected and if anything resembling a suit be found it should be forwarded for examination. A chemical examination of the viscera is useless in cases of suit poisoning as in such cases poison cannot be detected in the viscera.

(2) The entire alimentary canal should be opened and its contents inspected for suspicious-looking substances. If any suspicious-looking substance be detected in the alimentary canal, it should be packed in a separate vessel, and spirit should not be added unless necessary for its preservation.

(3) About two pounds of the contents of the stomach, with about a pound of the contents of the intestines, should be placed in a clean glass or well-glazed earthen vessel or vessels and strong unethylated spirit added in the proportion of not less than one-fourth of the apparent bulk of the material when the contents are nearly dry, but if much liquid be present spirit should be added in the proportion of one-third of the bulk of the material. Also about a pound of the liver and a similar weight of the stomach should be placed in a separate clean glass or well-glazed earthen vessel and unethylated spirit should be added in the proportion of one third of the bulk of the material. A sample of the spirit used in packing should also be sent, 4 ounces are sufficient.

(4) Dried cattle-dung may be sent without addition of spirit.

(5) Suspected cattle poisons rarely require the addition of spirit for their preservation, and spirit should not be used unless necessary.

(6) The instructions given as to the packing and transmission to the Chemical Examiner of substances requiring chemical examination in cases of suspected human poisoning are applicable to these cases and should be carefully attended to and the same precautions must be adopted as to sealing and labelling the different vessels—*vide* paragraphs 9, 10 and 11.

(7) When under instructions received from a Magistrate or Superintendent or Assistant Superintendent of Police, a Medical Officer forwards articles to the Chemical Examiner for examination, he should at the same time address and forward separately a letter to the Chemical Examiner advising their despatch. This letter should contain—

(a) an impression of the seal used in closing the vessels, and a description thereof,

(b) a list of the articles forwarded and information as to how the articles have been forwarded,

(c) the name of the officer from whom the order has been received to forward the articles and the number and date of such order

(d) information as to the number and kind of animals affected and number of deaths,

(e) any information obtainable as to *post-mortem* appearances, nature and duration of symptoms

and which may be likely to indicate the probable nature of the poison.

15. Analysis of water.—(1) Before forwarding a sample of water to the Chemical Examiner for analysis, it is necessary to write to the Chemical Examiner and ascertain when it will be convenient to receive the sample or samples which may require to be examined, it being desirable that samples should be examined shortly after they are received at the laboratory.

(2) The duty of collecting the samples should always be undertaken by a responsible person. The employment of peons or servants for this purpose is strictly prohibited. The bottles used should be thoroughly cleansed, and then well washed out twice with water from the same source it is intended to fill them from, just before finally filling them.

(3) Glass-stoppered bottles are best, but if those are not procurable, new corks are to be used with the ordinary quart wine bottle of light-coloured glass. In filling the bottles, a little space should be left between the cork and the water.

(4) Not less than one gallon of each sample of water is to be forwarded.

(5) Each bottle to be labelled with the name of the well and date of collection.

(6) On forwarding water for analysis, the Medical Officer should, at the same time forward separately a letter to the Chemical Examiner. This letter should contain—

(a) An impression and description of the seal used in closing the bottles.

(b) Information as to the number of samples sent, and a statement as to how the samples have been forwarded.

(c) An explanation as to the reason for which the examination is required and information as to by whom it is desired.

(d) A statement as to the source from which each sample was collected and by whom and when each sample was collected.

SCHEME FOR POST-MORTEM EXAMINATION.

No DATED

Note of a Post-mortem Examination on the body of—

| | | |
|----------------|---------------------------|--------|
| Name | Female | |
| Aged about | Years, m, d. approximate | |
| Colour of eyes | Height | ft. in |
| Residence | Colour of hair, length in | |
| Occupation | Caste | |
| Found | A.M. | on at |
| Died at | P.M. | |
| Sent by | with letter No | dated |
| in charge of | grade Head Constable No | |

Received at $\frac{A.M.}{P.M.}$ on at

It is stated that the body was found

It is stated that there was an interval of
between the last
eating drinking and the development of the symptoms which were—

| | |
|--------------|--------------|
| Vomiting of | Purging of |
| Twitching of | Clutching at |
| Tingling of | Delirium |
| Convulsions | Deep sleep |

other persons partook of the same food drink
and exhibited

symptoms.

The following articles were also sent with the corpse —

| | |
|---------|---------------------|
| Clothes | Ornaments—Jewellery |
| Excreta | omit |
| Weapons | |

The examination was conducted by

and was begun at $\frac{A.M.}{P.M.}$ on

External Examination.

The body is corpulent stout well nourished emaciated, not muscular, jaundiced leprotic. Rickety
Has Addison's patches, on eruption of

Is covered with down scratches on blood and vernix caseosa

Tattooing Old scars Ulcers

Burns (purple red boundary)

Caste marks Condition of clothes

Internal Examination.

The features are calm, contorted, distorted pale, livid, congested swollen bloated

The eyes are open, closed, lids not swollen, pupils not contracted, not dilated

The nose is not broken. There is no discharge of blood, mucous No foreign body, polypus ulcer
septum.

The mouth and lips give forth no characteristic odour of are not discoloured,
stained, mucous lining is not softened, destroyed. There is no discharge of blood froth

Tail of saliva running down to chest No foreign body in

The teeth are complete are wholly absent are broken or decayed

The jaws are not clenched. The gums are blue red, spongy

The tongue is not protruded between teeth, stained, mucous surface, swollen.
 No ulcer, no new growth.
 The ears have no discharge of pus, blood, fluid; No foreign body Lobes not recently torn.
 The neck is not marked by rope
 No wound dividing
 No old scar
 Glands not enlarged.
 The chest is shaped formed.
 No difference in trunk the two sides Mammary glands Auxiliary glands not enlarged.
 Hair Fracture Hernia
 Line of demarcation Cord Cutis anserina Umbilical
 Generative organs—hair Mummification of cord
 penis (shortening of, in drawing)
 No discharge No venereal Testicles
 not descended Hydrocele Labia
 Vagina fistula Hymen
 No
 discharge of blood, mucous Foreign body No venereal, no marks of violence
 The hands are not clenched, empty, contain
 have no extra digits Show no signs of work. No mark of wedding ring on finger
 No stains no fracture dislocation nails not broken. Sand, mud
 cutis anserina on arms Cholera fingers
 The feet are not oedematous There are no nodes fractures
 dislocation Deformity stains soles.
Vide Sketch
 Character no foreign body
 in wounds Cuts on clothing do not correspond with wounds on body.
 Injuries might have been self-inflicted
 caused by accident by
 caused by weapons produced which fit wounds.
 Eye-balls flaccid Flattening of points of support.
 hypostasis (prove by incision). Rigor motus *Post-mortem*
 Discolouration of
 Odour softening of eye balls Exudation from nose, mouth. Blebs on back of legs neck, sides of chest.
 Peeling of cuticle Loosening of hair Damage by wild animals.
 Thorax, abdomen burst Sutures of skull opened Eyes gone.
 Saponification. Mummification ago
 Death would appear to have occurred about
 The general appearances do not tally with the Police report.

Internal Examination.

| | | | | |
|--|-----------------------|--------------------|----------------|-------------------------|
| Depth of fat | in | Colour of | Development of | colour of muscles, no |
| extravasation no fluid | amount of | | | |
| oz. | | Level of diaphragm | R | L |
| Position of organs | normal | | | |
| Position of organs | normal | Fracture of | | ribs, |
| Pleura increased vascularity, roughening of surface, effusion of fluid | | | | |
| character of lymph | Old, recent adhesions | Wound | | |
| Pericardium reddened distended | Fluid in | | ozs. | Character |
| of inner surface dark roughened | Wounded | | | Spots of |
| hemorrhage on | | | | |
| Weight | oz | | | Hypertrophied, Dilated. |

(Note—Organs to be merely inspected and none removed)

| | | | | | |
|--|--|--------------------|----------|--|---|
| | Fatty infiltration, degeneration abnormality, wound, rupture | | | | turged |
| Rt. auricle contains | | | | | Rt. ventricle contains |
| Lt. auricle contains | | | | | Lt. ventricle contains |
| Valves and endocardium rigid, rough, contracted, thickened, adherent perforated, vegetations puckered, atheromatous | | | | | |
| Chordae tendinae shortened, broken. Clots | | | | | |
| Polypus Coronary vessels. | | | | | |
| General character dark, cherry coloured. Coagulated. Firm, abnormally fluid | | | | | |
| Atheroma, aneurism, wound, rupture | | | | | |
| Distended not marked by ribs. Do not collapse. | | | | | |
| Colour | <i>Insular marbling</i> —Weight | | | | R |
| Feel dry, soft oedematous hard, friable, non-elastic, emphysematous, collapsed | | | | | L |
| Do not section and exudation on pressure | | | | | |
| amount of blood, water secretion, granular, bloody, tenacious, tubes reddened, thickened, dilations, grey yellow tubercle, cartaceous mass, shrinking cavities Pigment, fibroid change. Red grey hepatization, purulent, infiltration, diffuse circumscribed abscess, atelectasis gangrene cancer, wounds, rupture | | | | | |
| Contains water, mud and | | | | | |
| Injected, swollen, discoloured, oedematous, belled froth | | | | | corrugated leathery |
| new growth impacted mass, hyoid bone. | | | | | |
| Outer surface vascular, injected, adherent, distended by food, gas | | | | | Contracted wound rupture |
| Interior surface contents | ozs | | | | looking with characteristic odour of colour |
| Appearance—colour | vascular injected, dilated and tortuous vessels | | | | punctuated oedema |
| tous, charred, extravasation effusion, seeds of | | | | | |
| Particles of ulcer perforated | Character of edge | | | | |
| Mucous membrane thick, soft, hard, eroded corrugated, leathery | | | | | |
| Mucous membrane partly detached, easily stripped, soft brittle, sodden, white, brown stricture new growth, impacted mass, wound. | | | | | |
| Weight | oz. | | | | |
| Relations | adhesions | rupture | | Weight | enlarged diminished |
| atrophied wound | | | | | |
| Edges thick, thin, rounded | | | | | |
| Surface smooth, shining dull nodulated, scarlike bands | | | | | |
| Colour red yellow mottled, pigmented. | | | | | |
| Consistence hard soft, flabby, tough fleshy, greasy, friable, waxy, diffuent | | | | | |
| Section hyperaemic, nutmeg granular, distended, ducts, embolism hydatid, abscess (reagent reaction) | | | | | |
| Capsule adherent, thickened, loose, wrinkled. | | | | | |
| Gall bladder full, empty, stone. | | | | | |
| Ducks thickened, constricted, obstructed by | weight | | | large small wrinkled | Rupture, |
| wound, colour | Capsule thick adherent | | | | |
| Consistence hard, soft, brittle, friable abscess, infarcts | | | | | |
| Relations | No hernia | Fat, no adhesions, | injected | hypostasis | |
| Glands swollen scrofulous ulcer, tubercle, caseous masses | | | | effusion of lymph | Weight R |
| oz 1. oz. | Larger, smaller, heavier, lighter | | | | |
| Colour red, yellow white mottled, hypostasis, smooth, rough lobulated. Section soft, hard friable, anemic, hyperaemic colour | | | | | |
| Corticle increased, wasted pelvis dilated | pyramids | | | malpighian bodies increase of connective tissue. | |
| Capsule very non-adherent, thick, thin stellate veins | | | | new old, abscess cyst, calculus rupture- | |
| wound (reagent reaction) enlarged, irregular, firm adherent, section yellow, grey, white, cheesy, cretified. | | | | | |

Small intestine *outer surface* hypostasis (especially pelvic) adherent. Injected
 interior contents colour membrane swollen pulpy, sloughing ulcerated (diffuse follicular)
 Peyer's glands impacted mass twisting new growth thinning wasting and contraction
 Large intestine *outer surface*

5 *Ileo caecal valve*3 —6 *Appendix length.**Interior**Rectum*

| | | | | |
|---------------------------------|------------|------------------|------------|-------------------------|
| Contents | oz. | Calculus | new growth | |
| Menstruation | | pregnancy | abortion | Violence |
| wound | | rupture | new growth | |
| Fracture of pelvis | | | | |
| The soft parts present. | | | | |
| The bones are | | | | |
| The Dura mater | adherent | anæmic, vascular | hypostasis | |
| The Arachnoid | dry sticky | tubercle | | The pia mater injected |
| Convulsions | flattened | | | Ventricles full empty |
| Substance softened (red yellow) | hard | abscess | | |
| Tumour | Hæmorrhage | | clot | Basal fracture |
| Exostosis | Caries | | Wound | |
| <i>Soft parts present</i> | | | | |
| <i>The bones are</i> | | | | |
| <i>The Dura mater</i> | adherent | anæmic | vascular | hypostasis |
| <i>The Arachnoid</i> | dry | sticky | tubercle. | |
| <i>The Pia mater</i> | injected | | | |
| <i>The cord length</i> | weight | oz | soft | hard vascular injected. |
| Semi translucent | | | | |

Colour

Columns

Nerve roots

The following numbered and sealed as under and each labelled with a signed note of reference to this report are together with a sample of the spirit in which they are preserved reserved for chemical analysis —

- 1 Stomach and contents
- 2 Intestine and contents
- 3 Spleen.
- 4 Sample of liver
- 5 Kidney
- 6 Sample of muscle
- 7 Sample of blood
- 8 Sample of spirit.



Result of analysis.

Summary of opinion The deceased would appear to have

Dated day of 19

at Sg

C—QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS BY CHEMICAL EXAMINER

Quantitative analysis to be made only in mineral poisoning—The Chemical Examiner's report is legal and important evidence in an investigation or trial. In the case of Vegetable Poisoning Quantitative Analysis of human viscera etc. is likely to be fallacious in its results and as such worthless as legal evidence. Quantitative Analysis should therefore be made in addition to Qualitative Analysis only in the case of Mineral Poisoning for finding out the amount of poison found in each article—(Vide G.O. No 1307 Judicial dated 17th August 1905.

3 Free from a dark hue or a light shade, spotted clear as a fair skin
The northern people large and fair-complexioned. *Shale*
4 Not overcast cloudless — said of the wind or weather as a fair sky or day

To wish your views may well run over *F* *son*
5 Free from obstacles or hindrances unimpeded
to go on — said of a road or passage and the like as a fair mark in fair light a fair view
The sea calm and in quiet company which was a fair way to a village. *Shale*
6 Free from a false and good insight. *Shale*

7 Characterized by frankness honestly impartially candid open upright free from suspicion or bias — said of persons character or conduct as a fair man fair dealing or off a show of fair to be to may my *Shale* would call fair 121) *Shale*

8 Free from favorable inspiring hope and confidence — said of words promises and the like
When your words and most cannot will not present to us we must be right in our view. *Shale*

9 Free from any marked characteristic not distinguished or unusual
The color of my face and good. *Shale*

10 Free from any marked characteristic not distinguished or unusual
The color of my face and good. *Shale*

11 Free from any marked characteristic not distinguished or unusual
The color of my face and good. *Shale*

12 Free from any marked characteristic not distinguished or unusual
The color of my face and good. *Shale*

13 Free from any marked characteristic not distinguished or unusual
The color of my face and good. *Shale*

14 Free from any marked characteristic not distinguished or unusual
The color of my face and good. *Shale*

15 Free from any marked characteristic not distinguished or unusual
The color of my face and good. *Shale*

16 Free from any marked characteristic not distinguished or unusual
The color of my face and good. *Shale*

17 Free from any marked characteristic not distinguished or unusual
The color of my face and good. *Shale*

18 Free from any marked characteristic not distinguished or unusual
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33 Free from any marked characteristic not distinguished or unusual
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34 Free from any marked characteristic not distinguished or unusual
The color of my face and good. *Shale*

35 Free from any marked characteristic not distinguished or unusual
The color of my face and good. *Shale*

2 The land of (illusory) the shade or country of the Day (Obs)

11 (Aurora) is a king crowned in Fairy *Epiphany*

3 The inhabitants or people of Fairy land (Obs)

The fourth kind of spirit (s) called the Fairy *St. James*

4 An imaginary supernatural being or spirit supposed to assume a human form either male or female and to mischief for good or evil in the affairs of mankind. *See Fairy and Elf*

Round about the trees down in
Like a v or journey in a trip. *Shale*

5 An enchantress (Obs)

1 Fairy of the moon is a lunar being supposed to visit mankind and to love it in the darkness of the night. *See Fairy and Elf*

No golden or sweet fairy of the moon
But a harsh power loved to dance blotted from it. *Shale*

2 Fairy of the moon is a lunar being supposed to visit mankind and to love it in the darkness of the night. *See Fairy and Elf*

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To speak the strength of belief, carefully found, among the fictions, fables, only true. *Shale*

4 Conformable to truth; as a faithful narrative or representation

5 True worthy of belief

6 True worthy of belief

7 True worthy of belief

8 True worthy of belief

9 True worthy of belief

10 True worthy of belief

11 True worthy of belief

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14 True worthy of belief

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1000 True worthy of belief

D—FEE TO MEDICAL OFFICERS

(i) *For conducting a Postmortem or Medico-legal Examination*—The fee to be paid to a Medical Subordinate other than an officer of commissioned rank for conducting a Post mortem or Medico-legal Examination when it does not fall within the ordinary scope of his duties, shall be Rs 4. It is to be understood that Medical Subordinates lent by the Government to Municipalities or Dispensary Committees will be required to perform these examinations as part of their regular duties, without further remuneration. In the case of Officers of Commissioned Rank the fee shall be Rs 16 for Post mortem Examination and Rs 10 for Medico-legal Examination—(G O No 694 Judicial dated 15th March 1884).

(ii) *For Attendance in Court*—A Medical Officer, not being a Civil Surgeon or an officer in Medical charge of a Civil Station shall be entitled to a fee of Rs. 16 for conducting Post mortem Examination and to a fee of Rs. 10 for conducting a Medico-legal Examination other than a Post mortem Examination in cases not falling within the ordinary discharge of his duties whether or not he is required to give evidence in a Court of Justice in connection with such examination. When he is required to give such evidence in a Court of Justice he shall not be entitled to any remuneration in addition to the fee sanctioned above other than the usual expenses paid to a witness—(G O No. 1367 Judicial dated 21st September 1882).

(iii) *For grant of certificate or Medical opinion*—Paragraph 381 of the Civil Medical Code shall be amended as follows—(Vide G O No 755 Public, dated 12th September, 1908) —(a) Medical Officers who are public servants shall in no case receive any fee from the public revenues for giving certificates opinions or evidence regarding any proceeding of public interest such as inquests or judicial inquiries. Certificates shall invariably be granted when required by the Police. If in any case a Medical Officer considers that unnecessary or improper use is made of this rule by the Police he should, after granting the certificate, report the matter to the District Medical and Sanitary Officer who will bring it to the notice of the District Magistrate. If the officer is himself the District Medical and Sanitary Officer or a Civil Surgeon, he will similarly report the matter to the District Magistrate. (b) A fee may be charged subject to the provisions of clause (d) below, for a certificate or opinion given by a Medical Officer in Government, Municipal or Local Fund service at the instance of a private person treated or examined by him in his official capacity for any purpose whether it be in connection with a civil or criminal proceeding or not, and the fact such person was treated in a State Municipal or Local Fund Hospital shall not exempt him from the payment of such fee to the certifying officer. When such a certificate or opinion is given by a Commissioned Medical Officer or a permanent Civil Surgeon he shall be entitled to a fee at the usual rate of remuneration admissible to him in the case of an ordinary certificate. When it is given by a Subordinate Medical Officer, the fee shall not exceed two days salary (i.e. pay without allowances) of such officer subject to maximum of Rs. 5. Provided that where a private person pleads that from poverty he cannot pay the fee demanded the Medical Officer shall not therefore refuse to treat or examine such person and shall record the results of the examination. He may however in such case refuse to grant a certificate without the payment of a fee but if he does so, he shall record his reason for such refusal. *Provided further that a Medical Officer shall not levy a second fee for giving evidence in a Court to prove a certificate or opinion previously given by him to private person and for which he has already received a fee. There is however, no objection to a Medical Officer taking a fee from a private person for giving evidence in a Court in cases in which the officer has not obtained a fee beforehand for consultation or for a certificate in regard to the same matter and in which he has been summoned to give evidence in Court by that person and not by the Court or another party.

(c) *Treatment not to be postponed*.—A Medical Officer shall not be at liberty by directing the appli

(d) *No fee for certificate under M. S. Act*.—Notwithstanding anything contained in the above rules no fee shall be charged by Medical Officers for certificates granted with reference to section 36 of the Merchant Shipping Act 1906 on the requisition of the port authorities.

NB—(Vide G O No 218 Public dated 21-2-1899 No 319 Public, dated 25-4-06, No 762 Public, dated 6-8-00 No 1302 Judicial dated 17-8-05, No 2 F dated 11-3-75 and 1-8-83, No 819, Public, dated 2-10-08 No. 604 F dated 15-3-84 No 1307 F dated 21-9-82, No. 755 Public dated 12-9-08 and No 644 Public, dated 8-8-08.)

C.—Bengal Rules.—The following rules and orders under s. 174 are in force in Bengal —

At every division of a district where there is a Sub-Assistant Surgeon or European Medical Officer, the *post mortem* in all cases of violent or suspicious deaths occurring in that division should be held by such officer

Where there is only a Native Doctor, where the state of the dead body, the distance, the weather, or the condition of the roads renders it improbable that the body will reach the Sudder Station in such condition as to enable the Civil Surgeon satisfactorily to hold a *post mortem* examination on it, the body must be sent to the Sub-divisional Medical Officer. A copy of the report of such officer will, however, be submitted to the Civil Surgeon, who will make any remarks he thinks proper on the margin of the report, for the information of the Sub-divisional Officer. When the body has external marks of violence, as in the case of hanging, fractures or severe cuts, the Sub-divisional Magistrate should himself, if possible, view the body in the presence of the Native Doctor

When, on the other hand, circumstances permit, the body should be sent to the Sudder Station for examination by the Civil Surgeon, and at such examination the Sub-Assistant Surgeon, or the Native Doctor of the Sudder Station, should be present, so that he may be able to attend. If required at the Sub-divisional Court, and, give evidence as to causes of death in cases in which the absence of Civil Surgeon on his duty would be attended with serious inconvenience to those under his medical charge—*Resolution, Bengal Government 10th October, 1863*

9. Evidentiary value of a post-mortem report.—A *post mortem* report cannot be used as evidence at the trial except by way of refreshing the memory of the person who made it or to contradict him, 6 C. W. N. 98, 9 C. 455 = 11 C. L. R. 569.

10. Disposal of the body.—The Police-officer sent in charge of a corpse need not be present throughout the details of the *post mortem* examination. It will suffice if he stands sufficiently near to be able to testify that the body which has been in his charge was the one which was examined by the Medical Officer. In all cases where the Police bring a body for *post mortem* examination, they should arrange for the subsequent disposal of the body. If the relations or friends of the deceased will arrange for the burial the body should be given to them. If they decline the Police should arrange for the burial of the body themselves—*Mad. Pol. Man, Vol. I p. 80*

11. Questions that may be put to medical and other witnesses in certain cases.—

No 1

Questions which may be put to a medical witness in a case of suspected poisoning after post mortem examination of the body

- 1 Did you examine the body———, late a resident of———, and if so, what did you observe?
- 2 What do you consider to have been the cause of death? State your reasons
- 3 Did you find any external marks of violence on the body? If so, describe them
- 4 Did you observe any unusual appearance on further examination of the body? If so, describe them.
- 5 To what do you attribute these appearances, to disease, poison or other cause?
- 6 If to poison, then to what class of poisons?
- 7 Have you formed an opinion as to what particular poison was used?
- 8 Did you find any morbid appearances in the body besides those which are usually found in cases of poisoning by ——? If so, describe them.
- 9 Do you know of any disease in which the *post mortem* appearances resemble those which you observed in this case?
- 10 In what respect do the *post mortem* appearances of that disease differ from those which you observed in the present case?
- 11 What are the symptoms of that disease in the living?
- 12 Are there any *post mortem* appearances usual in cases of poisoning by ———but which you did not discover in this instance?

- 13 Might not the appearances you mention have been the result of spontaneous changes in the stomach after death ?
- 14 Was the state of the stomach and bowels compatible or incompatible with vomiting and purging ?
- 15 What are the usual symptoms of poisoning by — ?
- 16 What is the usual interval between the time of taking the poison and the commencement of the symptoms ?
- 17 In what time does — generally prove fatal ?
- 18 Did you send the contents of the stomach and bowels (or other matters) to the Chemical Examiner ?
- 19 Were the contents of the stomach (or other matters) sealed up in your presence immediately on removal from the body ?
- 20 Describe the vessel in which they were sealed up and what impression did the seal bear ?
- 21 Have you received a reply from the Chemical Examiner, if so is the report now produced that which you received ?
- 22 (If a female adult) what was the state of the uterus ?

No. II

Questions that may be put to a non-professional witness in case of suspected poisoning

- 1 Did you know —, late a resident of — ? If so did you see him during his last illness and previously ?
- 2 What were the symptoms from which he suffered ?
- 3 Was he in good health previous to the attack ?
- 4 Did the symptoms appear suddenly ?
- 5 What was the interval between the last time of eating or drinking and the commencement of the symptoms ?
- 6 What was the interval between the commencement of the symptoms and death ?
- 7 What did the last meal consist of ?
- 8 Did anyone partake of this meal with — ?
- 9 Were any of them affected in the same way ?
- 10 Had — ever suffered from a similar attack before ?
- 11 Did vomiting occur ?
- 12 Was there any purging ?
- 13 Was there any pain in the stomach ?
- 14 Was — very thirsty ?

If any of the following symptoms have been mentioned in answer to question 1 special questions may be asked regarding them as follows

- 15 Did he become faint ?
- 16 Did he complain of headache or giddiness ?
- 17 Did he appear to have lost the use of his limbs ?
- 18 Did he sleep heavily ?
- 19 Had he any delirium ?
- 20 Did convulsions occur ?
- 21 Did he complain of any peculiar taste in the mouth ?
- 22 Did he notice any peculiar taste in his food or water ?

This is with reference to *Aux Vomica*

- 23 Was he sensible in the intervals between the convulsions ?

This is with reference to *Aconite*

- 24 Did he complain of burning or tingling in the mouth and throat or of numbness and tingling in the limbs ?

No. III

Questions which may be put to a medical witness in a case of supposed death by wounds or blows after post mortem examination of the body

- 1 Did you examine the body of — late a resident of —, and if so what did you observe ?
- 2 What do you consider to have been the cause of death ? State your reasons
- 3 Did you find any external marks of violence on the body ? If so describe them

C.—Bengal Rules—The following rules and orders under s. 174 are in force in Bengal—

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- 2 What do you consider to have been the cause of death? State your reasons
- 3 Did you find any external marks of violence on the body? If so, describe them
- 4 Did you observe any unusual appearance on further examination of the body? If so describe them
- 5 To what do you attribute these appearances, to disease, poison or other cause?
- 6 If to poison, then to what class of poisons?
- 7 Have you formed an opinion as to what particular poison was used?
- 8 Did you find any morbid appearances in the body besides those which are usually found in cases of poisoning by ——? If so, describe them
- 9 Do you know of any disease in which the *post mortem* appearances resemble those which you observed in this case?
- 10 In what respect do the *post-mortem* appearances of that disease differ from those which you observed in the present case?
- 11 What are the symptoms of that disease in the living?
- 12 Are there any *post mortem* appearances usual in cases of poisoning by —— but which you did not discover in this instance?

- 13 Might not the appearances you mention have been the result of spontaneous changes in the stomach after death ?
- 14 Was the state of the stomach and bowels compatible or incompatible with vomiting and purging ?
- 15 What are the usual symptoms of poisoning by ——— ?
- 16 What is the usual interval between the time of taking the poison and the commencement of the symptoms ?
- 17 In what time does ——— generally prove fatal ?
- 18 Did you send the contents of the stomach and bowels (or other matters) to the Chemical Examiner ?
- 19 Were the contents of the stomach (or other matters) sealed up in your presence immediately on removal from the body ?
- 20 Describe the vessel in which they were sealed up and what impression did the seal bear ?
- 21 Have you received a reply from the Chemical Examiner, if so, is the report now produced that which you received ?
22. (If a female adult) what was the state of the uterus ?

No. II

Questions that may be put to a non professional witness in case of suspected poisoning

- 1 Did you know——, late a resident of——? If so did you see him during his last illness and previously ?
- 2 What were the symptoms from which he suffered ?
- 3 Was he in good health previous to the attack ?
- 4 Did the symptoms appear suddenly ?
- 5 What was the interval between the last time of eating or drinking and the commencement of the symptoms ?
- 6 What was the interval between the commencement of the symptoms and death ?
- If death occurred,*
- 7 What did the last meal consist of ?
- 8 Did anyone partake of this meal with —— ?
- 9 Were any of them affected in the same way ?
- 10 Had —— ever suffered from a similar attack before ?
- 11 Did vomiting occur ?
- 12 Was there any purging ?
- 13 Was there any pain in the stomach ?
- 14 Was —— very thirsty ?
- If any of the following symptoms have been mentioned in answer to question 1, special questions may be asked regarding them as follows*

- 15 Did he become faint ?
- 16 Did he complain of headache or giddiness ?
- 17 Did he appear to have lost the use of his limbs ?
- 18 Did he sleep heavily ?
- 19 Had he any delirium ?
- 20 Did convulsions occur ?
- 21 Did he complain of any peculiar taste in the mouth ?
22. Did he notice any peculiar taste in his food or water ?

This is with reference to *Aux Vomica*

- 23 Was he sensible in the intervals between the convulsions ?

This is with reference to *Aconite*

- 24 Did he complain of burning or tingling in the mouth and throat or of numbness and tingling in the limbs ?

No. III

Questions which may be put to a medical witness in a case of supposed death by wounds or blows after post mortem examination of the body

- 1 Did you examine the body of —— late a resident of ——, and if so what did you observe ?
- 2 What do you consider to have been the cause of death ? State your reasons.
- 3 Did you find any external marks of violence on the body ? If so describe them.

4 Are you of opinion that these injuries were inflicted before or after death? Give your reasons.

5 Did you examine the body internally? Describe any unnatural appearance which you observed

6 You say that in your opinion ———— was the cause of death, in what immediate way did it prove fatal?

7 Did you find any appearance of disease in the body?

8 If so do you consider that if the deceased had been free from this disease, the injuries would still have proved fatal?

9 Do you believe that the fact of his suffering from this disease lessened his chance of recovery from the injuries sustained?

10 Are these injuries taken collectively or is any one of them ordinarily and directly dangerous to life

11 Have they been caused by manual force or with a weapon?

12 Did you find any foreign matter in the wound?

13 By what sort of weapon has the wound been inflicted?

14 Could the injuries have been inflicted by the weapon now before you (No — in the Police charge sheet)?

15 Could the deceased have walked (so far), or spoken etc., after the receipt of such an injury?

16 Have you chemically, or otherwise examined the stains, (or the weapon, clothes etc.,) now before you (No — in the Police charge-sheet)?

17 Do you believe the stains to be those of blood?

18 What time do you think elapsed between the receipt of the injuries and death?

19 What was the direction of the wound and can you form an opinion as to the position of the person inflicting such a wound with respect to the person receiving it?

20 Is it possible for such a wound to have been inflicted by anyone on his own person? Give your reasons

21 Give precise direction of the wound
22 Did the appearance of the wound indicate that the gun had been discharged close to the body at some distance from it?

23 Did you find any slug, bullet, wadding, etc., in the wound or had — made its exit?

24 Do you think it possible that you could have mistaken the aperture of entrance for that of exit?

NO IV

Question that may be put to a medical witness in a case of supposed infanticide after post mortem examination of the body

1 Did you examine the body of a ^{male} child sent to you by the District Superintendent of Police on the ——— of ——— 19—? And if so what did you observe?

2 Can you state whether the child was completely born alive, or born dead? State the reasons in your opinion

3 What do you consider to have been the cause of death? Give your reasons

4 What do you believe to have been the uterine age of the child? State your reasons

5 What do you believe to have been the extra uterine age of the child? Give reasons

6 Did you find any marks of violence or other unusual appearances externally? If so describe them accurately

7 Did you find any morbid or unusual appearances on examination of the body internally? If so describe them accurately

8 Did you believe the injuries you observed to have been inflicted before or after death? Give reasons

9 Can you state how they were inflicted? Give reasons

10 Do you consider that they were accidental or not? Give reasons

find it there for this

Crete

four

we carry their fees

8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45, 46, 47, 48, 49, 50, 51, 52, 53, 54, 55, 56, 57, 58, 59, 60, 61, 62, 63, 64, 65, 66, 67, 68, 69, 70, 71, 72, 73, 74, 75, 76, 77, 78, 79, 80, 81, 82, 83, 84, 85, 86, 87, 88, 89, 90, 91, 92, 93, 94, 95, 96, 97, 98, 99, 100

11 Had the infant respired fully, partially or not at all?

12 Did you examine the person of—the alleged mother of the infant? If so have you reason to suppose that she was recently delivered of a child? Can you state approximately, the date of her delivery? Give reasons.

No V

Questions that may be put to a medical witness in a case of supposed death by hanging or strangulation

- 1 Did you examine the body of —, late a resident of — and if so what did you observe?
- 2 What do you consider to have been the cause of death? State the reasons for your opinion.
- 3 Did you observe any external mark of violence upon the body?
- 4 Did you observe any unnatural appearances on examination of the body internally?
- 5 Was there any rope or other such article round the neck when you saw the body?
- 6 Can you state whether the mark or marks you observed were caused before or after death?
- 7 By what sort of articles do you consider the deceased to have been hanged (or strangled)?
- 8 Could the mark you observed have been caused by the rope or other article now before you (No— of the Police charge-sheet)?
- 9 Do you think that this rope could have supported the weight of the body?
- 10 Would great violence be necessary to produce the injuries you describe

If strangulation

No. VI

Questions that may be put to a medical witness in a case of supposed death by drowning after post-mortem examination of the body

- 1 Did you examine the body of —, late a resident of —, and if so what did you observe?
- 2 What do you consider to have been the cause of death? State your reasons.
- 3 Were there any external marks of violence upon the body? If so, describe them.
- 4 Describe any unnatural appearances which you observed on further examination of the body.
- 5 Did you find any foreign matters, such as weeds, straw, etc., in the hair, or clenched in the hands of the deceased, or in the air passages or attached to any other part of the body?
- 6 Did you find any water in the stomach?

No. VII

Questions that may be put to a medical witness in a case of alleged rape

- 1 Did you examine the person of Mussammat —? If so, how many days after the alleged rape did you make the examination, and what did you observe?
- 2 Did you observe any marks of violence about the vulva or adjacent parts?
- 3 Are the injuries such as might have been occasioned by the commission of rape?
- 4 Was the hymen ruptured?

NE—This question is only to be asked in the case of the rape of a girl of tender years?

- 5 Did you observe any further marks of violence upon the person of the woman?
- 6 Had she passed the age of puberty?
- 7 Can you state approximately what her age is?
- 8 Did you find her to be a strong, healthy woman, or so weakly as to be unable to resist an attempt at rape?
- 9 Did you examine the person of the accused?
- 10 Did you observe any marks of violence upon his body?
- 11 Was he suffering from any venereal disease?
- 12 Did you find the woman to be suffering from a similar or other venereal disease?
- 13 Had a sufficient time elapsed, when you examined the person of the woman for venereal disease to have made its appearance, in case of her having been infected?

Feigner (in et) n One who feigns, an inventor, [ellen N. H. Ger. feilen, D. ellen, Sw. fäla, Dan. (FELT) n [A. G. feig feige, N. H. Ger. feigen, M. D.

th. y. gdon
Syn - See CONGRATULATE
Feligitate n (L. Lat. felicitas) p of felix
fare) Male very happy
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SAVAGE FEROUS blood

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3 A skin or hide, a felt [Ole]
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(From f. f. & r) An sh. sent
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H. f. f. f.

F, f, d, g, f, long, d, z, f, d, g, y short, care, far, last, fall, what, there, felt, fern, plaque, firm, done, for, dg, wolf, food, foot,

- 14 Can you state approximately how long the accused had been suffering from this complaint?
- 15 Can you state approximately how long the woman had been suffering from this (venereal) complaint?
- 16 Have you examined the stained articles forwarded to you, and now in Court (No—of the Police charge-sheet)?
- 17 What is the result of your examination?
- 18 Do you believe that a rape has been committed or not? State your reasons

No VIII

Questions that may be put to a medical witness in cases of suspected insanity.

- 1 Have you examined——?
- 2 Have you done so on several different occasions so as to preclude the possibility of your examinations having been made during lucid intervals of insanity?
- 3 Do you consider him to be capable of managing himself and his personal affairs?
- 4 Do you consider him to be of '*unsound mind*,' in other words, *intellectually insane*?
- 5 If so do you consider his mental disorder to be complete or partial?
- 6 Do you think he understands the obligation of an oath?
- 7 Do you consider him, in his present condition, competent to give evidence in a Court of Law?
- 8 Do you consider that he is capable of pleading to the offence of which he now stands accused?
- 9 Do you happen to know how he was treated by his friends (whether as a lunatic, an imbecile, or otherwise) prior to the present investigation and the occurrences that have led to it?
- 10 What, as far as you can ascertain, were the general characteristics of his previous disposition?
- 11 Does he appear to have had any *previous* attacks of insanity?
- 12 Is he subject to insane *delusions*?
- 13 If so what is the general character of these? Are they harmless or dangerous? How do they manifest themselves?
- 14 Might such delusion or delusions have led to the criminal act of which he is accused?
- 15 Can you discover the *cause* of his reason having become affected? In your opinion was it *congenital* or *accidental*?
- 16 If the latter, does it appear to have come on suddenly, or by slow degrees?
- 17 Have you any reason for believing that his insanity is of *hereditary* origin? If so, please to specify the grounds for such an opinion, and all the particulars bearing on it, as to the insane parents or relatives of the accused, the exciting cause of his attack, his age when it set in, and the type which it assumed.
- 18 Have you any reason to suspect that he is in any degree, *feigning* insanity? If so what are the grounds for this belief?
- 19 Is it possible, in your opinion that his insanity may have followed the actual commission of his offence, or been caused by it?
- 20 Have you any reason to suppose that the offence could have been committed during a *lucid interval*, during which he could be held responsible for his act? If so what appears to you to have been the duration of such lucid interval? Or, on the contrary, do you believe his condition to have been such as altogether to absolve him from legal responsibility?
- 21 Does he now display any signs of *homicidal* or of *suicidal* mania, or has he ever done so to your knowledge?
- 22 Do you consider it absolutely necessary, from his present condition, that he should be confined in a lunatic asylum? or again
- 23 Do you think that judicious and unremitting supervision *out of an asylum*, might be sufficient to prevent him from endangering his own life or the property of others?

No IX

Questions that may be put to a medical witness in a case of alleged causing miscarriage (Sections 312—316, Indian Penal Code).

- 1 Did you examine the person of Mussammitt ———? If so, when? What did you observe?
- 2 Are you of opinion that a miscarriage has occurred or not? Give your reasons.
- 3 In what mode do you consider the miscarriage to have been produced, whether by violence per vaginam, or by external violence or by the use of irritant internally? Give your reasons.
- 4 It is alleged that a drug called ——— was used state the symptoms and effects which the administration internally of this drug would produce. Do you consider that it would produce miscarriage?
- 5 Can you state whether the woman was quick with child when miscarriage was produced? State your reasons.
- 6 Did you see the fœtus? If so, at what period of gestation do you consider the woman to have arrived?

No X.

Questions that may be put to a medical witness in a case of grievous hurt.

- 1 Have you examined ———? If so, state what you observed.
- 2 Describe carefully the marks of violence which you observed.
- 3 In what way do you consider the injuries to have been inflicted? If by a weapon, what sort of a weapon do you think was used?
- 4 Do you consider that the injuries inflicted could have been caused by the weapon now shown to you (No—of the police charge-sheet)?
- 5 What was the direction of the wound, and can you form an opinion as to the position of the person inflicting such a wound with respect to the person receiving it?
- 6 Is it possible for such a wound to have been inflicted by anyone on his own person? Give your reasons.

The Magistrate in putting this question will show the Indian Penal Code to the witness or the Magistrate may vary the form of the question so as to elicit the required information without calling the witness's attention to the Code.

- 7 Do you consider that the injuries inflicted constitute any of the forms of "grievous hurt" defined in s 320 of the Indian Penal Code? If so which of them? Give your reasons.

- 8 Do you consider that the person injured is now out of danger?
- 9 It is alleged that the injuries were caused by ——— Could they have been caused in the manner indicated?
- 10 Have you chemically or otherwise examined the stains on the weapon, clothes, etc., now before you (No—of the Police charge-sheet)?

NB—In case of the injuries being gun-shot wounds questions 11 to 24 under the head of No III (Deaths by wounds) may be put to the witness.

- 11 Do you believe the stains to be those of blood?

NB—See also C. P. Cr. Cir., Part II, No 55 and Oudh Cr. Dig., p 33

POINTS TO BE REQUIRED IN CASE OF DEATH FROM RUPTURE OF THE SPLEEN

Report on Rupture of the Spleen by Dr Brown Principal of the Lahore Medical College

Rupture of the spleen usually occurs from violence affecting the spleen when it is already diseased, but it may occur when the structure is quite healthy if the violence is very great, or it can happen without violence if the spleen is in a very diseased state, when rupture has occurred either from muscular efforts or straining, coughing or vomiting or even it is stated, spontaneously in intermittent fever, but these cases are very rare. It is, therefore of great importance to determine what was the condition of the spleen in all cases in which death has been caused by rupture of this substance.

When the spleen is ruptured by violence, the marks of that violence can sometimes be seen on the body, but not in all cases, since rupture of the spleen often produces death so rapidly that no effusion of blood can occur, and also sometimes the violence appears only to affect the spleen, and not to injure other parts

[illegible]

a violence of an act; to borrow the coarseness of a brutality by which it was marked. *Scarcely the crust of iron can guard the helmeted warrior. A moment ferocious to the foe he turns gentle; his act and character in the same instant carry a death purpose, *savage in the spirit with a fluid form expressed in his words or deeds.**

to clothe in gold. *Flatteringly with savage cruelty a ruthless dress.* The state of being ferocious as age therefore, *ferociously*

to rob of its. *[Lat ferre from ferre. Fer is secret, fer from fer. Lat ferre lat ferre. Lat ferre.]* *Savage wildness of the mind.* *The pride and ferocity of the*

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It is therefore quite possible that the spleen should be ruptured by violence, and yet no evidence of the injury be seen on the skin or other parts of the body

The condition of the spleen previous to rupture can generally be determined by its size and consistency after death. A healthy spleen measures about 5 or 5½ inches long 3 or 4 inches wide and 1 to 1½ inch thick and it weighs about 6 ounces—varying from 4 to 8. When the spleen is so diseased as to render a rupture from slight violence probable it will often weigh from 10 to 30 ounces and measure from 7 to 12 inches in length. The healthy spleen does not project beyond the ribs but the diseased spleen does so—often to a considerable distance.

The consistency of the spleen when healthy is moderately firm so that it may be cut with ease leaving a sharp edge and smooth surface when divided but in disease the spleen may become quite soft and pulpy or even diffident so as to fall away like a thick liquid when the capsule is divided. This condition however may also occur from putrefaction if the body is kept long after death or if the weather is very warm and therefore these circumstances should also be ascertained.

The enlargement and softening of the spleen from disease is usually a result of previous attack of intermittent fever or ague it may also occur in other diseases especially typhoid fever scurvy and purpura.

The part of the spleen which is usually ruptured is the concave or inner surface and the extent of the rupture varies greatly but death usually occurs more rapidly in proportion as the rupture is larger and deeper. When the rupture is small the patient may live several days or may even recover entirely.

If the rupture is extensive the person is usually incapable of moving from the place where the rupture occurred.

Lastly in some instances the spleen is covered with a layer of membrane caused by previous attacks of inflammation this may delay or even prevent death by limiting the rupture or preventing excessive bleeding.

The questions therefore which appear necessary to ask in cases of death from rupture of the spleen are—

1st.—What appearances of external violence were perceptible on the body?

2nd.—What was the size and weight of the spleen after death?

3rd.—How far did it project beyond the ribs?

4th.—What was the consistency of the spleen—hard, firm soft, pulpy or diffident?

5th.—How long after death was the body examined and what was the temperature of the air?

6th.—Was the body much putrid?

7th.—What was the position of the rupture?

8th.—What was the length and depth of the rupture?

9th.—Is it your opinion that the rupture was caused by external violence or not? State your reasons for your opinion.

10th.—Were there any adhesions about the spleen, if so were they older than the rupture or not?

12. Statement of the conditions of Medico legal enquiry in India as compared with such enquiry in England

Extract from the Report of the Chemical Examiner, Punjab for 1873.

Conditions of the enquiry in India compared with Europe—The investigation and proof of Medico-legal cases in India are generally conducted under very different conditions and by very different means from those in most countries of Europe and it is very necessary for the officers engaged in this country, to understand the value and the significance of the various parts of the investigation that each has to perform and especially for the Magistrate to know how its decision is to be modified by the way in which the investigation has been conducted.

The proof of poisoning though it may be clear by other evidence, depends mainly on establishing the cause of certain symptoms or of death that it rests principally on scientific evidence. Of this evidence there are three parts—the symptoms the *postmortem* appearances if death occurred and the chemical evidence—from the proper investigation and correlation of which the unknown cause may be established.

Evidence as to symptoms in Europe—In Europe there is a class of qualified medical practitioners distributed universally who certify to the causes of death the public registration of which is compulsory. When a person is seized with sudden illness followed or not by death there is almost always a medical attendant sufficiently skilled in diagnosis to recognize the symptoms as those of some known disease or if not he is able in one class of cases to give an opinion that those symptoms are not those of any known disease but that they are those of certain injury, or poison or class of poisons while in another class of cases he may only be able to say that they may possibly be those of a certain disease, but that they suspiciously resemble those of some poison or injury.

Evidence as to symptoms in India—In India qualified practitioners not being generally diffused among the people the causes of sudden illness or death are not recognized by the ignorant relatives and attendants. In this way many cases of disease may be attributed to poison or injury, or witchcraft, and from ignorance, doubt or enmity be reported to the Police. On the other hand cases of real poisoning may be passed over as cases of disease. This part of the investigation has generally to be conducted by the Police who cannot be supposed to be skilled in the observation and estimation of symptoms. In addition they have to get an account of the symptoms after they have occurred and from ignorant witnesses and they have to contend with a difficulty in getting them to speak the truth unknown in Europe. The evidence so far is therefore generally defective and must be so till there be a class of practitioners spread among the people sufficiently skilled to certify to the causes of deaths. In all possible cases the Police should have the assistance or advice of a Medical Officer, and the evidence of attendant *hakims*, who often show considerable acuteness in observation should be taken down and signed by them.

Post mortem examination in Europe—The second part of the investigation the *post mortem* examination, is generally made in Europe by the medical attendant along with another doctor. In one class of cases an opinion can be affirmed that the *post mortem* appearances are or are not those of the suspected disease but that they are not or are those of the suspected injury, poison or class of poisons. In another class in which the *post mortem* appearances are not so diagnostic, an opinion can only be given expressing probability or uncertainty.

Post mortem examination in India—In India the evidence from *post mortem* examination is also generally less definite from various causes. Not only is the evidence regarding symptoms which ought to guide in distinguishing suspected and possible causes of death, more imperfect, but very often the autopsy has to be performed without any information at all. The number of possible causes of death being numerous it is in such cases only possible to give an opinion of certainty or probability when marked and profound lesions are left by disease, injury and poison, and there is a chance of uncommon lesions or slight appearances which might prove important in evidence being overlooked. Again the body often reaches the Medical Officer advanced in decomposition, when the slighter appearances left by disease, injury or poison may not be recognizable. But in all cases it is distinctly to be understood that the examination should be made, as even in such cases many causes of death may be established or negatived. Also in all cases a complete and not a partial examination is more necessary in this country on account of the imperfectness of the preliminary evidence as to the possible causes of death. Different causes may afterwards be suggested in the evidence regarding which judicial enquiries may be made.

In order to render this part of the evidence more definite and valuable it is necessary that the Police in handing over the body for examination should at the same time hand over an account of all that is known as to the suspicious circumstances of death and it should be noted by the Medical Officer whether he was in possession of this information or not when making the *post mortem* examination.

Chemical evidence in Europe—In Europe the third part of the evidence—the chemical—is one of the most definite in its results. The symptoms and *post mortem* appearances recorded by duly qualified and informed observers are laid before the Chemical Examiner and the question asked is whether one poison or at most one of a class of poisons, be present in the substances sent and he certifies to the presence or absence of those poisons indicated which can be identified by chemistry.

Chemical evidence in India—In India, from the imperfectness of the preceding evidence, the problem proposed is more indeterminate and often insoluble. As a general rule substances have hitherto been sent for analysis with no information as to what poisons might possibly have been used. This problem, which is seldom met with in a lifetime by an expert in Europe, resolves itself into a search for the poisons, commonly

used in the country, unless some suspicious appearance or particles lead to a conjecture in another direction. The number of substances that may cause death being practically indefinite, it would be impossible with a limited amount of material and time to attempt anything else

In order that the Chemical Examiner's evidence may be as definite as possible, if no poison is found, he should distinctly certify as to the poison he was led to examine for and whose absence he demonstrated

Position of the Magistrate in England—The position of the Magistrate as regards the scientific witness differs in India and England. In England the scientific witness are really cross-examined by the defence, both as to the facts they have observed and the opinions they bring forward, and similar witnesses may be brought forward to challenge their statements

Position of the Magistrate in India.—In India this is very seldom possible. The Civil Medical Officer has practically functions rather resembling those entrusted to him in some countries of Europe. He is a Government official charged with the investigation of facts, regarding which he has to give evidence in the same way as the Police-officer. In addition he has to interpret to the Court the precise value, significance and limits of the scientific evidence, and it is his duty to bring forward with judicial carefulness any conclusions or opinions connected with the facts. In India, also, it is physically impossible for the Chemical Examiner to be cross-examined and his evidence has therefore to be taken without any other proof of attestation than his signature. He should, therefore, restrict himself to a statement of observed or demonstrated facts, and should, on no account, make mention of probabilities or opinions, unless specially asked, but it is his duty to reply to any questions regarding the meaning or limits of the scientific evidence which the local Medical Officer may wish to be referred or which the Court may choose to propose.

Estimation of the value of the evidence.—If the cause of death be not satisfactorily proved by the scientific evidence, the Magistrate has to consider to what extent it proves or disproves anything. It is purely negative in value in the case of poisons not detectable by chemistry which do not produce symptoms and *post mortem* appearances distinguishable with certainty from those of disease or injury. It is also negative in the case of detectable poisons of which the symptoms and *post mortem* appearances alone are not decisive, when the Chemical Examiner has not been led to examine for those poisons. In this class of cases the proof principally depends on whether the Medical Officer was in possession of the suspicious circumstances of death when making the *post mortem* examination and whether the Chemical Examiner knew both these when examining for poisons. If the latter had no information, he could only certify to the absence of common poison, and it is to be remarked that the large number of poisoning cases proved in this country is due to the ignorance of the natives, and that as intelligence spreads, uncommon poisons will be used more frequently.

Meaning of "no poison found".—If no poison has been found, it should be noted that it may have been administered in the following cases—

1st—If a poison has been given for which there are no chemical tests

2nd—If a detectable poison were used for which the Chemical Examiner was not led to examine.

3rd—If a volatile poison has been used which has been placed in circumstances in which it might have volatilized

4th—If certain organic poisons have been used, and a sufficient time has elapsed for their decomposition

5th—In the case of most organic poisons it is only the part left in the stomach after death that can be discovered, that which is absorbed into the system becomes chemically changed, so that it is really the part that does not cause death that is detected. Consequently, if the stomach has been well cleared out by the stomach pump or vomiting or if sufficient time has elapsed before death to allow the poison to be absorbed, none may be detected

6th—Even in the case of metallic poisons which can be detected after absorption, if sufficient time (three weeks to a month) elapse before death, the whole of the poison may be eliminated from the system by the kidneys, etc., and the patient may die from the lesions caused by the poison

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III.—RULES FOR ENQUIRING INTO AND REPORTING ON SERIOUS ACCIDENTS ON INDIAN RAILWAYS.

The following rules regarding notices of accidents occurring in the course of working a railway and the duties of railway servants—Police-officers, Government Inspectors and Magistrates on the occurrence of such accidents, framed by the Governor-General in Council in exercise of the powers conferred by s. 84 of the *Indian Railways Act* 1890, are to be closely observed—

Notes—1. General—(a) Serious accident or accidents attended with loss of human life, or serious injury to person or property or accidents of a description usually attended with such loss or injury

(b) In the case of any railway passing through Native States, the Government of India will, from time to time, direct what official shall, for the purposes of these rules, be regarded as the Magistrate of the district in respect of the portion of the railway situate in each such State.

(c) Throughout these rules the words "*District Superintendent of Police*" of the district in which the occurrence takes place shall be substituted for the words "*Railway Police Superintendent*" in respect of railways where a Railway Police Superintendence has not been established. The word "*Manager*" shall include the Agent of a guaranteed or other Railway Company, or other officer in charge and the Chairman of the Corporation in the case of Calcutta Municipal Railway, and the Vice-Chairman of the Calcutta Port Commissioners in the case of railways belonging to that body, and also the Chief Engineer or Engineer in Chief or other officer in charge of any railway—

The officer authorized by Government to investigate and report on accidents is called the "*Government Inspector*," and his address and official designation will be notified to Managers from time to time by Local Governments or Administration or by the Government of India

2. Notices—The notices mentioned in s. 83 of the *Indian Railways Act*, 1890, shall contain the following particulars, namely—

(a) mileage at which the accident occurred and the name of the station nearest to the spot, (b) time and the date of the accident, and the number and description of the train or trains, (c) nature of the accident and the number of people killed or injured, as far as known, (d) cause of the accident, as far as known, (e) probable detention to traffic.

In the case of the following accidents, namely—

(a) accident attended with loss of human life, or with serious injury to persons or property, or (b) collisions between trains, of which one is a train carrying passengers, or (c) the derailment of any train carrying passengers, or of any part of such a train, such notices shall be sent by telegraph immediately after the accident has occurred

NB—Notices of accidents described in s. 38 of the *Indian Railways Act*, 1890, and not falling under this rule, must in accordance with that section be given without unnecessary delay, and may be sent by post.

3. Duties of Railway Servants.—Every railway servant shall report, with as little delay as possible, every accident occurring in the course of working the railway on which he is employed which may come to his notice. Such reports shall be made to the nearest station master, or where there is no station master, to the railway servant in charge of the section of the railway on which the accident has occurred.

4 Departmental inquiry—(1) Whenever an accident such as is described in s. 83 of the *Indian Railways Act*, 1890, has occurred in the course of working a railway, the Agent or Manager shall cause a departmental inquiry to be promptly made by a railway servant for the thorough investigation of the causes which led to the accident

Provided that such inquiry may be dispensed with—(a) if the accident has not been attended with loss of human life or with serious injury to persons or property, (b) if there is no reasonable doubt as to the cause of the accident, and (c) if one department of the railway intimates that it accepts all responsibility in the matter

(2) Where a departmental inquiry is dispensed with it shall be the duty of the Heads of Departments of the railway to make such inquiry as they may consider necessary if their staff or their system of working is concerned, and to adopt or suggest such measures as they may consider expedient for preventing a recurrence of similar accidents.

5 Notice of departmental inquiry.—(1) Whenever a departmental inquiry is to be made, the Agent or Manager shall cause notice of the date and hour at which the inquiry will *commence to be given to the following officers* namely—(a) the Magistrate of the district in which the accident occurred or such other officer as the Local Government may appoint in this behalf, (b) the Government Inspector appointed under s. 4 sub-sect. (1) of the *Indian Railways Act 1890*, for the section of the railway on which the accident occurred (c) the Consulting Engineer in administrative charge of the railway when that officer is not the Government Inspector referred to, in clause (b) of this rule for the section of the railway on which the accident occurred and (d) the officer in charge of the Railway Police or if there are no Railway Police, the officer in charge of the Police-station in the jurisdiction of which the accident occurred.

(2) The date and hour at which the inquiry will commence shall be fixed so as to give the officers mentioned or referred to in clauses (a) (b) (c) and (d) of this rule sufficient time to reach the place where the inquiry is to be held.

6. Report of departmental inquiry.—As soon as any departmental inquiry has been completed the railway servant who made the inquiry shall submit to the Agent or Manager a report in the form prescribed by Rule 23.

(2) The Agent or Manager shall forward a copy of such report—(a) to the Government Inspector mentioned in Rule 5 cl. (b) and (b) if no inquiry has been made under Rule 16 or if the departmental inquiry has been held first to the Magistrate or officer mentioned in Rule 5 cl. (a) and (c) if any judicial inquiry is being made to the Magistrate making such inquiry.

(3) Such copy shall be accompanied—in case (b) a statement of the persons if any, whom the Agent or Manager desires to prosecute and in case (c), by a copy of the evidence taken at the departmental inquiry.

(4) Whenever an Agent or Manager receives a copy of the Government Inspector's report as contemplated in Rule 24 he shall submit his remarks thereon through the authority in administrative control of the railway for the Government of India and shall forward a copy of such remarks to the Government Inspector concerned.

7 Assistance in holding the inquiry.—(1) Whenever any accident has occurred in the course of working a railway the Agent or Manager shall give all reasonable aid to the District Magistrate or the Magistrate appointed or deputed under Rule 16 and to the Government Inspector, Medical Officer, the Police and others concerned enable them promptly to reach the scene of the accident and shall assist those authorities in making inquiries and in obtaining evidence as to the cause of the accident.

(2) When any enquiry under Rule 16 or any judicial inquiry is being made the Agent or Manager shall arrange for the attendance as long as may be necessary, at the office or place of inquiry of all railway servants whose evidence is likely to be required.

8 Arrest of offender.—Whenever any accident has occurred in the course of working a railway and any offence referred to in s. 131 of the *Indian Railways Act 1890*, has been committed the Agent or Manager or some officer of the railway nominated by him or if there be no such officer the railway officer of highest rank present may direct the senior Police-officer or Policeman present or if there be no member of the Police Force present a railway servant at once to arrest the offender and no railway servant shall arrest any person under the authority of the said section without such direction except for the purpose of preventing him from making his escape provided that when such offender is a railway servant whose arrest is considered for any reason undesirable proper precautions shall be taken to prevent his escape.

9 Medical aid to sufferers.—Whenever any accident occurring in the course of working a railway has been attended with serious personal injury it shall be the duty of the Agent or Manager to afford medical aid to the sufferers and to see that they are properly and carefully attended to till removed to their home or handed over to the care of their relatives or friends. In such case or in any case in which any loss of human life has occurred the local Medical Officer should be communicated with if he is nearer than any Railway Medical Officer.

10. Duties of Police-officers.—The Railway Police may make an investigation into the causes which led to any accident occurring in the course of working a railway and shall do so—(a) whenever any such accident is attended with loss of human life or with grievous hurt as defined in the *Indian Penal Code*, or with serious injury to property or is proved to be due to any criminal act or omission or (b) whenever the

District Magistrate or the Magistrate appointed under Rule 16 has given a direction under cl. (c) of that rule. Provided that no such investigation shall be made when a magisterial inquiry has been commenced or ordered under Rule 16 cl. (a) or cl. (d).

11 Who to conduct the Police investigation—(1) Whenever an investigation is to be made by the Railway Police—(a) in a case in which an accident is attended with loss of human life or with serious injury to persons or property, or (b) in pursuance of a direction given under Rule 16, cl. (c), the investigation shall be conducted by the officer in charge of the Railway Police or, if that officer should be unable to conduct the investigation himself then by an officer to be deputed by him.

(2) An officer deputed under cl. (1) of this rule shall ordinarily be an Assistant Superintendent of Police but if in any case it should be found impracticable to depute an officer of that grade, an Inspector of Police may be deputed.

12 Mode of conducting the Police investigation—The officer who is to conduct an investigation in pursuance of Rule 11 shall proceed without delay to the scene of the accident and conduct the investigation there and shall at once advise the Agent or Manager of the railway and the Traffic officer of the district, by telegraph of the date and hour at which the investigation will commence so that, if possible the presence of a railway official may be arranged for to watch proceedings and to aid the officer making the investigation. The absence of a railway official must not however be allowed to delay the investigation which should be made as soon as possible after the accident has taken place.

13. Railway Police to communicate with District Police—(1) In every case to which Rule 11 applies immediate information shall be given by the Railway Police to the District Police, who, if so required shall afford all necessary assistance, and shall if occasion arise, carry the investigation beyond the limits of the railway premises. But the Railway Police are primarily entrusted with the duty of carrying on the investigation within such limits.

(2) Subject to any provisions elsewhere contained in these rules the further prosecution of the case on the conclusion of the Police investigation shall rest with the Railway Police.

14. Communication of the report of investigation—The result of every Police investigation shall be reported at once to the Magistrate of the district or other officer appointed in this behalf by the Local Government, and to the Agent or Manager of the railway.

15 District Police to act in the absence of Railway Police—Where there are no Railway Police the duties imposed by Rules 10 11 12 and 13 cl. (2), and Rule 14 on the Railway Police or on the officer in charge of the Railway Police shall be discharged by the District Police or by the District Superintendent of Police, as the case may be.

16. Duties of Magistrates.—Whenever an accident such as is described in s. 83 of the *Indian Railways Act, 1890*, has occurred in the course of working a railway, the District Magistrate or any other Magistrate who may be appointed in this behalf by the Local Government, may either—(a) himself make an inquiry into the causes which led to the accident or (b) depute a Subordinate Magistrate who, if possible should be a Magistrate of the first class to make such an inquiry or (c) direct an investigation into the causes which led to the accident to be made by the Police.

17. Notice of magisterial inquiry—Whenever it is decided to make an inquiry under Rule 16 cl. (a) or cl. (b) the District Magistrate or other Magistrate appointed as aforesaid or the Magistrate deputed under Rule 16 cl. (b) as the case may be shall proceed to the scene of the accident and conduct the inquiry there and shall at once advise the Agent or Manager of the railway and the Government Inspector, by telegraph of the date and hour at which the inquiry will commence so as to enable the Railway Administration to summon the requisite expert evidence.

18 Power to summon witnesses.—A Magistrate making an inquiry under Rule 16 may summon any railway servant, and any other person whose presence he may think necessary and after taking the evidence and completing the inquiry shall if he considers there are sufficient grounds for a judicial inquiry, take the requisite steps for bringing to trial any person whom he may consider to be criminally liable for the accident. Whenever technical points are involved the Magistrate should be careful to call for and take the opinion of the Government Inspector or other professional persons.

19. Communication of the result of magisterial inquiry.—The result of every inquiry made under Rule 16 shall be communicated by the Magistrate to the Agent or Manager of the railway and to the Government Inspector.

20. Summoning railway employees—If in the course of any judicial inquiry into an accident occurring in the course of working a railway, the Magistrate desires the assistance of the Government Inspector or of the Agent or Manager of the railway, or the attendance of any officer of the railway, to explain any matter relating to railway supervision, management or working, he will issue a requisition to such officer to attend the Court, stating at the same time the nature of the assistance required. In summoning railway servants, the Magistrate will take care not to summon so large a number of the employees, specially of one class, on the same day, as to cause inconvenience to the working of the railway. In the case of very serious accidents it will generally be advisable for the Magistrate to receive either the evidence of, or a report from, both the Government Inspector and the Agent or Manager of the railway in regard to the accident before finally concluding the judicial inquiry.

21. Report of magisterial inquiry—On the conclusion of any such judicial inquiry, the Magistrate shall send a copy of his decision to the Agent or Manager of the railway and shall unless in any case he thinks it unnecessary to do so report the result of the inquiry to the Local Government.

22. Duties of the Government Inspector appointed under s. 4 (1) of the Indian Railways Act, 1890.—Whenever the Government Inspector receives notice under s. 83 of the *Indian Railways Act* 1890 of the occurrence of an accident which he considers of a sufficiently serious nature to justify such a course, he shall report the occurrence direct to the Government of India by telegraph.

Every such report shall contain the particulars prescribed by Rule 2.

23. (1) The Government Inspector shall proceed to the scene of the accident to note the facts and to inquire generally into the causes which led to the accident whenever he receives notice as aforesaid of an accident which he considers serious enough to warrant an inquiry or investigation being made under any of these rules.

If the Government Inspector, after reporting to the Government of India the occurrence of an accident in accordance with Rule 22, decides that an inquiry or investigation is not necessary, he shall in every such case advise the Government of India accordingly.

(2) Whenever an inquiry under cl. (1) of this rule is made by the Government Inspector, he shall, if practicable be present at the departmental inquiry (if any) made under Rule 4.

24. Report of Government Inspector.—Whenever the Government Inspector has made an inquiry under Rule 23 cl. (1) he shall submit a report, in writing through the Senior Government Inspector, to the Local Government or Administration controlling the railway, and to the Government of India, or in the case of a railway which is directly administered by the State to the Government of India only, and shall forward a copy of such report to the Agent or Manager of the railway concerned, and if a magisterial inquiry has been made to the Magistrate who made such inquiry.

25. Form and contents of Government Inspector's report.—In the case of all serious accidents, such reports shall be submitted in the form adopted by the Inspecting Officers of the Board of Trade, in order to admit of their reproduction in a uniform shape in the Quarterly Accidents Returns, and shall contain—

(1) A brief description of the accident, (2) a description of the locality of the accident, (3) a detailed statement of the evidence taken, (4) the conclusion arrived at by the Government Inspector, (5) an appendix stating the damage done, and (6) (when necessary) a sketch illustrative of the accident.

26. In important cases, where the occurrence of an accident appears to show that a change in the system of working is necessary, the Government Inspector shall inform the Government of India or the Local Government or Administration controlling the railway, of the steps which have been or are proposed to be taken by the Railway Administration to prevent a recurrence of similar accidents, and whether, in his opinion further action in the matter is desirable.

27. The Government Inspector shall, as far as possible assist any Magistrate making an inquiry under Rule 16, or a judicial inquiry, whenever he may be called upon to do so.

N.B.—These rules do not limit the exercise of any of the powers conferred on Government Inspectors by s. 5 of the *Indian Railways Act*, 1890.

175. (1) A Police-officer proceeding under section 174 may, by order in writing, summon two or more persons as aforesaid for the purpose of the said investigation and any other person who appears to be acquainted with the facts of the case. Every person so summoned shall be bound to attend and to answer truly all questions other than questions the answer to which would have a tendency to expose him to a criminal charge or to a penalty or forfeiture.

(2) If the facts do not disclose a cognizable offence to which section 170 applies such persons shall not be required by the Police-officer to attend a Magistrate's Court.

Notes.—1 Witness bound to answer truly—scope of section—In this section the word 'truly' is still kept probably through an oversight though it is now omitted in s. 161. See Notes to that section. Investigations in the nature of inquest consist of the investigation of the apparent cause of death. Such an investigation ceases when the cause of death is ascertained i.e. when it is determined whether the death is natural, suicidal or accidental or due to homicide. Once it is established that the death was due to homicide the inquiry becomes one under s. 161 and there was no obligation on the witness to speak the truth. As soon as the *punchnama* and report are made and the death is determined to be homicidal then the investigation becomes one under s. 161 and the witness is not bound to speak the truth. 15 K. L. R. 143 = 2 Cr. L. J. 590. See Notes to s. 161. See also 5 M. L. T. 356 where sanction to prosecute in respect of a statement made by a Police-officer under s. 174 contradicting statement before a Magistrate was upheld.

2 Section not applicable to Madras City—So far as regards the area comprised within the ordinary original civil jurisdiction of the High Court of Judicature at Madras is concerned this section is replaced by s. 4 of Act V of 1889. It is also notified that—

I. When from the information received by an officer in charge of a Police-station he has reason to believe—

(a) that the deceased person is an European or East Indian or

(b) that any person has been killed by the act or neglect of another or has died under circumstances raising a reasonable suspicion that some other person has committed an offence such officer after giving written information to the Commissioner of Police as required by s. 174 and stating therein his belief that the event is one falling under cl. (a) or cl. (b) of this rule and the grounds of such belief shall not proceed to discharge any of his further functions under that section.

II. If the Commissioner on receiving intimation as aforesaid considers that there are sufficient grounds for believing that the event therein reported falls under cl. (a) or cl. (b) of Rule I he shall either himself discharge the further functions imposed on the officer in charge of a station under s. 174 or shall depute some Police-officer of not lower rank than Inspector to discharge such functions.

Provided that when the deceased is an European or East Indian such further functions shall be discharged by a Police-officer who is himself an European or East Indian.—*Notification No. 187 Fort St. George Gazette 1899 Pt. I p. 336*

3. Statements of witnesses may be recorded—There is nothing in this Code which prevents the statements of the witness examined at an inquest being recorded *verbatim* in the report, (1911) M. W. N. 123 = 12 Cr. L. J. 124.

4 Reports to be submitted by the Police-officer—When a person is accused and arrested upon an inquest, the Police will send in three reports possibly to three different Magistrates viz. (i) the intimation under s. 174 (1) to the nearest Magistrate empowered to hold inquests (ii) the report under s. 174 (2) to the District or Sub-divisional Magistrate and (iii) the report under s. 170 (1) to the Magistrate empowered to take cognizance of the offence.

176. (1) When any person dies while in the custody of the Police, the nearest Magistrate empowered to hold inquests shall, and in any other case mentioned in section 174, clauses (a) (b) and (c) of sub-section (1) any Magistrate so empowered may hold an inquiry into the cause of death either instead of, or in addition to the investigation held by the Police-officer, and, if he does so

Inquiry by Magistrate into cause of death



fastened to some-

apple pair
Flap-mouthed (mouth), a. Having loose, hanging

2 To shine out with a sudden and unsteady light or splendor

When the sun begins to hang
in a beam.
d to too much light
in a shine all the day
spread outward
vane suddenly heated or exult
unsteady, broad, offensive light
sudden passion or passionate con

burn as gas issues from nozzles in combustion
to blaze
The main blaze of it is past, but a small thing would make

of bastion
3 (Arch) The side of any building
4 The strategy most

Brande

3 The time of a burst of light, an instant, a very

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Flamen Dulce Flamen
Mirtualls and Flamen
Quirius
The vuline-eds, a Pertain
ing to a flamen, familiar
l lán'ing ly, ade Most
rightly, with great show or
vile meteo

Flamín'go (fla ming go) n
[p & l g flamenco, fr fla-
(Pharmacopoeia ruber)



Flamén a Made or consisting of flannel. [Cot]
Flammen robes

the side of an assailing
discovered to discharge their
FLANKERED, p or s
FLANK, v i i fr flán-

3 To burst or break forth with a flood of light
and light as, the powder flamed in the pan
3 To burst forth like a sudden flame, to make
quick and unexpected transit.

He flashes into one groove or another
a thought flashed in my mind which he called in act

flowers wet with dew

fl, s, t, d, g, long. fl, s, t, d, g, short; cáre, fúr, lást, fáll, whét, thère, vgl, térm, pléque, flím; dóne, fór, dg, wqll, fódó, fódú,

he shall have all the powers in conducting it which he would have in holding an inquiry into an offence. The Magistrate holding such an inquiry shall record the evidence taken by him in connection therewith in any of the manners hereinafter prescribed according to the circumstances of the case.

(2) Whenever such Magistrate considers it expedient to make an examination of the dead body of any person who has been already interred, in order to discover the cause of his death, the Magistrate may cause the body to be disinterred and examined.

Notes —1 A similar power is entrusted to the Coroners of Calcutta and Bombay.—See the *Coroners' Act* IV of 1871, as amended by Act V of 1899, printed in the *Appendix*.

2 Concurrent jurisdiction of the Coroner and Presidency Magistrate in Bombay and Calcutta.—A Presidency Magistrate is not ousted of his jurisdiction in the case of an offence by which death has been caused because the Coroner has held an inquiry into the cause of death and drawn up an inquisition under the *Coroners Act* IV of 1871. He has jurisdiction to deal with the case according to law and is in no way bound by the Coroner's proceedings. He may hold an inquiry notwithstanding a commitment for trial has been made to the High Court by the Coroner. *Ratanlal* 540; 16 B. 159.

3. Section not applicable to Madras City.—So far as regards the area comprised within the ordinary original civil jurisdiction of the High Court of Judicature at Madras is concerned, this section is replaced by s. 4, Act V of 1889.

4 Proceedings not void.—If any Magistrate not empowered holds an inquest under this section erroneously in good faith, his proceedings are not on that account to be set aside. See s. 529 (c).

5 Report by Magistrate is not judicial proceeding.—There is nothing in the language of this section which requires a Magistrate holding an inquiry under it either to make a report or to come to a finding. The report, sent by him to the District Magistrate, could not be considered as part of a judicial proceeding, and therefore, the High Court has no power to send for it under s. 435. No analogy exists between a Coroner's inquest and an inquiry into the cause of death under this section. 3 C. 742 = 3 C. L. R. 59, followed in *Ratanlal* 843.

PART VI.

PROCEEDINGS IN PROSECUTIONS

CHAPTER XV.

OF THE JURISDICTION OF THE CRIMINAL COURTS IN INQUIRIES AND TRIALS

Notes —1 *Illegality of arrest does not affect the jurisdiction of Courts to try the offender.*—The irregularity of an arrest will not render invalid the subsequent trial and conviction of the accused in British India, 6 P. R. 1899; 26 M. 124, 1 P. R. 1911 = 4 P. W. R. 1911 = 12 Cr. L. J. 113. If the Magistrate before whom an accused has been charged has jurisdiction to try the offence, his jurisdiction to inquire into or try, cannot be affected by any illegality in connection with his arrest, 35 B. 225. See also 17 B. 369, 31 C. 857; 17 P. R. 1906 and Note 15 at p. 84. In 35 B. 225, the case of *Mihoned Yusufuddin* (1897) 24 J. A. 137 was distinguished, as follows: "The judgment does not purport to deal with the question whether an illegal arrest in foreign territory vitiates an inquiry by a Magistrate into an offence against the Indian Penal Code charged against the person arrested when brought before the Court, nor does it appear from the report that the question was argued. The Chief Court of Burma, however, in 7 Bur. L. R. 83 relying on 24 J. A. 137 held that when a person is illegally arrested and brought before a Magistrate, and the warrant is found to be illegal, the Court is bound to stay further proceedings against the accused in respect of charges of offences for which the warrant was issued. The accused had the right of being replaced in the same position and place as he would have been in, had no illegality been done."

2 General Rule.—National or territorial jurisdiction depends upon the locality of the crime.—All crime is local. The jurisdiction over the crime belongs to the country where the crime is committed, *McLeod v. Attorney General*, L. R. (1891) A. C. at p. 438, see also 17 B. 369; 5 B. 338. In the view of English Law, crime is

1 A bursting or cracking a breach
flaw, a defect of continuity or cohesion
 in a knife, a vase, or a wall.

2 (Naut.) A sudden burst of wind, a squall
 or blast of short duration
 Snow and hail and stormy gust and *flaw*
 Like *flaw* in summer lying lacy corn

3 A sudden burst of noise and disorder
 Mult, uproar, a quarrel

Uly, a leech, [Obs.]
 deer on the face of deer. Soak
 who flares, a mocker, a fawn.
 In a fleeing manner.
 At, a place where vessels float,
 at m, to float again, to Ger *flot*
 float, M H, Ger *flut*, N H, Ger

cock or hilt a bay or estuary a
 a used in compound names of
 street, North *flut*, *flut* prison

we were to enter the fish
 wavy flesh, *flut* *flut*
 on in London, — so called from
 it (now filled up), on which is

longman of low character, in the
 grow up and persons in *flut*
flut as a time of day to admit
 or without, and without *flut*

Flaw (er) f

See FLAY

Flaw (y), a 1

ferious fault

2 Subject f

Flax, a (A S

flax M H G

Ger *flax* 1

same root as Ger *flachen*

to beat flat (twist)

1 (Bot.) A plant of the ge

ner *flax* (L *lin* it *linum*)

bearing a single slender stalk

about a foot and a half high

with blue flowers The fiber

of the bark is used for making

thread and cloth called *flax*,

conbr *flax* 1 ce &c Lin

seed oil is expressed from the

seed



ek'er, v t Same as FLECK
 ck/less, a Without spot or blame
 My conscience will not count me *flackless*

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set

With her on is
 shall say thy wealth is over
Flay (er) (fl or 4) = One who strips off the skin
Flay (flay), v t [see supra] To flay [Obs.]
 How it be flayed first
 And hence to be made of skin
 Flayer

purely local *ie*, depends on the law of the place in which it is committed, and not on the nationality of the person who commits it, *Sirdar Gurdyal Singh v. Rajah of Faridkote* (1894) A. C. 670. On this principle aliens are amenable to the English Criminal Law, in respect of crimes committed in England, *Barronels case* 1 E. and B. 1, and British subjects are not amenable to that law in respect of offences committed outside England unless committed within the Admiralty jurisdiction or unless specially provided for by statute. *Russell on Crimes*, Vol. I, p. 19. Apart from statute, existing English Courts cannot take cognizance of any crime committed on land outside England whether by a British subject or an alien, *Archbold*, p. 25. Extra territorial jurisdiction is, however, vested in the Governor General in Council in his executive capacity and also in the Indian Legislature. See Notes 4 and 5 to s. 188.

(a) *National or territorial jurisdiction must be distinguished from local venue*—Venue or local jurisdiction is quite distinct from national or territorial jurisdiction, *Mozambique Co. v. British South Africa Co.* (1893) A. C. 602; *R. v. Ellis* (1899) 1 Q. B. 230; 24 P. R. 1901 (F.B.). Whether an accused is to be tried in one or other local area is a question of procedure (*cf* s. 531), while the question whether a local Court can try a person for an offence committed outside the realm is a question of jurisdiction. See 35 P. R. 1888; 24 P. R. 1901. According to the English Common Law, the Courts of common law had apart from statute no power to try any offence not committed within the body of the realm *ie*, their criminal jurisdiction was territorial and not personal, *McLeod v. Attorney General of N. S. Wales* (1891) A. C. 455; *Sirdar Gurdyal Singh v. Rajah of Faridkote* (1894) A. C. 670. But the liability of a subject to be made answerable for crimes committed out of the jurisdiction has been affirmed by statutes for more than three centuries and a half in England see *Hall, Foreign Power and Jurisdiction of the British Crown* (1894), Pt. I, Chapter, p. 12. As to the powers of the Indian Legislature and the Governor General in Council. See Note 5 to s. 188.

2. *Jurisdiction of British Indian Courts when offences committed outside British India.*—(a) *No jurisdiction over foreigners for offences committed in foreign territory*—No proposition of law can be more incontestable or more universally admitted than that according to the general law of nations, a foreigner cannot be held criminally responsible to the law of a nation not his own, for acts done beyond the laws of its territory, *Franconia case* (1876) 2 Ex. D. 63; *Jameson* (1896) 2 Q. B. 430. An act will not be construed as applying to foreigners in respect of acts done by them outside the dominions of the sovereign power enacting. That is a rule based on International Law, by which one sovereign power is bound to respect the subjects and the rights of all other sovereign powers outside its own territory, 1 P. R. 1901. S. 181 is intended to regulate the jurisdiction of Courts in British India and cannot vary or abrogate the ordinary rule that no foreign subject shall be tried in British India for an offence committed outside British India, 23 A. 372. Where the offence of theft is committed by a subject of a Native State within its limits, a British Indian Magistrate has no jurisdiction to try such a person 2 Bom. L. R. 337; 6 M. H. C. R. Appx 3. See also 20 P. R. 1878, 30 P. R. 1889; 7 P. R. 1894; 28 A. 372; but if there is a special treaty, the British Courts have jurisdiction, see 3 M. H. C. R. 354, as to jurisdiction of British Courts over residents of Ramandrug in the Sandur State. Where the instigation of an offence by a foreigner is complete in a Foreign State, the British Courts have no jurisdiction, 10 Bom. H. C. R. 356; but if the offence is completed in British territory, the foreigner if found in British India may be tried, 36 B. 524. Non British subjects found in a Native State in possession of property stolen in British India cannot be tried in British India for an offence under s. 412, 1 P. C., 9 A. 523; 22 P. R. 1888; 18 P. R. 1880. *Ill* (d) to s. 180 has no application to such a case 18 C. W. N. 1178 = 15 Cr. L. J. 537. It must, however, be noted that a foreigner may while residing in British India initiate acts which may take effect outside British India and the foreigner will be amenable to the jurisdiction of the local Courts if the acts committed by him amount to an offence. See ss. 125 and 126, 1 P. C. See also 20 C. W. N. 62 = 17 Cr. L. J. 123 = 33 In. Ca. 304; 8 C. 993 and 18 C. W. N. 1178 = 15 Cr. L. J. 537.

(b) *British Indian Courts have jurisdiction over such offences when committed*—(1) *By Native Indian subjects wherever the offence may have been committed* (2) *by British subjects and servants of the King within the territories of any Native Prince or Chief in India.*—See ss. 3 and 4, 1 P. C., and the definition of an 'offence,' s. 40, 1 P. C. Having regard to the provisions of s. 5 it seems to be clear that the Code is applicable to all such offences. Then the question arises as to which local Courts have jurisdiction to try such offences and the relation of s. 188 to ss. 177 to 184 has to be considered.

(c) *Is the venue of such offences governed by ss. 177 to 184 or is it dealt with by s. 188 exclusively?*—In a large number of cases it has been held that ss. 177 to 184 are applicable only to local areas in British India and they have no application when the offence is committed outside British India. See 10 Bom. H. C. 356; 1 M. 171; 5 M. 23; 16 C. 667; 7 S. L. R. 17 = 14 Cr. L. J. 439. Therefore it

5. Flout of blowing for flood [Ola.] Hooker
 6. To flood, to inundate, to overflow, to cover

face of a fluid, to move, to flow, to run, to
 the air

7. To flood, to inundate, to overflow, to cover

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with ease and fluency of speech
 Flippantness, n. The state or quality of being | BOARD

2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, long 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7 short, care, far, last, fall, what, there, still, firm, plume, firm, done for, up, well, food, food

held that all offences committed outside British India would fall within the provisions of s 188 and the provision to that section governs the trial of all such offences. Sections 177 to 184 must be read subject to the provisions of s 188. Where an offence has been committed outside British India a Magistrate of British India cannot take cognizance without certificate of the Political Agent or the sanction of the Local Government. A British Indian Court cannot take cognizance of the offence of criminal breach of trust committed in foreign territory merely because part of the property was retained in British India, 5 B. L. R. 266 = 13 Cr. L. J. 530. Offence of kidnapping when complete outside British India cannot be tried in British India merely because the minor is within the local limits, 1 P. R. 1901. S 181 (4) has no application. That section implies that the offence has been committed in British India and refers to Courts of different local areas whose jurisdictions have been created by the Code. When, therefore, a minor was taken away from the custody of her husband in a Native State, detained there for some time and then removed to British India, *held* the British Court had no jurisdiction over the offence of kidnapping completed outside British India, 7 B. L. R. 17 = 15 Cr. L. J. 439. See also 21 M. L. J. 441 = 1910 M. W. N. 143 = 8 M. L. T. 54 = 11 Cr. L. J. 306. In favour of this view it may also be urged that the special provision made by s. 188 should not be qualified by the general provisions in ss 177 to 184.

SADASIVAIER, J., however, in 38 M. 779, *held dissenting from* 5 B. L. R. 266; 21 M. L. J. 441 and *Madras Cr. M. P. No 97 of 1911* that s 188 must be read as auxiliary to ss 177 to 184. 'I should rather think that s 188 which follows ss 179 to 184 was intended rather to draw into the net of the jurisdiction of the British Indian Courts cases which notwithstanding the full use of ss. 179 to 184 could not be brought within the jurisdiction of any British Indian Court, than to restrict by its first proviso the extended jurisdictional privileges conferred by ss 178 to 184 on Courts, which, according to the ordinary rule of s 177, would not have had jurisdiction. See also 14 Bom. L. R. 147 = 13 Cr. L. J. 426. It is submitted that having regard to the language of ss 179 to 184 and the possible danger of a Native Indian subject being tried twice over for the same offence by a Non-British Court and a British Court, which it was the intention of s 188 and proviso thereto to avoid, that the above decision is wrong.' See Note 6 to s 188.

4. Jurisdiction in respect of offences on the High Seas.—See s 188 does not apply to offences on the High Seas, 4 Bur. L. T. 58 = 5 L. B. R. 221 = 12 Cr. L. J. 198 (F.B.). By virtue of the Statute 12 and 13 Vict., c 90 ss 2 and 3, extended jurisdiction over offences committed within the limits of the ordinary jurisdiction of such Court shall have jurisdiction to hear and determine such case as if the said crime or offence had been committed as last aforesaid. Thus it will be seen that even with regard to offences committed at a distance of more than three miles from the shores of British India, the British Indian Courts have jurisdiction over British subjects and the procedure applicable is also the same, 14 B. 227. It may reasonably be argued that by the Statute 12 and 13 Vict., c 90 and 23 and 24 Vict., c 88, it was intended to apply the Indian Law of procedure including the law of evidence to cases of offences by Native Indian subjects while it was intended by 37 and 38 Vict., c 27, to apply the substantive law of penalties in force in India. *Per TWOMEY, J.*, at 5 L. B. R. 221 = 4 Bur. L. T. 58 = 12 Cr. L. J. 198. For other cases, see Note 5 to s 188.

5. Subsequent transfer of territory where offence was committed to a Native State does not affect jurisdiction of British Courts.—Subsequent to the commission of an offence, the place where the offence had been committed was transferred to the independent Native State of Benares. The offender who was a British subject and never ceased to be so was apprehended long after the transfer, and committed to the same Sessions Court which would have tried the case had the territory not been transferred. *Held*, that the Sessions Court had jurisdiction to try the offender, 34 A. 451. Transfer of territory does not take away the jurisdiction of an Appellate Court to dispose of the appeal then pending in it in respect of offences committed within the transferred territory, 33 A. 578.

6. Sections 177 to 189 deal with the place of inquiry or trial of 'offences' only.—For definition of offence, see s 4 (O). All these sections from 177 to 189 deal with the place of inquiry and trial of an 'offence'. These sections have therefore no applications to (a) *inquiries under Chapters VIII, X or XII*. These are specially provided for, see 3 C. W. N. 143, where it was *held* that s 182 did not apply to a proceeding under s 145

to *fling*, to haul, send, allied to *let*, *figure*, to

flippant, fluency of speech, volubility of tongue;

The paddle of a sea turtle, the broad

5. The act of flowing. flux, flood [C&A] *flux*

6. A wave [C&A] "The Mediterranean Sea"

face of a fluid, to move gently and easily through

with water

Proud *fluctuates* the fruitful lands. *Dryden*

3 (*Fluctuating*) To pass over and level the surface of with a float dipped frequently in water. *Fluctuating* work (mastering made level by means of a

flout
2. A severe or contemptuous remark. a glub, a sneer. *Abscissa*

with ease and volubility of speech.
Flippant *flout*, n. The state or quality of being

board

1. *Fluctuate*, v. To flow, to move, to pass over and level the surface of with a float dipped frequently in water. *Fluctuating* work (mastering made level by means of a

2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, long. 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, short. *flout*, n. The state or quality of being. *flout*, v. To pass over and level the surface of with a float dipped frequently in water. *Fluctuating* work (mastering made level by means of a

12 A. L. J. 390 = 15 Cr. L. J. 520, where it was *held* that s. 185 had no application to a proceeding under s. 145 (b) *Nor to maintenance proceedings under s. 488 3 P. R. 1893; 13 P. R. 1885*. See s. 488 (9) for the special provision made for such proceedings.

7. Provisions of this Chapter apply to Investigation by Police.—See s. 156

A—Place of Inquiry or Trial

Ordinary place of inquiry and trial. **177.** Every offence shall ordinarily be inquired into and tried by a Court within the local limits of whose jurisdiction it was committed

Notes.—1 Exceptions to the General Rule.—The rule given in the section is a general one. Exceptions to it may be found in various Acts which make special provisions for place of trial of offences created by those Acts. S. 1 saves these special provisions and limits the application of the general provision enunciated in this section e.g. see ss. 47 and 48 of Act V of 1887 (*Native Passengers Ships*) and ss. 44 and 48 of Act XIV of 1887 (*Indian Marine*), s. 134 of Act I of 1880 (*Railways*), s. 52 of Act XIV of 1887 (*Pilgrim Ships*).

(a) By s. 60 of the *Indian Ports Act* V of 1889, any person offending against the provisions of that Act in any port subject to that Act is liable to be punished by any Magistrate having jurisdiction over any district or place adjoining the port and such Magistrate may exercise all the powers of a Magistrate under that Act in the same manner and to the same extent as if the offence had been committed locally within his jurisdiction.

(b) *Place of trial for offences under the Stamp Act*—Every offence under the *Indian Stamp Act* committed in respect of any instrument may be tried in any district or Presidency town in which such instrument is found as well as in any district or Presidency town in which such offence might be tried under the Code of Criminal Procedure for the time being in force.—S. 72 *Indian Stamp Act* II of 1899

(c) *Place of trial in case of offences under the Breach of Contract Act* 1859—Where the contract and its breach take place in a foreign territory British Indian Courts have no jurisdiction to arrest the accused on a warrant in such territory, and try the offender under Act XIII of 1859 though the work is to be done in British India, 7 M. 354. See Notes under Appendix VII

(d) *Offences under the Assam Labour and Emigration Act* VI of 1901—A recruiter who induces a person at Cawnpore to go to Fiji but on the way takes him to a cooly depot at Arrah and induces him to proceed to Sylhet in contravention of the *Assam Labour and Emigration Act* VI of 1901 commits no offence under s. 164 of that Act at Cawnpore but only at Arrah and a Magistrate of the latter place has jurisdiction to try such offence 37 C. 27

2 Conflict of jurisdiction in the case of military offenders.—S. 101 of the *Mutiny Act* is merely permissive of a military trial but does not deprive Criminal Courts of jurisdiction over British soldiers committing offences within the territorial limits of such Courts, nor does it render the exercise of their jurisdiction dependent upon the sanction of the Commander-in-Chief 5 C. 124 = 4 C. L. R. 432. Therefore when the civil authorities have taken up the investigation of the offence and the military have not availed themselves of the alternative procedure of trying the offenders by a *General Court-martial* the Magistrate is competent to proceed under this Code. S. 549 provides for delivery to military authorities of persons liable to be tried by *Court-martial*

3 Venue where accused charged with several offences—Where a Magistrate has jurisdiction to inquire into or try one offence and has no jurisdiction over another offence committed in the course of the same transaction, the two offences should be inquired into or tried by a Magistrate having jurisdiction in respect of both the offences and not by different Courts Weir II, 144.

4 Procedure in cases of doubt.—Whenever any doubt arises as to the Court by which any offence should be inquired into or tried the High Court within the local limits of whose appellate criminal jurisdiction the offender actually is may decide by which Court the offence shall be inquired into or tried. See s. 185 and Notes thereunder

of inquiry, that the case can be more conveniently tried in another district. In the event of the latter contingency, he should suspend further proceedings and place himself in communication with the Magistrate of such other district, recommending that the case be removed to that district. If the Magistrate of that district should concur, but not otherwise, the proceedings and the accused should be forwarded to such other Magistrate, and the prosecutor directed to attend and prosecute his complaint. If the other Magistrate should differ from him in his opinion as to the district in which the investigation and trial can be most conveniently held, the first Magistrate should either proceed with the inquiry and trial, or refer the question of *venue* for the determination of the High Court.—*Punjab Cr. Vol. II, pp 123-124*

5. Jurisdiction as to contempt of High Court.—The provisions of s 5, relating to the procedure under which "all offences under any other law" are punished do not include a contempt of the High Court committed by the publication of a libel out of Court when the Court is not sitting, although such contempt may include defamation—such a contempt being more than mere defamation and of a different character, **10 C. 109 (P.C)** The jurisdiction of the High Court as a superior Court, of record, to commit for contempt has not been affected by this Code

6. Effect of trial at an unauthorized place.—(a) *Outside British India* A District Magistrate cannot legally dispose of a criminal case at a place not in British India, though the offence was committed within his jurisdiction, **Ratanlal 376**. But having regard to s. 12 (2), the jurisdiction of and powers, a Sub-divisional Magistrate extends throughout the district unless specially restricted by the terms of his appointment, **29 C. 389**

(b) *In a different local area*—S 531 declares that *venue* is not a matter of jurisdiction when the question whether a trial or inquiry ought to have been held in some other local area in British India, than that in which it was held, **44 P. R. 1885, approved in 2 P. R. 1902**. Ss 177, 179, 180, 181 and 183 must be read together with s 531. The intention of s. 531 is to provide against the contingency of a finding, sentence or order regularly passed by a Court in the case of an offence committed outside its local area being set aside when no failure of justice has taken place, **30 M. 94, 32 A. 397**.

7. Commitment to a wrong Sessions Court.—If an order of commitment, contrary to the requirements of this section directs the commitment to be made to a Court of Session which has no territorial jurisdiction, it is not to be set aside unless it "appears that the error" has occasioned a failure of justice, **8 B. 312; 2 Bom. L. R. 394, 18 A. 350**. But the Madras High Court applying the principle laid down in **9 A. 191 (P.C)** held that where a commitment is made to a wrong Sessions Court, the High Court can only set it aside and cannot uphold it and transfer the case to the right Sessions Court, **36 M. 387**.

8. Effect of inquiry and commitment by a wrong Magistrate—Where a Magistrate empowered to commit, enquires into an offence committed in a place over which he has no territorial jurisdiction and commits the case to the Sessions Court for trial, the order of commitment is valid unless such error has in fact occasioned a failure of justice, **8 B. 312; 16 B. 200; 17 M. 402**. A committal by a Magistrate who has authority to commit but has not territorial jurisdiction in the place where the offence is committed is valid, unless it appears that failure of justice has in fact been occasioned by such committal **26 M. 640; 36 M. 387. See 42 Mad. 791**.

9. Section subject to power of High Court to transfer.—The provisions of this section are controlled by the power of the High Court under s 526 to transfer cases. *See 42 Mad. 791*.

10 Rules and procedure where Magistrates are of opinion that a transfer is necessary.—The following rules have been made by the Chief Court of Punjab concerning the place of inquiry and trial. *See Punjab Cr. p 226*

Transfer of criminal cases—There is reason to believe that Magistrates on their own authority not unfrequently transfer for trial to other districts cases in which the accused person, under the provisions of ss. 178—183 of the Cr P. C., may be tried either in the district in which he has been arrested or in some other district. The practice is objectionable and should cease. A Magistrate should act under these sections *solely with reference to the public convenience*. Ordinarily, the proper district for the inquiry and trial of offences falling under those sections would be the district in which the witnesses could, with the least inconvenience, attend.

Transfer of cases how to be effected.—If the Magistrate be of opinion that the inquiry or trial can be more conveniently held in another district, he should at once address the Magistrate of that district. If the

Magistrate of that district concur, the case will be transferred. If he dissent the first Magistrate should either proceed with the inquiry or the question may be referred to the Chief Court and the Court, under the provisions of s. 185 will decide in which district the inquiry or trial shall be held.

Application to be made through District Magistrate—If the transfer is proposed by a Subordinate Magistrate the application should be submitted through the District Magistrate who will if he considers the transfer desirable forward it with his own recommendation to the Magistrate of the district in which he thinks the case should be tried.

Short statement of case to accompany application—An application for the transfer or withdrawal of a criminal case should always be accompanied by a short statement of the case and of the reasons for making the application.

11 Case under Indian Copyright Act, 1914—Where a printing of a book for sale took place at L, only the Court at L has jurisdiction under this section to try an offence under s. 7 of Copyright Act of 1914 28 P. R. 1916 (Cr)

Power to order cases to be tried in different Sessions divisions. **178** Notwithstanding anything contained in section 177, the Local Government may direct that any cases or class of cases committed for trial in any district may be tried in any Sessions division.

Provided that such direction is not repugnant to any direction previously issued by the High Court under section 15 of the Indian High Courts Act, 1861, or under this Code, section 526

Notes.—S 526 deals with power of the High Court to transfer a case to a Subordinate Court or to itself

1. Cases and Criminal Cases—Act XI of 1874 introduced a distinction between 'Cases' and 'Criminal Cases' and this distinction is continued and extended to this section and ss. 192, 528 and 556 on the one hand where the wording is 'Case' and ss. 526 and 527 on the other, where the wording is 'Criminal Case'. These terms are not used indiscriminately or interchangeably, 28 C. 709. See, however, Notes to s. 526

2. Local Governments (Barma) power to transfer cases—The Local Government has no power under s. 178 to transfer for trial to the Court of a Commissioner a criminal case duly committed for trial to the Court of the Recorder of Rangoon but such Government has power to transfer a case from the District of Rangoon to the Sessions Division of Pegu 10 C. 613. See now the Lower Burma Courts Act VI of 1900.

3. High Court's Act, 1881, is the 24 and 25 Vict. c. 104 an Act of the British Parliament for establishing High Courts of Judicature in India. See s. 15 of the Act printed at p. i of the Appendix.

179. When a person is accused of the commission of any offence by reason of anything which has been done and of any consequence which has ensued such offence may be inquired into or tried by a Court within the local limits of whose jurisdiction any such thing has been done or any such consequence has ensued.

Accused triable in district where act is done or where consequence ensues.

Illustrations

(a) A is wounded within the local limits of the jurisdiction of Court X and dies within the local limits of the jurisdiction of Court Y. The offence of the culpable homicide of A may be inquired into or tried by X or Y.

(b) A is wounded within the local limits of the jurisdiction of Court X and is during ten days within the local limits of the jurisdiction of Court Y, and during ten days more within the local limits of the jurisdiction of Court Z, unable in the local limits of the jurisdiction of either Court Y or Court Z to follow his ordinary pursuits. The offence of causing grievous hurt to A may be inquired into or tried by X, Y or Z.

(c) A is put in fear of injury within the local limits of the jurisdiction of Court X and is thereby induced within the local limits of the jurisdiction of Court Y, to deliver property to the person who put him in fear. The offence of extortion committed on A may be inquired into or tried either by X or Y.

(d) A is wounded in the Native State of Paroda and dies of his wounds in Poona. The offence of causing A's death may be inquired into and tried in Poona.

Notes.—1 When the offence is complete where it has been initiated, this section has no application—Where the complainant was assaulted and the injury, viz., fracture of the leg was complete in the Baroda Territory and subsequently the complainant was in hospital for over a month in British India held the accused

could not be tried for the grievous hurt in British India as no ingredient of the offence had occurred in British India, 8 Bom. L. R. 513 = 4 Cr. L. J. 54. An offence under s 477 A is complete where the accounts are falsified and the offence cannot be tried at any other place, 4 M. L. T. 481 = 9 Cr. L. J. 92. The offence of criminal breach of trust is completed by the misappropriation or conversion of the property dishonestly and must be tried at the place where the misappropriation or conversion took place, 38 M. 639. See, however Note 7 to s 180 and also 1 P. R. 1901 = 121 P. L. R. 1901

2 Must the consequence be a part and parcel of the offence?—*By reason of any consequence which has ensued* There is a difference of opinion as to the exact scope of these words. In 7 P. R. 1910 = 7 P. W. R. 1910 = 11 Cr. L. J. 253, 5 A. L. J. 333 = 7 Cr. L. J. 394, 34 A. 487, 38 M. 639; 29 M. L. J. 178 = 15 Cr. L. J. 491 it is laid down that the *consequence* means a consequence which forms a part and parcel of the offence and does not mean a consequence which is not such a direct result of the act of the offender as to form any part of that offence so that a loss resulting from a criminal breach of trust is no part of the offence. The consequence referred to must be one of the facts to be proved to establish the offence. It must form an integral part of the offence but not be a consequence arising from it, 5 L. B. R. 57 = 10 Cr. L. J. 86. In 2 P. R. 1902; 24 P. R. 1901, 19 A. 111, 32 A. 397; 35 A. 29, 38 M. 779, a wider construction has been adopted, *consequence* being taken to include the direct effect of the offence, loss resulting to an employer by criminal breach of trust, failure to account for moneys misappropriated at the head office of a firm. The section applies not only to cases in which the offence is completed by reason of a consequence ensuing within the local limits of another jurisdiction (as *e.g.* the case of a man being wounded in one district and dying in another), but also to cases in which the fact of a consequence ensuing in another jurisdiction is the cause of the offender being accused of the offence, 18 P. W. R. 1908 = 8 Cr. L. J. 75. See Note 6. In 29 M. L. J. 178 = 16 Cr. L. J. 491, it was doubted whether s 179 applied to offences of criminal breach of trust, when there was a special provision, s 181 dealing with them. See also 19 A. L. J. 69 where the duty of servant to account to his master at a particular place was held to give jurisdiction to a Court of that place. See 46 Bom. 471.

3. The act or omission must form a part of the offence.—*By reason of anything which has been done* This would also include illegal omissions, see s 4 (2). The act must be one constituting the offence or part of it and the consequences referred to should be such as modify or complete the act, 6 Agra 36 and 46; 4 O. C. 376. The section does not therefore apply to an offence which consists of an illegal act or illegal omission alone, and to complete which no consequence is necessary, *e.g.*, the offence of buying or obtaining possession of a minor for the purpose of prostitution is complete where the act of buying or obtaining possession takes place. Where, therefore, a person obtained possession of a minor for such purpose in a Native State and merely brought the girl into British India, it was held, that the British Magistrate had no jurisdiction to commit him to the Court of Session, 1 Leg. Rem. at P. 1. See also 6 Agra 46 and 138; 3 A. 251, 1 P. R. 1901, 1 B. 50.

4 Scope of Illustrations.—The illustrations are not exhaustive and to hold that all the consequences prescribed by the Legislature in framing the section as conferring jurisdiction are *ejusdem generis* with the consequences specified in the illustration is not justified by the language of the section, 18 P. W. R. 1908 = 8 Cr. L. J. 75; 7 P. R. 1900, but see 19 A. 111

5. Is s 179 subject to section 188?—In 38 M. 779, it was laid down that s. 179 cannot be read subject to s 188. If, therefore, a Native Indian subject commits an offence which falls within the scope of s 179 the British Court within whose jurisdiction the consequence arises may try the offender and no certificate is necessary as required by the proviso to s 188. See Note 3 at page 393 and Note 6 to s 188

6. Section applies to foreigners and to offences part of the essential elements of which takes place outside British India.—This section must now be read with s 188. Illustration (d) which is new, renders no longer necessary the assumption that the offence has been committed within the local limits created by the Code. But it is necessary that the accused should be in British India. A foreigner in foreign territory who initiates an offence which is completed within British territory, is if found within British territory liable to be tried by the British Court within whose jurisdiction the offence was completed. Where, therefore, the accused who was a subject of the Cambay State conspired with one A and sent A to a professional forger B residing in British territory, with instructions to instigate B to forge a valuable security, and B committed the forgery in pursuance of the conspiracy, and was charged before the Additional British Court of Ahmedabad with the offence of abetment of forgery, and an objection was raised that he was not amenable to the jurisdiction of that Court, held, that the accused was triable by the British

Court when found within its jurisdiction, as the offence of abetment was (by conspiracy) completed only in British India, where the consequent act, namely, the forgery of the document, was done, 14 Bom. L. R. 147 — 13 Cr. L. J. 426. But where the instigation of the crime has been wholly committed within the foreign territory, the instigator, a foreigner, could not be tried in British India 10 Bom. H. C. R. 356

In *R v Munton* (1793) 1 Esp. 60, the defendant who was the principal storekeeper at Antiqua bought certain stores in England at a nominal price agreed between him and the sellers and then charged to Government his full nominal price misappropriating the deductions allowed to him by collusion with the sellers. *Held*, he could be tried in England where the false returns were received and where the fraud had been complete by their having been there allowed. In *R v Oliphant* (1903) 2 K. B. 37, the accused being employed in Paris by a London firm to manage their Paris branch fraudulently misappropriated certain sums, having omitted to enter them in certain slips which it was his duty to transmit to London in order that the amount might be incorporated in the London cash book, *held*, he was triable in London where his false slips had been received. See also *A v De Marney* (1907) 1 K. B. 333, where the accused, the editor of a newspaper, was convicted in London of the offence of causing and procuring obscene books to be sold by advertisements inserted in his paper which related to sale of obscene books by foreigners. In *A v Stoddart* (1909) 23 T. L. R. 612, the indictment was a charge of obtaining money by false pretences with reference to a coupon competition. Postal money orders and letters containing money were in consequence of the advertisement of the competition, posted in London to the accused in Holland. It was contended that the obtaining of the money was in Holland and the London Central Criminal Court had no jurisdiction but the contention was overruled on the ground that the offence was complete on the posting of the letters in London. The trend of the decisions in England and the United States is to the effect that a person who when abroad, is concerned in directing a crime, may be punished for the same if arrested or found where the crime was committed although he was at the time of commission and concoction out of the latter's jurisdiction. See *Russell on Crimes*, Vol. I, pp 52—57, *Archbold*, p 33. Where a person caused a letter to be posted in Calcutta to his agent at Gorakhpore, inciting him to the commission of an offence at Gorakhpore, it was *held* he was guilty of the offence of abetment as soon as the letter was received by the agent at Gorakhpore and that he might be tried at Gorakhpore, 16 A. 339. See Note 3 to s 180

7. Offences of criminal breach of trust and criminal misappropriation.—See Note 7 to s. 181. See also 44 C. 912

8. Offence of defamation.—In a charge of defamation it appeared that the defamatory matter complained of was contained in a petition signed by the accused and addressed to the Lieutenant Governor of the Punjab, which the accused stated he placed in the Lieutenant Governor's petition box at Lahore. The petition asked the Lieutenant-Governor to have an inquiry into the truth of the charge contained in it, made from the native gentlemen of Amritsar and also from two persons who carried on business there and in consequence of this request the libel was sent to Amritsar and published there. *Held* (SPITTA, J. *dissenting*), that the Amritsar Courts had jurisdiction to try the case, as when the complainant could show that the publication at Amritsar took place at the request of the accused he was at liberty to reply on the publication at that place as being that which completed the offence, and if that publication be regarded as a consequence naturally arising from the accused's acts, it was also a consequence by the reason of which he was charged with the offence of defamation within the meaning of this section 45 P. R. 1335; 14 F. R. 1839. Where a libel is sent from one Court to another the venue may be laid in either country, *R v Burdett*, 4 B. and Ald 95, *R v Ellis*, (1899) 1 B. 230; *R v Watson*, 1 Camp. 215. See also remarks of West, J., in 5 B. 333 at p 359 as to the effect of sending a libel by post which is published abroad. Cf 17 W. R. 15 where it was stated that, it is considered settled law that an indictment for sending a threatening letter may be tried either in the county in which the offender sent the letter or in the county where the prosecutor received the letter. "When a crime of libel is committed by publication in any paper in the State against a person residing in the State, the jurisdiction is in either the county where the paper is published, or in the county where the party libelled resides. But the defendant may have the place of trial changed to the county where the libel is printed, on executing a bond to the complainant in the penal sum of not more than 250 dollars nor less than 100 dollars, conditioned, in case the defendant is convicted for the payment of the complainant's reasonable and necessary travelling expenses in going to and from his place of residence and the place of trial, and his necessary expenses in attendance thereon, which bond must be signed by two sufficient sureties to be approved of by a Judge of a Court of Record exercising criminal jurisdiction." *N Y Cr Pro Code*, s 138. See 44 M. L. J. 643

9. Offence of Cheating—ss. 417—420, I. P. C.—(i) *May be tried at the place where the accused was bound to account*—Where it is proved that the accused, the complainant's agent at Shalimar (outside the Presidency town of Calcutta), received money from complainant's firm at Calcutta and rendered false accounts to them at Calcutta, *held*, that the Presidency Magistrate had jurisdiction to take cognizance of complaint of the offence of cheating under ss. 417, 418 and 420, and of using a forged document under s. 471, I. P. C., 25 C. 746; 2 P. R. 1902. In 1908 A. W. N. 115 = 5 A. L. J. 333 = 7 Cr. L. J. 394, however, it was *held*, that the words embrace only such consequences as modify or complete the act alleged to be an offence, therefore, where G at Aligarh purchases certain *hundies* at *Halhras* and sent them to the accused at Calcutta for realization and the accused was charged with the offence of cheating for having realized the *hundies* after becoming insolvent. *Held*, that the Court at Aligarh had no jurisdiction to try the offence which should be tried at Calcutta. See also 5 L. B. R. 57 = 10 Cr. L. J. 86 and 13 A. L. J. 1067. (ii) *May be tried at the place where the head office of the firm cheated is and where the loss ensued*—At the instance of G, of Lahore, A sent goods from Karachi under false description A was brought from Karachi to Lahore to stand his trial there with G for offences under the *Indian Railways Act*, 1890, and for cheating and abetment thereof. *Held*, that as regards the offence of cheating this section conferred on the Courts at Lahore jurisdiction by reason of the loss in freight being caused to the Railway Administration at Lahore, where its headquarters were, 7 P. R. 1900. Where D residing at Lahore was charged with an offence under s. 420, I. P. C., for having recovered money from a Bank at Bombay on a forged draft of the Amritsar Branch of the P N Bank at Lahore and was also charged under ss. 420 and 109 I. P. C., for having abetted I, residing at Amritsar, in recovering money on a similar draft from the Multan Branch of the P N Bank. *Held* that under this section the Lahore Court had jurisdiction inasmuch as the consequence, namely, loss to the Bank, whose drafts were forged contemplated in his section, ensued at Lahore where the Head Office of P N Bank was situate. The loss occurred at the place where the accounts of the Bank are made up and its business as a Company is situate 18 P. W. R. 1908 = 8 Cr. L. J. 75; 24 P. R. 1901 at p. 17; 26 C. 746. Where the accused at M induced certain persons to part with money on certain representations which were subsequently discovered at A to be fraudulent, *held* the offence of cheating was complete at M and the discovery of the fraud at A was not a consequence 13 A. L. J. 1067 = 16 Cr. L. J. 325. The complainant at M ordered and received goods from a firm at C which were found to be not in accordance with the order but the complainant had already sent in advance the money by post *held* the offence of cheating was committed if at all at M, 12 A. L. J. 1022 = 15 Cr. L. J. 719; 17 Bom. L. R. 389 = 3 Bom. Cr. Ca. 52 = 16 Cr. L. J. 433. See Note 2 and s. 18.

10. Criminal conspiracy.—See s. 120-A of the I. P. C. added by the amending Act VIII of 1913 "Conspiracy may be tried in the place where the conspirators agreed to do the wrongful act which is the object of the conspiracy, but as the place of agreement is often unknown conspiracy is generally a matter of inference deduced from the criminal acts of the accused persons which are done in pursuance of a common criminal purpose and are often not confined to one place, a charge of conspiracy may consequently be laid in any county where one of these criminal acts is committed, although no act may have been done by some of the accused in that county, yet if all the accused had a common criminal purpose and jointly co-operated in forwarding in different counties, the *venue* may be laid in any county in which overt acts are done by some one of them in prosecution of the conspiracy"—*Halsbury's Laws of England*, Vol. IX, p. 283.

Conspiracies.—In indictments of conspiracies, the *venue* may be laid in any county in which it can be proved that an act was done by anyone of the offenders in furtherance of their common design, *Rex v. Brisse* (1803) 4 East 164 = 7 R. R. 557. This was a case of fabricating false vouchers on board a man-of-war and it was *held* that the offence was triable in Middlesex where some of the false vouchers transmitted by one of the conspirators had been received, citing *R. v. Beates*, 1 Term Rep. 696 = 1 R. R. 363, as an authority for the principle that "the conspiracy as against all having been proved from the community of criminal purpose, and by their joint co-operation in forwarding the objects of it, in different places and counties, the locality required for the purpose of the trial was holden to be satisfied by an overt act done by some of them in prosecution of the conspiracy in the county where the trial was held". In the case of conspiracies, s. 34, I. P. C., provides not only for liability to punishment but also for the subjection to British jurisdiction of a conspirator who resides in foreign territory, 14 Bom. L. R. 147 = 13 Cr. L. J. 426. See also *R. v. Burdell*, 4 B. and Ald. 95. In the above Bombay case it was *held* citing *R. v. Olphant*, (1803) 2 K. B. 67 and *R. v. Rogers*, (1877) 3 Q. B. D. 23, that even where the instigation is committed by a person in a foreign territory of an offence in British India through human agency, the instigator may be tried in British India. The above English cases only lay down that there is no difference between sending information by post (or telephone) and giving the same information by direct personal communication. It is a matter of some doubt where

an intelligent active agent is interposed between the foreigner initiating the crime and its commission in England, whether the Courts of the place where the offence was committed have jurisdiction over the foreigner, *Badische Anilin und Sodafabrik v. Basse Criminal Works*, (1898) A. C. 200. A, a member of a conspiracy sent money by post from Calcutta to other conspirators at Patna who also did acts at Patna in furtherance of the conspiracy, *Hell* A could be tried at Patna, 17 W. R. 15 = 9 B. L. R. 38.

But it should be observed that if a conspiracy is entered into in district A and acts are committed in pursuance of the conspiracy in district B, the Magistrate of district A can try the offence of conspiracy, but cannot try the accused in the same trial for offences committed outside his district.

S 239 of the Code cannot give jurisdiction to a Magistrate who has no jurisdiction to try the offence under the provisions of Chapter XV of the Code, 28 G. W. N. 973.

11. Falsification of accounts—S. 477-A, I. P. C.—A person accused of an offence under s. 477 A, I. P. C., falsification of accounts, made in one place cannot be tried in another place by reason of any consequence which has ensued, as the offence is complete under s. 477 A, I. P. C., where the accounts are falsified with intent to defraud. The *tenue* of an offence under s. 409, I. P. C., is now governed by 181 (2) 4 M. L. T. 431 = 9 Cr. L. J. 92.

12. Bigamy—In England, the offence of *Bigamy* may be tried in any county or place where the offender is apprehended or is in custody, 24 and 25 *Vict.*, c. 100, s. 57. The same rule applies to Forgery, Post office and Revenue offences.

180. Where an act is an offence by reason of its relation to any other act which is also an offence or which would be an offence, if the doer were capable of committing an offence a charge of the first mentioned offence may be inquired into or tried by a Court within the local limits of whose jurisdiction either act was done

Place of trial where act is an offence by reason of its relation to other offence

Illustrations

(a) A charge of abetment may be inquired into or tried either by the Court within the local limits of whose jurisdiction the abetment was committed, or by the Court within the local limits of whose jurisdiction the offence abetted was committed.

(b) A charge of receiving or retaining stolen goods may be inquired into or tried either by the Court within the local limits of whose jurisdiction the goods were stolen, or by any Court within the local limits of whose jurisdiction any of them were at any time dishonestly received or retained.

(c) A charge of wrongfully concealing a person known to have been kidnapped may be inquired into or tried by the Court within the local limits of whose jurisdiction the wrongful concealing, or by the Court within the local limits of whose jurisdiction the kidnapping took place.

Notes—1 S. 180 must be construed subject to s. 183.—The general provisions of this section are controlled by s. 189. See 26 M. L. J. 511 = 1910 M. W. N. 143 = 8 M. L. T. 54 = 11 Cr. L. J. 306. This case was doubted in 38 M. 779. See Note 6 at p. 411.

2. Place of trial for abetment by letter sent through post.—Where one person instigates another to the commission of an offence by means of a letter sent through the post, the offence of abetment by instigation is completed so soon as the contents of such letter become known to the addressee, and such offence is triable at the place where such letter is received 16 A. 389. For the purpose of giving jurisdiction, a letter speaks continuously from the moment of its being posted until its receipt by the addressee *R v. Rogers* (1877) 3 Q. B. D. 23. See 14 Bom. L. R. 147 = 13 Cr. L. J. 426. Note 8 to s. 179 and also 8 B. 312 and 15 A. 350.

3. Where abetment and offence are in different territories.—

(a) *Abetment in British India of an offence committed in foreign territory*—The accused, a Native Indian subject of Her Majesty abetted the commission of murder, or of rioting under ss. 302 and 147, I. P. C. The alleged abetment consisted of words spoken in British territory by the accused, inciting certain Portuguese subjects to kill one Bhama if he attempted to remove the produce of certain lands situate in the Portuguese territory of Damaun. A disturbance afterwards occurred at Damaun in connection with this matter, in which one man was killed and another wounded. *Held*, that s. 188 had no application to the present case, the alleged offence of abetment not having been committed outside British India, 19 B. 105. See also 5 B. 338 and 7 Bom. H. C. R. Cr. Ca. 89.

This difficulty is now removed by the addition of s. 108 A to the *Indian Penal Code* which is as follows —

"S 108-A A person abets an offence in British India within the meaning of this Code, who in British India abets the commission of any act without and beyond British India, which would constitute an offence if committed in British India."

Illustrations

"A in British India instigates B, a foreigner in Goa, to commit a murder in Goa. A is guilty of abetting murder."

(b) *Abetment in foreign territory of offence committed in British India*—A subject of a Native State who by acts done in that State and not in British territory abets the commission of an offence in British territory is not liable to be tried in British India, 20 P. R. 1878, but if he is a Native Indian subject, he may be tried in British India if a certificate is obtained. *Madras C. M. P. N. 97 of 1911*, but see Note 6 to s. 179.

Where a foreign subject, resident in foreign territory, instigated the commission of an offence which in consequence was committed in British territory, *held*, that the instigation not having taken place in any district created by this Code, the instigator was not amenable to the jurisdiction of a British Court established under the Code, 10 B. H. C. R. 356, 20 P. R. 1878; 35 P. R. 1880. Now, see however, the new illustration (d) to s. 179.

4. *Venue for the trial of the offence of receiving stolen property*—ss. 411, 412, I. P. C., if theft in one territory and receiving in another.—(i) *Theft in British India, possession of stolen property in Foreign State by British Indian subject*—Where a Native Indian British subject was found in a Native State in possession of property alleged to have been stolen at a dacoity in British India, *held*, he could under s. 180 be tried in British India for an offence under s. 412, I. P. C., but a certificate of the Political Agent under s. 188 would be necessary, 21 M. L. J. 441 = 1910 M. W. N. 143 = 8 M. L. T. 54 = 11 Cr. L. J. 306.

(ii) *Theft in British territory, possession of stolen property in Foreign State by non-British subject*.—Certain Non-British subjects were found in a Native State in possession of stolen property, the subject of a dacoity committed in British India. It was not proved that they had taken any part in the dacoity, or received stolen property in British India, *held*, that they could not be convicted of offence under s. 412, I. P. C., as no offence was committed within the jurisdiction of a British Court, 9 A. 523. A foreigner residing in foreign territory if arrested therein is not triable by a British Indian Court for the offence of being in possession of stolen property in such territory as the Magistrate has no jurisdiction 22 P. R. 1899; 16 P. R. 1890; 4 Bom. H. C. R. Cr. Ca. 33. The operation of the Code cannot be extended beyond British territory, so as to give jurisdiction to a British Court to try a person residing outside British India for the offence of retaining stolen property outside British India, though the properties may have been stolen in British India. Illustration (b) of this section has no application to such a case, 18 C. W. N. 1178 = 15 Cr. L. J. 537.

(iii) *Theft in Foreign State, retention of stolen property in British India*.—Where the offence of theft or dacoity takes place in a Foreign State, a conviction under s. 411, I. P. C., may be sustained if the stolen property is brought or retained in British India. See s. 410, I. P. C., as amended by Act VIII of 1882, 1 B. 50 and 6 C. 307 = 7 C. L. R. 411. The opinion of the majority in 5 B. 333 is no longer law. If the person who commits theft or dacoity outside British India brings the proceeds of the offence into British India, he may be convicted of the offence of retaining stolen property under s. 411, I. P. C., though he cannot be tried in British India for the offence of theft or dacoity which was completed outside British territory, 10 B. 188; 23 A. 372. See also 1 M. 171, 4 Bom. H. C. R. Cr. Ca. 33 and Weir II, 143, where conviction of the offence of mischief in respect of an animal stolen in foreign territory was upheld.

5. *Venue in English law for the offence of receiving goods stolen abroad*—The *Larceny Act* 1896 (59 and 60 Vict., c. 52), s. 1, sub-sec. (1) enacts that "if any person without lawful excuse, receives or has in possession any property stolen outside the United Kingdom knowing such property to have been stolen he may be indicted in any county or place in which he has, or has had, the property."

181. (1) The offence of being a thug, of being a thug and committing murder, of dacoity, of dacoity with murder, of having belonged to a gang of dacoits or of having escaped from custody, may be inquired into or tried by a Court within the local limits of whose jurisdiction the person charged is

Being a thug or belonging to a gang of dacoits, escape from custody, etc.

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A bad author deserves better usage than "advice" as a man may be the savior or enemy through the fortunes of war of judgment; but he can not be the latter without both that and a superlative. *Idem.*

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f. peculiar

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4 That which is formal: the formal part
is quality which constitutes a thing what it is.

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fór'mi eáte, } a [Lat. fornicatus,
fór'mi eáted, } from fornar, arch,

I Vaulted like an oven or furnace, arched

2 (2 of) Arching over, over
arched

For α elements, $r \neq 1$ [Lat. form α
for α elements from α form arch
as also under ground walls.]

8c 15, f ruler, 15 furnished
new 10 140 10 140 10 140

* ā, ē, ī, ū, ṁ, ȳ, lung; ā, ē, ī, ō, ṁ, ȳ, short, cāre, lār, lāt, rōlī, vḥat, t'

[illegible][illegible]

arm, pique, firm, donc, for, de, well, food, foot.

(2) The offence of criminal misappropriation or of criminal breach of trust may be inquired into or tried by a Court within the local limits of whose jurisdiction any part of the property which is the subject of the offence was received or retained by the accused person or the offence was committed

Criminal misappropriation and criminal breach of trust.

* (3) The offence of theft or any offence which includes theft or the possession of stolen property, may be inquired into or tried by a Court within the local limits of whose jurisdiction such offence was committed or the property stolen was possessed by the thief or by any person who received or retained the same knowing or having reason to believe it to be stolen

Theft.

(4) The offence of kidnapping or abduction may be inquired into or tried by a Court within the local limits of whose jurisdiction the person kidnapped or abducted was kidnapped or abducted or was conveyed or concealed or detained

Kidnapping and abduction.

Note.—With regard to this section the Select Committee say we accept the clauses but would enlarge the enumeration of offences to include the possession of stolen property. This will also cover the case of extortion. See the definition in s. 410 I P C.

The only important change in this sub-section is the addition of or any offence which includes theft or possession of stolen property. See 24 A L J 148

Notes.—1 No jurisdiction over foreigners for offences committed in foreign State.—There is nothing in this section which contravenes the general rule of international law that no Court has jurisdiction over foreigners in respect of an offence committed in foreign State. 1 P R 1901, 20 P R 1878, 2 Bom L R 337. See also 28 A 372, 7 P R 1894, 1 P R 1901, 20 P R 1878. See Notes 2 and 3 at p 392

2 Section applies only to British Courts of different local areas. The section only applies as between Courts of different areas whose jurisdiction has been limited under s 12 and to which this section applies. It has no application to an offence committed in a Native State and of such offence the Magistrate cannot take cognizance except on the certificate of the Political Agent given under s 188. A British Indian Magistrate cannot take cognizance of a criminal breach of trust committed in a Native State merely because part of the property was retained by the accused within his jurisdiction. 5 B L R 268 = 13 Cr L J 530. So also where the offence of kidnapping was completed in a Native State and the minor was brought subsequently to British India held the British Court had no jurisdiction. 14 Cr L J 439 (Sindh). 1 P R 1901

3. Escape from lawful custody in a foreign State.—British Courts have no jurisdiction.—The accused was arrested in the Mysore State by the State Police on suspicion of having committed theft in British India. While in the State lock up he effected his escape for which a Magistrate in British India arrested and convicted him under s 224 I P C. Held that as the offence of escape from lawful custody was committed out of British India the Magistrate had no jurisdiction to try the accused for it. Ratnial, 870. Even if the person in custody be afterwards declared to be innocent the offence of escape from custody will be complete provided only the custody be lawful. 24 W R 45. See however 12 G 190 and 5 M 22

4. No jurisdiction to try offence of theft or dacoity committed in foreign territory by foreign dacoits even if property retained by them in British territory.—Where a dacoity was committed at Velanpur in an allied territory and a part of the stolen property found where it had been concealed by the accused in British territory it was held that a conviction of dacoity could not be sustained that being a substantive offence completed as soon as perpetrated at Velanpur although, had Velanpur been in British territory, the subsequent acts in the process of taking away the property might in legal sense have coalesced with the first and principal one so as to give jurisdiction under this section in each district into which the property was conveyed. But on a conviction of retaining stolen property, the sentence awarded could it was held be sustained the retaining having taken place in British territory, 1 B 50, 6 G 307 = 7 C L R 411, 10 B 185; 28 A 372

* Sub-section (3) was substituted for the original sub-section (2) by the Cr P C Amendment Act XVIII of 1923 s 42

into stone pithed as fossil sh is bones of
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to, ish n a ly

2 To become antiquated rigid or fixed boys

if failure of change or progress

Fossilized p 1 Converted into a fossil oil

Fossilate a [Lat fossil a l the dit h imin
mive of fossil See fossil] Having been heated or

Foul v t [i p a p p
FOULING] [A B f d m

This decision is now superseded by Act VIII of 1882, which amends s 410 of the I P C by adding the words "whether the transfer has been made, or the misappropriation or breach of trust has been committed within or without British India." See also 5 B 338, 10 B. H. C. R. 356; 4 B. H. C. R. 38.

In the case reported in 1 M. 171, the accused stole property in foreign territory, and was apprehended with it in his possession in a district in British territory. It was *held*, that s 67, Act X of 1872, did not give the Courts of such district jurisdiction to try him for the theft. Illustration (f) to that section apparently treated a theft completed in one district as continuing in three others to which the stolen property is carried. If this is the meaning, the Magistrate would have had jurisdiction if the theft had been committed in a district within British India and consequently subject to this legislative provision. In such a case one of the Municipal Courts would have had jurisdiction and the effect of this rule of procedure would be to give it also to another. The rule, however, is applicable only to the scope of the relative jurisdictions of Courts in British India, and cannot be applied to an offence not committed within the jurisdiction of either of them. Then the general rule applies that a Court trying an offender must have jurisdiction over the place of the delict.

5. *Venue for the offence of belonging to a gang of dacoits*—A resident of a Native Indian State was arrested in that State and brought before a Magistrate of the G District in British India and charged with the offence of belonging to a gang of dacoits along with others who had committed certain dacoities within his jurisdiction and it was not alleged that the prisoner had participated in any dacoity or associated with dacoits in the G District and the Magistrate committed the accused to the Sessions. On its being argued that the commitment should be quashed it was *held*, that the Magistrate had jurisdiction over the accused as he was in G District at the time of the charge, 1 P. R. 1911 = 4 P. W. R. 1911 = 12 Cr. L. J. 113.

6. *Meaning of "may be inquired into or tried by a Court within the local limits of whose jurisdiction the person charged is."*—The word 'is' does not mean 'is of his own accord'. The word 'is' after the word 'charged' gives the Magistrate jurisdiction equally whether the accused has come within the local limits of his jurisdiction of his own accord or has been brought there by force, 6 B. 622 and *Punjab Cr A* No 2089 of 1907 referred to, 1 P. R. 1911 = 4 P. W. R. 1911 = 12 Cr. L. J. 113.

7. Criminal Breach of Trust and Criminal Misappropriation—ss 403–409, I. P. C.—

(i) *Is s 179 applicable?*—In accordance with the ordinary rules of construction the special provision in s 181 (2) should ordinarily receive effect unqualified by the general provisions of s 179. Unless, therefore, clear reason is shown in the particular facts of the case, s 179 does not seem to be applicable. See 29 M. L. J. 178 = 16 Cr. L. J. 491.

(ii) *Is loss a necessary consequence?*—As to whether loss resulting from a criminal breach of trust is a necessary consequence as to attract the provisions of s 179 there is a difference of opinion. The trend of the decisions seems to be that the Courts in which the wrongful conversion takes place and the primary loss occurs must be usually resorted to and that whenever there is uncertainty as to where the property was received or the offence was committed, recourse may be had to the place where the complainant, who is entitled to the property misappropriated and where it is to be accounted for resides. See Notes 2, 3 and 9 to s 179.

(iii) *Have the courts where the complainant who suffers loss occasioned by the offence resides jurisdiction by reason of the consequence loss?* See Note 1 to s 179.

Madras.—The offence of *criminal breach of trust* is completed (assuming a preliminary trust) by the misappropriation or conversion of the property dishonestly, i.e., with the intention of causing wrongful gain or wrongful loss. It is only the intention which is essential. Whether wrongful gain or loss actually resulted is immaterial, it is a consequence, but no essential part of the offence, and a person is not accused by reason of it. The offence of *criminal breach of trust* by reason of dishonest use or disposal of property in violation of a contract is committed where the dishonest use or disposal takes place—not where the contract was made or should have been performed, 34 A. 437 followed 38 M. 639. In this case, a merchant at D in the Madras Presidency sent hundies to the accused at Bombay for encashment the accused was charged under s. 403 I P C, with having cashed the hundies and misappropriated the proceeds. *held*, that the Magistrate at D had no jurisdiction. The Court in 29 M. L. J. 178 = 16 Cr. L. J. 491, dissented from 38 M. 639 in so far as it laid down that the existence of dishonest intention not the ensuing of loss, was the essential element in the offence of criminal breach of trust. For we are unable to conceive any case in which more than mere preparation or attempt could be *held* established but no loss whatever, it may be only a temporary or highly insignificant one could be found to have been caused. Our conclusion is in fact that the loss ensues immediately on the conversion because by it the property of the principal entrusted to the agent, is diminished in the latter's hands. A firm at

fractio, by fraction It fra ions Lat fractio, from
frangere fractum to break }

1 The act of breaking, or state of being broken, especially by violence. [Obs.]
 No, therefore, the natural body of Christ be subject to any fraction or breaking up. *For.*

* = 1 5 2 F, 10 6, 2 7 2, 8 2 F, short, cu

a window door picture or
looking glass

firm, done, for dy wylf, food too,



Madras employed the accused at *N* to sell the oil sent to him and remit the sale proceeds to Madras. The accused was charged under ss. 406 and 409, I P. C., with having misappropriated the cash realized. *Held* that the Magistrate at Madras had no jurisdiction. The origin of the oil was immaterial as the offence charged was the misappropriation of the money and not of the oil. The primary loss occurred at *N* immediately the proceeds were converted. It was further contended in the last case that although the firm's loss at *N* may have been a primary consequence, the loss at Madras, the firm's headquarters where its funds were kept and where the firm ordinarily received the accused's accounts and remittances was a secondary loss and the Court at Madras had jurisdiction, *held* however, that such a secondary loss was not contemplated by s. 179, and could not give the Madras Court jurisdiction. 34 A. 437; 35 A. 29 and 8 Bom. L. R. 513 were referred to, 29 M. L. J. 178 = 16 Cr. L. J. 491.

Both these cases *dissented* from 33 M. 779, where it was *held* that failure to account for the property misappropriated was a part of the offence, acts including illegal omissions. The facts of the case were that complainant at *V* in British India entrusted the accused with certain jewels for sale on commission, and he was alleged to have dishonestly converted two jewels to his own use by pledging them at *B* in a Native State and misappropriated a third jewel at *M* in British India and that it was part of the arrangement that the accused should account for the jewels or their price at *V*, *held*, that as the loss which ensued, occurred, at *V*, this was sufficient under s. 179 for the Magistrate at *V* to have jurisdiction. 19 A. 111 and 35 A. 29 were *followed*. See also 4 M. L. T. 431 = 9 Cr. L. J. 92.

Allahabad.—(a) *When it is difficult to say where the actual offence of breach of trust was committed s. 179 may be resorted to and the offence may be tried at the place where the loss, the consequence of the breach of trust occurred.*—A company at Cawnpore complained that its servant *B* being in charge on behalf of the Company at a place in Bengal of certain goods belonging to the Company, failed to account for them or return them to Cawnpore or pay their price. He was charged with criminal breach of trust under s. 408, I P. C. *Held*, that the Courts at Cawnpore had jurisdiction to inquire into the charge, inasmuch as the consequence of *B*'s acts, namely, loss to the Company, occurred in Cawnpore, 19 A. 111. Accused was an agent of a firm at *M*. Goods were entrusted to him for sale in various places in Bengal and from time to time he sold some of the goods and remitted money, but finally failed to account for some of the goods or money he had received for them, he was tried and convicted at *M*. The conviction was upheld following 19 A. 111, as it was impossible to state exactly where the act or acts of embezzlement took place, 32 A. 397. In 35 A. 29 the cases in 19 A. 111 and 32 A. 397 were followed and it was *held* that the loss resulting from criminal breach of trust is a consequence which completes the offence and the Court within whose jurisdiction such loss occurs may try the offence. In this case also it was difficult to state where actually the offence was committed. The complainant alleged that the accused was an agent in charge of the machine in question permitted to exhibit it at various places in India for her and her husband's benefit and was bound to return it and account for its profits to her at Cawnpore. The entrustment and criminal breach of trust were both outside Cawnpore. *Held*, the Cawnpore Court where the accused had to account had jurisdiction. In this case 4 O. C. 376 was *dissented from*.

(b) *When, however, the place where the offence is committed is known, the Courts of that place ought to be resorted to, as that is the place where the primary loss occurs.*—In 34 A. 437, KARAMAT HUSSAN, J., was of opinion that 'consequence' means a consequence which forms a part and parcel of the offence and does not mean a consequence which is not such a direct result of the act of the offender as to form no part of that offence and *held distinguishing* 26 C. 746 and 19 A. 111 and *following* 5 A. L. J. 333 = 7 Cr. L. J. 394, *held* that where the offence of misappropriation is completely committed in a branch of a firm by an agent the Courts at the head office of the firm have no jurisdiction. Accused *A* was employed at *G* as the gumasta of a branch firm whose head office was at *C*, the accused was charged with having misappropriated the money of the firm at *G* which he had to send to *C*. *Held* that the Court at *C* had no jurisdiction since the loss to the principal firm at *C* is not a consequence of the act of the accused committed at the branch of the firm within the meaning of s. 179. See also 5 A. L. J. 333 = 1903 A. W. N. 119, when the charge was one of cheating.

Calcutta.—See the cases of 26 C. 746 and 41 C. 305 and 44 C. 912 and 26 C. W. N. 175.

Where the accused is under a liability to render accounts at a particular place and fails to do so by reason of having committed an offence of criminal breach of trust, the Court within the local limits of whose jurisdiction that place is situate, may inquire into and try the offence under s. 181, sub-sec. (2) 29 C. W. N. 432.

Punjab.—A firm having its head office at Karachi had a branch office in the district of *F* in the Punjab. The branch office appointed the accused as their purchasing agents in the district of *J* and they were

accountable to the branch office and had no dealings direct with the head office. A general deficiency on settlement of accounts being found, the accused were tried and convicted at *F* of the offence of criminal breach of trust. It was argued that the loss was to the Karachi head office and the offence was committed in *J. Held*, that the accused were rightly tried at *F* as the general balance was payable at *F* where the accounts had to be rendered and it might be said to have been retained at *F* within the meaning of sub-sec (2), 2 P. R. 1902. Where, however, certain specific items have been misappropriated and the accused is not tried for a deficient balance, the Court at *F* may have no jurisdiction, *Cr. Mis 58 of 1900 (Punjab)*, 22 P. R. 1915. In 7 P. R. 1910 = 7 P. W. R. 1910 = 11 Cr. L. J. 253 also it was held that where the complainant despatched goods from Delhi to the accused at Calcutta for sale on commission, and the accused mortgaged the goods and misappropriated the money to their own use, the offence of misappropriation was complete as soon as the money had been misappropriated and that the Calcutta Court alone had jurisdiction. The words "*any consequence that has ensued*" mean some consequence modifying or completing the acts constituting the offence and do not include the loss resulting to an employer from criminal breach of trust by his servant, following 5 A. L. J. 333 = 7 Cr. L. J. 394; 67 P. L. R. 1901 and dissenting from 19 A. 111. In 223 P. L. R. 1913 a servant was employed by a master in a district different from the one in which he lived. The servant then committed a criminal breach of trust whereby the master suffered a pecuniary loss, held the servant cannot be tried under s 179 where the master lived in 22 P. R. 1915 = 16 Cr. L. J. 775, the complainant at *R*, filed a complaint wherein he stated that the accused who was engaged at *R* to manage a branch business at *P* had made false entries in respect of various items and had committed the offence of criminal breach of trust, held the case was triable at *P*, and not at *R*.

Ondh—The complainant in his complaint under s 409 alleged that he consigned goods from *F*, where he lived, to the address of the accused in the Central Provinces who misappropriated the goods there, held that the accused could not be tried at *F* by virtue of s 179. S 179 was inapplicable as the accused was not charged with the commission of an offence by reason of any consequence which ensued at *F* or elsewhere, but solely by reason of what they were alleged to have done in the Central Provinces, 40 C. 376.

Rangoon—Where the accused, an agent at Kobe (in Japan) of the complainant at Rangoon misappropriated certain moneys entrusted by the complainant, held that the accused committed criminal breach of trust in Kobe and that s 179 of the Code has no application. 1 R. 56 (35 A. 29 dissenting from 34 A. 437 and 44 C. 913 followed).

8 Entrustment in British India and breach in foreign territory.—Where *B* who was entrusted with rice at Mangalore for conveyance to Calicut took the cargo to Goa, in foreign territory, and there sold it, held, that the Sessions Court at Mangalore had no jurisdiction to try the offence and that no offence was committed on the High Seas so as to give the Court jurisdiction under 12 and 13 *Vid.*, c 96, extended by 23 and 24 *Vid.*, c 88, 5 M. 23. But now see s 188, 7 M. 354 and 38 M. 779.

9. Venue for trial of embezzlement under English law.—The locality of a crime varies with the nature of the crime. If the crime is an act of omission, the place where the crime is committed is the place where the act which is omitted ought to have been done, *R v. Minter*, (1846) 2 Car. and Kir. 310. So in the case of an act of commission such as embezzlement, when there is no evidence of embezzlement except non-accounting, the venue may be laid in the place where the non-accounting occurred, but this does not apply where there is distinct evidence of misappropriation elsewhere, for then the offence is triable in either place, *R v. Davison and Gordon*, (1855) 7 Cox. C. C. 185. *Halsbury's Laws of England*, Vol IX, p 280

10. Kidnapping or abduction in foreign territory and conveying through British India.—
(a) *Foreigner*. This section has no application to a *foreigner* committing an offence out of British India, the intention of the section being evidently to provide for the case of an offender proceeding from one local jurisdiction in British India to another. Where, therefore, a foreigner kidnapped a girl in a foreign State and while conveying the girl by rail from that State through British India, he was arrested, tried and convicted of the offence of kidnapping, it was held, that the British Court had no jurisdiction, as the offence was complete out of British India and no consequence ensued in British India so as to bring the case within s 179. Nor was the offence a continuous one to bring it under s 182. The words "*was conveyed*" do not import any kidnapping was complete previous to such conveying, 1 P. R. 1893; 2 C. W. N. 81; 19 A. 409, 4 C. W. N. 645; 8 P. R. 1895. J. 931, 1 S. L. R. 104 = 8 Cr. L. J. 361; 1 M. 173; 18 A. 390, as to when kidnapping from lawful guardianship is complete. See also 20 C. W. N. 62 = 17 Cr. L. J. 123 = 33 In. Ca. 304, 5 C. 985 and 18 C. W. N. 1177 = 15 Cr. L. J. 537.

3 Liberated by arriving at a certain age from the control of parents guardian or master
4 Not confined or imprisoned, released from arrest liberated

Latin unhappy prisoner free
5 Not subjected to the laws of physical necessity, caprice of violent activity, endowed with mind liberty — said of the will
6 Clear of offense or crime, guiltless innocent

His hands are guilty, but his heart is free
7 Unconstrained by a link or distrust, unrestrained, independent, familiar

He was naturally of a timid spirit which was none what caused by a suffering, so that he was free of any vice

Unrestrained of temperance, lavish, licentious — used in a bad sense

The virtues have been free from the passions, free from

8 Not close or parasiticous liberal, open handed

9 Free united or combined with any thing close separated, dissociated, unattached as liberty to escape as free carbonic acid

10 Let clear release liberated — followed by from or rarely by of

11 Free detaching themselves free from the obligation of the estate

12 Inveighed with a particular free lion or free child enjoy one's immunities or privileges admitted to one's rights — followed by of

13 Characterized of one selling wares out outwardly to retail of hawking

14 If even will by open or made entirely access able to be enjoyed without hindrance or restriction not obstructed (unopposed or appropriate) open — and of a thing to be possessed or enjoyed

Why are you not the streets as of

15 Not given by superior to or put in one's power as a free admission

16 Not at the service or despotic access of one individual as rights as of by a person or laws as of a government etc

Free agency is the state or the power of self

Free choice is the power of self

Free will is the power of self

Free choice is the power of self

Free will is the power of self

Free choice is the power of self

Free will is the power of self

Free choice is the power of self

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Free will is the power of self

Free choice is the power of self

Free will is the power of self

Free choice is the power of self

3 Improper familiarity, violation of the rules of decorum, license

Syn — See LIBERTY

Freehold, n. A freehold is a piece of land which is held by a person who is not a tenant of the land

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Water freezes at the temperature of 32° above zero by a Fahrenheit thermometer mercury freezes at 32° below zero

2 To become chilled with cold or as with cold to be of low temperature, to be of low animation or life by lack of heat, as the blood free of the virus

Freeze v t To congeal to harden to freeze to convert from a fluid to a solid form by cold or abstraction of heat

3 To cause loss of animation or life in, from lack of heat, to give the cessation of cold and abstinence to chill

4 As salt cold free virus through my veins

Freeze n 1 The act of congealing, or of state of being congealed or completely chilled 2 (Arch) A freeze 30 FRIERE

Freeze n 1 A mixture of salt and snow, or of chemical salts for production of intense cold

Freeze n 1 A thermometer and 2 to on the Centigrade

Freeze n 1 A later form of frost 2 v t 1 To shut which were made for transport on land cargo especially of a lot of a car on a rail or the like as 2 To freeze to be paid

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(b) *Native Indian subject of His Majesty*—A Magistrate would have jurisdiction to try Native Indian subjects of His Majesty accused of the offences of kidnapping, abduction, etc., committed outside British India if the conditions required by s. 188 are observed, 7 S. L. R. 17 = 14 Cr. L. J. 439. A subject of a Native State cannot be tried in British India for the offence of the abduction of a woman (ss. 362, 366, 1 P. C.) committed in a Native State, but if the woman brought to British India is removed from there by the same deceitful means employed to induce her to leave her native place, an independent offence of abduction is committed in British India over which the British Courts have jurisdiction 7 S. L. R. 128 = 15 Cr. L. J. 511.

11. Detention.—Offence of detaining a married woman enticed away for purpose of illicit intercourse is to be enquired into in the district where detention occurs, 51 P. L. R. 1918.

Place of inquiry or trial where scene of offence is uncertain,

or not in one district only,

or where offence is continuing,

or consists of several acts

182. When it is uncertain in which of several local areas an offence was committed or

where an offence is committed partly in one local area and partly in another, or

where an offence is a continuing one, and continues to be committed in more local areas than one, or

where it consists of several acts done in different local areas, it may be inquired into or tried by a Court having jurisdiction over any of such local areas

Notes—1. S 135 of N Y Cr P C provides that when a crime has been committed on the boundaries of two or more counties, or within 500 yards thereof the jurisdiction is in either county. See also 7 Geo 4, c 54, s. 12, where if felony or misdemeanour is committed on the boundary of two or more counties or within 500 yards of the boundary or is begun in one county and completed in another, the *venue* may be laid in either county

2. Section applies only to offences—This section only relates to cases of offences, *i.e.*, acts which are punishable by law, and a case under s 145 is not a case relating to an offence, 3 C. W. N. 148.

3 "Local area" does not include foreign territory.—The words, "local area" used in this section only apply to a "local area" over which the Criminal Procedure Code applies, and not to a "local area" in a foreign country or in other portions of the British Empire to which the Code has no application, 16 B. 667. They include and were intended to include 'District, Province Sub-division and Sessions Division,' 25 C. 858

4 Scope of Section—Conflict of areas—This section in reality intends to provide for the difficulty which would arise where there is a conflict between different areas in order to prevent an accused person getting off entirely because there may be some doubt as to what particular Magistrate has jurisdiction to try the case. Each portion of the section refers to this conflict, 16 C. 667 at p 676. In 25 C. 858, this section was applied to a case where it was known where the offence took place but it was uncertain to which sessions division the place belonged. Where the accused who was employed by a firm at *M* as a travelling agent to sell goods, sold the goods, remitted some money and misappropriated the balance and failed to account to his principals, and it was impossible to state exactly where the act of embezzlement or the various acts of embezzlement took place, but they must have taken place either at *M* or at one of the various districts where the accused travelled, *held*, applying s 179 and this section the Court at *M* had jurisdiction, 32 A. 397. See also 23 C. 55 and 2 C. W. N. 450. The Director of a Company is liable under s 32 cl. 4 of the Indian Companies' Act VII of 1913, for default in filing a copy of the annual list of members and the summary prescribed therein in the Office of the Registrar of Joint Stock Companies, Calcutta. A Presidency Magistrate has jurisdiction to try such offence under s 182 of the Criminal Procedure Code, and if not s. 531 cures the defect.

183. An offence committed whilst the offender is in the course of performing a journey or voyage may be inquired into or tried by a Court through or into the local limits of whose jurisdiction the offender, or the person against whom, or the thing in respect of which, the offence was committed passed in the course of that journey or voyage

Offence committed on a journey,

Notes.—1. Compare s 136 of the N Y Cr P C. Under it when crime is committed on board a vessel navigating a river, lake, canal, etc., or lying there in the course of a voyage the jurisdiction is in any county where such voyage terminates, or would terminate if completed. See also the *Criminal Law Act 1836* (7 Geo 4 C 64) s 13, and the *Fugitive Offenders Act, 1881* (44 and 45 Vict, c 69)

2. The journey must be a continuous journey from one terminus to another.—The section gives jurisdiction to the local tribunal at the place where the offender, etc., first stops or breaks his journey or voyage. Where an offence was alleged to have been committed during a journey from Bombay to Calcutta, and was in fact committed between Bombay and Allahabad, at which latter place the complainant and the accused halted and separated, and proceeded to Calcutta by different trains. *Held* that the Magistrate at Howrah had no jurisdiction to try the case. In order to give jurisdiction to the Magistrate, the journey must be a continuous journey from one terminus to another terminus, regard being had, for the purpose of estimating the continuity to all the ordinary incidents affecting journeys of the particular kind which may be under consideration. **21 W. R 66 = 13 B. L. R. Appx 4.** In **1 M. H. C. R 193** the Madras High Court construing s 35 of Act XVIII of 1862 *held*, that if a person be accused of an offence committed whilst a journey or voyage is going on he may be tried if any part of that journey or voyage during which the offence is alleged to have been committed lies within the local limits of the Court's jurisdiction. In that case a Railway guard was charged under s 27 of the Railway Act with drunkenness whilst in charge of a train and he was removed from that train and detained at Arkonam a place beyond the local limits of the High Court, but he broke away and continued the journey to Madras. It was *held* that the High Court had no jurisdiction as the journey on which the offence was alleged to have been committed ended so far as regarded the person accused of the offence, at a place beyond the local limits of the High Court's jurisdiction. See also **1 G. L. J 334 = 2 Cr. L. J. 411.**

3. Journey not broken by halt.—A box containing money having been missed during a halt at S in the district T, from a boat, which was on the way to C. *Held*, that the journey was not broken by the halt at S and the case could be tried at C. **25 W. R. 45.** The stoppage was due to the nature of the journey itself.

4. Committed in the course of journey or voyage.—The journey referred to in the first part of this section is the journey which the offender is in the course of performing, and the words *that journey* at the end of the section refer to the same journey. Where, therefore, a *Surang* was charged under s 280 I P C., with rashly navigating a vessel so as to endanger human life. *held* that the only Courts which have jurisdiction to try the offender are the Courts through or into the local limits of whose jurisdiction, the offender in the course of that journey passed. **1 G. L. J. 334 = 2 Cr. L. J. 411**

5. Section not applicable to journey or voyage beyond British India.—This section is part of the Code of Procedure for the trial of offences committed in British India. The words 'journey or voyage' spoken of in it do not include a voyage on the High Seas or in foreign territory, but are confined in their meaning to a journey or voyage within the territories in British India. The section has relation only to a trial of an offence committed in British India in which the only defect is that some Court in British India, other than the Court which actually tried the charge, had local jurisdiction over the offence, **5 M. 23**, see, however, next Note.

6. Offence committed during a voyage on the High Sea.—The complainant and the accused left in a vessel from Bombay to Honwar. During the voyage, within nine miles off the Janjira State the accused threw overboard a box belonging to the complainant, for which on arrival at Honwar, he was charged with mischief. *Held* that the Magistrate at Honwar, through whose jurisdiction the accused passed on the voyage had jurisdiction to try the accused. **Ratanlal 181**

7. What particulars should be given in the charge.—In order to confer jurisdiction over an offence committed on board a boat upon a canal in respect to the cargo thereof, it must be averred in the indictment and proved that the crime was committed on board the boat or vessel, and on that trip or voyage she had passed through some part of the country where the indictment was found.—*Larkin v. People* **61 Barb 226**

Offences against
Railway Telegraph,
Post Office and Arms
Acts.

184. All offences against the provisions of any law for the time being in force relating to Railways Telegraphs, the Post Office or Arms and Ammunition may be inquired into or tried in a Presidency town, whether the offence is stated to have been committed within such town or not.

Syn -To affright, terrify, scare, damp

Some friends, with it only you
 & aptness to write, conformity affinity, c
 spondence [U.S.]

may [lose] ⁵
we might have rejected the outside of them [Johanna] all to

[The fr. of the,] 11
[The fr. of the,] 11

anting war of 14
 • like will long
 d'napanati f' p' f'
 ution or input, a
 is frigid and
 arting natural f' r'

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Provided that the offender and all the witnesses necessary for his prosecution are to be found within such town

Notes.—1. *Railway*—Act IX of 1890; *Telegraph*—Act XIII of 1885, amended by Act XI of 1888, *Post Office*—Act VI of 1898, Repealing Act IV of 1866, *Arms and Ammunition*—Act XI of 1878

2 This section correspond. with the *Presidency Magistrate's Act* IV of 1877, ss 238 and 239

High Court to decide in case of doubt, district where inquiry or trial shall take place.

* 185. (1) Whenever a question arises as to which of two or more Courts subordinate to the same High Court ought to inquire into or try any offence, it shall be decided by that High Court

(2) Where two or more Courts not subordinate to the same High Court have taken cognizance of the same offence, the High Court within the local limits of whose appellate jurisdiction the proceedings were first commenced may direct the trial of such offender to be held in any Court subordinate to it and if it so decides all other proceedings against such person in respect of such offence shall be discontinued. If such High Court, upon the matter having been brought to its notice, does not so decide, any other High Court within the local limits of whose appellate criminal jurisdiction such proceedings are pending may give a like direction, and upon its so doing all other such proceedings shall be discontinued

Note.—“In view of the conflicting decisions in the Indian Law Reports, 44 C. 595 and I. L. R. 40 M. 835, it is proposed to make it clear that one High Court has no power whether by implication or otherwise to transfer a case to itself from another High Court or *vice versa*, or to decide which of two other High Courts should try a particular case. *Statements of Objects and Reasons*, 1921

The procedure laid down in this sub-section will relieve the High Court of following the round about way of reference to the Governor General under s. 527

Notes—1. *Place of trial where offence is alleged to have taken place in another district.*—On a reference by a District Magistrate for the transfer of a case pending before a Cantonment Magistrate within whose jurisdiction the accused were alleged to have committed an offence under s 493, I P C., to another district in which the offence was alleged to have occurred, the High Court declined to pass any order holding that if the fact relevant to s 498 occurred in the other districts, and if the Cantonment Magistrate is empowered under s 186 of the Code, he can deal with the matter under that section, *Ratanlal 849*

2. *Courts subordinate to two High Courts*—Where Court of two Magistrates subordinate to two different High Courts have jurisdiction to try an offence the High Court within the local limits of whose jurisdiction the offender actually is, may decide by which Court the offence shall be tried, 5 L. R. R. 17 = 9 Cr. L. J. 581. In 17 C. W. N 761 = 14 Cr. L. J. 598, two charges were laid one at Gujranwalla in Punjab and another at Chittagong in respect of the same matter, the accused in one case being the complainant in another, the Calcutta High Court held that it could pass an order under this section that the case should be inquired into at Chittagong and transfer the case from the Court of the District Magistrate at Gujranwalla to the Court of the District Magistrate at Chittagong. Proceedings in the case were, however, stayed for two months to enable the accused to take civil proceedings

3. *Nature of the doubt—Scope of section.*—The doubt contemplated by this section is only as to the Court by which the offence is to be inquired into or tried—not, e.g., a doubt as to the competency of a committing Magistrate to commit an accused for trial, 13 P. R. 1887; 3 A. 251. In 5 L. B. R. 17 = 9 Cr. L. J. 581, it was held that s 185 is not restricted to cases in which there is doubt as to whether one Court or another has jurisdiction, but is applicable also to a case in which the doubt is on the point whether the choice between two Courts both of which have jurisdiction, should be decided on the ground of public convenience. But in 41 C. 505 it was held that s. 185 does not warrant interference by the High Court merely on the ground of convenience. The decision of the High Court within the local limits of whose appellate jurisdiction the offender actually is, can only be sought where a doubt arises as to the Court by which an offence should be inquired into or tried. In this case a prosecution was instituted at Lahore by a Company against persons

* This section was substituted for the original section by Act XV of 1923 s 43

residing at Chittagong for offences under ss 409, 420, 467, 477, I P C The High Court held that there was no doubt that on the allegation of the prosecution that the Courts at Chittagong and Lahore were equally competent to exercise jurisdiction. See also 44 C. 595 (F.B.) See also 40 M 835, which has been adopted by the amending Act XVIII of 1923 21 A. L. J. 621 following 44 C. 595

4 When place of offence uncertain.—B, resident of Almora, in the *Kumaon District*, was travelling in the plains, accompanied by H, who had charge of his money and other personal property On arriving at Shahabad, in the *Bulandshar District*, B demanded an account from H and found a considerable sum unaccounted for and certain movable property missing After B's return to Almora, H was arrested in the Kumaon District and his house searched, but none of the property was found there The property was given at different places, and it was not very clear where it was given, while the discovery of the breach of trust was made at Shahabad Held, that the Magistrate of *Bulandshar* had jurisdiction to try the case, 1883 A. W. N. 83; 1908 A. W. N. 115; 5 A. L. J. 333 = 7 Cr. L. J. 394

5 Section not applicable to proceedings under s 145.—This section has reference only to cases where some offence is being inquired into or tried It has no application to proceeding under s 145 12 A. L. J. 390 = 15 Cr. L. J. 520.

6. Section not applicable to a Magistrate outside the jurisdiction of the High Court, 40 M. 835.

186. (1) When a Presidency Magistrate, a District Magistrate, a Sub divisional Magis-

Power to issue summons or warrant for offence committed beyond local jurisdiction

time being in force, be

Magistrates procedure on arrest

Magistrate of the first class, sees reason to believe that any person within the local limits of his jurisdiction has committed without such limits (whether within or without British India) an offence which cannot, under the provisions of sections 177 to 184 (both inclusive), or any other law for the time being in force triable in British India, such Magistrate may inquire into the offence as if it had been committed within such local limits and compel such person in manner hereinbefore provided to appear before him, and send such person to the Magistrate having jurisdiction to inquire into or try such offence, or, if such offence is bailable, take a bond with or without sureties for his appearance before such Magistrate

(2) When there are more Magistrates than one having such jurisdiction, and the Magistrate acting under this section cannot satisfy himself as to the Magistrate to or before whom such person should be sent, or bound to appear, the case shall be reported for the orders of the High Court

Notes.—1. Validity of warrant issued from foreign territory.—It is not essential to the validity of a warrant issued under this section that the Magistrate issuing it should be, at the time he issues it, within the local limits of his jurisdiction He may issue a warrant from a place in foreign territory, 1 B. 340. See also 23 P. R. 4910; 17 A. 36.

2 When Magistrate can decline jurisdiction.—If a Magistrate not empowered under this section finds that he is without jurisdiction under Chapter XV, he can decline to exercise jurisdiction, *Ratanlal* 849.

3. Powers of the High Court.—It was held in *Wells* II, 146, that the High Court has jurisdiction under s. 29 of the *Letters Patent* to make an order directing a Magistrate to hold a preliminary investigation and in the event of a *prima facie* case being made out to commit for trial to the Sessions a case which falls within this section. But where the circumstances of a case fall exactly within the terms of this section the procedure must be governed by such special provision and the High Court will not exercise the general powers conferred upon it by the *Letters Patent*, unless the case is of an extremely exceptional character

4. Magistrates specially empowered.—All Magistrates of the first class have been specially empowered to act under this section. For *Madras* see *Gazette* 1871 p. 717, *N-W Provinces Gazette*, 24th December, 1873; *Oudh Gazette* 1873 p. 3 *Punjab Gazette* 1873 p. 75, and *Gazette*, 1833, Pt. I p. 2 *Bombay Gazette*, 1872, p. 1325

5 Proceedings of Magistrates not empowered.—If any Magistrate not specially empowered acts under this section his proceedings will not be set aside merely on the ground of his not being so empowered *see* s. 529 (d).

6. Object of the inquiry under this section.—The object of the inquiry under this section is only to satisfy himself that there are *prima facie* grounds for sending the person believed to have committed the offence to a Magistrate having jurisdiction over it. Such inquiry should be conducted as prescribed by Chapter XXIII of this Code.

187. (1) If the person has been arrested under a warrant issued under section 186 by a Magistrate other than a Presidency Magistrate or District Magistrate such

Procedure where
warrant issued by Sub-
ordinate Magistrate

Magistrate shall send the person arrested to the District or *Sub-district* Magistrate to whom he is subordinate unless the Magistrate having jurisdiction to inquire into or try such offence issues his warrant for the arrest of such person in which case the person arrested shall be delivered to the Police-officer executing such warrant or shall be sent to the Magistrate by whom such warrant was issued.

(2) If the offence which the person arrested is alleged or suspected to have committed is one which may be inquired into or tried by any Criminal Court in the same district other than that of the Magistrate acting under section 186 such Magistrate shall send such person to such Court.

Note.—It is unnecessary for a first-class Magistrate to send the accused to the District Magistrate where certificate has been obtained.—Where an offence was suspected to have been committed by a Native British subject in a place without and beyond the Indian territories under the dominion of Her Majesty and the offender is arrested in British territory under the authority of a warrant from a Magistrate of the first class there. *Held* that the Magistrate was authorized to complete the inquiry himself and s. 174 of Act X of 1872 (now s. 186) made it unnecessary for him to send the accused to the District Magistrate as the certificate required by s. 188 had been duly furnished by the Political Agent Ratanlal 97

Liability of British
subjects for offences
committed out of Bri-
tish India

188. When a Native Indian subject of Her Majesty commits an offence at any place without and beyond the limits of British India or

when any British subject commits an offence in the territories of any Native Prince or Chief in India or

when a servant of the Queen (whether a British subject or not) commits an offence in the territories of any Native Prince or Chief in India

he may be dealt with in respect of such offence as if it had been committed at any place within British India at which he may be found

Provided that notwithstanding anything in any of the preceding sections of this Chapter no charge as to any such offence shall be inquired into in British India unless the Political Agent if there is one for the territory in which the offence is alleged to have been committed certifies that in his opinion the charge ought to be inquired into in British India and where there is no

Political Agents to
certify fitness of in-
quiry into charge.

Political Agent the sanction of the Local Government shall be required

Provided also that any proceedings taken against any person under this section which would be a bar to subsequent proceedings against such person for the same offence if such offence had been committed in British India shall be a bar to further proceedings against him under the Foreign Jurisdiction and Extradition Act, 1879 in respect of the same offence in any territory beyond the limits of British India

Note.—The recent amendment to the first proviso makes it clear that ss. 177 to 184 are controlled by the provisions of section 188. This amendment was necessitated by a contrary view held in 38 M 779. The Select Committee observe: "Certain decisions of the Madras High Court seem to make it doubtful whether

fumifer-ous, *a.* [*Lat fumif-er; fumus*, smoke,
and *ferre*, to bear; *It & Sp fumif-ero*] Producing

Fu-ni-m-bu-lá-tion *n* Ro-
Fu-ni-m-bu-lá-to-ry (*á*) (*á*)
1 Informal g like a rope d
2 Narrow lik the walk of
Fu-ni-m-bu-lá-t *n* [*Sc i*]

Fun-ct-ion *n* to perform ex-
ecution *It fun-ct-ion*
1 The act of execut-
ing, office or calling per-
That function equal or
A representing commoner in

Dist into of funda
11 at 1 (Anat) The base of any cone

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11 at 1 (Anat) The base of any cone

s 188 is subject to the provisions of ss 177 to 184, and we think it desirable to clear this up. We are not satisfied that this was the intention of s. 188, and in our opinion it is safer, when a man is tried in British India in respect of an offence committed in a Native State to require the Political Agent's certificate in every case. See Note 6 below.

Notes.—1. The provisions of this section shall not apply to any offence referred to in s 57 of Act VI of 1898 (*Postoffice*).

2. Definitions.—India—'India shall mean British India together with any territories of any Native Prince or Chief under the Suzerainty of Her (His) Majesty exercised through the Governor General of India or through any Governor or other officer subordinate to the Governor General of India.' S 3 (27) of *General Clauses Act X* of 1897

British India—See Note 1 to s. 1 at p 11

British subject—See Notes to s 4 (i) at p 19

'*Political Agent*, shall include (a) the principal officer representing the Government in any territory or place beyond the limits of British India, and (b) any officer of the Government of India, or of any Local Government appointed by the Government of India or the Local Government to exercise all or any of the powers of a Political Agent for any place not forming part of British India under the law for the time being in force relating to foreign jurisdiction or extradition.' S 3 (40) of *General Clauses Act X* of 1897

Servant of the Queen—The words "Servant of the Queen" denote all officers or servants continued, appointed, or employed in India by or under the authority of the said Statute 21 and 22 *Vict.*, c 106, entitled 'An Act for the better Government of India,' or by or under the authority of the Government of India or any Government. S 14 of the *Indian Penal Code* (XLV of 1860). For the Legislative authority of the Government of India, see s. 22 of 24 and 25 *Vict.*, c. 67

Native Indian subject of Her Majesty—The term does not include "Servants of His Majesty" 16 B. 178. The Legislative authority of the Government of India is expressly declared to extend to all Native Indian subjects. S 1 of the Indian Councils Act, 1865 (32 and 33 *Vict.*, c 98). A son of an alien born in British territory, who did not become a naturalized subject at the time of the annexation of the Punjab, is, notwithstanding his father's non-naturalization a natural-born subject of the British Crown, 9 P. R. 1893. Merely owning land in British India and occasionally residing in British India does not make one 'a Native Indian subject.' That term means only native subjects *as jure* and not *de facto* and occasional residence in British territory cannot be taken to render a person who is not *de jure* a subject, a subject for the purpose of criminal jurisdiction being exercised over him for an act committed by him in foreign territory which, if committed within British territory, would have been an offence cognizable by Municipal Courts 1 P. R. 1895. See also 6 B. 522

Nor does the mere fact of non-residence divest a person of his *nationality*. Subject to certain modifications of the Governor General in Council, the whole Criminal Law of British India follows only (1) all Indian Native subjects of His Majesty in any place beyond British India, and (b) all European British subjects in the territories of any Native Prince or Chief in India. 2 A. 218 (F.B.)

Offence—The term offence used in this section means an offence under the Indian Penal Code, and where offences under ss 182, 193 and 211, 1 P. C., were committed against the Police or the Courts of a Native Indian State and certificate of the British Resident was obtained under s 188 of the Code, *held*, that the complaint could not be entertained by the City Magistrate of Surat in India, inasmuch as the acts charged having been committed in relation to Courts and authorities outside British India did not constitute offences under the Indian Penal Code, 47 B. 807.

3. Section does not confer jurisdiction over foreigners committing offences in foreign territory.—A foreigner is not liable to be dealt with in British India for an offence committed and completed outside British territory, 7 P. R. 1894; 2 Bom. L. R. 337. Where two persons, one a British subject and the other a foreigner, were committed on a charge of robbery (perpetrated in a Native State) to the Sessions Court at Jhansi, it was *held* that neither of the accused could be tried *for the robbery*, for the reason that one of the accused was not a British subject and as to the other the certificate required by this section was wanting. But both of them might be tried on a charge under s 411, 1 P. C., in spite of the fact that the accused themselves were the actual robbers in the Native State, 28 A. 372, where 10 B. 186 is followed. See also 30 P. R. 1894 and see Notes 2 and 3 at pp 391-392

4. Foreigner—servant of the Queen amenable to the jurisdiction of the British Courts.—A foreigner in the service of the Punjab Government who commits a murder in Jhind (a Native State) may be tried and convicted of murder at any place in British India in which he may be found. See III (c) to s. 4, 1 P. C.

This clause supersedes the decision in *16 B. 178*, where it was held that a British Court had no jurisdiction to try a servant of the Queen not a British subject for an offence in foreign territory. But the Governor-General in Council has directed that for offences committed in some of the Native States (including Jhind) the persons accused should, except under certain circumstances, be handed over for trial to the Courts of the State. *Gazette of India, 16th August, 1876, No 87 J*

5. Object and scope of the section.—Extra territorial jurisdiction is vested in the Governor General in Council in his executive capacity and also in the Indian Legislature. The Legislative powers are derived from three Acts of Parliament. These are—(i) The *Indian Councils Act, 1861* (24 and 25 *Vict.*, c 67). "For all servants of the Government of India within the dominions of Princes and States in alliance with Her Majesty" (ii) The *Government of India Act 1865* (28 and 29 *Vict.*, c 15). "For all British subjects of Her Majesty within the dominions of Princes and States in India in alliance with Her Majesty whether in the service of the Government or otherwise" (iii) The *Indian Councils Act 1869* (32 and 33 *Vict.*, c 98). "For all persons being Native Indian subjects of Her Majesty without and beyond as well as within the Indian territories under the dominion of Her Majesty"

The jurisdiction of the Governor-General in Council in his executive capacity is much wider and is now declared in the Indian (Foreign Jurisdiction) Order in Council 1902, see *Gazette of India, Part I, p 687*. This Foreign Jurisdiction is delegated to the Governor General in Council by His Majesty the King, and the Foreign Jurisdiction of His Majesty is declared in similar terms in the preamble to the *Foreign Jurisdiction Act, 1890* (53 and 54 *Vict.*, c xxxvii). S 188 has been amended so as to conform exactly with the above statutes and is intended to prevent a conflict of jurisdiction between the Courts in British India and the Courts of Foreign Sovereigns and Courts established by His Majesty the King by Order in Council under the Foreign Jurisdiction Act, 1890, or by the Governor General in Council either under ss 4 and 5 of Act XXI of 1879, or under the Foreign Jurisdiction Order in Council 1902. The first paragraph of s 188 corresponds to the Indian Councils Act 1869 the second with the Government of India Act 1865 and the third with the Indian Councils Act, 1861

For the application of s. 188 the Act committed in a Native State must be an offence under the I. P. C.—Where false information was given to a Native State Police and perjury was committed in the Court of a Native State held that a complaint could not be entertained by a Magistrate in British India inasmuch as the acts charged against the accused having been committed in relations to Courts and authorities outside British India, did not constitute offences under the I. P. C. *47 B. 907*.

6. Does this section restrict the scope of sections 177 to 184 when offences committed outside British India?—Is a certificate necessary when a Court may get jurisdiction by virtue of ss 179 to 184?—It was all along held (see Note 9) that in every case where an offence committed outside British India was tried in British India a certificate would be necessary to give jurisdiction and such an interpretation could be justified only on the footing that s 188 is the only section which deals with offences committed outside British India, as the proviso deals only with 'such offences as are referred to in the section'. If a person could be tried in British India by virtue of ss 177 to 184 for an offence outside British India it is difficult to see why a certificate or sanction under s. 188 should be obtained. In the cases noted in Note 9 it was consistently held that ss 179 to 184 had no application where the offence was committed outside British India.

In *33 M. 779* SADASIVIER, J., was of opinion that s 188 did not limit the scope of ss. 177 to 184. The scheme of Chapter V, sub-chapter (A) in which ss 177 to 189 appear, seems to me to be intended to enlarge as much as possible the ambit of the sites in which the trial of the offence might be held and to minimise as much as possible the inconvenience which would be caused to the prosecution by the success of a technical plea that the offence was not committed within the local limits of the jurisdiction of the trying Court. Ss. 178 to 184 all confer more extended powers and larger jurisdiction to Courts than would belong to them if the ordinary rule found in s. 177 were carried to its strict logical conclusions. S 188 comes in almost at the end of the sub-chapter to make their further encroachments on the general rule of 177," and he further held that the proviso to s. 188 will come into operation only when the British Indian Court cannot get jurisdiction under ss. 179 to 184 and has to depend on the first part of s. 188 to get such jurisdiction and he dissented from *21 M. L. J. 441*—(1910) *M. W. N. 143*; *5 S. L. R. 266*—*13 Cr. L. J. 530* and *Madras Cr. M. P. 97 of 1911*. This decision is, it is submitted wrong. See also Note 3 at p 392, and also the introductory note to the section above.

7. Scope of the proviso—Is it restricted only to territories of Native Princes and Chiefs in India?—In *4 Bur. L. T. 58* = *5 L. B. R. 221* = *12 Cr. L. J. 193*, it was laid down that the word 'territory' in the proviso is used in reference only to territories of any Native Prince or Chief in India and that the word cannot include

wrath;
things, as
winds

3 (M)

grance, a bit up, a bit down

4. One of the Parce, or Latic [very rare]

In or lers
Furze (lion n
cus dark swarth

It fuso] Of a dark color brown or grayish

black.

But ar
and the

Fuse (in

Now

That's the reason of this fusing fuso
like fuso but he never stole from us.

Fuse.

the ship

the ship plates (Vand) plates of
the ship plates (Vand) plates of

BC 1111

fus, O
It fus
1 f

end
Fusill e [Lat fusilis from funderet,
funderet to pour, to cast. Fr & It fusile]
1 Cy at le of being melted or rendered
soft by heat fusile [fuser] A
kind of food marble Wood rare
2 Running or flowing, as a liquid
[fuser] A fusile n [fuser]
Fusill (la til) (Syrup, f 130), n [Fr
fusil, it fusile fuser, from It fuser,
fuser, fire from Ital fuser, hearth,
fire place L Lat fire]
2 A light musket or firelock.

Fusill
fuser.

F

2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, long, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45, 46, 47, 48, 49, 50, 51, 52, 53, 54, 55, 56, 57, 58, 59, 60, 61, 62, 63, 64, 65, 66, 67, 68, 69, 70, 71, 72, 73, 74, 75, 76, 77, 78, 79, 80, 81, 82, 83, 84, 85, 86, 87, 88, 89, 90, 91, 92, 93, 94, 95, 96, 97, 98, 99, 100

the High Seas since they are not part of the territories of any State and that for offences on the High Seas no sanction of the Local Government is necessary. It is submitted that the generality of the words used and the history of the section do not warrant such a narrow interpretation. In 6 B. L. R. 260 = 14 Cr. L. J. 298 it was held that the proviso was universal in its application and was not restricted to Native States in India and therefore a Native Indian subject cannot without the sanction of the Local Government be tried in British India for the offence of criminal breach of trust committed in Spain. But see 41 B. 667, which decides that the first proviso to s 188 is limited to territorial jurisdiction and had no bearing upon the question of jurisdiction to try an offence committed on the High Seas. Consequently it was held that the Magistrate had jurisdiction to try a case without the sanction of the Local Government under s 188 even though the offence was committed on the High Seas.

8. "May be found."—This expression must be taken to mean not where a person is discovered, but where he is actually present, 6 B. 622, 13 B. 147, 2 A. 218; 1 P. R. 1911 = 4 P. W. R. 1911 = 12 Cr. L. J. 113; 33 B. 225 and Note 1 at p 391.

9. Want of a certificate invalidates trial.—Want of a certificate by the Political Agent will invalidate any inquiry, trial or commitment, 24 B. 287; 8 Bom. L. R. 513 = 4 Cr. L. J. 54. The defect cannot be cured by s 532 or by the subsequent production of the certificate, 13 M. 423. See also 10 B. 190; 24 A. 236; Ratanlal 870; 1884 A. W. N. 85; 5 M. 23; Weir II, 148; 1910 M. W. N. 143 = 8 M. L. T. 54 = 11 Cr. L. J. 306, 6 B. L. R. 260 = 14 Cr. L. J. 298; 1 Bur. 8 R. 334; 12 Bom. L. R. 667. In 13 M. 423, 5 M. 23; 19 A. 109, a certificate was held to be necessary, even when the District Magistrate who tried the case was himself the Political Agent. In 24 A. 236, it was held, that the actual existence of a certificate at the date of commitment, but which, at the time of commitment had not come into the hands of the committing Magistrate would not make the commitment valid. The want of a certificate is an absolute bar to the trial of a case. See 17 A. L. J. 450. The proviso to this section is prohibitive. 19 A. 109. Also see 1 Bur. 8 R. 334; 24 B. 287. In 8 Bom. L. R. 507 = 4 Cr. L. J. 49, the commitment was held good where the certificate of the Political Agent had been received after the examination of the witnesses for the prosecution, but before the commitment order was made, though it would have been more regular, had the Magistrate recalled the witnesses already examined. See also next note. But in Punjab it has been held, that the trial of a Native Indian subject in the absence of such certificate is an error or omission in the proceedings before trial and not a defect of jurisdiction and it is therefore curable under s 537 if the objection is not taken at the trial of the case, but a late stage of the appeal, 35 P. R. 1888 approved in 30 P. R. 1889 and followed in 4 P. R. 1902 (F.B.), but in 11 P. R. 1889, it was held that as the defect arising from want of a certificate had been noticed and objection thereon raised before the trial of the accused, the commitment was bad and must be quashed. See 41 A. 432 following 19 A. 109. See also 5 L. 416.

10. Preliminary steps to inquiry not prohibited.—The section still leaves a Court competent to issue process such as a summons or warrant or to take any other steps which are merely preliminary to an inquiry.—*Puny Ch C Vol II*, s 31. All that the proviso requires is that the offence should not be inquired into without a certificate. There is nothing in the language of the proviso making illegal the obtaining of the certificate after the complaint has been filed and the inquiry has begun or been completed as far as the framing of the charge. 12 Bom. L. R. 667 = 11 Cr. L. J. 543. This decision is open to doubt.

11. Trial on a charge not mentioned in certificate valid.—Where the Political Agent has certified that an offence has been committed by a person named in the certificate, the certificate granted under this section is valid, though the offence is not the one mentioned in the certificate, 33 A. 814. The Magistrate is not restricted to the sections mentioned in the certificate, 33 A. 814.

12. Political Agent cannot recall certificate.—When a District Magistrate, as Political Agent had once granted his certificate for the trial of the case against the applicant by a second class Magistrate in the district, the latter was legally seized of the case and the Political Agent had no authority, thereafter, to recall his certificate, or issue as District Magistrate a warrant for the arrest of the applicant. Ratanlal 233, 14 Bom. L. R. 377 = 13 Cr. L. J. 837.

13. Certificate may be granted after issue of a warrant under a. 7 of the Extradition Act.—A Political Agent at the instance of the authorities of a Native State issued a warrant for the arrest of an accused in British India under s. 7 of the Extradition Act 1903, and subsequently at the instance of the accused issued a certificate under this section. It was contended that the issue of the certificate after the issue of the warrant was bad in law as it contravened Rule 3 framed by the Governor General in Council under s. 22 of the Extradition Act (p 1831 of Vol. III of the General Statutory Rules), viz., 'if the accused person is a British

GĀin, n. [Fr. gain, Pr. gairanh, It. guadagnare, See GĀl'ter, n. [Cf. Fr. quatre Armes]



2. a p l a n d
 3. le, magni-
 4. in-2 waton,
 5. geals, pr do,
 6. or f alvity

7118

2
a g
chall
chall
a 750,
a 750
6.63
1
some
pied:

Was paged by our king

2 To bind by pledge, caution, or security; to
page.

Quest del'84

Where's my time something too good gal,
I wish left me good.

QALGE, v t To measure See QALGE

You shall not put me

By what we do to-night.

Галъгер, п. A measurer. Бон ГАЛГЕР.

4.

I like a lounge

G₂⁺-tooth π Δ projecting tooth *H illa*

6.äg'-toothed a having projecting teeth

Then follow the lips; some men there be that put the
out by reason that they are gag-tongued *Hollander*

They be very painful and profitable to U^r masters. Follow

on wall

{ u { L Lat & Fr y l ang a O Fr
 g a l s g n e g a l n g e G e r g a l d
 d i t i o n i s l a t i o n i s l a t i o n i s

Transfer

24. From

To go a step further, we have to ask the question: What is the purpose of the law?

Not done with you we care, but love with care. I care

3 To come off winner or victor is to be successful

ful in as to *gain* a battle to *gain* a case at law

to obtain by competition as to gain a prize

3. To draw to a line (vertical or horizontal) in relation to

gave the top of a mountain, to give a good harbor
bordered by a lake and gained the wood." Stevenson

There have been many studies on the effects of the

It works for you

That called me I rather than my purpose hither,

2 of 2 pages printed by 16

carriage while moving

What majesty is in her post!

I do know him by his good

1) A monolithic culture of *A. n. n.* 10

A little sale will soon disperse that cloud.

And winds of perfect gale Arab an edore fanned

Learn to use soft wax.

ä, æ, i, ü, u, y, long. ä. ē. i. ö u v. short. eare. für. löst. soll. what. thäre. will. thäm. wane. siem. dömt. for. do. wölf. sööd. sööl.

subject the Political Agent shall before issuing a warrant consider whether he ought not to certify the case as one suitable for trial in British India. *Held*, that the direction or admonition in Rule 3 did not control or purport to control s. 188, and therefore the certificate was good 14 Bom. L. R. 377 = 13 Cr. L. J. 537.

14. Extradition of criminals from Native States.—The following procedure should be followed to obtain delivery from a Native State of a subject of such State charged with an offence committed in British territory. Such cases are not governed by the *Extradition Act* XV of 1903, which relates only to the surrender to Native States of their criminals taking refuge in British territory. That Act in no way affects the demand of the British Government on Native States, whether extradition treaties exist with them or not. Magistrates should act promptly in the manner prescribed below.

The offences for which the surrender of the subjects of Native Feudatory States is demanded should be limited to those for which authority may be given to British officers to surrender the subject of Native States. In the case of British subjects a larger catalogue should be allowed, but in every case in which a demand is made, it should be made by British Magistrates not to the State direct, but to the Political Officer where there is one, and the demand should invariably be accompanied by a copy of any depositions made, or where no evidence has yet been taken, by a statement of the information on which the arrest of the offender is deemed necessary. It should rest with the Political Agent, if necessary, to call on the Magistrate for further evidence, but if the Political Agent possesses the influence and weight he ought to have he should seldom fail to obtain compliance with any reasonable demand made by the *Durbar* to which he is accredited for the surrender of an absconded criminal—*Reg. and Ord. N W P.*, s. 10 p. 538.

NB—See Appendix II for the *Extradition Act* XV of 1903 and various orders and rules relating to the subject of extradition of fugitives from justice.

189. Whenever any such offence as is referred to in section 188 is being inquired into

or tried, the Local Government may, if it thinks fit, direct that copies of depositions made or exhibits produced before the Political Agent or a Judicial Officer in or for the territory in which such offence is alleged to have been committed shall be received as evidence by the Court holding such inquiry or trial in any case in which such Court might issue a commission for taking evidence as to the matters to which such depositions or exhibits relate.

Power to direct copies of depositions and exhibits to be received in evidence.

Note.—As to the issue of commissions of inquiry, and the Courts by which commissions may be issued, see s. 503.

B.—Conditions requisite for Initiation of Proceeding.

190. (1) Except as hereinafter provided any Presidency Magistrate District Magistrate or Sub-divisional Magistrate, and any other Magistrate specially empowered Cognizance of offences by Magistrates. in this behalf, may take cognizance of any offence—

(a) upon receiving a complaint of facts which constitute such offence,

(b) *upon a report in writing of such facts made by any Police-officer,

(c) upon information received from any person other than a Police-officer or upon his own knowledge or suspicion, that such offence has been committed.

(2) The Local Government, as the District Magistrate subject to the general or special orders of the Local Government, may empower any Magistrate to take cognizance under sub-section (1), clause (a) or clause (b) of offences for which he may try or commit for trial.

(3) The Local Government may empower any Magistrate of the first or second class to take cognizance under sub-section (1) clause (c) of offences for which he may try or commit for trial.

Note.—Clause (b) of section (1) is amended by substituting the words 'upon a report in writing' for the words "a Police report." For the probable effect of this amendment see Note 19, *infra*.

Notes.—1. The section was s. 191 of Act X of 1882. Section 190 of that Act contained the definition of the term Political Agent and as that term is defined in s. 3, sub-sec. (40) of the *General Clauses Act*, X of 1897, it is omitted from the Code. The old s. 191 is now split up into two sections, 192, 190 and 191.

2. **Object of the section**—The object appears to be, that before proceedings are taken against an accused person, such as would bring him to a Court of Justice Magistrate must have before him knowledge based either upon a complaint or upon a Police report. If he chooses to take action without such independent report, he is bound to inform an accused that he is entitled to have the case tried by some Court other than the Court of such Magistrate. *Per* KNOX, J., 11 A. L. J. 331 = 14 Cr. L. J. 218.

3. **Meaning of 'taking cognizance'**—cognizance of an offence must be in one of three ways specified in clauses (a) (b) or (c)—The expression 'to take cognizance' has not been defined in the Code and it is difficult to ascertain at what precise stage of a case cognizance is said to be taken. 17 C. W. N. 795 = 14 Cr. L. J. 425. Taking cognizance does not involve any formal action, or indeed action of any kind but occurs as soon as a Magistrate as such applies his mind to the suspected commission of an offence. 37 C. 412. Where an officer who was also a Magistrate holds a departmental inquiry and charges are made before him he cannot be said to have taken cognizance, 19 B. 51. Where there was only an oral complaint to a Magistrate, which was not recorded under s. 200 and there was no Police report, nor did the Magistrate take cognizance of the offence *suo motu* it was held, that the Magistrate had not duly taken cognizance of the case under this section and that the arrest of the accused in the presence of the Magistrate and the warrant remanding the accused to custody were illegal, *Weir* II, 149 and 241. See, however, 17 C. W. N. 795 = 14 Cr. L. J. 425. A Magistrate who issues a warrant under the peculiar powers conferred on him by s. 6 of the *Bombay Gambling Act* IV of 1887, cannot be said to take cognizance of the case at all, 8 S. L. R. 66 = 15 Cr. L. J. 657. See also 14 C. 707 and 39 C. 119.

A Magistrate is not debarred by any provision in the Criminal Procedure Code from taking cognizance of an offence only because another Magistrate has taken cognizance of the same and is in session of the case, and a multiplicity of trials can be avoided by a transfer of the cases to one of them. 50 C. 492.

4. **No power to take cognizance of an offence where sanction, etc., wanting.**—In cases provided for by ss. 132, 188, 195—199, 480, 485, etc., the Magistrate is not competent to take cognizance of an offence upon a mere complaint unaccompanied by the requisite sanction or certificate, etc., properly given, 27 C. 820, 116 Cr. L. J. 751 (B.). A complaint was made before a Magistrate of an offence under s. 399 I P C., and he was informed that an application for sanction under the *Explosive Substances Act* had been made as the same facts constituted an offence under that Act also and it was not known at the time the complaint was made that the bombs in possession of the accused were of the kind mentioned in s. 4 (b) of that Act. Held that the Magistrate had not taken cognizance of the offence under the *Explosive Substances Act*. 39 C. 119.

When sanction is not availed of Magistrate may himself proceed under cl. (c).—Where a sanction given by a Magistrate is not proceeded under, it is open to the District Magistrate to take up the case without complaint under cl. (c) of this section. 4 C. 712. See also 27 P. R. 1902; 12 M. 47; 5 W. R. 9; 22 C. 131, 1 S. L. R. 119 and Note 73 to s. 195.

5. **Proceedings against a witness**—is s. 351 independent of s. 190?—A Magistrate taking cognizance of an offence against a witness in a case which is pending before him, upon the facts disclosed by the evidence of another witness, does so under cl. (c) of this section, and not under s. 351, 1 C. W. N. 105. But in 5 N. L. R. 113 = 10 Cr. L. J. 303, it was held following 3 C. W. N. 279, that s. 351 was self-contained and complete in itself and quite independent of s. 190 and necessarily of s. 191. One J. was arrested by the Police and sent up for trial on Police report to a second-class Magistrate. In the course of the trial the Magistrate saw reason for believing that the offence had been committed not by J., but by one I., who had given evidence before him. The Magistrate professing to act under s. 351, took cognizance of the case against J., arrested him and reported the case for transfer to another Magistrate. The Sessions Judge reported the proceedings on the ground that under s. 190 (c) the Magistrate's proceeding was *ultra vires*. Held, that the Magistrate was empowered to take cognizance of the offence against J. In 4 S. L. R. 258 = 12 Cr. L. J. 399, it was also held that a Magistrate acting under s. 351, if he has already taken cognizance of the offence on a complaint or a Police report is not proceeding under s. 190 (c) and may join as a co-accused any person attending Court who seems to him to be implicated in the case under trial. The expression 'cognizance of any offence in this section is not equivalent to cognizance of any offender, for the definition of complaint includes a complaint that some person unknown has committed an offence.

6. **Under which clause does a Magistrate act when after taking cognizance on complaint or Police report or on transfer, he takes proceedings against persons, or for offences not mentioned therein?**—Generally when a Magistrate has taken cognizance of an offence and proceeds with the trial of the case it is his duty to proceed to deal with the evidence brought before him and to see that justice was done in regard

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as GALOCH
[From gall and the term
] quant. [id.] Morton.
The same as GALL.



Galvanic Battery

original form
by Volta to
send elec
pile of silver
zinc, laid up
with between
riple or acid
al metals
in alternate

galvanic,
na, the dis-



(Gallon hose)

1 Large open hose or trousers

2 Leather guards worn on the legs

Gall it māt'it ā (ah) ā (synop) 1

without meaning [Obs or rare]

gall (sall)

Gāl'it nīp per n [Probably from gall Lat gulla,

gall nut and nip, q v] Δ large mosquito

Gāl'it nīle, n [Lat,

gallinula d m of gall

in hen fr gall-

in (r) (fr in) An

aqueous bird (Gallinula

chloropus) which in

habits rivers ponds

at icy spots and marshy

places, — called also

water hen, moor-hen,

and coot

Gāl'it nīl in See GAL-

l'it nīl in

Gāl'it nīl in

An

inferior kind of olive

oil derived from that

fruit in the kingdom of

Nepal



Purple Gallinule (Gallinula porphyrio)

to any person who might be proved by the evidence to be concerned in that offence. But when he takes proceedings against other persons or in respect of offences not mentioned in the report if he is to be deemed as taking cognizance under cl. (c), then he must comply with the provisions of s. 191, and failure to do so would invalidate the conviction. It is to be noted that the expression '*cognizance of an offence*' in this section is not equivalent to the cognizance of an offender, for the definition of complaint includes a complaint that some person unknown has committed an offence, 4 B. L. R. 258 = 12 Cr. L. J. 399, nor is it necessary that the person aggrieved should be the complainant 41 C. 1013.

(a) *Where the Magistrate takes the initiative on a complaint and issues processes against other persons whose names transpire in the prosecution evidence during the trial, he does so under cl. (a).*—A complaint under ss 342 and 363, 1 P. C., was made against four persons by the husband of a girl against whom the offences were said to have been committed, whereupon the Magistrate ordered the complainant to prove his case but before the date fixed he filed a petition withdrawing the complaint. The Magistrate, however, examined witnesses on the date fixed and proved that there was no satisfactory evidence against the four accused, but holding that there was sufficient evidence against two other persons, he issued processes against them under ss. 342 352 and 363, 1 P. C., though he was not empowered to take cognizance under cl. (c), *held*, following 4 C. W. N. 367 and 3 C. W. N. 279 and not following 1 C. W. N. 105 that where the Magistrate who had taken the initiative on a complaint, took cognizance of the case against the others on the evidence adduced on behalf of the prosecution, he did so under cl. (a) and not under cl. (c), 41 C. 1013. Where a person complained to a Magistrate by a petition in which he charged three persons with certain offences and the Magistrate thereafter examined the complainant and certain witnesses on his behalf and issued summonses against the three persons as well as against a fourth person not named in the complaint for an offence other than those mentioned in the complaint petition. *Held*, that the Magistrate took cognizance of the offence as against the fourth person also under cl. (a) and not under cl. (c), the Magistrate in effect having received a complaint of facts stated in the deposition of the complainant constituting the offence, and that consequently the Magistrate was not debarred from trying the case, 28 C. 786 followed, 32 P. R. 1904. See also 4 C. W. N. 367 and 1907 A. W. N. 93 = 5 Cr. L. J. 275. Where, however, after the institution of a complaint and before any proceedings were instituted the names of some more accused persons, which were not in the original complaint, were added by the Public Prosecutor under instructions from the District Magistrate. *Held* that the case against the newly added accused was taken cognizance of by the District Magistrate under s. 190 (1), (c) and that s. 191 applied to the case, 14 Bar. L. R. 327 = 9 Cr. L. J. 84.

(b) *Police Report*—Where a Magistrate takes the initiative on a Police report and he issues processes against other persons concerned in the offence, he does so under cl. (b) and not under cl. (c).—See Note 23. A complaint was lodged before a Police-officer against four persons. One accused was sent up for trial and was convicted and sentenced. At the trial it appeared upon the evidence of one of the witnesses for the prosecution that two others were concerned in the crime. The Magistrate issued summonses against the two *held* that the Magistrate did not act without jurisdiction. The case having been duly referred to him, and having cognizance of the offence it was his duty to proceed to deal with the evidence and to see that justice was done in regard to any person who might be proved by the evidence to be concerned in that offence 4 C. W. N. 367; 41 C. 1013; 32 P. R. 1904; 9 N. L. R. 65 = 14 Cr. L. J. 290; 28 C. 786. A Magistrate not empowered under sub-sec. (c) while acquitting A sent up by the Police stated that B had in his opinion committed the offence and that the Police should take action against B, B was accordingly sent up and convicted, *held*, that the Magistrate had acted within his powers, 4 L. B. R. 137 = 7 Cr. L. J. 414. The Police sent in one S for trial on a charge of stealing. The Magistrate began his proceedings by examining the Inspector, and on his evidence the Magistrate directed the applicant who was present in custody on another charge to be put in the dock along with S, tried and convicted them *held* following U. B. R. 1897 = 10, 156 that the Magistrate took cognizance under cl. (b) and not cl. (c), U. B. R. 1910 Cr. P. C. 2 = 11 Cr. L. J. 439. But where three persons were sent up for trial by the Police with a remark added to the Police report that it had been elicited from the accused that one A had instigated the offence and that Court was at liberty to take proceedings against A on legal evidence being tendered, and the Magistrate at the conclusion of the trial of the accused sent up, issued a non-bailable warrant against A for abetment of the offences of which the accused were convicted, *held* that the Magistrate who was not empowered to act under (c) had no jurisdiction to take cognizance of the offence under s. 190 (c) and as the Police report was defective he could not act under s. 190 (b) and the order of the Magistrate was set aside, 5 B. L. R. 1 = 12 Cr. L. J. 92. He could not proceed under s. 351 either, as A was not in attendance at his Court. Where the trial of the second accused is not on the same evidence on which the first accused was tried, but on other evidence

Gā'gre nē'sent, a. Tending to mortification.
Gā'gre nō's a [*Fr gangreneux*] Mortified,
 indicating mortification of living flesh.
Gāng'wāke a Rogation week, or gang week. See


(*Nut*) The first plank fastened on
 outside
 and the first range or streak of
 planks next the keel

[*Prov Eng*] **Gau'net, n** [*A S*]



To run the *gantlet* to suffer the punishment of the
 gantlet hence to go through severe criticism or contro-
 versy or all treatment.
 Winthrop ran the gantlet of daily slights from his neigh-
 bors

Garde *n*
 Plot or plantation of a garden
 Horticulture [*Fr*]
 A stand or support for some



Garg'ize *v*
 To gargle, to rinse



adduced on behalf of the defence of the first accused, such proceedings cannot be regarded as proceedings upon complaint or any other foundation upon which the case originally proceeded, and must be regarded as being within the terms of cl. (c) of this section, 3 C. W. N. 279. In *Ratanlal 931*; it was also held that where under s. 170 A was sent up by the Police before a first-class Magistrate charged with the offence of robbery and in the inquiry that ensued the Magistrate after reading certain statements which appeared in the diary of the chief constable and examining two witnesses, issued warrants for the arrest of *B, C, D and E Held*, that the Magistrate was bound to commit all the five accused to the Court of Session on a charge of dacoity, as under the circumstances the Magistrate must be held to have taken cognizance of the offence against *B, C, D and E*, in the manner mentioned in cl. (c) of this section. Where a Magistrate directs the Police to send up a prosecution witness for trial before him, *held*, that the Magistrate took cognizance of the offence under sub-clause (b) and not clause (c), 23 Bom. L. R. 842.

(c) *On transfer*—As to jurisdiction of a Magistrate to deal with the person who appears to be implicated in a case which has been transferred to him, *see* Notes 7 (b). Where the accused was charged with the offence of assaulting a public servant (s. 353, I P C.), but the evidence disclosed that he had assaulted a witness (s. 352, I P C.) and he was convicted therefor, and the conviction attempted to be justified on the ground that the Magistrate acted under cl. (c) *Held* that the conviction was wrong as there was no complaint by the private person, and if the Magistrate acted under clause (c), he was bound to take further proceedings under s. 191 6 C. W. N. 202

(d) *Where, however, the Magistrate institutes proceedings against other persons and for an offence disclosed in evidence adduced on behalf of the defence, the Magistrate must be deemed to act under cl. (c).*—In the trial of one *B* it appeared from the evidence given by the witnesses for the defence that another person *R* was concerned in the same transaction or offence. The Magistrate proceeded against *R* and examined witnesses who had been already examined in the trial of *B* as witnesses for the prosecution against *R*. It was *held* 'although as it has been held, the Magistrate is competent at the trial against one person to proceed against another who may appear upon the evidence taken to be concerned in that offence, and in doing so it cannot be properly regarded that he is acting within the terms of cl. (c) so as to enable the accused person to object to that Magistrate proceeding further in the case, still in laying down this view of the law it was contemplated that the two persons should be on trial together in the same case or for the same offence. It was never intended that this rule should be applied to a case when the trial of the second accused was not for the same offence for which the first accused was tried but on other evidence adduced on behalf of the defence of the first accused.' It was further held that such proceeding, cannot be regarded as a proceeding upon a complaint or any other foundation upon which the case originally proceeded, but must be regarded as being within cl. (c), 3 C. W. N. 279. In 41 C. 1013 this case was distinguished on the ground that it was there held that the Magistrate had taken cognizance under cl. (1), (c) not because *R* was not mentioned in the complaint, but because his name did not transpire in the evidence for the prosecution.

(e) *When a Magistrate institutes proceedings for a different offence against the same accused*—*See* 3 C. W. N. 279.

7. *When Magistrate is properly seized of a case, he alone is competent to proceed against all persons connected.*—(a) *Absence of power to take cognizance does not render the Magistrate incompetent to proceed against others implicated in the same case*—A Magistrate not having jurisdiction to take cognizance of an offence tried and convicted some persons, but refused to proceed against others who had absconded and against whom warrants had been issued. *Held* that having taken cognizance of the offence, he had jurisdiction to hold judicial proceedings in regard to all persons who, the evidence showed, were the offenders. His action is in no way limited in regard to proceedings against persons concerned in an offence by his powers, in regard to taking cognizance of an offence as it may be originally disclosed, 4 C. W. N. 560. When a case is referred to by a superior Magistrate to a Subordinate Magistrate, the latter has power, though not specially empowered, under cl. (c), sub-sec. (1) to take cognizance of the case against persons not before the Court, but whose connection with the offence is disclosed by evidence in the case referred, 4 C. W. N. 367. But where on a complaint of a cognizable offence, the Police sent up only some of the accused persons who were tried and convicted, and the District Magistrate, later, while inspecting the Police outpost made a note that the remaining accused should be sent and thereupon the remaining accused were sent up before the same Deputy Magistrate *Held*, that nothing was made over to the Deputy Magistrate at first except the case of the accused previously convicted and that the proceedings taken against the remaining accused, without anyone formally taking cognizance of the case, were irregularly instituted and should be set aside 3 C. L. J. 87 = 3 Cr. L. J. 290.

(b) *On transfer, Magistrate is completely seized of the case as regards all persons in any manner connected with it*.—Where cognizance had been taken of an offence on a Police report and the case made over to a Subordinate Magistrate, so long as the case connected with the offence remains with the Subordinate Magistrate, no other Magistrate is competent to deal with it and application for warrants against other persons concerned in that offence should be made to the Magistrate before whom the case is, and to no other Magistrate, 27 C. 879. See also 27 C. 798; 30 C. 449 and 7 C. L. J. 249 = 7 Cr. L. J. 318; 3 C. W. N. 490; 32 C. 783; 4 C. W. N. 367. See Note 7 (b) at p. 427

(c) *Power of District Magistrate to take cognizance of offence against accused mentioned in Police report made to a Sub divisional Magistrate*.—A complaint was laid against M and ten others that they committed robbing and looted complainant's crops from his land. Warrants of arrest were issued against all of them upon Police report, but proceedings were commenced against five of them only and they were convicted. Thereupon the complainant again moved the same Magistrate to issue warrant against the remaining five persons and to try them but the application was rejected on the ground that conviction of some of the accused previously tried was sufficient to meet the justice of the case and it was not necessary to proceed against the remaining accused. The complainant then moved the District Magistrate who made an *ex parte* order to the effect that the case should be proceeded against the remaining accused upon the original complaint. Held, that it was not proper for the District Magistrate to direct proceedings to be taken on the Police report unless he had withdrawn the whole matter from the Court of such Subordinate Magistrate, 4 C. W. N. 242. See 5 C. W. N. 438, where in similar circumstances the District Magistrate was held to have acted under sub-sec. (1) cl. (c)

I.—MAGISTRATES EMPOWERED TO TAKE COGNIZANCE.

8. *Magistrate competent to act*.—In Madras all Magistrates of the first class are empowered to act under this section (*Fort St George Gazette*, 1873, p. 717). Further, under sub-sec. (2) the District Magistrate may empower any Magistrate to take cognizance under clauses (a) and (b) of sub-sec. (1), while the Local Government alone can empower a Magistrate (not being a third-class Magistrate), to act under clause (c) of sub-sec. (1). Magistrates cannot act under this section in those taluks in which those taluks, where there are Stationary Sub-Magistrates, Tahsildars exercise extraordinary powers of Magistrates of the second class, except the powers of taking cognizance of offences under this section and of committing for trial under s. 206 (*Fort St. George Gazette*, 1893 Pt. I, p. 579)

In Bengal and Bombay, Magistrates are empowered under this section only on special applications, but in Bombay they should not be Honorary Magistrates—*Calcutta Gazette* 1873, p. 63 and *Bombay Gazette*, 1873, p. 16

In the Punjab all Magistrates of the first and second class are invested (see *Punjab Gazette*, 1883, p. 52) with power to take cognizance of offences upon complaint and upon information, but not on their own knowledge or suspicion, 20 P. R. 1901. Magistrates of the first class have also power, subject to the control, of the District Magistrate to entertain cases without complaint—*Punjab Gazette*, 1878, Pt. I, p. 361

In the United Provinces all Magistrates of the first class have been empowered to act under this section—*Allahabad Gazette*, 1873 p. 903

As to additional powers conferrable on Magistrates, see s. 37 and Schedule IV

9. *Effect of action by Magistrate not empowered*.—If a Magistrate acts in good faith under clause (a) or (b) of sub-sec. (1) his proceedings shall not be set aside merely on the ground of his not being so empowered. See s. 529 (c). But as to cl. (c), see s. 530 (k) which makes his proceedings void. See Ratanlal 554.

10. *Successor of Magistrate taking cognizance competent to issue process*.—In a case begun by one Magistrate and continued by his successor, the latter has power under clauses (a) and (b) of this section to issue process for the arrest of an accused against whom the process was not issued by the Magistrate who began the trial, Ratanlal 652.

11. *Competency of Magistrates not curtailed by the Bombay District Municipal Act, 1873*.—S. 82 of the *Bombay District Municipal Act* (VI of 1873) does not deprive a Magistrate of the power conferred by this section of taking cognizance of an offence upon a complaint or upon information, etc., or a Police-officer of the power conferred by s. 23 of Bom. Act VII of 1867, of laying information of such an offence before a Magistrate, Ratanlal 335.

II.—CLAUSE (a)—COGNIZANCE UPON COMPLAINT.

12. Complaint.—For definition, see s 4 (h) and Notes thereunder—(a) *No complaint where no offence alleged.*—See Note 4 at p 16 Where a petition supported by an affidavit was presented to a Magistrate under s 82 of the *Indian Companies Act* (VI of 1882) but did not contain any allegation of any specific offence as defined in s 4 (a) having been committed, nor did the Magistrate profess to act under cl (c) on any information knowledge or suspicion that any such offence had been committed *Held*, that the proceedings of the Magistrate were *ultra vires*, as he had not sufficient materials before him to take cognizance of any offence under this section, **Weir I, 720 ; II, 149.**

(b) *Complaint must be with a view to set the criminal law in motion.*—Complaint being an allegation made to a Magistrate with a view to his taking action under the Code, a petition to a Magistrate alleging that an offence has been committed against the petitioner, but that the petitioner did not wish the Magistrate to take any action is not a complaint and under cl (a) the Magistrate cannot act on such a petition on his own responsibility as there is neither a complaint nor the examination of a complaint taken before himself But under cl (c) the Magistrate can take cognizance of the offence as upon his own knowledge, **6 C. W. N. 926.**

(c) *Proceeding on informal complaint or demi-official note illegal.*—Magistrates in the mofussil are very apt to commence criminal proceedings against accused when they are moved by informal or demi official notes and when there is no formal complaint before them A letter commenced "My dear D, and concluded after making certain suggestions, what say you? Yours truly, J H O and was addressed to R D, Esq On the strength of this letter the accused was prosecuted and convicted On revision the Chief Court remarked, a Magistrate who is prepared to receive a document such as this as a complaint must have some peculiar notions of the dignity of his Court and of the office of Magistrate The document might be regarded notwithstanding its objectionable form as being "information received from a person, other than a Police-officer," but this is carefully distinguished in s 190 from a complaint and a complaint was essential under s 186 of the *Municipal (Punjab) Act, 2 P. R. 1892 and cf 3 P. R. 1892.* A document was addressed to the Commissioner of R by the Municipal Committee of B requesting that in accordance with the Committee's proceedings of a certain day a second prosecution might be instituted against A under s 169, Punjab Municipal Act. The Deputy Commissioner thereon endorsed that a case be instituted and be made over to a Tahsildar of S *Held*, that this was not a proper complaint which a Magistrate could take cognizance of, **1 P. R. 1892.** A memorandum under the signature of the Collector sanctioning a prosecution is not a complaint, **5 Bom H C. R. Cr. Ca. 43 ; 16 P. R. 1890.** A petition having been presented to the Collector (who was also the District Magistrate), complaining of the conduct of one of the Collector's subordinates and requesting the Collector to redress the petitioner's grievances the Collector got the petitioner to repeat the statements in the petition and proceeded to deal with the case as though it was a complaint *Held*, that the petition was not a complaint and the Magistrate was not justified in arbitrarily turning departmental complaint into a criminal complaint, **30 C. 415**

(d) *Police Report, when a 'complaint'.*—See Note 11 at p 9

13. Does complaint include deposition of complainant?—*Complaint* includes not only the written complaint but also the examination of the complainant, at any rate prior to the issue of process, **Ratanlal 584.** In this case the Magistrate was *held* justified on the allegations made in the complainant's examination prior to issue of process to add a charge under s 498, I P C to those mentioned in the written complaint. A complainant in her petition charged the accused with committing the offences mentioned in ss 352 and 354 I P C, but in her examination on oath alleged facts which in the opinion of the Magistrate constituted an offence under s 193 read with s 109 I P C *held*, that the Magistrate took cognizance of the offence under cl (a) and not cl (c), and that he was not debarred from trying the case under s 191, 28 C 786 ; **14 Bom L R 131 = 13 Cr. L. J. 287.** In a complaint of criminal trespass the complainant in his written petition made no mention of the offence which the alleged trespasser intended to commit, but on his being examined by the Magistrate stated that the offence intended was that of criminal intrigue with his wife *held*, that there were sufficient materials before the Magistrate to enable him to take cognizance of the offence against the accused, **1899 A. W. N. 212.** See also **25 A. 209.** A complainant, after stating the manner in which he was defamed, concluded with the prayer, "your petitioner therefore charges the said accused person under Chap. XXI I P C, and prays that they may be dealt with according to law" In his examination before the Magistrate he charged the accused under s. 500 and said "the matters stated in my written complaint are to the best of my belief true." *Held* that though the complaint was defective in not stating all the facts necessary to constitute an offence under s. 302, I P C, as required by s. 190 there was in the petition a complaint before the Magistrate of offences falling under ss 500 501 and 502 I P C. **8 P. R. 1891.** In **10 A. 39** following **5 A. 233**, it was however, *held* that a charge of

detamation could not, subsequent to the presentation of the complaint be added by the Magistrate on the statements made by the complainant in his evidence, whether of his own accord or with reference to suggestions made by the Magistrate. See also 14 Bom. L. R. 141 = 13 Cr. L. J. 237 and 14 Bom. L. R. 1166 = 14 Cr. L. J. 1. Cf 6 C. W. N. 202; 3 C. W. N. 279.

14. Who may complain.—See Note 3 at p 17. As a general rule it is the right and, in some cases, also the duty of any person having knowledge of the commission of an offence to set the law in motion by a complaint, even though he is not personally interested or affected by the offence. To this rule there are exceptions created by Statute, e.g., ss. 195 and 198, offences about the Stamp laws, about Lotteries, etc. There is nothing in the Code showing an intention to confine prosecution to the persons directly injured, 13 B 600 followed in 18 A. 465; 10 Cr. L. J. 13 (A) 14 Cr. L. J. 409 (Oudh.), 7 S. L. R. 77 = 15 Cr. L. J. 369. See also 20 C. 331; 21 B. 536.

(a) *Complaint by Magistrate's servant*—The fact that the complainant is a servant of the Magistrate does not deprive the latter of his jurisdiction, though in such a case it would generally be expedient for him to refer the complainant to another Magistrate, 9 B. 172.

(b) *Complaints by Court or public servants of offences mentioned in s 195*—This section applies to offences mentioned in s 195 as well as to others, i.e., a Magistrate can only take cognizance of an offence mentioned in s. 195 in one of the three ways specified in this section and s. 195 further declares that except where the Court or public servant concerned is the complainant its or his sanction is necessary. The Code does not contemplate a Court or public servant giving sanction where no application for sanction has been made. If a Court or public servant thinks it necessary to initiate a prosecution the proper course is to make a complaint. As far as Civil, Criminal and Revenue Courts acting in the course of a judicial proceeding are concerned, the procedure to be followed is prescribed in s. 476. Other Courts or public servants are not specially provided for. They are in the category of ordinary complainants. Where it is the Court or public servant that wishes to prosecute, sanction is not required. All that is wanted is the complaint of the Court or public servant, 1907 U. B. R. Cr. P. C. 1 = 6 Cr. L. J. 25. Where an Assistant Collector trying a rent suit came to the conclusion that the plaintiff had committed perjury and submitted the records to the Collector and District Magistrate for starting a case under s. 193 1 P. C. Held that the Assistant Collector's order cannot be regarded as one under s. 476 and it fell within the definition of complaint so that the Collector and District Magistrate had power to act upon it under this section, 26 A. 514 where 23 A. 249 is followed.

15. Where there is a complaint, Magistrate must be presumed to act under cl. (a)—Where a complaint is made to a Magistrate, the Magistrate takes cognizance under sub-sec. (a) and not sub-sec. (c) even though he may record on the complaint that he acts under sub-sec. (c), 14 Bur. L. R. 250 = 4 L. B. R. 300 = 8 Cr. L. J. 505; 9 Bom. L. R. 212, 11 P. R. 1911 = 32 P. W. R. 1911 = 146 P. L. R. 1911 = 12 Cr. L. J. 217; 7 S. L. R. 77 = 15 Cr. L. J. 369.

15-A Stamp on complaint and process fee.—A petition of complaint in a non-cognizable case presented to Criminal Court must bear a stamp of ½ rupee. See the Court Fees Act VII of 1870 Sch. II, Art 1 (b). Where a complainant being liable, under Rule 11 of the H. C. Cr. Cir. p. 7, to pay process-fee, neglects or refuses to pay the same, the Magistrate should dismiss the complaint unless he considers that there should be a prosecution in the interests of the public under this section, Ratanlal 491. See s. 204.

16. Magistrate bound to take cognizance upon a proper complaint.—(i) *Magistrate has no option*—The use of the term "may take cognizance of any offence" in this section does not make it optional with a Magistrate to hear a complainant but refers rather to the action of the Magistrate in taking cognizance of an offence in either of the specified courses in which the facts constituting the offence may be brought to his notice. He is bound to examine the complainant, and then can either issue summons to the accused or order an inquiry under s. 202 or dismiss the complaint under s. 203, 13 C. 334; also Ratanlal 363; 29 C. 410. See also Notes under ss. 200 203. (ii) *Complainant not going to Police is no ground for not taking cognizance*—A Magistrate cannot refuse when properly called on to do so, to exercise jurisdiction merely on the ground that the complainant might reasonably have had recourse to the Police instead of the Magistrate, 12 B. 161; 14 W. R. 36. (iii) *District Magistrate not acting*—A Subordinate Magistrate is not precluded from taking cognizance of a formal complaint when the Magistrate of the district has refused to act upon communication received through post regarding the same subject matter. Such refusal does not amount to dismissal of complaint, 1999 A. W. N. 201; cf Weir II, 149. (iv) *Offence requiring severer punishment*—A Magistrate duly empowered under the Opium Act of 1878, cannot refuse to take up a case on the ground that the gravity of the offence required a severer punishment than the Magistrate could inflict, Ratanlal 373.

(v) *Magistrate cannot decline jurisdiction because number of others jointly concerned in the offence have been convicted*.—A Magistrate cannot decline jurisdiction and refuse to issue process in a case where there has been a legal complaint against persons concerning whom there is *prima facie* evidence. It may sometimes be expedient for the authorities to stay their hands after a certain number of people have been convicted but if the persons offended against claim to have tried the persons against whom there is evidence, there is no provision of the law which can prevent the case from proceeding 13 C. W. N. 103. See also Notes under s 200 (vi) *Must not merely accept the conclusion of the Police*.—When a person appears before a Magistrate and states that an offence has been committed and requests that it might be investigated by calling and examining his witnesses this is tantamount to a complaint which the Magistrate is bound to inquire into. He could not avoid the responsibility of making the inquiry himself merely by accepting the conclusion of the Police on the subject 14 C. 707. See also 40 C. 71, 4 C. W. N. 221 (vii) *Illegality of arrest*.—Where a Magistrate refused to take cognizance of a case on the ground that the accused had been improperly arrested and brought before him it was held, that the Magistrate was bound to take cognizance of the offence as the question whether the officer who effected the arrest was acting within or beyond his powers does not effect the question whether the accused were guilty or not of the offence with which they were charged 26 M. 124. See also Note 15 to s. 54 at p. 84 and Notes to s. 200.

17 *Receiving complaint is a judicial act*.—A Magistrate taking cognizance of a complaint and issuing a summons thereon acts *not ministerially but judicially* 5 B. H. C. R. Cr. Ca. 29.

18 *Complaints under other Acts*.—Prosecutions under miscellaneous Acts and persons by whom they must be instituted. (*The list is not exhaustive*.)

Act XXI of 1857 (*Cultivation of poppy in Bengal*) s. 2b.—By Deputy Agent Sub-Deputy Agent Collector or Abkhar Officer.

Act III of 1877 (*Registration*) s. 83.—By or with the permission of the Inspector General Branch Inspector-General in Sind the Registrar or Sub-Registrar within whose district the offence is committed.

Act XV of 1879 (*Rangoon Port Commissioners*) s. 7a.—Commissioners or any person authorized by them in this behalf.

Act II of 1880 (*Burma District Cess and Rural Police*) s. 18.—By order of or under authority from the Deputy Commissioner.

Act VII of 1880 (*Merchant Shipping*) s. 5.—By or with the consent of the Local Government.

Act XY of 1881 (*Factory*) s. 15.—By or with the previous sanction of the local Inspector.

Act VI of 1882 (*Indian Companies*) s. 216.—By the official Liquidator.

Act XII of 1882 (*Salt*), s. 11.—On the complaint of an Assistant Commissioner or other Salt Revenue Officer not inferior to Sub-Inspector.

Act XX of 1882 (*Paper Currency*) s. 26.—By the Head Commissioner Commissioner or Deputy Commissioner of Paper Currency.

Act XXI of 1883 (*Indian Emigration*) s. 96.—The officers mentioned in s. 96.

Act X of 1887 (*Native Passenger Ships*), s. 48.—At the instance of the officer appointed to grant certificates or Chief Customs Officer.

Act XV of 1889 (*Official Secrets*) s. 5.—Consent of Local Government or of the Governor-General in Council.

Act XIV of 1895 (*Pilgrim Ships*) s. 53.—Penalties under this Act shall be enforced only on information laid at the instance of officers appointed to grant certificates or at any port or place where there is no such officer at the instance of the Chief Customs Officer.

Act XII of 1896 (*Excise*) s. 57.—A Court shall not take cognizance of an offence under any one of the following sections of the Act, viz., 45 46 47 48, 49 51, 52 and 53 except on the complaint or report of the Collector or an Excise Officer and unless the prosecution is instituted before the expiry of six months next after the commission of such offence.

Act VI of 1898 (*Indian Post Offices*), s. 72.—No Court shall take cognizance of an offence punishable under any of the provisions of ss. 51 53 54 cl. (a) and (b) 55, 56 58 59 61 64 65 and 67 of the Post Office Act (VI of 1884), unless upon complaint made by order of or under authority from the Director-General of Post Offices or a Postmaster-General.

Act VII of 1898 (*Indian Steam Ship Act*) s. 9.—No Magistrate shall try any offence under the Indian Steam Ship Act unless he is a Presidency Magistrate or Magistrate whose powers are not less than those of a Magistrate of the first class.

Act VIII of 1899 (*Petroleum Act*), s. 91—In Presidency towns—Presidency Magistrates and elsewhere first-class Magistrates where specially empowered are competent to try cases under the Petroleum Act, 1899 1.

Act VI of 1882 (*Companies Act*), ss 48—50—Under the Punjab Government Notification No 3, the Registrar of Joint Stock Companies is empowered to authorize any person to institute complaints of offences under the Companies Act, 14 P. R. 1916 = 17 Cr. L. J. 243 = 34 In. Ca. 952.

Act XVI of 1908 (*Registration Act*) ss 82 and 63—By or with the permission of the Inspector General, the Registrar or Sub-Registrar within whose local jurisdiction the offence is committed, see also 35 A. 354

15-A. As regards offences under s 20 of Cattle Trespass Act, a Magistrate can take cognizance upon receiving complaint, 21 Bom. L. R. 1034 = 44 B. 42.

III.—CLAUSE (b)—COGNIZANCE UPON POLICE REPORT.

19. What amounts to a Police report.—Police reports include all kinds of Police reports and not merely *Charge-sheets* or formal reports under Chapter XIV in cognizable cases (1904-06) U. B. R. Cr. P. C. 25 = 1 Cr. L. J. 1047; 29 C. 417. A Police report in a non-cognizable case is a Police report within the meaning of cl (1), (b) and there is no authority in the Code for examining the Police-officer submitting the report as if he were a complainant, 1914 U. B. R. 19 = 16 Cr. L. J. 97. There is no reason or authority for limiting the "Police report" for the report mentioned in s. 170 and the preceding sections of the Code. S 155 shows that Police officers are empowered to investigate a non-cognizable case, provided that they act under the orders of a Magistrate having power to try such a case and, as a natural consequence, they can send in a report under s 173, 11 A. L. J. 331 = 14 Cr. L. J. 218. Police report includes also a report under s. 62, 3 P. R. 1910 = 35 P. W. R. 1909 = 11 Cr. L. J. 150. See Note 11 under s 4 (1), (A) at p 9 and s. 173. Where a Police-officer carrying out the orders of the Magistrate under ss 87 and 88 on being obstructed, sent a private person to inform the Magistrate of what had taken place, and the Magistrate thereupon sent the Senior Inspector to take up the case, instructing him at the same time that he should take the statement of the attaching Police-officer as the first information of the occurrence and forward the same to him (the Magistrate) for cognizance to be taken under this section, held that the proceedings thus instituted were proper and legal 29 C. 417. But in 28 B. 150 (F.B.) it is held that there is no section in the Criminal Procedure Code, 1898, which empowers a Police-officer to make, of his own motion, any report to a Magistrate in a non-cognizable case, hence where he files a formal complaint in such a case, he cannot be said "to make a report" and his complaint falls within the definition of "complaint" in s 4. So the Magistrate will be taking cognizance in such a case under sub-cl (a) of sub-sec. (1) of s 190 and not under sub-cl. (b) of the same sub-section. It is doubtful whether by the present amendment by doing away with the word "Police report" and substituting the words "upon a report in writing by any Police-officer" the Legislature intend to do away with the technical sense in which the word "Police report" is understood by the Bombay High Court and thereby to overrule the Bombay decision in 26 B 150. If this be so then the report of a Police-officer in a non-cognizable case will have to be regarded as a report under cl. (b) and not a complaint under cl. (a) and the Magistrate will not have to follow the procedure under s 200 but see 46 C. 807 and 528 C. W. N 490 which holds that a Magistrate by section 190 (1), (b) can take cognizance both in cognizable and non-cognizable offences upon a report such as is mentioned in section 190 (1), (b).

20. Police Challan in the Punjab.—A Police *challan* is a Police report of the fact constituting an offence, with the further incident that the accused and the witnesses accompany the report. Therefore a Magistrate is competent to take cognizance of the offence of working an illicit still, under Act XII of 1896 on the *challan* of a Deputy Inspector of Police who is also an Excise Officer in the Punjab. See 22 P. R. 1900 and 8 P. R. 1901; see also 9 P. R. 1903, 15 P. R. 1837 and 4 P. R. 1893.

21. Magistrate not bound to take cognizance on Police report.—A Magistrate having before him a Police report submitted under s. 157 (b) may determine as he thinks expedient either to take no further steps or to take cognizance of the offence under cl. (b) to this section or to proceed under s. 203, Weir II, 119 and 150. A Magistrate is competent to refuse to initiate proceedings on a Police report in a case in which there is no complaint, but only a report to the Police, and if he wrongly makes an order for the discharge of the accused under s. 253, his order is to be taken as one refusing to initiate proceedings under this section and the High Court will not revise such an order, 1 A. L. J. 609. But where the Police have reported the case as true and the Magistrate believes in its truth he cannot decline to order a judicial inquiry, merely because in his opinion there is no chance of a conviction and no useful purpose would be served by the inquiry. He is bound to examine the complainant and issue process, 29 C. 410.

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21-A. Report of a Police-officer in Bombay arresting a woman under s. 10 (1) of the Bombay Prevention of Prostitution Act, 1923.—An arrest by a Police-officer, who is not specially authorized in this behalf by the Commissioner of Police in Bombay, under s. 10 (1) of the Bombay Prevention of Prostitution Act, without a complaint for an offence under s. 3 of the Act, is illegal, and the Presidency Magistrate has no jurisdiction under s. 190 of the Code to try the woman for the offence unless a complaint within the meaning of s. 4 (1), (b) is before him because in the City of Bombay a valid report by a Police-officer of the kind contemplated by cl (c) of s. 190 can only be made (1) in the case of cognizable offence and (2) when it contains information of a cognizable offence which he has been authorized by the Presidency Magistrate to investigate, 26 Bom. L. R. 1225. See Notes on s. 4 (b)

22. Duty of Magistrate when Police report defective.—Section 173 indicates what a Police report should set forth and provides that it should among other things set forth the nature of the information. Where the Police report was absolutely silent on the point, the prosecution instituted on such a Police report was set aside 37 C. 49. In this case no cause was shown against the rule. The Police report referred to is the report under s. 173, i.e. one made by the Police after they have investigated the case and ascertained the fact and come to the conclusion that there were sufficient materials to justify forwarding the person reported to the Magistrate. When a Magistrate took cognizance on a report which fulfils none of these conditions, his order may be set aside 58 L. R. 1 = 12 Cr. L. J. 92. If the Police report is defective, the Magistrate may treat the report as a complaint, in which case he would have to call upon the Police-officer to appear and substantiate the report on oath 16 C. W. N. 1049 = 13 Cr. L. J. 691.

23. Magistrate taking cognizance of case on information derived from the Police report acts under cl. (b)—The Police report need not set out the name of the accused person to give the Magistrate jurisdiction to deal with him under cl (a) or (b) 1905 U. B. R. Cr. P. C. 1. A Magistrate after perusing a Police report which set out that proceedings should not be instituted against two persons, directed the prosecution of a third person, *held*, that the Magistrate had not acted under cl (c) and no transfer was necessary, 1907 A. W. N. 93 = 5 Cr. L. J. 275. Where during the investigation on a Police report of an offence against L, the Magistrate considering that one S also should be joined as an accused person, issued process to him and tried and convicted both. *Held*, that the Magistrate took cognizance of S's offence under cl (b) and not under cl (c) of sub-sec. (1) of this section and was therefore not bound first to take action under s. 191, 9 N. L. R. 65 = 14 Cr. L. J. 290. Although a Magistrate not empowered under cl (c) of this section cannot take cognizance of an offence on his own motion he has the powers on receipt of information from the Police to order the prosecution of any person, who, in his opinion, ought to be put on the trial, *a fortiori* he can after taking evidence, know whom the Police ought to put up before him and order such person to be put up before him, 4 L. B. R. 137 = 7 Cr. L. J. 414. A Magistrate may take cognizance under this section of an offence brought to his notice by a Police report which affords ground for suspicion that an offence has been committed, but, as a matter of sound judicial discretion, a Magistrate should not so proceed and direct that the person suspected be tried until some person aggrieved has complained or until he has before him a Police report on the subject based on an investigation directed to the offence to be tried, 14 C. 707 (F B). When a Magistrate received a paper by post to the effect that certain Chowkidars had committed an offence and the Magistrate then and there sent the paper to the Police for inquiry, who sent a report suggesting the prosecution of the accused and thereupon the Magistrate took proceedings under s. 204, *held* that it must be presumed that the Magistrate acted upon the Police report, 11 A. L. J. 331 = 14 Cr. L. J. 218.

24. Magistrate taking cognizance of case on Police report directed by himself acts under cl (b)—Where on a complaint against certain persons to a Magistrate an investigation is made by the Police and a report made to the Magistrate implicating several other persons not mentioned in the complaint, and if the Magistrate thereupon takes cognizance of the offence against the persons not mentioned in the original complaint he does so under cl (b) and not under cl (c) of this section, so that s. 191 does not apply to such a case, 8 C. W. N. 864.

25. Appellate Court re-trying a case itself, acts under this sub-section.—Where a Magistrate acting under s. 423 (1) (6) sets aside on appeal the sentence of the original Magistrate and tries the offender himself the Magistrate acts under sub-sec. (b) and not (c) as he has before him the Police charge-sheet stating all the facts 30 M. 228

25-A.—A letter written to the Superintendent of Police to his superior charging a Police-officer with extortion was placed before a Magistrate who issued a warrant on the strength of it. Without examining the Superintendent *held* the letter was not a Police report but a complaint, 20 Cr. L. J. 875.

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

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IV—CLAUSE (c)—INFORMATION, KNOWLEDGE OR SUSPICION

26 Application of clause (c) is for vindication of public justice—Clause (c) of this section applies only to cases in which a private individual who is injured or aggrieved or someone on his part does not come forward to make a formal complaint. It is a provision of law for enabling a public official to take care that justice may be vindicated notwithstanding that the persons individually aggrieved are unwilling or unable to prosecute **5 B. L. R. 274 = 13 W. R. 27**

27 Sources of information.—(a) *Communication through post*—A communication received by a District Magistrate through post is not a complaint but it is an information coming under cl (c) of sub-sec. (1) and may be acted upon by such Magistrate if he choose but he is not bound to deal with it judicially **1899 A. W. N. 201; 11 W. R. 1** It is competent to a Magistrate to receive and take action on petition relating to criminal charges when transmitted to him by post whether the Magistrate should do so or not is a matter within the Magistrate's discretion in each particular case. The language of cl (c) would clearly cover such a case—even an anonymous letter being information received from any person other than a Police-officer **Weir II, 149** See also **4 M. L. T. 431** The opinion was expressed *obiter* that a Magistrate not specially empowered under s. 190 (c) cannot issue a warrant for the arrest of a person in the absence of a complaint and on the information contained in a telegram to him from a would-be complainant.

(b) *Anonymous petition*—Where a Magistrate takes cognizance of a case on anonymous communication he does so under cl (c) of the section and the accused is entitled to ask for its transfer to some other Magistrate **3 G. W. N. 65**

(c) *Cognizance of a case upon inquiry held by Sub-Magistrate*—When a District Magistrate takes cognizance of offences under ss. 161 and 116 I. P. C., on an inquiry held by a Subordinate Magistrate which was directed to consider an altogether different question held that the case was instituted in the manner described in cl. (c), and that the Magistrate was on the objection of the accused debarred from holding the trial himself **3 G. W. N. 262**

(d) *Information received from another Magistrate*—A Magistrate taking cognizance of an offence on information received from another Magistrate acts under cl. (c) and the accused is entitled to have the case transferred to another Magistrate **10 P. W. R. 1914 = 15 Cr. L. J. 261**

(e) *Meaning of information received from person other than a Police-officer*—Section 190 (c) cannot possibly include a case of information derived from the Police and does not oblige a Magistrate acting on such information to adopt the procedure under s. 191 **3 P. R. 1910 = 35 P. W. R. 1909 = 11 Cr. L. J. 150** The expression information received from any person other than a Police-officer in s. 190 (1) (c) clearly means only such information as does not constitute a complaint or a Police report *Per IRWIN, O. C. J.* in **14 Bur. L. R. 250 = 4 L. B. R. 300** See Note 23

28 Illegal order of District Judge directing the prosecution of a person is not Information.—The order of a District Judge as a civil officer directing the prosecution of a man nor under the *Guardian and Wards Act* cannot be regarded as information within the meaning of cl (c) as his order was illegal and there was no authority for the prosecution **87 P. L. R. 1910 = 11 Cr. L. J. 602** See however **11 Cr. L. J. 736 (Barma)**

29 Has Magistrate no power to take cognizance on information derived by himself in another public capacity?—In **37 C. 221** it was held following **10 G. W. N. 775** that a Magistrate who has received information of an offence in another public capacity *e.g.* as manager of an encumbered estate cannot act on it in his capacity as a Magistrate and take cognizance under s. 190 (1) (c). If the Magistrate desires to institute proceedings he should follow the ordinary procedure and have a proper complaint lodged. But **CARNDUFF J.** was of opinion that the ruling in **10 G. W. N. 775** went too far. Where a Magistrate is personally interested in a case he cannot under s. 556 try it or commit it for trial without special permission but the line is drawn at trial or commitment and does not go the length of impeding mere cognizance of crime. See **12 C. W. N. 438** But **43 M. 709** agrees with the opinion of **CARNDUFF J.** and holds that the fact that a Magistrate who happens to be also the President of the District Board receives in the latter capacity information as to the commission of an offence by a servant of the Board does not debar him from taking cognizance of the offence under s. 190 cl. (c) of the Code. **10 G. W. N. 775, dissented from.**

And in **2 p. 439** it was held that where the District Registrar was also the District Magistrate and found that a document in an appeal before him, was a forgery and ordered the prosecution of the appellant under s. 471 I. P. C. held that although the District Registrar was not a Court within the meaning of s. 476 he could as District Magistrate take cognizance of the offence under s. 190 (1), (c).

30 Cognizance of case put up before him by the order of another Magistrate is under cl (c)—A Magistrate passing orders for the issue of summons against the accused in a case placed before him by an order

Gilb'ier n. [Fr *giber* from L. *gibba*, hump, crest, or a *po*, wallet, purse] Wild fowl name. Ch. Amm. Addendum.
[Chin.]
Gil'ibon, n. (Zool) An animal of the genus *Gil'ibon* (H. lar), a kind of ape remarkable for the length of its arms, which, when the animal is standing reach to



To ^{if} ^{your} barren musty place which thou hast need of
To reproach with contemptuous words,
to scoff at, to treat with sarcasmo false

look
 Ghast'ly a.
 LEST } (A
 ghost, spirit,
 I like a gh
 dismal
 Each tu
 His face was a
 2 Horrible
 with ghastly
 Ghast'ly adv
 Staring
 Ghast'ness
 Ghast (gaw
 Ghastly con

medicine against the gulfiness of the brain *shu-wu*
 , dōne, fōr, dē wōlf, fōd, fōol,

of the Collector to the effect that the case should be put up before the Magistrate for the issue of necessary orders takes cognizance of the case under sub-sec. (c) 12 C. W. N. 438 = 7 Cr. L. J. 224. See also 14 Bur. L. R. 327 = 9 Cr. L. J. 64. The Police reported an information of their lodged against the petitioners by S to be false and recommended the prosecution of S, the Deputy Magistrate in charge on receipt of the Police report ordered a judicial inquiry although there was no complaint by S and made over the case for disposal to another Magistrate B who issued summonses against the petitioners, *held*, that the first Magistrate who really contemplated taking proceedings against the accused was the Magistrate B and that it was clear that he did not act either upon a complaint or a Police report and although (c) did not strictly apply it was desirable that the case should be tried by another Magistrate 15 C. W. N. 795 = 14 Cr. L. J. 425. Where a District Magistrate holding an inquiry under the Land Revenue Code, comes to the conclusion that a case had been made out against the accused under ss. 161 and 162, I P C, and after obtaining the sanction of the Government transfers case to a Subordinate Magistrate *Held* that it was the District Magistrate who took cognizance of the offence and not the Subordinate Magistrate, 7 Bom. L. R. 537 = 2 Cr. L. J. 532.

31. **What the information must contain**—To justify a Magistrate in taking cognizance of an offence under s 190 (c), upon information received from any person other than a Police-officer, the information need not contain all the allegations necessary to be proved to establish the offence, it is sufficient if enough is alleged to justify the Magistrate in dealing judicially with the matter, 35 C. 1076.

32. **If a Magistrate acts on insufficient information, High Court may stay proceedings in the absence of evidence**.—Where prosecution against one P under the *Opium Act*, having failed, the District Magistrate without any further information on that subject directed proceedings to be taken against S and his servants, the consignors of the (opium) parcel, and that they should be held by a Sub-Magistrate, and that "when the case was disposed of, the record will be put up before the District Magistrate for executive action. *Held*, that the District Magistrate having himself instituted the proceedings took cognizance of the offence under cl (c), and by the fact of his having directed that the trial should be held by a Sub-Magistrate, his action cannot be regarded other than that of a Magistrate acting judicially, and that the proceedings having been taken without any evidence at all should be stayed 4 C. W. N. 825. Where a Revenue Officer who is also a Magistrate himself institutes proceedings under cl (c) and directs one of his Subordinate Magistrates to proceed with the trial the action of the Revenue Officer certainly cannot be regarded, as other than that of a Magistrate acting judicially, 4 C. W. N. 825. See also 9 Bom. L. R. 212 = 5 Cr. L. J. 202.

33. **Procedure on getting information**—(a) *Magistrate bound to record the information on which he acts*.—Where a Magistrate takes cognizance of an offence on information from any person, other than a Police officer, he should at least record the information on which he has acted though it may not be obligatory upon him to disclose the sources of his information. But where the Magistrate is himself directly interested in the case as the Agent to the Court of Wards he was *held* not competent to act on the information which has reached him as such agent and to issue warrants, as by so doing he was practically making himself a Judge in his own case, 10 C. W. N. 775 = 3 Cr. L. J. 473, where 5 B. L. R. 274 and 13 W. R. 1 are followed.

(b) *So much of the information should be recorded as to make out a prima facie case*.—What allegations or how much of the information should be recorded by the Magistrate in such a case, it is difficult to lay down in general terms, but when it is found that the recorded information is sufficient to justify the Magistrate in considering that a *prima facie* case has been made out, the High Court will not interfere with the Magistrate's action in taking cognizance under s 190 (c) 35 C. 1076.

(c) *No power to administer oath to a person from whom Magistrate seeks information*.—A Magistrate wishing to ascertain whether there were sufficient grounds for his taking action under cl (c) of this section against some person not before the Court has no authority to administer an oath to a person from whom he seeks information, and the person so examined is not bound by any provision of law to speak the truth, 27 C. 455, 7 N. L. R. 65 = 12 Cr. L. J. 326

(d) *Magistrate must inform the accused that he is entitled to have the case transferred*. See s 191 and Notes thereto

34. **'Knowledge.'**—A gratuitous suspicion or belief founded on private information contained in an anonymous petition is not 'knowledge'. A Magistrate is bound to disclose the information, private or otherwise, on which he has issued a warrant for the arrest of the accused, 4 B. L. R. Appx 1 = 13 W. R. 1.

35. **Taking cognizance under cl. (c)** does not deprive Magistrate of jurisdiction to try.—This section very clearly shows that the mere fact that a Magistrate who is authorized under cl (c) to take cognizance of offences has directed the institution of proceedings upon his own knowledge or upon his own suspicion

1. *Red/te-stead* (n.), n. That part of the body
 where the giraffe is worn. [Obs.]
 In his belly's rim was sheathed below his *primal*
climax

times with hops
 2. *in a* [A contraction of *engine*] *T*
 instrument by which the mechan-
 ical powers are employed in aid
 of human strength (especially a
 machine consisting of a tripod
 formed of poles united at the top
 one of them being for g. r. l. v. the
 rear an (called the *py pole*) with
 a windlass pulleys ropes &c

by rotary sails
 3. A trip a snare [Obs.] *T*
 critical *pin* [i. p. & p. p. GINNED,
 GIVING]
 1. To clear of sculls by a machine
 ton

does not preclude such Magistrate from jurisdiction to hear and determine the case which may in fact have been instituted upon his own peculiar knowledge of the fact. In such cases s. 191 enables the accused to apply for a transfer of the case to some other Magistrate but unless the accused exercises that privilege the jurisdiction of the Magistrate to institute hear and determine the particular case is unquestionable. A merely pre-conceived opinion as to the guilt of an accused does not necessarily deprive a Magistrate of jurisdiction to adjudicate on the charge 1893 A. W. N. at p. 79

36 Provisions of cl (c) do not extend to proceedings under Chapter VIII—The provisions of cl. (c) of this section and of s. 191 do not as a rule apply to proceedings under Chapter VIII 27 A 172 But where a Magistrate has initiated proceedings under s. 110 in some measure though not mainly on his own knowledge it was thought undesirable that he should proceed with the inquiry 29 C. 392 See Note 15 at p. 182

Y—MISCELLANEOUS

37 Fresh proceedings against person discharged—Where a Subordinate Magistrate has discharged an accused the District Magistrate is not competent acting under sub-sec. (1) cl. (c) of this section to direct another Magistrate to re-hear the case—2 B 534—But see 6 B L. R. Appx 67—14 W. R. 65 and 8 W. R. 61 See also 23 C. 652 (F. B.) 29 C. 726 (B. F.)

38. As a general rule, no limitation for lodging a complaint—It is only by express statutory provisions that rules of limitation can be made applicable to criminal proceedings 20 B 543.

All offences under the Penal Code may be prosecuted after any lapse of time the only exception expressly provided being in respect of offences requiring previous sanction and for which sanction has been granted But the maxim *Nullum tempus Occurrit regi* is becoming more and more obsolete and sundry special and local laws have been from time to time passed which prescribe periods within which offences against their provisions must be prosecuted.

The following are some of these laws —

I—PARLIAMENTARY STATUTES

| PERIOD OF LIMITATION | TITLE | SUBJECT |
|----------------------|---------------------------|---|
| Five years | 21 Geo III c 70 s 7 | Prosecution of the Governor-General etc. |
| Three years | 24 Geo III c 25 s 82 | Prosecution of British subjects guilty of offences in India |
| One year | 54 and 45 Vict c 58 s 170 | Prosecution under the Army Act 1881 |

II—ACTS OF THE GOVERNOR GENERAL OF INDIA IN COUNCIL

| PERIOD OF LIMITATION | YEAR | ACT | SECTION | TITLE OF THE ACT | REMARKS |
|----------------------|------|------|---------|--|--------------------------|
| Three years | 1883 | IX | 15 | Merchandise Marks | See under 1 year below |
| Two years | 1872 | XX | 76 | Christian Marriages | See Amendments. |
| One year | 1847 | XX | 61 | Copyright | |
| Do | 1857 | XIII | 26 | Opium Bengal | |
| Do | 1869 | IV | 15 | Merchandise Marks | See under 3 years above |
| Six months | 1879 | VI | 9 | Elephants | See Amendments |
| Do | 1882 | XII | 11 | Salt | |
| Do | 1882 | XIII | 16 | Burma Steam Boilers | See Amendments |
| Do | 1886 | V | 13 | Mirzapur Stone Mahal | |
| Do | 1896 | XII | 57 | Excise | |
| Three months | 1850 | XIX | 18 | Binding Apprentices | See under 1 month above |
| Do | 1859 | XIX | 53 | Police Aldras | See Amendments. |
| Do | 1861 | V | 42 | Police | Do |
| Do | 1869 | XX | 26 | Volunteers | Do |
| Do | 1878 | XIII | 198 | Sea Customs | Do |
| Do | 1878 | XX | 33 | Arms | |
| Do | 1879 | XX | 12 | Glanders and Farcy | |
| Do | 1880 | II | 19 | Burma District Cesses and Rural Police | See Amendments. |
| Do | 1882 | XV | 97 | Presidency Small Causes Courts | Do. |
| Do | 1890 | VI | 9 | Cruelty to Animals | |
| One month | 1850 | XIX | 18 | Binding Apprentices | See under 3 months above |

III—ACTS OF THE GOVERNOR OF FORT ST GEORGE IN COUNCIL.

| PERIOD OF IMITATION | YEAR | ACT | SECTION | TITLE OF THE ACT | REMARKS |
|---------------------|------|-----|---------|--------------------------|----------------|
| Six months | 1889 | IV | 42 | Salt | |
| Do | 1873 | I | 9 | Wild Elephants | |
| Do | 1886 | I | 72 | Excise | |
| Do | 1886 | II | 87 | Madras Harbour | See Amendment |
| Do | 1888 | III | 81 | Madras City Police | |
| Do | 1904 | III | 452 | Madras City Municipality | See Amendments |
| Three months | 1888 | III | 81 | Madras City Police | |
| Ten days | 1866 | II | 16 | Cattle Disease | See Amendments |

IV—ACTS OF THE GOVERNOR OF BOMBAY IN COUNCIL.

| | | | | | |
|--------------|------|------|-----|-------------------------|---------------------------|
| Six months | 1879 | VI | 87 | Port Trust | See Amendments |
| Do | 1888 | III | 514 | Bombay Municipality | See under 3 months below |
| Do | 1890 | II | 61 | Salt | See Amendments |
| Do | 1890 | IV | 80 | District Police | |
| Do | 1891 | II | 33 | Steam Boilers | |
| Four months | 1878 | V | 67 | Excise | See Amendments. |
| Three months | 1867 | VII | 42 | District Police | |
| Do | 1873 | VI | 82 | District Municipalities | See Amendments. |
| Do | 1888 | III | 514 | Bombay Municipality | See under 6 months above. |
| Eight days | 1867 | VIII | 14 | Village Police | See Amendments |

V—ACTS OF THE LIEUTENANT GOVERNOR OF BENGAL IN COUNCIL.

| | | | | | |
|--------------|------|------|-----|----------------------------|----------------------|
| Six months | 1864 | VII | 37 | Salt | See Amendments |
| Do | 1873 | VII | 72 | Excise | Do |
| Do | 1879 | III | 12 | Steam Boilers | |
| Three months | 1866 | IV | 99 | Calcutta Police | See Amendments |
| Do | 1884 | III | 303 | District Municipalities | See Act IV 1894 s 90 |
| Do | 1888 | II | 419 | Calcutta Municipality | |
| Do | 1890 | III | 142 | Calcutta Port | See Amendments. |
| Do | 1891 | II | 56 | Calcutta Hackney Carriages | |
| Two months | 1880 | VIII | 12 | Contagious Disease Animals | |

191. When Magistrate takes cognizance of an offence under sub-section (1) clause (c)

Transfer or commitment on application of accused.

of the preceding section the accused shall before any evidence is taken be informed that he is entitled to have the case tried by another Court and if the accused or any of the accused if there be more than one objects to being tried by such Magistrate the case shall instead of being tried by such

Magistrate be committed to the Court of Session or transferred to another Magistrate

Notes.—1 What amounts to taking cognizance under cl. (c) of s. 190, see Notes 3 and 27—33 to s. 190

2. Accused must be informed of his right to claim transfer.—His silence is no waiver.—These words shall be entitled are mandatory and a Magistrate cannot refuse to comply with them

13 A 345. Silence on the part of the accused to take any objection as to the trial by a Magistrate taking cognizance of the case against him under cl. (c) in the face of the obligation imposed on the Magistrate by law to inform the accused of his right to object to the trial by such Magistrate cannot prejudice him and there cannot be any waiver of his right in such a case 3 C. W. N. 279. See also 6 C. W. N. 202. The accused if he elects to be tried by another Court must signify his election before any evidence is taken 29 P. R. 1894 at p. 82.

glare d'œuf, the glare of an egg from A S *gläre*,
amber glare I sat *glaria* any thing sticky

1. To shoot or dart a ray of light or splendor, to

Both glance from heaven to earth, from earth to heaven. S&L

Glance, *n.* ^{feil} To shoot or dart suddenly or ob-
liquely at or upon.

3 (Sten o-mach) The cover of a stuffing box, — sometimes called a

Gar Ince

h, e, i, ü, ä, f, long, ä, ë, i, ö, n, f, short, cäre, fär, läst, fall, what, thäre, veil, törm, pique, flum, döme, löf, dg, wolf, löbd, löu.

3. Omission to inform the accused of his rights under the section, not mere irregularity.—This section is a modification of the same section of Act X of 1882 as amended by Act III of 1884, and it is now made clear that the accused shall be informed of his right to be tried by another Court and that an opportunity must be given him of making his choice before any evidence is taken. Such an omission cannot be held to fall within the provisions of s. 537 especially when he Magistrate had interested himself very considerably in preparing the case against the accused, 13 P. R. 1898. When cognizance has been taken under cl. (c), the accused is entitled to have the case transferred and the Magistrate has no option or alternative but to grant such application of the accused or commit him for trial. A Magistrate who, notwithstanding an application by an accused for transfer, proceeds to hear the case, acts without jurisdiction and any error or defect in his procedure is not cured by s. 537, 13 A. 345. A Magistrate is not competent to try the case until he has informed the accused. Omission to inform will invalidate the conviction, 6 P. L. R. 333 (1903), 28 A. 212; 5 N. L. R. 113; 4 Bur. L. T. 259 = 13 Cr. L. J. 52. The fact that the Magistrate did not inform the accused that he was entitled to have the case transferred, is a ground for having the proceedings set aside, but not for making an order for transfer, *Weir II*, 151. Where a Cantonment Magistrate warned the accused that he must not tie his buffaloes in a certain spot, but the accused persisted and the Magistrate on a local inspection finding the place filthy, charged and convicted the owner on his own personal knowledge. *Held*, the mere fact that the Magistrate had made a local inspection did not debar him from trying the charge, provided he acted on independent evidence before convicting the accused. But if the Magistrate intends to proceed on his own knowledge without taking any independent evidence, he must conform to the provisions of this section and hence the conviction and sentence were set aside as illegal, 8 P. R. 1905 = 2 Cr. L. J. 45. See also 3 A. L. J. 694 = 1906 A. W. N. 303 = 4 Cr. L. J. 374. In 31 P. L. R. 1905 = 2 Cr. L. J. 187, the Punjab Chief Court in quashing a similar conviction observed "that the brevity permitted in a summary trial does not mean that there shall be no trial at all or that an accused can be heavily fined at a Magistrate's discretion on a personal knowledge, not withstanding that the law gives the accused the right of demanding that his case should be tried by another Court. See also 84 P. L. R. 1905 = 2 Cr. L. J. 363, 10 C. W. N. 775, 21 A. L. J. 89, 41 A. 164; 22 Cr. L. J. 319.

4. 'Trial' of a case does not include preliminary inquiry and Magistrate may commit to Sessions on objection.—When a Magistrate is empowered to make a commitment of a case within his cognizance he cannot do so without holding a preliminary inquiry, *a fortiori*, when the case is triable by the Court of Session exclusively, 21 A. 109. The right view appears to be that the accused are only entitled to object to a trial by the Magistrate taking cognizance under cl. (c) of s. 190, but the Magistrate is not bound to transfer the case; he may elect to commit it to the Court of Session, 22 M. 148; 26 C. 786.

5. Accused not entitled to choose his own Court.—All that the accused is entitled to under this section is to have the case tried by another Court. The section gives the accused no right to select or determine for himself by what other Court the case is to be tried. 7 Bom. L. R. 637 = 2 Cr. L. J. 582. See 22 M. 148. Note above.

6. Applicability of the section to proceedings under Chapters VII and XIII.—If a Magistrate proceeding under s. 110 has received information other than under cl. (a) and (b) of s. 190, he is not bound to inform the accused that he is entitled to have the matter heard by another Court, 27 A. 172. But the principle that no man ought to be a judge in his own case would apply, if a Magistrate instituting proceedings acts or relies on his knowledge of the character of the party proceeded against. 29 C. 392. See Note 15 at p. 182 and also 24 A. 151 and 1904 A. W. N. 206.

7. Appellate Magistrate taking cognizance of case and re-trying need not transfer.—See 30 M. 228. Note 23 at p. 478.

8. Magistrate taking cognizance cannot hear appeal.—A Subordinate Magistrate who took cognizance of a case under sub-sec. (1), (c) of s. 190 could not after becoming District Magistrate hear an appeal from a conviction in the case which was tried by another Subordinate Magistrate without following the procedure laid down by this section, an appeal being part of the trial for an offence, 12 C. W. N. 433 = 7 Cr. L. J. 224. But a Magistrate who did not take cognizance or directed a local investigation but merely directed the issue or summons holding that the investigating Magistrate had not given satisfactory reasons for recommending the dismissal of the complaint is not incompetent to hear the appeal on conviction, 36 C. 869. See also 1899 A. W. N. 74, and compare 16 C. 121; 12 M. 451; 23 C. 44; 1895 A. W. N. 226; 23 C. 975.

Transfer of cases by
Magistrates

192. (1) Any Chief Presidency Magistrate, District Magistrate or Sub-divisional Magistrate may transfer any case, of which he has taken cognizance, for inquiry or trial, to any Magistrate subordinate to him

(2) Any District Magistrate may empower any Magistrate of the first class who has taken cognizance of any case to transfer it for inquiry or trial to any other specified Magistrate in his district who is competent under this Code to try the accused or commit him for trial, and such Magistrate may dispose of the case accordingly

Notes.—1. Scope of section.—(i) *Note the difference between sub-secs (1) and (2)—*(a) Under sub-sec (1) the transfer may be made to any Magistrate subordinate to the transferring Magistrate while under sub sec. (2) the transfer must be made to a specified Magistrate competent to try the accused or commit him for trial (b) Under sub-sec. (2) any case may be transferred while sub-sec (2) seems to contemplate such cases only where there is an accused and he is to be tried or committed excluding cases under ss 144, 145, etc. *See 4 C. W. N. 821 and 35 C. 370.*

(ii) *District and Sub-divisional Magistrates have co-ordinate jurisdiction as regards cases pending before Magistrates subordinate to latter—*Under this section the District Magistrate and the Sub-divisional Magistrate have co-ordinate jurisdiction as regards cases pending before Magistrates subordinate to the latter, and whatever the Magistrate of the district might do with regard to offences committed in the district, the Divisional Magistrate is competent to do with regard to offences within his local jurisdiction, **4 A. 366. See also 12 A. 66.**

(iii) *Orders not within the scope of the section—*It is not competent to a District Magistrate to direct a Subordinate Magistrate to dispose of a case, pending in the Court of the latter in a particular manner, e.g., by commitment, **Weir II, 152 and Weir I, 299.**

2 What 'cases' may be transferred—Though the words 'any case' are very wide, it is doubtful having regard to the position of this section in the Code, whether they do not apply exclusively to criminal cases or cases relating to offences, **28 C. 709 at pp 716, 717.** But in **35 C. 243,** it was held that under this section a District Magistrate is competent to transfer any case cognizable by a Criminal Court and his power of transfer is not restricted to criminal cases only

(a) *Cases under s 107.—*A District Magistrate may under the provisions of this section transfer to the file of a first class Magistrate subordinate to himself, proceedings which he had himself initiated under s 107 though such Magistrate of the first class by want of local jurisdiction would be incompetent to initiate such proceedings **24 A. 131; see also 31 C. 350, 29 C. 389; 28 C. 709; 22 C. 898 and Notes under s 107**

(b) *Cases under s 110—*A District Magistrate is competent under this section to transfer a case under s. 110, **35 C. 243** But not where the Magistrate to whom the case has been transferred is not empowered to decide cases under s. 110, **Ratanlal 833, 1 S. L. R. 2 = 9 Cr. L. J. 246,** and Notes under Heading XVI at p 212

(c) *Cases under s 145—*The words of sub-sec. (1) of this section are wide enough to include cases under Chapter XII The general power conferred by this section and s. 529 upon District and Sub-divisional Magistrates is not taken away or cut down by anything in s. 145 **22 C. 898; 26 M. 163, 10 C. W. N. 1095 and 2 C. L. J. 614 = 3 Cr. L. J. 83.** But a Magistrate of the first class empowered to transfer cases under sub-sec. 2 is so empowered only to transfer an inquiry or trial relating to an accusation or charge of an offence He is not competent to transfer cases under s 145 **4 C. W. N. 821, followed in 36 C. 370, see, however, s. 529 (f) and 3 C. W. N. 686,** where a District Magistrate transferred a case under s. 145 to a senior Deputy Magistrate to be disposed of by him or by any other Magistrate whom the latter may direct and subsequently the Deputy Magistrate transferred the case to another Magistrate who finally disposed of it. *Held,* that the transfer under this section was irregular, not being to a specified Magistrate, but by reason of s. 529 (f), the irregularity did not vitiate the proceedings. *See Note 163 at p 306, 29 A. L. J. 215.*

(d) *Cases under ss 487 and 556—e.g.,* cases falling under s 487 or s. 556, or cases initiated by the Magistrate himself or in which is a material witness, *see 4 B. L. R. A. Cr. 15; 8 B. L. R. 422 (F.B.), 2 C. 23 = 23 W. R. 87; 29 C. 292; 19 M. 263; 24 C. 439, and 25 C. 727.*

3. When cases may be transferred.—The section empowers the transfer of cases of which cognizance has been taken for inquiry or trial

(a) *Complaint may be transferred even before issue of process*—The term 'case' has not been defined in the Code, but reading together s. 192 (1), cl. (a) of s. 190 (1) and proviso (g) to s. 200, it is clear that it includes a proceeding upon a complaint as soon as the complaint has been received by the Magistrate who takes cognizance of the offence complained of. Therefore a District Magistrate may, under s. 528 on the application of an accused person, withdraw a complaint from one Subordinate Magistrate and refer it to another Magistrate even before the first Magistrate has decided to issue any process against the accused, 7 N. L. R. 97—12 Cr. L. J. 437. See, however, 27 C. 798.

(b) *Purheard case cannot be transferred*—Where a Magistrate who has taken cognizance of a case and partly tried it finds that only an offence which a Subordinate Magistrate is competent to try has been committed, he has no power to transfer the case to the Subordinate Magistrate but must dispose of it himself, Weir II, 152. See also 12 A. 66.

(c) *Transferred cases cannot be transferred*—This section has reference only to cases of which the transferring Magistrate has taken cognizance, i.e., acted under s. 190. It has no reference to cases which have been transferred, 12 A. L. J. 277 = 15 Cr. L. J. 357; 36 A. 166. This section confers no authority on one Subordinate Magistrate to refer to another Subordinate Magistrate a case referred to him for disposal, 7 M. H. C. R. Appx. XXXIII = Weir II, 151. But having regard to s. 529 (f), proceedings would not be void, if the Magistrate acts in good faith, Weir II, 152; 4 C. W. N. 821.

(d) S. 192 (1) of the Code empowers a Magistrate to transfer a case or inquiry or trial but it does not empower him to transfer a case simply for the purpose of considering a report of an investigation under s. 202 of the Code which he has himself ordered. The provisions of s. 193 or 202 do not entitle a Magistrate, after he has proceeded under the latter section to make an order under the provisions of s. 192, transferring the case for being dealt with under s. 203 or 204 without a fresh investigation as contemplated by s. 202. 29 C. W. N. 508.

4. *Power to transfer cases which the Subordinate Magistrate is not competent to try*.—Though a complaint under s. 20 of the *Cattle Trespass Act* must be entertained either by a District Magistrate or a Magistrate specially authorized, such Magistrate has now power under sub-sec. (1) of this section to transfer the case after taking cognizance of it, to any Subordinate Magistrate, 34 C. 926 overruling 23 C. 300; 23 C. 442, where it was held that the section does not authorize a District Magistrate to transfer for trial to a Subordinate Magistrate cases which are not in the power of that Magistrate to try.

5. *Notice of transfer should be given to parties*.—Before transferring a case under s. 528 from one Subordinate Magistrate to another, a notice of such intended transfer should be served upon the parties to come forward and show cause why such transfer should not be made, 2 Bom. L. R. 342; 8 C. 393 = 10 C. L. R. 232. See also 3 A. 749; Ratanlal 460; 22 B. 519. But where a case is transferred under this section as soon as complaint is received, no notice would seem to be necessary. So also notice is not necessary where a District Magistrate *suo motu* withdraws the case to his own file or transfers or re transfers it from one Court to another under his control 3 P. R. 1910 = 35 P. W. R. 1909 = 11 Cr. L. J. 150, where 24 M. 317 is referred to.

(a) *Transfer how made in the Punjab*.—"Complaints referred to Subordinate Magistrates under this section must always be sent by post or by a messenger of the Court, after being endorsed with the date of presentation and an order of reference, specifying the number of days within which the complainant must appear to prosecute, and, at the same time a memorandum must be given to the person presenting the complaint, informing him what Magistrate the complaint has been referred to, and of the time within which he must appear before such Magistrate to prosecute"—*Punjab Gazette*, 1879, Pt. III, p. 571.

6. *Effect of transfer*.—(a) *When no reservation is made, the whole case is transferred*.—Where a complaint or Police report deals with several persons, it is not necessary that the entire case, i.e., the case regarding the offences committed according to the complaint or report should be transferred. Whether such a transfer has been made is a question of fact depending on the intention of the officer marking the order, which intention must be gathered from the order itself. Where no reservation is made, it may be concluded that the entire case has been transferred.—*Per HENDERSON, J.*, 32 C. 783 at p. 789.

(b) *After transfer no other Magistrate can deal with that case*.—Where a case has been transferred to a Deputy Magistrate, it is that officer alone who has jurisdiction to deal with any application or summons until the case is withdrawn from his cognizance. The case is entirely out of the hands of the transferring Magistrate, so long as it is not withdrawn from the file of the Deputy Magistrate. Until such withdrawal, the District Magistrate has no power to make any order, save an order, for further inquiry under s. 437, 32 C. 783. See also 3 B. L. R. Appx. 151 = 12 W. R. 53; 27 C. 979; 27 C. 798; 5 C. W. N. 493; 4 C. W. N. 242 and 30 C. 449. It

is the case that is transferred, *ie.*, offence, not the offenders, of which cognizance has been taken under s 190 and he can proceed even against parties not mentioned in original the complaint 4 G. W. N. 560; 27 C. 979, 41 C. 1013. He may while discharging the accused sent to him institute proceedings against persons concerned in the case whom the transferring Magistrate had not summoned even on complaint, 7 C. L. J. 249 = 7 Cr. L. J. 318

7. After transfer prosecution witnesses must be examined afresh—When a case is transferred after the evidence for the prosecution has been recorded the procedure to be followed is that the prosecution witnesses must be examined afresh. The Magistrate cannot act upon the evidence recorded already by another Magistrate 14 A. 346, Welr II, 152. But see 35 C. 457 and Notes to s 350

8. Sworn statement need not be taken afresh if already taken before transfer.—The power conferred by this section to transfer cases to Subordinate Magistrates after taking cognizance thereof may be exercised before the examination of the complainant [s. 200 (a)] but where the transferring Magistrate has already examined the complainant, the Magistrate to whom the case is transferred, is not bound to re-examine the complainant. See also 200 (c) and 4 N.-W. P. H. C. R. 83, *contra* 18 W. R. 18

9. Chief Presidency Magistrate—The subordination of the Presidency Magistrates (stipendiary as well as honorary) to the Chief Presidency Magistrate, is of the same kind and extent, as the subordination of Magistrates and Benches to the District Magistrate under s 17 (1). The Chief Presidency Magistrate can therefore act under s 528, 1 Bom. L. R. 347.

10. Powers of first-class Magistrates in Madras and Punjab—In Madras and in the Punjab, all Magistrates of the first class have been invested with powers to transfer cases to their Subordinate Magistrates under sub-sec. (2)—*Fort St. George Gazette*, 1873 p 717, *Punjab Gazette* 1879, Pt I p 680

11. Transfer by Magistrate not authorized.—If a Magistrate not empowered under this section transfers a case, the irregularities cured by s 529 (f) 36 C. 869.

12. Rules as to proper construction of transfer orders of the High Court directed to the District Magistrate—When a criminal case is transferred by an District Magistrate to the Court of a District Magistrate, power to transfer the case to a subordinate Court, that Court. If no such intention is expressed it will be understood that in the case of a transfer from a Court subordinate to a District Magistrate to a District Magistrate's Court that District Magistrate's Court is expected to try the case itself but, when the transfer is from the Court of one District Magistrate to that of another it will be understood that unless the contrary is directly expressed the Magistrate of the Court to which the transfer is made has power and jurisdiction to apply this section and to transfer the case to the Court of any Magistrate subordinate to him who may be competent to try it 19 A. 249

193. (1) Except as otherwise expressly provided by this Code or by any other law for the time being in force, no Court of Session shall take cognizance of any offence as a Court of original jurisdiction unless the accused has been committed to it by a Magistrate duly empowered in that behalf

(2) Additional Sessions Judges and Assistant Sessions Judges shall try such cases only as the Local Government by general or special order may direct them to try, or, as the Sessions Judge of the division by general or special order, may make over to them for trial.

Notes.—1. Generally Sessions Court has no authority to take cognizance of any offence or hold a trial without commitment.—Except in cases in which a Court of Session is expressly empowered to take cognizance of an offence as a Court of original jurisdiction it has no power to do so, unless a commitment has been made by a Magistrate duly empowered in that behalf 1907 A. W. N. 178 = 5 Cr. L. J. 7. See Notes to ss 226 and 227 as to the powers of a Sessions Court to add new charges

The trial of persons who are not committed to the Sessions is invalid 15 M. 352; 22 C. 80. The absence of any commitment is a defect in substance not in form and therefore not covered by s 517 42 P. R. 1884 at p 92. See also 25 M. 61 (P.C.) and Note 9

* As to procedure of Courts of Session in (1) Upper Burma see the *Upper Burma Criminal Justice Regulation V* of 1892 Sch. s 11 (1) (2) and in (2) the British Baluchistan see *British Baluchistan Criminal Justice Regulation V* of 1896. The procedure however does not affect the Code in its application to European British subjects in both these provinces see the Regulations referred to Sch. at 14 and 11 respectively

† The words "in the case of Assistant Sessions Judges" have been omitted by Act XXIII of 1923.

2 To a good degree quite considerably
 Hardly as easy as one easy thing good cheap He best

Good-tempered a
 can y irritated or annoy

Her good voice was full of harmony to his eyes. E de y
 Goodly ad. Excellently [Oke] Sp near
 Goodly a [compare GOODLIKE] superl. GOOD

Say ye to the goodman of the house Where is the
 guest-chamber? Hardly a r id.

Good-mor row a or interj. A term of saluta-
 tion good morning
 Good-must need a Na usually mild in temper not
 easily provoked

Exceptions to this general provision.—In the following cases a Court of Session can take cognizance of cases without commitment by Magistrates. **S. 435.**—Power to order commitment on examining records' **S. 477.**—Power of a Court of Session to take cognizance of offences committed before itself and triable by the Court of Session exclusively **S. 478.**—Power of Civil or Revenue Courts to complete investigation and commit to High Court or Court of Session. **S. 480.**—Procedure in certain cases of contempt. **S. 483.**—Proceedings against a person refusing to answer or produce documents **S. 351.**—Would seem to empower a Court of Session to proceed against any person attending the Court and appearing to be an offender. See ss 195 and 476 for power to sanction and for sending for inquiry cases mentioned in s 195.

2. Object of the restriction is to secure to the accused a preliminary inquiry.—The object of restricting a Sessions Court from taking cognizance of any offence unless the accused person has been committed by a Magistrate, is to secure to the prisoner a preliminary inquiry which affords him an opportunity of becoming acquainted with the circumstances of the offence imputed to him and enables him to make his defence, **3 M. 351** and see Notes to s 208. In another case the same High Court remarked "the law contemplates that in serious cases of which a Court of Session may take cognizance, the accused should have some information of the case he has to answer," **4 M. 227.**

3. Effect of informal commitment.—A Court of Session cannot treat as a nullity a commitment by a Magistrate of the first class on the ground that he investigated the case, and committed the prisoner without a formal complaint being made to him, but should proceed with the case in the usual way, **1 B. H. C. R. Cr. C.A. 35.** The onus is on the party impugning the correctness of the proceedings to show that there was no jurisdiction, **13 W. R. 17.** See *Evidence Act*, s 114, cl (c). See s 532 and Notes thereunder as to when irregular commitments may be validated. See **3 R. 53.**

4. Amended charge to be in the name of committing Magistrate.—The charge though amended or altered by the Sessions Court, under s 226, must still be drawn in the name of the committing Magistrate—*M H C Pro*, 30th August, 1862.

5. Assistant Judge in charge of the duties of the Sessions Judge may try only the cases made over to him.—An Assistant Sessions Judge, who had been directed by Government to take over charge of the duties of the District and Sessions Judge, during a temporary vacancy in the office, is not an officer appointed to act as Sessions Judge, and has no jurisdiction to try any case even as an Assistant Sessions Judge, unless it was made over to him by general or special order under the last paragraph of this section, **Ratanlal 500.** See also s 17 (3) and (4) and s 7.

6. Additional Sessions Judge—His powers.—(a) *Applications for revision can be referred to him*—**9 B 352** is now superseded by sub-sec. (2), s. 438. See also s. 17 (4) and (9).

(b) *To direct commitment*—**9 B. 164** is now superseded by s 438 (2).

(c) *Reference under s. 123*—Such a reference is not a case committed for trial, and the Court of Session disposing of such reference does not "try a case" within the meaning of this section. Therefore an Additional Sessions Judge empowered to try all cases which may be committed for trial by the Magistrates of the District has no jurisdiction to pass orders under s. 123, **Ratanlal 830.** See Notes 10 at p. 175.

The word "cases" in sub-sec. (2) does not include appeals, **37 A. 286**, and see Note to s. 409.

Where under s. 123 a Magistrate referred the case to the Sessions Judge and the latter transferred the reference to the first Additional Sessions Judge for disposal held that the Sessions Judge had jurisdiction to transfer such a case to the Additional Sessions Judge for disposal, **27 C. W. N. 896** (*Bengal Government Notification, dated 19th June, 1916 referred to*).

7. Power of Government to make over a particular case to an Additional Sessions Judge.—In *Kanyan Allenon's case* (Weir II, 319) the Government directed that the trial of a person governed by s. 187 and of another not governed by that section, shall be by a particular Court. On objection being taken, that under s 147 the Local Government had no power to specify the Court that should try the second accused, held that this section justified the order of the Government as the trial was held by an Additional Sessions Judge and the Local Government could direct the case of a particular accused person to be tried by such Judge.

8. Jurisdiction of Sessions Courts in cases of offences committed before it.—See Notes under s. 477.

9. Power of Sessions Judge to try approver forfeiting conditional pardon.—A Sessions Judge who has held that a witness giving evidence under conditional pardon has not complied with the conditions, is not competent at once to try him. He can hold a trial only after commitment by a competent Court. He should,

GAWE } Testimony, [Gls] B.
 as GAVE q
 modification of Acet, q v

1750] (Med) A saturated solution of the sub-acetate of lead used as a remedy for inflammation
 overning the system of published form of law, as, a r
 clean government

Gout (gou), n [Fr Lat gustus, taste] Tonic

Gout'y, a. 1. Diseased with or subject to, the gout as a gouty person a gouty joint
 2 Pertaining to the gout Gouty matter

The office of a governor
 from Gael, & Ir gug m, bod,

y, or mountain daisy [Gof]
 was fine" Burns.
 ood granite

Where sin abounded, grace did much more abound

behold

He is complete in feature and in mind
 With all good graces to grace a gentleman. So
 4 Decent, physical, intellectual or moral character, mostly, easy elegance of manners, perfection form

I have formerly given the general character of Mr Add
 son a style and manner as natural and unaffected, may a
 re is and full of those graces which a literary imagination

10 (it) A play do Grace ting and with

u, s, y, u, G, y, long, u, s, y, u, G, y, short, care, fkr, lant, fpl, whet, there, wpl, tfrn, pique, firm, done, for, dg, wpl, food, foot,

therefore in such a case order it to be laid before a competent Magistrate with his own opinion or that the Magistrate may act in accordance with law 19 W R 43; 15 M 352, 22 C. 50, 23 B. 493. See also 1907 A W N 178 in Note 1 and see Note under s. 339

Cognizance of offences by High Court Act X of 1875 s 145

194. (1) The High Court may take cognizance of any offence upon a commitment made to it in manner hereinafter provided

Nothing herein contained shall be deemed to affect the provisions of any Letters Patent granted under the India High Courts Act 1861 or any other provisions of this Code

(2) (a) Notwithstanding anything in this Code contained the Advocate General may, with the previous sanction of the Governor General in Council or the Local Government exhibit to the High Court against persons subject to the jurisdiction of the High Court informations for all purposes for which Her Majesty's Attorney General may exhibit informations on behalf of the Crown in the High Court of Justice in England

(b) Such proceedings may be taken upon every such information as may lawfully be taken in the case of similar informations filed by Her Majesty's Attorney General so far as the circumstances of the case and the practice and procedure of the said High Court will admit

(c) All fines penalties forfeitures debts and sums of money recovered or levied under or by virtue of any such information shall belong to the Government of India

(d) The High Court may make rules for carrying into effect the provision of this section

Notes—1 The *Indian High Courts Act* of 1861 is the 24 and 25 Vict c 104

2 See ss 22 to 29 both inclusive of the Letters Patent of the High Courts to Bengal Madras and Bombay and ss 15 to 22 both inclusive of W P High Court as to ordinary and extraordinary criminal jurisdiction of the several High Courts Appx I

3. Subsec. (2) clauses (a) (b) (c) correspond with s. 144 of Act X of 1875 which is now repealed S 146 is now to some extent covered by s. 338

195. (1) No Court shall take cognizance—

Prosecution for contempt of law authority of public servants. (a) of any offence punishable under sections 172 to 188 of the Indian Penal Code except on the complaint in writing of the public servant concerned or of some other public servant to whom he is subordinate

Prosecution for certain offences against public justice. (b) of any offence punishable under any of the following sections of the same Code namely sections 193 194 195 196 199 200 205 206 207 208 209 210 211 and 228 when such offence is alleged to have been committed in or in relation to any proceeding in any Court except on the complaint in writing of such Court or of some other Court to which such Court is subordinate

Prosecution for certain offences relating to documents given in evidence. (c) of any offence described in section 463 or punishable under section 471 section 475 or section 476 of the same Code when such offence is alleged to have been committed by a party to any proceeding in any Court in respect of a document produced or given in evidence in such proceeding except on the complaint in writing of such Court or of some other Court to which such Court is subordinate

(2) in clauses (b) and (c) of sub-section (1) the term Court includes a Civil Revenue or Criminal Court but does not include a Registrar or Sub-Registrar under the Indian Registration Act 1877

Subsec. (1) has been substituted in the place of the old subsec. (1), by Act I V III of 1923

† The word "in" has been substituted in the place of "means" by Act X V III of 1923

4 (Zob) A small fish (the *Leuciscus* *Latourneuxi*), found in



Gram'mar less, a. Dialect of grammar
Gram'mar School (skool). A school in which
grammar, or the science of language is taught,
peculiarly, a school in which Latin and Greek are
taught.
Gram'matics, n. pl. Rudiments, as of grammar
(obs.)

eyes, when they but taste the rumour
of the enemy's designs
and the enemy's.

as ter, n. [I. Lat. Scen; m]
an, a. [I. Lat. Scen; m]



striking the water.

Grain's edge n. Surface on grain
Grained, a. 1 Divided into small
particles or grains

2 Roughened {Obs} Shot

3 Dyed in grain, ingrained

Persons light & good, not proved in gen-
erous honesty, are but pale in goodness

Brown.

4. (Bot) Having tubercles or grain
like processes, as the petals or seg-
ments of the corolla of some flowers

Grain'er n. 1 A harrow obtained
by infusing pigeon's dung in water
used by farmers to give flexibility to
skins — c. did also &c

2 One who paints in imitation of the grain of



Grain's edge n. Surface on grain
Grained, a. 1 Divided into small
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2 One who paints in imitation of the grain of

principles or ped

ā, ē, ī, ū, ā, ŷ, long, ā, ē, ī, ū, ā, ŷ, short, cāre, fār, lāst, spāll, wāt, thēre, vāll, tērm, pīque, fīrm, dōne, fōr, dō wāll, fōd, fōot

*“(3) For the purposes of this section, a Court shall be deemed to be subordinate to the Court to which appeals ordinarily lie from the appealable decrees or sentences of such former Court, or in the case of a Civil Court from whose decrees no appeal ordinarily lies, to the principal Court having ordinary original civil jurisdiction within the local limits of whose jurisdiction such Civil Court is situate

Provided that—

(a) where appeals lie to more than one Court, the Appellate Court of inferior jurisdiction shall be the Court to which such Court shall be deemed to be subordinate, and

(b) where appeals lie to a Civil and also to a Revenue Court such Court shall be deemed to be subordinate to the Civil or Revenue Court according to the nature of the case or proceeding in connection with which the offence is alleged to have been committed”

(4) The provisions of sub-section (1) with reference to the offences named therein apply also to ‘criminal conspiracies to commit such offences and to’ the abetment of such offences, and attempts to commit them

† (5) Where a complaint has been made under sub-section (1), clause (a) by a public servant, any authority to which such public servant is subordinate may order the withdrawal of the complaint and, if it does so, it shall forward a copy of such order to the Court and upon receipt thereof by the Court, no further proceedings shall be taken on the complaint”

Preliminary Note.—The principal amendments made in this section by Act XVIII of 1923 are—

(a) The words ‘with the previous sanction’ have been omitted from clauses (a), (b) and (c) of sub-section (1).

(b) Sub-sections (4) (5) and (6) which dealt with sanction have also been omitted.

(c) The words ‘in writing’ are added after the word ‘complaint’ in clauses (a) (b) and (c).

(d) In sub-section (2) the word ‘includes’ has been substituted for the word ‘means’.

(e) Sub-section (5) is entirely new

* The provisions of s. 195 cause constant and great difficulty, and various amendments have been suggested which we have considered at length. We have no doubt that it will not be possible to remedy the evils which are connected with this section so long as private individuals are allowed to prosecute for offences connected with the administration of justice. In our opinion the only effective way of dealing with this section is to allow prosecutions to be launched only by the public servant or by the Court.

We see no reason why the public servant or the Court should not file a complaint exactly in the same way as a private individual would do in other cases and our proposals in this connection with this section and the enlargement of s. 476 involve the adoption of this principle. In our view s. 476 should bar the cognizance by any Court of offences of this nature except upon such complaint while the procedure to be followed when the Court desires to prosecute should be prescribed by s. 476

“The adoption of this principle will at all events get rid of the objectionable practice of keeping a sanction which has been granted to a private individual, hanging over the head of the accused person for a period of six months which is frequently utilized for the various purposes of blackmail. In the case of a complaint by a Court or the public servant we do not think that it will be necessary to prescribe any length of time

It will also, in our opinion, be a distinct advantage to get rid altogether of the term ‘sanction’ in connection with these prosecutions, a result which will be effected by the amendments we propose

† We recognize that clause (a) of sub-section (1) stands on a somewhat different footing from clauses (b) and (c), but we think there is no reason to retain even in it any reference to a sanction, as prosecutions under clause (a) can reasonably be launched in all cases on the direct complaint of a public servant.” *Report of the Select Committee of 1916.*

* Cl. (3) was inserted by Act XVIII of 1923

† The words ‘criminal conspiracies’ inserted by Act XVIII of 1923.

and to ‘were inserted by s. 4 of the Criminal Law Amendment Act 1921 (XIII) of 1921

The principal changes effected by the amendment—Under the new amendment under s 195 the necessity of a sanction for the cognizance of certain offences enumerated in s 195 is done away with. It is now obligatory upon a Court taking cognizance of offences mentioned in s. 195 to do so only upon a complaint in writing of either the Court before whom the offence was committed or the public servant concerned.

In short s 195 now deals with the limitations that exist to the cognizance of offences by a Court. While if a Court before whom an offence mentioned in s 195 is committed wants to take action against the delinquent it can only proceed under s 476 by lodging a complaint in writing. Of course a public servant concerned in the prosecution of offences mentioned in clause (a) is reasonably expected to file a direct complaint against the accused. (See *Report of the Select Committee of 1916 quoted above*)

The object of requiring a complaint in writing of the public officer or Court instead of a sanction as previously is to protect private persons from being prosecuted by baseless prosecutions at the instance of private individuals for the offences mentioned above. Under the old law any sanction given or refused could be revoked or granted by any authority to which the authority giving or refusing it was subordinate. Now under sub-clause (a) which is newly added power to withdraw a complaint made by a subordinate public servant is given to the authority which is superior to it. For revocation or grant of complaint by Appellate Court see sections 476 A and 476 B.

It will also be seen that under the old law an application for sanction to prosecute was made to a Court under s 195 as it was generally supposed that a Court had no business of its own motion to grant sanction to a private individual without an application from him (see for instance 19 A 213; 27 C 820). Of course there were contrary decisions which held that it was open to a Court to grant a sanction without an applicant (see for instance 16 Bom L R 947). But now under the present amendment sanction to prosecute is absolutely done away with and therefore there is no possibility of an application under s 195. Now s 195 only lays down the conditions necessary for the cognizance of certain offences by a Court. And the complaint which is a condition precedent to cognizance of an offence under s 195 can only be lodged by a Court under the circumstances mentioned in s 476 which requires that a Court may proceed by lodging a complaint for offences mentioned in clauses (b) and (c) of sub-section (1) of s 195 either on its own motion or on the application of a private person. So under the present law a private person can prefer an application only under s 476 requesting a Court to file a complaint and consequently there is no room for any application under s. 195.

Effect of amendments on the rights of parties to criminal proceedings—(1) Where the petition was under s 195 cl. (6) of the old Code, to set aside an order of a District Magistrate revoking the sanction granted by a Subordinate Magistrate held by the High Court that the right conferred by s 195 cl. (6) of the old Code was not a right in the nature of a right of appeal that the amendments made by the new Code did not take away any substantive right and merely affected procedure and that the petition was therefore unsustainable. 46 M L J. 274.

(2) A sanction to prosecute granted after September 1st 1923 when the new amendments were introduced by Act XVIII of 1923 is illegal. 26 Bom L R 1235. See also 81 C 652.

(3) Whether power under old s. 195 (6) to the superior Court to revoke or grant sanction was in the nature of a right of appeal.—The right conferred by s 195 (6) of the old Code was not a right in the nature of a right of appeal but the amendments made by the new Code did not take away any substantive right and merely affected procedure and so the petition of the petitioner who contended that the right for sanction under s 195 (6) was in the nature of a substantive right, is not sustainable. 46 M L J 274 = 47 M 334.

(4) Whether prosecution for perjury by a private person is valid after the 1st of September, 1923, on which the Amending Act XVIII of 1923 came into force, after having obtained sanction under the old section 195 before the introduction of the new amendment.—It is now held that such a prosecution would be illegal as no Court under the amended s 195 can take cognizance of an offence of perjury except on the complaint of a public servant to be produced in writing on the date of the prosecution. 23 A L J 35, because nobody has a vested right to a matter of procedure. See also 6 Lah. 41.

Whether the right to apply to higher authorities to revoke a sanction against a person is a mere matter of procedure or of a substantive right—Where a Sub-Magistrate granted sanction under s 195 of the Code under s. 211 I P C. and in pursuance of the sanction the prosecution was instituted before the amendment of the Code repealing s. 195 came into force the District Magistrate had jurisdiction under s. 195 (6) of the Code to revoke the sanction notwithstanding that the amendment had come into force before the date of the

petition before him to revoke the sanction. *Held* the right of a person to apply to higher authorities to revoke a sanction against him is not a matter of mere procedure but is a substantive right vested in the party to invoke the aid of a higher tribunal and it is not affected by later amending statute in the absence of express words to that effect. **43 M 620 (47 M 334 considered and referred to).**

(5) Where sanction to prosecute and complaint filed before the Amending Act XVIII of 1923.—*Held* where sanction for the prosecution was obtained and complaint was also instituted prior to the 1st September, 1923 and though the case for hearing did not come on till after the coming into force of the Amending Act the restriction as to the jurisdiction of the Court did not apply and the old Code governed the case **7 Lah 99**. See, also **49 M L J 275** where in a similar case it was *held* that an alteration in the law of procedure relating to the grant of sanction cannot invalidate proceedings validly begun under the old procedure.

Notes.—1 Offences.—[Ss 172 to 189 I P C. relate to contempt of the lawful authority of public servants **S. 193.**—Giving or fabricating false evidence in a judicial proceeding or in any other case **S. 194.**—Giving or fabricating false evidence with intent to cause any person to be convicted of a capital offence if an innocent person be thereby convicted and executed **S. 195.**—Giving or fabricating false evidence with intent to procure conviction of an offence punishable with transportation or imprisonment for more than seven years **S. 196.**—Using in a judicial proceeding evidence known to be false or fabricated **S. 199.**—False statement made in any declaration which is by law received as evidence, **S. 200.**—Using as true any such declaration known to be false **S. 203.**—False personation for the purpose of any act or proceeding in a suit or criminal prosecution or for becoming bail or security **S. 206.**—Fraudulent removal or concealment etc. of property to prevent its seizure as a forfeiture or in satisfaction of a fine under sentence or in execution of a decree **S. 207.**—Claiming property without right or practising or deception touching any right to it to prevent its being taken as a forfeiture or in satisfaction of a fine under sentence or in the execution of a decree **S. 208.**—Fraudulently suffering a decree to be passed for a sum not due **S. 209.**—False claim in a Court of Justice **S. 210.**—Fraudulently obtaining a decree for a sum not due or causing a decree to be executed after it has been satisfied **S. 211.**—False charge of offence made with intent to injure **S. 223.**—Intentional insult or interruption to a public servant sitting in any stage of a judicial proceeding **S. 228.**—Forgery **S. 471.**—Using as genuine a forged document, **S. 475.**—Counterfeiting a device or mark used for authenticating documents **S. 476.**—Counterfeiting a device or mark used for authenticating documents other than those described in s. 476 I P C.]

1 A.—The word "Court" in s 195 sub-sec. (1) (c) of the Code does not include a Court in the Native States of India. Therefore no complaint is necessary for the prosecution of a person for producing a fabricated receipt in the Savli Court (Baroda State) when the prosecution is launched in the Court of the Resident First-class Magistrate at Vadod in British Indian territories. **27 Bom L R 1053.**

ANALYSIS OF NOTES

2 Although a sanction for prosecution is done away with under the new amendments all those considerations that weighed with Courts in granting a sanction would if it is submitted now weigh with Courts granting an application under s. 476 for lodging a complaint. So it is thought desirable to retain all those cases laying down rules of prudence which a Court should follow in granting or refusing a sanction as similar principles would apply in granting or refusing an application under s. 476 for lodging a complaint. See **29 M L T 557**

I Complaint.

II When sanction not necessary

III What is a Court?

IV Subordination of public servants

V Application for sanction what it should contain

VI Who can apply for sanction and to whom sanction may be granted.

VII Who can grant sanction

VIII Who can act on sanction granted.

IX Points to be considered in dealing with sanction application

X Court's power to hold preliminary inquiry and go beyond the record in granting sanction

XI Notice to the accused.

XII Sanction in respect of perjury

it extends to cases of fabrication of false evidence in advance. In this case the accused fabricated false evidence with the intention of using it in a subsequent civil suit. After the suit was disposed of and an appeal was pending therefrom, a complaint was preferred to a Magistrate against the accused for offence under s 193, I P C, without sanction, *held*, the sanction of the Civil Court was necessary and the Magistrate could not take cognizance of the offence without such sanction, 18 M. L. T. 322 = 16 Cr. L. J. 721. Where the applicant was the pleader of an accused against whom a case of dacoity was sent up to a Magistrate on 10th April, 1922, and it was alleged that the applicant suborned three of the witnesses for the prosecution on 10th April, 1922, and proceedings were immediately started against the applicant under s 193, I P C, without obtaining sanction under s 195 and before even the dacoity case was decided, *held* that the want of sanction was fatal to the proceedings against the applicant, *per* CRUMP, J., the words, "in relation to s 195 (b) are very general and are wide enough to cover a proceeding in contemplation before a Criminal Court, though it may not have begun at the date when the offence was committed, 25 Bom. L. R. 1153. See Note 7 above and 23 A. L. J. 956

(ii) *False charge*—There is a difference of opinion as to whether sanction is necessary or not when in pursuance of a charge made to the Police, proceedings have subsequently taken place in Court. See Notes 144 and 145, but the better opinion is that when once proceedings are taken to a Court, sanction is necessary. See 18 M. L. T. 322 = 16 Cr. L. J. 721. *H* made a report to the Police against several persons including one *S*, accusing them of the offences of robbing and voluntarily causing hurt. The Police made inquiry and sent up all the persons excepting *S* for trial. The Magistrate convicted some of them, but the Sessions Judge acquitted them on appeal. Thereupon *S* made a complaint to the Magistrate charging *H* under s 211 I P C, with having made a false report in respect of himself to the Police. The Magistrate took cognizance of the complaint without sanction, holding that no sanction was necessary, *held* that the offence committed in respect of *S* if it was one under s 211, I P C, was committed in relation to the proceeding in Court, as it was the report which led to the proceedings in Court and that the sanction of that Court was therefore necessary, 34 A. 522. See Notes 5 and 6 to s 524. The test for the necessity of the grant of sanction is not the character of the offender but the character of the offence. Sanction is necessary when an offence punishable under s. 211 is committed in or in relation to any proceeding in Court. Where therefore *K* a policeman took part in preparing a *panchnama* in regard to an offence said to have been committed by a talukdar but took no further part in the subsequent proceedings, and the case started by *K* was then investigated by others in the usual way and then sent up and the accused was acquitted *K* was directed to be prosecuted for an offence under s 211, I P C, it was contended that no sanction was necessary as he had not given evidence at the trial and the offence was committed before any judicial proceedings were begun, *held* that sanction was necessary. The offence imputed to *K* was the instigation of the false charge against the talukdar the charge which, in the ordinary course of criminal procedure, took the form of a trial. It may be that the instigation was committed before the proceeding in Court was begun, but none the less the investigation was an act committed in relation to the proceeding held by the Magistrate against the talukdar, 15 Bom. L. R. 362 = 13 Cr. L. J. 527. But in 36 A. 212 it was *held* that where a District Judge forwarded a petition presented to him in certain proceedings to a Magistrate who instituted proceedings thereon and discharged the person proceeded against, the District Judge was competent to

(iii) *Forgery, etc.* s 463, etc., I P C—Where in respect of a document produced in Court, an offence under s. 471, I P C, has been committed outside the Court no sanction is necessary, the use complained of being prior in date to the production of the document in Court, 4 Bom. L. R. 268; 16 Cr. L. J. 617 (C), 15 P. R. 1915; 26 B. 785; but see 14 C. W. N. 479 = 11 Cr. L. J. 290; 11 M. L. T. 391 = 1912 M. W. N. 536 = 13 Cr. L. J. 231. Where the accused made an application to the Excise Collector saying that two persons who held licences for selling ganja, etc. had executed a sub-lease in his favour of certain ganja and opium shops and long before that application had executed a *Zaminama*, in which he made certain false statements implying that the said two persons had executed a sub-lease in his favour which, if they had done, would render their licences liable to be cancelled, *held* (i) that no sanction under this section was necessary for prosecuting the accused for fabricating the *Zaminama* as the offence was completed when the document was executed which was long before the application to the Excise Collector, and (ii) that the *Zaminama* was intended to be used before it

Lat. *gratum*, from *gratus*, pleasing, agreeable.
 AGREE }
 1. Good will, favor. [Obs.]

So much ground as would scarce grow the golden age. *Kismet*.
 } To feed on, to eat from the ground, as grow

not to be used — off the back of a horse —
 — employed to designate the entire set
 sample from lowest to highest — *Green* as
 seal of a kingdom, state &c — *The gr*
 gushed the rich, the powerful.

Philips

Grä'sser (grä'sher, n) One who pastures cattle,
 and rears them for market.
Grä'ssing n 1 the act of feeding on grass

Grēā
 nobl
Grēā
 DAI

hasin
 sharp
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 And
 wing
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2
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 Mst
 met
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 pol c

0 Holding a child
 inent, their pushed
 men, the great seal,
 bke

He doth object
 7 Fattile in car

By the great in the green or whole as a contrast to
 built a ship by the great — Great circle of a sphere, a
 circle the place of which passes through the center of the
 sphere — Great circle passing the act or art of contrivance

contrivance

Green, n like *gre*, *Pr* *grat* ll. *Sp* & *Lu* *gr* lo

It is common in the
 contrivance

g, *h*, *i*, *o*, *u*, *y*, long, *ā*, *ē*, *ī*, *ō*, *ū*, short, *cārt*, *fur*, *lāt*, *gāll*, *whāt*, *thēre*, *vēll*, *tērm*, *plique*, *flam*, *dōne*, *fōr*, *dē*, *wēll*, *fōod*, *fōot*,

petition before him to revoke the sanction. *Held* the right of a person to apply to higher authorities to revoke a sanction against him is not a matter of mere procedure but is a substantive right vested in the party to invoke the aid of a higher tribunal and it is not affected by later amending statute in the absence of express words to that effect. 48 M 620 (47 M 384 considered and referred to).

(5) Where sanction to prosecute and complaint filed before the Amending Act XVIII of 1923 — *Held*, where sanction for the prosecution was obtained and complaint was also instituted prior to the 1st September, 1923 and though the case for hearing did not come on till after the coming into force of the Amending Act the restriction as to the jurisdiction of the Court did not apply and the old Code governed the case. 7 Lah 99. *See*, also 49 M L J 276 where in a similar case it was *held* that an alteration in the law of procedure relating to the grant of sanction cannot invalidate proceedings validly begun under the old procedure.

Notes—1 Offences—(Ss 172 to 188 I P C relate to contempts of the lawful authority of public servants
 S. 193.—Giving or fabricating false evidence in a judicial proceeding or in any other case S. 194.—Giving or fabricating false evidence with intent to cause any person to be convicted of a capital offence if an innocent person be thereby convicted and executed S. 195.—Giving or fabricating false evidence with intent to procure conviction of an offence punishable with transportation or imprisonment for more than seven years S. 196.—Using in a judicial proceeding evidence known to be false or fabricated S. 199.—False statement made in any declaration which is by law received as evidence S. 200.—Using as true any such declaration known to be false S. 205.—False personation for the purpose of any act or proceeding in a suit or criminal prosecution or for becoming bail or security S. 206.—Fraudulent removal or concealment etc. of property to prevent its seizure as a forfeiture or in satisfaction of a fine under sentence or in execution of a decree S. 207.—Claiming property without right or practising or deception touching any right to it to prevent its being taken as a forfeiture or in satisfaction of a fine under sentence or in the execution of a decree S. 203.—Fraudulently suffering a decree to be passed for a sum not due S. 209.—False claim in a Court of Justice S. 210.—Fraudulently obtaining a decree for a sum not due or causing a decree to be executed after it has been satisfied S. 211.—False charge of offence made with intent to injure S. 228.—Intentional insult or interruption to a public servant sitting in any stage of a judicial proceeding S. 463.—Forgery S. 471.—Using as genuine a forged document S. 475.—Counterfeiting a device or mark used for authenticating documents S. 476.—Counterfeiting a device or mark used for authenticating documents other than those described in s. 476 I P C.]

1 A.—The word 'Court' in s 195 subsec. (1) (c) of the Code does not include a Court in the Native States of India. Therefore no complaint is necessary for the prosecution of a person for producing a fabricated receipt in the Savli Court (Baroda State) when the prosecution is launched in the Court of the Resident First-class Magistrate at Vadod in British Indian territories. 27 Bom L R 1063.

ANALYSIS OF NOTES

2. Although a sanction for prosecution is done away with under the new amendments all those considerations that weighed with Courts in granting a sanction would it is submitted now weigh with Courts granting an application under s. 476 for lodging a complaint. So it is thought desirable to retain all those cases laying down rules of prudence which a Court should follow in granting or refusing a sanction as similar principles would apply in granting or refusing an application under s. 476 for lodging a complaint. *See* 20 M L T 557

- I Complaint.
- II When sanction not necessary.
- III What is a Court?
- IV Subordination of public servants.
- V Application for sanction and what it should contain.
- VI Who can apply for sanction and to whom sanction may be granted.
- VII Who can grant sanction.
- VIII Who can act on sanction granted.
- IX Points to be considered in dealing with sanction application.
- X Court's power to hold preliminary inquiry and go beyond the record in granting a sanction.
- XI Notice to the accused.
- XII Sanction in respect of perjury.

1800 1900 2000 2100 2200 2300 2400 2500 2600 2700 2800 2900 3000 3100 3200 3300 3400 3500 3600 3700 3800 3900 4000 4100 4200 4300 4400 4500 4600 4700 4800 4900 5000 5100 5200 5300 5400 5500 5600 5700 5800 5900 6000 6100 6200 6300 6400 6500 6600 6700 6800 6900 7000 7100 7200 7300 7400 7500 7600 7700 7800 7900 8000 8100 8200 8300 8400 8500 8600 8700 8800 8900 9000 9100 9200 9300 9400 9500 9600 9700 9800 9900 10000 10100 10200 10300 10400 10500 10600 10700 10800 10900 11000 11100 11200 11300 11400 11500 11600 11700 11800 11900 12000 12100 12200 12300 12400 12500 12600 12700 12800 12900 13000 13100 13200 13300 13400 13500 13600 13700 13800 13900 14000 14100 14200 14300 14400 14500 14600 14700 14800 14900 15000 15100 15200 15300 15400 15500 15600 15700 15800 15900 16000 16100 16200 16300 16400 16500 16600 16700 16800 16900 17000 17100 17200 17300 17400 17500 17600 17700 17800 17900 18000 18100 18200 18300 18400 18500 18600 18700 18800 18900 19000 19100 19200 19300 19400 19500 19600 19700 19800 19900 20000 20100 20200 20300 20400 20500 20600 20700 20800 20900 21000 21100 21200 21300 21400 21500 21600 21700 21800 21900 22000 22100 22200 22300 22400 22500 22600 22700 22800 22900 23000 23100 23200 23300 23400 23500 23600 23700 23800 23900 24000 24100 24200 24300 24400 24500 24600 24700 24800 24900 25000 25100 25200 25300 25400 25500 25600 25700 25800 25900 26000 26100 26200 26300 26400 26500 26600 26700 26800 26900 27000 27100 27200 27300 27400 27500 27600 27700 27800 27900 28000 28100 28200 28300 28400 28500 28600 28700 28800 28900 29000 29100 29200 29300 29400 29500 29600 29700 29800 29900 30000 30100 30200 30300 30400 30500 30600 30700 30800 30900 31000 31100 31200 31300 31400 31500 31600 31700 31800 31900 32000 32100 32200 32300 32400 32500 32600 32700 32800 32900 33000 33100 33200 33300 33400 33500 33600 33700 33800 33900 34000 34100 34200 34300 34400 34500 34600 34700 34800 34900 35000 35100 35200 35300 35400 35500 35600 35700 35800 35900 36000 36100 36200 36300 36400 36500 36600 36700 36800 36900 37000 37100 37200 37300 37400 37500 37600 37700 37800 37900 38000 38100 38200 38300 38400 38500 38600 38700 38800 38900 39000 39100 39200 39300 39400 39500 39600 39700 39800 39900 40000 40100 40200 40300 40400 40500 40600 40700 40800 40900 41000 41100 41200 41300 41400 41500 41600 41700 41800 41900 42000 42100 42200 42300 42400 42500 42600 42700 42800 42900 43000 43100 43200 43300 43400 43500 43600 43700 43800 43900 44000 44100 44200 44300 44400 44500 44600 44700 44800 44900 45000 45100 45200 45300 45400 45500 45600 45700 45800 45900 46000 46100 46200 46300 46400 46500 46600 46700 46800 46900 47000 47100 47200 47300 47400 47500 47600 47700 47800 47900 48000 48100 48200 48300 48400 48500 48600 48700 48800 48900 49000 49100 49200 49300 49400 49500 49600 49700 49800 49900 50000 50100 50200 50300 50400 50500 50600 50700 50800 50900 51000 51100 51200 51300 51400 51500 51600 51700 51800 51900 52000 52100 52200 52300 52400 52500 52600 52700 52800 52900 53000 53100 53200 53300 53400 53500 53600 53700 53800 53900 54000 54100 54200 54300 54400 54500 54600 54700 54800 54900 55000 55100 55200 55300 55400 55500 55600 55700 55800 55900 56000 56100 56200 56300 56400 56500 56600 56700 56800 56900 57000 57100 57200 57300 57400 57500 57600 57700 57800 57900 58000 58100 58200 58300 58400 58500 58600 58700 58800 58900 59000 59100 59200 59300 59400 59500 59600 59700 59800 59900 60000 60100 60200 60300 60400 60500 60600 60700 60800 60900 61000 61100 61200 61300 61400 61500 61600 61700 61800 61900 62000 62100 62200 62300 62400 62500 62600 62700 62800 62900 63000 63100 63200 63300 63400 63500 63600 63700 63800 63900 64000 64100 64200 64300 64400 64500 64600 64700 64800 64900 65000 65100 65200 65300 65400 65500 65600 65700 65800 65900 66000 66100 66200 66300 66400 66500 66600 66700 66800 66900 67000 67100 67200 67300 67400 67500 67600 67700 67800 67900 68000 68100 68200 68300 68400 68500 68600 68700 68800 68900 69000 69100 69200 69300 69400 69500 69600 69700 69800 69900 70000 70100 70200 70300 70400 70500 70600 70700 70800 70900 71000 71100 71200 71300

y
e doth not assist willingly nor grow e the child n of men
Lam. iii 24.

The students paid themselves at my concern. Couper
2 To sorrow over, to mourn as to grieve out of
de (Kare)
love r 6 To feel grief to be in pain of mind on
account of an evil to sorrow to mourn — often
followed by at or for

[arms by] cart to use occasionally are not in evidence
Distr. 2

distorted (grī mīst') *a* Distorted, having a

He had gaped the mouth open as a strider and he by the
20. The
2. The white hole to the bowels of as if by pressure

Guo

[illegible]

d nothing in the state but
 if the poor and rich men
 1 To move same b
 e operation of gr and
 e the common prais
 come ground or pulv
 is smooth, etc

high cm. — Great circle so 1 short cm.

There:

blanc, firm, d'âne, fôr, du wêlf, fôdd foot.

- XIII Sanction for instituting false charges, etc
- XIV Sanction in respect of forged documents
- XV Delay in applying for sanction.
- XVI Subordination of Courts.
- XVII Powers and duties of superior Court in dealing with application under sub-sec. (6)
- XVIII Appeal.
- XIX Review and fresh sanction
- XX Revision.
- XXI Remand for further inquiry
- XXII Proceedings under this section are judicial proceedings.
- XXIII Stay of proceedings
- XXIV Propriety of sanction not to be questioned by Court entertaining complaint.
- XXV Effect of sanction on powers of trying Court.
- XXVI Judge granting sanction ought not to try the case himself.
- XXVII Miscellaneous

I.—COMPLAINT.

3. The word "complaint" to be interpreted according to the definition in the Code.—See s 4 (h).—The present amendment necessitates a complaint under s. 476 of the Code by a Court for offences mentioned in clauses (b) and (c) of s. 195. But for offences mentioned in clause (a) of sub-section (1) of s. 195, it is submitted, the complaint will have to be filed by the public servant concerned or some other public servant to whom he is subordinate.

Information to Police not a complaint—Under the Bengal Tenancy Act, a Civil Court directed a peon to cut crops distrained. On being obstructed he lodged information of the occurrence at the Police *thana* and the accused were eventually convicted under s. 186, I P. C., *held*, that under this section, there should be a complaint by the public servant concerned and there being no such complaint within the meaning of s 4 (b) the conviction was bad in law, 30 C. 285.

4. Complaint must be by the public servant concerned—A complaint regarding any of the offences mentioned in cl. (a) must be made by the public servant concerned or by his superior. It cannot be made by the person who may have been injured by the act complained of, *e.g.*, in a case of unlawful resistance to execution 2 B. 633. See, also, 11 C. L. J. 111 = 11 Cr. L. J. 212; 48 C. 1086; 17 A. L. J. 1034.

The power to make a complaint cannot be delegated.—See the referring judgments in 38 B. 642 (F.B.). 8 Bom. L. R. 477 = 4 Cr. L. J. 34 must be considered to be overruled, 15 Cr. L. J. 251 (Pan).

5. Responsibility for prosecution rests with complaining Judge in a case started on complaint.—Where a Court makes a complaint or proceeds under s. 476 or s. 478, the responsibility for the prosecution rests upon the Judge entirely, such a prosecution being a very different thing from a prosecution instituted on the complaint of a private party and merely sanctioned by the Court, 1 C. 450; 15 B. 334; 7 C. 208.

6. Orders that were considered as 'complaints'—Where a Magistrate sanctions a prosecution when there is no application for the same before him, his order must be considered as a complaint made of his own motion, 7 M. 189. Where a Revenue Court being satisfied from the perusal of certain documents tendered in evidence that they were forgeries, sent the case to the District Magistrate for action, *held* that such a communication was a complaint within the meaning of this section, but did not constitute a proceeding under s. 476, 30 P. R. 1905 = 105 P. L. R. 1905; 23 A. 249. Where an Assistant Collector trying a rent suit, being of opinion that the plaintiff had committed perjury, sent the record to the Collector of the district for "starting a case under s. 193, I P. C., and that officer "ordered" that a case under that section should be instituted and made it over to a Magistrate of the first class, *held*, that although the order of the Assistant Collector was not one under s. 476 it was a sufficient complaint within this section and the Collector who was also the District Magistrate had jurisdiction to take cognizance of it, 26 A. 514. Where a Munsiff being of opinion that a document, filed in a case before him had been tampered with communicated his suspicions to the District Judge who thereupon wrote to the District Magistrate requesting him to take action in the matter, *held* the letter of the District Judge amounted to a complaint, 35 A. 6. See 11 M. 443. Where a District Judge passed an order to the following effect, I hereby complain against A that he filed two false and forged bonds in the Court of Small Causes M and thereby committed an offence under ss 471 and 467, I P. C. The papers will be sent to

distantful service is
Gron 2. If Soul
r that which grinds.
used to grind or mas
frames f r cotton whi

Grille n. [Fr. See *CHILL* & *f*.] A lattice-work
or grating. The grille which formed part of the

Grindlingly ad-
A kind of platonic, a base

5

try
He does not submit willingly nor go

To sorrow over to mol.
fate. (Page 3)

Gr^{ave} 1. To feel grief / to be in pain of mind on account of an ev^t / to sorrow / to mourn ~ often followed by of or for *What*

Do not you grieve at this *What*

Gr^{ave} 2. { n } 1. *A grave or that grief* / a ma
grieve / { n } 2. *of a farm, or of a cr. or of any work*
a cr. a ma. orial build^g { s } of

The children were ho sewn pp d by the *griev* when found trespassing *W* d u

Syn -- fierce (racious curious horrid horrible
fra, dul & astly gris) hideous stern sulking sour
sat)

2 A peculiar mode of clasping the limbs by

The lam it was go *one* u for land *Gen* *du* 10
The thing was very *g* serious *a* Ab *aham* *s* *st* cause of
L *s* son *xx* 11

use *D true* :
 Gr̥m̥m̥r̥d̥ (gr̥m̥m̥) a Distort d having a
 crumbled look
 Gr̥m̥m̥'k̥in̥ n [Coer p e t from gr̥m̥m̥ n from
 gr̥m̥r̥gr̥ j̥ n̥ l̥ m̥ l̥ i̥ q̥] Inodent l̥ k̥ l̥ p̥
 r̥ l̥ i̥ n̥ l̥ m̥ h̥ n̥ w̥ n̥ e̥ n̥ k̥ u̥ r̥

3 To give pain to the bowels of as if by pre

atrocity enormity
Gall, n Grasp *r a h* {*O's*}

grahed use
Colofin

urn or It is also an ornament of Greek architecture See GAY

of closing the
drawing the

griffin See GRYPE 10 a
I pon whose breast a fi or
Than del. wo h v n b r d r

100

ake a, a, a store and good need
 can down polish or sharp
 smooth sharp or pointed to
 another name or to be
 require for examination to
 {any universities}
 pieces by ac are fine
 addition to to harness
 including in the state but keep
 at the poor and rich men
 as 1. To move some b
 as operation of grind
 Next
 to a common grass the
 -rooms ground or pulv
 to grounds well
 rooms polished or sharp
 - grounds smooth ste 1

[illegible]

the District Magistrate with the request that they be made over to a competent Court for disposal' it was held that the order amounted to a *complaint* within the meaning of s 4 (A) as the Judge was a Court to whom the Court of Small Causes was subordinate and had jurisdiction to make a complaint, 12 A. L. J. 891 = 15 Cr. L. J. 700.

II.—WHEN SANCTION NOT NECESSARY.

NB—Though "sanction" is done away with under the recent amendment and complaint is required in all cases under the new s 105 Still it is thought desirable to retain the rulings dealing with sanction as the same considerations will apply in the case of complaint as did previously apply in the case of sanction and we may generally say that under the new amendments a complaint will not be necessary where previously sanction was not necessary

7. It is submitted that the alleged conflict of decisions noted below has been set at rest by the Legislature by altering the wording of s 195 sub-sec (1) (c) The Legislature have thought fit to adopt the very words of PIGGOTT J, in 38 A. 169 so now it is no matter whether an offence has been committed prior to the Court proceedings, if the disputed document was produced in that Court, then after its production no criminal case could be started without the sanction of the Court in which it was produced, 23 A. L. J. 956. So the effect of the amendment of s. 195, sub-sec. (1) (c) is to uphold the decision in 38 A. 169, and the cases in 4 Bom. L. R. 269; 34 A. 654 have become of mere academic interest and are no longer good law See, also, 43 A. 60.

7-A. Is sanction necessary for offences committed prior to proceedings in Court?—TAYBRI J, in distinguishing 4 Bom. L. R. 268 and 34 A. 654 points out the difference between cl (b) and cl (c) of sub-sec. (1). Clauses (b) and (c) agree in some respects, but differ in this that the offence is identified in cl (b) by reference to the fact that it has a direct connection with some proceeding in Court, viz, having been (i) committed in, or (ii) in relation to the proceeding whereas in cl (c) the offence has to be connected not with the proceeding, but (i) with the document produced or given in evidence in the proceeding, and (ii) by the fact that the document has been given or produced in evidence by a party to the proceeding Cl (b) runs when the offence is committed cl (c) 'when the offence has been committed' Having regard to the object of the section, when the offence is of such a nature that at the time of committing it, the accused must have legal proceedings in mind, and prior to his being charged with the commission of the offence, legal proceedings of the same nature have already commenced in any Court, it seems to be most in consonance with the intention of the Legislature to require that sanction of the Court should be obtained 18 M. L. T. 322 = 16 Cr. L. J. 721; 18 M. L. T. 322 = 39 M. 677.

(i) *Fabricating false evidence prior to magisterial proceedings, s 193 I P C*—Where offences under s. 193 and 211 I P C, were alleged to have been committed at a time when the proceedings were pending before the Police and anterior to the commencement of any inquiry by the Magistrate it was held the offences were not committed *in relation to* any proceeding in a Court within the meaning of sub-sec (1) (b) and therefore no sanction of Court was necessary for the prosecution of the offender Weir II, 162. No sanction is required under cl (b) of this section to prosecute a person for having fabricated false evidence during a Police investigation and when there was no proceeding pending in any Court in relation to which the alleged false evidence was said to have been fabricated, 26 C. 786 where 26 C. 359 is distinguished in See also 24 W. R. 41; 25 W. R. 33. But see below 24 Bom. L. R. 1153.

Contra—M and others were charged with having made false statements and abetted the making of them during the Police investigation in a theft case. The theft case was subsequently tried by the Magistrate and the evidence collected during the Police investigation was again laid out before the Magistrate after the close of that trial. M was charged with an offence under s. 193, in respect of the statements before the Police without any sanction having been obtained, held, that he could not be tried in the absence of a sanction from the Court which tried the theft case and before which the evidence alleged to be fabricated was used, 14 Bom. L. R. 715 = 13 Cr. L. J. 751. So also when after fabricating a document, the accused got it registered and subsequently instituted a suit and filed along with the plaint a certified copy of the forged document. Subsequently the accused was charged with an offence under s. 193 I P C, without any sanction and it was considered that no sanction was necessary as the offence was completed prior to the institution of the suit held that sanction was necessary the offence having been committed in relation to a proceeding in Court, 17 C. W. N. 937 = 16 Cr. L. J. 259. The object of s. 195 (1), (b) is to save the time of Criminal Courts being wasted, and accused persons being needlessly harassed by erecting a safeguard against rash, baseless or vexatious prosecutions for the offences specified. This safeguard is not limited to cases where the offence is committed *pendente lite*, but

They have examined themselves with 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 100

having very long and slender antennae as 1



Grype, v. f. To grype, see GRYPE. Spenser
Grype n. [Gr. γρυψ, grups, grif n.] [Written
also grype] A vulture, sometimes also, a griffin
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[Obs.]

For Heaven still guards the r. lit. Stat.
To protect the edge of (especially with an or
namental box let, hence, to fasten or ornament with
lace and the like

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[Obs.]

it extends to cases of fabrication of false evidence in advance. In this case the accused fabricated false evidence with the intention of using it in a subsequent civil suit. After the suit was disposed of, and an appeal was pending therefrom, a complaint was preferred to a Magistrate against the accused for offence under s. 193, I P C., without sanction, *held*, the sanction of the Civil Court was necessary and the Magistrate could not take cognizance of the offence without such sanction, 18 M. L. T. 322 = 16 Cr. L. J. 721. Where the applicant was the pleader of an accused against whom a case of dacoity was sent up to a Magistrate on 10th April, 1922, and it was alleged that the applicant suborned three of the witnesses for the prosecution on 10th April, 1922, and proceedings were immediately started against the applicant under s. 193 I P C., without obtaining sanction under s. 195 and before even the dacoity case was decided, *held* that the want of sanction was fatal to the proceedings against the applicant; *per* CRUMP, J., the words, "in relation to s. 195 (b) are very general and are wide enough to cover a proceeding in contemplation before a Criminal Court, though it may not have begun at the date when the offence was committed," 24 Bom. L. R. 1153. See Note 7 above and 23 A. L. J. 936.

(ii) *False charge*—There is a difference of opinion as to whether sanction is necessary or not when in pursuance of a charge made to the Police, proceedings have subsequently taken place in Court. See Notes 144 and 145, but the better opinion is that when once proceedings are taken to a Court, sanction is necessary. See 18 M. L. T. 322 = 16 Cr. L. J. 721. *H* made a report to the Police against several persons including one *S* accusing them of the offences of rioting and voluntarily causing hurt. The Police made inquiry and sent up all the persons excepting *S* for trial. The Magistrate convicted some of them, but the Sessions Judge acquitted them on appeal. Thereupon *S* made a complaint to the Magistrate charging *H* under s. 211, I P C., with having made a false report in respect of himself to the Police. The Magistrate took cognizance of the complaint without sanction, holding that no sanction was necessary, *held* that the offence committed in respect of *S* if it was one under s. 211, I P C., was committed in relation to the proceeding in Court, as it was the report which led to the proceedings in Court, and that the sanction of that Court was therefore necessary, 34 A. 522. See Notes 5 and 6 to s. 524. The test for the necessity of the grant of sanction is not the character of the offender, but the character of the offence. Sanction is necessary when an offence punishable under s. 211 is committed in or in relation to any proceeding in Court. Where therefore *K* a policeman took part in preparing a *panchnama* in regard to an offence said to have been committed by a talukdar but took no further part in the subsequent proceedings, and the case started by *K* was then investigated by others in the usual way and then sent up and the accused was acquitted, *K* was directed to be prosecuted for an offence under s. 211, I P C., it was contended that no sanction was necessary as he had not given evidence at the trial and the offence was committed before any judicial proceedings were begun, *held* that sanction was necessary. The offence imputed to *K* was the instigation of the false charge against the talukdar the charge which, in the ordinary course of criminal procedure, took the form of a trial. It may be that the instigation was committed before the proceeding in Court was begun, but none the less the investigation was in act committed in relation to the proceeding held by the Magistrate against the talukdar, 14 Bom. L. R. 362 = 13 Cr. L. J. 527. But in 38 A. 212 it was *held* that where a District Judge forwarded a petition presented to him in certain proceedings to a Magistrate who instituted proceedings thereon and discharged the person proceeded against, the District Judge was competent to sanction the prosecution of the petitioner for an offence under s. 182, I P C., being the public servant to whom the false information was given but it was doubtful if he could sanction the prosecution for an offence under s. 211, I P C., as the District Court was not the Court in which the criminal proceedings were instituted. See also 20 C. W. N. 1347 = 23 C. L. J. 59. See Also 46 A. 906, 4 P. 323.

(iii) *Forgery, etc.*, s. 463, *etc.*, I P C.—Where in respect of a document produced in Court, an offence under s. 471, I P C. has been committed outside the Court no sanction is necessary, the use completed of being prior in date to the production of the document in Court, 4 Bom. L. R. 283; 16 Cr. L. J. 617 (C), 18 P. R. 1915; 26 B. 785; but see 14 C. W. N. 479 = 11 Cr. L. J. 230; 11 M. L. T. 391 = 1912 M. W. N. 535 = 13 Cr. L. J. 241. Where the accused made an application to the Excise Collector saying that two persons who held licences for selling ganja, etc. had executed a sub-lease in his favour of certain ganja and opium shops and long before that application had executed a *Zaminama*, in which he made certain false statements implying that the said two persons had executed a sublease in his favour which if they had done, would render their licences liable to be cancelled, *held* (i) that no sanction under this section was necessary for prosecuting the accused for fabricating the *Zaminama* as the offence was completed when the document was executed which was long before the application to the Excise Collector, and (ii) that the *Zaminama* was intended to be used before the



[pig] (Zool) A small
Brazilian rodent. The
tail is long.



row wings and
with a straight
pink hook



Great black backed Gull.

I to express stupidly. I can not sit
e gulls are very knowing birds in the
relative of being gulled. [Obs]

Had you no quirk
large ear by such a creature? E. Howe
is One who catches gulls and
traps silly people. [Obs]

liquor are taken into the stomach.

and Quan 2 in Quan 1

Guilim/bard (Fr guilbarde) A j w s harp ul

Guilim



Gai

G

Guilim/bard n See GILIMPA TOWEL.

He frets like a pained devil.

â, ă, ı, ô, ô, ȳ, long; â, ă, ı, ô, ô, ȳ, short. câre, âkr, lâst, fâll, vâhâ, thêre, vâll, tîrm; pîque, fîrm, dône, fôr dâ, wêlf fôdd, fôûl

Collector who was not a Court within the meaning of cl (c) of this section, 10 C. W. N. 220 = 3 Cr. L. J. 196; 10 W. R. 3; 3 C. W. N. 491 which *distinguishes* 25 C. 339. So long as the prosecution is confined to offences connected with a document prior to its production in Court, no sanction is required. All that s 195(c) prohibits is taking cognizance of an offence described in s. 463 when such offence has been committed by a party to any proceeding in any Court in respect to a document produced or given in evidence in such proceeding, 34 A. 634. Where an offence under s. 471 is made out in a complaint, the use complained of being prior in date to the use of the document in question in evidence in a Civil Court, the sanction of such Court is not necessary, 18 P. R. 1915 = 16 Cr. L. J. 617. It was *held* in 8 O. C. 313 = 2 Cr. L. J. 653, that no previous sanction is necessary for a prosecution under ss. 465 and 467, I P. C., in respect of a document, a registration copy of which had been produced in a suit and a finding came to that the original document was forged, since the original document in the Civil Court. See also employed the words 'off commission of the alleged offence, but with reference to the date on which the cognizance of the Criminal Court was invited and 34 A. 654 was distinguished and 4 Bom. L. R. 263 discussed, 17 A. L. J. 1030 = 42 A. 130.

Contra—The word "offence" occurring as the third word in cl (c) of s. 195 (1) is designedly used in a somewhat abstract manner. It is the offence in itself, not any particular offender's offence which the section aims at and that is in accordance with s. 40, I P. C., where "offence" is defined as the *thing* made punishable by the Code. In other words, the clause deals with the case where there is a substantive offence committed by a party to a suit. If that condition is realized then the clause enacts that no Court can take cognizance of "such offence." It is not likely that while the prosecution of the main offender could not be instituted without a sanction, any minor aiders or abettors or accessories of his could be prosecuted without a sanction. A will having been found to be a forgery in a civil suit, sanction was obtained to prosecute *L*, a party to the suit under ss. 193 and 467, I P. C., and to prosecute the attesting witnesses and the writer not parties to the suit, under ss. 193 and 467, I P. C. The High Court set aside the sanction on the merits. Then an application was made to the Court that the complaint under s. 467 alone as against the persons not parties to the suit should be proceeded with as no sanction was necessary as they were not parties to the original proceedings in the Civil Court, *held*, that the revocation of the sanction by the High Court carried with it as a necessary consequence the termination of the prosecution of all the parties for the offence of forgery generally, 12 Bom. L. R. 383 = 11 Cr. L. J. 388. In a suit in the Court of Small Causes, the Court made a reference to an arbitrator. The accused, a party to the suit, who was alleged to have fabricated evidence and to have committed forgery and used a forged document produced before the arbitrator was prosecuted in respect of those offences without the sanction of the Court of Small Causes, *held*, the Magistrate could not take cognizance of the case without the sanction of the Court of Small Causes, where the document alleged to be forged was filed with the award and formed a part of the record of the suit 17 M. L. J. 420 = 2 M. L. T. 496, 3 P. R. 1914 = 15 Cr. L. J. 358. On the institution of a complaint under s. 467 I P. C. in respect of forgery of a document produced in a suit in a Civil Court, objection was taken for want of sanction. It was contended that no sanction was necessary as the forgery was alleged to have been committed before the production of the document in the suit, *held*, sanction was necessary as s. 195 provides that no Court shall take cognizance without sanction of any offence described in s. 463, I P. C., etc., when such offence has been committed by a party to any proceeding in any Court in respect of a document produced or given in evidence in such proceeding 14 C. W. N. 479 = 11 Cr. L. J. 280. See 44 C. 1002. See Note 7 above and 23 A. L. J. 956.

8. *Forging a Vakalatnama*.—No sanction is necessary for prosecution as the person forging, was not a party to the proceedings in which the Vakalatnama was filed 18 Cr. L. J. 563.

9. *No sanction necessary for offence under s. 183 I. P. C., where public officer is complainant*.—Where a person was charged with an offence under s. 185 I P. C. for obstructing a bailiff of a Court in the execution of a warrant, *held* it was open to the bailiff to file a complaint without any sanction. It would not doubt be open to his superior Judge to direct a complaint to be filed 15 Cr. L. J. 649.

10. *Whether sanction necessary against persons not parties to proceedings.* (1) *Witness*.—Under cl (c) of sub-sec. (1) no sanction is required in respect of any document produced by a witness, a witness not being a party to the proceeding 3 M. 600; 25 M. 671; 30 M. 225; 32 A. 74; 32 C. 1004; 26 M. L. J. 220 = 15 Cr. L. J. 242. (ii) *Abettor*.—Or for abetment of offences mentioned in cl (c), 32 A. 74; 15 C. W. N. 565 = 12 Cr. L. J. 101. It may be that if there are other charges requiring sanction intimately connected with the charges which do not



Gybe, r f & t [sup & p p GYBED, p pr & r & t
GYBING] (Naut) To shift from one side of a vessel to the other,—said of the boom of a fore and

dis n [Gr *gymnos* naked and
(Lof) Naked fruit, having no
fural envelop about the fruit

gymnos [Gr *gymnos* naked and *gyn*
(Bot) A genus of leguminous
timber coffee tree The leaves are
in seeds are a good substitute for

1. The first skin of an animal.
2. The white mass of the natural color of the skin of men.
3. A button. [L. f. r. & u. [Lof]
4. The substance of the skin in two or three when ready to be used and laid out flat. A thread. This, when laid out flat, is used as part of a skin. The skin is used as part of a skin. The skin is used as part of a skin.

Gat r f [sup & p p GYBED p pr & r & t
GATING] (Ger taken See supra.)

A, B, I, O, G, F, long, A, B, I, O, G, F, short

require sanction, the Court may be induced to exercise its powers of supervision by directing the stay of proceedings, till the whole case is complete, 12 C. W. N. 822 = 8 Cr. L. J. 51, explained in 15 C. W. N. 563 = 12 Cr. L. J. 101. See, however 12 Bom. L. R. 393 = 11 Cr. L. J. 368; see also 5 Pat. L. J. 135; 49 B. 608 = 27 Bom. L. R. 607.

10-A.—But distinction should be observed with regard to cl (b) of sub-sect 1 of 195 and cl (c) of the same, cl (b) mentions offences committed in or in relation to any proceeding in any Court and makes no mention of any parties, while cl (c) specifically mentions offences committed by parties to any proceedings. So far as cl (c) is concerned the Court's power to lodge a complaint under s 476 is restricted to parties in the proceeding, but as far as cl (b) is concerned the Court's power to complain under s 476 is not limited to parties to the suit or proceeding. So it is held in 3 Rang. 303 that in respect of offences enumerated in s 195 (1) (b) of the Code the powers of the Court to complain are not confined only to the parties before it.

10-B. Whether ss 476 and 476-A apply to a forged document produced in Court, the person forging the document neither being a party to the proceeding nor producing the document in Court.—A person who possibly forged the document which was produced in Court cannot be proceeded against under s 476-A of the Code if there be no ground for supposing that he did so for the purpose of using it in Court and there is nothing to show that it was he who used the document in Court. 28 C. W. N. 880

11 Whether sanction necessary for Abetment.—See now sub-section (4) of 193, 20 M. 8 which lays down that no sanction is required previous to the prosecution of a person charged with the abetment of offences mentioned in the section is now overruled by sub-section (4). But where the person charged with abetment is not a party to the proceedings before the Court, no sanction is necessary, 32 A. 74, but see 12 Bom. L. R. 382 = 11 Cr. L. 368. See also 32 M. 3.

12. For disobeying order promulgated by the Local Government.—No sanction is required for prosecution for disobedience to an order of Government issued under the *Epidemic Diseases Act* III of 1897. Where the Chairman of a Municipality re-published the *Plague Rules* in his Municipality, it was held his sanction was not necessary. 33 M. 70.

13 Where forged document has not been produced in Court—Clause (c) of this section refers only to cases where a forged document has been put in evidence in a Civil or Criminal Court, in other cases, a Magistrate is competent *proprio motu* to inquire into allegations of forgery without sanction under this section 10 W. R. 5.

14 False statement in a departmental inquiry.—No sanction is necessary for prosecution on account of a false statement made in a departmental inquiry, 22 B 936 or in a preliminary inquiry made on a Police report 23 M. 223.

15 Forged documents presented to a Registration Officer.—No sanction is necessary, 11 M. 500 and see sub-sec (2) and Note 44

16 No sanction required against a Police-officer for making a false report—A Police-officer making a false or coloured report cannot properly be said to institute or cause to be instituted any criminal proceeding against any person. Therefore sanction for his prosecution under s 211, I P C, is bad in law, 4 C. W. N 337.

17. **Sanction not necessary when proceedings initiated as if under s 476.**—Where a Munsiff, on the report of a peon that he had been unlawfully resisted by judgment-debtors and assaulted by them, took action and sent the case to the District Magistrate, *held* that the District Magistrate was not justified in refusing to take cognizance for want of sanction, but should have proceeded under s 476 (2) B. C. W. N 535. Where an Assistant Judge before whom a witness gave false evidence took cognizance of the case as a District Magistrate under s. 190 (c) and it as a District Magistrate was not by the officer was in effect under s under s. 478.

18 Procedure where in the same transaction offences are committed, some requiring sanction and others not requiring previous sanction.—The complainant alleging that he was assaulted when trying under the orders of an Amin to open the door of a judgment-debtor's house, charged the accused with offences under ss. 183, 186 356 and 323, I P C, held that the sanction of the Court was not necessary in respect of offences under ss. 355 and 323 I P C, and the sanction of the Amin would be sufficient in respect of the other offences, 31 M. 43. See also 12 C. W. N. 822; 15 C. W. N. 565; 25 B. 90.

H.

H.

habitation, it *habitatione* } Qualifi
) Ability (*hab*) } *hab* *hab*

Art is properly an habitual knowledge of certain rules and maxims.
 2 According to habit customary, as, the habitual practice of sin.

It is the distinguishing mark of bad and piety to be praised for the most common maxims.

3 Formed by repeated impressions produced permanent by continued causes, as, an habitual color of the skin.

Syn = Customary, accustomed usual common

hab (*hab*) n. [See & *hab* & *hab* in the sea] The act or occupation of fishing for cod, ling and turbot in the St. Andrew's fishery.
hab (*hab*) n. [See *hab* & *hab*] A fish the Duke

two operate rectro ally on each other. The giving produces a habit of liberality. Habits of a prominent the custom of going to church. Cadet at once an act of the habit of habit-given modes

III.—WHAT IS A COURT ?

19. Meaning of the word "Court".—The word "Court" is not defined in the Code, but as used in this section has a wider meaning than the words "Courts of Justice" as defined in s. 20 of the *Penal Code*. Having regard to the obvious purpose for which s. 195 was enacted we think the widest possible meaning should be given to the word and that it would include a tribunal empowered to deal with a particular matter, and authorized to receive evidence bearing on that matter, in order to enable it to arrive at a determination, **17 C. 872 followed in 15 Bom. L. R. 45 = 14 Cr. L. J. 72.** There must be power to receive evidence and to come to a judicial determination on the evidence so recorded, **24 M. 121; 28 M. L. J. 123 = 16 Cr. L. J. 241; 36 M. 72.** The mere fact that a judicial officer is specially vested with certain quasi-judicial functions does not make him a Court while exercising those functions, **39 M. 581 referring to 11 M. 26 (P.C.), 30 M. 328 and to Vol. IX, Halsbury's Laws of England, p. 9,** where it is said "many bodies are not Courts, although they have to decide questions, and in so doing have to act judicially in the sense that the proceedings must be conducted with fairness and impartiality." The definition of "Court" given in the *Evidence Act* (I of 1872) is framed only for the purposes of the Act itself and should not be extended beyond its legitimate scope. **12 B. 38.** See Note 16 to s. 43a and Notes 6 to 8 to s. 476. See also **43 C. 585.**

Election Commissioners are deemed to be a Court under the wider sense of the term.—Election Commissioners are not a Civil Court within the meaning of s. 476, but they must be deemed to be a Court in the wider sense of the term under s. 195 of the Code and any complaint made by them of an offence may be regarded as filed under s. 195 (1), (6) of the Code, **23 A. L. J. 845 = 47 A. 934.** See also **23 A. L. J. 956** (for the definition of "Court").

It was further held that an order made by Election Commissioners under s. 476 of the Code could not be upheld as they are neither civil nor criminal, nor revenue Court within the meaning of that section. But as the complaint was purported to have been instituted under s. 476, the High Court entertained an appeal therefrom and set aside the order, but maintained it as a complaint under s. 190, sub-sec. (1), (a) of the Code **47 A. 934.** But see **46 A. 611.**

20 Revenue Officers held to be Courts.—

(i) *Tahsildar holding an inquiry as to mutation of names under Madras Act III of 1869*—A Tahsildar holding an inquiry under Madras Act III of 1869 as to whether a transfer of names in the Land Register should be made or not is a Revenue Court and before a party to any proceeding in such a Court can be prosecuted for an offence referred to in cl. (c) of sub-sec. (1), sanction should be obtained, **24 M. 121.** See also **12 Cr. L. J. 109 (A).** In **19 P. R. 1915 = 16 Cr. L. J. 785,** it was however held distinguishing **24 M. 121,** that a *Narb Tahsildar* dealing under the Punjab Land Revenue Act with mutation proceedings does so in his administrative capacity as a Revenue Officer and not in his judicial capacity as a Revenue Court.

(ii) *Certificate Officer acting under Bengal Act I of 1895*—Sanction must be obtained before a person can be charged under s. 206 I P C for having cut and carried away crops under attachment under Bengal Act I of 1895 as the Certificate Officer is a Court, **28 C. 217.**

(iii) *Income-tax Collector hearing objections*—A Collector hearing objections under s. 25 of the *Income-tax Act* II of 1886 is a Revenue Court, **44 P. R. 1903.** An Income-tax Collector is a Court within the meaning of cls. (b) and (c) of s. 195, **33 B. 642 (F.B.), 36 M. 72.**

(iv) *Mamlatdar holding inquiry under Chapter XII of Bombay Land Revenue Code*—A Mamlatdar holding an inquiry under Chapter XII of the Bombay Land Revenue Code is a Revenue Court within the meaning of s. 195, sub-sec. (1), cl. (c), as he has power to summon witnesses, to take evidence although he may not have power to administer an oath, to consider the evidence and make a final order, **39 B. 310.** See, however, **28 M. L. J. 123 = 1915 M. W. N. 177 = 16 Cr. L. J. 241.**

21. Revenue Officers held to be not Courts.

(i) *Officer recording tenant's rights under Chapter XI of the Madras Estates Land Act I of 1908* is not a Court—A Revenue Officer preparing a record of rights under ss. 164 to 187 of the *Madras Estates Land Act* is only discharging an executive function of the Court and is not a Court within the meaning of s. 476. He is not invested with powers to record evidence nor with the powers of a Survey Officer under *Madras Act IV of 1907*, **23 M. L. J. 123 = 16 Cr. L. J. 241.** See, however, **39 B. 310.**

(ii) *Settlement Officer preparing a record of rights.*—See **26 A. 322.**

- 1 To call after loudly, to accost, to salute
 2 To name, to designate, to call
 And such a son as all men do love me happy. *Shon.*

hair-worm (hāi-worm) n. (*Zool.*) A worm id. *Half-hound* or (hāf), n. One who takes dinner. *Half-sword* (hāf-sword), n. A sword
 of the genus *Gordius* resembling a hair or id. length of a sword, close fight.

As to a long, a, e, y, o, u, f, short, cure ear last fall, what, there, eight, term, pine, drum, done, for, up with food, food,

(iii) *Revenue Officer disposing of objection petition under s 103-A of the Bengal Tenancy Act*—See 3 C. L. J. 133, 23 C. 471

(iv) *Land Acquisition Collector*—A Land Acquisition Collector acts merely as the agent of the Government for purposes of acquisition and is not a Court. See 7 C. W. N. 249, 27 C. 820

(v) *Assistant Collector in the United Provinces to whom the execution of a decree by sale of immovable property is transferred under ss 68 and 70 Civil Procedure Code*—Under the rules framed by the Local Government by virtue of s. 70 of the Civil Procedure Code 1908 certain functions may be delegated to an Assistant Collector in order to effect a sale of immovable property in execution of the decree of a Civil Court but such an Assistant Collector is not a Court within the meaning of this section as he has not the power either to sell the property as a Court or to confirm the sale or to set it aside and he cannot give a sanction in respect of an application to set aside a sale on application which he could not deal with 37 A. 334

(vi) *Assistant Collector holding a departmental inquiry under the Bombay Land Revenue Code is not a Court*—(i) An Assistant Collector holding a departmental inquiry under the *Bombay Land Revenue Code* s 197 into the alleged misconduct of a subordinate is not a Court within the meaning of this section and no sanction is required for prosecution of the complainant under s 195 cl. (b), 22 B. 936 (ii) *Quere* whether a Sub-Deputy Collector holding proceedings under ss 52 and 84 of the *Land Registration Act* VII of 1876 (B.C.) is a Court within the meaning of this section so as to require his sanction to prosecute a person giving false evidence in such proceedings and whether such proceedings are judicial proceedings? 9 C. W. N. 127 (iii) Similarly a Collector whom to an application is made to replace a damaged stamp is not a Court 3 B. L. R. Cr. 6 = 11 W. R. 45. See also 1891 A. W. N. 82

(vii) *Excise Collector not a Court*—No sanction is necessary for prosecuting for the offence of fabricating false evidence (s 193 I. P. C.) by means of a document intended to be used before an Excise Collector who is not a Court 10 C. W. N. 220 = 3 Cr. L. J. 196

22. Persons exercising quasi judicial functions are not Courts within the meaning of s 195—

(i) *Commissioner to take evidence not a Court*—A Commissioner appointed to take evidence is not a Court. The word Court in s 195 must mean the Court whose duty it is to consider the evidence and decide whether it is true or false 11 C. W. N. 909 = 6 Cr. L. J. 160

(ii) *Official Assignee is not a Court*—An Official Assignee is not a Court even though he has a wide discretion in deciding on the claims of persons alleging themselves to be creditors of the insolvent or because at persons aggrieved by decisions of his case appeal to the Insolvency Court from those decisions 37 M. 107

(iii) *Arbitrator appointed by Court not a Court*.—In respect of an offence before an arbitrator appointed by the Court it is the Court that can grant sanction 17 M. L. J. 420 = 6 Cr. L. J. 331; 6 A. 101. A complaint cannot be entertained for offences under ss 193 and 471 I. P. C. alleged to have been committed before the arbitrator without the sanction of the Court 3 P. R. 1914 = 15 Cr. L. J. 358

23. *Judicial Officers vested with quasi judicial functions*—(1) Under Rule 5 of the rules framed by the Madras Government under s 413 of Madras City Municipal Act III of 1904 a Presidency Magistrate is authorized to hold an inquiry and decide whether a particular candidate is fit or not to stand for election to a Municipal Council held he was not a Court 33 M. 531 (2) See 21 B. 279 and 30 M. 326. The question in 33 M. 581 was whether the Presidency Magistrate when exercising the special function was subject to the superintendence of the High Court under s. 15 of the Charter Act. It may be that the Magistrate may be considered to be a Court for the purposes of s 195. See 37 B. 365, where the case in (1895) P. J. 844 was distinguished

24. *District Judge acting under Bombay District Municipalities Act is a Court*.—A District Judge when acting under s. 22 of the *Bombay District Municipalities Act* III of 1901 is a Court within the meaning of cl. (b), 37 B. 265

25. *Registrar of Presidency Small Cause Court*.—Under the Calcutta rules of the Presidency Small Cause Court

the same time

but

length of sword, close fight

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the, done, for, do well, told, told

26. Village Munsiff is a Court.—A Village Munsiff trying a suit is a Court, and as such can give sanction under this section where false evidence is given before him, 11 M. 375. But in 15 M. 131, the accused intentionally insulted a Village Munsiff in the discharge of his magisterial duties. The Village Munsiff did not prefer complaint or sanction prosecution, but a second-class Magistrate charged the accused under s. 228, I P C, on Police report and convicted him, *held*, that the second-class Magistrate was competent to try the complaint and the conviction was right, want of complaint being cured by s. 537.

27. Police-officer not a Court.—A Police constable taking down a statement under s. 161 is not a Judge, nor is the place where he officiates a Court. His sanction is therefore not necessary, under this section, to a prosecution for a false statement made to him whether the charge be framed singly or alternatively 11 B. 559. The prosecution of a person for giving false evidence before a Police *pauel* requires no sanction as a Police *pauel* is not a Criminal Court within the meaning of the Code (Act X of 1872), and s. 468 of that Code renders sanction necessary only when one of the offences specified therein is committed before or against a Civil or Criminal Court 4 B. 479.

28. Registration Officer not a Court.—*See* cl. (2). A Registrar or a Sub-Registrar is not a Court within the meaning of this section but offences committed before such officers are specially made punishable under ss. 81, 82 and 33 of the *Registration Act* III of 1877. Hence no sanction is required for prosecution in respect of an offence committed before such an officer and falling within clauses (b) and (c) of sub-sec. (1) though previous sanction or complaint is necessary in respect of offences within cl. (a) of sub-sec. (1), 11 C. 565. A District Registrar dealing with a complaint against a Sub-Registrar is not a Court 10 C. W. N. 221 = 2 C. L. J. 619 = 3 Cr. L. J. 112. *See* 10 C. 604; 12 B. 36 and 12 M. 201, where 10 M. 154 and 11 M. 3 are explained and also 15 M. 133, 2 C. W. N. 244; 11 O. C. 358; 11 C. L. J. 111 = 11 Cr. L. J. 212; 16 Bom. L. R. 946 = 16 Cr. L. J. 106.

IV.—SUBORDINATION OF PUBLIC SERVANTS.

29. Subordination of Police to District Magistrate.—A person gave false information to the Police and his prosecution was sanctioned by the District Magistrate, and he was convicted and sentenced to pay a fine. On appeal the conviction was affirmed by the District Magistrate. *Held*, that although Police-officers are generally subordinate to the District Magistrate, the subordination contemplated by this section is not such subordination, but subordination of some superior officer of Police, 27 C. 452. But if the District Magistrate gives the sanction at the request of the Police who it was contended ought to have given it, the sanction is proper, 32 C. 180. *Contra* in 27 A. 292; 6 P. R. 1910 = 10 P. W. R. 1910 = 11 Cr. L. J. 252, it was *held* that the District Magistrate is the head of the Police (*see* s. 4 of Act V of 1861) and is a public servant to whom the Police is subordinate within the meaning of sub-sec. (1), (a) and is competent to grant sanction for prosecution under s. 182, I P C, in respect of a false report to the Police. *See* also 47 P. R. 1867; 9 P. R. 1868, 4 Lah. 130.

30. Sessions Judge cannot grant sanction in relation to a proceeding before the Police.—A Sessions Judge cannot grant sanction to prosecute a person for an offence under s. 182 I P C, committed in relation to a proceeding before a Police-officer or a Sub-Magistrate to whom the reports were sent by the former, as neither of them was a subordinate of the Sessions Judge within the meaning of cl. (7), 27 M. L. J. 535 = 1914 M. W. N. 793 = 15 Cr. L. J. 612.

31. Taluk second-class Magistrate not official superior of Police Station-house Officer.—A second-class Magistrate of a *taluk* not being the official superior of a Police Station house Officer, cannot sanction a prosecution under s. 182, I P C, for giving false information to the Station house Officer, 6 M. 146. *See* also 2 N.-W. P. H. C. R. 237; 7 B. H. C. R. Cr. Ca. 64; 11 W. R. 22.

32. Honorary Magistrate not official superior of Police-officer.—A sanction given by a Bench of Honorary Magistrates for the prosecution under s. 182, I P C, of a person alleged to have made a false report to the Police was an illegal sanction inasmuch as the Police-officer to whom the report was made was not subordinate to the Bench of Honorary Magistrates within the meaning of this section, 1895 A. W. N. 152; 19 W. R. 53.

33. Village Munsiff is not subordinate to a Sub-Magistrate.—Under s. 195, the subordination of one public servant to another may arise either from express enactment or from the fact that both the public servants belong to the same department, one being superior in rank to another. There is no enactment which makes Village Munsiffs subordinate to Sub-Magistrates, nor do they belong to the same department 18 M. L. J. 534 = 4 M. L. T. 214 *dissenting from* 4 M. 241. *See* Note 26.

34. Registrar of the Small Cause Court subordinate only to the Chief Judge.—Where the Registrar of a Presidency Small Cause Court grants sanction under cl. (a) of sub-sec. (1) it was only the Chief Judge of the

Court to whom the Registrar acting as a public servant is subordinate, who can revoke the sanction, 27 B. 130. Had he been acting judicially, only the High Court as the principal Court of original jurisdiction could have interfered. In no event can a Bench of one or more Judges of the Small Cause Court interfere with the sanction accorded by the Registrar of the Court

35. Secretary of Municipal Board subordinate to Chairman.—The Chairman of a Municipal Board has power, apart from and independently of the Board to grant sanction for prosecution of an offence under s. 182, I P C., committed in respect of the Secretary of the Board, 1892 A. W. N. 31

Y.—APPLICATION FOR SANCTION, WHAT IT SHOULD CONTAIN.

36. Generally an application is indispensable for granting sanction.—A sanction to prosecute presupposes an application for sanction and where no such application is made, a Court ought not to take upon itself to grant sanction, but should take action under s. 476, 18 A. 213; 3 A. 62. In 1915 N. L. R. 111; 91 = 17 Cr. L. J. 59 = 32 In. Ca. 651, the case in 18 A. 213, was followed. The Code does not contemplate a Court or public servant giving sanction where no application has been made, 1907 U. B. R. Cr. P. C. 1 = 6 Cr. L. J. 25. Sanction should not be accorded without an application made for it by some person who may desire to complain of the offence 27 C. 820; 20 C. 474; 6 C. W. N. 37; 10 C. W. N. 222 = 2 C. L. J. 619 = 3 Cr. L. J. 112; 11 C. L. J. 111 = 11 Cr. L. J. 212, 23 P. R. 1901; 30 P. R. 1905 = 2 Cr. L. J. 687; 16 Cr. L. J. 251 (Pun), M. 189; 20 C. 349; 6 A. L. J. 796 = 10 Cr. L. J. 437, 8 S. L. R. 21 = 15 Cr. L. J. 662. Where a Sub-divisional Magistrate, after merely perusing the calendar of a case tried by a Magistrate subordinate to him sent for the record and without any application for sanction passed an order under this section sanctioning the prosecution of a witness in the case for perjury, *held* that the order was illegal, as the Magistrate had no jurisdiction to take cognizance of the offence, though he be a Court superior to the Court in which the offence was committed, 7 M. 560. Where a Magistrate directed a Police investigation in a case pending before him and as the result thereof passed an order against the complainant purporting to be under this section, *held* that the order was irregular inasmuch as this section presupposes an application by some person for sanction to prosecute, 1902 A. W. N. 193 following 1896 A. W. N. 32. A Police report setting forth the facts and containing a request that the petitioner should be prosecuted under s. 183, I P C., is a sufficient application to justify the Magistrate in giving sanction, 17 C. W. N. 976 = 14 Cr. L. J. 292.

Contra—There is nothing in law which requires that sanction to prosecute shall only be granted upon application by a private prosecutor, 10 C. L. R. 4. Where it was contended that the proceedings for grant of sanction were irregular because no application had been made for that purpose by the party to whom sanction had been granted, *held*, that s. 195 does not expressly provide that an application has to be made for the grant of the sanction. No doubt the cases in 27 C. 820; 18 A. 213; 20 C. 474; 10 C. W. N. 222 = 2 C. L. J. 619 = 3 Cr. L. J. 112, recognize the proposition that ordinarily a sanction should be given only on an application made for it by some person who may desire to complain of the particular offence, but whose complaint cannot be entertained without such sanction. The rule recognised in the cases mentioned may be justified to this extent that before a sanction is granted the Court must be satisfied that there is some person who is willing to avail himself of the sanction and to carry on the prosecution for the purpose whereof the sanction is granted, 13 Cr. L. J. 4 (C). In 17 C. W. N. 976 = 14 Cr. L. J. 292. CHAIRMAN, J. was of opinion that there was no necessity for any application in cases which come under sub-sec. (1) (a), *see* also 7 Mad. H. C. R. 58. In 16 Bom. L. R. 947 = 16 Cr. L. J. 107, it was *held* that to require an application in all cases was to depart outside the terms of s. 195 and it is open to a Court to grant a sanction without an applicant. The sanction contemplated by this section is not a sanction to any particular person to prosecute, but a sanction to the Criminal Courts concerned to take cognizance of certain offences specified in this section of which the Criminal Courts cannot take cognizance except with the previous sanction or on the complaint of the authority described in this section. The sanction whilst it is in force restores to the Criminal Courts a jurisdiction of which the same section deprives them in respect of specified offences and need not even name the accused person 8 Bom. L. R. 32 = 3 Cr. L. J. 277, where 27 C. 820 is not followed. In 16 Cr. L. J. 740 (M) the High Court granted sanction in respect of an offence before a District Munsiff without an application and ordered the District Munsiff to direct the process-server to act upon the said sanction. *See* also 17 Cr. L. J. 305 (S). *See* also Notes 57 and 90

37. Is a written application necessary?—It is the established practice on the Original Side of the Calcutta High Court to grant a sanction only on a formal petition being put in upon which an order could be passed. Where, therefore, on an oral application, the Judge then sitting on the Original Side said 'very well' but the officer refused to draw up the order as there was no application in writing, and subsequently a written application was made to another Judge sitting on the Original Side, *held* the latter had jurisdiction to make the order since the previous order was not in form and infructuous, 40 C. 423.

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33. No particular form necessary.—This section does not make any particular form of application or sanction necessary, 18 M. 437. No particular form of application is necessary, 3 C. W. N. 2.

39. What should application generally contain.—

(i) *The application must ask for sanction.*—A mere complaint by a stranger to the proceedings that a party has made a false statement without asking for sanction is not an application on which sanction should be granted, 13 P. W. R. 1913 = 68 P. L. R. 1913 = 14 Cr. L. J. 107.

(ii) *Application must specify the offence.*—Sanction for prosecution under a section other than that under which sanction was asked for by the applicant cannot be granted, 1898 A. W. N. 203.

(iii) *Application must specify time and place of offence.*—An application for sanction must specify the time when and the place where the offence was committed and sanction should not be granted except upon evidence before it of such matters, 5 A. L. J. 247.

(iv) *Application for sanction for perjury must contain the assignment of perjury.*—An application to prosecute for perjury must indicate precisely the statements alleged to be false showing the place where and the occasion on which such alleged false statements were made, 18 A. 203; 36 C. 808; U. B. R. (1913) (1st quarter) 168 = 14 Cr. L. J. 422. Mere omission to specify the statements in the application is not a ground for revoking the sanction, 537, 3 Bar. L. T. 151 = 11 Cr. L. J. 749; 36 C. 808.

(v) *Application for sanction for forgery must specify the document.*—Application to prosecute for perjury or forgery must indicate precisely the document in respect of which forgery is said to have been committed or must set forth in detail the statements alleged to be false, showing the place where and the occasion on which such alleged false statements were made. It should not be left to the Court which is asked to grant the sanction or to the Court which is to act on that sanction, to find out by reference to another record what the document is in respect of which sanction is sought or given, 18 A. 203; 7 M. 560; 8 P. R. 1898. It is not competent to a Magistrate to sanction the prosecution of a person in respect of a document in regard to which the application for sanction is silent and does not complain, 2 C. L. J. 612 = 3 Cr. L. J. 81.

VI.—WHO CAN APPLY FOR SANCTION AND TO WHOM SANCTION MAY BE GRANTED

40. Anyone may apply for sanction.—This section does not enact that application shall be made by any particular person. It merely provides that no Court shall take cognizance of certain offences without a sanction, 18 M. 437. See Note 90

(i) *Agent.*—In 39 C. 463 it was held that a landlord is entitled to authorize his agent to obtain sanction to prosecute an accused in respect of an offence committed against him.

(ii) *Minor cannot apply for sanction.*—A Civil Court ought not to entertain an application for sanction under s 195, presented by a minor unless it is presented on his behalf by some responsible person acting as the next friend 11 Cr. J. 327 (C.)

Whether sanction can be granted to legal representative of a deceased applicant.—Criminal proceedings started by a private person abate on his death, and so a petition for sanction for perjury filed by a party cannot on his death be allowed to be continued by his legal representative, though the latter may himself present new application for the same purpose. 47 M. 88.

41. Court may grant sanction to any person private or official.—“There is nothing to prevent a Police-officer from obtaining sanction under this section, and then filing a complaint or submitting a report to the Magistrate for him to take cognizance of the offence under section 190. Similarly if a Magistrate wishes to act in a fit case upon any other information or upon his own knowledge or suspicion, he has only to apply for a sanction. Nor is there anything to preclude a Public Prosecutor from obtaining the necessary sanction for any person to file a complaint.” *Per SANKARAN NAIR, J.*, 32 M. 49 at p. 56 and see also *Weir II*, 596. A Court may grant sanction at any time and to any person it considers fit to carry on the prosecution. The section affords a remedy without the necessity of granting sanction to a private party. A sanction may as easily be granted to the Public Prosecutor or any other official deputed by the District Magistrate to obtain it and the District Magistrate can be moved in a variety of ways if the case is one deserving of his attention. *Per PINNEY, J.* 32 M. 49 at p. 60. See Notes 90 and 52

(i) *Government Pleader.*—The Government Pleader on instructions from the District Magistrate may apply for sanction to prosecute in respect of an offence alleged to have been committed in connection with a Civil Suit (1908) A. W. N. 209 = 8 Cr. L. J. 157. When the Court is unwilling to grant sanction to a private

prosecutor and has refused, his application the Court is at liberty to give sanction to a Public Prosecutor, **13 Cr. L. J. 4 (C)**. So also a District Magistrate may instruct the Government Pleader to apply for the extension of the prescribed period of six months where the grantee of the sanction has allowed the time to expire, **15 O. C. 177 = 13 Cr. L. J. 551**. In **41 C. 446**, a Special Bench of the High Court holding an inquiry under s. 10 of the Letters Patent into the conduct of an attorney, thought that there were matters in the case which called for further inquiry with a view to possible criminal proceedings and the papers were placed before the Public Prosecutor, who applied through the Standing Counsel for sanction under s. 195 for offences under ss. 193 and 196, I P C., and sanction was granted. See also **32 M. 49**.

(ii) *Sheristadar*—In **12 Cr. L. J. 320 (Sindh)** sanction was given to the Sheristadar of the Court without any application by him and it was held that it virtually amounted to a complaint.

(iii) *District Magistrate*—See also **37 C. 13**, where it was held distinguishing **3 C. W. N. 3** that there is nothing in the Code to limit the grant to a party to the proceeding in which the offence was committed and sanction was granted to a District Magistrate. See **10 C. L. R. 4; 39 C. 463**.

(iv) *Strangers, but not if application is not bona fide and made out of spite*—In **3 C. W. N. 3**, it was held that no Court should entertain an application for sanction by a person not a party to the suit out of which proceedings for sanction arose. In this case an application for sanction unsigned and unverified was filed before a Munsiff, purporting to be on behalf of the defendant in a Civil Suit, who deposed that he was not aware of the application or its contents, and was not desirous of prosecuting, and the Munsiff found that it was filed by one R who was not a party to the suit, out of ill feeling, held, that no Court should entertain an application for sanction to prosecute, made by persons who are not parties to the suit out of which the proceeding arose. So also in **13 Cr. L. J. 1 (C)** and in **13 P. W. R. 1913 = 63 P. L. R. 1913 = 14 Cr. L. J. 107**, it was held that a Judge acted properly in not giving a sanction to a stranger to the suit. See also **11 A. L. J. 313 = 14 Cr. L. J. 389**.

VII.—WHO CAN GRANT SANCTION ?

42. Application for sanction should be made first to the Court before which the offence was committed.—As a general rule, application for sanction should be made in the first instance to the Court before which the alleged offence was committed, **6 M. H. C. R. 92; 7 M. H. C. R. Appx. 12; 22 W. R. 11; 29 P. R. 1879**, and unless there are exceptional circumstances the superior Court will not interfere in the first instance, **17 W. R. 46; 1903 P. R. 55** and see **32 B. 203**, where it was held that the appellate tribunal had no jurisdiction to grant a sanction when the first Court had dismissed the application for default of appearance. "Where sanction is asked for the prosecution of an offence alleged to have been committed before any Court it is in every way expedient that the application for sanction should, in the first place, be made to the Court in which, or in relation to any proceeding in which the offence was committed" **16 A. 80** at p. 82. See Notes 214 and 230.

43. Sanction may be granted by the Superior Court in the first instance.—Under clauses (b) and (c) of sub-sec (1), such superior Court is competent to accord sanction in the first instance, even though no application had been made to the Court in which the offence is alleged to have been committed, **27 M. 223**. An order passed by an Appellate Court is in law the order which ought to have been passed by the Subordinate Court and will therefore have the same efficacy and operation as the order which ought to have been passed by the latter, **27 M. 223** at p. 225; **Ratanlal 937; 6 C. 440 = 7 C. L. R. 330**. Under clis (b) and (c), it is competent to the Appellate Court, in the first instance to sanction the prosecution of appellants for forgery of a document not produced in his Court, but given in evidence in the appeal pending in that Court, an appeal being certainly a proceeding within the meaning of this section, **11 A. L. J. 11 = 14 Cr. L. J. 47**. On a petition to set aside for want of notice an *ex-parte* decree in a second appeal, the High Court called for a report from the District Munsiff and finding from the report that the petitioner had committed perjury before the District Munsiff gave sanction for his prosecution **18 Cr. L. J. 740 (M)**. The power of an appellate tribunal in sanctioning prosecutions for perjury, etc., is not restricted to cases in which an appeal is heard, but vests in the superior Court as a Court exercising supervision and control over the subordinate Court, as for instance, it might be exercised on a perusal of the records. It is immaterial how the superior Court is put in motion, **Weir 11, 160**. But it would be very undesirable for the High Court, except under very peculiar circumstances, to entertain in the first instance an application for sanction to prosecute for perjury, **17 W. R. 45**. See also **11 N. L. R. 38 = 16 Cr. L. J. 239; 67 P. L. R. 1916 = 17 Cr. L. J. 233**.

(i) *High Court acting in revision under s. 439 may grant sanction*—The High Court while exercising its powers of revision has power to grant sanction **25 M. L. J. 593 = 14 M. L. J. 512 = 16 Cr. L. J. 524**.

(ii) *Sessions Judge not competent to grant sanction*—A Sessions Judge is not competent to grant sanction for an offence under s. 193 committed before a Subordinate Magistrate, 27 M. L. J. 536 = 15 Cr. L. J. 612. But a Sessions Judge is competent to grant a sanction for the prosecution of a witness for statements made by him before the committing Magistrate and brought to the notice of the Sessions Judge (1917) M. W. N. 441.

(iii) *Superior Court not competent to grant sanction with regard to case pending on the file of a Subordinate Court*.—When a case is pending on the file of a Subordinate Magistrate and no final order has been passed by him, a District Magistrate has no power to grant sanction unless he withdraws the case to his own Court, 3 C. W. N. 490.

44. *Where practible, Judge who tried the case to be resorted to*—No doubt, ordinarily as a matter of convenience and expediency, an application for sanction should be made to the Judge who tried the case if he be present in Court. If he is not present, either by death or absence on leave or transfer, it is open to the Court, i.e., any other Judge of the Court to grant sanction. The words *such Court* does not mean *such Judge*, 33 C. 193; 7 A. L. J. 50 = 11 Cr. L. J. 140.

45. *Change of incumbent is no change of Court*.—The Court before which the perjury is alleged to have been committed is to give the sanction. The change of incumbent leaves it still the same Court, 7 M. H. C. R. Ap 12; 5 C. L. J. 176, where 33 C. 193 is followed 34 C. 551 (F.B.), 29 P. R. 1879. Thus in 11 C. W. N. 119 it was held that a Munsiff has jurisdiction to grant sanction in respect of an offence committed before his predecessor in office, 9 C. W. N. 859 distinguished and doubled. The term Court in cl. 1 (b) is not confined to the Judge who tried the case on the appeal, but also means and includes the successor in office of such Judge who can therefore grant sanction, 5 C. L. J. 176 = 5 Cr. L. J. 186. But it is always desirable that sanction should be granted by the Judge who tried the case, 7 A. L. J. 50 = 11 Cr. L. J. 40. A succeeding third class Magistrate may dispose of a sanction petition, even though he is incompetent to conduct the trial conducted by his predecessor, in which the offence for which sanction is applied for was committed, 19 M. L. J. 55. Note 55, but see next Note and also 39 C. 463.

46. *But when change of presiding officer make a change in the Court, sanction cannot be granted*.—Court trying the case and granting sanction must be the same.

(i) *Succession of Deputy Magistrates*.—Where there are many Deputy Magistrates and one of them is transferred, the Deputy Magistrate who comes to fill the gap is not the successor in office of the Deputy Magistrate who has been transferred 33 C. 437 at p. 460. The incoming Magistrate is not, therefore, competent to grant sanction in respect of an offence committed before the outgoing Magistrate, 42 C. 667.

(ii) *Can District Magistrate grant sanction for offences before Subordinate Magistrate who is transferred?*—After acquittal by a first-class Magistrate who was transferred outside the district an application for sanction to prosecute the complainant under s. 211 was made to the District Magistrate and granted. It was contended that inasmuch as on the departure of the Deputy Magistrate all cases then pending in his Court were placed before the District Magistrate, the District Magistrate for the time being became the presiding Judge in the Deputy Magistrate's Court and the sanction was good. The sanction was set aside, held it may well be that in so far as he proceeded to dispose of such part heard cases the District Magistrate within the meaning of s. 350 succeeded to and exercised the jurisdiction which the Deputy Magistrate had ceased to exercise, but in the present instance neither the original case nor the application for sanction were among the cases so left part heard 16 Cr. L. J. 840 (C). See, however, 20 Bom. L. R. 117 = 42 Bom. 190.

(iii) *Court trying case and granting sanction must be the same*.—A case was heard and decided by an Assistant Magistrate with second-class powers. On his transfer from the district, all his work was transferred to the Joint Magistrate who granted sanction in respect of a case disposed of by the Assistant Magistrate and the sanction was upheld on appeal by the Sessions Judge, held, that the Joint Magistrate had no jurisdiction to accord sanction, and though the Sessions Judge had power on a proper original application made to him to accord sanction, his appellate order cannot cure the defect, inasmuch as the Sessions Judge was not dealing with the matter as an Original Court, but as a Court of Appeal 1902 A. W. N. 9.

(iv) *Court of Subordinate Judge not a permanent Court*.—In 7 P. R. 1913 = 14 Cr. L. J. 178 it was held following 25 P. R. 1889 that though there is a class of Courts called Courts of Subordinate Judges, there is no Court of a Subordinate Judge as a permanent Court with a perpetual succession of Judges, and on transfer of a Subordinate Judge from a district, the Court of the Subordinate Judge, who takes over the pending work is not identical with the Court or the Subordinate Judge who has been transferred. See Note 190.

47. Court trying the case must be resorted to and not Court taking cognizance merely or transferring.—It is the Court which tries the case on the merits, that is the proper authority to grant sanction, and not the Court before which proceedings are instituted and by which process is issued, 6 C. W. N. 35; 3 C. W. N. 33. A complaint was made before a District Magistrate against a Police-officer. He allowed the complainant to make his complaint before a Deputy Magistrate at the headquarters. That Deputy Magistrate improperly transferred the investigation to the Sub-divisional Officer at B, who after investigation found the case to be false. Then the Deputy Magistrate recalled the case and passed an order deciding the trial of the complainant under s. 211, I P C., held the order for prosecution was without jurisdiction, as the Deputy Magistrate had after transfer no jurisdiction to recall the case or pass any orders under s. 476, 16 C. W. N. 885 = 13 Cr. L. J. 494. An order for prosecution for bringing a false case should be given by the officer investigating and not by the officer who transfers the case 40 C. 41

48. Magistrate making an investigation under s. 202 has no power to grant sanction.—A Deputy Commissioner upon receiving a petition of complaint against a public servant referred it for inquiry and report to a Sub-divisional Magistrate, who in consequence of an opinion formed by him during the inquiry proceeded to try the petitioner who was one of the complainants to the Deputy Commissioner, and convicted him under s. 182, I P C. held, that the Sub-divisional Magistrate has no jurisdiction to institute proceedings or to grant sanction, inasmuch as the complaint which led to the trial of the petitioner was not made to him but to the Deputy Commissioner 4 C. W. N. 366; 22 M. L. J. 419 = (1912) 1 M. W. N. 499 = 13 Cr. L. J. 209

49. Second-class Magistrate cannot grant sanction in respect of an offence before a Village Magistrate.—See 18 M. L. J. 584 (Notes 49 and 42), where 4 M. 241 was not followed. A sanction to a prosecution for an offence under s. 182, I P C., accorded by a second-class Magistrate, when the false information was supplied to a Village Magistrate is a sufficient sanction if the Village Magistrate is subordinate for the purpose at all events of transmitting information to the Magistrate granting sanction, 4 M. 241. *Quære* whether a Village Magistrate in Madras is a Magistrate within the meaning of this section and of s. 197 having regard to the definition in s. 3 (31) of the *General Clauses Act*, X of 1897?

50. False evidence before Village Munsiff's Court.—A Village Munsiff trying a suit is a Court, and as such can give sanction under this section when false evidence is given before him, 11 M. 376.

51. Sanction for perjury by an offender under conditional pardon.—Under s. 339 (3), the High Court alone is competent to accord sanction for the prosecution for perjury by an offender to whom a conditional pardon had been tendered.

52. Officer of Court may grant sanction for offences against him.—Where the complainant alleging that he was assaulted when trying under the orders of the Amin to open the doors of the judgment debtors' house, charged the accused with offences under ss. 183, 186, 355 and 323 I P C., it was held that sanction of the Court was not necessary in respect of ss. 355 and 323, I P C., and the sanction of the Amin would be sufficient in respect of the other offences, 31 M. 43. See also 8 A. 382

53. Persons not acting as a Court cannot grant sanction—

(i) *Commissioner examining witnesses cannot grant sanction.*—Where perjury is alleged to have been committed before a Commissioner appointed under s. 503, the proper authority to accord sanction is not the Commissioner, but the Court that tries the case, 11 C. W. N. 909 = 6 Cr. L. J. 160.

(ii) *Arbitrator appointed by Court cannot sanction.*—Where it was alleged that a party to the suit had committed before an arbitrator appointed by the Court, the offences of fabricating evidence, etc. held the sanction of the Court was necessary for prosecuting the party, 17 M. L. J. 420 = 6 Cr. L. J. 33.

(iii) *Official Assignee cannot grant sanction.*—See Note 38

(iv) *Collectors and Assistant Collectors acting departmentally.*—See Notes 36 and 37

(v) *Registration Officers.*—See Note 44

54. Dual capacity of grantor.—When an order which would have been a valid sanction if made by the Sessions Judge was in fact passed by the same person as District Judge, the High Court set aside the sanction, as in the absence of notice to the accused in that case it could not be said he had not been prejudiced. In 26 A. 514; 26 M. 139, the misdescription was held to be immaterial. See also 13 C. W. N. 1062; 17 W. R. 54 and Note 124

55. Contradictory statements in two Courts.—See Notes 132 and 133

IX.—POINTS TO BE CONSIDERED IN DEALING WITH SANCTION APPLICATIONS.

56. Only upon an application.—See Note 36 at p 449

57. Application should not be dismissed for default of appearance of applicant.—Where a Public the Court warranted appear at was bound the Court, cannot be dismissed on the non-appearance of the complainant, *Ratanlal 137*. See *Ratanlal 43*, where the complainant was allowed to withdraw

58. Notice must be given to the accused.—See Note 78 under Heading XI

59. Where necessary preliminary inquiry must be held.—See Note 99 under Heading XIII

60. Sanction must be based on legal evidence.—In cases falling under cls (b) and (c) of sub-sec. (1), sanction can be granted only on materials which can be regarded as legal evidence according to the provisions of the *Indian Evidence Act*. It is therefore illegal to grant a sanction based solely on an investigation conducted under s. 202 whether by a Police-officer or by the Magistrate himself. *SUNDRA IYER, J.*, in *22 M. L. J. 419 = (1912) 1 M. W. N. 499 (contra SPENCER, J.)*. When a Magistrate dismisses a complaint upon a report from the Police there is no legal evidence before him on which he could grant a sanction. It is irregular to substitute the opinion of the Police-officer who made the report for that of the Magistrate, *10 M. 232 (F.B.)*. A sanction ought not to be granted in respect of false statements contained in an affidavit sworn by him in a case in which he was an accused person *28 A. 331, 19 A. 200; 7 S. L. R. 75*. A declaration before it can be made the foundation of a prosecution under s. 199, I P C., must be one which is admissible in evidence and which the Court before which it is filed is bound or authorized by law to receive in evidence, *35 A. 58*. No sanction ought to be granted in respect of a statement in an affidavit which is sworn to before a Magistrate who had no power to administer oath, *5 S. L. R. 102 = 12 Cr. L. J. 563*. A Magistrate cannot grant a sanction or make an order under s. 476 in a matter which did not come within his cognizance in the course of a judicial proceeding, *2 C. L. J. 612 = 3 Cr. L. J. 81*. Thus sanction to prosecute a person for making a false statement at an investigation held by a Magistrate under s. 202 to which the public were not allowed access, was held illegal on the ground that such an investigation was not a judicial proceeding and that no oath could legally be administered in such a proceeding, *Weir II, 167*. Similarly, inquiry held by a Divisional Magistrate at the instance of the District Magistrate into the circumstances of a complaint against the Police was held to be not a judicial inquiry, *23 M. 223; 4 C. W. N. 366; 20 C. 724; 22 B. 938*. Where the person against whom sanction is sought was examined on oath, held the sanction based on such evidence was unsustainable, *26 M. 116*. It has never been doubted that under s. 195 sanction can be accorded only on legal evidence, *21 M. L. J. 795 = 10 M. L. T. 47 = 1911 2 M. W. N. 9 = 2 Cr. L. J. 323*. The evidence must be of a substantial nature and the evidence of an accomplice, unless corroborated is not sufficient to sustain a sanction for prosecution, *1900 A. W. M. 150*. Again a Court will not be justified in according sanction against a person merely because someone makes a statement behind his back that he had committed a certain offence and the Court believed such statement. An order granting sanction must be based on legal evidence. See *Weir II, 188; 23 B. 50; 27 M. 54; 23 M. 223*. The observations in *10 M. 232 (F.B.)* that the order giving sanction should be made on judicial evidence, or legal evidence, do not mean as contended for before us that such evidence must have been given on the application for sanction or even on the hearing of the complaint itself. In that case their Lordships held that the sanction granted merely on the strength of the Police report and of the result of the investigation was illegal. *PER WALLIS, J.*, in *26 M. L. J. 456 = 15 Cr. L. J. 271*. In that case it was held as I understand the points on which all the learned Judges were agreed, that the Magistrate should not substitute the judgment of the Police for his own judgment and cannot accord sanction merely upon Police report. It does not state that the authority giving sanction should act only upon legal evidence. It says that the authority giving sanction should act on the materials on which a Court can be satisfied. *AYYAR, J. ibid.* Where, therefore, a Subordinate Magistrate has granted sanction to prosecute the accused, for preferring a false charge, after having sent for the records of a previous case in which the fact which formed the subject matter of the present complaint by the accused were set up and found against him after his evidence as a complainant had been recorded and the complaint dismissed, held, the sanction was legal following *22 M. L. J. 419 = 11 M. L. T. 367 = 13 Cr. L. J. 209. Ibid*. See also the observations of *WHITE, C.J.*, in *39 M. 788*.

Contra.—SPENCEK, J.—A Magistrate proceeding under s 195 would not be wrong, if he took into consideration statements made before himself, not on oath, in the course of an investigation made by himself under s. 202. Opinion of AVLING, J., in 21 M. L. J. 795 = 10 M. L. T. 47 = (1911) 2 M. W. N. 9 = 12 Cr. L. J. 323 approved in 22 M. L. J. 419 = 11 M. L. T. 367 = 13 Cr. L. J. 209. See also 32 M. 49 at p. 57 where it is stated by SANKARAN NAIR, J.—“There are many cases falling within s 195 which do not fall within s. 476 as the latter is confined to judicial proceedings which the former is not”

61. Sanction ought not to be given unless there is a clear “*prima facie*” case against the accused.—No sanction ought to be given unless there is a clear case against the accused. That question ought not to be left over for consideration at the trial, 11 C. W. N. 195 = 5 C. L. J. 219 = 5 Cr. L. J. 29; 11 C. W. N. 35; 12 M. L. J. 392 and 408; 6 M. L. T. 91. A sanction given under this section is not a mere formal matter, and before sanction can be granted it is necessary for the Court granting sanction to consider the evidence and decide as to whether there is a *prima facie* case and any reasonable chance of a conviction being obtained, Weir II, 193. The reason that the Magistrate considers it essential that the truth of the matter should be thrashed out and that for that reason he sanctions the prosecution of the petitioner “as this appears to be the only course by which it can be decided whether or no this very serious offence was committed” is no ground for sanctioning prosecution, 26 M. 193. The evidence should show a *prima facie* case and a strong probability of conviction, in order to ensure the safeguard provided by law against vexatious and frivolous prosecution of parties before a Court and of witnesses attending and giving evidence in Courts of Justice in discharge of a public duty imposed upon them by law. Where a Magistrate granted sanction for prosecution of the complainant for the offence of forgery provided that an *alibi* of S is found on investigation to be true, held, that such an order was absolutely illegal. No sanction can be granted of a provisional character in case certain conditions are satisfied in the future. It is the duty of the Magistrate before granting sanction to satisfy himself that there was at the time of the order, a *prima facie* case against the party, 36 M. 471. See also 6 A. 114; 1889 P. R. 137; 1 C. W. N. 400; 23 M. 210; 10 M. 232; (F. B.) 16 C. 730; 20 C. 349; 23 C. 532; 7 M. 560 at p. 562; 11 C. W. N. 712; 12 C. W. N. 3 = 6 Cr. L. J. 356; 15 C. L. J. 337 = 13 Cr. L. J. 291; 10 M. L. T. 117 = (1911) 2 M. W. N. 172 = 12 Cr. L. J. 448, 3 Bar. L. T. 151 = 11 Cr. L. J. 749; 9 N. L. R. 184 = 15 Cr. L. J. 33; 13 A. L. J. 1111. See, however, 41 C 446 and the remarks of NAPIER, J., 17 M. L. T. 15 = 1915 M. W. N. 140 = 15 Cr. L. J. 115. An application for sanction must be carefully considered before the sanction is given, 17 Cr. L. J. 93 (A.) An opportunity should always be given to the person supposed to have made contradictory statements to give on oath an explanation of the statement he has made. See 43 M. 1 where 17 M. L. T. 15 is followed and the dictum of Sheshagiri Ayyar in 32 M. L. J. 54 dissented from.

62. Before granting sanction Judge must be satisfied that in all probability conviction will result.—When a Court is invited to sanction a prosecution because in offence against public justice has been committed, the ends of justice should not be allowed to be defeated on technical grounds. At the same time a sanction should not be lightly granted on mere suspicion, but the Court must satisfy itself that there is a *prima facie* case and that there is a reasonable prospect of a successful termination of the prosecution to be instituted, 15 C. L. J. 387 = 13 Cr. L. J. 291. The object of law in allowing sanction to prosecute is to restrain the exercise of private spite and to insist on there being prosecutions only when the interests of public justice render it necessary. It is not intended by the law to allow any person as of right to attack his civil adversary in a Criminal Court. * * Another reason for not granting sanction to prosecute in every case is that there may not be a number of prosecutions without convictions. It would be disastrous if there were a number of prosecutions ending not in convictions, but in acquittals. The result would be that, instead of putting down perjury, it would rather tend to encourage it. Therefore, a Judge, before sanctioning a prosecution, should be satisfied not only that in his judgment the document is not genuine but that in all probability conviction will be the result, 1 C. W. N. 400; 11 C. W. N. 712; 12 C. W. N. 3; 13 Cr. L. J. 4 (C.) No sanction under this section or s. 476 should be granted unless there is a reasonable probability of conviction. It would be an abuse of the powers vested in a Court of Justice if sanction were given or upheld on the principle that though the conviction of the party complained against is a mere possibility, it is desirable that the matter should be thrashed out, so that it may be decided whether or not offence has been committed, 37 C. 250 where 7 A. 871; 12 C. W. N. 3 and 1 C. 450 referred to, 10 N. L. R. 117 = 18 Cr. L. J. 161. The authority giving the sanction or upholding the sanction must go into the merits of the sanction application and unless there is a *prima facie* case and reasonable probability of conviction, sanction ought not to be given. It would be an abuse of the powers vested in Courts if sanction should be given or upheld on the principle that though the conviction of the party complained against is a mere possibility and is by no means probable, yet the giving of sanction would in itself operate as a punishment which in the opinion of the person giving or upholding the sanction is deserved by the person

whose prosecution is sanctioned, 26 M. L. 118; 7 Bom. L. R. 732 = 2 Cr. L. J. 611; 2 M. L. T. 518; 4 L. B. R. 234 = 14 Bur. L. R. 207 = 7 Cr. L. J. 423; 5 M. L. T. 91; 9 W. R. 3.

63. Court should consider whether prosecution necessary in the interests of justice.—Courts should not merely see that there is good prospect of conviction but should also consider whether the circumstances are such as to render a prosecution desirable in the public interests, 37 M. 564. Apart from the existence of a *prima facie* case, in cases where sanction to prosecute is applied for, the Court should see if there are good grounds for thinking that a prosecution is necessary in the interests of justice. See 20 M. L. T. 557 = 32 M. L. J. 56. Where the view of NAITER, J., in 17 M. L. T. 15 is dissented from. A case where the character of a public officer has been attacked by accusing him of having committed a cruel and barbarous offence apparently with the object of making it appear that he was not a fit person to proceed with a trial of a case pending before him at that time, is eminently one which ought to be heard and determined (1911) 2 M. W. N. 172 = 10 M. L. T. 117 = 12 Cr. L. J. 446. In 40 C. 446 the High Court declined to grant a sanction as the accused had been illegally and unnecessarily harassed by previous illegal proceedings. See also 33 M. L. J. 545.

64. Application for sanction should not be dealt with as though it were a trial—Nature of discretion exercised in according sanction.—In dealing with applications, for sanction, the Court is not trying the guilt or innocence of the accused, but is merely considering whether the statutory bar imposed by this section should be removed and the law allowed to take its ordinary course. The section is expressed in the widest terms and vests in the Court an absolute and unqualified discretion. Not one jot or tittle can be taken away from or added to the plain and express provisions of the Legislature by any decision of the Court, nor can this discretion vested by the section be crystallized or restricted by any series of cases, it remains free and untrammelled to be fairly exercised according to the exigencies of each case. When a tribunal is invested by Act of Parliament or by rules with a discretion without any indication in the Act or rules of the grounds upon which the discretion is to be exercised, it is a mistake to lay down any rules with a view to indicate the particular grooves in which the discretion should run for if the Act or rules did not filter the discretion of the Judge, why should the Court do so. There are, however, certain rules of procedure to which any Court exercising its discretion would pay regard, and pre-eminent among them, possibly a compendious statement of all would be the rule that the Court will be astute to see that there should be no abuse of administration of criminal justice. No one therefore, would be permitted to use a penal law merely to satisfy his own private ends or personal spite, 41 C. 446. See also 13 A. L. J. 1111.

65. Question of guilt or innocence need not be decided.—The question whether the person, sanction for whose prosecution is sought is guilty or not cannot be decided in sanction proceedings. The sole question is whether there are *prima facie* grounds for removing the bar to the institution of criminal proceedings by which alone the question of guilt or innocence can be determined, 7 Bom. L. R. 732 = 2 Cr. L. J. 611; 11 Bom. L. R. 1164 = 10 Cr. L. J. 539; 10 C. L. J. 564 = 11 Cr. L. J. 37; 14 Bom. L. R. 581 = 13 Cr. L. J. 639, 41 C. 446. It is not the function of the Court giving the sanction for a prosecution to require the same strictness of proof that Courts are wont to demand before they pronounce an accused person to be guilty. It is too much to expect the prosecution to prove at the time the sanction is applied for that there was no particle of truth in the complaint, (1911) 2 M. W. N. 172 = 10 M. L. T. 117 = 12 Cr. L. J. 446.

66. Sanction not to be given before termination of the original proceedings in respect of which the offence was committed.—The proceedings in respect of which the alleged offence has been committed must have judicially terminated before the Court to which an application for sanction has been made can grant it, 15 B. 729. By judicial determination it is not meant a trial of the persons against whom the original complaint is made, but the officer holding the inquiry must have finally disposed it of. 5 C. W. N. 254, 5 C. W. N. 106, 3 C. W. N. 490, 758 and 3, 16 W. R. 37, 5 A. 387, 4 C. L. J. 89; 1 M. H. C. R. 30, 1832 P. R. 50, 1 A. 497; 14 C. 707 (F.B.), 4 C. W. N. 305; 13 C. W. N. 398 = 11 Cr. L. J. 4. Proceeding with a view to the prosecution of a witness for giving false evidence should not be taken until a conclusion has been come to by the Magistrate or Judge conducting the trial in which the false evidence is supposed to be given upon the evidence given therein, 1913 U. B. R. (1st quarter) 166 = 14 Cr. L. J. 422; 21 C. W. N. 753. See Note 95.

67. Duty of Court when there are a number of accused.—Before granting a sanction to prosecute, a

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68. Point to be noted in granting sanction for disobedience of order under s. 144.—A Magistrate should not sanction a prosecution under s. 188 I P. C., for disobedience of an order under s. 144 unless there is some evidence that the disobedience of the order tends to cause annoyance, etc., 14 C. W. N. 234 = 11 Cr. L. J. 49.



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 2 Serving to promote health, salutary, as, a healthy diet.
 3 Indicating, characterized by, from health or soundness, as, a

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69. **Reasons for the order should be clearly set forth and proceedings must be so conducted as to satisfy the Superior Court.**—A Court should give reasons for granting or refusing sanction, 14 Cr. L. J. 195 (C). A Court sanctioning a prosecution under this section should state the reasons for doing so, and not confine itself merely to saying that it sanctions the prosecution. Otherwise a Superior Court is not in a position to decide whether it should exercise the powers conferred on it under sub-sec. (6), 1904 A. W. N. 171. But it must at the same time be remembered that s. 367 does not apply to orders under this section as it refers only to judgments on trials, 6 Rom. L. R. 897. When Subordinate Courts grant sanction to prosecute under this section, it is incumbent on them so to frame the proceedings before them as to enable the High Court to satisfy itself from the record, whether the application for sanction has been properly granted or not. A Magistrate, in disposing of a charge of theft, delivered the following judgment:—“The charge of theft of doors and windows is not proved at all against the accused. They are acquitted.” There was no further record of the proceedings held, that the mere fact of the charge laid by the complainant not having been proved, was not in itself sufficient ground for granting sanction to prosecute him under ss. 182 and 211 of the Penal Code and as beyond the judgment of the Magistrate, there was nothing on the record, to show that there were sufficient grounds for granting the sanction, it should be revoked, 16 C. 661, concurred in 23 M. 210, where it was further held that the Lower Court did not exercise a proper discretion in not giving the party against whom sanction was sought, notice of the application especially where the predecessor of the Judge granting sanction had refused it. Sanction should not be indefinite, 6 C. W. N. 37.

(i) *That there would be numerous similar applications is no ground for rejection*—A Judge ought not to dismiss the application for sanction on the ground that there would be numerous similar applications every day, 14 C. W. N. 808 = 11 Cr. L. J. 357; nor for the reason that there is nothing in the record to show that the case is false.

(ii) *Sanction by trying Judge's successor good, though based on predecessor's opinion*—A Sub-Judge, after duly hearing both parties and examining a witness on behalf of opponents and relying on the opinion recorded by his predecessor in office who heard and decided the suit and by the Joint Judge who confirmed it on appeal gave sanction for the prosecution of some of the plaintiffs, the opponents, for the forgery of a document produced by them in a civil suit in his Court, in which his predecessor, holding the document relied upon by the plaintiffs not to be genuine dismissed their claim and in which on appeal to the Joint Judge, declaring the document to be a forgery, confirmed the Sub-Judge's decision. The District Judge set aside the sanction, stating that the Sub-Judge ought to have held independent inquiry, instead of relying on the opinion expressed by the trying Sub-Judge, held, that the Sub-Judge adopted the proper procedure, and had material whereon to base his order, Ratanlal 705. See also 40 C. 423.

(iii) *Giving sanction on mere assurance of pleader is illegal*—Where the evidence on record being insufficient in the opinion of the Judge to sustain a charge under s. 211, I P C., the pleader of the petitioner obtained sanction to prosecute under s. 211, on the assurance that further evidence would be adduced at the hearing held the sanction was bad 14 C. W. N. 122. But it was open to the Judge to proceed in the matter of the sanction should he see it fit on further evidence which may be produced before him.

70. **Can a second sanction be granted when the first was infructuous.**—See Notes 167 and 228

71. **Costs should not be awarded.**—In proceedings under this section costs cannot be awarded, Weir II, 196. The powers of the Civil Procedure Code as to costs cannot be imported into a criminal proceeding, even though the Court called on to exercise the powers under this section be a Civil Court. A proceeding under this section ought not to be treated as a proceeding between private parties and costs ought not to be awarded. The person who applies for sanction presumably does so in the interests of the administration of public justice and if that was his real point of view he cannot very well claim costs, 13 Cr. L. J. 8 (C.), 5 P. R. 1915 = 16 Cr. L. J. 281. See also (1913) U. B. R. (1st quarter) 166 = 14 Cr. L. J. 422; 18 C. W. N. 1323 = 18 Cr. L. J. 151. The practice in the Madras High Court is to award costs, 17 Cr. L. J. 184 = 33 In. Ca. 824 (M). It was held, however, that proceedings of a Civil Court under s. 195 must be treated as of a criminal nature and costs should not be awarded 23 C. W. N. 661.

72. **Person against whom sanction is applied for ought not to be put on oath**—See Note 77

X—COURT'S POWER TO HOLD PRELIMINARY INQUIRY AND GO BEYOND THE RECORD IN GRANTING SANCTION.

73. **Court competent to hold preliminary inquiry and let in fresh evidence.**—On an application for sanction to prosecute, it was originally held that it is not competent to the Court to go beyond the record in

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determining whether or not sanction should be granted when the record itself discloses no foundation for the charges, 6 M. 29; 13 M. 224; 6 C. 440. But this was considered as *obiter dictum* and *dissented from* by NORRIS, J (BEVERLY, J, *concurring*), in 19 C. 343. There it was *held* that it is competent for a Civil Court before which a case may have been settled without any evidence being gone into, and which has grounds for supposing an offence of the nature referred to in this section has been committed before it during the pendency of such a case, to make a preliminary inquiry, and thus satisfy itself whether a *prima facie* case has been made out for granting sanction, and if satisfied, to grant sanction for the prosecution of the person alleged to have committed such offence. A sanction granted after such preliminary inquiry and based thereon is not illegal, The case in 6 M. 29 and 13 M. 1224, were also dissented from by the Madras High Court in a later case. The Court remarked that reading s. 195 with s. 476, it is open to a Court, when a person is accused of giving false evidence before it, to hold inquiry into the truth of the accusation and take other evidence besides that contained in the record of the case. The words of the sections contain no limitation to an offence appearing on the face of the record, though nothing would have been easier than to have expressed such limitation, if it was intended to have effect. To admit the contention that the Court cannot go beyond the record in determining whether sanction for prosecution should be granted or not would be, by an artificial rule, to screen from prosecution men who might have committed the grossest offence against public justice, and offences perfectly capable of being proved merely because, owing to surprise, accident or oversight, etc., evidence of the offence was not, or could not be produced before the Court at the same time that the offence was committed. In deciding the case in 6 M. 29 and 6 C. 440 = 7 C. L. R. 330, the learned Judges did not refer to the effect of s. 471 (now s. 476) of the then Criminal Procedure Code, and it is difficult to reconcile these decisions with the provisions of that section, 20 M. 339; Weir II, 477. See also 7 Bom. L. R. 732 = 2 Cr. L. J. 614; 4 L. B. R. 234 = 14 Bur. L. R. 207 = 7 Cr. L. J. 493; (1911) 2 M. W. N. 528 = 13 Cr. L. J. 19.

74. Preliminary investigation may be dispensed with if sufficient evidence on record.—Though a Court acting under s. 195 (b) is competent to and in a proper case should give notice and make inquiry before granting sanction, the law does not compel the giving of notice or the holding of an inquiry before granting sanction, 11 N. L. R. 36 = 16 Cr. L. J. 289. See also 12 C. 58; 18 A. 358; 10 M. 232, 26 M. 692. If in the course of a criminal trial, the evidence recorded by the trying Magistrate discloses a *prima facie* case of an offence under s. 193, I P C, sanction may be given by that Magistrate without independent preliminary investigation, Ratanlal 132. When the facts have been already fully set forth, a separate preliminary inquiry is not necessary, 2 P. R. 1888; 6 C. 308; 20 C. 474; 5 A. 62. When a proper inquiry has already been made by some authority subordinate to the Court to which application for sanction is made, such Court would be justified in according sanction without any further inquiry, 3 B. L. R. A Cr. 9.

75. Preliminary inquiry must be held when the evidence on record does not disclose *prima facie* case for prosecution.—Sanction application cannot be summarily dismissed.—It may be necessary to hold some inquiry before sanction is given though there is no rigid rule of law making it imperative 20 C. 349 and 474, 6 C. W. N. 295 23 C. 532, 6 C. 308; 26 B. 785, 30 C. 415. Sanction should not be granted without a preliminary inquiry where such inquiry is necessary within the meaning of s. 476, 6 A. 98 and 101; 5 A. 62 and 7 M. 189. Where a Judge dismissed an application for sanction to prosecute a plaintiff for bringing a false suit on the ground that he was not bound to go beyond the record, *held* that the records had nothing to do with the application. The plaint is before the Court and the Court will have to ascertain whether the case made out on the plaint was a true or a false case, and if a false case whether the sanction should be granted or not. If the Judge finds that to decide whether the case is false will involve an inquiry equivalent to trying the case *de novo*, he must discharge the duty the law imposes on him 37 C. 714. A Magistrate has no power upon an application for sanction at once to grant sanction and issue warrants against the accused even without examining the complainant on oath, 2 C. L. J. 612 = 3 Cr. L. J. 81. But an Appellate Court which did not hear

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necessary, under s. 476 10 C.

W. N. 1091. When an arbitrator found a document to be forged, the Court that referred the matter to the arbitrator can grant sanction in respect of the forged document, only after holding a preliminary inquiry to satisfy itself that there were materials to justify a prosecution, 6 A. 101. A plaintiff filed a suit on a promissory note but withdrew the suit before any summons or notice was taken out for the defendant. The defendant alleging the document to be forged applied for sanction to prosecute the plaintiff under ss. 463, 471 and 475, I P C. The Munsif in whose Court the suit was filed refused sanction relying on 35 C. 820, but the District Judge set aside the order and granted sanction. There was no inquiry into the question whether the promissory note was

69. Reasons for the order should be clearly set forth and proceedings must be so conducted as to satisfy the Superior Court.—A Court should give reasons for granting or refusing sanction, 14 Cr. L. J. 195 (C). A Court sanctioning a prosecution under this section should state the reasons for doing so, and not confine itself merely to saying that it sanctions the prosecution. Otherwise a Superior Court is not in a position to decide whether it should exercise the powers conferred on it under sub-sec. (6), 1904 A. W. N. 171. But it must at the same time be remembered that s. 367 does not apply to orders under this section as it refers only to judgments on trials, 6 Rom. L. R. 897. When Subordinate Courts grant sanction to prosecute under this section, it is incumbent on them so to frame the proceedings before them as to enable the High Court to satisfy itself from the record, whether the application for sanction has been properly granted or not. A Magistrate, in disposing of a charge of theft, delivered the following judgment:—"The charge of theft of doors and windows is not proved at all against the accused. They are acquitted." There was no further record of the proceedings, *held*, that the mere fact of the charge laid by the complainant not having been proved, was not in itself sufficient ground for granting sanction to prosecute him under ss. 182 and 211 of the Penal Code and as beyond the judgment of the Magistrate, there was nothing on the record, to show that there were sufficient grounds for granting the sanction, it should be revoked, 16 C. 661, *concurring* in 23 M. 210, where it was further *held* that the Lower Court did not exercise a proper discretion in not giving the party against whom sanction was sought, notice of the application especially where the predecessor of the Judge granting sanction had refused it. Sanction should not be indefinite, 6 C. W. N. 37.

(i) *That there would be numerous similar applications is no ground for rejection*—A Judge ought not to dismiss the application for sanction on the ground that there would be numerous similar applications every day, 14 C. W. N. 806 = 11 Cr. L. J. 357, nor for the reason that there is nothing in the record to show that the case is false.

(ii) *Sanction by trying Judge's successor good, though based on predecessor's opinion*—A Sub Judge, after duly hearing both parties and examining a witness on behalf of opponents and relying on the opinions recorded by his predecessor in office, who heard and decided the suit, and by the Joint Judge who confirmed it on appeal gave sanction for the prosecution of some of the plaintiffs, the opponents, for the forgery of a document produced by them in a civil suit in his Court, in which his predecessor, holding the document relied upon by the plaintiffs not to be genuine dismissed their claim and in which on appeal to the Joint Judge, declaring the document to be a forgery, confirmed the Sub-Judge's decision. The District Judge set aside the sanction, stating that the Sub-Judge ought to have held independent inquiry, instead of relying on the opinion expressed by the trying Sub-Judge, *held*, that the Sub-Judge adopted the proper procedure and had material whereon to base his order, Ratanlal 705. See also 40 C. 423.

(iii) *Giving sanction on mere assurance of pleader is illegal*—Where the evidence on record being insufficient in the opinion of the Judge to sustain a charge under s. 211, I P C., the pleader of the petitioner obtained sanction to prosecute under s. 211, on the assurance that further evidence would be adduced at the hearing *held* the sanction was bad 14 C. W. N. 122. But it was open to the Judge to proceed in the matter of the sanction should he see it fit on further evidence which may be produced before him.

70. Can a second sanction be granted when the first was infructuous.—See Notes 167 and 228.

71. Costs should not be awarded.—In proceedings under this section costs cannot be awarded, *Weir* 11, 196. The powers of the Civil Procedure Code as to costs cannot be imported into a criminal proceeding, even though the Court called on to exercise the powers under this section be a Civil Court. A proceeding under this section ought not to be treated as a proceeding between private parties and costs ought not to be awarded. The person who applies for sanction presumably does so in the interests of the administration of public justice and if that was his real point of view he cannot very well claim costs, 13 Cr. L. J. 6 (C), 5 P. R. 1915 = 15 Cr. L. J. 231. See also (1913) U. B. R. (1st quarter) 166 = 14 Cr. L. J. 422; 18 C. W. N. 1223 = 16 Cr. L. J. 151. The practice in the Madras High Court is to award costs, 17 Cr. L. J. 184 = 33 In. C. 824 (M). It was held, however, that proceedings of a Civil Court under s. 195 must be treated as of a criminal nature and costs should not be awarded 23 C. W. N. 661.

72. Person against whom sanction is applied for ought not to be put on oath.—See Note 77.

X—COURT'S POWER TO HOLD PRELIMINARY INQUIRY AND GO BEYOND THE RECORD IN GRANTING SANCTION.

73. Court competent to hold preliminary inquiry and let in fresh evidence.—On an application for sanction to prosecute it was originally *held* that it is not competent to the Court to go beyond the record in

3 The end
Heel'-p'at n (Lat) The post which supports, at the outer end, the propelling screw of a steam vessel
 1 A small piece of leather for the

Heel'-p'at er, } One who

Heel

Heer n The tongue of woolen threads

Heft n (Eng Heave Cf A weight)

1 The act or effort of heavy strain or exertion, effort
 10 He cracks his gorge
 With violent heave

9 Weight ponderousness

Hegel
He'gel'ian n One v
 a system of Hegel
He'gel'ian'ism n

Hegel
 He'gel'ian
 He'gel'ian'ism

Guinea Betw to the north sea, in the same height as even in the north

Guinea

Guinea
 a [Or the one belonging to the sun from above, the sun N Lat heli- aque] (Astron) 1 emerging from the sun or passing into it rising or setting at nearly the same time as the sun

Guinea

h, k, t, d, g, long h, k, t, d, g, short; care, fear, least, fall, what; there, sell, term, plique, firm, done, for, dog, wolf, sand, foot;

determining whether or not sanction should be granted when the record itself discloses no foundation for the charges, 6 M. 29; 15 M. 224; 6 C. 440. But this was considered as *obiter dictum* and dissented from by NORRIS, J. (HEVERLEY, J., concurring), in 19 C. 343. There it was held that it is competent for a Civil Court before which a case may have been settled without any evidence being gone into, and which has grounds for supposing an offence of the nature referred to in this section has been committed before it during the pendency of such a case, to make a preliminary inquiry, and thus satisfy itself whether a *prima facie* case has been made out for granting sanction, and if satisfied to grant sanction for the prosecution of the person alleged to have committed such offence. A sanction granted after such preliminary inquiry and based thereon is not illegal. The case in 6 M. 29 and 15 M. 224, were also dissented from by the Madras High Court in a later case. The Court remarked that reading s. 195 with s. 476, it is open to a Court, when a person is accused of giving false evidence before it, to hold inquiry into the truth of the accusation and take other evidence besides that contained in the record of the case. The words of the sections contain no limitation to an offence appearing on the face of the record though nothing would have been easier than to have expressed such limitation, if it was intended to have effect. To admit the contention that the Court cannot go beyond the record in determining whether sanction for prosecution should be granted or not would be, by an artificial rule, to screen from prosecution men who might have committed the grossest offence against public justice, and offences perfectly capable of being proved merely because, owing to surprise, accident or oversight, etc., evidence of the offence was not, or could not be produced before the Court at the same time that the offence was committed. In deciding the case in 6 M. 29 and 6 C. 440 = 7 C. L. R. 330, the learned Judges did not refer to the effect of s. 471 (now s. 476) of the then Criminal Procedure Code, and it is difficult to reconcile these decisions with the provisions of that section, 20 M. 339; Weir II, 177. See also 7 Bom. L. R. 732 = 2 Cr. L. J. 611; 4 L. B. R. 234 = 14 Bur. L. R. 207 = 7 Cr. L. J. 495; (1911) 2 M. W. N. 526 = 13 Cr. L. J. 19.

74. Preliminary investigation may be dispensed with if sufficient evidence on record.—Though a Court acting under s. 195 (b) is competent to and in a proper case should give notice and make inquiry before granting sanction the law does not compel the giving of notice or the holding of an inquiry before granting sanction, 11 N. L. R. 36 = 16 Cr. L. J. 289. See also 12 C. 58; 18 A. 358; 10 M. 232; 26 M. 592. If in the course of a criminal trial, the evidence recorded by the trying Magistrate discloses a *prima facie* case or an offence under s. 193, I P C, sanction may be given by that Magistrate without independent preliminary investigation, Ratanlal 132. When the facts have been already fully set forth, a separate preliminary inquiry is not necessary, 2 P. R. 1888; 6 C. 308; 20 C. 474; 5 A. 62. When a proper inquiry has already been made by some authority subordinate to the Court to which application for sanction is made such Court would be justified in according sanction without any further inquiry, 3 B. L. R. A. Cr. 9.

75. Preliminary inquiry must be held when the evidence on record does not disclose *prima facie* case for prosecution—Sanction application cannot be summarily dismissed.—It may be necessary to hold some inquiry before sanction is given though there is no rigid rule of law making it imperative, 20 C. 349 and 474; 6 C. W. N. 295; 23 C. 532; 6 C. 308; 26 B. 785; 30 C. 415. Sanction should not be granted without a preliminary inquiry where such inquiry is necessary within the meaning of s. 476 6 A. 98 and 101, 5 A. 62 and 7 M. 189. Where a Judge dismissed an application for sanction to prosecute a plaintiff for bringing a false suit on the ground that he was not bound to go beyond the record, held that the records had nothing to do with the application. The plaintiff is before the Court and the Court will have to ascertain whether the case made on the plaintiff was a true or a false case, and if a false case whether the sanction should be granted or not. If the Judge finds that to decide whether the case is false will involve an inquiry equivalent to trying the case *de novo*, he must discharge the duty the law imposes on him, 37 C. 714. A Magistrate has no power upon an application for sanction, at once to grant sanction and issue warrants against the accused even without examining the complainant on oath, 2 C. L. J. 612 = 3 Cr. L. J. 81. But an Appellate Court which did not hear the evidence is not competent to give sanction to prosecute for perjury on materials not in evidence at the trial and which the witness has had no opportunity of explaining while under examination. The Court under such circumstances should hold a preliminary inquiry into the matter and proceed, if necessary, under s. 476, 10 C. W. N. 1091. When an arbitrator found a document to be forged, the Court that referred the matter to the arbitrator can grant sanction in respect of the forged document, only after holding a preliminary inquiry to satisfy itself that there were materials to justify a prosecution, 6 A. 101. A plaintiff filed a suit on a promissory note but withdrew the suit before any summons or notice was taken out for the defendant. The defendant alleging the document to be forged applied for sanction to prosecute the plaintiff under ss. 463, 471 and 475, I P C. The Munsiff in whose Court the suit was filed, refused sanction relying on 35 C. 820, but the District Judge set aside the order and granted sanction. There was no inquiry into the question whether the promissory note was

forged as no evidence was taken, *held, per* ABDUR RAHIM, J.—A Court before granting sanction ought to be satisfied that there is at least a *prima facie* case for prosecution, and the person to be prosecuted must have had an opportunity of showing that the document on which he based his suit is genuine. There must be some inquiry and the Court granting sanction must be satisfied on evidence that the document used in Court is false. Though where a suit has been properly tried there need not be a fresh inquiry into the character of the document, yet when a suit has not been tried at all, sanction ought not to be granted without its being found on proper inquiry held for the purpose that there are sufficient grounds for holding the document to be a forgery. *Contra*—*Per* SPENCER, J. S 195 does not unlike s 476, require any inquiry as a necessary antecedent to the grant of sanction, 20 C. 474, *referred to*. The District Judge had only to see if a *prima facie* case had been established. Actual proof might be left to the trial. The sanction should not be interfered with, (1911) 2 M. W. N. 526 = 13 Cr. L. J. 19. See also 22 C. 1004 and Notes 152 and 153.

76. Nature of the inquiry.—Any inquiry that may be held under this section need not even be a judicial inquiry. *Per* SPENCER, J., in (1911) 2 M. W. N. 526 = 13 Cr. L. J. 19 referring to 6 W. R. 41. *Per* ABDUR RAHIM, J. "I do not wish to lay down that the inquiry must be in any particular form. The Code does not say that in granting sanction under the section the Court must take evidence. The section does not say upon what materials and what evidence the Court should act before either granting or refusing sanction." See also 14 Bom. L. R. 587 = 13 Cr. L. J. 689; 26 M. L. J. 436 = 15 Cr. L. J. 271. If the Court were to take evidence then it would turn itself into a Court trying the criminal case, whereas the question under s 195 is whether there is *prima facie* ground for sanctioning prosecution. In Ratanlal 629 it was held competent to a Magistrate to take supplementary evidence after an application has been made to him for sanctioning the prosecution of a person for making a false complaint, but in such cases such evidence must be duly recorded. Court executing a decree has jurisdiction to sanction the prosecution of persons resisting execution by attachment of movables solely on the evidence of the peon carrying out the execution order, 47 C. 744.

77. Respondent not to be put on oath or cross-examined.—Although the respondent is not upon his trial upon a criminal charge, in being required to show cause why he should not be criminally prosecuted, he is in the position of a person accused of committing an offence and his examination therefore should not be on oath, nor should he be cross-examined, but any questions put to him should be put with the object of enabling him to explain the circumstances which required explanation, (1913) U. B. R. (1st/quarter) 166 = 14 Cr. L. J. 422. See 6 Cr. L. J. 25 (U.B.R.) 11 Bom. L. R. 1164 = 10 Cr. L. J. 339. There is no section in the Code which warrants the admission of affidavits in the preliminary inquiry, but when the affidavits have been admitted by consent of parties, the admission is a mere irregularity within s 537 and the sanction is not bad. 14 Bom. L. R. 587 = 13 Cr. L. J. 689.

XI.—NOTICE TO THE ACCUSED.

78. Notice to accused generally necessary.—A conviction for preferring a false complaint is not illegal only by reason of the prosecution having been sanctioned without notice previously given to the accused. Sanctioning a prosecution for an offence is a judicial act, and the party to whose prejudice it is done must be previously heard and a judgment formed upon legal evidence. In cases in which the Magistrate dismisses the original complaint upon a report from the Police, there is no legal evidence before him on which to form his judgment. In cases however, in which the Magistrate examines the complainant and hears the evidence and acquits or discharges the accused, and then, without notice to the complainant, sanctions his prosecution for preferring a false charge, sanction cannot be said to be improperly given, 10 M. 232 (F.B.). There is no hard and fast-rule that notice must be given in all cases to an accused person before sanction is granted, 26 M. 592. The Allahabad High Court has *held* that though sanction is not bad for want of notice, notice is desirable. 18 A. 338; 23 A. 142, where 23 M. 210; 4 Bom. L. R. 750 and (1904) A. W. N. 171 are *referred to*. See also 30 A. 59. Though notice may not be legally necessary in all cases, it is certainly necessary, that the authority competent to grant sanction should judicially consider and determine as a Court responsible for the granting of sanction whether any special reason appears to warrant a departure from the ordinary practice that the party to whose prejudice any order is to be made must be previously heard, 4 Bom. L. R. 750.—An application for sanction must be carefully considered before the sanction is given, 17 Cr. L. J. 93 (A). An opportunity should always be given to the person supposed to have made contradictory statements to give on oath an explanation of the statement he has made. See 20 Cr. L. J. 616; 18 Cr. L. J. 759; 18 A. L. J. 331.

Sanction not to be granted before service of notice.—When a notice has been issued to the accused to show cause why his prosecution (under s 193 I. P. C.) should not be sanctioned, sufficient time should be allowed for its service. Sanction cannot then be granted before its service. Ratanlal 404. See also 23 M. 210.

About this place in this
university of herbood
time to come, in some future

HERB
L. Herbs collectively, green food for beasts,
grass, pasture

The influence of true religion is made
it constant as the descent of the evening
herbage

Herbage is visible and tasteless
entire in an ideal world exists, is
ing out of substantial corporeal

HERBARIUM [L. Lat., from Lat. herb., see
HERB]
A collection of dried plants, carefully arranged
and preserved

HERB-GRASS, n. (bot.) A certain plant, the rose

79. When notice may be dispensed with.—No notice is necessary to the person against whom it is intended to proceed before the Court in which the alleged offence has been committed can grant sanction a complaint being made to a Magistrate regarding one of the offences specified in this section, when the offence is committed before the Court whose sanction is applied for, 12 C. 58 (F.B.) *overruling* 10 C. 1100. *See* 18 A 358; 7 M. 224; 10 M. 332 (F.B.), 26 M. 292; 41 C. 446; 11 N. L. R. 36 = 16 Cr. L. J. 289.—But where a party hearing that sanction has been applied for against him requests to be heard before sanction was given, *held* that this opportunity should have been given him, 16 C. 651.

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A sanction
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81. Before granting sanction for offences committed before the Police, notice should be given.—It is very desirable that in offences under s. 182, I P. C., especially when they are said to have been committed before a Police-officer, notice should be given to the accused in order that he may have an opportunity to clear himself before sanction for his prosecution is given, but the absence of notice does not vitiate the whole proceedings, so that the sanction awarded ought not on that ground alone be summarily reversed, 1890 A. W. N. 168; 10 M. 232 (F.B.), 7 M. 292. But *see* 15 A. 336.

XII.—SANCTION IN RESPECT OF PERJURY AND FABRICATING FALSE EVIDENCE.

82. Facts to be taken into account in according sanction for perjury.—In sanctioning a prosecution for perjury against a witness, the Magistrate should remember that the statement must be *intentionally* false in order to justify a prosecution. When the question is neither material to the issue in the case nor goes to the credit of the witness sanction ought not to be accorded. Some allowance ought to be made to a witness seeking to evade some matter relating to for instance, his past history, 2 A. L. J. 839 = 3 Cr. L. J. 43, where 28 A. 509 is *distinguished*. The materiality of the evidence to the matter in issue is not the only point to be considered, *Weir* II, 166 and 652, *see* also 15 C. W. N. 169 = 12 Cr. L. J. 11. When a witness on cross-examination stated he had not applied for insolvency while, as a matter of fact, he had applied and the application had been dismissed, *held*, that without knowing the form in which the question was put, it is unreasonable to assume that the reply was intentionally false and give sanction for his prosecution under s. 193, I P. C., 12 P. R. 1908 = 8 Cr. L. J. 243. Sanction for perjury ought not to be granted against a witness based on records which were not produced before or at the time of the deposition and in respect of which the witness was not given any opportunity for an explanation 17 M. L. T. 15 = 1915 M. W. N. 140 = 16 Cr. L. J. 115. *See* also 72 P. L. R. 1911 = 14 P. W. R. 1911 = 12 Cr. L. J. 263.

83. Before granting sanction, a locus penitentis ought to be given to the witness.—Where the
he is not a free man shall be granted the safest rule is to give the witness as
himself thereof, a prosecution for perjury is inexpedient for sanction to prosecute for perjury, Courts are
entitled in doubtful cases to consider the grounds on which the Government may suggest that a prosecution is inexpedient. Although the scheme of procedure adopted in this country recognizes the right of a private person to institute criminal proceedings it also recognizes the right of the Crown which is a party to all criminal trials as representing the public to intervene and procure a stay of proceedings, *Weir* II, 193. *See* Note 17 under s. 236.

84. Contradictory statements in the course of the same deposition.—Prosecution for perjury for contradictory statements in one and the same deposition ought not to be sanctioned without considering the deposition as a whole and without having regard to the circumstances in which the contradictory answers were made, *Weir* II, 168; 3 C. W. N. 81. Nor should sanction be accorded upon a charge in the alternative of having made two contradictory statements when one of the statements has been made in the circumstances in which the person making it is not bound by law to speak the truth. Sanction cannot be accorded merely because a statement made on oath is opposed to the other statement made not under an obligation to state the truth *Weir* II, 169; 23 M. 223. Sanction should not be granted merely on a discrepancy between the statement made before a Court on oath and that recorded on mutation proceedings which was not on oath and

ron, Sp. auron, Fr
 auron, It. apli
 ri ne, from O. H.
 Ger. heyr, heyr
 to heyr, heron,
 heyl heyl Uan
 heyr. Cf. O. H.
 Ger. heyr, M. H.
 Ger. heyr, N. H.
 Ger. heyr, A. S.
 heyr, Iggern,
 woppeck, he
 Cf. MCHET (He



icpcau, pertaining to even.
 fflite,
 in the in
 o flower
 Tl evo
 Venus,
 (Geog)
 re, in Ger



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XII.—SANCTION IN RESPECT OF PERJURY AND FABRICATING FALSE EVIDENCE.

82. Facts to be taken into account in according sanction for perjury.—In sanctioning a prosecution for perjury against a witness, the Magistrate should remember that the statement must be *intentionally* false in order to justify a prosecution. When the question is neither material to the issue in the case nor goes to the credit of the witness sanction ought not to be accorded. Some allowance ought to be made to a witness seeking to evade some matter relating to for instance, his past history. 2 A. L. J. 835 = 3 Cr. L. J. 45, where 26 A. 509 is distinguished. The materiality of the evidence to the matter in issue is not the only point to be considered, *Weir* II, 166 and 652, see also 15 C. W. N. 169 = 12 Cr. L. J. 11. When a witness on cross-examination stated he had not applied for insolvency while, as a matter of fact, he had applied and the application had been dismissed, *held*, that without knowing the form in which the question was put it is unreasonable to assume that the reply was intentionally false and give sanction for his prosecution under s. 193, I P.C., 12 P. R. 1908 = 8 Cr. L. J. 243. Sanction for perjury ought not to be granted against a witness based on records which were not produced before or at the time of the deposition and in respect of which the witness was not given any opportunity for an explanation 17 M. L. T. 15 = 1915 M. W. N. 140 = 16 Cr. L. J. 115. See also 72 P. L. R. 1911 = 14 P. W. R. 1911 = 12 Cr. L. J. 265.

83. Before granting sanction, a locus penitentis ought to be given to the witness.—Where the question is whether sanction for perjury shall or shall not be granted, the safest rule is to give the witness as far as possible a *locus penitentis* and if the witness avails himself thereof, a prosecution for perjury is inexpedient, 1903 A. W. N. 68. In dealing with an application for sanction to prosecute for perjury, Courts are entitled in doubtful cases to consider the grounds on which the Government may suggest that a prosecution is inexpedient. Although the scheme of procedure adopted in this country recognizes the right of a private person to institute criminal proceedings it also recognizes the right of the Crown which is a party to all criminal trials as representing the public, to intervene and procure a stay of proceedings, *Weir* II, 193. See Note 17 under s. 236.

84. Contradictory statements in the course of the same deposition.—Prosecution for perjury for contradictory statements in one and the same deposition ought not to be sanctioned without considering the deposition as a whole and without having regard to the circumstances in which the contradictory answers were made, *Weir* II, 168; 3 C. W. N. 81. Nor should sanction be accorded upon a charge in the alternative of having made two contradictory statements when one of the statements has been made in the circumstances in which the person making it is not bound by law to speak the truth. Sanction cannot be accorded merely because a statement made on oath is opposed to the other statement made not under an obligation to state the truth, *Weir* II, 169; 23 M. 223. Sanction should not be granted merely on a discrepancy between the statement made before a Court on oath and that recorded on mutation proceedings which was not on oath and

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to which the attention of the witness was not called in the course of his examination in Court, 7 A. L. J. 647 = 11 Cr. L. J. 445. It is not proper to hold a contradiction in the statements made in the course of a single deposition and at one and the same time to be an offence, simply by reason of the fact that there is a contradiction, *Weir II*, 169; 4 C. W. N. 249. When one of the two contradictory statements is made by a person examined as a complainant under s. 200, but does not bear his signature as required by that section, the record, not being made as directed by law, cannot be used as evidence of the statement made, 6 C. W. N. 840. It would be most undesirable that a witness should be afraid to correct a mistake made in his deposition for fear of rendering himself liable to prosecution for perjury. Prosecution for contradiction in the same deposition is maintainable if the contradiction was made not to correct a *bona fide* error, but with a dishonest intention (10 C. 937 and 26 M. 55 referred to), 9 S. L. R. 202 = 17 Cr. L. J. 240.

85. Sanction must not be given as a matter of course where witness has made contradictory statements.—It would be a dangerous doctrine to hold that the fact of a witness having made contradictory statements before the committing Magistrate and in Court at the trial would alone justify the granting of sanction to prosecute him for perjury. The Court should consider how it has come about that there are contradictions and why the witness has resiled from his statements before the Magistrate. The High Court refused to grant a sanction though it found that the witness had made false statements before the committing Magistrate, but had deposed truly in Court, 37 C. 618. When a witness made two contradictory statements, one before the committing Magistrate and the other in the Sessions Court and the Sessions Judge believed the latter statement to be true, *held*, that he was right in not sanctioning the prosecution for having made statements, one or the other of which must necessarily be false. *Held* also that the Sessions Judge might sanction the prosecution of the witness if he believed that the evidence given before the Magistrate was false, provided there was such proof forthcoming as to justify a reasonable expectation that the prosecution would be successful, *Weir II*, 166; see 6 W. R. 11. Whether sanction should be granted for giving false evidence on the mere fact that the witness made contradictory statements depends on circumstances, 37 C. 618 approved, 4 Bur. L. T. 262 = 13 Cr. L. J. 56; see also 7 A. 44; 1910 M. W. N. 397 = 8 M. L. T. 86 = 11 Cr. L. J. 353. The practice of charging a man with making two mutually contradictory statements should be adopted only where the two statements are necessarily and irreconcilably contradictory, 1915 M. W. N. 34 = 16 Cr. L. J. 14. Every possible presumption must be made in favour of the reconciliation of the two statements, 7 A. 44, 7 S. L. R. 96 = 15 Cr. L. J. 379; 10 B. 124; 7 S. L. R. 108 = 15 Cr. L. J. 488.

86. Contradictory statements in different depositions—sanction should be on each branch of the alternative by the proper Court.—Where it is intended to charge a person with having made a false statement in the Court of a Magistrate or alternatively a false statement in a Subordinate Judge's Court, it is necessary that there should be a proper sanction for prosecution on each branch of the alternative, *i.e.* one sanction from the Magistrate or his superior and another from the Sub-Judge or his superior. Sub-sec. (5) will not cure the want of sanction on each separate head. The Court to which both Courts are subordinate might properly grant the sanction where one of the Courts is not subordinate to the other, 36 P. R. 1890. In the course of two departmental inquiries the petitioner made two contradictory statements before two different officers. He was charged under s. 182, I. P. C., with giving false information to a public servant in that he made contradictory statements one of which he must have known to be false. The sanction of both of the officers had not been obtained but of only one. *Held*, that the Magistrate had no jurisdiction to entertain the charge as laid, in the absence of sanction of both of the officers before whom the statements were made, *Weir II*, 157. Where the accused makes contradictory statements in two Courts of which one is not subordinate to the other, then neither Court can give sanction in the alternative, but the application for sanction must be made to that Court to which the said Courts are subordinate, 30 P. R. 1901. See also 17 W. R. 54; 11 B. H. C. R. 34; *Ratanlal* 224; 10 B. 190; 27 M. L. J. 586 = 16 M. L. J. 612. But where the statement made to the Police in an investigation under s. 174 contradicts the statement in the inquiry before a Magistrate, a sanction by the Magistrate is valid, 5 M. L. T. 355. But perhaps these rulings will not apply when proceedings are instituted under s. 476. But in 45 B. 834, it is *held*, that where an alternative charge of giving false evidence is based on contradictory statements made before different Courts, it is necessary that the sanction of each of these Courts must be obtained under s. 195. If, however, want of sanction has not occasioned a failure of justice it cannot be made the basis of interference in revision.

87. Pleadings must be considered as a whole.—When sanction is applied for in respect of a false statement in a written statement, the whole of the defendant's written statement must be taken into consideration as well as the fact that the proceedings in the Mofussil where no great exactitude of expression is found should not be taken too literally, 5 M. L. T. 346 = 10 Cr. L. J. 364.

85 Sanction necessary for a charge of fabricating false evidence, s. 193 I P C.—The petitioner instituted a suit and along with his plaint filed a certificate copy of a document which was said to have been fabricated by him and asked the original to be produced. *Held* that sanction of the Court was necessary before he could be prosecuted for an offence under s. 193 I P C. **17 C. W. N. 937**

89 False statement in declaration inadmissible in evidence cannot be made the subject of charge under s. 193 I P C.—A declaration before it can be made the foundation of a prosecution under s. 199 I P C must be one which is admissible in evidence and which the Court before which it is filed is bound or authorized by law to receive in evidence. **35 A. 58**. See also **14 C. 653, 20 C. 729 and 22 C. 131**. The Criminal Procedure Code except in the special circumstance of section 74 makes no provision for any matter being proved before a Magistrate by affidavit and the Magistrate before whom the affidavit is sworn is not competent to administer the oath no sanction ought therefore to have been granted in respect of statements made in the affidavit as they were *coram non iudice* and cannot form the subject of a charge under s. 193 I P C. **55 L. R. 102 = 12 Cr. L. J. 563**. See also **75 L. R. 75 = 14 Cr. L. J. 600**

90 False affidavit by an accused person not perjury.—No one can be prosecuted in respect of false statements continued in an affidavit sworn by him in a case in which he was an accused person. **23 A. 331** which follows **19 A. 200**. But see Notes to s. 342 but see **8 Lah. 34** where **23 A. 331** is disapproved.

91 Prosecution not to be held forth in terrorum over a witness while giving evidence.—Where G was discharged on a charge of murder and after G's evidence was recorded in the trial of certain persons for perjury the Sessions Judge asked him certain questions as to his liability to be committed to the Sessions Court on a charge of murder and under s. 436 *infra* committed him. *Held* (1) that the consequence to public justice would be very serious, if a witness during the course of his deposition and before being absolved from his oath were liable to be suddenly called upon to show cause why he should not be committed for some other distinct and serious crime of which he had been discharged and (2) that the questions put to him could not be considered to be the beginning of the special proceedings authorized by s. 436. **Ratanlal 538**. Proceedings with a view to the prosecution of a witness for giving false evidence should not be taken until a conclusion has been come to by the Magistrate or Judge conducting the trial in which the false evidence is supposed to be given upon the evidence given therein. Any other course would be open to very serious objections. **1913 U. B. R. (1st quarter) 166 = 14 Cr. L. J. 422**, see also **3 C. L. J. 302**. A committing Magistrate ordered the prosecution of a witness under s. 193 I P C while the case in which the witness made the false statement was still pending in the Sessions Court the High Court set aside the order with the remark that in any case the impropriety of taking proceedings against a witness while the case is still pending cannot be too strongly insisted upon. **16 Cr. L. J. 147 (C)**

92 Where there is a conflict of findings not expedient to grant sanction.—In a case in which the Court of first instance finds a document to be genuine and the Judge in appeal takes a different view of the matter it is not desirable to grant sanction. **1 C. W. N. 400**

XIII.—SANCTION IN RESPECT OF INSTITUTING FALSE CHARGES, Etc

93. Before granting sanction, opportunity should be given to accused to prove his case.—A sanction for prosecution for making a false charge under s. 211 of the Penal Code without hearing all the witnesses whom the person accused of making a false charge wished to call is illegal. **6 C. 584 = 8 C. L. R. 265, 8 C. 496 = 7 C. L. R. 467, 7 C. 87 = 8 C. L. R. 387, 7 C. 208 = 8 C. L. R. 267, 13 C. 270, 15 C. 661, 2 C. L. R. 315 and 389, 4 C. L. R. 134, 7 C. L. R. 332, 8 C. L. R. 289 3 C. W. N. 758, 5 A. 36, 8 A. 39, Weir II, 167, 27 C. 921; 16 W. R. 44, 8 C. 435, 14 C. 707 (F B), 8 A. 392, 25 W. R. 10, 5 C. W. N. 106 1 C. W. N. 452 4 Oudh C. 127; 2 P. W. R. 1909 30 C. 544**. But see *contra* **6 C. 532, 4 A. 182, 7 M. 292 16 Cr. L. J. 423 (M)**.

94 Sanction may be given after examination of complainant and dismissal of complaint.—A Magistrate dismissing a complaint under s. 203 after examining the complainant and considering the result of the investigation under s. 202 on the ground that the allegations contained therein were false is competent to sanction prosecution under s. 211 I P C. **2 P. R. 1907**, where **5 C. W. N. 295** is followed and **8 A. 38** disapproved. In **12 Bom. L. R. 229** CHANDAVARKAR J. doubted the correctness of the decisions which lay down that when a Magistrate grants sanction without taking all the evidence which the complainant is willing to adduce the

sanction under s. 201 I P C. the Magistrate should matter to the Police and when the Police report is received by him then he may determine whether the complaint is true or false. There is nothing in the Code which compels a Magistrate in express terms to examine any or all the witnesses whom the

complainant wishes to adduce before dismissing a complaint and granting sanction. See 22 B. 596, where it was held that the inquiry before the committing Magistrate and the trial before the Sessions Court, gave ample opportunity to the accused to substantiate his complaint, see also 20 C. 474 and 6 C. 308; 15 A. 336; 4 A. 182.

95. Before granting sanction case must be judicially determined.—So long as a complaint is not dismissed under s 203 or otherwise judicially determined, no proceedings can be instituted under s 211, I P C, against the person lodging that complaint. The original complaint must be disposed of according to law before such proceedings can be taken, 3 C. W. N. 758. So where a complaint was dismissed without any reasons, to prosecute the complainant, held that the order must be a further enquiry and there cannot have been made, 13 Cr. L.J. 482 (C). Unless a complainant is duly examined, inquiry and report under s 202 cannot be called for, and if made are made without jurisdiction and cannot form the basis of any further action. A Magistrate is incompetent to sanction the prosecution of the complainant for a false charge under s 195 or take action under s 476, 11 P. L. R. 1912 = 2 P. R. 1912 = 12 Cr. L. J. 539, 27 C. 921 and 4 C. W. N. 305, relied on. Sanction for prosecution must not be given merely on a Police report that the complaint is false. The complainant should be afforded an opportunity to prove his case, 5 C. W. N. 106. An application for an inquiry into his complaint before according sanction is in effect in the nature of a complaint and sanction cannot be given until and unless that complaint is judicially determined on evidence. 5 C. W. N. 254, where 14 C. 707 and 3 C. W. N. 490 are followed. A person who lays an information is entitled to have his case determined before he is called upon to answer the charge of laying false information. 14 C. W. N. 785 = 11 Cr. L. J. 354. In according sanction for a prosecution under s 211, I P C it is not necessary that the applicant for sanction should have been summoned to answer the false complaint. But no sanction should be granted until final orders have been passed, viz., under s 203, terminating the trial or by the discharge under s 253 of persons jointly accused with the applicant, 26 A. 244; 3 C. W. N. 490 and 758; 4 C. W. N. 305, notice calling upon a complainant to show cause why he should not be prosecuted for preferring a false charge ought not to issue until it has been finally decided that the complaint must be dismissed as false, 11 P. L. R. 1912 = 2 P. R. 1912 = 12 Cr. L. J. 539. If, however, the complaint has been legally disposed of under s 203 the fact that the complainant had no opportunity to substantiate his case, will not make the sanction bad, 2 P. R. 1907 = 6 Cr. L. J. 258. The Allahabad High Court seems to hold otherwise. See 29 A. 587, where it was held following 8 A. 38 and 15 A. 336 that such a complainant ought to be given an opportunity of substantiating if he can the charge which he has brought, before he is prosecuted.

96. Sanction ought not to be given without a judicial investigation of the complaint.—A Magistrate, would not be justified in granting sanction on a mere Police report. It is the duty of the Police to collect evidence, but it is the function of the Magistrate alone to decide on the sufficiency of the evidence when so collected, 10 M. 232 (F.B.), 27 C. 921, 10 C. W. N. 30. *Per SUNDARA, IVER, J.*, in 22 M. L. J. 419 = 11 M. L. T. 367 = 13 Cr. L. J. 209. A sanction is bad in law if it is given without a judicial investigation of the complaint. 1 C. W. N. 452; 5 C. W. N. 106; 30 C. 415; see also 8 A. 38; 6 C. 498; 5 C. W. N. 254; 3 C. W. N. 490; 7 M. 189, 33 P. R. 1890. But in 3 B. L. R. 132 = 11 Cr. L. 3 it was held distinguishing 1 C. W. N. 452 that where a petition was presented to a District Magistrate praying that he would proceed under s 110 against a certain person and giving certain information, it is open to the District Magistrate to grant sanction for an offence under s 182, I P C, without holding a judicial investigation, as it is entirely within his discretion to take action or not on such petition. When apart from the Police report there is other material which the Magistrate considers, the sanction is not invalid. It is not necessary that such evidence must have been given on the application or even on the hearing of the complaint itself, 25 M. L. J. 405 = 15 Cr. L. J. 271.

97. No sanction necessary when charge laid before the Police only.—The words "in or in relation to any proceeding in any Court" are applicable only to offences mentioned in cl. (b) and this clause does not refer to a false charge made to the Police, 12 P. R. 1905 = 74 P. L. R. 1905 = 2 Cr. L. J. 66; 10 M. 232; (F.B.); 6 Bar. L. T. 129 = 13 Cr. L. J. 578 (F.B.), 13 Cr. L. J. 430 (Mad). Where, therefore, a false complaint has been made to the Police, but no further steps are taken, sanction of the Magistrate is not necessary for a prosecution, under s 211 I P C, 3 C. W. N. 33; 24 W. R. 41; 25 W. R. 33; 15 W. R. 44; 4 C. 869 = 4 C. L. R. 413; 1 A. 497; 6 C. 832 = 8 C. L. R. 255; 8 C. 281; 6 C. W. N. 295; 14 C. 707; 3 A. 322; 25 C. 786; 7 M. 292; 20 C. W. N. 1587 = 25 C. L. J. 59 nor is it necessary when the Magistrate has merely ordered the Police to remove the case from their file, 13 Cr. L. J. 430 (M.), 14 Bom. L. R. 1160 = 13 Cr. L. J. 904. In 34 A. 522 the correctness of this view is doubted as this leads to the absurdity while sanction is necessary for the lesser offence under s 182, I P C, it is not necessary in the case of the more serious offence under s 211, I P C. But a sanction is necessary if the false complaint is made to the Inspector-General of Police who is a Magistrate under s. 5 of Act V of 1861, 26

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P. R. 1908 = 7 Cr. L. J. 291; and a Sessions Judge has no jurisdiction to sanction the prosecution under s. 211, I P C., of two persons on the allegation that they instigated a *chowkidar* to lodge false information at a *thana*, and the sanction was revoked as one made without jurisdiction, 7 C. L. J. 373 = 12 C. W. N. 575 = 7 Cr. L. J. 340. Before a Court can grant sanction, the record must show that it has exercised its own judgment on the facts proved before it. See also 24 C. L. J. 134 = 20 C. W. N. 1285 and 20 C. W. N. 1347.

98. Sanction is necessary if the charge before the Police is judicially dealt with.—Though no sanction is necessary when charge is laid only before the Police, yet if the complainant should, when the Police report the complaint to be false, insist upon a judicial investigation, he must be taken to have preferred a complaint to the Magistrate and the Magistrate has seizure of the case, 14 C. 707; 10 M. 232; 33 C. 1; 10 C. L. J. 565 = 11 Cr. L. J. 57; so a sanction would be necessary when after the rejection of the complaint by the Police as false, the complainant makes a complaint to a Magistrate who after full inquiry discharges the accused, 6 L. B. R. 50 = 5 Bur. L. T. 111 = 13 Cr. L. J. 565. Where a matter does fairly come under s. 211 and where a sanction is needed in order that the prosecution may proceed under that section to proceed without any magisterial sanction under s. 182 is to evade the salutary provisions of the law, *per* HEATON, J., in 15 Bom. L. R. 574 = 2 Bom. Cr. Ca. 86 = 14 Cr. L. J. 491. See Note 24, 4 P. 323; 5 P. 33.

Exceptions—(i) If a prosecution has been instituted in respect of a false charge under s. 211 laid before the Police before any complaint is made to a Magistrate, no sanction of the Magistrate in respect of the subsequent complaint would be necessary to enable the Magistrate who has already taken cognizance of the offence under s. 211 to finish trying the offence, 6 L. B. R. 50 = 5 Bur. L. T. 111 = 13 Cr. L. J. 565.

(ii) A complaint made to Police by G, accusing some persons of robbery, was reported to the Magistrate to be false on investigation. G, was thereupon charged by the Police under s. 211, I P C., with having made a false charge to the Police, on which the Magistrate issued process. On the application of G, who appeared before the Magistrate in consequence of the process, the Magistrate inquired judicially into his complaint of robbery and discharged the accused, *held* that no sanction was necessary for the prosecution of G, under s. 211, I P C., as at the time the Police made the complaint against G there was not in existence any proceeding in any Court, Ratanlal 704.

(iii) Similarly, in 30 A. 52 it was *held* that cl. (b) of this section does not apply to a case where a person makes a report to a *thana*, but does not follow it up by a complaint to any Court. By making a report no offence is committed in or in relation to any proceeding.

Contra—In U. B. R. (1912) I. 134 = 13 Cr. L. J. 576 it has, however, been *held* that when a complaint to the Police was held to be false and subsequently the same complaint is made to a Magistrate and held to be false no sanction is necessary to prosecute the complainant under s. 211, I P C. in respect of the false charge to the Police. A man may make a false charge on more than one occasion and if he does so, he is responsible for what he did on each occasion. See also 36 A. 212 In 1915 U. B. R. IV 95 = 17 Cr. L. J. 177, however, 5 Bur. L. T. 111 = 6 L. B. R. 50 was followed. See also Note 24 *supra*.

99. When sanction should be for offence under s. 182, I P C., and when for offence under s. 211, I P C.—There is a difference of opinion between the High Courts. The Bombay High Court holds that false information to the Police comes under s. 182, I P C., and a false charge in a Court under s. 211, 19 B. 747; 9 Bom. L. R. 33; Ratanlal 72; 7 B. 184; section 182, I P C., is to be interpreted not in isolation but in association with s. 211, I P C. Where the information conveyed to the Police amounts to the institution of criminal proceedings against a defined person or amounts to the falsely charging of a defined person with an offence, then the person giving such information has committed an offence under s. 211. In such a case, s. 211 is not and s. 182 is the appropriate section under which to frame the charge, 15 Bom. L. R. 574 = 2 Bom. Cr. Ca. 86 = 14 Cr. L. J. 491. The Calcutta High Court has held that prosecution for a false charge may be under s. 182 or s. 211, but if the charge is serious, s. 211 should be applied, 32 C. 180, 4 C. L. J. 88 and a false charge made to the Police of a cognizable offence falls under s. 211 and not under s. 182, 5 C. W. N. 727. The Madras High Court is of the same opinion, *Wheir* I, 120. It is for the Court to determine under what section the prosecution should be *held* 15 A. 336. The Punjab Chief Court seems to favour the Bombay view, 14 P. R. 1832. When the false charge amounts to an offence under s. 211 I P C., also, proceedings should be taken with respect to the more serious offence s. 211, I P C., U. B. R. (1912) I. 134 = 13 Cr. L. J. 576. The main test whether a person makes 'a charge' within the meaning of s. 211 is, "does the person who makes the statement which is alleged to constitute the 'charge' do so with the intention and object of setting the criminal law in motion against the person against whom the statement is directed," 26 M. 642, 8 E. L. R. 179 = 15 Cr. L. J. 104.

100. Sanction to prosecute under s. 182, I. P. C., sufficient when false accusation not of a serious nature.—Where the offence in respect of which a false charge is preferred is not of a serious nature it is not necessary to accord sanction under s. 211, I. P. C., but it is sufficient if sanction is accorded to proceed under s. 182 I. P. C., 32 C. 180. Here a Magistrate at the request of the Police to whom a false complaint had been made, sanctioned prosecution under s. 182, I. P. C. *Held*, that the sanction of the Magistrate was sufficient and the prosecution did not require the sanction of the S. H. O., or of his official superior. Also the Magistrate would not be disqualified from trying the case himself merely because he had sanctioned the prosecution thereof, 12 P. R. 1905 = 74 P. L. R. 1905 = 2 Cr. L. J. 66. A prosecution under s. 182 of the Penal Code may be instituted by a private person, provided he first obtains the sanction of the public officer to whom the false information was given or of his official superior. Where a specific false charge is made, especially where the false charge is a serious one, the proper section for proceedings to be adopted is s. 211 of the Penal Code, 8 A. 352 *overruling* 5 A. 36. See also 37 A. 110.

101. Guiding principles in sanctioning prosecution for making false charge.—A prosecution of a charge under s. 211, I. P. C., should not be sanctioned as a matter of course under this section, but only when the complainant can satisfy the Court that the interests of justice require a prosecution and there is a strong *prima facie* case against the accused, 6 A. 114, *Weir* II, 178; *Ratanlal* 374; 36 P. R. 1882; 16 C. 661; 38 P. R. 1888; 1 C. W. N. 400 and 529; 4 L. B. R. 234 = 7 Cr. L. J. 495, 137 P. L. R. 1909. Where the case brought, is not false in substance but is bolstered up by false evidence, the proper section to give sanction to prosecute is under s. 196, I. P. C., 7 C. L. J. 169 = 7 Cr. L. J. 196. To bring a vexatious charge against any person is not an offence under s. 211, I. P. C., therefore a Magistrate has no jurisdiction to summon the applicant (complainant) to show cause why sanction should not be granted for his prosecution under that section for such an act 1 Bom. L. R. 11. See also 34 C. 42. Sanction for prosecution under s. 182, I. P. C., should not be granted where there is nothing to show that the information given by the accused was false to his knowledge or that he believed it to be false.

102. False charge must have been made with the intention of setting the criminal law in motion.—The charge must be one made with the intention and object of setting the criminal law in motion 25 M. 640, 8 A. L. R. 179 = 16 Cr. L. J. 104. Where a complaint was presented to the Collector as Agent to the Court of Wards containing allegations against one of his subordinate employees and he granted sanction to prosecute the complainant under s. 211 I. P. C. *Held*, that the Collector was not justified in arbitrarily turning a departmental complaint into a criminal complaint and at any rate before granting sanction he should have afforded the complainant an opportunity of calling his witnesses and proving his allegations, 30 C. 415. A complaint made to an executive officer as such, which contains certain imputations against a person is not making a false charge of an offence for which sanction to prosecute under s. 211, I. P. C., is allowable, 2 P. W. R. (1909) = 37 P. L. R. 1909 = 9 Cr. L. J. 152. The false charge must be made to a Court or to an officer who has power to investigate or send it for trial 6 C. 620; 13 C. W. N. 393; 16 Cr. L. J. 252 (M). Where a District Registrar on a complaint against a Sub-Registrar made a departmental inquiry and concluding that the complaint was false, forwarded a report to himself as District Magistrate and as such sanctioned the prosecution of the complainant under ss. 182 and 211 I. P. C. *held* that it was not clear from the record whether the District Magistrate purported to act under s. 195 or s. 476 but in either case the order was bad. If he purported to act under s. 195, then the sanction would be without authority, for he was not a public officer to whom he was subordinate and so there was no offence committed in or about the sanctioning of the prosecution. If he purported to act under s. 476, then the sanction would be without authority, for he was not a public officer to whom he was subordinate and so there was no offence committed in or about the sanctioning of the prosecution. A complaint to a Village Magistrate may amount to an offence under s. 211, 32 M. 258.

103. On reversal of conviction, Appellate Court not to grant sanction ordinarily.—Where on an appeal from a conviction, the District Magistrate set aside the conviction and granted sanction to prosecute the complainant under s. 211, I. P. C., *held*, that an Appellate Court in overruling a reasoned and strongly expressed opinion of the original Court should not order the prosecution of the complainant except under very unusual circumstances 58 P. R. 1905 = 1905 P. L. R. 180 = 3 Cr. L. J. 121.

104. Where sanction for offence under s. 211, I. P. C., is rejected, no proceeding can be taken under s. 500 I. P. C., on the same facts, 44 C. 970

XIV.—SANCTION IN RESPECT OF FORGED DOCUMENTS

105. Document produced or given in evidence.—Since the addition of the words 'produced or' in cl. (c) sub-sec. (1), sanction can be given in respect of documents which are only tendered in evidence but not exhibited and marked and considered by the Court. The words 'produced or' have to be read apart from the

words 'given in evidence' which follow (1911) 2 M. W. N. 526. In 29 C. 857, defendants produced two bonds, alleging that the plaintiff who had sued on an alleged debt, was indebted to them. The Court dismissed the suit without considering the case put forward by the defendants. On an application by the plaintiff for sanction to prosecute the defendants in respect of the two bonds alleged to be forgeries, *held*, that though the Court had power to grant sanction, yet inasmuch as before sanction could be given it would be necessary for the Court to see whether there are *prima facie* grounds for holding the bonds to be forgeries, and as there were no grounds on the evidence already taken to believe the bonds were not genuine, sanction ought not to be given. But *see* 14 C. W. N. 806 = 11 Cr. L. J. 357 and Note 99. A document is given in evidence within the meaning of this section when it is handed over by the person tendering it to the Court, even though on inspection the Court may reject it as evidence for insufficiency of stamp or want of registration, *Ratanlal* 232; 27 Bom. L. R. 1039 = 49 B. 799.

106. The word 'produced' in sub-sec. 1 (c) is wider than the terms 'filed' or 'put in' and gives more latitude to the Court's discretion.—In 22 C. 1004 certain documents were filed annexed to a petition in a suit pending before a Munsiff, but were not given in evidence. The Munsiff, on suspicion that they had been tampered with, held an inquiry and committed the petitioners for trial by the Court of Sessions, *held*, it was a proper commitment under s. 478, *contra see* 15 M. 224; where certain documents were put into Court in a suit pending before District Munsiff, but not given in evidence. The District Munsiff made an order for the prosecution of the parties who so put them in on the ground that they were forgeries, *held*, that the Munsiff was not competent to go beyond the record, therefore his order was bad in law. This and the rulings in 1895 A. W. N. 145 and 7 C. W. N. 112 are no longer law, *see also* 12 P. R. 1897; 10 W. R. 5, 3 M. 400. In 29 C. 887 it was *held* that sanction cannot be refused on the ground that a document alleged to be forged, was only *tendered* and not judicially considered, *see also* 7 C. W. N. 795. In 9 Bom. L. R. 735 = 6 Cr. L. J. 78, it was also *held* that the production of a document is not the same thing as giving it in evidence, a document 'produced' in a Court means one which is produced for the purpose of being tendered in evidence or for some other purpose. Similarly, where a suit was decided on oath and there was no finding whether certain documents produced were genuine or not, it would be wrong to give sanction for prosecuting a party for forgery in respect of the documents, 15 M. L. J. B. N. 37; (1911) 2 M. W. N. 526. *See, however*, Note 99 and 18 Cr. L. J. 1001. *See also* 45 M. 928 where it is held that actual production in suit is necessary for requiring a sanction under s. 195, 27 Bom. L. R. 1039 = 49 B. 799.

107. The mere filing of a document may constitute a user within the meaning of s. 471, I. P. C.—At least in certain circumstances the filing of a document may constitute a user, *see* 39 C. 463; 17 C. W. N. 94 = 13 Cr. L. J. 449. The mere filing of a document in Court without tendering the same in evidence may constitute user of it under s. 471, I. P. C. It cannot be laid down as an inflexible rule that such an act does not constitute an attempt to use it as evidence. 18 Cr. L. J. 6 (Cal.), 35 C. 820 *explained*. Where a plaintiff produced and filed certain documents as, coming from the custody of certain witnesses who were summoned to produce the documents, *held* that such production constituted a user within the meaning of s. 471, and sanction was necessary, 19 C. W. N. 125 = 16 Cr. L. J. 309.

108. The term 'forgery' is used as a generic term.—The word 'forgery' is used as a general term in s. 463 of the I. P. C., and that section is referred to in a comprehensive sense in this section, so as to embrace all species of forgery, and thus includes a case falling under s. 467, I. P. C., 12 B. 36; 14 C. W. N. 479 = 11 Cr. L. J. 280; 16 Cr. L. J. 203 (A.). So also an offence under s. 468, I. P. C., 36 M. 337. A complaint of an offence under s. 466, I. P. C., *viz.*, forging a register kept by a public servant, which forged document was given in evidence, cannot be entertained without sanction, as the offence falls within the wider description of offences prescribed under s. 463 to which this section applies, *Ratanlal* 83; 16 Cr. L. J. 617, *contra* (1913) U. B. R. (1st quarter) 166 = 14 Cr. L. J. 422. No sanction is necessary for the prosecution of an offence under s. 474, I. P. C., 19 C. W. N. 125 = 15 Cr. L. J. 309. Where a document was produced before a Magistrate by a party but was forged beforehand at the time of registration held that sanction of the Magistrate was necessary under s. 191(1), C. 44 C. 1002; 5 L. 550.

109. Sanction not desirable when there is a difference of opinion between two Courts.—Where a Court of first instance finds a document to be genuine and the Appellate Court, proceeding mainly upon a comparison of signatures finds the document to be false, when the matter rests upon a very doubtful consideration of the comparison of handwriting, and also upon more or less evenly balanced testimony and when there is such difference of opinion between the two trying Courts it is not desirable that the Appellate Court should grant sanction to prosecute under this section, 1 C. W. N. 400.

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110. False document given in evidence—Pleader's responsibility.—A Sessions Judge granted sanction for the prosecution of a Pleader for presenting on behalf of his client, a document, merely on the ground that it bore on its face such marks of its being a fabricated document, that the Pleader's suspicions must have been aroused at the first sight of it, and that he ought to have strictly examined it, and had he done so, he would either have rejected it or advised his client to produce it in Court on his own risk or responsibility, *held*, that a Pleader is under no higher obligation than any other agent, and to justify his prosecution for offences under ss. 196, 471 and 109, I P C, in connection with a document presented by him on behalf of his client, it must be shown that he was a party (principal or accessory) to the concoction of the document or had the knowledge that it was concocted. The mere fact that his suspicions ought to have been aroused by the sight of the document is not *prima facie* evidence that he knew or had reason to believe the document to be forged, 22 B. 317.

111. No sanction necessary for prosecution of a witness or agent in respect of the offences dealt with in cl. (c), sub-sec. (1).—No sanction is necessary to prosecute a witness, as the clause is limited to a party to the proceeding 25 M. 671; 15 C. W. N. 565 = 12 Cr. L. J. 101; 26 M. L. J. 220 = 15 Cr. L. J. 242. *See also* 3 M. 400. A prosecution commenced on a sanction which includes both a party and a witness is not invalid, 15 B. 581 at p. 583 (but *see* 16 A. 80). No sanction is necessary to prosecute the agent of a party, 9 P. R. 1879; 3 Bur. L. T. 108 = 12 Cr. L. J. 87.

112. No sanction necessary for prosecution of abettor not a party.—The offences for which s. 195, cl. (1) (c) read with cl. (3) requires that sanction should be given by a Court with respect to documents produced in Court must be offences committed by parties to the proceeding, whether the offence, be one of the substantive offences mentioned in cl. (1), (c) or only amounts to abetment of such offences, 32 A. 74; 15 C. W. N. 555 = 12 Cr. L. J. 101; 26 M. L. J. 220 = 15 Cr. L. J. 242; 10 P. R. 1917 (Cr.). *See Note 27*

113. No sanction necessary if the completed offence has no connection with any Court.—*See Note 7 (iii).*

114. Where sanction is accorded for forgery, trying Magistrate might try for any cognate offence.—Where sanction is accorded for a prosecution for forgery, the trying Magistrate might charge the accused in addition with fraudulent using (s. 471, I P C) or abetment of forgery, 6 W. R. 20; *see also* s. 230 and 10 Bur. L. R. 77. Under sub-sec. (5) when sanction is given for prosecution for a particular offence, the Magistrate may frame a charge for any other offence covered by the same facts and referred to in this section, 30 C. 905.

XV.—DELAY IN APPLYING FOR SANCTION.

115. No period of limitation for making application for sanction.—There is no fixed period of limitation for making applications for sanction under this section. Article 178, Schedule II, of the *Limitation Act*, 1877, does not apply to such applications. Rules of limitation are foreign to the administration of criminal justice, and it is only by express statutory provision that any rule of limitation could be made applicable to criminal cases, 10 A. 350; 20 B. 543 at p. 547. Such a rule would result in greater impunity to criminals, B. H. C. P. J. 1889 at p. 123. Therefore, where sanction to prosecute was granted by a second-class Magistrate and it was revoked by the District Magistrate on the only ground that the application for sanction was made too late, the High Court set aside the District Magistrate's order and restored the sanction, Ratanlal 805 and 859. Court may grant sanction at any time, 32 M. 49; 19 C. W. N. 447.

116. Delay in making application for sanction.—Applications for sanction to a prosecution for any of the offences mentioned in this section should be made promptly or the delay should be satisfactorily accounted for. Where there is great delay in making the application, a Court cannot help suspecting that the applicant, is acting, not in the interests of justice, but from an indirect motive, possibly to worry, annoy and to persecute his opponent. Orders but, or securing the d
was rejected owing to a

in mind namely, whether in view of the length of time which has already elapsed before the application for sanction, a prosecution commenced thereafter is likely to be brought to a successful termination, 13 Cr. L. J. 4 (C.). Where a trying Magistrate refused an application for sanction, made four months after the decision of the case on the ground that "the case was at best a mere suspicious one," but the Sessions Judge granted it without giving notice to the accused and without calling for and examining the record of the case, the High Court set aside the Judge's order, 1 C. W. N. 529. In 7 A. L. J. 60 = 11 Cr. L. J. 140, a sanction was set aside as there was no satisfactory explanation of delay of four months in making the application. *See also* 21 In. Ca. 172 (C.).

Bom. Cr. A. No. 330 of 1910; 15 Cr. L. J. 577 (O), 15 Cr. L. J. 698 (A), 88, L. R. 49 = 15 Cr. L. J. 654. In 19 C. W. N. 447 = 21 C. L. J. 198 = 16 Cr. L. J. 236, however, the High Court set aside the order of the lower Court refusing to grant a sanction to a Public Prosecutor on account of delay, as there could be no suggestion of *malafides* in a prosecution undertaken by the Government.

XVI.—SUBORDINATION OF COURTS FOR PURPOSES OF SUB-SECS. (6) AND (7).

Note.—The power that was conferred under sub-section (6) of the old s 195 upon a superior Court to revoke or grant a sanction that was given or refused by any authority subordinate to it, is now relegated to s. 476-B of the Code by the new amendment and instead of the sanction being revoked or granted by the superior Court, under the new amendment it can withdraw the complaint or make a new complaint as the case may be. (See s 476-B)

117. Scope of sub-sec. 7.—It is suggested by CHAMIER, J, in 34 A. 197 that the whole of sub-sec. (7) seems to be confined to Courts against some or all of whose decisions appeals do lie and that the result of such a construction is that the Legislature has made no provision in s 195 for an appeal against the order of a Small Cause Court giving or refusing sanction and it may be that the only Court which can interfere with such an order is the High Court. But all the High Courts have followed the view that sub-sec. (7) applies to all Courts CHAMIER, C.J., followed in 1 Patna L. J. 206 = 17 Cr. L. J. 320 = 34 In. Ca. 320 his opinion in 34 A. 197. But see 15 A. L. J. 721 (F.B.) where 1 Pat. L. J. 206 and 2 Pat. L. J. 1 are dissented from and not followed. And 34 A. 197 is distinguished and it is held that an appeal against an order of a Small Cause Court granting sanction to prosecute lay to the District Judge, the principal Court of original jurisdiction.

Appeals 'ordinarily' lie.—Cl. (a) of sub-sec. (7) is in accordance with the decision of the Bombay High Court in 2 B. 431; see also 11 B. 438 and 7 M. 314. The explanation is a complete exposition of the term 'ordinarily'; 23 M. L. J. 486 = 16 Cr. L. J. 439; 8 N. L. R. 57 = 13 Cr. L. J. 498; 43 M. L. J. 375.

Meaning of 'case in sub-sec. (7) (b).—The word 'case' means the actual proceedings in which the offence is said to have been committed and not the original case out of which the proceedings arose, 34 A. 197. Where, therefore, an offence is committed in an execution proceeding, the case in connection with which the offence is alleged to have been committed is the execution proceeding and not the original suit.

118. Sub-sec. (7) does not apply to subordination of officers not acting judicially.—The subordination of an authority which is a Court, to another authority is regulated by sub-sec. (7). But when the authority granting or refusing sanction does not act as a Court the appeal lies under sub-sec. (6) to the authority to which the former is subordinate under s 17. Thus where sanction granted by a Subordinate Magistrate for prosecution under s 182, I P C., referred to in cl (a), sub-sec. (1), was revoked by the Sub-divisional Magistrate and the Sessions Judge in the exercise of his revisional powers set aside the order of the Sub-divisional Magistrate. Held (1) the Sessions Judge had no power to interfere under sub-secs (6) and (7) (ii) that he had no authority under s 435 to set aside the order of the Sub-divisional Magistrate, Weir II, 155. The Sub-divisional Magistrate having acted not as a Court, but as an executive officer he is not under s. 17(5) subordinate to the Sessions Court. See also 27 B. 130; 27 M. L. J. 586 = 15 Cr. L. J. 612. In 44 M. L. J. 323, it is held that a Magistrate passing an order under s 144 of the Code does so only as a public servant and not as a Court and sub-sec. (7) of s 195 is inapplicable to such a case and it was further held that the proper authority to revoke the sanction is the District Magistrate. (Weir II, 155 referred to, 42 M. 64 = 35 M. L. J. 454 dissented from = 47 M. 56, 47 B. 102.

Where a District Magistrate receives information of illicit possession of arms and issues a search warrant, he acts as a Court, though the search warrant is issued under s 25 of the Indian Arms Act and an application lies to the Sessions Court under s 195, sub-clause (6) to revoke a sanction given by him for prosecution of the informant under s. 162, I P C. (42 M. 66; Weir II, 155 (1903) dissented from and 39 C. 953 referred to)

119 Sub-sec. (7) contemplates two Courts.—*Appellate Bench of Chief Court, Burma cannot interfere with sanction granted by Judge sitting on the original side*—Section 193 (6) and (7) contemplates that a sanction may be revoked only by a Court which is distinct from and superior to the Court that gave it. A Bench of the Chief Court, Burma, is not a superior Court but a section of the same Court, specially empowered to hear appeals from the single Judge under *Lower Burma Courts Act* 1900, and has no power to interfere with the order of sanction made by the Judge sitting on the Original Side, 4 Bur. L. T. 206 = 12 Cr. L. J. 469. The Original Side of a High Court is not a different Court from the Appellate Side, (1911) 2 M. W. N. 259 = 10 M. L. T. 278 = 12 Cr. L. J. 543.

(A)—APPEALS ORDINARILY LIE

120. District Magistrate subordinate to Sessions Judge.—Whether when a District Magistrate grants a sanction on the Appellate or Original Side, the Sessions Judge has jurisdiction to revoke it, 24 P. W. R. 1908 = 8 Cr. L. J. 557. See also 18 Cr. L. J. 759; 11 P. R. 1917 (Cr.)

121. First-class Magistrate not subordinate to District Magistrate.—There may be inferiority without subordination, *e.g.*, the Court of a first-class Sub-divisional Magistrate is not subordinate to the District Magistrate within the meaning of this section, 6 A. 98, even in respect of proceedings under ss 110 and 118, 7 P. R. 1902 = 44 P. L. R. 1902, *overruling* 30 P. R. 1901; 2 P. R. 1912 = 11 P. L. R. 1912 = 12 Cr. L. J. 539, but there cannot be subordination without inferiority, as *subordinate* means *inferior in rank*, 9 B. 100. A District Magistrate has accordingly no jurisdiction to grant a sanction refused by a first-class Magistrate, Ratanlal 511; 1008 A. W. N. 74 = 5 A. L. J. 562 = 7 Cr. L. J. 304. Having regard to sub-secs (6) and (7), the Rulings in 2 B. 334 and 2 A. 295 are now obsolete. In Madras a Joint Magistrate is not a Court superior to the Sub-Magistrate within the meaning of s. 195 (a), 34 M. L. J. 404

First class Magistrate subordinate to the Sessions Court.—For the purposes of this section, a Magistrate of the first class is subordinate to the Sessions Judge and not to the District Magistrate, for appeals ordinarily lie to the former, except in two special cases provided for by ss. 406 and 515, 7 P. R. 1902 which *overrules* 30 P. R. 1901; 2 P. R. 1912 = 11 P. L. R. 1912 = 12 Cr. L. J. 539; 16 Cr. L. J. 640 (C). See also 1908 A. W. N. 74 = 5 A. L. J. 562 = 7 Cr. L. J. 304, 10 P. R. 1894. A first-class Magistrate passing an order under s. 145 is subordinate to the Sessions Judge and not to the District Magistrate. A Magistrate of the first class having passed an order under s. 145 of the Code was transferred to another place. His revenue charge was made over to another Magistrate and his judicial charge went to the City Magistrate. The order made was disobeyed. An application for sanction to prosecute under s. 195 sub-sec (1), clause (a) was made to the District Magistrate. Held, that the District Magistrate had no jurisdiction to grant the sanction and that the Sessions Courts only could entertain the application, *per SHAH*, Ag C]. Under clause (a), sub-sec. (1) of s. 195, if a public servant making the order is a Court, in respect of that order the Court to which that Court would be subordinate would be the Court to which appeals would ordinarily lie, 25 Bom. L. R. 810.

122. Magistrate subordinate to Additional Sessions Judges.—Where under s. 408 appeals lie from the Court of first instance to the Court of Sessions, an Additional Sessions Judge can exercise jurisdiction in that Court under s. 409 read with s. 9. The Magistrate is subordinate to the Additional Sessions Judge and the latter has jurisdiction to act under sub-sec (7), 14 Cr. L. J. 195 (C), 20 A. L. J. 603; 40 B. 877.

123. Second and third-class Magistrate subordinate to the District Magistrate and not to the Sub-divisional first-class Magistrate.—A Joint Magistrate though authorized under s. 407 (2) to entertain appeals

granting a sanction, given or refused by a Subordinate Magistrate may be presented to the Joint Magistrate. The proper Court to entertain such applications is that of the District Magistrate, 26 M. 658 (F.B.), 27 M. 124; 30 C. 394; 11 B. 438, 22 C. 487; 3 N. L. R. 50 = 5 Cr. L. J. 433; 18 M. 487 is *overruled* on this point. In 2 Bom. L. R. 336 it was however held, that where a District Magistrate had directed an Assistant Collector to perform the routine work of the Collector's office, including the criminal appellate and revisional work, the Assistant Collector so acting is competent to revoke a sanction granted by a second-class Magistrate. In 41 Mad. 787, it was held that a Joint Magistrate to whose Court appeals from convictions by a third-class Magistrate do not ordinarily lie but who hears an appeal from such Court by transfer from the District Magistrate cannot grant sanction for perjury as a Court of first instance or as an Appellate Court. 35 A. 90 *not followed*.

124. When a second-class Magistrate is subordinate to the Sessions Court.—A Subordinate Magistrate, who commits a case for trial to a Court of Session, is subordinate to the Court of Session in matters connected with and arising out of the trial. The Sessions Court may accordingly sanction a prosecution against a witness for giving false evidence at the preliminary inquiry, although the witness may not have been examined in the Sessions Court. Welr II, 160.

125. Acting Magistrate is not subordinate to permanent incumbent.—Where an officiating Sub-divisional Officer made an order under s. 476, and then reverted as Deputy Magistrate, his successor, the permanent Sub-divisional Magistrate has no authority to act under s. 195 on the ground that his predecessor was subordinate to him, but he has power to act independently as the offence was committed in his Court. 7 A. L. J. 991 = 11 Cr. L. J. 435. See also 22 P. R. 1918 (Cr.).

126. Munsiff's Court subordinate to District Judge.—In Punjab, for the purposes of this section, the Court of the District Judge is the Court to which a Munsiff is subordinate, and that Court alone can give sanction in respect of offences committed in the Court of the Munsiff, 16 P. R. 1898; 25 P. R. 1900, but see 16 P. R. 1887; 10 P. R. 1891, see 2 Lah. 57.

127. Subordinate Judge not competent to deal with orders of Munsiffs.—A Subordinate Judge, to whom an appeal from the order of a Munsiff refusing sanction for prosecution in respect of offence under ss. 463 and 471, I P. C., was transferred by the District Judge under s. 22 of the *Bengal Civil Courts Act*, has no jurisdiction to try the appeal as the only Court to which an appeal ordinarily lies from the decree or order of the Munsiff and to which he was subordinate is the District Court, 39 C. 774; 13 Cr. L. J. 296 (G). Where, however, by a notification issued under the *Madras Civil Courts Act*, 1873, the Government empowered Subordinate Judges to receive appeals direct from orders of District Munsiffs in all cases where the Sub-Court is situated in a place different from that of the District Court, held that all such Subordinate Courts who have been empowered by the notification are Courts to which appeals 'ordinarily lie' within the meaning of sub-sec. (7), 28 M. L. J. 436 = 17 M. L. T. 446 = 16 Cr. L. J. 439.

128. Deputy Commissioner of Sonthal Pergannas subordinate to Commissioner.—The Court of the Deputy Commissioner of the *Sonthal Pergannas* is to be deemed to be subordinate to the Court of the Commissioner of *Bhagalpur* and hence an application from the appellate order of the Deputy Commissioner ought to be made to the Commissioner of *Bhagalpur* and not to the Calcutta High Court, 30 C. 916.

(B)—WHERE APPEALS LIE TO MORE COURTS THAN ONE

129. Where appeals ordinarily lie to more Courts than one, application must be made to the inferior Appellate Court.—Clause (a) of sub-sec. (7) which in general terms furnishes a complete definition of the term 'ordinarily' and covers all cases where appeals lie to more than one higher Court. Consequently when a Civil Court in practice tries suits of values so different that appeals from some of its decisions lie to one and appeals from other decisions to another higher Court then for the purpose of sub-sec. (6), it is the Appellate Court of inferior jurisdiction that can revoke the sanction or grant the sanction refused by the Subordinate Court, 8 N. L. R. 57 = 13 Cr. L. J. 498; 11 B. 438; 22 C. 497 referred to. The Appellate Court of inferior jurisdiction is the Court to which the Court giving or refusing sanction is subordinate for the purpose of this section, 16 M. L. J. (S.N.) 42. See also 22 C. 497 as to an application against the order granting sanction of the Recorder of Rangoon in a case in which appeal lay to the Privy Council.

130. Subordinate Judge's Court subordinate to District Court.—A District Court has jurisdiction under this section to revoke or grant a sanction granted or refused by a Subordinate Judge's Court, even though the appeal in the particular case might lie to the High Court. The application to the superior Court where the first Court refuses sanction is by way of appeal and not by an *original* application, 2 B. 481; 7 M. 314; 11 B. 438; 1 A. 17 (F.B.) is no longer law having regard to sub-sec. (6). See also 1893 A. W. N. 104. The word *appeal* used in sub-sec. (6) only indicates the tribunal which can interfere with sanction given or refused. See also 20 Cr. L. J. 766, see 45 M. L. J. 320; 43 A. 409.

(C)—WHERE NO APPEAL LIES.

131. Where no appeals lie, subordination is to principal Court of original jurisdiction, sub-sec. (7), (c).—The finality of the decision of the Court with reference to the nature of the case and not with reference to the constitution or the Court is the element which determines subordination. A District Judge has therefore power to revoke a sanction granted by a Collector in a proceeding in which the Collector's order was final, 31 A. 313, but see 34 A. 197.

132. What is a principal Court of original jurisdiction?—The nature of the proceedings in which
There is no justification
 if they were principal
 impossible to suppose
 that the Legislature intended the principal Court of original civil jurisdiction to revise the orders of Criminal and Revenue Courts with which it has no concern as a Civil Court. The principal Court of original jurisdiction under the *Agra Tenancy Act* 1901, is the Court of the Collector, 34 A. 197.

133. District Judge and not Collector may entertain applications under sub-sec. (6) from Mamlatdar's Court.—The *Mamlatdar's* Court constituted by Bombay Act III of 1876, is a Civil Court within the meaning of this section, therefore a complaint of an offence mentioned in it when such offence is committed before or against the *Mamlatdar's* Court shall not be entertained in the Criminal Courts, except with the sanction of the *Mamlatdar's* Court, or of the High Court to which it is subordinate, 5 B. 137. See 4 B. 168 (F B) and 9 B. H. C. R. 249. But now under sub-sec. (7), cl. (c) the District Judge has authority to grant sanction in respect of offences committed before a *Muhalkari* in a possessory suit under the *Mamlatdar's Court's Act*, 5 Bom. L R. 206; and to hear appeals from orders granting or refusing sanction granted by the Mamlatdar. The Collector has no jurisdiction, 9 Bom. L R. 896 = 6 Cr. L J. 225.

134. Court of Small Causes subordinate to District Court and not to High Court.—37 C. 13. See also 31 A. 313. See 20 Cr. L. J. 577; 39 A. 657 (F.B.), 20 O. C. 223; 21 C. W. N. 948

135. Presidency Court of Small Causes subordinate to High Court.—According to cl. 7 (c), an appeal against an order of the Presidency Small Cause Court granting sanction would lie to the High Court because the High Court is the Principal Civil Court of original jurisdiction within whose jurisdiction the Small Cause Court is situate, 35 M. 133. As the High Court is one, whether it exercises original or appellate jurisdiction or by whomsoever the jurisdiction of the Court may be exercised, whether by a single Judge or by a Bench of more than one Judge there is no foundation for the argument that the appeal lies to one particular branch of the High Court

136. Single Judge of Presidency Small Cause Court not subordinate to Full Bench.—The Full Court of the Presidency Small Cause Court has no power to grant or revoke a sanction refused or granted by a single Judge of that Court, as the power conferred on it under ss 37 and 38 of the *Presidency Small Cause Court's Act* XV of 1882, is not appellate but revisional only. The Act does not make a distinction between a Judge and more than one Judge of the Presidency Small Cause Court, 34 B. 316; 43 M. 395.

137. Where the Registrar of the Small Cause Court grants sanction.—If the Registrar of the Small Cause Court grants sanction in his judicial capacity, the Small Cause Court, whether a Full Bench or presided over by one or more Judges, cannot revoke such sanction. But where the Registrar acts as a public servant (ministerial officer) merely, the Chief Judge only can revoke such sanction, 27 B. 130.

138. Village Munsiff not subordinate to Sub-Magistrate.—A Village Munsiff is not subordinate to a Sub-Magistrate under s 195 (a). The subordination of one public servant to another may arise either from express enactment or from the fact that both belong to the same department, one being superior in rank to another. There is no enactment which makes Village Munsiffs subordinate to Sub-Magistrates. The Code does not do so, nor Regulations XI of 1816 and IV of 1821. They do not belong to same department, 18 M. L. J. 584 = 4 M. L. T. 214, 4 M. 241 not followed. See 47 M. 229.

139. Village Munsiff subordinate to District Judge.—As no appeal lies under Act III of 1892 from the decrees of a Village Munsiff, that Court is under sub-sec (7) (c) deemed to be subordinate to the principal Court of original jurisdiction within the local limits of whose jurisdiction it is situate. The District Judge is therefore under sub-sec. (1), (b) competent to grant sanction, 6 A. L. J. 796 = 10 Cr. L. J. 437 under Act XII of 1887 (Bengal Agra and Assam Civil Courts Act) a Munsiff is subordinate to the Additional Sessions and Subordinate Judge, 40 A. 21.

140. Subordination of officers authorized to act under N-W P. Revenue Acts.—The Assistant Collector and Collector exercising jurisdiction under *N W P Land Revenue Act* are only ministerial officers and as such are not subordinate to the District Judge or to the High Court. 1891 A. W. N. 82; 34 A. 197, nor to the District Magistrate in a suit for profits under the *N-W P Tenancy Act*, 9 Cr. L. J. 180 (A). When a Tahsildar refused to grant a sanction in respect of a statement made in a mutation proceeding before him, an application to set aside the order does not lie either to the High Court or to the District Magistrate but only to the Collector, 12 Cr. L. J. 109 (A)

141. Other cases of subordination.—See Notes under heading VII above at pp 503 and 504

XVII.—POWERS AND DUTIES OF SUPERIOR COURT IN DEALING WITH APPLICATION UNDER SUB-SEC. (6)

Note.—The power conferred under the old sub-sec. (6) of s 195 to revoke or grant a sanction given or refused by any Lower Court is now relegated to s 476-B which is newly added by the amending Act XVIII of 1921. S 476-B now expressly provides for an appeal against the refusal to make a complaint or the making

of a complaint under s 478 by a Lower Court. Therefore the power that is vested in the superior Court under s. 476-B is the ordinary power that is exercised by a Court of appeal and so the doubts raised whether the jurisdiction conferred by the old sub-sec. (6) of s 195 was a special appellate or revisional jurisdiction are set at rest by s. 476-B. The cases raising these doubts are now only of academic and historic interest and they are given below as such.

142. Jurisdiction conferred by sub-sec. (6) is a special jurisdiction and not the ordinary appellate or revisional jurisdiction.—The power conferred by sub-sec. (6) is not a part of the appellate or revisional jurisdiction conferred by Chaps XXXI and XXXII of the Code. It is a special power, 22 M. L. J. 419 (F.B.) = (1912) 1 M. W. N. 499 = 13 Cr. L. J. 209; 30 M. 382 (F.B.) approved. It will be noted that cl (6) applies not only to cases of application to a superior Court of Justice, but to superior Executive Officers or to Government, to whom the authority granting the sanction is subordinate, and the Legislature appears to have deliberately refrained from describing the proceeding before the superior officer as either 'appeal' or 'revision.' Provision had also to be made for cases in which the application for sanction is not made to the Court in or in relation to which the offence is alleged to have been committed, but to a Court to which such last mentioned Court is subordinate. See also 40 C. 239; 37 C. 714.

143. Application is not an appeal.—An application under sub-sec. (6) to the superior Court is not an appeal, but a substantive application, the jurisdiction of the High Court therefore under s 115 of the Civ. P. C., 1908, to revise orders of Subordinate Civil Courts is not ousted by s 195 (6), 37 C. 714. An application under sub-sec (6) is not an appeal within the meaning of s 224 of the *Bengal Civil Court's Act*, 1887, 39 C. 774; 40 C. 37. Cl. (7), (c) merely designates the Court to which an appeal lies under that clause and does not describe the nature of the jurisdiction which it exercises. But when one Court deals with a judgment of another Court having power to confirm or to set it aside, the jurisdiction it exercises is appellate jurisdiction. The High Court does not exercise any original jurisdiction in dealing with applications against the orders of the Presidency Small Cause Court under this section, 36 M. 138; 37 C. 714 approved. See also 30 M. 332. An application made to an Appellate Court under sub-sec. (6) may probably be regarded as an application by way of an appeal, though it is not material by what name the application is called in pursuance of which the Appellate Court, after going into the merits of the case, revokes a sanction granted or grants sanction refused by a Subordinate Court, 26 A. 244, where 15 A. 61 is discussed. The distinction between granting or revoking a sanction under cl. (6) and revoking an order on appeal may seem to be one of words only, but the distinction exists and must be recognized, 8 S. L. R. 49 = 15 Cr. L. J. 654.

144. Superior Court must consider the merits.—The Appellate Court must not direct its attention only to the point whether the Court of first instance was competent or not to grant sanction, but must go also into the merits of the case and decide whether the Magistrate has properly exercised his discretion. 40 P. W. R. 1912 = 13 Cr. L. J. 831. The power of granting sanction possessed by Appellate Courts ought to be exercised carefully, specially where sanction is refused by the Court of first instance. Sanction given on a small residue of the case by the Appellate Court, after the Original Court had refused sanction, was set aside by the High Court on the ground that it would simply serve as a means of harassment, 31 C. 811. See also 4 N. L. R. 140 = 8 Cr. L. J. 351; 56 P. R. 1905. 'The right conferred by clause (6) may not be exactly a right of appeal, but it is strongly analogous to such rights. I think the Legislature intended that a Court of superior jurisdiction whose jurisdiction was invoked under cl. (6) should reconsider the entire matter on the merits and while allowing all reasonable weight to the opinion of the Court below should nevertheless reconsider the question of the propriety of the order of sanction on its merits upon a complete review of the entire facts, 37 A. 439; 10 Bar. L. T. 161. See, however, the remarks of SADASIVIER, J., in 26 M. R. J. 436 = 15 Cr. L. J. 271.

145. Superior Court in dealing with an application under sub-sec. (6) must state its reasons.—When a person for whose prosecution sanction has been granted under this section applies to a superior Court to have such sanction revoked, the superior Court in dealing with such application should give its reasons for either confirming or revoking the sanction and not simply say, "I decline to interfere on revision—Rejected." 1992 A. W. N. 60; 26 M. 116.

146. Application must not be summarily rejected.—In 12 C. W. N. 243, it was held that an application for revocation of sanction granted, made under sub-sec. (6) should not be summarily rejected under s 421 without giving the applicant a reasonable opportunity of being heard in support of the same. The provisions of s. 476 do not apply to such a case. See also 25 A. 142 and 1916 M. W. N. 8.

HARRY: 1 4 [See HUNNY]
rolling sound. [06s]
R is the dog's letter and Harry A

Syn - Haste speed

11 BY HENNINGER
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assault }
or 11

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of his Creator
To Asahel up
The spirit of the season

ἀποκρινόμενος, *foros*, whence O Fr *Apofia*, *poia*
clamos or *poia*.

ā, ē, ī, ō, ā, ȳ, long, ē, ē, ī, ō, ā, ȳ, short

*Bsp. 55.11.01. 10.12.01. 11.12.01. 12.12.01. 13.12.01. 14.12.01. 15.12.01. 16.12.01. 17.12.01. 18.12.01. 19.12.01. 20.12.01. 21.12.01. 22.12.01. 23.12.01. 24.12.01. 25.12.01. 26.12.01. 27.12.01. 28.12.01. 29.12.01. 30.12.01. 31.12.01. 1.1.02. 2.1.02. 3.1.02. 4.1.02. 5.1.02. 6.1.02. 7.1.02. 8.1.02. 9.1.02. 10.1.02. 11.1.02. 12.1.02. 13.1.02. 14.1.02. 15.1.02. 16.1.02. 17.1.02. 18.1.02. 19.1.02. 20.1.02. 21.1.02. 22.1.02. 23.1.02. 24.1.02. 25.1.02. 26.1.02. 27.1.02. 28.1.02. 29.1.02. 30.1.02. 31.1.02. 1.2.02. 2.2.02. 3.2.02. 4.2.02. 5.2.02. 6.2.02. 7.2.02. 8.2.02. 9.2.02. 10.2.02. 11.2.02. 12.2.02. 13.2.02. 14.2.02. 15.2.02. 16.2.02. 17.2.02. 18.2.02. 19.2.02. 20.2.02. 21.2.02. 22.2.02. 23.2.02. 24.2.02. 25.2.02. 26.2.02. 27.2.02. 28.2.02. 29.2.02. 30.2.02. 31.2.02. 1.3.02. 2.3.02. 3.3.02. 4.3.02. 5.3.02. 6.3.02. 7.3.02. 8.3.02. 9.3.02. 10.3.02. 11.3.02. 12.3.02. 13.3.02. 14.3.02. 15.3.02. 16.3.02. 17.3.02. 18.3.02. 19.3.02. 20.3.02. 21.3.02. 22.3.02. 23.3.02. 24.3.02. 25.3.02. 26.3.02. 27.3.02. 28.3.02. 29.3.02. 30.3.02. 31.3.02. 1.4.02. 2.4.02. 3.4.02. 4.4.02. 5.4.02. 6.4.02. 7.4.02. 8.4.02. 9.4.02. 10.4.02. 11.4.02. 12.4.02. 13.4.02. 14.4.02. 15.4.02. 16.4.02. 17.4.02. 18.4.02. 19.4.02. 20.4.02. 21.4.02. 22.4.02. 23.4.02. 24.4.02. 25.4.02. 26.4.02. 27.4.02. 28.4.02. 29.4.02. 30.4.02. 31.4.02. 1.5.02. 2.5.02. 3.5.02. 4.5.02. 5.5.02. 6.5.02. 7.5.02. 8.5.02. 9.5.02. 10.5.02. 11.5.02. 12.5.02. 13.5.02. 14.5.02. 15.5.02. 16.5.02. 17.5.02. 18.5.02. 19.5.02. 20.5.02. 21.5.02. 22.5.02. 23.5.02. 24.5.02. 25.5.02. 26.5.02. 27.5.02. 28.5.02. 29.5.02. 30.5.02. 31.5.02. 1.6.02. 2.6.02. 3.6.02. 4.6.02. 5.6.02. 6.6.02. 7.6.02. 8.6.02. 9.6.02. 10.6.02. 11.6.02. 12.6.02. 13.6.02. 14.6.02. 15.6.02. 16.6.02. 17.6.02. 18.6.02. 19.6.02. 20.6.02. 21.6.02. 22.6.02. 23.6.02. 24.6.02. 25.6.02. 26.6.02. 27.6.02. 28.6.02. 29.6.02. 30.6.02. 31.6.02. 1.7.02. 2.7.02. 3.7.02. 4.7.02. 5.7.02. 6.7.02. 7.7.02. 8.7.02. 9.7.02. 10.7.02. 11.7.02. 12.7.02. 13.7.02. 14.7.02. 15.7.02. 16.7.02. 17.7.02. 18.7.02. 19.7.02. 20.7.02. 21.7.02. 22.7.02. 23.7.02. 24.7.02. 25.7.02. 26.7.02. 27.7.02. 28.7.02. 29.7.02. 30.7.02. 31.7.02. 1.8.02. 2.8.02. 3.8.02. 4.8.02. 5.8.02. 6.8.02. 7.8.02. 8.8.02. 9.8.02. 10.8.02. 11.8.02. 12.8.02. 13.8.02. 14.8.02. 15.8.02. 16.8.02. 17.8.02. 18.8.02. 19.8.02. 20.8.02. 21.8.02. 22.8.02. 23.8.02. 24.8.02. 25.8.02. 26.8.02. 27.8.02. 28.8.02. 29.8.02. 30.8.02. 31.8.02. 1.9.02. 2.9.02. 3.9.02. 4.9.02. 5.9.02. 6.9.02. 7.9.02. 8.9.02. 9.9.02. 10.9.02. 11.9.02. 12.9.02. 13.9.02. 14.9.02. 15.9.02. 16.9.02. 17.9.02. 18.9.02. 19.9.02. 20.9.02. 21.9.02. 22.9.02. 23.9.02. 24.9.02. 25.9.02. 26.9.02. 27.9.02. 28.9.02. 29.9.02. 30.9.02. 31.9.02. 1.10.02. 2.10.02. 3.10.02. 4.10.02. 5.10.02. 6.10.02. 7.10.02. 8.10.02. 9.10.02. 10.10.02. 11.10.02. 12.10.02. 13.10.02. 14.10.02. 15.10.02. 16.10.02. 17.10.02. 18.10.02. 19.10.02. 20.10.02. 21.10.02. 22.10.02. 23.10.02. 24.10.02. 25.10.02. 26.10.02. 27.10.02. 28.10.02. 29.10.02. 30.10.02. 31.10.02. 1.11.02. 2.11.02. 3.11.02. 4.11.02. 5.11.02. 6.11.02. 7.11.02. 8.11.02. 9.11.02. 10.11.02. 11.11.02. 12.11.02. 13.11.02. 14.11.02. 15.11.02. 16.11.02. 17.11.02. 18.11.02. 19.11.02. 20.11.02. 21.11.02. 22.11.02. 23.11.02. 24.11.02. 25.11.02. 26.11.02. 27.11.02. 28.11.02. 29.11.02. 30.11.02. 31.11.02. 1.12.02. 2.12.02. 3.12.02. 4.12.02. 5.12.02. 6.12.02. 7.12.02. 8.12.02. 9.12.02. 10.12.02. 11.12.02. 12.12.02. 13.12.02. 14.12.02. 15.12.02. 16.12.02. 17.12.02. 18.12.02. 19.12.02. 20.12.02. 21.12.02. 22.12.02. 23.12.02. 24.12.02. 25.12.02. 26.12.02. 27.12.02. 28.12.02. 29.12.02. 30.12.02. 31.12.02. 1.1.03. 2.1.03. 3.1.03. 4.1.03. 5.1.03. 6.1.03. 7.1.03. 8.1.03. 9.1.03. 10.1.03. 11.1.03. 12.1.03. 13.1.03. 14.1.03. 15.1.03. 16.1.03. 17.1.03. 18.1.03. 19.1.03. 20.1.03. 21.1.03. 22.1.03. 23.1.03. 24.1.03. 25.1.03. 26.1.03. 27.1.03. 28.1.03. 29.1.03. 30.1.03. 31.1.03. 1.2.03. 2.2.03. 3.2.03. 4.2.03. 5.2.03. 6.2.03. 7.2.03. 8.2.03. 9.2.03. 10.2.03. 11.2.03. 12.2.03. 13.2.03. 14.2.03. 15.2.03. 16.2.03. 17.2.03. 18.2.03. 19.2.03. 20.2.03. 21.2.03. 22.2.03. 23.2.03. 24.2.03. 25.2.03. 26.2.03. 27.2.03. 28.2.03. 29.2.03. 30.2.

147. Superior Court cannot remand for further inquiry or for fresh evidence.—A superior Court cannot direct further inquiry when dealing with an appeal from the Court of first instance, 30 M. 311; *followed* in 33 M. 90. See Notes under heading XXI. But 44 M. 47 has now held that an Appellate Court hearing an application to revoke or grant a sanction, granted or refused by a Lower Court under s. 195 has power itself to take additional evidence before disposing of the application, 30 M. 311 and 33 M. 90 distinguished, *see* also 40 A. 21.

148. Notice to opposite party generally necessary.—(1) *Accused.*—See Note 102 at pp. 518 and 519. (ii) *Applicant.*—When an application is preferred against an order granting sanction, notice must go either to the District Magistrate or to the person to whom sanction was granted, 7 Bur. L. T. 205 = 15 Cr. L. J. 571. As a rule *ex parte* proceedings are opposed to general principles. In 31 C. 811, though it was held that notice was not necessary to the person who obtained the sanction, the District Magistrate had been served with a notice.

149. Superior Court cannot transfer applications under sub-sec. (6).—S. 407 does not entitle a District Magistrate to send applications under sub-sec. (6) to a Magistrate of the first class subordinate to him, 34 A. 244; 30 C. 394, 26 M. 656; nor can a District Judge transfer such an application to a Subordinate Judge, 39 C. 774; 40 C. 37. As to the power of the High Court, *see* 34 M. 186 and Note 13 to s. 526.

150. Superior Court may revoke sanction even if complaint had been lodged.—The mere fact that a complaint has been lodged in pursuance of a sanction would be no bar to a Court competent under sub-sec. (6) to deal with an application for revoking such sanction, entertaining such application and disposing of it according to law, even where the complaint in pursuance of the sanction is preferred to itself, 27 M. 124. *Quare* whether an Appellate Court could *suo motu* and without any application to it, revoke or grant sanction under sub-sec. (6)? See 32 B. 203.

151. Is the superior Court competent to proceed under s. 476?—Where a Subordinate Judge refused to grant a sanction under this section, it was held a District Judge on appeal could make an order under s. 476, but in doing so, he should proceed under cl. (1), (b) of this section read with s. 476, 32 B. 184, where 34 C. 551. (F.B.) is *dissented from*, not followed in 32 M. 49. In 19 P. W. R. 1911 = 12 Cr. L. J. 434 it was held that it was not open to the superior Court while dealing with an application under sub-sec. (6) to take proceedings under s. 476, 6 P. R. 1909 = 12 P. W. R. 1909 = 104 P. L. R. 1909 = 10 Cr. L. J. 158 referred to. See also 34 P. R. 1886.

152. Proper course is to invoke aid of superior Court under sub-sec. (6) and not by an original application.—Where an application for sanction has been made to a proper Court and refused, the proper remedy for the party seeking sanction is to proceed by way of appeal or revision to the proper appellate tribunal and not to make an independent application to such Appellate Court for the granting of the necessary sanction, 25 A. 126; 32 B. 203; 1902 A. W. N. 197. See Note 170.

153. Superior Court cannot direct Subordinate Court to rectify mistakes in sanction.—Under cl. (6) of this section, it is open to a Superior Court either to revoke or grant a sanction when such sanction has been given or refused by a Subordinate Court, but there is no provision of law which authorizes the Superior Court to send the case back to the Subordinate Court with directions to draw up an order in accordance with the observations made in the judgment. In this case, the High Court intervened and directed the Subordinate Court to pass a proper and comprehensive order on the application fulfilling the requirements of law by specifying the offences alleged to have been committed and other materials necessary for the trial of the case. 14 Cr. L. J. 655 (C).

154. Superior Court cannot grant sanction when the Original Court has not dealt with application.—When a Subordinate Judge erroneously dismissed for default an application for sanction and the District Judge on appeal accorded the sanction, it was held that, as there was no sanction given or refused by the Subordinate Judge, the District Judge had no jurisdiction to accord the sanction under this section. The only jurisdiction he had under the circumstances was to revise the order of the Subordinate Judge dismissing the application as for default, 32 B. 203.

155. Does sub-sec. (6) contemplate only one application by way of appeal or a series of applications?—

A. The Madras and Calcutta High Courts hold that petitions by way of further appeal may be made under sub-sec. (6) and (7) against appellate orders of Civil Criminal Courts dealing with orders passed by Courts of first instance granting or refusing sanction. (a) A petition by way of appeal lies to the High Court

moisture from yarns or cloths in process of manufacture
 It is also known as *Prussian blue*, a (Chem.) Pertaining to, or obtained from, ferrocyanide of barium decomposed with sulphuric acid, as, *hydroferrocyanic*

It is usually made of glass with a graduated stem and indicates its specific gravity of a liquid by the depth to which it sinks in it, the zero of the scale marking the depth to which it sinks in pure water.

It is produced from Gravel
 Causing a discharge

long in full or dry
 long or reduced or not

from, done, for, do, well, found, some

in every case in which a Civil or Criminal Court subordinate to it within the meaning of sub-sec. (7) (a) gives or refuses a sanction whether in respect of an offence committed before it or of one committed before a Court subordinate to it, and in the latter case whether it gives a sanction refused by a Subordinate Court or revokes a sanction accorded by such Court, 27 M. 223; 29 M. 122; 30 M. 382 (F.B.) (ii) The High Court has power to interfere with the appellate order of a District Judge affirming sanction granted by a Munsiff, 5 C. L. J. 222 = 5 Cr. L. J. 188; 11 C. W. N. 193 = 5 C. L. J. 219 = 5 Cr. L. J. 29. (iii) So with the appellate order of a District Judge revoking sanction granted by a Munsiff, 30 M. 382 (F.B.), see also 11 C. W. N. 193; 6 S. L. R. 81 = 13 Cr. L. J. 768. *Contra* 10 C. W. N. 1026 = 4 Cr. L. J. 168, where it was held that the High Court cannot interfere with the order of a District Judge revoking sanction granted by a Munsiff, and see also 37 C. 13. See also 25 P. R. 1903; 24 P. W. R. 1903 = 8 Cr. L. J. 457; 16 C. W. N. 643 = 13 Cr. L. J. 191.

B. The Allahabad High Court holds that there is no further appeal under this sub-section from an appellate order dealing with sanction appeals, 1907 A. W. N. 283; 30 A. 243; 36 A. 403 and also 36 A. 479, where the Court refused to alter the practice (i) The Sessions Judge has no power to interfere with the appellate order of a District Magistrate granting a sanction refused by a third-class Magistrate, 30 A. 109. (ii) Where a District Judge confirms a sanction granted by a Subordinate Judge, no appeal lies to the High Court, 31 A. 33. (iii) And so where a District Judge grants a sanction refused by a Munsiff, High Court cannot interfere 31 A. 43; 36 A. 469, 13 A. L. J. 709 = 16 Cr. L. J. 524. In 30 A. 243 it was, however, held that the High Court could under its revisional powers conferred by ss. 435 and 439 deal with an appeal against the order of a Sessions Judge affirming a sanction granted by a Subordinate Magistrate.

C. Central Provinces.—The Legislature never intended that a particular power of superior control, given under a particular section of the adjective law, shall be exercised more than once, and by different Courts in the same case. Sub-sec. (6) contemplates one proceeding only, in a single superior Court, after which the power given by it is exhausted a view supported by the language of sub-sec. (7) cl. (a) 4 N. L. R. 140 = 8 Cr. L. J. 331. See also 6 O. C. 216.

156. Though there is only one appeal from a conviction, there may be a third or even a fourth appeal from an order preliminary to a trial.—Where it was argued that the sanction prescribed by clauses (b) and (c) of sub-sec. (1) is a sanction to be accorded either by the Court in which the offence was committed or by the Court to which such Court is subordinate within the meaning of sub-sec. (7), (a) and therefore a sanction accorded by the High Court in cases in which the offence was committed in a Court not subordinate to it within the meaning of sub-sec. (7), (a) would be inoperative, held that the argument was untenable and proceeded on a misapprehension of the jurisdiction exercised by an appellate tribunal. An order passed by the Court of Appeal is in law the order which ought to have been passed by the Subordinate Court and will therefore have the same efficacy and operation as the order which ought to have been passed by the latter, 27 M. 223. See also 26 M. L. J. 435 = 15 Cr. L. J. 271.

157. No period of limitation for application to superior Court.—An application under sub-sec. (8) to superior Court is not an appeal and therefore Article 154 of Schedule I to *Limitation Act*, 1908 which provides a period of thirty days for appeals under the Criminal Procedure Code to any Court other than a High Court does not apply, 22 M. L. J. 419 = (1912) M. W. N. 499 (F.B.), 40 C. 239, 139 M. 730 and 39 M. 768. Rules of limitation are foreign to the administration of criminal justice and it is only by express statutory provision that any rule of limitation could be made applicable to a criminal case. S. 178 of the *Limitation Act* 1877 (corresponding to s. 18 of the 1908 Act) does not apply to an application under this section 10 A. 330. But the application should be made without unnecessary delay, 8 S. L. R. 49 = 15 Cr. L. J. 654. In this case an application under sub-sec. (6) prepared by the Government after the lapse of a year was disallowed.

158. How applications under this sub-section are to be registered.—Every application made to a Criminal Court under s. 195, presented either to a Court of first instance or directly to the Appellate Court for the grant of sanction refused by the Subordinate Court, or for revocation of sanction granted by the Subordinate Court, should be registered as a "Criminal Miscellaneous Petition" and not as a "Revision Petition" though presented to an Appellate Criminal Court which may have also revisional jurisdiction. S. 186 of the *Madras Criminal Rules of Practice* 1910. In 13 A. L. J. 709 = 16 Cr. L. J. 524, the somewhat curious practice of registering applications to the District Judge under cl. (6) from orders of inferior Civil Courts as 'criminal appeals' was commented upon and 23 A. 554 was referred to.

159. Sanction cannot be revoked because of the delay in drawing up the order.—A Sessions Judge set aside on 27th July, 1895 an order passed by a Sub-Judge on 10th April, 1895, granting an application for

sanction to prosecute for perjury on the ground that after an interval of three-and-a-half months no formal and legal sanction had been recorded. *Held*, that the order of the Sessions Judge was illegal, the time allowed by the Code within which sanction shall remain in force being six months, *Ratanlal* 859.

160. Judges of a Chartered High Court if equally divided in hearing an application under sub-sec. (6), case governed by Letters Patent—When the Judges of a Chartered High Court constituting the Bench are equally divided in opinion in dealing with an application under sub-sec (6), the case is governed by the Letters Patent (*s* 36 Madras) and not by *s* 429 or *s* 439 of this Code. The opinion of the senior Judge prevails, *22 M. L. J. 419 (F B)* = (1912) *M. W. N.* 499 = *11 M. L. T.* 367. *See* *39 M. 768*.

XVIII.—APPEAL

161 Letters Patent Appeal from order of a single Judge of the High Court.—An order in a sanction matter passed by a single Judge of the High Court is not a sentence or order in a *criminal trial* and therefore an appeal lies under *s* 15 of the Letters Patent, *Weir I, 787, II, 1199* = *12 M. L. J. 408; 32 C. 379; contra 17 M. 105*. The rejection by such a Judge of a revision petition, declining to revise the order passed by District Judge refusing to revoke a sanction is a judgment *30 M. 311*; where *23 M. 169* and *27 M. 340* are not followed. The Madras High Court has in *L. P. A. 79* and *80* of 1903 *held* that an appeal lies under *s* 15 of the Letters Patent against the order of a single Judge granting sanction in the exercise of the original criminal jurisdiction of the High Court. *See also 45 M. 928; 47 B. 270*.

162 Does an appeal lie to the Privy Council under cl. (39) of the Letters Patent against an order granting sanction?—In a proceeding under *s* 10 of the Letters Patent, sanction was granted, *IMAM, J.* *held* that an order granting a sanction is a 'final order' within the meaning of *s* 39 of the Letters Patent, as it materially affected the status of the party against whom the sanction was granted though *CHAPMAN, J.* differed from him, and leave was granted to appeal to the Privy Council. On review, however, the leave was cancelled on the ground that a proceeding under cl (10) of the Letters Patent does not fall under any of the jurisdictions specified in cl. (39) *41 C. 734*

XIX—REVIEW AND FRESH SANCTION.

163. No power to review order disposing of sanction application.—A Sessions Judge has no power to review his order refusing to revoke a sanction to prosecute, such an order being final and not open to review, *23 B. 50; 10 B. 176, 15 A. 61; 30 P. R. 1903; 32 B. 203*, but *see 1904 A. W. N. 10*. The contrary view has prevailed in *29 C. 728*, in respect of an order of discharge. Where a sanction application was dismissed for default of appearance, but was subsequently restored to file and proceeded with, the High Court refused to interfere as the order of restoration was a proper order required to set right what had been done without jurisdiction, *15 Cr. L. J. 71 (M)*

164 Re-consideration of ex-parte order not prohibited.—This section does not prevent an officer or Court from re-considering an order passed *ex-parte* granting sanction to prosecute a person, *Weir II, 194*.

165. Court which gave the sanction has no power to revoke it—When a Court properly grants a sanction it has no power to revoke it, *40 C. 423*. Such an application must be made to the Appellate Court, *32 C. 379*.

166 Where revocation on merits, no power to grant a fresh sanction—Where the sanction granted by a Magistrate under *s* 193, I P C was revoked by the Sessions Judge, the District Magistrate cannot grant a fresh sanction himself in respect of the same alleged perjury. The District Magistrate may, however, move the High Court to have the Judge's order of revocation set aside. There is nothing in the Code which either authorizes a District Magistrate to call upon a Sessions Judge for explanation or which justifies a Sessions Judge in furnishing him with one, *1 A. L. J. 395*

167. Where original sanction revoked on technical grounds not affecting merits—Where the original sanction granted was revoked by the appellate authority on the ground that it was based solely on affidavit evidence it was *held* that the Court had power to re-hear the application for sanction, *Weir II, 195, (1911) M. W. N. 1000*.

168 After sanction had lapsed by the expiry of six months, could a fresh sanction be granted?—Where sanction is exhausted by lapse of time, fresh sanction should not be granted unless some explanation was given for the omission to commence proceedings within six months, or some special grounds shown why fresh sanction should be given. Where the explanation is not given or special grounds not shown, a Court

1st Pronounced *Hyperbole* in the classics.

2nd *Hyperbole* is [or *hyperbole*, beyond all]

h, y, l, o, g, f, long, h, y, l, o, g, f short cäre, färe, läst, fäll, whät, thäre, väll, tärn, lëgue, färm, döne, färe, äg, wälf, f, bäl sou...

to you seek to cheat in vain. *Hyperbole*
 as to the other and better than he
 o. for the purpose of doing
 puts on a false countenance
 virtue or piety, and who peruse
 fully and virtuously
 receive a home should perish. *Hyperbole*
 r, discountenance person here cheat. *Hyperbole*

does not exercise sound discretion in granting fresh sanction, 11 C. 577. In 18 A. 358, it was held following 6 A. 43 and 1892 A. W. N. 245 and dissenting from 22 C. 573, that a fresh sanction could be given when the first sanction has become infructuous, see also 22 C. 176. In 40 C. 584, it was, however, held that a second sanction cannot be given, and having regard to the power of the High Court to extend the time, even after the lapse of six months (25 M. 191 and 480) there will be no great hardship if the power to grant a fresh sanction were negatived. See, however, Note 167.

169. Subsequent application by a different person.—Where sanction accorded to one person was allowed to lapse by the expiry of six months and then another application for sanction was made by a different person. Held, that very strong grounds would be necessary for second sanction to be granted, for the first sanction opened the door of the Criminal Courts for the institution of criminal proceedings and the High Court could be moved to extend the time for the first sanction. *Quære* whether a Court could grant a second sanction to a person other than the person to whom it had been originally granted? 6 Bom. L. R. 1097.

170. Fresh application to appellate tribunal on refusal by the Lower Court.—Where a Magistrate refused to sanction a prosecution under s. 211 and no appeal or revision was made against such refusal, a fresh original application to the Sessions Judge or High Court for sanction should not be encouraged, 25 A. 126; see also 32 B. 203, where it is held that the appellate tribunal had no jurisdiction to entertain such an application, when the original tribunal had dismissed the application for sanction for default of appearance of applicant. See Note 214.

XX.—REVISION.

171. High Court may interfere in revision.—The High Court is competent under s. 439 to interfere with an order of a subordinate Criminal Court made under this section. The Court has, under that section, the powers conferred on a Court of Appeal by s. 423 to alter or reverse any such order, 15 C. 730; 5 P. R. 1908 (F.B.), 30 A. 243, 36 A. 403. *Contra*, see 13 B. 109, where it was held, that this section distinguishes between the sanction granted by a Court to a prosecution by a private individual and a complaint made by the Court itself. A superior Court to which such Court is subordinate may revoke the sanction granted in the former case to the private prosecutor, but it has no power in the latter case to set aside a complaint duly made by a Subordinate Court. See also 13 M. 145; 7 A. 871; 1 C. 450; 23 M. 205; 7 C. 208; 1907 U. B. R. 1 = 6 Cr. L. J. 25. In a case in which both the original and the Appellate Criminal Courts refuse a sanction, the High Court as a Court of Revision may call for the record and if the refusal proceeds on an error of law, it may accord the sanction which ought to have been granted by the Appellate Criminal Court and such sanction will of course be operative for purposes of clause (b) and (c) of sub-sec. (1), 27 M. 223. This power of revision is not affected by the jurisdiction conferred by sub-sec. (6), 37 C. 714. See 20 Cr. L. J. 564.

172. Revision under ss. 435 and 439 is confined to sanction given or refused by Criminal Courts.—Where sanction is granted by a Civil or Revenue Court the High Court has no power to interfere in revision under ss. 435 and 439.

(1) Madras.—26 M. 139, 29 M. 122, 17 M. L. T. 268 = 16 Cr. L. J. 232.

(2) Calcutta.—8 C. W. N. 73; 23 C. 332; 14 C. W. N. 808 = 11 Cr. L. J. 357; 40 C. 477, 19 C. W. N. 447 = 21 C. L. J. 198 = 16 Cr. L. J. 236.

(3) Allahabad.—28 A. 554 (F.B.) overruling 26 A. 1 and 1903 A. W. N. 170, 1903 A. W. N. 172; 1905 A. W. N. 85; 26 A. 249 (F.B.). See also 31 A. 33 and 45.

(4) Bombay.—26 B. 785; 28 B. 533.

(5) Burma.—4 L. B. R. 138 = 7 Cr. L. J. 418.

(6) Oudh.—17 O. C. 25 = 15 Cr. L. J. 217 where 6 O. C. 216 and 13 O. C. 193 were considered and distinguished.

No petition lies to the High Court under s. 439 to revise the orders of a Small Cause Court Judge, 1903 A. W. N. 712; 14 C. W. N. 806 = 11 Cr. L. J. 357 or of a Subordinate Court or District Judge, 31 A. 33.

But in Punjab and Central Provinces it has been held after an investigation of all the authorities that it is competent for the High Court to interfere in revision under ss. 435 and 439 with orders passed by any Civil, Revenue or Criminal Courts, etc., under this section or s. 476, 5 P. R. 1908 = 103 P. L. R. 1905 = 7 P. W. R. 1905 = 7 Cr. L. J. 251; 158 P. L. R. 1911 = 38 P. W. R. 1911 = 12 Cr. L. J. 216; 4 N. L. R. 140 = 6 Cr. L. J. 351; 9 N. L. R. 184 = 15 Cr. L. J. 33.

I.

List of Abbreviations and Acronyms

BYLT

| NYLT | | Asnc. | |
|-----------------|------------------------------|-------|--|
| fr +'-glazed, a | Glazed or incrustated with e | | |

300-100-6

100 = 100%

$$I_1 = I_2 = I_3$$

References

1. Introduction

References

Table 1

hunt after, from *ixves*, to hunt, to seek
 hunt, Ar. *nu ns* I



hunted and
a company
re-called
to it
wife [that]
no place
did not



Box (Ligand Set)

Ice-fall, 79 Ice having

Ice-field, n A sheet of ice that can not be seen

ice'-float, ice'-flōe, { *n.* A large mass of floating ice

It is now a man I don't
know in the house

D, d, Y, long, &, z, l, ô, ô, y, short; cône, sûr, last, fall, what, there, well, term, pique, firm, dont, sûr, do, well, food, foot,

173. Where Civil Courts pass orders under this section, Civil Procedure Code applies.—Where sanction is granted by a Civil Court an application for revision should be made to the High Court under s 115 of the *Civil Procedure Code*, Act V of 1908 (s 622 the old Code Act XIV of 1882) 29 M. 122; 31 A. 38; 33 R. 54, 16 Cr. L. J. 285.

174. Power of High Courts under the Charter Act.—Where sanction was granted by a Subordinate Judge and confirmed by the District Judge and there were no grounds for interference under s. 622, Civ P C, held, that the High Court could in the exercise of its extraordinary power of superintendence conferred on it by s 15 of the *Charter Act*, set aside the sanction, 27 M. 223 at p. 228. In 40 C. 477, HENDERSON, J., in his referring judgment states that it is the settled practice in the Calcutta High Court to treat cases under the section by way of appeal and no question as to revisional powers of the Court or the powers under the *Charter Act* arises.

175. Revisional powers how to be exercised.—When the Courts below have refused sanction, the High Court in revision will not grant sanction unless there are strong grounds for exercising its discretion in the ends of justice, 22 W. R. 11. Revisional powers ought to be exercised only in order to prevent a gross and palpable failure of justice, 36 A. 403. When Subordinate Courts grant sanction to prosecute under this section, it is incumbent on them so to frame the proceedings before them as to enable the High Court to satisfy itself from the record whether the application for sanction has been properly granted or not, 16 C. 651, 23 M. 210.

176. High Court has no power to revise when District Magistrate acts as head of the Police.—Where a District Magistrate as head of the Police sanctions a prosecution under s. 182, I P C, the High Court has no power to interfere in revision, 27 A. 292 where 27 C. 452 is *dissented from*. See also 30 P. R. 1903; 6 P. R. 1910 = 10 P. W. R. 1910 = 11 Cr. L. J. 252.

For the purposes of s 195 (1) (a) of the Code the Superintendent of Police is subordinate to the District Magistrate in accordance with s 4 of the Police Act, 1861 (27 A. 292, *followed*)

But the Lahore High Court in 4 Lah. 130 has *followed* 27 C. 452, and held that the Police is not subordinate to District Magistrate within the meaning of s. 195 (1) (a) of the Code. It was further held that a revision to the High Court was competent, 4 Lah. 130.

177. High Court can under cl. (6) of this section extend the time of a sanction to prosecute, even after the expiry of the period of six months from its date 18 Bom. L. R. 636 = 17 Cr. L. J. 377.

XXI.—REMAND FOR FURTHER INQUIRY.

178. Section does not contemplate remand for further inquiry or for fresh evidence or to rectify a mistake—The Appellate Court under sub-sec. (6) can only revoke sanction given or give sanction refused. It has no jurisdiction to remand the case for further inquiry, 16 M. L. J. (S.N.) 45; 33 A. 512, nor can the Appellate Court setting aside the order granting sanction on the ground that no notice had been given to the accused, direct the Magistrate to dispose of the matter afresh after giving notice to the accused, 1911 M. W. N. 100 = 9 M. L. T. 97 = 11 Cr. L. J. 699. As an order of remand is *ultra vires* all subsequent proceedings in consequence thereof are a nullity, 7 P. R. 1913 = 14 Cr. L. J. 378. Nor can it direct the first Court to take fresh evidence 30 M. 314, where it is laid down that the power to direct fresh evidence to be taken is not inherent in the Appellate Court and is not necessarily incident to the exercise by the Appellate Court of the jurisdiction conferred on it by sub-sec. (6). The proceedings under this section are of a criminal rather than of a civil nature and the provisions of ss. 563 and 579, Civ P C, are not made applicable to such proceedings by s 647, Civ P C, 1882, even when sanction is granted by a Civil Court. See also 20 C. 633. The power to take or call for further evidence given by s 428 is limited to appeals under Chapter XXXI and a superior Criminal Court acting under s. 195 (6) cannot do so, 33 M. 90. In 14 Cr. L. J. 655 (C.) it was held that the Court dealing with an application under cl. (6) is not competent to direct the Subordinate Court to rectify a mistake in the form of a sanction *e.g.*, specifying the offences for which sanction is asked for. See also 17 Cr. L. J. 222 = 34 In. Ca. 334 (Bur).

XXII.—PROCEEDINGS UNDER THIS SECTION ARE JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS

179. Judicial Proceedings.—See s. 4 (m) and Notes thereunder at pp. 21 22.

180. Proceedings of Courts under this section are judicial proceedings—An application under this section for grant of sanction is a judicial proceeding. An application for sanction when presented to the Court of first instance commences a judicial proceeding and the order made is a judicial act. Consequently

1 The same not different
person
I can not remember a thing that happened a year ago
out a strong as strong as mind
same of a long time who now remember the event, did I

1600000, from id to make a peculiar
make proper or peculiar, from id of proper peculiar

1 A peculiar mode of expression, a phrase stamped by the usage of a language or sometimes of an author with another than its grammatical

by

gu

Id 1600000

1 An idiom a mode of expression

1 den-ti-fi-able n. Capable of being identified
den-ti-fi-ca-tion n. [Fr. *identifiant* Sp. *identificación*] The act of identifying or proving

3 Dialect peculiar
Syn — Dialect — Idiom
la a long to identify
varieties of expression

Id 1600000
n. IDIOTIZING [See *supr*]

And to just — The
Who in the dark our fire
Do not know our bar
and of friend and foe

Why stand ye here all the day
4 Given to rest and ease a ease to labor or en-
ployment Lazy as an idle man an idle flow
en h it be and rare

1600000, beside and so on backward to tell, in
from the idea.

Id 1600000 n. [Fr. *idiotisme* and *idiotisme* from
the 12th of proper peculiar and ease a mixture,
from *separatus* to mix mingle] Peculiarity of con-
stitution, that temperament or state of constitu-
tion, which is peculiar to a person. *Idiosyncrasy*

A, E, I, O, U, long A, E, I, O, U, short, care far, last light, what; there, veil, firm; pique, firm, done, sur, x

foot,

the proceeding before the Appellate Court under sub-sec. (6) in which it is invited to review the propriety of the order of the Court of first instance is a judicial proceeding, 13 Cr. L. J. 1. (C.) 10 M. 232; 20 M. 883; 23 M. 210; 7 C. W. N. 423 must be taken to be overruled by 37 C. 642. Proceedings of the High Court under sub-sec. (6) are judicial proceedings, 34 A. 602 *overruling* 18 A. 80 on this point. See, however, 18 M. 487; 1903 A. W. N. 74.

181. An inquiry under this section need not be a judicial inquiry.—*Per* SPENCER J., in (1911) 2 M. W. N. 528 *following* 6 W. R. 41; 22 M. L. J. 419 = (1912) 1 M. W. N. 499 = 13 Cr. L. J. 209. See Note 76

182. Granting sanction under cl. (a), sub-sec. (1) may not be a judicial proceeding—Some cases at least within cl. (a) of sub-sec. (1) have no reference to any legal proceedings and then the provisions of ss. 196 and 197 are not connected with judicial proceedings at all. 22 M. L. J. 419 = (1912) 1 M. W. N. 499 = 13 Cr. L. J. 209. See also 18 M. 437. In most cases the public servant concerned or his superior officer may not be a judicial officer or an officer exercising judicial functions

XXIII.—STAY OF PROCEEDINGS.

183. Where stay of proceedings expedient.—As a matter of discretion and propriety it is right for a Court before committing a person on a charge of perjury upon his own uncontradicted statement to await the hearing of the appeal where an appeal is pending in the case in which he gave evidence alleged to be false, 6 C. 308; 13 C. W. N. 398 = 11 Cr. L. J. 4. See also 2 C. W. N. 60, where JENKINS, J., postponed a sanction to prosecute for perjury until after the disposal of the appeal in the original case. But in 26 B. 785, it was held that in a complaint of perjury, making and using false documents and making of a false complaint, the High Court will not order a stay of proceedings in the Criminal Court pending the disposal of a second appeal out of which the criminal proceedings arose

184. A Sessions Judge has no jurisdiction to stay proceedings in a Criminal Court outside his Sessions division.—Where a complaint was filed in a Court in the Chingleput District on a sanction granted by a second class Magistrate in the district of South Arcot and confirmed on appeal by a Deputy Magistrate in the same district and an application was made to the Sessions Judge of South Arcot to revise the sanction order and for stay of proceedings meanwhile, in the Chingleput District, held, that the order of the Sessions Judge staying proceedings in the Court of a Magistrate in the Chingleput District was *ultra vires* 26 M. 137. *Quære* Having regard to the Full Bench Ruling in 30 M. 382 (F.B.) the decision in this case that it was not competent to the Sessions Judge under s. 438 to revise the sanction proceedings himself but that he should have reported it for the orders of the High Court with a recommendation to quash the sanction is probably not correct.

185. Application for stay of proceedings must be made on the criminal side.—Though an application to revise sanction given or refused by a Civil Court should be made on the civil side, yet an application to stay proceedings in the Criminal Court based on the sanction should be made on the criminal side by a criminal miscellaneous petition, 8 C. W. N. 31

186. Advisability of postponing criminal proceedings.—It is advisable to postpone criminal proceedings

parties to the suit. As to those not parties to the suit it is not advisable to prosecute them while the civil proceedings are pending and so the criminal proceedings should be stayed. 15 M. L. J. (S.N.) 41, 7 Bar. L. J. 73 = 15 Cr. L. J. 438. A Court may well hesitate to give sanction under s. 195 to a private individual to prosecute his adversary for an offence alleged to have been committed during the pendency of a civil litigation, before it has terminated. But it would, however, be a dangerous doctrine to lay down any hard and fast rule to the effect that a criminal trial or inquiry should, of necessity be stayed simply because a civil suit has been instituted between the parties in which some or all the matters materially in issue in the criminal case would have to be determined, until the civil litigation was finally decided, 13 C. W. N. 393 = 11 Cr. L. J. 4. See also 143 C. W. N. 131 and Notes to s. 476.

187. Sanction not to be used to stifle appeals.—Great caution ought to be exercised that sanction is not merely sought by a su
681; 6 A. 144; 17 M. R. 46
o in appeal to the High
11
19 B. 362; 1 C. 450; 16 C.
filed pending the disposal
n committed, held, that it

was undesirable to grant sanction pending disposal of appeal and that the proper course would be to await the conclusion of the litigation and then to move the highest appellate tribunal to take action if necessary in the ends of public justice. *See also 7 A. L. J. 647 = 11 Cr. L. J. 445; 12 C. L. J. 270.*

188. High Court's power to stay proceedings.—The High Court might stay criminal proceedings pending disposal of a civil suit or appeal, **16 B. 729; 26 B. 785; 30 M. 226.** But this, however, is not an invariable rule, **18 B. 581**. In **23 C. 610**, **RAMPINI, J.**, was of opinion that the High Court had no such power, *see also 35 C. 909.* It makes no difference in principle whether the criminal proceedings have been instituted in pursuance of sanction given by a Court or in the exercise of the right given to a party to institute proceedings when no sanction is necessary. In either case the test is whether the party is likely to be prejudiced by proceedings going on when a civil suit is pending in which the genuineness of the document is in issue, **16 Cr. L. J. 637 (M)**. In **5 C. W. N. 44**, the question as to the High Court's power was not raised and it was *held* that the Magistrate ought to have stayed proceedings pending the decision of a civil suit touching the same matter and the High Court made the necessary order staying proceedings. Where proceedings are stayed the accused might be put on terms as to his appearance, **23 C. 610.** *See also 31 C. 858 = 7 Bar. L. T. 73 = 15 Cr. L. J. 488; 8 S. L. R. 20 = 15 Cr. L. J. 651, 19 C. W. N. 125 = 16 Cr. L. J. 309.*

XXIV.—PROPRIETY OF SANCTION NOT TO BE QUESTIONED BY COURT ENTERTAINING COMPLAINT.

189. Trying Court not to question the propriety of sanction.—Where sanction is given by a superior Court a Court subordinate to it cannot question its propriety, but is bound to accept it as valid and leave the accused to question it before a competent Court if so advised. In other words, the propriety or impropriety of the sanction is a question for the accused which he may raise before a competent Court, **4 C. 869 = 4 C. L. R. 413; 26 M. 189; Ratanlal 473; 26 M. 592.** The most it can do is to stay proceedings in order to allow the accused to get the sanction revoked by some Court to which the Court granting the sanction is subordinate, **18 P. R. 1887; 2 P. R. 1888.** It cannot refuse to act on the ground of the insufficiency of the sanction. **1893 A. W. N. 177.** *See also Ratanlal 718; 41 C. 448.*

190. Magistrate cannot discharge accused for impropriety of sanction.—A Magistrate to whom a complaint accompanied by a sanction is presented, cannot discharge the accused because in his opinion the sanction ought not to have been granted. He can discharge only, if in his opinion the evidence against the accused is not sufficient to frame a charge or to commit to the Court of Session. **5 B. H. C. R. Cr. Ca. 41.**

XXV.—EFFECT OF SANCTION ON POWERS OF TRYING COURT—SUB-SEC. (5).

191. After grant of sanction, trial Court may proceed against others and for other offences.—Once a Magistrate has taken cognizance, he has power under sub-sec. (5) to frame a charge in respect of any other offence referred to in this section and which may be disclosed by the facts and the Magistrate might also proceed against persons other than those against whom sanction has been accorded. The Magistrate who has taken cognizance of the offence with jurisdiction has jurisdiction to deal with the entire case, **4 C. W. N. 167; 15 C. W. N. 124; 12 Cr. L. J. 320 (Sind); 26 M. 592.** Rulings to the contrary in **10 W. R. 24-A** and **15 W. R. 53** seem to be no longer law, sub-sec. (5) was put in specially to meet, **8 B. H. C. R. 28**, where it was *held* that the trying Magistrate could not add a new charge for which sanction has not been accorded. Under sub-sec. (5), the Magistrate may frame a charge for any other offence covered by the same facts and referred to in this section, **30 C. 905.**

192. When sanction is accorded for forgery, trying Magistrate may try for any cognate offence.—Where sanction is accorded for a prosecution for forgery, the trying Magistrate might charge the accused in addition with fraudulent using (**s 471, I P C**) or abetment of forgery, **6 W. R. 20.** Sanction was given for offences under ss 417 and 468 **I P C**, and the conviction was under ss 468 and 109, **I P C**, *held* that the conviction was right, **30 C. 905.**

193. Trying Court may convict for offence different from that sanctioned when facts identical.—Where a complaint was made by a Sub-Inspector after obtaining sanction under s 353 **I P C**, for prosecution in respect of facts which disclosed offences under ss 188 and 225-B, **I P C**, though, the Police-officer thought that s. 353 was the more appropriate section the trying Magistrate altered the charge into one under ss 186 and 225-B, **I P C**, and convicted the accused, *held* the conviction was good as there was a distinct complaint of facts constituting an offence under s. 186, **I P C**, by the public servant concerned. **13 C. W. N. 123.**

194. A similar but entirely different offence cannot be charged.—A Magistrate inquiring into a case of perjury in respect of a particular statement specified in the order of sanction cannot pick out a wholly different statement in the same deposition and charge the accused on that, 10 *Bar. L. R.* 77; s 537 will not cure such irregularities

195. Power of Appellate Court under s. 423 to alter finding not controlled by this section.—An Appellate Court when it alters the finding under s 423 is not bound by the requirements of a previous sanction, 25 *A. 534*. But it was held in 18 *Cr. L. J.* 603 (*Bar.*) that a Revisional Court cannot convert the conviction for an offence for which no sanction is required to conviction or an offence in respect of which sanction would be necessary

196. One sanction covers only one complaint.—Where once a sanction to prosecute is availed of and a complaint instituted on its strength proves infructuous, a fresh complaint on the same sanction is incompetent, 17 *O. C.* 18 = 15 *Cr. L. J.* 230.

XXVI.—JUDGE GRANTING SANCTION OUGHT NOT TO TRY THE CASE HIMSELF.

197. Highly desirable sanctioning Judge should not try.—It is highly undesirable that the same Judge who has heard the evidence and expressed an opinion in granting sanction should also be the Judge to try a prisoner on a complaint based upon the sanction and supported by the same evidence, though a conviction is not necessarily bad for this reason, 22 *W. R.* 16; 14 *A.* 354; 1884 *A. W. N.* 37; 16 *C.* 766 (*F.B.*) , 6 *B.* 479, 18 *B.* 380 (*F.B.*) , 36 *P. R.* 1892. In 16 *M.* 561, where a Head Assistant Magistrate on sanctioning under this section a prosecution for an offence under s. 211, I P C., forwarded the proceedings to the Deputy Magistrate of another division, who ordinarily had no jurisdiction over the place where the alleged offence was committed, it was held no objection could be taken to the jurisdiction of the Deputy Magistrate to try the charge.

198. Whether Magistrate giving sanction may hear appeal—A District Magistrate who gave sanction to the prosecution on the Police report of an offence under s. 182 I P C., is competent to hear the appeal from the conviction, as s 487 does not apply, 27 *C.* 452.

199. Judge giving sanction competent to hear appeal from conviction.—See 15 *Bom. L. R.* 104 = 14 *Cr. L. J.* 190 following 6 *B.* 479 and 16 *C.* 766. See also Notes under ss 487 and 566

200. Trial for disobedience of an order of Magistrate.—A Magistrate is not competent to try and convict a person under s 188, I P C., for disobedience of an order under s. 144 issued by himself. Further by s. 487, he is disqualified from trying such a case himself, as the offence is one mentioned in this section, *Ratanlal* 904 where 18 *B.* 380 is distinguished See however 8 *S. L. R.* 41 = 15 *Cr. L. J.* 649. A person was ordered by a Magistrate to appear before him which that person failed to do. He was thereupon convicted by that Magistrate under s 174 I P C. Held that having regard to s 487, Cr P C., the Magistrate whose order had been disobeyed could not try the case it being a case within the purview of s. 195 16 *A. L. J.* 432.

XXVII.—MISCELLANEOUS.

201. This section does not apply to a matter coming before the Collector in his administrative capacity and proceedings taken not bad for want of a sanction, 20 *Cr. L. J.* 798.

202. Orders under this section and s. 250 might be made at the same time.—A Court while granting sanction for a prosecution under s 211 I P C., might at the same time make an order for compensation under s 250, 15 *W. R.* 9 = 6 *B. L. R.* 296; 21 *M.* 237; 26 *C.* 181; 30 *C.* 123 (*F.B.*) overruling 28 *C.* 251; 22 *C.* 586 construed and see also 29 *C.* 479; 18 *P. R.* 1901; 6 *P. R.* 1905 and Notes under s. 250

203. Damages for unsuccessful application for sanction.—See 9 *A.* 59.

204. Sections of the Code and other Acts where previous sanction is required.

Act XI of 1878 (*Arms*), s. 29, previous sanction of the Magistrate of the district or in Presidency towns of the Commissioner of Police. See 27 *C.* 692.

Act I of 1889 (*Metal Tokens*), s. 5, previous sanction of the District Magistrate or of Sub-divisional Magistrates.

Act XVII of 1890 (*Census*), s. 11, previous sanction of the Local Government or of some officer authorized in this behalf by name or office.

Act V of 1898 (*Cr Pro Code*), see ss 108, 132 188 195, 196, 196-A, 197, 198, 199 339 and see also ss, 230 238 and 537 which deal with previous sanctions.

Act II of 1899 (*Stamp*), s 70, sanction of the Collector or such other officer as the Local Government generally or the Collector specially authorizes in that behalf. See 1883 A. W. N. 98.

Act III of 1877, s 83, Act XVI 1908 (*Registration*), s 82, see 11 C. 566.

Act XXII of 1881, s 47 and XII of 1896, s 57 (*Exercise Act*), see 9 P. R. 1903; 8 P. R. 1901; 22 P. R. 1900; 9 P. R. 1897.

Act VI of 1898 (*Post Office*) s 72, see 10 C. W. N. 1029.

Act XII of 1882 (*Salt*) s 11 see 20 B. 543.

205. Power of Appellate Court to grant sanction under s. 197.—This section does not confer on an Appellate Court any authority having regard to the provisions of s 439, in respect of an order made by a Subordinate Court under s 197, 26 C. 852. But see *Ratanlal* 683, where it was held that a District Magistrate is not precluded from taking cognizance of offences under s 193 I P C, merely because a Subordinate Magistrate in whose Court the evidence had been given had refused to give sanction to prosecute.

196. No Court shall take cognizance of any offence punishable under Chapter VI or IX A* of the Indian Penal Code (except section 127), or punishable under section 108-A or section 153-A, or section 294 A, or section 505 of the same Code, unless upon complaint made by order of, or under authority from, the Governor General in Council, the Local Government or some officer empowered by the Governor General in Council in this behalf

Notes.—1. **Chap VI—Of offences against the State** S 127.—Receiving property knowing the same to have been taken by waging war against any Asiatic power in alliance or at peace with the Queen, or committing depredation on the territories of such power S 294 A—keeping lottery office or publishing proposals regarding lotteries S 108—Abetment in British India of offences outside British India S 153-A—Promoting enmity between classes S 505—Statements conducing to public mischief

* We have added to the list of offences which can only be proceeded against under the order of the Government, offences under ss 108-A, 153-A and 505 The two latter offences resemble in substance offences against the State, and offences under s. 108 A involve questions affecting Foreign States—*See Com Rep.* Offences under Ch IX A relating to election from s 171 E to 171 I were added to this list by Act XXIX of 1920

2 Difference between sanction under the old s 195 and that under this and the following sections—There is a marked distinction between the classes of offences dealt with in old s 195 and those dealt with in this section and s 197 A Court granting sanction under clauses (b) and (c) of sub-sec (1) of s 195 does so in connection with offences committed in or in relation to any proceeding in such Court and the Court therefore acts in its judicial capacity in granting the sanction upon legal evidence But the Government in according or with holding sanction under this and the following sections acts purely in its executive capacity and the sanction need not be based on legal evidence. The Government certainly does not act in a judicial capacity nor exercise a judicial function in sanctioning a prosecution under this or the next section 27 M. 54.

3. Persons authorized to complain in Burma—(1) Deputy Commissioners and Assistant Commissioners have been empowered to make complaints or to authorize the making of complaints of offences under s. 294-A, I P C (*Burma Gazette*, 1897, Pt. II, p 144), (2) Deputy Commissioners of Hunthawaddy, Amherst and Pegu have been empowered to order or to authorize the institution of prosecutions for such offences (*Burma Gazette*, 1880, Pt. I, p. 411, 1883, Pt. II, p 55) and (3) the Commissioners of Arakan Tenasserim Pegu and the Deputy Commissioners of Shwegyin, Toungoo, Tavoy, Mergui, Prome Bassala, Thayetmyo Henzada and Thongwa (*Burma Gazette*, 133 Pt. II, p 103).

4. Absence of complaint vitiates the trial and conviction—A Magistrate or a Sessions Court proceeding to try a person accused of an offence under Chap VI, I P C exceeds his jurisdiction if he takes cognizance of such offence without a complaint and this defect is not cured by the provisions of s 537, 16 P. R. 1890. The absence of such authority is a defect which vitiates the proceedings *ab initio* and is not a mere irregularity

* The words of IX A were added by Act XXXIX of 1920 (Plea of Offences and Inquiries Act)

curable under s 537, 42 P. R. 1894. Absence of complaint makes the whole proceeding void *ab initio*. The defect goes to the root of the matter and makes it impossible for the Court to hold a valid trial for the offence, the offence not being specified and the accused person not being mentioned, 15 C. L. J. 517 = 13 Cr. L. J. 609. When the accused were committed for trial under s 121, I P C., without the complaint or sanction of the Government and convicted, *held distinguishing* 9 B. 288 and *dissenting* from 22 B. 112, that s. 532 did not cure the defect. There was a want of jurisdiction not only in the Magistrate, but also in the Court of Sessions for at no stage were the conditions of s 196 satisfied, 16 P. R. 1890 approved 37 C. 467-492. When the complainant omitted to name an accused person in his petition of complaint the defect goes to the root of the matter and the accused not so named stands discharged from the trial initiated on such a complaint even though his name appears in the sanction authorizing the complaint, 33 C. 539. Sanction is different from a complaint. But where the accused was prosecuted under s 505, I P C., upon a letter of the Commissioner conveying the sanction of the Government without a formal complaint and no objection was taken at the trial. *Held*, that as the absence of the complaint had not prejudiced the accused the defect was cured by s 537 (a), 8 P. R. 1908 = 15 P. W. R. 1908 = 7 Cr. L. J. 353, where 16 P. R. 1890 was distinguished on the ground that in that case the necessary sanction was not given until long after the institution of proceedings, *see* also 1, 2 and 3 P. R. 1892.

5 **Effect of irregularity or insufficiency of complaint.**—Where after a trial and conviction it was contended on appeal that the complaint was defective inasmuch as it did not set forth the facts relied on as constituting the offences and the words of the sections of the Penal Code were literally copied out *held* that after an elaborate inquiry and trial it was plainly no longer competent to the accused to invite the Appellate Court to set aside the conviction on the ground that the inquiry was materially defective. Such a case is completely covered by s. 537, 15 C. L. J. 517 = 13 Cr. L. J. 609. The proper course is to bring up the question of the sufficiency or legality of the complaint to the proper tribunal before the completion of the case in the Subordinate Court and get the proceedings quashed, 11 C. W. N. 178 = 5 Cr. L. J. 13 referred to *Per* MUKERJEE, J, in 15 C. L. J. 517 = 13 Cr. L. J. 609. In such a case, to make the whole proceeding void *ab initio*, it is necessary for the accused to show that there was no complaint before the Magistrate and Magistrate had no other course but to refuse issue of process on the ground that he had no jurisdiction. It is not enough to say that the materials which the Magistrate had before him were meagre or even insufficient, for if the Magistrate had jurisdiction to issue process, the trial would be perfectly regular even if the Magistrate had exercised that jurisdiction on insufficient material. *Per* HARRINGTON, J, *ibid*

6 **Complaint must set out facts and not merely copy the sections of the Penal Code.**—MUKERJEE J, *held* that the following complaint was defective as it did not state the concrete facts constituting the offences but merely copied the words of the sections.—Your petitioner has reasons to believe that the persons named in the Government Order, dated the 28th July 1910 which is hereunto annexed have amongst themselves and together with other persons known or unknown conspired to wage war against His Majesty the King and to deprive His Majesty of the Sovereignty of British India and they have collected arms and have otherwise prepared to wage war with the intention of either waging war or being prepared to wage war against the King and have further concealed with intent to facilitate a design to wage war against the King, and have thereby committed offences punishable under ss 121 A, 122 and 123 I P C.' 18 C. W. N. 1105 = 15 C. L. J. 517 = 13 Cr. L. J. 609.

7. **Letter of Government is not the complaint nor the person who signs it the complainant.**—A letter by Government sanctioning the prosecution of S. K. under s 121 I P C. may be an authority to institute a complaint but the letter itself is not a complaint 16 P. R. 1890. Nor is the person who signs the letter of authority the complainant and it is not therefore necessary to take his examination under the law. The person who armed with authority makes the application to the Court for the apprehension of the accused is the complainant and his examination is to be taken, 35 C. 141

8. **Want of sanction cannot be cured even by subsequent order of Government.**—The accused were committed for trial under s. 121, I P C. At the trial objection was taken to the charge for want of sanction of Government. An order authorizing the institution of a complaint was obtained from the Government while the case was before the Court of Sessions and the accused were convicted. *Held* that the subsequent order was of no value. Under s 196 the only order or authority within the competence of the Government is one that permits a complaint, but no complaint was made 37 C. 467 at p. 492. Where the sanctions, as they originally stood contained a misdescription of the articles on which the prosecution was based and this was rectified by a subsequent sanction filed in course of the trial, *held* the petitioner was not prejudiced and the defect was cured by s 537 35 C. 141. S 537 does not cure any irregularity in or defect of a sanction under s. 194, 31 M. 80

That which was

When v or p precede it, it is pronounced

place, or of no value, &c

It makes and is necessary to read
it as in the margin.

That

Imp'ie tye five, a [Lau-
tine] taining or able to obtain by
taining {Ode

Ip ill

irreconcilable, a [Fr & p as p-
lin pla'ca ble, a

There are many subtle differences between the words. (Note)

S, s, l, o, g, y, long, s, s, l, o, g, y, short, care, like, last, fall, what, there, well, term, plique, firm, done, for, do, well, loud, loud

9. Section does not prescribe any particular form of order and does not even require the order to be in writing.—At the trial of Mr Tilak for an offence under s 124 A, I P C, an order for his prosecution given by Government under this section in the following form was tendered in evidence —“ Under the provisions of s 196, Cr Pro Code M A Baig, Oriental Translator to Government, is hereby ordered by H E the Governor in Council to make a complaint against Mr Bal Bangadhur Tilak, Publisher, Proprietor and Editor of the

the order was sufficient and was admissible, 22 B. 112 at p. 150; 19 C. 35; but see 37 C. 467. What the section requires is that the complaint should be made upon authority from the Local Government. There is nothing in the section to warrant the construction that the actual complaint must be expressly authorized by the Local Government. The only question which the Court has to consider is ‘is the complaint which I am asked to entertain, a complaint made by order or under authority of Government,’ 32 M. 3. When the persons to be prosecuted are named and the sections under which they are alleged have committed the offences as also the period of their activity are specified the mere circumstance that these persons are not described as members of the Revolutionary Society, the existence whereof was sought to be established at the trial does not affect the validity of the sanction, 15 C. L. J. 517 = 13 Cr. L. J. 609. Sanction by telegram from Government is sufficient under this section (1918) M. W. N. 926, 42 M. L. J. 108.

A letter purporting to be issued from the Chief Secretary to the Government of Bengal was signed by the Deputy Secretary, not in his official capacity, but for the Chief Secretary, and it was held that there was no legal proof that the Local Government had sanctioned the prosecution under s 196 of the Code, 50 C. 133 (35 C. 141 distinguished).

10. Authority need not be signed by the Governor.—The authority under this section need not in the case of Local Government be signed personally by the Lieutenant Governor, it is enough if it is signed by one of his accredited and Gazetted Officers. It must be presumed that all official acts have been duly performed and s. 144 *Indian Evidence Act*, amply supplies all omissions in the method of communication of the sanction to the prosecuting officer and the Magistrate 35 C. 141. The order granting the sanction need not be signed personally by the Governor, 87 C. 467 at p. 493, 42 M. L. J. 557; 44 M. L. J. 166.

11. Sanction must be strictly proved and accused's identity established.—In a trial under s 121, I P C the sanction of the Local Government, required by this section, must be strictly proved in the manner laid down in s. 78 of the *Evidence Act* and the identity of the prisoner named in the sanction must be established, 1 Bar. S. R. 389. But where the letter of authority for a prosecution under s 124 A did not specify the name of the accused, but he was sufficiently indicated from the first and his name was supplied at the commencement of the Police Court proceeding, held it was a sufficient compliance with the section, 35 C. 141.

12. Absence of Government sanction, does not affect accused's liability for other offence requiring no sanction.—Where a person is accused of committing acts which constitute a grave offence requiring sanction under this section, but the Government refuses to accord sanction it does not affect the accused's liability to punishment on the same facts for a minor offence under some other section which requires no sanction. Thus the accused was tried and convicted by an Assistant Sessions Judge of abetting or attempting dacoity. The Sessions Judge on appeal held that the evidence disclosed the offence of attempting to wage war against the Queen under s 122, I P C, but as no charge could be framed under that section for want of sanction by Government, the accused could not be brought to trial at all and he set aside the conviction. On appeal by Government the High Court reversed the acquittal holding the refusal of the Government to prosecute under s 122, I P C, did not effect the liability of the accused under other sections, 23 B 80. See also 13 B 502 which proceeds on the same principle, and also 42 C. 937, 7 Lah. 218.

13. Commitment for offences not in complaint authorized by Government bad.—Where an order under s 196 authorized a particular Police-officer to prefer a complaint of offences under ss 121 A, 122 123 and 124 of the Penal Code, “or under any other section of the said Code which may be found applicable to the case,” and the examination of the complainant also referred to the same sections. Held that no complaint under s 121 of the Penal Code was thereby authorized by the Local Government or in fact preferred and that the Magistrate had no power to commit thereunder 37 C 467 at p. 491. But in 32 M. 3 it was held that a sanction for an offence under s 124 A, I P C. will authorize a complaint under ss 124 A and 114, I P C. *Quare* whether this section deals with offences of abetment (except that under s 108 A, I P C) and any sanction is necessary, 20 M. 8 referred to

2. What is import 1 or imj lll 1, import, imth-
ing, significance {Obs}

The wisest beholder could not say if the importance were
joy or sorrow {Obs}

3 Importance, solicitation {Obs and imj rrr}

At our import we hither is he come. {Obs}

As serves to execute a mind very important {Obs}

2 Carrying or possessing weight or consequence,
Of valuable content or bearing, significant, weighty

Thou art all as nothing

He makes important.

4 Bearing on 1 rrrlln driving 1 rrrlln

See 1 rrrlln

14. Local Government cannot delegate its powers—The Local Government cannot delegate to any other body or person the controlling power and discretion of determining whether cognizance shall be taken by the Court of an offence mentioned in this section and its judgment must be specifically directed to the particular section and no other, under which the prosecution is to be carried on and the order or authority should be proceeded by a deliberate determination in this respect. An order authorizing a complaint under certain specified sections *or under any other sections found applicable* if it means found by anyone other than the Government involves a delegation which cannot be sustained **37 C 467 at pp 489 and 490**

15. Definition of Lottery—Lottery is a scheme for the distribution of property by lot or chance among persons who had paid or agree to pay a valuable consideration for the privilege of participating in such scheme.—*MacClain's Criminal Law of the United States*

16. Publication of advertisement of lotteries—The publication of advertisement in newspapers of any proposals relating to lotteries which have not been authorized by the Government is an offence punishable under s 294 A I P C. Magistrate should therefore take steps to make the Government acquainted with any such cases occurring in their district in order that sanction to the prosecution of offenders may be obtained under the provisions of this section. *Reg and Ord N W P p 376*. Before deciding not to proceed against the parties concerned in a lottery he should investigate the matter and take the orders of Government. *Madras Notification 4th June 1874*

Prosecution for certain classes of criminal conspiracy

196-A. No Court shall take cognizance of the offence of criminal conspiracy punishable under section 120-B of the Indian Penal Code

(1) in a case where the object of the conspiracy is to commit an illegal act other than an offence or a legal act by illegal means or an offence to which the provisions of section 196 apply, unless upon complaint made by order or under authority from the Governor General in Council the Local Government or some officer empowered by the Governor General in Council in this behalf or

(2) in a case where the object of the conspiracy is to commit any non cognizable offence or a cognizable offence, not punishable with death transportation or rigorous imprisonment for a term of two years or upwards unless the Local Government or a Chief Presidency Magistrate or a District Magistrate empowered in this behalf by the Local Government has by order in writing consented to the institution of the proceedings

Provided that where the criminal conspiracy is one to which the provisions of * sub-section (4) of section 195 apply no such consent shall be necessary

Notes.—1. Section new—This section was inserted by s 5 of the *Indian Criminal Law Amendment Act \ III of 1913*

2. Definition and punishment of criminal conspiracy—See Chapter \ A newly inserted by s 3 of Act \ III of 1913 in the Indian Penal Code

120-A. When two or more persons agree to do or cause to be done—

(1) An illegal act or

(2) An act which is not illegal by illegal means such an agreement is designated a criminal conspiracy

Provided that no agreement except an agreement to commit an offence shall amount to a criminal conspiracy unless some act besides the agreement is done to effect the object thereof by one or more parties to such agreement.

Explanation.—It is immaterial whether the illegal act is the ultimate object of such agreement or is merely incidental to that object.

120-B (1) Whoever is a party to a criminal conspiracy to commit an offence punishable with death transportation or rigorous imprisonment for a term of two years or upwards shall where no express provision is made in this Code for the punishment of such a conspiracy be punished in the same manner as if he had abetted such offence.

(2) Whoever is a party to a criminal conspiracy other than a criminal conspiracy to commit an offence punishable as aforesaid shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term not exceeding six months or with fine or with both.

* The words "sub-section (4)" was inserted for sub-section (5) by Act XVIII of 1921

3. **Object and scope of the section**—Except s. 121 A, I P C., the offence of criminal conspiracy *per se* was unknown to the Indian Criminal Law. By Act VIII of 1913, criminal conspiracy was for the first time made a substantive offence in British India. The word 'illegal' used in the definition of the offence (s. 120-A, I P. C.) is as defined by s. 43, I P. C., applicable to everything which is an offence, or which is prohibited by law or which furnishes ground for a civil action. The very wide scope of the definition would make even a civil trespass indictable as a criminal conspiracy. Under English Law to which the Indian Law has been assimilated, indictments for conspiracy extend to almost every possible sort of case (see *Russell on Crimes*). In order to avoid any possible danger of the provisions of the new Act being misused two safeguards,—viz., (1) amendment of s. 195 by the addition of the words 'criminal conspiracies to commit such offences and to' after the words 'the abetment' in sub-secs (3) and (2) the insertion of this section, were introduced in the Select Committee. 'We think that these safeguards will satisfactorily ensure that the provisions of the Bill will only be used when prosecutions are necessary in the public interest.' See the Report of the Select Committee, 10th March, 1913.

Thus to take cognizance of the offence of criminal conspiracy, it is requisite that if the object of the conspiracy is (1) to commit an offence specified in sub-sec. (1) of s. 195, there must either be the complaint or sanction of the public servant or Court as the case may be, or is (2) to commit an offence specified in s. 196, there must be a complaint made by order or under authority of the Governor General in Council, etc., or is (3) to commit a non cognizable offence or a cognizable offence not punishable with death, transportation or rigorous imprisonment for a term of two years or upwards and not specified in s. 195, there must be to the initiation of the proceedings a consent in writing of the Local Government or a Chief Presidency or District Magistrate empowered in this behalf by the Local Government, or (4) to commit either an illegal act other than an offence, or a legal act by illegal means, there must be a complaint as specified in sub-sec. (1) above.

So there is no condition precedent to a Court taking cognizance of a criminal conspiracy the object of which is to commit an offence punishable with death, transportation or rigorous imprisonment for two years or upwards and not specified in ss. 195 and 196, see 49 C. 373 = 26 C. W. N. 680.

3-A.—The proviso "not punishable with death, etc." in s. 196-A does not apply to the commission of a non-cognizable offence but is confined to a cognizable offence only, 15 A. L. J. 841.

4. **What a complaint for conspiracy must set out**.—Generally a tolerably full statement of the concrete facts must be incorporated in the complaint so as to enable the Magistrate to discharge his judicial functions under ss. 203 and 204 and in the event of the issue of process under the latter section to furnish indication to the accused of the outlines of the case for the prosecution. A complaint which merely copies out literally the words of the sections in the Penal Code is a colourable compliance with the requirements of the statute and not a complaint as required by s. 190. 'It is well settled that in accordance with the general rule in criminal prosecutions, an indictment or information for conspiracy must contain a statement of the facts relied upon as constituting the offence in ordinary and concise language, with as much certainty as the nature of the case will admit. *Rex v. Jones* (1832) 4 B. and Ald. 345; *Rex v. King* (1844) 7 Q. B. 782—795. I am not unmindful of the view sometimes taken that where conspiracy is made a statutory offence, if the statute sets out fully and without uncertainty or ambiguity, the elements necessary to constitute the offence intended to be punished, a charge in the language of the statute is sufficient, *Reg. v. Rowlands* (1851) 17 Q. B. 671. But it is indisputable that if the statute employs broad and comprehensive language descriptive of the general nature of the offence denounced, the complaint should embody a particular statement of the facts and circumstances; *Rex v. Peck* (1839) 9 A. and E. 682; *Pelthone v. United States* (1892) 143 W. S. 197." *PER MUKERJEE, J.*, 15 C. L. J. 517 = 13 Cr. L. J. 609. See also 42 C. 957.

5. **Absence of complaint under authority or consent in writing**.—In the absence of a complaint or consent in writing as required by the section the proceedings would be void *ab initio*. S. 537 does not remedy the absence of a complaint or of a consent as required by this section. See Note 4 to s. 196.

Consent in writing of the authorities specified in s. 196-A of the Criminal Procedure Code is not necessary to a prosecution for criminal conspiracy to commit a non-cognizable offence when s. 195 (3) is applicable, 80 C. 461 (49 C. 351 followed).

Where the criminal conspiracy falls within sub-sec. (1) of s. 196-A absence of complaint by the Governor-General would altogether vitiate proceedings in a Magisterial Court. Further *Ald.*, that s. 196-A of the Code applies only to a prosecution for conspiracy punishable under s. 120-B, I P. C., and not for abetment of conspiracy punishable under s. 109 I P. C., 3 R. 95.

6. **Charge for conspiracy**—See Note 8 under s. 223

***196-B.** In the case of any offence in respect of which the provisions of section 196 or section 196-A apply a District Magistrate or Chief Presidency Magistrate may, notwithstanding anything contained in those sections or in any other part of this Code, order a preliminary investigation by a Police-officer nor being below the rank of Inspector in which case such Police-officer shall have the powers referred to in section 155, sub-section (3)

Note.—This new section is designed to meet the difficulty which arises from the fact that cases under ss. 196 and 196-A cannot be properly investigated by the Police before complaints are made. Doubts have arisen as to whether investigation can be ordered under s 155 cl. (2) by a Magistrate without his taking cognizance of the case. The new section will provide for a preliminary investigation. We recognize that it does not altogether meet the case where the desirability of adding a new charge arises in the Sessions Court. It has been suggested that this difficulty might be met to some extent by substituting the words 'proceed to the trial' for the words 'take cognizance' in ss. 196 196-A. But on the whole we prefer not to make this change and to leave the sections unaltered (*Report of the Joint Committee 1922*).

† 197. (1) When any person who is a Judge within the meaning of s 19 of the Indian Penal Code or when any Magistrate or when any public servant who is not removable from his office save by or with the sanction of a Local Government or some higher authority is accused of any offence alleged to have been committed by him while acting or purporting to act in the discharge of his official duty, no Court shall take cognizance of such offence except with the previous sanction of the Local Government

(2) Such Government may determine the person by whom the manner in which the offence or offences for which the prosecution of such Judge, Magistrate † or public servant is to be conducted and may specify the Court before which the trial is to be held

Note—Referring to amendment of this section the Select Committee say It has been pointed out to us that difficulties with regard to s. 197 have recently come to light. There are certain public servants who are only removable from office by the Secretary of State and it is unreasonable that they should obtain no protection under the section. Further in view of s 4 cl (2) of the Code the word 'Judge' has to be interpreted according to the definition given in s 29 of the Indian Penal Code with the result that Magistrates acting in certain capacities under the Code *e.g.* when holding inquiries obtain no protection. We have therefore proposed a re-draft of sub-sec. (1) of s. 197 to meet these difficulties. We have confined the operation of the section to public servants removable by a Local Government or some higher authority and have provided that the sanction required for a prosecution will be the sanction of the authority which has power to remove. Mr Chaudhri would prefer to leave s 197 unaltered save in so far as the Bill proposed to amend it, he considers that the amendment proposed by us would enhance the difficulty of obtaining sanction.

Notes.—1 **Scope of this section**—The section does not apply unless the person accused is (1) a Judge or public servant 3 C 758, and (2) not removable from office without the sanction of Government 4 B 357 and 479, and 12 M L T 331 = 13 Cr L J 770, and (3) the act constituting the offence was done by the accused while acting as Judge or public servant. The section applies to those cases only in which the offence charged is an offence which can be committed by a public servant only *i.e.* in which his being a public servant is a necessary element in the offence 26 C 852, 2 Bom L R 1079, 32 M 255, 30 C 927, 23 M 540, 2 B 431. For the distinction between ss. 197 and 195 see 2 Ld 303, where it is held that a District Judge ordering sanction against a Sub-Judge under s. 197 act in his executive capacity and such order cannot be revised by the High Court.

1—JUDGE AND PUBLIC SERVANTS

2 Who are public servants?—See ss 19 and 21 I P C. and s. 4 (2) which make these definitions applicable—(1) *Committing Magistrate*—Though all Judges are public servants all public servants are obviously not Judges *e.g.* a committing Magistrate inquiring into a case triable exclusively by a Court of Session though not a Judge would be protected by this section as a public servant, 6 M H. C. Appx. XXI (2) *Volunteer*

* Section 96 H has been added by the Criminal Procedure (Amendment) Act 1925.

† s 197 (1) was substituted by Act XXIII of 1914.

* The word "Magistrate" added by Act XVIII of 1922

(Issuing) From animals of the

at which is void or empty, false
(I are)band
In n 1 A person who is in office, — the otural capacity
It is a for an inability to discover what they are
that occur in natureSyn — Inability, In potency, Inactivity
peculiar weakness, pec InequalityIn 2/ble, a Disabled [106] Here
In 2/ble ment, a [106] INABILITY

inability,

[I are]

[I are]

[I are]

[I are]

Inability, n. [Lat. Inability, Fr. Inability, It. In-

ability]

1 Inaction, void space, vacuity, n. and

2 Inactivity of the mind, also act of agent

senseless (as, frivolity)

In 2/ble, n. Inability, — of, inferiority

(I are)

Inapproachable a [I are] in, not, and depend

In **s 8 A. 201**, Mr Justice STRAIGHT *held*, that any person, whether receiving pay or not, who chooses to take upon himself duties and responsibilities belonging to the position of a public servant, and performs those duties and accept those responsibilities and is recognized as filling the position of a public servant, must be recorded as such, *e.g.*, a *volunteer* in a Tahsildar's office (3) Every *Manager under the Sindh Encumbered Estates Act s 35* of Act XX of 1896, is a public servant within the meaning of the I P C. As to Chairman of a Union Panchayat, *see* (1916) **M. W. N. 384 = 17 Cr. L. J. 168.**

3. Municipal Commissioner is a public servant.—A Municipal Commissioner appointed under Act XIII of 1884 (now Act XX of 1891), is a public servant, he not being removable from his office except by Government, therefore he cannot be prosecuted for any act done by him in his capacity as a Commissioner except with the sanction of Government, **14 P. R. 1890 followed 17 P. R. 1902.** Similarly as regards a *Municipal Chairman* **Weir I, 243.** But a *Chairman delegate* is not so protected for acts done by him as such, even though he be also a Municipal Councillor, **Weir II, 226.**

4. Municipal Corporation not a public servant.—A Municipal Corporation is not a public servant within the meaning of this section, and may, therefore, be prosecuted under the Penal Code without the previous sanction of Government **3 C. 753 = 2 C. L. R. 520.** A Corporation is liable to prosecution for nuisance under the Penal Code in the same way as any ordinary individual.—*The Birmingham and Gloucester Ry Co.*, **3 Q. B. Rep. 223**, *Scott 8 Q. B. Rep 547*, *The Great North of England Ry Co.* **9 Q. B. Rep 315; Weir I, 143.**

5. Sanction not necessary where public servant removable from office without sanction of Government.

(i) *Police patel in Bombay*—The prosecution of a Police *patel* for an offence committed by him in his official capacity as such needs no previous sanction. The provisions of the Bombay Act VIII of 1867 (*Village Police Act*), s 9, as amended by Act I of 1876, render a Police *patel* removable from his office without the previous sanction of Government, and, therefore, this section does not apply, **4 B. 357 and 479; Ratanlal 147.**

(ii) *Sub-Overseer in Madras*—No sanction is necessary to prosecute a Sub-Overseer in the Madras Presidency, for a charge of bribery against him inasmuch as under the rules of the Public Works Department he can be appointed or removed by the Superintending Engineer without reference to the Local Government **12 M. L. T. 331 = 13 Cr. L. J. 770.**

(iii) *Member of Union Committee*—The sanction of the Local Government under s 197 of the Code is not necessary for the prosecution of the Chairman of a Union Committee who is not removable from his office only by the Local Government, **29 C. W. N. 650.**

6. Effect of delegation by Government of the power of removal.—Where a public servant is one not removable from his office without the sanction of the Government the fact that the power of removal has been delegated to other authorities does not remove the public servant from the category of persons who are not removable from office without the sanction of Government. The delegation by the Local Government of its power to a special officer only means that the Local Government performs that act itself through the medium of a particular officer as the channel through which it is done and it is an ordinary case of *quifacit per alium* *fict per se* **1916 M. W. N. 384 = 17 Cr. L. J. 168.**

7. Village Headman in Madras—A Village Magistrate whose authority and position as Village Magistrate were made use of in order to constrain a person to give a bribe was held not liable to be prosecuted for extortion without sanction under this section **Weir II, 221.** But it was *held* that no such sanction was necessary when the Village Magistrate was alleged to have caused hurt in trying to prevent an altercation because in so doing he was preventing an offence and not trying an offender. Illustration (d) to s 19 I P C., makes it clear that in such capacity he was not a Judge and since he is not a public servant within the meaning of this section no sanction is necessary. A Village Magistrate exercising jurisdiction and trying an offender under Regulation IX of 1816 would be a Judge, **23 M. 540.** So also when a Village Magistrate is charged for extortion no sanction is necessary **6 M. L. T. 126**, and when a Village Magistrate fabricates a record, of a Criminal Case, sanction is not required for his prosecution, for a Magistrate who fabricates a record in which he figures as a Judge cannot properly be said to be acting as a Judge when he does so, **32 M. 255.**

7-A.—A member of a Village Panchayat in Madras.—A member of a Village Panchayat established under Act II of 1920 is a Judge and complaint of an offence alleged to have been committed by him either under s 171 E or s 161, I P C., requires sanction. In the former case under s 196, Cr P C., as amended by s 3 of Act XXIX of 1920 in the latter with reference to s 199 Cr P Code, **42 M. L. J. 139.**

II.—OFFENCES FOR WHICH SANCTION IS REQUIRED.

8. **Sanction to prosecute a Judge for words uttered or acts done on the Bench.**—Where a Judge was charged with using defamatory language to a witness during the trial of a suit it was *held* that under s 197 the complaint could not be entertained by a Magistrate without sanction, 9 M. 439, *followed* in 9 P. L. R. 1905, where it was *held* that sanction was required where a Munsiff was charged under ss 342, 500 and 506, I P C. See also 29 P. R. 1904; 17 P. R. 1902. But the Madras case was *dissented from* in 26 C. 852 and 25 M. 16. In the Calcutta case it was *held* that sanction under this section is necessary in those cases only in which the offence charged is an offence which can be committed by a public servant only, i.e., in which his being a public servant is a necessary element in the offence. The language of the section 'is accused as such Judge,' etc seems sufficient to indicate that the offence charged must involve, as one of its elements, that it was committed by a person filling that character, and it is not apparent why, in cases outside that category, the sanction provided by the section should be required. This case was *followed* in 2 Bom. L. R. 1079, where it was *held* that no sanction was required to prosecute a Magistrate for having used abusive language to another Magistrate when both were sitting together as a Bench. See 2 B. 431. A Magistrate who fabricates a record in which he figures as Judge cannot be said to be acting as a Judge when he fabricates the record and no sanction is necessary, 32 M. 255.

9 **Section extends only to offences which could be committed by public servants alone.**—This section extends to all acts ostensibly done by a public servant, i.e., to acts which would have no special significance except as acts done by a public servant, 2 B. 481; 7 B. H. C. R. C. 61; 26 C. 852, 9 M. 439 and 8 P. R. 1879. Thus, sanction under this section is not necessary to prosecute a public servant, when the offence charged does not involve as one of its necessary elements that it can be committed only by a person filling that character, 25 M. 15; 26 C. 852, where a Village Magistrate is charged with extortion 6 M. L. T. 17 and 32 M. 255. Again where the *Administrator General of Bengal* was appointed by the High Court administrator to a particular estate and in his capacity as such administrator was charged with an offence under the *Calcutta Municipal Act*, *held* that the fact that he was administrator to that particular estate was a mere accident and that no sanction under this section was necessary as he was not charged as a public servant with any offence committed in his public capacity, 30 C. 927 where 26 C. 852 is *followed*. *Quere* whether this section is limited in its application to Chap IX of the I P C. alone? In all cases where a public servant purports to exercise his function as such he must be deemed to be acting 'as such public servant. The test is not whether the particular act is within his power but whether he acted in the capacity with which he is clothed. Of course if he simply uses his position as a public servant to commit an illegal act he will not be acting as such public servant, 17 Cr. L. J. 894 (M.). Where a Magistrate abuses or defames a witness or a legal practitioner appearing before him it cannot be said that he is acting in a judicial capacity. But if in order to examine a witness he detains him until the time of his re-examination comes or until he makes inquiries as to the failure of the witness to appear before him his acts are purely judicial and it any offence is committed by the Magistrate exceeding his powers in doing those acts sanction should be necessary under s 197, 25 C. W. N. 956.

10 **No sanction necessary for offences not covered by this section.**—Where a complaint charged a person who was one of the public servants mentioned in this section with committing acts which, if committed by a private individual would have constituted the offence of extortion, *held* (in the particular case) that it was not illegal to treat the charge as a charge of extortion, and to proceed with the trial without sanction for the prosecution 7 B. H. C. R. C. 61 *followed* in 2 B. 481, and *approved* in 26 C. 852, but want of sanction for an offence covered by the section vitiates the trial, 31 M. 80. See also 19 B. 51; Note 19, 9 B. 288 and Note 17.

10-A. **Is sanction necessary for offence of criminal breach of trust by a public servant.**—The question before the Court in 1916 M. W. N. 384 = 17 Cr. L. J. 188 = 33 In. Ca. 643 was 'whether an offence is committed by a person as a public servant when the statute says that he commits the same offence as any other person but the property in respect of which he commits criminal breach of trust comes into his hands as a public servant. The public servant was charged with an offence under s. 409, I P C. Courts-Trotter, J., *held* after considerable hesitation that sanction was not necessary. 'I think on the whole that even if it is a necessary averment to say that he was a public servant and not a mere matter of proof, nevertheless the offence is the offence of criminal breach of trust, and that it is not an offence which is committed by him in his capacity of public servant as such, his capacity of public servant being only that which puts him, so to speak, in a position in which such an offence can be committed.'

11. **Conviction for abetment when sanction is given for substantive offence only.**—The omission from this section of a provision similar to s. 195 (3) does not necessarily suggest that separate sanction for an abetment is necessary when sanction for the substantive offence has been granted. By virtue of s. 230 when the

conviction for an abetment of an offence is based on the same facts in respect of which sanction for the substantive offence has been granted no fresh sanction is necessary from the *abetment*, 30 C. 1905.

III.—SANCTIONING AUTHORITY IN FORM OF SANCTION.

12. **Sanctioning authority as regards Village Headmen, Police Inspectors, etc., in Madras.**—The power of sanctioning prosecution of heads of villages in their capacity as Village Munsiffs as well as in their magisterial capacity is vested in the District Magistrate (G O No 1886-J, dated 9th October, 1874). Similarly the power of sanctioning the prosecution of Subordinate Magistrates, Tahsildars and Deputy Tahsildars in their magisterial and revenue capacities is delegated to the Board of Revenue (G O No 1281 J, dated 29th June, 1891) while in regard to all other classes of Magistrate the like power is reserved to the Governor in Council (*Fort St George Gazette*, 1873, p 1503).

Inspectors of Police are public servants not removable from office without the order of Government and the power of sanctioning under this section their prosecution is given to the Inspector General of Police and to the District Magistrate (G O No 1085, Judicial, dated 8th June, 1874, and G O No 1365, Judicial, dated 25th July, 1874 See *Mad Pol Man Vol I, p. 175*). The like power as regards Registrars and Sub-Registrars is vested in the *Inspector-General of Registration*, *Mad. Jur. 31*.

12-A. **Meaning of 'empowered in this behalf.'**—The words 'empowered in this behalf' mean empowered to give sanction for prosecution and not empowered to order his removal, 1916 M W. N. 334 = 17 Cr. L. J. 168.

13. **Sanction against kulkarni may be given by mamlatdar or patel.**—The sanction for the prosecution of a *kulkarni* for making a false report as a public servant may be given by the *mamlatdar* or by the *patel* to whom such *kulkarni* is subordinate. The sanction of the Collector is not necessary, 7 B H. C. R. Ca. 64.

14. **Power of superior Court or officer to sanction prosecution.**—Every Court or officer to whom the Judge or other public servant is subordinate has implied authority unless such authority has been expressly limited by Government to sanction or direct a prosecution for an offence committed by such Judge or public servant in his capacity as such public servant, 7 M. H. C. R. 58. See 4 P. R. 1919 (Cr.).

15. **No particular form in which sanction has to be given.**—The Code does not prescribe any particular form for the sanction required by this section, as it does, *e.g.*, by sub-sec. (4) of s 195. Hence the omission to mention the place or time does not affect the validity of sanction, 27 M. 54. Where an Executive Engineer by a letter addressed to the Magistrate gave sanction to prosecute a first-grade Overseer (a public servant within the meaning of this section) *held* that the letter constituted a sufficient sanction for prosecution, *Ratanlal 32*; 30 C. 905, 20 Bom. L. R. 607.

16. **Sanction to be in respect of specific offence.**—Delegation of authority to sanction prosecution.—The sanction required by this section must be granted with reference to some *specific offence* with which the accused is charged in his capacity as a public servant, and the intention of the Legislature clearly was that the authority empowered to grant the sanction should take the responsibility of deciding whether there were reasonable grounds for prosecuting such public servant for such offence. Therefore, where an order was passed by the Board of Revenue sanctioning the prosecution of a Deputy Tahsildar by the Collector of the district for "bribery or such of the charges set forth in the Deputy Collector's report as he thinks likely to stand investigation by a Criminal Court," *held* that it is not a legal sanction within the meaning of s 197, as the Board had no power to delegate its discretion, 16 M. 468. Unlike s 195 a general sanction is insufficient under this section. But the offence need not be specified with the same precision as is necessary in framing a charge, 13 C. W. N. 1052. The Local Government granted sanction for the prosecution of one of its servants of an offence under s. 161, I P C., or any other section of the Code that may be found to be applicable in respect of the offence briefly described in the schedules hereto annexed and in the schedule the facts were duly set out. It was contended that this section was too vague and indefinite and that the Local Government practically delegated its functions under s 197 to some other person which it had no power to do, *held* that the sanction was not vague or indefinite and that there was no delegation, 16 M. 468, distinguished. All that the Local Government has done is to make it clear that it sanctions the prosecution of the petitioner in respect of certain specific acts committed by him that it considers that these acts are punishable under s 161, I P C., but that it leaves it open to the Court to convict him upon these facts of any other offence, in the opinion of the Court some other section of the I P C. is more relevant thereto than s. 161, 37 C. 467, which deals with a sanction under s. 196 is not in point. The considerations which arise in a case to which s. 197 is applicable

are essentially different from those considerations of policy which underlie the sanction under s 196 referred to in that case, 11 P. R. 1911 = 146 P. L. R. 1911 = 12 Cr. L. J. 217.—No doubt the authority which gives the sanction must specify the offence but that does not mean that the particular section of the Penal Code should be mentioned. If the facts mentioned in the sanction point to a particular offence the terms of the section are complied with, 1916 M. W. N. 334 = 17 Cr. L. J. 168. See also 43 Bom. 147.

17. Notice to accused before sanction not necessary.—The sanction given by Government under this section cannot be held to be null and void for the reason that no notice was given to the accused to show cause why sanction should not be given. It is a matter left entirely to the discretion of Government whether such opportunity should be given to the person concerned before sanctioning his prosecution, 27 M. 54.

18. Preliminary inquiry before granting sanction is not a judicial proceeding.—There is no provision of law which authorizes the Government or its officer to whom the power of granting sanction is delegated to inform his mind by holding a judicial inquiry himself or by another, and there is no authority in him or the person acting for him to administer an oath, and the inquiry held by such person is merely departmental. Therefore a person giving false evidence such inquiry cannot be prosecuted for perjury under s 193 I. P. C., 23 M. 223.

II.—ABSENCE OF SANCTION.

19. Want of sanction vitiates the trial.—The saving clause of s 537 will not avail where the previous sanction required under this section is wanting. Where, therefore, a Village Magistrate was convicted of an offence in his official capacity of Village Magistrate, without previous sanction being obtained under this section the conviction was set aside, 31 M. 80. Where a sanction is granted in general terms and is too vague, s. 537 will not cure the defect, 15 M. 468; 9 B. 238; 9 P. L. R. 1905. In 42 B. 172 it is held that absence of sanction renders a commitment by a Magistrate illegal and s. 537 will not cure such defect but in 35 M. L. J. 259 holds a contrary view to the effect that an order of commitment upon a complaint in respect of which sanction is necessary under ss 195 and 197 of the Code, but in respect of which no sanction was obtained, is not necessarily invalid and the provisions of ss 531 and 537 of the Code apply to such a case. But it is submitted that in view of the new amendment of s. 537 by the omission of cl (b) to s. 537 containing references to ss 195 and 476, the Legislature has adopted the Bombay view.

20. Commitment without previous sanction not necessarily invalid.—An European British subject being a public servant was committed for trial to the High Court without any previous sanction being obtained under s 197. No objection as to sanction was raised at the magisterial inquiry. Held, that the language of s 197 is so strong in requiring a previous sanction that if it be not previously obtained there is no jurisdiction, but the Judge, presiding in a Court of Session to which the prisoner had been committed has power in his discretion under s 532 to accept the commitment and proceed with the trial. 9 B. 283 at p. 296; followed in 22 B. 112. See Note 9 under s 196. But now see 25 M. 61 (P.C.) and Note above. See 20 Bom. L. R. 89.

21. Subsequent sanction is of no effect.—A sanction obtained subsequently, i.e., after commencement of the trial, is of no effect. 9 B. 238; 2 B. 431, 7 M. H. G. R. 58, 7 B. H. G. R. Cr. Ca. 61.

22. Inquiry without sanction is a departmental inquiry and not a "taking cognizance of an offence."—The Local Government having received petitions charging a Deputy Collector with bribery, forwarded them to the Commissioner, who sent them to the Collector for inquiry and report, with directions to take evidence. The Collector, however, did not take evidence. Held, that the inquiry was a departmental inquiry and not a "taking cognizance of an offence." The Local Government then permitted the Deputy Collector to prosecute such petitioner for defamation by words spoken by him in reply to questions put by the District Magistrate in the so-called preliminary inquiry, and the accused was convicted under s. 211, I. P. C. Held that on account of want of sanction under s. 197, the District Magistrate's inquiry was not a "taking cognizance of an offence," but a mere departmental inquiry, 19 B. 51.

23. Taking sworn statement of complainant would not amount to "taking cognizance."—A Magistrate may receive a complaint against a public servant and if he thinks right make under s. 202 a preliminary inquiry into the truth thereof. But he should not cause the attendance of the accused, or take any evidence against him until he has obtained the necessary sanction, 7 B. H. G. R. Cr. Ca. 61. The preliminary examination of the complainant is not such cognizance as is intended by this section. It is often necessary to examine the complainant before his complaint can be understood and the complaint must be understood before sanction

can be given 7 M C R 182 at p 187, 3 C W N 17. A complaint against a public servant, *eg*, the Chairman of a Municipality must be dealt with in the same manner as any other complaint. The question of the applicability of s. 197 to the case should be postponed until after the complainant has been examined on oath in accordance with law 3 C W N 17

25. Non-compliance with terms of Government Order vacates jurisdiction—Where the Local Government directed by its sanction that the accused public servant should be prosecuted upon such charges as Mr C. might be prepared to prefer against him and there was nothing on the record to show nor did it otherwise appear that Mr C had preferred any charge against or taken any part in the prosecution of the accused public servant the High Court quashed the conviction of the accused as being without jurisdiction 8 B H C R Cr Ca 32. The person by whom the prosecution of such Judge or public servant is to be conducted cannot delegate his authority to anyone else unless specially authorized so to do. When the Government gives specific directions as to the person by whom and the manner in which the prosecution is to be conducted the Court has no jurisdiction to entertain a charge preferred otherwise than in accordance with such direction.

Y—SUB-SEC (2)—POWER OF GOVERNMENT AS TO PROSECUTION

25 Local Government can specify any Court for trial of public servant irrespective of jurisdiction—In 4 L B R 265 = 8 Cr L J 70, it was held that the power given in s 197 (2) of the Code overrides the general rule contained in s 177. As such the Local Government was entitled to specify any Court for the trial of a public servant charged with offences under ss 162 and 164 I P C committed within the jurisdiction of the Judicial Commissioner of Upper Burma and that a Magistrate within the jurisdiction of the Chief Court of Lower Burma who refused to receive a complaint presented by the Government Advocate Mandalay erred in holding that he had no power to receive the complaint.

26 Specifications of Court is not subject to control of High Court.—The power of Government to specify the Court before which the Judge or public servant shall be tried is not subject to the exercise of the general power of the High Court to transfer a criminal case—*vide* s 226 (7).

27 Validity of joint trial of a Judge and one not a public servant, when sanction specifies a particular Court—*K* A Subordinate Judge was charged under ss 161 and ¹⁶⁴/₁₀₅ I P C. and *S* not a public servant within the meaning of this section under s 164 I P C abetted by *K*. The Local Government in the exercise of its power under this section specified the Sessions Court at Tellicherry as the Court which should try both the prisoners and as Mr Cox the permanent Judge was disqualified to try this case by reason of having taken a special interest in launching this prosecution *At the same time* the Judge of Tellicherry. By a subsequent Government (of Tellicherry) On the conviction of both the prisoners Government having designated the Sessions Court of Tellicherry as the Court which should try the case and an Additional Sessions Court being a Court entirely distinct from a Sessions Court Mr Irvine had no jurisdiction to try the case and (as) that Government had no power to specify the Court which should try *S* he being not one of the class of public servants referred to in this section. Held though there can be only one Sessions Court for each Sessions division there may be more than one Judge for each Sessions Court and that the appointment of Mr Irvine as an Additional Sessions Judge did not constitute an Additional Sessions Court and that as an Additional Sessions Judge has jurisdiction to try only such cases as the Government might refer to him under s 193 Mr Irvine as Additional Sessions Judge of the Court of Tellicherry had jurisdiction to try the cases against both *K* and *S* *Weir II*, 215

YI—REVISION

28 Power of High Court to revise orders under this section—Having regard to s. 439 the power of the High Court Appellate and Revisional are co-extensive and s 198 does not confer on an Appellate Court any authority in respect of an order made by a Subordinate Court under this section 26 C. 852. The High Court therefore refused to interfere under s 439 but affirmed its power of interference with orders of Subordinate Courts made under this section under s. 15 of the *Charter Act*

Prosecution for
breach of contract
defamation and offences
against marriage

198. No Court shall take cognizance of an offence falling under Chap XIX or Chap XXI of the Indian Penal Code or under sections 493 to 496 (both inclusive) of the same Code except upon a complaint made by some person aggrieved by such offence

* Provided that where the person so aggrieved is a woman who according to the customs and manners of the country, ought not to be compelled to appear in public or where such person is under the age of eighteen years or is an idiot or lunatic or is from sickness or infirmity unable to make a complaint some other person may, with the leave of the Court make a complaint on his or her behalf

Notes.—1 Chap. XIX—*Of Criminal Breaches of Contracts of Service* Chap. XXI—*Of Defamation* Sections 493—496 relate to offences against marriage

2. Taking cognizance of an offence mentioned in the section without a complaint is illegal—For definition of 'complaint' see s. 4 (b) and Notes thereto and see Notes to s. 190 A charge of defamation not contained in the complaint presented to the Magistrate but added subsequently by the Magistrate upon statements made by the complainant in his examination under s. 200 (whether of his own accord or in consequence of suggestions from the Magistrate) is not a legal complaint made by an aggrieved person within the meaning of s. 4 (A) and this section so as to enable the Magistrate to take cognizance of the offence 10 A 39, 5 A 233.

not *prima facie* amount to defamation and a Magistrate should not take cognizance of an offence unless it is required by s. 198 commits material thereon a criminal prosecution and the High Court can interfere 3 P W R 1909 = 9 Cr L J 154. A Criminal Court is not competent to amend or alter a complaint under s. 501 I P C. into one under s. 500. The two offences are distinct and a Court cannot take cognizance of an offence under Chapter XXI I P C. except upon complaint by a person aggrieved of such offence 18 P R 1839. See the new amendment in the proviso authorizing some other person to complain on behalf of a woman or child.

(i) *Substance of the complaint must be looked to*—A complaint was made to the Magistrate under s. 211 that the accused had made a false charge against him (the complainant) of poisoning his daughter in law with a view to injure his reputation but the Magistrate dealt with it under s. 500 and framed a charge under the latter section to which the accused pleaded and put in his defence and called witnesses and eventually appealed against conviction. Held that looking to the substance of the complaint made to the Magistrate it could not be affirmed that there had been in the action of the Magistrate any violation of the rule laid down by this section 24 P R 1884. See also 8 P R 1891. It is not necessary that a complainant should state precisely the section of the Code under which the accused shall be charged. It is sufficient if the complainant lays before the Magistrate facts which if proved would be sufficient to sustain a charge under any of the sections of the I P C. referred to in this section. It does not matter that the complainant originally charged the accused with an offence under some other section only 25 A 209 where 1 C L R. 528 is followed. When the case is properly once before the Magistrate he may proceed against any person implicated. Where in the course of proceedings before a Magistrate against a person of having taken away or kept complainant's wife it appeared from information obtained by the husband after the institution of such proceedings and communicated to the Magistrate that the wife had committed bigamy with another man and the Magistrate thereupon without fresh complaint by the husband against the wife made the latter an accused person and the husband proceeded to adduce evidence against her of the second marriage, on which she was committed for trial by the Magistrate. Held that the proceedings of the Magistrate were not irregular and such committal was perfectly good 1 C L R. 523. But see 5 A. 233; 29 C. 415; 10 A 39, 14 C. W N 275 and Note 3 to s. 199.

In 8 Lah 375 it was held that it is sufficient for the complainant to state the true facts in his own language and it is for the Magistrate to apply the law to those facts. Thus where in a complaint purporting to be made under ss. 193 and 211, I P C. The Magistrate after hearing the evidence framed a charge of defamation and convicted the petitioner under s. 500 I P C. Held that, provided the complainant personally satisfied the conditions of s. 198 of the Code the failure in his complaint to mention specifically an offence under s. 500

3. *Abetment taking cognizance of without complaint bad.*—A Magistrate who takes cognizance of an offence falling under s. 494 I P C. and any section of the Code under abetment must be held to take cognizance of an offence under s. 494 within the meaning of this section 4 P R. 1888

ruption, it incorrupt; *ac*, Lat. *incorruptio*. The condition of being incorrupt, absence of corruption, exemption from corruption.

Inc'corruptive, *a*. [Prefix *in*, not, and *corruptive*.] Lat. *incorruptivus*. Not liable to corruption or

Syn.—Inlargement, extension (in with increment; addition; increase).

Increas'ful, *a*. Full of increase, abundant in produce.
Increaser, *n*. One who, or that which, increases.
In the way of growing.
& *p*; *INCREASED*, *p* *pr*.
(*increase* and *cre* *te*).

Inc'cras'ation, *n*. [Lat. *incrassatio*.] *Fr* *incrassation*, *sp* *incrassacion*, *It* *incrasacion*.
1. The act of increasing or the state of being increased.
2. A crust or coat of any thing on the surface of a body, a covering or growth of brittle matter, or other solid matter attached to a growing body, and the like.

Inc'cor'ably *adv*.
Inc'cor'ar *v*.

an extraordinary and improbable to admit of

by any process.
2. (*acc*) The maturation of a seedling, a process of incubation, the period which elapses between exposure to a cutaneous disease and the actual healing of it.
Inc'cras'tor, *n*. A machine by means of which

thicker.
3. The state of being increased or made thick.
Inc'cras'tion, *n*.
Inc'cras'tive, *a*. Having the quality of thickening.
Inc'cras'tive, *n*.
thicken.
Inc'cras'tible, *a*. (C.)

is imposed, as a rule, on a state of illness or being in office, or of an office to be paid to the bishop only during his life.
[Lat. *incumbens*, *p* *pr* of *incumbere*, *on* from *pro* *in* *ad* *incumbere*, *sp* *incumbere* *to* *be* *on* *the* *throne*.]
Fr *incumbent*.

incumbent, *firm*, *done*, *for*, *do* *well*, *subd* *two*

can be given, 7 M. G. R. 182 at p 187; 3 C. W. N. 17. A complaint against a public servant, *eg*, the Chairman of a Municipality must be dealt with in the same manner as any other complaint. The question of the applicability of s. 197 to the case should be postponed until after the complainant has been examined on oath in accordance with law, 3 C. W. N. 17.

24. Non-compliance with terms of Government Order vacates jurisdiction.—Where the Local Government directed by its sanction that the accused public servant should be prosecuted upon such charges as Mr C might be prepared to prefer against him, and there was nothing on the record to show, nor did it otherwise appear that Mr C had preferred any charge against, or taken any part in the prosecution of the accused public servant, the High Court quashed the conviction of the accused as being without jurisdiction, 8 B. H. C. R. Cr. Ca. 32. The person by whom the prosecution of such Judge or public servant is to be conducted, cannot delegate his authority to anyone else, unless specially authorized so to do. When the Government gives specific directions as to the person by whom and the manner in which the prosecution is to be conducted, the Court has no jurisdiction to entertain a charge preferred otherwise than in accordance with such direction.

V.—SUB-SEC (2)—POWER OF GOVERNMENT AS TO PROSECUTION.

25. Local Government can specify any Court for trial of public servant irrespective of jurisdiction.—In 4 L. B. R. 265 = 8 Cr. L. J. 70, it was *held* that the power given in s. 197 (2) of the Code overrides the general rule contained in s. 177. As such the Local Government was entitled to specify any Court for the trial of a public servant, charged with offences under ss. 162 and 164, I P C., committed within the jurisdiction of the Judicial Commissioner of Upper Burma and that a Magistrate within the jurisdiction of the Chief Court of Lower Burma who refused to receive a complaint presented by the Government Advocate, Mandalay, *erred* in holding that he had no power to receive the complaint.

26. Specifications of Court is not subject to control of High Court.—The power of Government to specify the Court before which the Judge or public servant shall be tried is not subject to the exercise of the general power of the High Court to transfer a criminal case—*vide* s. 526 (7).

27. Validity of joint trial of a Judge and one not a public servant, when sanction specifies a particular Court.—*K* a Subordinate Judge was charged under ss. 161 and ¹⁶⁴/₁₀₅ I P C., and *S* not a public servant within the meaning of this section under s. 164, I P C., abetted by *K*. The Local Government in the exercise of its power under this section, specified the Sessions Court at Tellicherry as the Court which should try both the prisoners and as Mr Cox, the permanent Judge, was disqualified to try this case by reason of having taken a special interest in launching this prosecution, Mr Irvine was appointed the Officiating Sessions Judge of Tellicherry. By a subsequent Government Order Mr Irvine was appointed Additional Sessions Judge of Tellicherry. On the conviction of both the prisoners, it was objected in appeal on behalf of *S* (i) that Government having designated the Sessions Court of Tellicherry as the Court which should try the case and an Additional Sessions Court being a Court entirely distinct from a Sessions Court, Mr Irvine had no jurisdiction to try the case, and (ii) that Government had no power to specify the Court which should try *S* he being not one of the class of public servants referred to in this section. *Held*, though there can be only one Sessions Court for each Sessions Division there may be more than one Judge for each Sessions Court and that the appointment of Mr Irvine as an Additional Sessions Judge did not constitute an Additional Sessions Court and that as an Additional Sessions Judge has jurisdiction to try only such cases as the Government might refer to him under s. 193 Mr Irvine as Additional Sessions Judge of the Court of Tellicherry, had jurisdiction to try the cases against both *K* and *S*. *Weir II*, 215.

VI—REVISION.

28. Power of High Court to revise orders under this section.—Having regard to s. 439 the powers of the High Court Appellate and Revisional are co-extensive and s. 195 does not confer on an Appellate Court any authority in respect of an order made by a Subordinate Court under this section, 26 C. 832. The High Court therefore refused to interfere under s. 439, but affirmed its power of interference with orders of Subordinate Courts made under this section under s. 15 of the *Charter Act*.

198. No Court shall take cognizance of an offence falling under Chap XIX or Chap XXI of the Indian Penal Code, or under sections 493 to 496 (both inclusive) of the same Code, except upon a complaint made by some person aggrieved by such offence.

Prosecution for
breach of contract de-
famation and offences
against marriage

In de fēn'el bly o'le I all lēfen-iblo manne
 In de fēn'el bly I lēfen-iblo manne
 Having no dēf. se

The sword swaetha lēfen-iblo manne
 In de fēn'el bly I lēfen-iblo manne
 The sword swaetha lēfen-iblo manne

Let fēn'el bly o'le I all lēfen-iblo manne
 Let fēn'el bly o'le I all lēfen-iblo manne
 Let fēn'el bly o'le I all lēfen-iblo manne

defin ition
 In de fēn'el bly I lēfen-iblo manne
 In de fēn'el bly I lēfen-iblo manne

* Provided that where the person so aggrieved is a woman who according to the customs and manners of the country, ought not to be compelled to appear in public or where such person is under the age of eighteen years or is an idiot or lunatic or is from sickness or infirmity unable to make a complaint some other person may, with the leave of the Court make a complaint on his or her behalf.

Notes.—1 Chap. XIX—Of Criminal Breaches of Contracts of Service Chap. XXI—Of Defamation Sections 493—496 relate to offences against marriage

2. Taking cognizance of an offence mentioned in the section without a complaint is illegal.—For definition of complaint see s. 4 (b) and Notes thereto and see Notes to s. 190. A charge of defamation not contained in the complaint presented to the Magistrate but added subsequently by the Magistrate upon statements made by the complainant in his examination under s. 200 (whether of his own record or in consequence of suggestions from the Magistrate) is not a legal complaint made by an aggrieved person within the meaning of s. 4 (A) and this section so as to enable the Magistrate to take cognizance of the offence 10 A 39; 5 A 233.

not *prima facie* amount to defamation and a Magistrate without a complaint as is required by s. 198 commits material thereon a criminal prosecution and the High Court can set aside the order of the Magistrate. The High Court is not competent to amend or alter a complaint.

under s. 501 I P C. into one under s. 500. The two offences are distinct and a Court cannot take cognizance of an offence under Chapter XXI I P C. except upon complaint by a person aggrieved of such offence 18 P R. 1889. See the new amendment in the proviso authorizing some other person to complain on behalf of a woman or child.

(i) *Substance of the complaint must be looked to*—A complaint was made to the Magistrate under s. 211 that the accused had made a false charge against him (the complainant) of poisoning his daughter in law with a view to injure his reputation but the Magistrate dealt with it under s. 500 and framed a charge under the latter section to which the accused pleaded and put in his defence and called witnesses and eventually was convicted.

It was held that the substance of the complaint made to the Magistrate was that the accused had committed a crime and the Magistrate any violation of the rule laid down by the Code that a complainant should state precisely the offence of which the accused is accused is necessary that a complainant should state precisely the offence of which the accused is accused.

It is sufficient if the complainant lays before the Magistrate facts which if proved would be sufficient to sustain a charge under any of the sections of the I P C. referred to in this section. It does not matter that the complainant originally charged the accused with an offence under some other section only 25 A 209 where 1 C L R. 528 is followed. When the case is properly once before the Magistrate he may proceed against any person implicated. Where in the course of proceedings before a Magistrate against a person of having taken away or kept complainant's wife it appeared from information obtained by the husband after the institution of such proceedings and communicated to the Magistrate that the wife had committed bigamy with another man and the Magistrate thereupon without fresh complaint by the husband against the wife made the latter an accused person and the husband proceeded to adduce evidence against her of the second marriage on which she was committed for trial by the Magistrate. Held that the proceedings of the Magistrate were not irregular and such committal was perfectly good 1 C L R. 523. But see 5 A 233, 29 C 415; 10 A 39, 14 C W N 275 and Note 3 to s. 199.

In 6 Lah 375 it was held that it is sufficient for the complainant to state the true facts in his own language and it is for the Magistrate to apply the law to those facts. Thus where in a complaint purporting to be made under ss. 193 and 211 I P C. The Magistrate after hearing the evidence framed a charge of defamation and convicted the petitioner under s. 500 I P C. Held that provided the complainant personally satisfied the conditions of s. 198 of the Code the failure in his complaint to mention specifically an offence under s. 500 I P C. did not restrict the Magistrate from taking cognizance under that section.

3. Abetment taking cognizance of without complaint bad.—A Magistrate who takes cognizance of an offence falling under s. 494 I P C. and any section of the Code under abetment must be held to take cognizance of an offence under s. 494 within the meaning of this section 4 P R. 1838.

* This proviso was added by Act XVIII of 1921 s. 51

5. Public servant complaining of defamation.—The following order has been passed by the Government of India in regard to a complaint by an officer of Government.

No officer of Government is permitted to have recourse to the Courts for vindication of his public acts or of his character as a public functionary from defamatory attacks upon it, as it is for the Government to decide in each case whether the institution of proceedings is necessary or expedient. The Local Government will decide whether the circumstances are such that the Government shall bear the costs of the proceedings civil or criminal, or leave the officer to institute the suit or prosecution at his own expense, and in the latter case it will also determine, in the event of the matter being decided by the Court in the officer's favour, whether he should be recouped by the Government the whole or any part of the costs of the action in connection with this subject (*Government of India, 5th September, 1890*). It may be added that all officers of Government have been forbidden, without the official consent in writing of the Local Government under whom they may serve, to communicate to the press any explanation or defence of their official conduct (*Government of India, 20th May, 1900*).

5. Who is a person aggrieved by defamation depends upon circumstances.—It is impossible to lay down any inflexible rule determining for every case whether the complainant is a person aggrieved by the offence alleged within the meaning of this section. It must be determined in each case according to its own circumstances whether the complainant can be said to be in a legal sense a person aggrieved. Where the complainant is the head of the family, his son a lunatic and the daughter in law is living under his protection and an allegation is made to the effect that she was taken away to her father's house and married to another person, the offence, if true, seriously affects his reputation and status in society. Hence the father in law is the person aggrieved within the meaning of this section and is competent to institute a complaint. *Grievance referred to in the words "person aggrieved" in this section does not contemplate any fanciful sentimental grievance.* It must be such a grievance that the law can appreciate, it must be a legal grievance and not a *state prorogatio voluntas reason* (*per MUKERJEE, J.*), 3 C. L. J. 38 = 3 Cr. L. J. 187 where 25 B 151 (F.B.) and 32 C 425 are referred to and 10 B. 340 explained, 1914 M. W. N. 351 = 15 Cr. L. J. 357. Where certain allegations in a newspaper against A and others found to be true as regards A though untrue as regards the others, *held* A was not a person aggrieved by the publication of the allegations, 1914 M. W. N. 351 = 15 Cr. L. J. 357. In cases of defamation, the words person aggrieved must be treated as equivalent with the expression 'person injured', the object of the section apparently being to limit the right of complaint to the person who suffered injury 1 Bur. B R. 617.

6. "Some person aggrieved" is not limited to the person defamed.—(i) *Husband*—When an imputation of unchastity is cast upon a married woman, living with her husband, *prima facie* her husband is

" :
1

(ii) *Son*. As regards his capacity to institute criminal proceedings under s 499 I P C., the Allahabad High Court in 1893 A. W. N. 207 *held* that a son is not in the same position with respect to his mother as a husband is with respect to his wife and he cannot therefore lodge a complaint for the alleged defamation of his mother (iii) *Brother*. But this view was not accepted by the Calcutta High Court which remarked 'A Hindu lady living with her father, her brother or her son is a member of his family, and her reputation is bound up with the reputation or the person in whose house and under whose charge she is living. If any imputation is made against her character, that would affect as much the relative with whom she is living as herself,' and therefore having regard to the circumstances and conditions under which people live in Bengal, the brother of a Hindu widow who was defamed and with whom she was living, was *held* to be an aggrieved person competent under this section to lodge a complaint 32 C. 425. In this case the Bombay Full Bench view, in 25 B 151 was *dissented from* and 18 M. 250 distinguished (iv) *Father-in-law*. See 3 C. L. J. 38 = 3 Cr. L. J. 187 noted above. See 5 Lah. 301; 22 M. L. J. 746.

7. Municipal President not person aggrieved when his subordinates have been defamed.—When certain newspaper-comments, alleged to be defamatory, were made against the Health Officer and his Subordinates who were all subordinate to the President of the Municipal Corporation and the latter officer lodged a complaint contending that he was responsible for the efficient discharge of their duties by his subordinate officers and that his credit had been injured *held* that assuming the statements were of the subordinate officers, they were not defamatory of the complainant and that he was not therefore a person aggrieved within the meaning of this section though he was responsible for the efficient administration of the Health Department, 26 M. 43.

produced naturally in a country or
 exotic
 on being indigenous, is cheap. Upon this

the plants
 is obtained by steeping the plant in water
 till the radicle is dissolved by ferment, and

In this case the plant is

being

is more

the difference
 In difference
 from
 (To be corrected)

In this case

In this case

In this case

Syn. - Invert, very destitute want used
 from the forest
 Indigene, n. (By the way, n. Sp. It. & Lat. indigene,
 from O. Lat. indigene, for indigene and Lat. genere)

Indigene
 How much is a prince of my great hopes forget
 be great indigene for you and upon it

Sp. 1

In this case
 In a manner no
 In discernibly, etc. or perceived

Indigene, n. (By the way, n. Sp. It. & Lat. indigene, from O. Lat. indigene, for indigene and Lat. genere)

8. Person aggrieved in respect of bigamy is either the first or second husband.—In the case of an offence under s. 494 I P C., the husband of the woman is the person aggrieved 26 C. 338. The mother of a minor husband cannot be regarded as the person aggrieved. The husband alone can make such a complaint *Weir II*, 231. See also 10 B. 340; 1 C. L. R. 523; 25 A. 132. The father of either of the husbands is not a person aggrieved, 32 A. 78; the father of the girl is not a person aggrieved 13 Cr. L. J. 204 (Mad). Brother of the husband is not a person aggrieved, 11 O. C. 143 = 7 Cr. L. J. 457. The brother of a female, whose wife is charged with having committed bigamy, is not 'a person aggrieved by such offence' within the meaning of this section 10 B. 340; 1 C. L. R. 523, nor is the brother of the second husband, 25 A. 132.

9 Abatement of prosecution for defamation on death of complainant.—Since the offence of defamation is compoundable without the permission of the Court before conviction, and even after conviction with the permission of the Appellate Court, the death of the complainant during the course of criminal proceedings for defamation has the effect of terminating those proceedings, 112 P. L. R. 1908 = 10 P. R. 1908 = 7 Cr. L. J. 290 at p. 353. See 31 C. 993 (F.B.).

10. No complaint for defamation would lie against a witness.—A witness cannot be prosecuted for defamation in respect of statements made by him in a judicial proceedings as they are privileged, nor can the witness be sued in tort 17 B. 127 and 573; 16 M. 233; 11 M. 477; 28 C. 794. But if a witness makes a statement irrelevant to the matter under inquiry or trial, maliciously and not in reply to a question put to him, he is not protected from prosecution for defamation, 32 C. 756.

199. No Court shall take cognizance of an offence under section 497 or section 498

Prosecution for adultery of the Indian Penal Code except upon a complaint made by the husband or by enticing a married woman of the woman, or in his absence, 'made with the leave of the Court' by some person who had care of such woman on his behalf at the time when such offence was committed

† "Provided that, where such husband is under the age of eighteen years, or is an idiot or lunatic, or is from sickness or infirmity unable to make a complaint, some other person may, with the leave of the Court, make a complaint on his behalf"

Note.—The Select Committee say "We note that the case of the absent husband with in view of the amendment proposed in the Bill be provided for twice. Under s. 199 of the Code as it stands any person who had care of the woman on behalf of the absent husband at the time when the offence was committed can make a complaint. Whereas under the proviso any other person may, with the leave of the Court make a complaint. We think this was probably an oversight. We have therefore removed the case of absence from the proviso and provided in the main section for the leave in the Court in the case where the husband is absent.

Notes.—1. S. 497, I P C., deals with adultery s. 498 I P C. provides punishment for enticing or taking away or detaining a married woman with criminal intent.

2. Complaint.—The word complaint in this section means a complaint as defined by s. 4 (A). See pp. 16—19. Therefore an information laid before the Police cannot be regarded as a sufficient complaint to warrant a conviction under s. 497 or s. 498, I P C. 30 C. 910 (F.B.). In this Full Bench case, *RAMPINI, J.*, was of opinion that the word 'complaint' whenever it occurs in this Code means always complaint as defined in s. 4 (A). Where a statement was made to a Magistrate by husband solely with the object of intimidating his wife to return certain jewels without having recourse to criminal proceedings held that such a statement did not amount to a complaint within the meaning of s. 4 and was not sufficient to give a Court jurisdiction to take cognizance of an offence under s. 498, I P C. 18 Cr. L. J. 466 (M). See also 6 A. 95, 7 M. 563, 11 M. 443, 14 C. 707 and 23 M. 626. A report to the Police even of a cognizable case is not a complaint 17 C. P. L. R. 765, nor the report of a Police-officer, 32 P. R. 1910 = 12 Cr. L. J. 50. See also Notes to s. 199 43 M. L. J. 554.

3. Conviction under ss. 497, 493, I P C., without a specific complaint as required by this section illegal.—A conviction for an offence under s. 498 I P C., without a complaint by the person referred to in this section is illegal *Weir II*, 235, 31 B. 218, 4 P. R. 1835, 22 P. R. 1910 = 12 Cr. L. J. 20; 20 C. 910 (F.B.). Courts are not empowered to take cognizance on a Police Report, 32 P. R. 1910 = 12 Cr. L. J. 50; U B R. (1912) (4th quarter), 155 = 14 Cr. L. J. 284.

* The words in brackets commas were added by Act XVIII of 1923

† The proviso was added by Act XVIII of 1923.

The same as INDUCTION.

[Ligature Epistola]

In the course

In the course

[Ligature Epistola]

In the course of the inductive process, the mind is led from the particular to the general.


1. The act of inducing or the process of induction, or the process of leading from the particular to the general.

2. An introduction or introductory scene, or a scene leading to the main action.

3. (The last) The act or process of induction, or the process of leading from the particular to the general.

Induction is the act of leading from the particular to the general, or the process of leading from the particular to the general.

Induction



Induction is the act of leading from the particular to the general, or the process of leading from the particular to the general.

Induction is the act of leading from the particular to the general, or the process of leading from the particular to the general.

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Induction is the act of leading from the particular to the general, or the process of leading from the particular to the general.

Syn - Induction is the act of leading from the particular to the general, or the process of leading from the particular to the general.

Induction is the act of leading from the particular to the general, or the process of leading from the particular to the general.

Induction is the act of leading from the particular to the general, or the process of leading from the particular to the general.

(i) *Is it necessary that the specific sections should be mentioned in the complaint or is it sufficient if the complaint mentions all the facts?*—The complaint referred to in the section is a complaint by the husband of a woman under s. 498 I P C. not a complaint under s. 497 I P C. criminal charge of adultery is with law, 5 A. 233; 29 C. 415 commencement of the inquiry no charge was formulated against accused under s. 498 I P C. On examination of complainant, who was the husband of the woman concerned, certain statements in his deposition disclosed an offence under s. 498, and the accused was acquitted on charges under ss. 366 and 379 but convicted of an offence under s. 498. *Held*, that the conviction must be set aside as the husband, being the aggrieved person, had not taken the initial steps by means of a complaint to a Magistrate, before the latter could take cognizance of the offence under s. 498 and had made no complaint to the Magistrate as required by law, 15 Bom. L. R. 141 = 13 Cr. L. J. 287. In 23 P. R. 1895, it was, however, *held* that it is quite sufficient for the husband to state the true facts in his complaint without mentioning the section or even mentioning a wrong section see also 25 A. 209; 1 C. L. R. 523.

(ii) *Husband appearing as prosecution witness is not a compliance with the section*—The circumstances that a husband appears as a witness for the prosecution in the case of rape against his wife cannot be regarded as amounting to the institution of complaint within the meaning of this section, 5 A. 233 followed in 27 M. 61; 10 A. 39; 29 C. 415, 1881 A. W. N. 112; 1882 A. W. N. 165. During the course of a trial for an offence under s. 366, I P C., the husband who was examined as a witness stated that he wished the accused should be prosecuted for committing adultery, *held* that such a statement was a complaint within the meaning of s. 4 (h) and 1 C. L. R. 523 and 23 A. 82 were not followed, 38 A. 276 = 14 A. L. J. 233 = 17 Cr. L. J. 72.

(iii) *Does complaint include examination of complainant?*—Where a complainant made a case against the accused specifying ss. 368, 397, 330 and 497, I P C., in his complaint, and when examined under s. 200 he said that the accused had kept his wife hidden and had enuced her away, the Magistrate found him guilty under s. 498, but the Sessions Judge on appeal quashed the conviction and sentence, holding that it was not enough that complainant's subsequent evidence disclosed an offence under s. 498 *held*, that the word "complaint" used in this section must be taken as including not only a written complaint, but also the examination of the complainant, at any rate prior to the issue of the process, Ratanlal 584. But in 15 Bom. L. R. 141 = 1 Bom. Cr. Ca. 83 = 13 Cr. L. J. 287, it was *held* that the statement by a husband in his deposition is not a complaint. It has also been doubted whether the formal assent of a husband to a charge of adultery added at the end of his deposition is a proper compliance with this section, 24 W. R. 18, 10 P. R. 1893. See Note to s. 190

(iv) *On a complaint under ss. 494 and 498, no jurisdiction to try under s. 497, I P C.*—A complaint of an offence under ss. 494 and 498, I P C., does not involve a complaint of an offence under s. 497, I P C., and a Magistrate has under this section no jurisdiction to try the accused for an offence under s. 497, when the husband has complained only under ss. 494 and 498, Ratanlal 531; 14 C. W. N. 275. Similarly on a complaint under s. 497, I P C., the Magistrate has no jurisdiction to convict under s. 498, I P C., 12 C. W. N. 116; 18 P. R. 1873.

(v) *On a complaint of rape, cannot convict of adultery*—A person charged by the husband under s. 316, I P C., may if the evidence be such as to justify a conviction for a minor offence, and yet insufficient for a conviction for the graver offence, be convicted, it was formerly held, of an offence under s. 493, I P C. The intention of the law is to prevent Magistrates inquiring of their own motion into cases connected with marriage, unless the husband or other person authorized moves them to do so, 20 C. 483; 1 C. L. R. 523. But see 27 M. 61 which in exactly similar circumstances *disapproved* of this Calcutta case, following 5 A. 233 and 22 C. 1006 at p. 1010 where the earlier Calcutta Ruling is *doubted*, and 30 C. 910 where it is *distinguished*. If, therefore a husband brings a complaint of *rape* only, the accused cannot be tried and convicted of *adultery*, 29 C. 415, 31 B. 218; U. B. R. (1912), 4th quarter, p. 155, 14 Bom. L. R. 141 = 13 Cr. L. J. 287; 32 P. R. 1910 = 12 Cr. L. J. 50. Acquittal of an offence under s. 366 I P C., does not bar a subsequent trial for an offence under s. 498, I P C., which the earlier Court was not competent to try in the absence of a complaint by the husband, 16 Cr. L. J. 637 (B.). Where the complaint was one of theft only there cannot be a conviction under s. 498, I P C., without a complaint by the husband under this section, 2 P. R. 1918 (Cr.)

(vi) *Adding of a fresh charge under s. 498 at the Sessions trial unwarranted*—The accused was charged under s. 498, I P C., and convicted the accused on all charges. The Sessions Judge was not regular and the accused was

materially prejudiced by the additional charge framed at that late stage. The conviction, therefore, under s. 498, I P. C., was set aside and a fresh trial ordered on the other charges, 31 B. 218; 14 Bom. L. R. 141 = 1 Bom. Cr. Ca. 82 = 13 Cr. L. J. 287; 29 C. 415.

(vii) Does this section limit the power of the Appellate Court to alter the conviction?—See 25 A. 534; 1 W. R. 45, Note 2 (h) to s. 198 and Notes to s. 423

4. Charge of house-trespass with intent to commit adultery requires no complaint of husband.—A charge of house-trespass with intent to commit adultery, may be inquired into without the husband's complaint, Weir I, 531; 2 P. R. 1877, per FITZPATRICK and LINDSAY, JJ (FLOWDEN, J, dissenting) See contra 5 M. H. C. R. Appx. Y. Where the husband charged the accused with an offence under s. 457, I P. C., alleging that the trespass was with intent to commit theft, but it was found at the trial that the intent was to commit adultery with complainant's wife, held the conviction under s. 457 could be sustained even though the husband had made no specific complaint of trespass with intent to commit an offence under s. 497, I P. C. 23 A. 82; 19 A. 74.

5. Representation of minor husband.—It was ruled prior to the 1882 Code that a minor husband can not be represented by another person for the purpose of instituting a prosecution for adultery, Weir II, 235. But now it seems but fair that the minor should be allowed to do so acting under the advice of his next friend, having regard to the fact that the section specially empowers some custodian of the wife on behalf of the husband to launch the prosecution in his absence.

6. Husband's death—abatement of prosecution.—The death of the husband does not necessarily put an end to a prosecution for adultery. All that the law requires is that the prosecution should be instituted by the husband, 4 M. H. C. R. Appx. LV. See also 1 S. L. R. 72 = 8 Cr. L. J. 190.

7. Unwillingness of husband to proceed with the prosecution.—Where the husband professed himself unwilling to proceed with the prosecution and the Assistant Sessions Judge thereupon ordered the accused to be discharged, the High Court declined to interfere, 5 B. H. C. R. Cr. Ca. 27. But in similar circumstances it was held a Magistrate who had made out the order of committal cannot discharge, the High Court alone having the power to quash a committal under s. 215 4 A. 150. See s. 213 (2) which is new, as to cancelling a charge already framed.

8. Marriage must be strictly proved.—In all prosecutions for adultery, under s. 497, I P. C., the legal marriage of the woman with whom the adultery is said to have been committed, should be strictly proved. Neither the assertion of the complainant nor a general admission on the part of the accused is sufficient for this purpose—C P. Cr. Cir. No. 13. Marriage should be strictly proved 7 C. W. N. 143 and there should be neither consent nor connivance on the part of the husband 1 P. R. 1874. Where the complainant had divorced his wife previous to making his complaint an order of acquittal under s. 498 was upheld 27 P. R. 1879.

9. Right of care-taker is limited to 'absence' of husband.—The words 'in his absence' limit the right of the care-taker and therefore a complaint of the care-taker would not give jurisdiction unless the husband was absent. The absence must be from the place and where a complaint was by a nephew of the husband when the husband was bed ridden with paralysis held that the Court could not take cognizance. The Legislature has made no provision for the protection of the lunatic, paralytic or invalid husbands, and the word absence cannot be taken to include such cases, 3 S. L. R. 15 = 9 Cr. L. J. 450. A father in whose custody a minor wife is, may complain even if the husband stands by, 17 Cr. L. J. 363 (M).

10. Acquittal from want of a proper complaint is no bar to a fresh trial on proper complaint.—Brother of the husband alleging authority from husband instituted complaint under s. 498, I P. C. After taking evidence the Magistrate acquitted the accused as the brother and no authority. On the husband instituting a complaint under s. 498 I P. C., held that previous acquittal was no bar, 31 A. 317. See also 16 Cr. L. J. 657 (B).

11. Cases under ss. 497 and 498 how registered.—The High Court of N. W. P. has directed that cases under ss. 497 and 498 ought not to be registered as 'King Emperor v. Accused' but only as 'Private Complainant v. Accused'.—N. W. P. Gazette, 1879, p. 123.

* 199-A.

Objection by lawful guardian to complaint by person other than person aggrieved

When in any case falling under section 198 or section 199 the person on whose behalf the complaint is sought to be made is under the age of eighteen years or is a lunatic, and the person applying for leave has not been appointed or declared by competent authority to be the guardian of the person of the said minor or lunatic, and the Court is satisfied that there is a guardian so appointed or declared notice shall be given to such guardian, and the Court shall before granting the application give him a reasonable opportunity of objecting to the granting thereof

CHAPTER XVI

OF COMPLAINTS TO MAGISTRATES

200. A Magistrate taking cognizance of an offence on complaint shall at once examine the complainant upon oath and the substance of the examination shall be reduced to writing and shall be signed by the complainant and also by the Magistrate

Examination of complainant

Provided as follows —

(a) when the complaint is made in writing nothing herein contained shall be deemed to require a Magistrate to examine the complainant before transferring the case under s 192, ‡ (aa) when the complaint is made in writing nothing herein contained shall be deemed to require the examination of a complainant in any case in which the complaint has been made by a Court or by a public servant acting or purporting to act in the discharge of his official duties

(b) where the Magistrate is a Presidency Magistrate such examination may be on oath or not as the Magistrate in each case thinks fit and need not be reduced to writing, but the Magistrate may if he thinks fit before the matter of the complaint is brought before him require it to be reduced to writing,

(c) when the case has been transferred under s 192 and the Magistrate so transferring it has already examined the complainant the Magistrate to whom it is so transferred shall not be bound to re-examine the complainant

Notes —1 The proviso ‡ (aa) to this section has been newly added to this section with a view to disengage with the examination of the complainant when the complaint is under s 476 (see Select Committee Report 1916).

2 Proceeding of Magistrates not empowered.—As to the effect of a Magistrate not empowered in that behalf erroneously and in good faith taking cognizance of an offence on a complaint under s 190 (1) cf (a) see s 529 (e).

3. Taking cognizance.—A Magistrate takes cognizance of a complaint under s 190 (1), (a) see Note 3 thereto. A Magistrate is bound to take cognizance see Note 16 under s. 140

4. Complaint.—For definition see s 4 (h) and for what is or is not a complaint see Notes 2—12 there under and Notes under Heading II under s 190. The provisions of this section and s. 203 do not apply to applications under s 552 for restoration of abducted females when no offence is alleged 4 Bom L. R. 609

5. Complainant—who may complain. See Notes 3 and 14 under s. 190

(i) Complaint in state prosecution authorized under s 196.—See 35 C. 141, 32 M. 3. Note 7 to s 196 and Note 11 at p 9

* Added by Act XVIII of 1923

† The words "subject to the provisions of section 476" have been omitted by the Criminal Procedure (Amendment) Act 1923. Clause (aa) has been added by the Criminal Procedure (Amendment) Act 1923

INFLICT

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6 Ordinarily complaint must be presented in person.—The words 'at once' clearly indicate that ordinarily a complaint must be presented in person. A complaint should never be accepted which is not signed by the complainant and is not preferred by a person duly authorized to prefer that specific complaint, **40 C. 92.**

(i) *Mukhtyar cannot present complaint*—A complaint under ss. 408 and 409, I P. C., having been presented by the complainant's Mukhtyar instead of by the complainant herself who was not present in Court, *held*, that the Magistrate was justified in dismissing the complaint, as he had no opportunity of examining the complainant as required by this section, **Ratanlal 623.** But it is not necessary for a Magistrate receiving a Police report to treat the reporting office as a complainant, **2 L. B. R. 146.**

(ii) *Agent may present complaint.*—Where sanction to prosecute has been accorded to a particular person, the prosecution might be initiated either by his heir or by any person specially authorized, but, in the latter case, the Magistrate is bound to record the authority of the actual complainant, even though the Magistrate be a Presidency Magistrate to whom cl (b) of this section applies. No summons could lawfully issue on the accused until the complainant's authority had been exhibited and recorded, **32 C. 469.** See also **8 C. W. N. 797.**

7. Sections 200-203 must be strictly complied with.—Ss. 200-203 should be read together, **14 C. 141.** The procedure laid down by these sections must be strictly complied with. See **11 A. L. J. 921 = 15 Cr. L. J. 21, 1885 A. W. N. 47; 10 M. L. T. 120 = 12 Cr. L. J. 463; 10 C. W. N. 773 = 3 Cr. L. J. 471; 30 C. 923; 9 C. W. N. 199; 8 C. W. N. 840; 17 Cr. L. J. 396, (C).**

(i) *Magistrate must deal with the complaint as provided by this Chapter and cannot refer to Police under s 156 (3).*—On the presentation of a complaint the Magistrate has no option of either taking cognizance in the manner provided by this Chapter or of referring to the Police for investigation under s 156 (3). It is his duty to immediately proceed in the manner laid down in this Chapter (1911) **2 M. W. N. 74 = 10 M. L. T. 120 = 12 Cr. L. J. 463.** The case in **30 C. 923,** it was explained does not pronounce any opinion on the legality of the action in not proceeding as laid down by s 200 but merely considers the effect of his omission on the legality of orders subsequently passed under ss 200 and 476.

(ii) *Cannot refer to a superior Magistrate for orders*—A Magistrate who receives a complaint and examines the complainant must deal with it himself under s. 203 or s 204, and cannot send it to the District Magistrate for orders, **40 C. W. N. 1085.** Where a complaint against a Police-officer was preferred to a Deputy Magistrate who having examined the complainant, put the case up before the District Magistrate and the latter officer on the strength of a report from the District Superintendent of Police dismissed the complaint under s 203, without even examining the complainant, *held* that the provisions of ss 201 and 202 not having been complied with and the complainant not being examined by the Magistrate who dismissed the complaint, the order of dismissal was wrong and illegal **9 C. W. N. 199 = 2 Cr. L. J. 51.** See also **6 C. W. N. 843; 39 C. 1041.**

(iii) *Magistrates cannot decline jurisdiction and refuse to entertain complaint.*—A Magistrate cannot decline jurisdiction because the offence complained against is cognizable by the village headman, **7 M. H. C. R. Appx. XXXI = Weir, II 237.** A Magistrate cannot refuse a summons to a complainant, even in a case in which the charge might have been made to the Police in the first instance, **14 W. R. 38.** A complaint properly laid under the *Indian Penal Code* should be investigated even if the case be one in which a civil action will lie, **10 W. R. 40.** But where a complaint is purely of a civil nature and discloses no offence, the Magistrate may refuse to entertain it. An order directing the petition of complaint to be filed *se,* to be shelved in the office is illegal, **16 W. R. 68.**

8. Object of examination is to ascertain if there is a prima facie case.—The object of the provision is to prevent the issue of process in cases where the examination of the complainant would show that the complaint was clearly false, frivolous or vexatious and that further proceedings would tend merely to harass unnecessarily an accused person and waste the time of the Court **11 P. R. 1911 = 144 P. L. R. 1911 = 12 Cr. L. J. 217; 10 A. L. J. 79 = 13 Cr. L. J. 704.**

9. Examination of complainant how to be made.—A cross-examination of a complainant by a Magistrate taking cognizance of a case on the depositions recorded by another Magistrate is not a sufficient compliance with law to enable the Magistrate to deal with the case under s 203, **30 C. 923.** See **13 B. 600** as to whether a Magistrate can cross-examine a complainant. The prescribed mode of ascertaining what a complaint is, is to examine the complainant and reduce his examination to writing, **Weir II, 237.** Care should be taken in conducting examinations of complainants under this section to make the inquiry sufficiently full to enable the

Magistrate to judge whether there are any grounds for proceeding—*Bom C Cr. Cir.*, p 14 The examination of the complainant is not to be a *mere form*,² but an intelligent inquiry into the subject matter of the complaint, carried far enough to enable the Magistrate to exercise his *judgment* as to whether there is or is not sufficient ground for proceeding, *Wilkins* 2.

In every case the complainant should be examined intelligently in such a manner as to enable the Magistrate to determine whether *there is prima facie* sufficient ground for proceeding The indiscriminate issue of process almost as a matter of course encourages false, frivolous and vexatious complaints and results in serious hardship to a large portion of the persons accused, besides wasting the time of the Courts Special caution should be used when several persons are accused at once and in cases where it appears that there is dispute between the complainant and the accused about a matter which should be decided by the Civil Courts Magistrates should also bear in mind the provisions of s 90, I P C and apply them reasonably to the complainants before them, with reference to the position in life of the parties concerned and the habits or the class to which they belong The law requires that the complainant shall be examined '*at once*'. The practice of fixing a future date for the examination of a complainant is absolutely prohibited.—*C P Cr Cir.*, Part II, No 14

(i) *Can complainant be examined on commission?*—A commission cannot be issued for the examination of a complainant, inasmuch as s 503 relates to commissions for the examination of witnesses, and in the preliminary stage of proceeding a complainant is not a witness but a complainant, *10 P. R. 1896 Contra 42 C. 19*, where it was *held* that the terms of s. 503 are very wide They refer not only to an inquiry and a trial, but to any other proceeding The section authorizes the examination of any witness and a complainant is certainly a witness.

(ii) *Effect of omission to take the signature of the complainant.*—The omission to take the signature of the complainant vitiates the record and cannot be cured by s 537, so that a conviction cannot be had under s. 193 I P C., in respect of two contradictory statements, one made under this section but not signed, and the other made while examined as a witness. *6 C. W. N 840*

10. Complainant must be examined at once—Is attestation or complaint on oath sufficient? It is the Magistrate's duty at once to examine the complainant on oath and reduce the substance of that examination into writing It is his duty to find out whether there is any matter which calls for investigation by a Criminal Court *10 A. L. J. 79 = 13 Cr. L. J. 704* On presentation of a complaint the Magistrate must examine the complainant upon oath and reduce or cause to be reduced the substance of that examination to writing and that writing must be distinct from the complaint Merely calling upon the complainant to attest the complaint on oath is not sufficient compliance with the law, *18 A. 221*. In distinguishing the case in *9 A. 666*, the High Court observed 'that the case was of an exceptional character The complaint was made by an Englishman against an Englishman The contents of the complaint, which was drawn up in English had evidently been drawn up with a great deal of care and not in the way in which complaints are so often prepared for the Courts of Magistrates Except when the complaint, is in writing and he transfers the case under s. 192, the Magistrate taking cognizance of the offence is bound to examine the complainant, and then he can either issue a summons to the accused or order an inquiry under s. 202, or dismiss the complaint under s. 203 *13 C. 334*. See also *5 Bom. L. R. 662; 35 M. 606*. A Presidency Magistrate need examine the complaint, only when the complaint is oral and he transfers the case under s. 192, *2 P. R. 1912 = 11 P. L. R. 1912 = 12 Cr. L. J. 839* In *6 Bom. L. R. 662* it is stated that when a complaint is in writing and is sufficiently clear, it may frequently be a sufficient compliance with s. 200 if the Magistrate reads it over to the complainant and the complainant is on oath asked to subscribe it It is only when the written complaint is obscure or vague, that the Magistrate is bound to examine the complainant at sufficient length for the purpose of clearly ascertaining the allegations on which the complaint is made.

11. Effect of omission to examine complainant—(i) *Cannot dismiss complaint*—The examination of a complaint is not a matter of form, and when a Magistrate dismisses a complaint without making such examination himself, the omission is a material one and he does what he has no authority to do under the Code, *U B R. (1910) 1. 73 = 12 Cr. L. J. 385*. Where a Magistrate, before whom a complaint was laid, dismissed the complaint and sanctioned proceedings against the complainant under s. 182, I P C., without examining the complainant or the witnesses named by him but only on a comparison of the complaint and the papers connected with a complaint that had previously been made at a Police-station *Held* that the proceedings were

irregular and must be quashed, and the Magistrate should be directed to re-open the inquiry and examine the complainant, **4 C. L. R. 134**. See also **17 W. R. 2**. Dismissal of complaint without examination will be set aside **30 C. 923**; **9 C. W. N. 199**; **3 C. W. N. 17**; **25 Bom. L. R. 183**.

(ii) *Cannot refer for inquiry and report under s 202*.—See Note 10 to s 202. Unless a complainant is duly examined, inquiry and report under s 202 cannot be called for and if made, are made without jurisdiction and cannot form the basis of any further action **27 C. 921**; **4 C. W. N. 303**; **1900 A. W. N. 189**; **2 P. R. 1912 = 11 P. L. R. 1912 = 12 Cr. L. J. 539**.

(iii) *Cannot issue process for appearance of accused*.—Process issued to the accused without examining complainant may be set aside, **17 C. W. N. 443 = 14 Cr. L. J. 76**. Where a Magistrate summoned the accused before examining the complainant, it was held that he had misconceived his duty in supposing that it was not his business to examine the complainant, **1864 W. R. 37**; **4 M. H. C. R. 162**. But where an accused person appears voluntarily before a Magistrate to answer a charge, the want of a complaint on oath, necessary for the issuing of a summons or warrant becomes immaterial, **5 B. H. C. R. Cr. Ca. 29**.

(iv) *Calling for report from accused before examining complainant*.—It is an irregular proceeding on the part of the Magistrate to call on the person complained against to submit a report as to the truth or otherwise of the allegations made against him, at any rate, this should not be done before the complainant has been examined, **3 C. W. N. 17**; **9 A. 666**. A presented a complaint to a District Magistrate against a first-class Magistrate for his having used certain offensive words during the course of an inquiry, which A alleged amounted to defamation. The District Magistrate expressing himself satisfied with the report of the first-class Magistrate rejected A's complaint without examining him. Held, that the action of the District Magistrate in calling for the report was not proper, and that in any case he ought to have heard the complainant and his witnesses before acting upon any statement made in the report by the person complained against, **Ratanlal 934**.

(v) *No sanction can be granted for prosecution under s 211, I P C*.—Where a complainant presented a petition to a Magistrate impugning the correctness of a report made by the Police regarding proceedings instituted by him at the *thana*, held the complaint to the Magistrate ought to have been dealt with under this section and the complainant examined, before any order can legally be made for the prosecution of the complainant under s 211 I P C., **33 C. 1**; **10 C. W. N. 773 = 3 Cr. L. J. 471**; see also **14 C. 707**; **27 C. 921**; **4 C. W. N. 303**; **5 C. W. N. 254**; **7 M. 292**; **22 B. 596**, **15 A. 338**; **2 P. R. 1912 = 11 P. L. R. 1912 = 12 Cr. L. J. 539**; **18 C. W. N. 95**; **25 Bom. L. R. 183**.

Where a complainant prefers a criminal charge before a Magistrate who neither examines him on oath nor takes down his statement in writing, he cannot be proceeded against under s 211 I P C even if the charge turns out to be a false one **28 Bom. L. R. 490**.

(vi) *When omission amounts to mere irregularity*.—Where a Tahsildar sent a *Yadast* to a Magistrate charging a person with an offence under s 174 I P C, it was held that the omission of the Magistrate to examine the Tahsildar was but an irregularity curable by s 537, **11 M. 443**; **15 C. W. N. 55**. Every Magistrate who takes cognizance of an offence upon complaint should as a matter of ordinary practice forthwith examine the complainant on oath and reduce the substance of his examination to writing and make the complainant sign the same. This is a very salutary provision of law and Magistrates should be careful strictly to observe it in every case. Where however, the complaint was preferred by a responsible public official was reduced to writing and signed by the said official and was accompanied with a formal sanction by the Local Government for the prosecution of one of its servants and the accused person was actually convicted, held the Magistrate's failure to examine the complainant on oath had not in any way prejudiced the accused or caused a failure or miscarriage of justice and that the irregularity had been covered by s 527 (a), **(9 A. 666, 11 M. 443 and 63 P. R. 1901 followed)** **11 P. R. 1911 = 146 P. L. R. 1911 = 12 Cr. L. J. 217**. Omissions to examine complainant is a mere irregularity, **15 Cr. L. J. 649 (Blad)**, **13 A. L. J. 840**. But in **43 M. L. J. 710** it is held that omission to examine the complainant under s 200 is a serious irregularity justifying interference in revision by the High Court. But **46 C. 807** holds that a Police report in a non-cognizable case is either a complaint under s 4 or a Police report within s 190 (1) (b) and the Magistrate has jurisdiction to take cognizance of an offence under s 211 of the I P C, disclosed therein **(25 B. 150 and 32 M. 3 not followed)**. If it is a complaint the omission of the Magistrate to examine the Police-officer under s 200 is a mere irregularity not going to the root of his jurisdiction. Failure to examine the complainant was merely an irregularity covered by s 537 A as it did not occasion a miscarriage of justice or prejudice the accused in any manner, **4 Lah. 359 (11 P. R. 1911 followed)**.

12 Procedure after examination.—Having examined the complainant, the Magistrate must either (i) issue summons, s 204, or (ii) order inquiry under s 202, or (iii) dismiss the complaint under s 203, 13 C. 334, 12 B. 161; 16 C. W. N. 143 = 13 Cr. L. J. 125.

(i) *Magistrate cannot refuse judicial inquiry.*—A complainant is entitled to be examined on his complaint and if his case is found to be true, to have process against the accused. After having found the complaint to be true, the Magistrate cannot refuse judicial inquiry on the ground that there is no probability of conviction 29 C. 310; 13 C. 333. See Note 7 to s 203 and Note 16 to s 190.

13. When complaint suspicious, complainant may be warned.—When Magistrates have a suspicion that a charge is false and vexatious, but the suspicion is not strong enough to justify them in withholding process they may before directing issue of process or ordering a local inquiry, warn the complainant of the risk he runs of being prosecuted for a false complaint, or of being ordered to pay compensation to the accused by way of amends. Magistrates should always endeavour to avoid compelling a person to appear before them to answer a criminal charge, unless they have first satisfied themselves that there is reason for proceeding against such person, Oadh Cr. Dig. p. 7.

14. Original complaint not to be returned.—It is irregular to endorse and return to a party his petition or complaint alleging an offence. The petitioner is only entitled to an authenticated copy of the Magistrate's order, on proper stamp, Welr II, 237.

15. Refusal to sign statement is punishable under s 180, I P C.

16 Complaint and examination of complainant whether and when admissible in evidence.—A complaint though sworn to is a statement not made in presence of the accused and cannot be taken as evidence as against him 10 M. L. T. 506 = (1911) 2 M. W. N. 576 = 12 Cr. L. J. 585. A petition of complaint and the examination of complainant on oath taken under this section are admissible as dying declarations under s 32 clause (1) of the Evidence Act, and are not as such, matters required by law to be reduced to the form of a document within the meaning of s 91 of that Act so as to exclude parol evidence of their terms. The statement admissible in evidence when made in the absence of the accused is the oral statement of the deceased, and not the record of it and such oral statement must be proved by the person who recorded it or heard it made, 8 C. 211 and 6 C. W. N. 72 followed in 36 C. 659.

17. No action lies for defamation in respect of statements made in complaint.—A statement contained in a complaint is absolutely privileged. If the complaint is false, the complainant may be prosecuted for preferring a false charge, but he cannot be convicted of defamation, 11 M. L. T. 431 = 13 Cr. L. J. 293; 33 C. 850. See also *Illey v. Roney*, 61 L. J. Q. B. 727, 36 M. 216 (F.B.).

201. (1) If the complaint has been made in writing to a Magistrate who is not competent to take cognizance of the case, he shall return the complaint for presentation to the proper Court with an endorsement to that effect

2) If the complaint has not been made in writing, such Magistrate shall direct the complainant to the proper Court

Notes.—1. *Oral complaints.*—Sub-sec (2) which is new contemplates the presentation of oral complaints. The corresponding section of the 1882 Code dealt only with complaints in writing.

2. Competency of Magistrates.—The want of competency contemplated by this section may be due to (i) the Magistrate not being empowered under s. 190 or (ii) want of local jurisdiction, or (iii) want of previous sanction under s. 132 or ss 195–199 or under some Special or Local law, or (iv) to the Magistrate not being qualified to try under Sch II, col. 8 or to commit for trial under s. 206 or (v) where the accused is an European British subject. A refusal to act for want of a proper sanction is no bar to a subsequent complaint with a proper sanction, 24 M. 337.

3. Procedure where Magistrate is not competent.—If on perusal of the petition of complaint the Magistrate finds he has no jurisdiction he is not bound to examine the complainant, and indeed he could not do so, but should return it, after making the endorsement required by this section when the complaint is in writing, *Agra N. A.* 1882 at p. 318. If not competent to take cognizance the Magistrate should act immediately under this section without examining the complainant 10 C. W. N. 1088.

Procedure by Magistrate not competent to take cognizance of the case

***202.** (1) Any Magistrate on receipt of a complaint of an offence of which he is authorized to take cognizance, or which has been transferred to him under section 192 may, if he thinks fit for reasons to be recorded in writing, postpone the issue of process for compelling the attendance of the person complained against and either inquire into the case himself or, if he is a Magistrate other than a Magistrate of the third class direct an inquiry or investigation to be made by any Magistrate subordinate to him, or by a Police-officer or by such other person as he thinks fit for the purpose of ascertaining the truth or falsehood of the complaint

Provided that no such direction shall be made—

(a) unless the complainant has been examined on oath under the provisions of section 200 or

(b) where the complaint has been made by a Court under the provisions of this Code

*** (2)** If any inquiry or investigation under this section is made by a person not being a Magistrate or a Police-officer, such person shall exercise all the powers conferred by this Code on an officer in charge of a Police-station except that he shall not have power to arrest without warrant.

†“(2A) Any Magistrate inquiring into a case under this section may, if he thinks fit, take evidence of witnesses on oath

(3) This section applies also to the Police in the town of Calcutta and Bombay

Note—Under the new amendment a Magistrate can act under s 202 though a case be transferred to him under s 192 (dealing with transfer of cases by Magistrates). The proviso under sub-clauses (a) and (b) is newly added. Clause (2A) was newly inserted

45 C. 854 which was decided before the section was amended holds that it has been a long practice to refer complaints to Subordinate Magistrates for local inquiry and report. The words “direct a previous local investigation by any officer subordinate include a local investigation by a Subordinate Magistrate. The definitions of inquiry” and investigation in s 4 are not exhaustive and are expressed to be subject to the context. The present amendment clearly confers the power upon a Magistrate other than a Magistrate of the third class to direct an inquiry or investigation to be made by any Magistrate subordinate to him and therefore expressly adopts the view held in **45 C. 854**. And the rulings in **38 C. 68** and **15 A. L. J. 642** holding to the contrary are no longer good law. (See Note 9 *infra*)

Notes.—1. (a) *Issue of Process* See ss. 68 and 75 1 or their forms see Sch. V Nos 1 and 2.

2. *All the powers of a Station House Officer*—See ss 55 56 127 128 153 156 and 157

3. **In Madras, all Presidency Magistrates are specially empowered.**—In Madras all Presidency Magistrates other than the Chief Presidency Magistrate have been invested with powers under this section—*Port St. George Gazette* 1892 Pt. I p 585

APPLICATION OF SECTION

1. **Third-class Magistrates not competent to postpone process.**—A Magistrate of the third class cannot postpone the issue of process even if he distrusts the truth of the complaint

5. **Section applies only when Magistrate takes cognizance on complaint.**—*Magistrate cannot make enquiry without complaint*—This section by its terms only applies to cases where there is a *complaint* which is expressly distinguished from *information* in s. 191 and further applies only to cases where the Magistrate sees reason to distrust the truth of the complaint and a Magistrate acting upon second-hand information cannot be said to be acting upon complaint, **25 P. R. 1833** Magistrate taking cognizance under s. 190 (c) is not competent to refer, **7 B. L. R. 75 = 14 Cr. L. J. 600** When there is no formal complaint before a Magistrate any inquiry made by

* Sub-clauses (1) and (2) were substituted for the original sub-sections by Act XV III of 1923 s. 53

† Sub-section (2A) is added by Act XV III of 1923 s. 54

In'sip'id-i-ty, adv. 1. Without meaning or

1. Not susceptible of emotion.
2. Not susceptible of emotion.
3. Not susceptible of emotion.
4. Not susceptible of emotion.
5. Not susceptible of emotion.
6. Not susceptible of emotion.
7. Not susceptible of emotion.
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stands we may speak

1. To creep wind or flow in.
2. To creep wind or flow in.
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1. Using insinuation.
2. Using insinuation.
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1. The act of slitting in any
by way of fomentation, false
a, e, i, u, o, y, long a, e

him into the truth of any information received by him is not an investigation directed by law and has no legal character and is not in any sense a judicial proceeding. Therefore any person making a false statement on oath in such inquiry cannot be prosecuted for giving false evidence as the Magistrate had no more authority to administer an oath or compel his questions to be answered than a private individual, 15 P. R. 1894, *cf* 32 A. 30. See also 7 A. L. J. 618 = 11 Cr. L. J. 351. On receipt of a Police report of an offence under s 173, a Sub-divisional Magistrate directed another Subordinate Magistrate to investigate, the Subordinate Magistrate examined witnesses and made a report to the Sub-divisional Magistrate who thereupon directed the issue of summons, *held* the proceedings were wholly irregular. It was open to the Sub-divisional Magistrate to take cognizance of the case under s 190 (b), but he did not choose to do so and proceeded to make over the case for inquiry and report as though the matter he was dealing with was on a complaint under s 200. The proceedings before the Subordinate Magistrate were not in consonance with the provisions of the law, 40 C. 854; 17 C. W. N. 795 = 14 Cr. L. J. 425. So also where information was lodged with the Police who reported it to be false and a Magistrate on receipt of the Police report passed the order 'complainant to prove his case' and made over the case to another Magistrate who made an order under s 476, *held*, that such order was made without jurisdiction. 17 C. W. N. 824 = 14 Cr. L. J. 387.

(i) *No power to direct investigation when person discharged under s 253*—The inquiry under this section should not be confounded with the inquiry under Chapter XVIII. This section applies only to the case or a complaint on which the Magistrate does not see fit to issue process. It is not competent to a Magistrate in virtue of this section to direct further inquiry to be made by the Police into a case in which the accused has been discharged under s 253, *Weir II*, 239.

(ii) *No power to refer for inquiry in maintenance cases, s 488*—A petition under s. 488 is not a case instituted on a complaint as defined in s 4 (h), and therefore the Magistrate to whom such a petition is preferred must inquire into it himself and has no power to refer it to a Subordinate Magistrate for inquiry and to dismiss it on his report, 29 P. R. 1905 = 90 P. L. R. 1905 = 2 Cr. L. J. 421 *following* 11 M. 199.

6. **Complainant entitled to be believed and have process issued.**—Every complainant is entitled to have the accused summoned unless the Magistrate who takes cognizance of the complaint does not believe it or has some doubts regarding its truth, 27 C. 798, U. B. R. (1910) 1. 73 = 12 Cr. L. J. 385. When a man files a complaint and supports it by his oath rendering himself liable to prosecution and imprisonment if it is false, he is entitled to be believed, unless there is some apparent reason for disbelieving him and he is entitled to have the persons against whom he complains, brought before the Court and tried, 40 C. 444. The Magistrate should start upon the right and healthy presumption that a person who has taken the trouble to come into Court and to take the further step of instituting a complaint is acting upon knowledge or information which he believes to be true. To start with the presumption that a complaint is false is not a sound method of procedure. Hence it is that when a Magistrate is not satisfied as to the truth of a complaint the law requires him to record his reasons for not being so satisfied 11 A. L. J. 754 = 14 Cr. L. J. 493. See also 29 C. 510.

7. **Process may be postponed only when Magistrate is not satisfied as to the truth of the complaint.**—Ordinarily after the examination of the complaint process shall issue. The Magistrate has no discretion to make a judicial inquiry. Such an inquiry can be *held* only when he, is not satisfied as to the truth of the complaint, 14 C. 141, 9 A. 85, 1900 A. W. N. 189. A Magistrate can send a case for inquiry by the Police under this section only when for reasons stated by him he distrusts the truth of the complaint. A circular issued by the District Magistrate that all cases against the Police should be sent for inquiry to the Superintendent of Police is illegal 20 M. 337.

8. **Magistrate must record his reasons for distrusting the truth of the complaint.**—The Magistrate is bound to state his reasons for not being satisfied, 27 C. 921; 14 C. 141; 1834 A. W. N. 47, 1902 A. W. N. 195, 6 B. L. R. 83 = 13 Cr. L. J. 749, 20 M. 337, 40 C. 41—The reasons so recorded will enable the Court of Revision to see whether proper discretion has been exercised 14 C. 141, 17 Cr. L. J. 395 (C).

(i) *Reason for amendment*—We have substituted the words *is not satisfied as to the truth of a complaint for sees no reason to distrust the truth of a complaint*, in sub-sec. (1) in order to give a little further latitude to the Magistrate's discretion.—*See Com Rep*

(ii) *Failure to record reasons*—The failure of a Magistrate having jurisdiction to act under this section, to record his reasons before ordering an inquiry is at most an irregularity, and unless it in fact occasions a failure of justice it can be no ground for setting aside his order of discharge under s 203 23 M. 546; *Weir II*, 244;

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| B To draw in by the operation of breathing, to
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p pr .
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There is also an issue

In a like case, a United States, 1944

$$\begin{array}{c} \mathbf{B} \\ \mathbf{In} \, \mathbf{A} \\ \mathbf{I} \\ \mathbf{I} \\ \mathbf{I} \end{array}$$

1994, 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014, 2015, 2016, 2017, 2018, 2019, 2020, 2021, 2022, 2023, 2024, 2025, 2026, 2027, 2028, 2029, 2030, 2031, 2032, 2033, 2034, 2035, 2036, 2037, 2038, 2039, 2040, 2041, 2042, 2043, 2044, 2045, 2046, 2047, 2048, 2049, 2050, 2051, 2052, 2053, 2054, 2055, 2056, 2057, 2058, 2059, 2060, 2061, 2062, 2063, 2064, 2065, 2066, 2067, 2068, 2069, 2070, 2071, 2072, 2073, 2074, 2075, 2076, 2077, 2078, 2079, 2080, 2081, 2082, 2083, 2084, 2085, 2086, 2087, 2088, 2089, 2090, 2091, 2092, 2093, 2094, 2095, 2096, 2097, 2098, 2099, 2100, 2101, 2102, 2103, 2104, 2105, 2106, 2107, 2108, 2109, 2110, 2111, 2112, 2113, 2114, 2115, 2116, 2117, 2118, 2119, 2120, 2121, 2122, 2123, 2124, 2125, 2126, 2127, 2128, 2129, 2130, 2131, 2132, 2133, 2134, 2135, 2136, 2137, 2138, 2139, 2140, 2141, 2142, 2143, 2144, 2145, 2146, 2147, 2148, 2149, 2150, 2151, 2152, 2153, 2154, 2155, 2156, 2157, 2158, 2159, 2160, 2161, 2162, 2163, 2164, 2165, 2166, 2167, 2168, 2169, 2170, 2171, 2172, 2173, 2174, 2175, 2176, 2177, 2178, 2179, 2180, 2181, 2182, 2183, 2184, 2185, 2186, 2187, 2188, 2189, 2190, 2191, 2192, 2193, 2194, 2195, 2196, 2197, 2198, 2199, 2200, 2201, 2202, 2203, 2204, 2205, 2206, 2207, 2208, 2209, 2210, 2211, 2212, 2213, 2214, 2215, 2216, 2217, 2218, 2219, 2220, 2221, 2222, 2223, 2224, 2225, 2226, 2227, 2228, 2229, 2230, 2231, 2232, 2233, 2234, 2235, 2236, 2237, 2238, 2239, 2240, 2241, 2242, 2243, 2244, 2245, 2246, 2247, 2248, 2249, 2250, 2251, 2252, 2253, 2254, 2255, 2256, 2257, 2258, 2259, 2260, 2261, 2262, 2263, 2264, 2265, 2266, 2267, 2268, 2269, 2270, 2271, 2272, 2273, 2274, 2275, 2276, 2277, 2278, 2279, 2280, 2281, 2282, 2283, 2284, 2285, 2286, 2287, 2288, 2289, 2290, 2291, 2292, 2293, 2294, 2295, 2296, 2297, 2298, 2299, 2300, 2301, 2302, 2303, 2304, 2305, 2306, 2307, 2308, 2309, 2310, 2311, 2312, 2313, 2314, 2315, 2316, 2317, 2318, 2319, 2320, 2321, 2322, 2323, 2324, 2325, 2326, 2327, 2328, 2329, 2330, 2331, 2332, 2333, 2334, 2335, 2336, 2337, 2338, 2339, 2340, 2341, 2342, 2343, 2344, 2345, 2346, 2347, 2348, 2349, 2350, 2351, 2352, 2353, 2354, 2355, 2356, 2357, 2358, 2359, 2360, 2361, 2362, 2363, 2364, 2365, 2366, 2367, 2368, 2369, 2370, 2371, 2372, 2373, 2374, 2375, 2376, 2377, 2378, 2379, 2380, 2381, 2382, 2383, 2384, 2385, 2386, 2387, 2388, 2389, 2390, 2391, 2392, 2393, 2394, 2395, 2396, 2397, 2398, 2399, 2400, 2401, 2402, 2403, 2404, 2405, 2406, 2407, 2408, 2409, 2410, 2411, 2412, 2413, 2414, 2415, 2416, 2417, 2418, 2419, 2420, 2421, 2422, 2423, 2424, 2425, 2426, 2427, 2428, 2429, 2430, 2431, 2432, 2433, 2434, 2435, 2436, 2437, 2438, 2439, 2440, 2441, 2442, 2443, 2444, 2445, 2446, 2447, 2448, 2449, 2450, 2451, 2452, 2453, 2454, 2455, 2456, 2457, 2458, 2459, 2460, 2461, 2462, 2463, 2464, 2465, 2466, 2467, 2468, 2469, 2470, 2471, 2472, 2473, 2474, 2475, 2476, 2477, 2478, 2479, 2480, 2481, 2482, 2483, 2484, 2485, 2486, 2487, 2488, 2489, 2490, 2491, 2492, 2493, 2494, 2495, 2496, 2497, 2498, 2499, 2500, 2501, 2502, 2503, 2504, 2505, 2506, 2507, 2508, 2509, 2510, 2511, 2512, 2513, 2514, 2515, 2516, 2517, 2518, 2519, 2520, 2521, 2522, 2523, 2524, 2525, 2526, 2527, 2528, 2529, 2530, 2531, 2532, 2533, 2534, 2535, 2536, 2537, 2538, 2539, 2540, 2541, 2542, 2543, 2544, 2545, 2546, 2547, 2548, 2549, 2550, 2551, 2552, 2553, 2554, 2555, 2556, 2557, 2558, 2559, 2560, 2561, 2562, 2563, 2564, 2565, 2566, 2567, 2568, 2569, 2570, 2571, 2572, 2573, 2574, 2575, 2576, 2577, 2578, 2579, 2580, 2581, 2582, 2583, 2584, 2585, 2586, 2587, 2588, 2589, 2590, 2591, 2592, 2593, 2594, 2595, 2596, 2597, 2598, 2599, 2600, 2601, 2602, 2603, 2604, 2605, 2606, 2607, 2608, 2609, 2610, 2611, 2612, 2613, 2614, 2615, 2616, 2617, 2618, 2619, 2620, 2621, 2622, 2623, 2624, 2625, 2626, 2627, 2628, 2629, 2630, 2631, 2632, 2633, 2634, 2635, 2636, 2637, 2638, 2639, 2640, 2641, 2642, 2643, 2644, 2645, 2646, 2647, 2648, 2649, 2650, 2651, 2652, 2653, 2654, 2655, 2656, 2657, 2658, 2659, 2660, 2661, 2662, 2663, 2664, 2665, 2666, 2667, 2668, 2669, 2670, 2671, 2672, 2673, 2674, 2675, 26

2 The seat in which one is pivoted [Obs] disorder
The several chairs of order look you around
The several chairs of order look you around

3 With urgency or importunity, *ἐκ δεξιῆς*,
pressingly
And when they came to Jesus,
καὶ ἐλθόντες πρὸς τὸν Ἰησοῦν,

Boulier, Simonida

[illegible]

To impress an animating power
a limitation, to cause the life by
Instinct. [Cub] Sir T. E. Spence
[?] Instinctive Ep. Inst. [?]
[?] determined by no real lin-
einstinct without training de-
viation or experience original
pendent on experience or reason

ought the whole conduct in [?] Type
with taste constructive pro-
re appropriate Known
natured [?] Instinctive judg-
ment constructions not ill adapted to
[?] judgment or conclusion with [?]

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Syracuse—Examiner case Bob FRANKLIN

Absolute Magnitude M_{bol} (mag)

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ä, ê, i, ü, u, y, long, ä, ë, i, ö, ü, y, short, cäre, tär, lät, fell, wbat, thäre, vell, tärn, pläus, firm, döne, för, dğ, wölł, fööl, fööl

5 M. L. T. 79; 10 M. L. T. 120 = (1911) 2 M. W. N. 76 = 12 Cr. L. J. 463; 15 A. L. J. 642. But see 14 C. 141; 27 C. 921 and 40 C. 41. Where it was held that such a failure was not a mere irregularity as the provisions of the statute were imperative and were directly disobeyed. See Note above.

9. Magistrate may 'inquire' or 'direct inquiry or investigation'—Magistrate not competent to adopt any other course. (i) Cannot call for and consider evidence. (ii) Cannot direct local investigation by a subordinate Magistrate.

section, if he is not satisfied as to the truth of the complaint, 11 A. L. J. 921 = 15 Cr. L. J. 21.

(ii) *Can call upon the Subordinate Magistrate to make an inquiry other than a local investigation*—Under the old section a Magistrate could not call upon a Subordinate Magistrate to make an inquiry other than a local investigation, but now under the present amendment a Magistrate other than a Magistrate of the third class may direct an inquiry by a Subordinate Magistrate. Therefore 38 C. 663 and 15 A. L. J. 642 holding the contrary view are no longer law (see Note above).

(iii) *Cannot direct local investigation by a superior Magistrate*—A Deputy Magistrate in charge of the District Magistrate's office at headquarters has no power as such, after taking cognizance of a complaint and examining the complainant on oath to send the case under this section for local investigation by the Subdivisional Officer to whom he is by law subordinate, nor dismiss the complaint, and to direct the prosecution of the complainant under s. 476 on the report and investigation by the latter, 39 C. 1041.

(iv) *Cannot refer the matter for the orders of the District Magistrate*—After the examination of the complainant a Subordinate Magistrate may either dismiss the complaint for good cause or direct any investigation under this section postponing the issue of process or immediately issue process for the attendance of the accused. He cannot suspend action and report the matter for the orders of the District Magistrate because that officer directed that he should do so whenever a complaint is made of a particular class of offence. Such a direction is illegal, 10 C. W. N. 1086 = 4 Cr. L. J. 213. But if he has not suspended his proceedings, but has proceeded either under this section or under s. 204 there seems to be no reason why he may not report to the District Magistrate so as to enable the latter either to withdraw the case for trial by himself or to transfer it to some other competent Magistrate for trial.

9-A. *After receipt of result of the local investigation, cannot Magistrate hold another inquiry?*—When a Magistrate has once acted under s. 202 and ordered an investigation by a person other than himself he is precluded from following the local investigation up by another inquiry. If there is ground for any further inquiry, it is better that process should issue against the accused and the evidence adduced in his presence, 11 A. L. J. 754 = 14 Cr. L. J. 493. But see 38 C. 63, Note 9 (ii).

10. *Reference cannot be made before examination of complainant*.—A complainant must be examined either by the Magistrate who receives the complaint or by some other Magistrate to whom the case might have been transferred before a report can be called for under this section. *Ratanlal* 363. Where therefore, a report was called for before the examination of the complainant, held that the inquiry conducted by the Magistrate who was asked to report was irregular and made without jurisdiction and that no action could validly be taken upon such report. 27 C. 921, see also 4 C. W. N. 305, 30 C. 923; 4 C. L. R. 134; 13 C. 334, 3 C. W. N. 17 and 9 C. W. N. 199, 2 P. R. 1912 = 11 P. L. R. 1912 = 12 Cr. L. J. 539; 8 S. L. R. 21 = 15 Cr. L. J. 662. When without examining the complainant, the Magistrate referred the case for Police investigation and on receipt of the report proceeded to act under s. 203 and the complainant asked for a judicial inquiry held that it could not be refused, 29 C. 410. Unless a complainant is duly examined, an inquiry and report under this section cannot be called for, and if made, are without jurisdiction and cannot form the basis of any further action, and a complainant, who was not examined cannot be prosecuted in respect of his complaint which was dismissed on a report called for under this section. 2 P. R. 1912 = 11 P. L. R. 1912 = 12 Cr. L. J. 539.

(i) *Examination by Subordinate Magistrate of no avail, when reference made by superior Magistrate*—Where a superior Magistrate transferred to his own file a case pending on the file of a Magistrate subordinate to him after the complainant had been examined by the latter, and referred it to the Police for inquiry and report, without examining the complainant and recording his reasons for distrusting the truth of the complaint and on receipt of a report from the Police that the complaint was not *bona fide*, dismissed it, held, the order of dismissal was illegal for failure to follow the provisions of this and the next section, *Weir* II, 244.

11 Reference cannot be made after issue of process to accused—Once process has been issued against the accused the Magistrate cannot exercise the option of holding a preliminary inquiry. He must proceed with the trial **6 S L R 83 = 13 Cr L J 749**. When a Magistrate has accepted a complaint and issued process upon it and taken evidence for the complainant his successor cannot refer the case to the Police for inquiry. Such a procedure is contrary to the provisions of s 350 **9 M 282**. This section does not contemplate action being taken under it when the case for the prosecution has closed **1900 A. W. N 189**. A Magistrate discharging an accused under s 253 cannot order further inquiry **Weir II, 239**. The procedure prescribed by this section can only be adopted before a process issues compelling the attendance of a person complained against. A Magistrate who after issue of process and taking of evidence in a case calls upon another person to make inquiry and report acts distinctly in contravention of the procedure prescribed by law. When he acts upon that report which is not evidence and decides the case upon it, he in fact abdicates his judicial functions and instead of deciding the case himself upon evidence as the law requires him to do leaves it to another person not authorized by law to decide it **1896 A. W. N 150**. The previous inquiry provided for by this section before complaint is taken up ought not to be made after the accused has been brought before the Court under a warrant **21 W. R. 44**.

(i) *District Magistrate cannot direct further inquiry after a Magistrate has taken cognizance and has issued process*—Perils of the combination of executive and judicial functions in the same officer—A complaint was filed before a first-class Magistrate on behalf of the Collector as the head of the excise administration against S under s. 49 of the *Excise Act XII of 1896*. Process was duly issued under s 204 without any inquiry under this section and proceedings under ss 242 and 244 were also taken. Notwithstanding all this the Collector who was also the District Magistrate ordered the Police to make independent investigation in the case. On being asked by the Chief Court the District Magistrate explained that he acted as head of the excise administration. *Held* that the procedure of the District Magistrate as such or as a Collector was wholly illegal and *ultra vires*. Also when an illegal order is passed and action taken which involves matters coming within the purview of law and justice and within the scope of the authority of the Courts such authority cannot be ousted by the mere *ipse dixit* of the officer that he was not acting as a judicial officer but in his executive capacity and the High Court can interfere in such matters in revision **4 P R 1905 = 7 Cr L J 202**.

(ii) *Interference by District Magistrate illegal when Subordinate Magistrate has ordered issue of process*—Where a Subordinate Magistrate has after examination of the complainant ordered process to issue the District Magistrate unless he thought it proper to remove the case to his own file under s. 528 has no power to interfere in the trial of the case and to pass an order (e.g., one directing a judicial inquiry by another Magistrate) in the case so as to postpone the trial. *Quare* even if the District Magistrate had withdrawn the case to his own file whether he could direct a judicial inquiry by any other Magistrate before the issue of process so as to postpone the trial because every complainant is entitled to have the accused summoned unless the Magistrate who takes cognizance of the complaint does not believe it or has some doubts regarding it, its trial **27 C. 798**. See also **27 C. 978, 4 C. W. N 242 and 30 C. 449, 15 A. L. J 842**.

LOCAL INVESTIGATION

12 Magistrate must himself make inquiry and not refer without necessity—After a perfunctory examination of the complainant the Magistrate who took cognizance of the complaint had directed an investigation of the case (viz. a criminal breach of trust against a *munim*) by a Subordinate Magistrate, **Knox, J** *Held* that such an order was illegal. The duty of making such an inquiry lies upon the Magistrate taking cognizance. The present was no case for a local investigation. There was no quarrel about boundaries or any matter of that kind and it is only a local investigation which the Magistrate after examining the complainant can pass on to some one else **10 A. L. J 78 = 13 Cr L J 704**. The Magistrate of a district who took cognizance of a complaint against a public officer made it over to a first-class Magistrate to make a local inquiry and then dispose of the case. The first-class Magistrate held the local inquiry examined the prosecution witnesses and passed an order dismissing the complaint and directed the prosecution of the complainant under s. 476 for an offence under s. 211 **I P C**. *Held* that the order of the District Magistrate before whom the complaint was laid directing the Subordinate Magistrate to whom the case was transferred to hold a local inquiry was bad inasmuch as the Code made no provision for such a course **18 C. W. N 95 = 15 Cr L J 70**. The Code does not permit a Magistrate to refer a complaint to another Magistrate for inquiry and report **20 C. W. N 63**. A Magistrate may inure himself to the case himself before directing a local investigation. A Magistrate taking cognizance cannot hold a further inquiry after receipt of the report of a local investigation.

11 A. L. R. 754 = 14 Cr. L. J. 493. The existence of a previous departmental inquiry exonerating accused from accusation which formed the subject of complaint is not a sufficient substitute for the personal inquiry or the local investigation contemplated by this section, **33 P. R. 1887.**

12. Who may make investigation.—(i) Even a clerk—The investigation contemplated by this section may be made by any officer subordinate to the Magistrate, even though he be a clerk, but if the investigation is entrusted to a Subordinate Magistrate he can in conducting the investigation exercise all magisterial powers, including the power to administer an oath, **35 C. 72**

(ii) Magistrate not competent to take cognizance of complaint—A Magistrate holding a local investigation under this section need not be competent to entertain the complaint which he is asked to investigate. Where the Magistrate who directs the investigation is competent to entertain it and dispose of the complaint on the evidence recorded at the local investigation there is no irregularity, and the complainant is not entitled to have all his witnesses examined by a Magistrate competent to take cognizance of the complaint, **6 C. W. N. 295.** But if a District Magistrate to whom a complaint of an offence exclusively triable by a Court of Session is made, makes it over for inquiry to a second-class Magistrate before examining the complainant, such inquiry cannot be regarded as one made under this section, **4 C. W. N. 305.**

another Magistrate of the first class to make inquiry under this section **2 P. R. 1912 = 11 P. L. R. 1912 = 12 Cr. L. J. 539.** See also **39 C. 1041.**

(iv) Directing Police-officer who is himself accused to inquire is illegal—If the accused be himself a Police-officer and as such subordinate to a Magistrate, it is not proper, and it was never contemplated, that the Magistrate should call for report from him for the purpose of ascertaining the truth of the complaint, **14 C. 141; 3 C. W. N. 17, 1884 A. W. N. 47.** In such cases it is generally better that the inquiry should be prosecuted by a Magistrate, **20 M. 337,** and he should arrive at a conclusion from evidence taken by himself **4 C. W. N. 221; 1901 A. W. N. 189.** Where there is a complaint against an officer of the Police force, it is inadvisable to direct the Superintendent of Police to make a local investigation and to report as to the truth of the facts of the complaint **9 C. W. N. 199 = 2 Cr. L. J. 51**

14 Indiscriminate use of Police agency for investigating complaints objectionable—It is an abuse of the power given by this section to refer petty cases of assault and the like to the Police for inquiry. The proper course for a Magistrate is to take action on the complaint at once unless it is manifestly false. There is abundance of serious work to occupy the time of the Police force without setting them to make preliminary inquiries into petty matters in which moreover they are under a strong temptation to make money out of the complaint **19 P. R. 1894.** It is not a proper course for a Magistrate when a complaint is made before him of an offence of which he can take cognizance to refer the complainant to a Police-officer. He is bound to receive the complaint, and after examining the complainant to proceed according to law. A different course would foster abuses and defeat the purpose of law, which is to give to persons who have been injured an access to justice independent of Police **12 B. 161.** Magistrates are cautioned against the indiscriminate use of Police agency for the purpose of ascertaining matters as to which a Magistrate is bound to form his own opinion upon evidence given in his presence. This caution is especially needful in respect of cases triable under Chapter XX and cases regarding offences not cognizable by the Police—*Wilkins* 108. The practice of referring trivial cases for Police investigation is objectionable on general grounds and tends to produce undesirable results in Police administration. It will be frequently found sufficient to limit the inquiry to the particular matters which have created distrust as to the truth of the complaint. When inquiry is found necessary, and the case is of a serious nature the Police should ordinarily be employed, but in trivial cases, unless there be some special reason for using a Police-officer one of the other modes of inquiry permitted by the section should be adopted.—*Pun Cr. Chap. XLI p. 219.* The employment of the Police to inquire into non-cognizable cases is open to much objection and should be discouraged. When however, it is necessary to employ the Police in such cases the Magistrate should mention the section under which the complaint seems to fall and should indicate clearly the particular point or points into which inquiry is needed.—*Beng. Pol. Code p. 370*

15. Procedure in referring for investigation complaints of non-cognizable offences through Police.—In referring complaints of non-cognizable offences to the Police for investigation, Magistrates should adopt the following procedure —

(1) Before issue of orders to the Police to investigate any complaint, the complainant should be examined and the substance of his statement recorded on the back of his petition (2) In no case should the original petition be made over to the Police. Should it appear necessary or advisable, for the proper understanding of the points which require local investigation, to communicate the terms of the petition to the Police, a copy of the petition should be sent. (3) The point or points requiring local inquiry should be definitely and specially stated in the order sent to the Police (4) Only such complaints should be referred to the Police for investigation as the Magistrate considers cannot be properly decided without such inquiry, and he should in all cases, record on the original his reasons for ordering the inquiry — *Reg and Ord., N-W P, v 307*

16 Magistrate making local investigation acts judicially and may administer oaths—Where a Magistrate after taking cognizance of a case on complaint sent it to another Magistrate who after inquiry directed the prosecution of the complainant under s. 476, held, that he was competent to do so as the proceeding conducted by him was a judicial proceeding where witnesses were examined, 38 C. 72. It is clear from the definition of 'Court in the Indian Evidence Act which includes all Magistrates and from s. 4 of the Oaths Act which authorizes all Courts to administer oaths that a Magistrate conducting a local investigation is competent to administer oaths to persons examined by him at such local investigation. As this local investigation is held by the Magistrate under authority of the law, i.e., s. 202, the oath was lawfully administered by him in the course of such investigation Sub-sec. (2) and the concluding portion of sub-sec. (1) make it clear that the local investigation if entrusted to a Magistrate is entrusted to him as a Magistrate subordinate to the Magistrate directing the local investigation and he can therefore exercise all the powers of a Magistrate including the power to administer on oath Such proceeding is a judicial proceeding within the meaning of s. 476, 1 Cr. L. J. 118 (M). *Contra*—A preliminary investigation undertaken by a Court under this section is not a judicial proceeding and therefore a person cannot be prosecuted for an offence brought to the notice of the Court during

the presence of the complainant who was allowed to suggest questions, sanction to prosecute a person for making a false statement under such circumstances was set aside as illegal, *Weir II, 167*.

17. Evidence need not be confined to complainant alone.—The provisions of the section do not confine evidence in the inquiry under it to that of the complainant, but leave it to the discretion of the Magistrate to examine such witnesses and make such inquiry as he thinks fit, *Ratanlal 669*. The investigating officer may examine the complainant and his witnesses and the defendant and his witnesses, if any, 33 C. 1282. Want of personal knowledge on the part of the complainant of the circumstances alleged in the complaint is not a sufficient reason for dismissing the complaint. The complainant should be allowed to bring evidence to prove them. But see 11 C. W. N. 170

18 Local investigation not intended to supersede a regular trial—The object of this section is to prevent the issue of process where there is some initial ground for doubting the truth of the complaint and where on a local investigation there appears no evidence to support it. A local investigation was not intended by the Legislature to supersede a regular trial. When it is found that there is evidence in support of the complainant's charge, the function of the officer making the local investigation is fulfilled. Process should then be issued and the truth or falsity of the evidence should be determined in a regular manner. The officer who conducts the local investigation cannot himself decide upon the truth or falsity of the complaint. U. B. R. (1910) 1, 78 = 12 Cr. L. J. 385.

19. Person complained against not an accused person—Has he any right or duty to appear during preliminary inquiry?—The Magistrate having jurisdiction to ascertain the truth of the complaint before issuing process under this section may, before issuing it, take any preliminary steps for finding out whether the complaint is true or not. He may call upon the person complained against to show cause why process should not issue against him and the person is at liberty to appear or not, whereas under a process issued under this section he is bound to appear, 6 Bom. L. R. 91. A Magistrate acts illegally when proceeding under s. 202 he calls for a report from an accused person even if that person, happens to be an officer subordinate to that Magistrate, 44 C. 141. The practice of conducting the preliminary inquiry

in the person of the accused is to be highly condemned and the accused should not be allowed to cross-examine the complainant's witnesses **40 C. 444**. A person complained against is not a party to the investigation held under s. 202 nor is he entitled to claim under s. 340 the right to be represented by a pleader at the investigation **33 C. 830; 17 Cr. L. J. 396 (C)**. A trial cannot be said to have commenced and a person complained against does not become an accused person until it has been decided to issue process against him under Chapter XVI of this Code. Section 340 does not hence entitle a person complained against to be represented by a pleader during the preliminary inquiry which may be held under s. 202 (1). If he chooses to attend the proceedings he may of course do so like any other member of the public but he has no *locus standi* as a party the purpose of the law being clearly to exclude him until sufficient ground

Magistrate refusing permission to cross-examine the complainant's witnesses gave cause to apprehend some bias in his mind against the person complained against held dismissing the application that there was no reason to think that the Magistrate was biased against the accused or that the latter has any plausible grounds for apprehending its existence **4 N. L. R. 81 = 8 Cr. L. J. 20**. See also **32 C. 1083, 23 C. 493, 16 B. 681, 12 Cr. L. J. 207 (C)** and also Note 2 to s. 204. See also **27 C. W. N. 196** where the Magistrate caused notice to be served upon a person named as an accused in a petition of complaint and directed him to show cause why process should not issue against him and on such cause being shown by a pleader on his behalf dismissed the complaint against him held that the procedure adopted was improper and was not in accordance with the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure as laid down in ss. 202 and 203. An accused person has no *locus standi* to appear or to be represented by a lawyer before the issue of process against him.

20 Practice—permitting Advocates or Pleaders to watch on behalf of person complained against, during preliminary inquiry—Although a person with regard to whom a preliminary inquiry is held under this section is not by any rule of law entitled to intervene there is no reason why he should not in practice be admitted to watch the proceedings and assist the Court in making its preliminary investigation by allowing a duly authorized Advocate or Pleader of Court on his behalf to act as *amicus curiae* in the preliminary inquiry **12 Cr. L. J. 207 (C)**. The practice is strongly condemned in **40 C. 444**.

21 Report of investigation forms part of the record—The report made and submitted by the Police-officer to whom the complaint has been referred for investigation forms part of the record of the case especially when the Magistrate dismisses the complaint under s. 203 on the result of such investigation **14 C. 141**.

22 Magistrate making inquiry is not disqualified thereby from trying the case—A Magistrate before whom a complaint is made and who before issuing process holds a preliminary inquiry under this section for the purpose of ascertaining its truth or falsehood and afterwards tries the case is not disqualified from trying the case. To such a case s. 558 is not applicable inasmuch as the Magistrate had not initiated the proceedings against the accused person nor taken an active part in the arrest or collection of evidence against such person **24 C. 167, 4 C. W. N. 604, see 20 C. 857 and 23 C. 328**, as to circumstances under which he is disqualified from trying.

23. Magistrate holding inquiry under this section is disqualified from recording a confession—A Magistrate holding an investigation under this section is not competent under s. 164 or s. 364 to record a confession made by an accused person. Consequently if recorded it is not admissible in evidence against him under s. 80 of the *Evidence Act* unless it is proved by some evidence to have been made as so recorded **32 C. 1083**. But see **37 C. 467**, where this case is distinguished and Note 4 to s. 164.

24. Date must be fixed for return of report—In every case referred for inquiry a date should be fixed by the Magistrate by which the report or an explanation of the cause of delay is to reach him the complainant should be informed of this date. *Beng. Pol. Code p. 370*

25. Statement by the person complained against—A statement made during an inquiry under this section by a person against whom the complaint is made cannot be used in evidence against him as proving itself but the question whether such a statement could be proved in any way was left open **32 C. 1093**.

26. Complaint kept pending for a long time—Magistrates have no right to keep complaints without passing orders for several months such action is in the highest degree improper and shows want of proper understanding as to what their duties are **18 Cr. L. J. 271**.

203. The Magistrate before whom a complaint is made, or to whom it has been transferred, may dismiss the complaint, if * "after considering the statement on oath (if any) of the complainant and the result of any investigation or inquiry under s 202' there is in his judgment no sufficient ground for proceeding

In such case he shall briefly record his reasons for so doing

Notes —1. When resort may be had to this section—This section may be resorted to (i) when after examination of the complainant the Magistrate has reason not to believe the truth of the complaint or (ii) after such examination the Magistrate entertains a reasonable doubt of such complaint, which doubt is confirmed by a proper report called for under s 202. In all other cases the complainant as soon as he has been examined is entitled to have the accused person brought before the Magistrate, 27 C. 921. See also U. B. R. (1910) I, 73 = 12 Cr. L. J. 395. A Magistrate may dismiss a complaint in one of the three following cases and refuse to issue process—(i) If he, upon the statement made by the complainant reduced to writing under s 200, finds that no offence has been committed, (ii) If he distrusts the statement made by the complainant and (iii) If he distrusts the complainant's statement but his distrust is not sufficiently strong to warrant him to act upon it he proceeds under s 202 and after considering the result of the investigation he finds no sufficient ground for proceeding, 14 C. 441, 13 B. 600.

2. Must strictly comply with the provisions of ss. 200 and 202.—A complaint was preferred to a Magistrate who without examining the complainant, sent it to the Police for inquiry, purporting to act under s 156 and on receipt of the Police report directed a Subordinate Magistrate under s. 159, to make a preliminary inquiry into the case. On receipt of the Subordinate Magistrate's report, the superior Magistrate not being satisfied with it, cross examined the complainant and some of his witnesses, examined three witnesses sent up by the Police and dismissing the complaint under this section, directed the prosecution of the complainant for an offence under s. 211, I P C, held that on the materials before him, the Magistrate had no jurisdiction to deal with the case or to dismiss it under this section, as there was no previous local investigation ordered under s 202 nor any examination of the complainant as directed by s 200. On receipt of the report of the preliminary inquiry under s 159 he should have dealt with the case in the same way as he would have dealt with it on receipt of a report from a Police-officer 30 C 923. See also 9 C. W. N. 199 = 2 Cr. L. J. 81; 33 C. 1, 2 P. R. 1912 = 11 P. L. R. 1912 = 12 Cr. L. J. 539 and 11 A. L. J. 921

3 Section does not apply when process has issued.—This section applies only to cases falling under Chapter XVI, where there has been no issue of process. When an accused person has been summoned to appear before a Magistrate, there has been a commencement of proceedings and a complaint cannot be dismissed under this section Ratanlal 544; 11 A. L. J. 451 = 14 Cr. L. J. 412.

COMPETENCY OF COURTS TO DISMISS COMPLAINTS.

4. Magistrate taking cognizance of complaint must deal with it unless it is withdrawn by superior authority.—The Magistrate to whom a complaint was preferred, examined some witnesses and recorded an order that he did not believe the complainant, but instead of dismissing the complaint submitted it to the District Magistrate. The District Magistrate however, directed the issue of summons and made over the case for disposal to another Magistrate held that the order of the original Magistrate submitting the case to the District Magistrate and the order of the latter Magistrate directing issue of summons were both illegal. The Magistrate who has power to receive the complaint has power to deal with it finally and it is his duty to do so. It is for him to dispose of it either by grant of process or by dismissing the complaint. The District Magistrate has no power to pass any order for the issue of process unless he first removes the case to his own file, 6 C. W. N. 843. See also 9 C. W. N. 199 and 10 C. W. N. 1066. The proper officer to issue a warrant is the officer who has heard the complaint made because it was he who can best exercise a discretion with regard to the *prima facie* merits of the complaint. When that officer has issued the warrant, the case ought to go on in due course according to the procedure prescribed by the Code, unless something occurs to show that the Magistrate who had issued the warrant had from some cause or another made a wrong exercise of his discretion. Where a District Magistrate removed a case from the file of the Subordinate Magistrate to his own after a complaint had been made and warrants issued by the Subordinate Magistrate upon the footing of the complaint and thereupon suspended the warrant and dismissed the

* The words "after ——— s 202" were substituted for the words "after examining the complainant and considering the result (if any) made under s 202" by Act XVIII of 1933

soft, tender, It *tenderize*] To make tender; to soften. [*Use*]

Admission and fees

Equal treatment for all.

Index

Equal interest no rocky grain. *Philip*
So have I seen the little pearls of a spring sweat through the
bottom of a bank, and submerge the stubborn pavent L.

du 7 ju

Intent on is when the mind, with great earnestness and choice, fixes its view on any idea, considers it on & on

Loc. 1a

2 The fixed direction of the mind toicular object, or in a particular way of acting an intention to go to New York.

Lire, *I merciumum*. *Intra inter*, between, and among
to call, proclaim, *It. Inter*: *lare* by *interdolare* Fr.
Interdolare To insert between others to intro-
duce as (*s*) (*Chron*) To insert, as a day or a
portion of time in a calendar.

attentively:

is of being intent, close
n) pillication

In test (14) r is p INTERRED p pr &

ed a INTERVENIO Lat. & It. *intervenire*, from
Lat. *in* and *venire* to go, to come.

Lat 74 and *terrestris* sp 1'g & 1'r enter-
ing the *calcareo* deposit and cover in the

earth, to bury me, as, to inter a dead body.

Later this becomes ill birth. Shut

Butler A Latowition signifying among or

bel (zen) — in reflex

^a after *act*, *n.s. infer*, between, and *act*; *Fr.*

entracte]
1. A short piece between acts as in a

1 A short piece between others, as in a
play. *Literary.*

play

DATE

1 To stop on its passage, to take or strike by the
 side, as to a ship, to stop.

33 To obstruct the progress of to stop as to

3. To obstruct the progress of, to stop, to interrupt a course or passage, to interfere the current

EWCCA

High ascension 840 out of the equator within 12 hours

the east, whereas at the beginning of the 19th century, the east was the west.

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{LMI interco-

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My wanted state to the regular one

für, last, fall, what, there, yet, term; please, firm, done, for, do, wolf, food, foot

complaint without hearing it in due course of procedure; *held* that it was an improper proceeding; he ought to have proceeded with the case from the stage at which it was when he removed it, 10 B. L. R. Appx. 26 = 19 W. R. 23.

5. **Power of District Magistrate to dispose of case pending on the file of Sub-Magistrate.**—A District Magistrate has no power to pass an order of dismissal under this section in a case which has been transferred to a Sub-Magistrate and which was at the time pending on the file of the latter, 3 C. W. N. 490. Where a superior Magistrate makes over a case to a Subordinate Magistrate for trial, the jurisdiction of the former Magistrate to do anything more in the case, ceases so long as the transfer is in existence. Until he formally withdraws the case, the only person who can deal with the case is the Subordinate Magistrate to who the case has been made over, 13 W. R. 53; 27 C. 798; 27 C. 979; 30 C. 449; 4 C. W. N. 232. A District Magistrate has no power to transfer a case remanded for further inquiry by a Sessions Judge to a Deputy Magistrate, 11 C. W. N. 316 = 5 Cr. L. J. 112 followed in 8 C. L. J. 241 = 8 Cr. L. J. 386.

6. **District Magistrate's jurisdiction to discharge accused.**—A District Magistrate called for proceedings from a Subordinate Magistrate, and having perused them ordered the discharge of the accused, *held*, that if the Magistrate came to the conclusion that there was no case of criminal character made out against the accused he was not only competent, but was bound to order the discharge of the accused, 6 B. L. R. Appx. 6 = 14 W. R. 63.

7. **Direction to submit particular classes of cases to the District Magistrate illegal.**—A direction by a District Magistrate that as regards a particular class of cases, Subordinate Magistrate taking cognizance of them are not to pass orders under this or the next section, but to submit them to him is clearly illegal, 10 C. W. N. 1086 = 4 Cr. L. J. 213. See also 27 C. 798 and Note 11 to s. 202.

DUTY OF MAGISTRATES BEFORE DISMISSAL.

8. **Must examine complainant.**—See Notes 12 and 13 to s. 200. A Magistrate is bound to examine the complainant before dismissing the complaint, 3 B. L. R. Ap Cr. 53. He cannot dismiss a complaint under this section until he has examined the complainant to see whether there is *prima facie* evidence of criminal offence. Until the Magistrate has examined the complainant, he is not in a position to exercise the discretionary power to issue process or dismiss the complaint, 4 M. H. C. R. 162. A Magistrate to whom the case is transferred cannot dismiss the complaint summarily, unless he has satisfied himself by examining the complainant that there is no sufficient ground to proceed, 3 C. W. N. 285. See also 30 C. 923 and 9 C. W. N. 199; 3 C. W. N. 17 and Note 12 (2) to s. 200. See also 26 Bom. L. R. 183 = 49 Bom. 360.

9. **No examination necessary when complaint is in form of Police report.**—A complaint made in the form of a Police report may be dismissed under this section without examining witnesses if the facts stated in the report constitute no offence. The complainant need not be examined because a Police report is expressly excluded from the definition of complaint in s. 4 (b), Weir II, 246. *Procedure on receipt of Police report.*—A Magistrate having before him a Police report submitted on him under s. 157 (b) may determine as he thinks expedient either (i) to take no further steps or (ii) to take cognizance of the offence under s. 190 (b) or (iii) proceed under this section, Weir II, 119.

10. **Must afford opportunity to complainant to substantiate his complaint.**—A complainant should be afforded an opportunity of being heard before any final order is passed on his complaint Ratanlal 365. A Magistrate must give an opportunity to the complainant to prove his case, 16 W. N. 143 = 13 Cr. L. J. 126. But a Magistrate disbelieving the story of the complainant is not bound to examine all his witnesses, but may proceed under this section on the investigation report, 6 C. W. N. 295. Where the complainant was willing to produce evidence and the Magistrate refused and ordered proceedings under s. 476, *held* that the proceeding was illegal and must be set aside, 21 M. L. J. 795 = (1911) 2 M. W. N. 9 = 10 M. L. T. 47 = 12 Cr. L. J. 323. It is improper for a Magistrate to dismiss a complaint while sitting in his private room and without giving the complainant or his pleader an opportunity of being heard, 10 C. W. N. 1036. Where on the acquittal of a co-accused, the other accused against whom process of arrest had been issued, surrendered before the Deputy Magistrate who tried the accused and he passes an order directing that the accused should not be proceeded against, *held*, that the order of the Deputy Magistrate was bad in law and should be set aside. The proper course for him was to send notice to the complainant, require him to proceed with the case and then dispose of it according to law, 12 C. W. N. 68. Where the Magistrate, after examining the complainant on oath, without either dismissing the complaint at once or issuing process, adjourned the case to another date, and on that date, he made certain inquiries and heard the pleaders of the accused who had appeared without process and looked into certain



Interlocking Arches

about 1000 ft. as a rule. The water is very pure and is used for drinking purposes.

papers filed by him and dismissed the complaint *Held*, that the procedure adopted by the Magistrate was irregular, and that, having elected to hold an inquiry under this section, he ought not to have dismissed the complaint without giving the complainant an opportunity to adduce evidence in support of his case, **16 C. W. N. 143 = 13 Cr. L. J. 125**. When a Magistrate adjourns a case he must be taken to have elected to proceed under s 202 and then it is his duty to impress on the complainant that he is bound to produce his evidence on the adjourned date

11. Must hear all complainant's evidence.—A Magistrate examined the complainant and only one of the witnesses for the prosecution, recorded the statement of the accused and then dismissed the complaint *Held*, that he could not pass the order without receiving the entire evidence of the prosecution unless he considered for some very strong reason that evidence unnecessary, **11 A. L. J. 431 = 14 Cr. L. J. 412**. When a complaint has not been disposed of under this section, but summonses have been issued to the complainant's witnesses, the Magistrate is bound to examine the witnesses tendered by the complainant and is not at liberty to acquit the accused on a consideration of the complainant's statement alone, **20 M. 388**. But where the Magistrate disbelieves the story of the complainant, the latter is not entitled to have all his witnesses examined by the Magistrate to whom the complaint was made, **14 C. 707 ; 27 C. 921 and 6 C. W. N. 295**.

12. Must consider the result of the investigation under s. 202.—Magistrate of all grades should clearly understand that while the Police perform their proper duty in collecting evidence, it is the function of the Magistrate alone to decide upon the sufficiency or credibility of his evidence when collected, **6 C. 496 = 7 C. L. R. 467**.

13. Accused may appear and apply for dismissal where complainant omits to take out summons.—A complainant, by omitting to take out a summons cannot keep a case hanging over a man for an indefinite time. The summons is merely a means of procuring attendance, but if the accused appears of his own accord without a summons he is entitled to require that the complaint shall be proceeded with or dismissed. If no evidence is offered against the accused, he must be formally discharged, **26 B. 552**

REASONS FOR DISMISSAL.

14. Reasons for dismissal must be recorded.—The last sentence embodies the ruling of the Calcutta High Court in **14 C. 151**. It is an imperative provision of law that a Magistrate shall briefly record his reasons for dismissing a complaint. There can be no question of irregularity when the provisions of the statute are imperative and are directly disobeyed, **40 C. 41**. No circular of Government can authorize Magistrates to infringe or in any way alter the statute law

15. Order of dismissal without reasons liable to be set aside.—An order of a Magistrate dismissing a complaint under this section without recording any reasons for dismissal, but merely stating that he agrees with the Police report is improper and will be set aside, **21 M. L. J. 492 = 7 M. L. T. 178 = 11 Cr. L. J. 331**. A Magistrate ought not to dismiss a complaint merely on a Police report. He is bound to make an inquiry and must state his reasons for dismissing the complaint, **13 C. W. N. 281**. Mere omission by a Magistrate to record his reason for dismissing a complaint is an irregularity and where the omission has been supplied by a statement under s 441 High Court will not interfere, **5 M. L. T. 79**. See also **23 M. 546**.

16. Reasons must be based upon proper evidence.—The expression 'sufficient ground' points exclusively to the facts which the complainant brings to the knowledge of the Magistrate, and to their establishing a *prima facie* trustworthy case against the accused, **13 B. 590 (F.B)**. The reasons for dismissing a complaint must be based upon the facts and not upon the evidence. The reasons for dismissing a complaint (i) the sworn evidence of the complainant and (ii) the sworn evidence of the witnesses examined by the Magistrate. This provides a wide field for the Magistrate to consider the facts and not the evidence. **6 Cr. L. J. 85** The decision of the High Court in **13 B. 590** is a landmark in the history of the law of criminal procedure.

17. What are proper grounds for dismissal.—(i) *Default of complainant to appear*—Where a Magistrate called upon the complainant to produce proof *ex parte* to justify the issue of process and upon default dismissed the charge, the High Court declined to say that, as a matter of law, Magistrate acted illegally in dismissing the case **17 W. R. 2**. In **13 B. 600**, it was laid down that where the offence is a summons case and not a warrant case the Magistrate ought to proceed with the inquiry or trial in spite of the withdrawal

ng which the executive brain is
pendent or interrupted with the
s or a change of the system.

regnum (in ter ran), n. [Lat. *interregnum*,
 regne. An interregnum. *from*
 reg, n. [From *Eog* + *ter*] One who in etc.
 It. *interreg*, *interre* Sp. *interre* & *interreg* &
 regent a magistrate that governs during an inter-
 regnum.
 In ter re.

In ter-ro-gá-te, s i | Imp R p p INTERROGATED,
p pr & to u. INTERROGATE, (Lit. in-
quire, interrogate, from inter, between and ro-
gare to ask. It. interrogare Ep & Yr interrogar,
Fr interroger) To question formally, to examine,
by asking questions, as to a witness.

in tēr'ro-gāte, r L To ask questions, to inquire.

In tēr'ro gā tēr', n. A question, an interrogatory question. {Rare} One who is interrogated or

Interrogation It interrogatio, 4^p interrogacion It
The act of questioning.

2 A question put as an inquiry.

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1. *Chlorophyll a* (Chl *a*)

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Do not in any way let me go my course. M. L.

[illegible]

1. *Journal of the American Medical Association*, 1997; 277: 1033-1038.

[illegible]

Figure 1. The effect of the concentration of the *Agrobacterium* suspension on the transformation efficiency of *Agrobacterium* strains. The *Agrobacterium* strains were grown in the YEA medium for 24 h at 28°C. The cell concentration of the strains was adjusted to 10⁸ cells/ml. The cell suspension was mixed with the plant tissue and the transformation efficiency was determined. The results were expressed as the mean ± SD of three independent experiments. The asterisks indicate the significant difference between the strains.

Figure 1. The effect of the number of trials on the mean error rate (\pm SEM) for each age group. Error bars represent SEM. * indicates significant difference between groups at $p < .05$.

For, de wplf, fōbā, fōu

of the complainant, if he finds the elements of an offence on the facts as set forth in the complaint. See also 23 C. 211 and Notes to ss. 247 and 259.

(ii) *That the offender is unknown*—Where the complaint discloses a cognizable offence against an unknown offender, the Magistrate must record under this section that there are in his judgment no sufficient grounds for proceeding. It will be also open to him to communicate with the Police recording the information supplied to him or to leave it to the complainant either to apply to the Police or take such other measures as he thinks proper for discovering the offender—1884 *Pun Rec Cir No VIII*, dated 27th June, 1884.

(iii) *That the complaint is based upon evidence which is privileged and not allowed to be produced*—Where a complaint is based on some official communication, oral or in writing, falling within the ss. 123, 124 or 125 of the Indian Evidence Act, and there is no likelihood of proving the communication by primary or direct evidence the Magistrate is justified in dismissing the complaint. No secondary evidence regarding the contents of written communications, made in official confidence is admissible, 4 P. W. R. 1910 = 11 Cr. L. J. 205.

18 *What are not proper grounds for dismissal*—(i) *Low caste of complainant is no ground*—The fact that the complainant is of low caste and the accusation was theft of a goat, and that such an accusation against such a man was only a harm under s. 95, I P C and not an offence is no ground for dismissal of a complaint of defamation under this section, 2 W. R. 35.

(ii) *Tendency to stir up religious ill feelings no ground*—It is not competent to a Magistrate to refuse to entertain a complaint or to dismiss it summarily on the ground that if entertained it would encourage hundreds of similar complaints and would also stir up old religious ill feelings, Ratanlal 562.

(iii) *Bad motive and conduct of complainant not legal ground for dismissal*—The existence of malicious feeling on the part of complainant is not a legal ground for refusing to entertain a complaint of an offence, and that the circumstance, that the alleged offence was committed six years ago and would be difficult of proof that party feeling ran high at the place and that if the act of the accused were held criminal, a large part of the population of the district would soon be in jail do not justify such a refusal, Ratanlal 549. In exercising his discretion the Magistrate ought not to allow himself to be influenced by a consideration of the motive by which the complainant may have been actuated in moving in the matter, 13 B. 590 (F.B.). The motives by which complainants are actuated must necessarily be of the most varied description, any attempt to determine them would open out a very wide and speculative field of inquiry. The object of the Code is to provide a machinery for the punishment of offences against the substantive criminal law. Had it been intended that the Magistrate should only proceed to inquire into an alleged offence when the complainant's motives were such as he could approve of very different language would have been used 13 B. 590, p. 598 (F.B.). That the Magistrate considered the probable result of the proceeding undesirable or the motive and conduct of the complainant discreditable are not relevant considerations, 33 M. 512.

(iv) *Libellous matter being a mere re-publication is no ground*—The fact that the libellous publication was made by a person who had not seen the original publication and published for s. 499, I P C., if the complaint is is bound to take

12!

(v) *Want of personal knowledge by the complainant of the circumstances alleged by him is not a sufficient reason for dismissing a complaint* but the complainant should be allowed to bring forward evidence to prove them, Ratanlal 559. But see cases noted under Note 7 to s. 200 *supra*.

(vi) *Existence of civil remedy no ground*—If upon any complaint duly made before a Magistrate it should appear to him that the act imputed amounts to an offence under the Indian Penal Code or any other penal law in force, and that there is a *prima facie* reason to suppose the accusation to be true, it is his duty to take cognizance of the offence. It is more convenient an appropriate remedy, 8 W. R. 111, 112, 113, 114, 115, 116, 117, 118, 119, 120, 121, 122, 123, 124, 125, 126, 127, 128, 129, 130, 131, 132, 133, 134, 135, 136, 137, 138, 139, 140, 141, 142, 143, 144, 145, 146, 147, 148, 149, 150, 151, 152, 153, 154, 155, 156, 157, 158, 159, 160, 161, 162, 163, 164, 165, 166, 167, 168, 169, 170, 171, 172, 173, 174, 175, 176, 177, 178, 179, 180, 181, 182, 183, 184, 185, 186, 187, 188, 189, 190, 191, 192, 193, 194, 195, 196, 197, 198, 199, 200, 201, 202, 203, 204, 205, 206, 207, 208, 209, 210, 211, 212, 213, 214, 215, 216, 217, 218, 219, 220, 221, 222, 223, 224, 225, 226, 227, 228, 229, 230, 231, 232, 233, 234, 235, 236, 237, 238, 239, 240, 241, 242, 243, 244, 245, 246, 247, 248, 249, 250, 251, 252, 253, 254, 255, 256, 257, 258, 259, 260, 261, 262, 263, 264, 265, 266, 267, 268, 269, 270, 271, 272, 273, 274, 275, 276, 277, 278, 279, 280, 281, 282, 283, 284, 285, 286, 287, 288, 289, 290, 291, 292, 293, 294, 295, 296, 297, 298, 299, 300, 301, 302, 303, 304, 305, 306, 307, 308, 309, 310, 311, 312, 313, 314, 315, 316, 317, 318, 319, 320, 321, 322, 323, 324, 325, 326, 327, 328, 329, 330, 331, 332, 333, 334, 335, 336, 337, 338, 339, 340, 341, 342, 343, 344, 345, 346, 347, 348, 349, 350, 351, 352, 353, 354, 355, 356, 357, 358, 359, 360, 361, 362, 363, 364, 365, 366, 367, 368, 369, 370, 371, 372, 373, 374, 375, 376, 377, 378, 379, 380, 381, 382, 383, 384, 385, 386, 387, 388, 389, 390, 391, 392, 393, 394, 395, 396, 397, 398, 399, 400, 401, 402, 403, 404, 405, 406, 407, 408, 409, 410, 411, 412, 413, 414, 415, 416, 417, 418, 419, 420, 421, 422, 423, 424, 425, 426, 427, 428, 429, 430, 431, 432, 433, 434, 435, 436, 437, 438, 439, 440, 441, 442, 443, 444, 445, 446, 447, 448, 449, 450, 451, 452, 453, 454, 455, 456, 457, 458, 459, 460, 461, 462, 463, 464, 465, 466, 467, 468, 469, 470, 471, 472, 473, 474, 475, 476, 477, 478, 479, 480, 481, 482, 483, 484, 485, 486, 487, 488, 489, 490, 491, 492, 493, 494, 495, 496, 497, 498, 499, 500, 501, 502, 503, 504, 505, 506, 507, 508, 509, 510, 511, 512, 513, 514, 515, 516, 517, 518, 519, 520, 521, 522, 523, 524, 525, 526, 527, 528, 529, 530, 531, 532, 533, 534, 535, 536, 537, 538, 539, 540, 541, 542, 543, 544, 545, 546, 547, 548, 549, 550, 551, 552, 553, 554, 555, 556, 557, 558, 559, 560, 561, 562, 563, 564, 565, 566, 567, 568, 569, 570, 571, 572, 573, 574, 575, 576, 577, 578, 579, 580, 581, 582, 583, 584, 585, 586, 587, 588, 589, 590, 591, 592, 593, 594, 595, 596, 597, 598, 599, 600, 601, 602, 603, 604, 605, 606, 607, 608, 609, 610, 611, 612, 613, 614, 615, 616, 617, 618, 619, 620, 621, 622, 623, 624, 625, 626, 627, 628, 629, 630, 631, 632, 633, 634, 635, 636, 637, 638, 639, 640, 641, 642, 643, 644, 645, 646, 647, 648, 649, 650, 651, 652, 653, 654, 655, 656, 657, 658, 659, 660, 661, 662, 663, 664, 665, 666, 667, 668, 669, 670, 671, 672, 673, 674, 675, 676, 677, 678, 679, 680, 681, 682, 683, 684, 685, 686, 687, 688, 689, 690, 691, 692, 693, 694, 695, 696, 697, 698, 699, 700, 701, 702, 703, 704, 705, 706, 707, 708, 709, 710, 711, 712, 713, 714, 715, 716, 717, 718, 719, 720, 721, 722, 723, 724, 725, 726, 727, 728, 729, 730, 731, 732, 733, 734, 735, 736, 737, 738, 739, 740, 741, 742, 743, 744, 745, 746, 747, 748, 749, 750, 751, 752, 753, 754, 755, 756, 757, 758, 759, 760, 761, 762, 763, 764, 765, 766, 767, 768, 769, 770, 771, 772, 773, 774, 775, 776, 777, 778, 779, 780, 781, 782, 783, 784, 785, 786, 787, 788, 789, 790, 791, 792, 793, 794, 795, 796, 797, 798, 799, 800, 801, 802, 803, 804, 805, 806, 807, 808, 809, 810, 811, 812, 813, 814, 815, 816, 817, 818, 819, 820, 821, 822, 823, 824, 825, 826, 827, 828, 829, 830, 831, 832, 833, 834, 835, 836, 837, 838, 839, 840, 841, 842, 843, 844, 845, 846, 847, 848, 849, 850, 851, 852, 853, 854, 855, 856, 857, 858, 859, 860, 861, 862, 863, 864, 865, 866, 867, 868, 869, 870, 871, 872, 873, 874, 875, 876, 877, 878, 879, 880, 881, 882, 883, 884, 885, 886, 887, 888, 889, 890, 891, 892, 893, 894, 895, 896, 897, 898, 899, 900, 901, 902, 903, 904, 905, 906, 907, 908, 909, 910, 911, 912, 913, 914, 915, 916, 917, 918, 919, 920, 921, 922, 923, 924, 925, 926, 927, 928, 929, 930, 931, 932, 933, 934, 935, 936, 937, 938, 939, 940, 941, 942, 943, 944, 945, 946, 947, 948, 949, 950, 951, 952, 953, 954, 955, 956, 957, 958, 959, 960, 961, 962, 963, 964, 965, 966, 967, 968, 969, 970, 971, 972, 973, 974, 975, 976, 977, 978, 979, 980, 981, 982, 983, 984, 985, 986, 987, 988, 989, 990, 991, 992, 993, 994, 995, 996, 997, 998, 999, 1000.

(12) *Bare denial of accused*—Where certain statements in a book were complained of as defamatory to the complainant but the Magistrate dismissed the complaint on the bare denial of the accused that they referred to the complainant *held* directing further inquiry that the complainant must be given an opportunity to prove that the statements were intended to apply to the complainant (1911) 2 M W N 8 = 10 M L T, 95 = 12 Cr L J 497

(viii) *No possibility of conviction*—See 29 C 410

(ix) *Withdrawal of a complaint in a warrant case*—See s 248 and 14 C 141

(x) *That the complainant is not personally injured or affected by the offence*—Where the offence is one against public interest (bribery) a Magistrate acts wrongly in dismissing a complaint by reason of the absence of personal injury to the complainant and the fact of his being a mere instrument 13 B 600

(xi) *Failure to pay process fee* This section does not apply where process has been issued See s 204 (3) for dismissal of complaint where process fee has not been paid

(xii) *Death of complainant*—As there is no abatement of a criminal case on the death of a complainant it ought not to be dismissed See 16 C L J 713 (M) and Note 4 to s. 247

(xiii) *Where on the conclusion of the hearing of a case*—The Bench Magistrates directed the accused to be present on the day fixed for judgment and the accused having absented himself on that date the Bench Magistrates ordered the complainant to file process fee to secure the attendance of the accused on a subsequent default of prosecution and fixing a date for pronouncement without jurisdiction 23

A L J 304

IRREGULAR ORDERS THAT MAY OR MAY NOT AMOUNT TO DISMISSAL

19 *Striking off case from Police file is not legal disposal*—Where after a complaint was referred to the Police the Magistrate made an order directing that the complaint may be struck off the Police file *held* that such a direction was not a legal disposal of the complaint (1911) 2 M W N 74 = 10 M L T 120 = 12 Cr L J 463

20 *Expending from list is not dismissal*—A person made a complaint to the Police that the accused had enticed away his wife (non-cognizable offence) and committed theft a cognizable offence. The Police inquired into the latter offence only and finding no *prima facie* case made out reported to that effect to the Magistrate who directed that that offence be expunged from the list of reported offences *held* that under the circumstances there had been no dismissal of the complaint in respect of the former offence and that there was no bar to the complaint of that offence being taken up and proceeded with 5 B 405

21 *Dismissing complaint for want of sanction under s 195 is not a proper disposal*—This section refers to the procedure of a Magistrate who has taken cognizance of a case. Where therefore a complaint requiring sanction is made to a Magistrate without previous sanction obtained he must refuse to take cognizance of it and not dismiss it under this section. Where a Magistrate erroneously dismissed a complaint under this section while in fact it was dismissed for want of sanction *held* that the Magistrate was competent to re-entertain the complaint after sanction is got 24 M 337 This ruling is no longer of importance having regard to the *Full Bench Ruling* in 29 M 126

22 *Refusal to issue process may amount to dismissal*—On a complaint against several persons the Magistrate proceeded against only one and convicted him. Thereafter the complainant applied for processes against the others, but the application was refused. *Held* that such a refusal was to all intents and purposes an order under this section subject to the Sessions Judge's power of revision under s 437 29 C 457 2 C W N 290. See also 27 C 979. Where upon a complaint the Magistrate merely passed an order to the effect enter mistake of law and refused to issue processes *held following* 29 C 437 and 8 C W N 456 = 1 Cr L J 355 that the order amounted to dismissal 17 C W N 461 = 14 Cr L J 123, 4 C W N 242, 30 C 449, 32 C 449, 32 C 783 at p 790. But where one of the accused is tried for one offence only and is convicted of that offence because there has been a conviction on that complaint the complaint cannot be said to have been dismissed in regard to the other offences for which the accused was not tried at all nor with regard to the other accused mentioned in the complaint 27 C 653, 5 B 403. See 12 C W N 68, 24 M 136, 17 C W N 451 = 14 Cr L J 123

INCIDENTAL ORDERS THAT MAY BE PASSED ON DISMISSAL OF COMPLAINT

23 *Is a Court dismissing a complaint competent to pass any order as to disposal of property?*—Where a complaint is dismissed but the section does not say that there has been any inquiry or trial in a

Magistrate's Court and therefore no order can be made under s. 517, but where property has been seized by the Police in the investigation of a false complaint and the Magistrate is of opinion that the property was found under circumstances which create suspicion of the commission of an offence (in this case of fabricating false evidence against the accused) the Magistrate is competent under s. 523 to pass such order as he thinks fit respecting the disposal of the property and in this case an order of forfeiture of the property to the Government was upheld, 24 M. L. J. 1 = 14 Cr. L. J. 27.

24. Compensation of false and vexatious complaint cannot be awarded.—In cases in which the complaint is dismissed under this section without the issue of process to the accused, the fact that the latter was present with a pleader at the inquiry under s. 202 would not enable the Court to award compensation to the accused under s. 200, 3 P. R. 1908 = 84 P. L. R. 1906 = 4 Cr. L. J. 36; 29 A. 137 and 14 P. R. 1897.

25. Prosecution for preferring false complaint.—So long as a complaint is not dismissed under this section, or otherwise judicially determined, no proceeding can be instituted under s. 211, I, P. C., against the person lodging that complaint. The original complaint must be first disposed of according to law, before such proceedings can be taken, 3 C. W. N. 753. But where a Magistrate after receiving a complaint, examined the complainant and on receipt of an investigation report under s. 202 dismissed the complaint under this section, it was *held* that there was a legal determination of the complaint for the purpose of a prosecution under s. 211, I P. C., 6 C. W. N. 295, 2 P. R. 1907 = 5 Cr. L. J. 491; 49 P. L. R. 1907 = 6 Cr. L. J. 233. But see 8 A. 33. See Notes to ss. 195 and 200.

COMPETENCY OF COURTS TO ENTERTAIN COMPLAINTS ONCE DISMISSED.

26. A Court is competent to take cognizance of complaint once dismissed under this section.—It was *held* by the majority of the Full Bench (SUBRAMANJA Aiyar and Davies, JJ., *dissenting*) that a Court dismissing a complaint under this section is competent to re-hear the complaint without any order for further inquiry by a superior tribunal under s. 437, 29 M. 125 (F.B.) following 23 C. 632 (F.B.). (Presidency Magistrates) and 29 C. 726 (F.B.) (Mofussil Magistrate), *dissenting from* 23 C. 933 and 24 C. 235; *overruling* 23 M. 255 and *Weir II*, 247 *approving*, 1 B. 64 and 9 A. 83, *distinguishing to* 22 A. 106 *referring to* 19 B. 732, 22 B. 949 and 23 M. 310. *Quere* (BENSON, J.) whether it would not make any difference if the Magistrate seeking to revive the complaint be different from the Magistrate that originally acted under this section? *Quere* (MOORE, J.) whether the Full Bench view could be sustained if the case was one of discharge under s. 253 or s. 259.

Where the accused is once discharged under s. 203 of the Code it is open to the complainant to file another complaint on the same facts before another Magistrate, but it is incumbent on the complainant to inform the second Magistrate the dismissal of the first complaint, 27 Bom. L. R. 352.

SUBRAMANJA Aiyar, J. (DAVIES, J., *concurring*). If a person against whom a *prima facie* case has been made out, but who was acquitted after trial, is entitled to be protected then a person against whom the case is so weak as not to warrant his being put on his trial is a *fortiori* entitled to protection.

Held by WHITE, C. J. in the Madras Full Bench Case that an order under this section is not a judgment within the meaning of s. 369 and that the revisional powers conferred on Superior Courts cannot be regarded as in any way restricting the jurisdiction conferred on Magistrates to inquire into offences. See also 1 C. W. N. 49 and 5 C. W. N. 169; 4 M. L. T. 142 = 3 Cr. L. J. 203; 9 Bom. L. R. 250 = 5 Cr. L. J. 255; 18 C. W. N. 1211 = 15 Cr. L. J. 728. In 16 Cr. L. J. 713 (M.) a second complaint was made as the case instituted on the previous complaint was said to have abated by reason of the death of the complainant. The High Court dismissed the second complaint but directed the previous case to be restored to file and proceeded with. A complaint was filed by a woman charging the accused with certain offences one of which was that her daughter was wrongfully taken away by the accused. The complaint was dismissed. A second complaint was filed by the husband of the girl, the acts complained of being the same as in the complaint of the mother, although the offences suggested were different. *Held* that the Magistrate had jurisdiction and was bound to entertain the second complaint and deal with it according to law. 23 A. 7. See also 9 A. 83, 1333 A. W. N. 86; 5 A. L. J. 137 = 1903 A. W. N. 67 = 7 Cr. L. J. 297; 35 A. 53.

In 1 N. L. R. 13, it was *held* following the Rulings approved of by the Madras Full Bench, that a Magistrate dismissing a complaint under this section may entertain fresh complaint upon the same facts but if the order of dismissal or discharge amounts to a judgment within the meaning of s. 367, a fresh complaint cannot be entertained. The Punjab Chief Court in 10 P. R. 1911 (F.B.) = 21 P. W. R. 1911 = 205 P. L. R. 1011 = 12 Cr. L. J. 368 following the other High Courts overruled 33 P. R. 1931 where it was *held* that a second complaint cannot be entertained. See also 23 P. W. R. 1923 = 8 Cr. L. J. 249; 17 O. C. 273 = 15 Cr. L. J. 633. In 8 S. L. R. 196 = 16 Cr. L. J. 174 it was *held* following 29 M. 125 that the mere fact that a complaint has been

dismissed under s 259 is not a sufficient ground for refusing to entertain a second complaint. But the complainant was directed by the High Court to enter into a bond with one surety undertaking to pay the costs of the accused if the prosecution did not succeed as the complaint was of a trivial kind.

Successor may take cognizance of a fresh complaint.—A second complaint was made to a Magistrate who had dismissed a previous complaint on the same facts, but before he could dispose of the second complaint he was transferred and his successor took up the case and ordered process to issue. *Held*, that the successor in office of a particular Magistrate although a different individual constituted the same tribunal and had jurisdiction to deal with the second complaint, 36 A. 129 *distinguishing* 22 A. 106.

27. Magistrate bound to entertain cognizable case if sent by Police even if he had previously dismissed it.—A Magistrate is not only competent, but is bound to entertain a cognizable case forwarded to him by the Police notwithstanding that he may have previously dismissed the same case under this section. *Odhi. S. C. No. 230; cf* 36 A. 53.

28. Cannot Magistrate of co-ordinate authority re-hear complaint?—Another Magistrate of co-ordinate authority is not competent to hear a complaint which has been dismissed under this section, 22 A. 106. It is submitted that though this case has not been overruled but expressly distinguished in 29 A. 7 and 36 A. 129, it is of doubtful weight in the light of the decisions of all the High Courts. *See* 16 Cr. L. J. 814 (M.). But unless there are very special reasons, a Magistrate might not entertain a complaint for the second time. *See* 10 P. R. 1912 = 12 Cr. L. J. 354 (F.B.).

29. Revival of Complaint after District Magistrate or Sessions Judge has refused further inquiry.—There is nothing illegal or *ultra vires* of a Deputy Magistrate reviving a complaint which he had dismissed under s. 203, after the District Magistrate has on an application made to him declined under s. 437, to order further inquiry into the complaint, 36 C. 415. In 11 P. W. R. 1910 = 11 Cr. L. J. 347, however it was *held* that a Magistrate cannot entertain a fresh complaint when a previous one on the same facts has been dismissed by his predecessor after a full inquiry and the order of dismissal has been upheld by the Sessions Judge. In such a case the complainant's remedy is to apply to the High Court for revising the lower Court's orders.

REVISION.

30. Revisional powers of High Court in cases of complaint dismissed by Presidency and other Magistrates.—The High Court has under s. 423, embodied in s. 439 power to set aside the order of discharge passed by all subordinate Criminal Courts including Presidency Magistrate, and direct a charge to be framed and tried by the proper Court. It can, under s. 436 and probably also under s. 439, order a further inquiry instead of a committal, irrespective of the question of jurisdiction 36 C. 994 *applying* 23 C. 211 (F.B.). 15 C. 608 (F.B.), 26 C. 746; 27 B. 84, and *dissenting* from 27 C. 126 and not *approving* 33 C. 1282 and 6 C. L. J. 705. *See* also 7 C. W. N. 521 and 13 O. C. 289 = 11 Cr. L. J. 629. In *Weir II*, 255 and 38 M. 512, this point was raised, but not decided.

31. Power of the High Courts under the Charter Act.—The High Court cannot interfere under s. 15 of the *Charter Act* with the order of a subordinate Court on the ground of an error in law, but only for an error affecting jurisdiction *se. i.* either a want or refusal of jurisdiction or an illegality in the exercise of it, 36 C. 994; 1 A. 101; 26 C. 746, 6 C. L. J. 705. There is no form of judicial injustice which the High Court, if need be, cannot reach under the *Charter Act* 12 C. W. N. 678 = 7 Cr. L. J. 499.

FURTHER INQUIRY.

32. Further Inquiry and notice to accused.—*See* s. 436 and Notes thereunder, 16 A. L. J. 30.

33. When directed to make further inquiry, Magistrate cannot again dismiss under this section.—Where a case once dismissed under this section is remanded under s. 437 now 436 the Magistrate holding further inquiry ought to summon the accused, but is not justified in again dismissing the complaint under this section, 11 C. W. N. 316. *See* Note 18 to section 436.

But it should be noted that in 30 C. W. N. 312 it is *held* that where on receipt of a complaint a Magistrate holds an enquiry under s. 202 of the Code and dismisses the complaint under s. 203, the Sessions Judge under s. 436 can only direct a full and proper enquiry of the same nature as the Magistrate has already held and cannot direct a further enquiry after summoning the accused.

The practice of allowing the accused to be represented in an enquiry under s. 202 has been condemned.

34. Case remanded for further inquiry cannot be transferred.—Where a Sessions Judge remands a case which was dismissed by a Deputy Magistrate under s. 203 and directs that further proceedings should be

held under the same section, the case cannot after remand be transferred by the District Magistrate from the Deputy Magistrate, 11 C. W. N. 316 = 5 Cr. L. J. 112.

APPEAL.

35 No appeal from an order under this section.—Having regard to section 401 no appeal can lie from an order under this section but further inquiry might be ordered under s. 437

CHAPTER XVII.

OF THE COMMENCEMENT OF PROCEEDINGS BEFORE MAGISTRATES

204. (1) If, in the opinion of a Magistrate taking cognizance of an offence there is sufficient ground for proceeding, and the case appears to be one in which according to the fourth column of the second schedule, a summons should issue in the first instance, he shall issue his summons for the attendance of the accused. If the case appears to be one in which according to that column, a warrant should issue in the first instance, he may issue a warrant or, if he thinks fit, a summons for causing the accused to be brought or appear at a certain time before such Magistrate or (if he has not jurisdiction himself) some other Magistrate having jurisdiction

(2) Nothing in the section shall be deemed to affect the provisions of s. 90

(3) When by any law for the time being in force any process fees or other fees are payable, no process shall be issued until the fees are paid and if such fees are not paid within a reasonable time the Magistrate may dismiss the complaint

Notes.—1 S. 68 relates to the issue of summons s. 75 to that of a warrant and s. 90 to the issuing of warrant in lieu of or in addition to, summons For forms see *Sch V Nos 1 and 2*.

2 Till process is issued, person complained against is not an accused person.—When an accused person has been summoned to appear before a Magistrate there has been commencement of proceedings within the meaning of Chapter XVII, of the Code, Ratanlal 544. Till process is issued under this section the person complained against does not become an accused person, he is not a part to the investigation under s. 202 nor is he entitled to claim under s. 340 the right to be represented by a pleader at that investigation. If he is present that is not by compulsion of law but out of his own free will, 38 C. 880; 37 C. 358. Therefore no suit for malicious prosecution will lie when a complaint is dismissed under s. 203 23 M. L. J. 1. See however, 2 B 431; 28 B 226 and Note 19 at pp 578 and 579

DUTY OF MAGISTRATES BEFORE ISSUING PROCESS.

3 Until there is sufficient ground for proceeding, process must not issue.—The Magistrate should not issue process unless satisfied that there is sufficient ground for proceeding with the complaint. So when the complainant stated in his examination that he made his statements solely on information derived from others the Magistrates should satisfy himself upon proper materials that a case has been made out before issuing such process, otherwise his proceedings are liable to be quashed 10 C. W. N. 1090. It is not competent to a Magistrate to issue a warrant or order of arrest in anticipation of an offence being committed. Such a case is merely one for the interference of the Police Ratanlal 90. Where a Government Pleader having no personal knowledge of the facts constituting an offence lodges a complaint on mere information, held it was not a proper complaint under section 200 on which a *judicial inquiry* could be directed and that a Court before issuing summons against an accused should satisfy itself on proper materials that a case has been made out for issuing summons, 11 C. W. N. 170 = 5 Cr. L. J. 13. See also 10 C. W. N. 1093; 1090 and 1884 W. R. 33 and 18 Cr. L. J. 626

Magistrate must come to an independent conclusion of his own.—The opinion of the Magistrate referred to in this section is his own independent opinion. Where a Police inquiry is ordered and the result reported, the opinion expressed by an Inspector will not warrant the complaint being dealt with, otherwise than it would have been if there had been no such report, 4 M. H. C. R. 162. See also cases cited in Note 18.

4 Magistrate must be properly seized of the case before he can issue process.—Where a Subordinate Magistrate to whom a case had been made over for disposal convicted some of the accused, but refused to issue process against the others. Held that the issue of the process under this section by the superior Magistrate who made over the case was without jurisdiction, 32 C. 783. See also 27 C. 979; 30 C. 419 and 4 C. W. N. 212.

u, e, i, o, a, y, long, ä, z, i, ö, ü, y, short, cäre, far, last, fall, whol, thäre, yell, bärn, värt, stür, löst, für, do, wolf, lödd, lödt!

5 Caution and discretion must be used in issuing process.—In exercising the discretion under this section, Magistrates must be guided by the circumstances of each case, the main point for consideration being whether having regard to the nature of the offences charged and the age, sex, position, etc., of the accused his appearance can be secured or not without his arrest. In cases relating to hurt, criminal force or assault, marriage, defamation, mischief and criminal intimidation, caution and discretion should be used in issuing summonses. An accused person ought not to be dragged off to answer a charge merely because a complaint has been lodged against him. The Magistrate should see there is a *prima facie* case against the accused, and, if not, should refuse the summons, or direct complainant first to produce his witnesses, or one or two of the chief of them, and should then grant or refuse the summons according as a *prima facie* case is or is not made out.—*Oudh Cr Dig*, p 7

6. Supervision by District Magistrates to prevent hasty and inconsiderate issue of process.—Magistrates of districts should endeavour, by exercising a systematic supervision over the procedure of Subordinate Magistrate, to prevent hasty and inconsiderate issue of process on complaints, and to enforce payment of compensation for frivolous or vexatious complaints or information. By requiring periodical returns of the results of criminal trials in the subordinate Courts District Magistrate will be able to keep themselves regularly informed of the working of those Courts, and to interpose promptly, and effectively, whenever they observe any tendency to laxity of procedure.—*Oudh Cr Dig*, p 7 As to unauthorised interference by the District Magistrate see s. 202 Note 11 at 575

7. If complaint is believed, process must issue.—See Note 6 to s. 302. Where the Police report was to the effect that the complainant was true and the Magistrate thereupon had directed the case to be entered as such, he cannot decline to enter on a judicial inquiry merely because in his opinion there was no chance of conviction and no useful purpose would be served by an inquiry. The complainant was entitled to have process against the accused for the attendance of his witnesses, 29 C. 410. The only condition requisite for the issue of process is that the complainant's disposition must show some ground for proceeding 1364 W. R. 33 and 37. See also 4 M. H. C. R. 162. It appears to be a common fault on the part of Magistrate to issue process against some of the accused although there is no reason in the examination of the complainant to discriminate between the several accused. Such a procedure is without jurisdiction and in every view objectionable 4 G. W. N. 560.

ISSUE OF PROCESS.

8 Notice to the person complained against is not a 'process'.—Where proceedings begin with the issue of a summons or warrant after a complaint is instituted and the Magistrate issues a notice to the person complained against that a preliminary inquiry will be held in the matter of the complaint such a notice does not amount to a summons or to the invitation to the party charged to appear to take any step in the matter, such a notice is not contemplated either by the Code nor is it one of the forms in the Fifth Schedule, 23 M. L. J. 1

9 Conviction cannot be quashed for issuing warrant instead of summons.—If a Magistrate issues a warrant in a case in which he ought to have issued a summons and passes a sentence, the High Court cannot quash the conviction on the simple ground that the Magistrate was mistaken in issuing a warrant, 1 W. R. 16

10. Substitution of summons for warrant discretionary.—Magistrates should use the discretion given them by this section and should not issue a warrant as a matter of course, especially in cases where a petty charge of defamation, insult to provoke breach of the peace or criminal intimidation is preferred before them.—C P Cr Cr, Part II, No 16—*Oudh Cr Dig*, p 8

11. Magistrate can cancel warrant issued and issue summons.—A Magistrate has also discretion under this section on sufficient cause being shown to cancel the warrants issued at first against an accused and issue summons instead, 1 S. L. R. 69 = 8 Cr. L. J. 137; 7 S. L. R. 40 = 14 Cr. L. J. 604. *Vide* s. 75

12. Magistrate may issue bailable warrant even in non-bailable cases.—See s. 76. Where on a complaint made against the accused, of robbery of certain articles belonging to a *Mutt* of which accused claimed to be the head, two witnesses were examined to prove the charge, and a non bailable warrant was issued. Held in the circumstances only a bailable warrant should have been issued, (1911) 1 M. W. N. 452 = 12 Cr. L. J. 430.

13. Summons unnecessary where accused appears voluntarily.—Where the accused appears voluntarily to answer a charge, the want of summons or of a complaint antecedent to the issue of summons becomes immaterial *Ratanlal S*. If the complainant does not take up process against all the persons accused every one of them may appear voluntarily and insist either that the complaint against him shall be proceeded with or dismissed 26 B 552

SUB-SEC (3)—PROCESS-FEES

14. Power to direct further inquiry into dismissed complaints.—When a complaint is dismissed under sub-sec. (3) for non-payment of process-fee the High Court or Sessions Judge or District Magistrate may under s. 437 direct a further inquiry.

15. Dismissal of maintenance case for failure to pay process-fee.—An application for maintenance under section 489 should not however, be dismissed under sub-sec. (3) on the applicant's failure to comply with an order for the payment of process-fees as neglect to maintain is not an offence and process-fee is leviable under the *Court Fees Act* only for an offence. 16 M 234.

16. Complaint cannot be dismissed under cl (3) when case adjourned.—Where a Magistrate who has entertained a complaint is unable to record evidence on the date originally fixed and has adjourned the case the witnesses in attendance should be told to appear on the adjourned date and a party should not be required to repeatedly summon his witnesses on payment of fresh process fees. A dismissal of the complaint under clause (3) is not therefore justifiable in law. 3 P W R. 1912 = 60 P. L. R 1912 = 13 Cr L J 176.

17. Court fees.—As to the payment of Court fees in connection with criminal cases see *Court Fees Act* VII of 1870 s. 20 and the Rules framed by the various High Courts thereunder.

REVISION

18. High Court competent to suspend proceedings.—See s. 439 and Notes thereto. Where neither the complaint nor the evidence for the prosecution made out any case against a person but process was issued the High Court quashed the proceedings against him holding that it was most unfair to him that he should be called on to rebut a charge which upon the evidence was baseless in so far as it affected him. 26 C 788, 1899 A W N 212, 21 C 131, 25 C 233, 38 C 63, 20 B 543, 21 W R 23, 28 M L J 505 = 16 Cr L J 477.

205. (1) Whenever a Magistrate issues a summons he may if he deems it reasonable so to do dispense with the personal attendance of the accused and permit him to appear by his pleader.

(2) But the Magistrate inquiring into or trying the case may in his discretion at any stage of the proceedings direct the personal attendance of the accused and if necessary enforce such attendance in manner hereinbefore provided.

Notes.—1. No warrant for *ex parte* proceedings in criminal cases.—Under the Code an accused person cannot be proceeded against *ex parte*. The Code does not contemplate such a proceeding. It is only with the special leave of the Magistrate that his personal attendance can be dispensed with and he be allowed to appear by an agent. 24 W R. 23.

2. Pleader how far he may act for accused.—As to the definition of the word *Pleader* see s. 4 (r). It includes any person appointed with the permission of the Court to act in a criminal case and thus an agent may come within the definition. But where he is allowed to appear by a Pleader even a judgment may be pronounced in the presence of such Pleader where the sentence is one of fine only. See s. 366.

3. What a Pleader may do.—When an order is made under this section allowing the accused to appear by a Pleader such appearance involves the performance of all acts which devolve upon the accused in the course of the trial such as answering the examination by the Court under s. 342 or pleading or refusing to plead to the charge under s. 205. The terms of s. 366 (2) support this view for it contemplates the absence of the accused up to the stage of judgment and even after that stage where the judgment is one of acquittal or one awarding a sentence of fine. See also form of summons to an accused Sch. V Form I 6 S. L. R 206 = 14 Cr L J 272.

4. Prosecution cannot be ordered for disobedience of summons where accused appears by Pleader.—Where appearance is made on behalf of the accused by his *Mukhtiyar* who asked the Magistrate to dispense with the personal attendance of the accused a prosecution under s. 174 I P C. cannot be directed against the accused for disobedience of summons. Appearance by a *Mukhtiyar* is valid appearance, though not a personal appearance. 27 C 935. In such cases the Magistrate should rather tell the *Mukhtiyar* that he requires the personal attendance of the accused on some fixed day and that if the accused does not choose to appear he will issue a warrant.

5. Applicability of section to security proceedings.—Though the Madras High Court in *Weir II*, 54 *Acld* that this section is not applicable to proceedings under Chapter VIII and that a person required to show cause why he should not be bound over for good behaviour cannot be permitted to appear by an agent yet,

was held in 25 A 375 following 23 C 493 and 27 C 656 that persons against whom proceedings are taken under Chapter VIII are accused persons within the meaning of the Code and as such have a right to be defended by a pleader and that notice of the date of hearing should be given them, *Quere* Whether personal attendance could not be dispensed with in such a case under special circumstances?

6. **Section applies to all cases where a summons is issued.**—The application of this section is not limited to summons-cases, but to any case in which a Magistrate may issue a summons. Therefore, in a warrant case if a Magistrate issues a summons in the first instance to a *pardanashin* lady, he can dispense with her personal attendance and thus he has discretion to do under s 204, 21 C 533; 20 P. W. R. 1908. The section applies only to cases where a summons is issued in the first instance, 2 Pat. 793.

7. **Accused cannot be exempted when warrant issued.**—S 205 applies only to case where accused persons are summoned, where a warrant is issued to compel the attendance of accused he cannot be exempted from personal appearance in Court, unless the accused is by reason of his illness unable to attend personally, 13 C. W. N. 150; 18 Cr. L. J. 975. But if a warrant has been issued by inadvertence, the Magistrates has power to act under this section. The Magistrate may on discovering his mistake direct the major process of warrant to take effect as a summons, 7 S. L. R. 40 = 14 Cr. L. J. 604.

8. **Personal appearance may be dispensed with any number of times.**—A Magistrate can excuse the attendance of an accused as often as he pleases, 14 C. W. N. 131.

9. **Section should be freely utilized.**—In 3 S. L. R. 167 = 11 Cr. L. J. 197; 7 S. L. R. 40 = 14 Cr. L. J. 604 it has been pointed out that s 205 is not confined to strict *pardanashins*, and that the section should be freely utilized in such a country as Sind where so much prejudice exists against the appearance of females in public. See also 6 S. L. R. 208 = 14 Cr. L. J. 272. Where the accused is a *pardanashin* lady, it is in the discretion of the Magistrate to dispense with her personal attendance and to permit her to appear by a Pleader until he has before him some legal and satisfactory evidence indicative of her having committed a breach of the criminal law when it will be proper time to require her to appear personally, 6 A. 59; 7 S. L. R. 161 = 15 Cr. L. J. 539. In 17 C. W. N. 1243 = 15 Cr. L. J. 281, where a Magistrate refused to dispense with the presence of certain *pardanashins*, the High Court in revision made an order allowing them to appear by Pleader before the Magistrate as also in the Court of Sessions, if they were committed, subject to their having to appear to hear sentence in case of conviction. See s 210 which provides for the charge being read and explained to the accused. As to the right of *pardanashin* women to give evidence in their *palanquins* see 1 B. L. R. (S.N.) v and 41 P. R. 1887.

10. **Personal appearance of a Pardanashin lady.**—*Pardanashin* women are not of right exempted from personal attendance in Court, 5 A 92. But a Criminal Court should abstain from compelling a *pardanashin* woman to attend in person unless and until the case against her has reached the stage at which her personal attendance is clearly and legally required in the interests of justice, 5 P. W. R. 1909.

11. **Accused being represented by her mother-in-law or father-in-law.**—A woman was charged with causing obstruction under *Bombay District Municipal Act VI* of 1873, s 48. She having gone to a village, her mother-in-law appeared in Court on her behalf and the Magistrate proceeded with the case and convicted her. *Held* that the conviction must be set aside as the accused was neither present nor duly represented in the case, *Ratanlal* 205. But where a woman was charged with the offence of 'fouling water' under s 61 of *Bombay District Municipal Act VI* of 1873 she being unwell, her father-in-law appeared in Court on her behalf, and the trying Magistrate proceeded with the case and convicted her. *Held*, that the father-in-law of the accused might probably have been received by the trying Magistrate as person appointed by her to act in the proceedings before him consistently with s 4 of the 1884 Code, and that the High Court did not consider it necessary in so trivial a case to make any order, *Ratanlal* 206.

11-A. **Appearance by an Estate Manager.**—Where the personal appearance of an accused is dispensed with and he appears by his estate-agent, the fact of such appearance should be taken note of by the Court. The Court allowing the estate-agent to appear for the accused can act upon a plea given by the estate-agent in a case falling under ss. 242 and 243 of the Code. 50 B 250.

12. **Reasons for refusing leave to appear by Pleader to be recorded.**—The Magistrate should place upon record his reasons for refusing an application for leave to appear in Court by a Pleader and not in person, more particularly when such application is made by a *pardanashin* woman accused of an offence. 6 A. 59. See also 6 C. W. N. 59, where an order requiring the personal attendance of an invalid was set aside as unreasonable.

13. Recognizance bond should be taken from accused and not from his agent.—Where the personal attendance of an accused is dispensed with, a recognizance bond if such be deemed necessary should be taken from him and not from his agent, binding him (the accused) to appear either in person or by an agent, and if the agent neglects to attend when the case is called on, the recognizance bond may be held to be forfeited and the accused made liable for the payment of the penalty. A Magistrate has no legal authority to secure the attendance of an agent by such a bond. **5 B. H. C. R. Cr. Ca. 64.**

14. A Sessions Judge can dispense with the personal attendance of an accused person under s. 205, read with s. 333:—

A Sessions Judge has power to dispense with the personal attendance of an accused and allow him to appear by a Pleader during a sessions trial, **43 M. 339.**

CHAPTER XVIII.

OF INQUIRY INTO CASES TRIABLE BY THE COURT OF SESSION OR HIGH COURT*

Scope of Chapter.—Nowhere but in this Chapter is the procedure laid down to be followed in making a commitment. The procedure to be adopted under this Chapter is not confined to cases exclusively triable by the Court of Session, but is also applicable to cases which in the opinion of the Magistrate concerned, ought to be tried by such Court, **5 A. 477; 24 C. 419 and 4 Bom. L. R. 85.** The provisions of this Chapter must be conformed to by every committing Magistrate. If *ab initio* he is convinced that the case ought to be committed, he should follow the procedure laid down by this Chapter from the start, and if he becomes convinced at a late stage of any inquiry or trial that the case ought to be committed, he should stay further proceeding and adopt the procedure laid down by this Chapter. **S. 347** ought not to be so construed as to override the express provisions of this Chapter, **5 Bar. L. T. 239 = 6 L. B. R. 129 = 13 Cr. L. J. 877 (F.B.) dissenting from 36 C. 48 and Ratanlal 975.** The direction in **s. 347** to stop further proceedings does not justify a Magistrate in disregarding the provisions of this Chapter but only requires him to stop proceedings with the case as a trial and instead to commit the case under the provisions of this Chapter **36 M. 321, 15 Cr. L. J. 366 (M); contra 15 Cr. L. J. 704 (M).**

† 206 (1)** Any Presidency Magistrate, District Magistrate, Sub-divisional Magistrate or Magistrate of the first class, or any Magistrate† (not being a Magistrate of the third class) empowered in this behalf by the Local Government, may commit any person for trial to the Court of Session or High Court for any offence triable by such Court.

(2) But, save as herein otherwise provided no person triable by the Court of Session shall be committed for trial to the High Court.

Notes 1—"This amendment is on the same lines as that of s. 144 cl (1) we do not think that the powers under this section should be granted to a Magistrate of third class" *Report of Select Committee, 1916*

2. Sessions Judge can only take cognizance when the accused is committed—*See s. 190J.* A Sessions Judge can only take cognizance as a Court of original jurisdiction when the accused has been duly committed. Where there is no proper commitment he cannot try the case.

3. Magistrates empowered in this behalf—In Madras all Magistrates are empowered to commit to the Court of Session (*Fort St. George Gazette*, 1873 p. 717) except the Tahsildar Magistrates of taluks in which there are Stationary Sub-Magistrates (*Fort St. George Gazette*, 1893, Pt. I, p. 579). In Bengal and in the Punjab, all Magistrates of the second class were similarly empowered but this power has been cancelled in Bengal (*Calcutta Gazette*, 1891, Pt. I, p. 1000) and withdrawn in the Punjab (*Punjab Gazette*, 9th March, 1883).

* Magistrates exercising jurisdiction in the *Town of Bangalore* when committing prisoners for trial commit them to the Chief Court *Secs 13 of the Lower Burma Courts Act VI of 1900* which came into operation on the 16th April 1900. *See Gazette of India, 1900 Pt. I p. 216*

† The words and figures "subject to the provisions of s. 443" have been omitted by the Cr. Law Amendment Act 1913 (XV of 1913).

‡ The words in brackets were added by Act XVIII of 1923

Japan, or to the peculiar language work of that country } **Jargon**, n (Uta) A variety of aircon See **Ein**
cov
flame

Jam, n (L. Lat. Janus, Lat. Janua) O

Jan, n 1st

Jan, n 1st To Janus.
See **JANUS**.
Jan, n 2nd Lat
Janus n violet col



And yet in a peace is but continual far **Spencer**
Case cease work, far and rest your n side in petch, **Wob**.
3 A vibration of the pendulum of a clock. **SSAL**.
More like not a jar of the clock
or or ajar open a little space, not quite
aid of a door

except in a time of universal
peace

Janus-faced (Jan) a Frac
ticing duplicity

Ja pan, n (From the country in
Asia so called) Work varnished
and flared in the manner prac
ticed by the natives of Japan, al
so the peculiar varnish or lacquer
used in Japanese metallic or
other articles

Ja pan, n. Of, or pertaining to,
Janus (from an so-
called statue)

2 An artificial idiom or dialect, a cant language,
along

Java.
Ja vel v. t. [Written also *vide*] [Tech. used for]
to split a large quantity of a liquid substance

J, j, I, O, G, F, long, A, Z, E, G, U, F, short **care, far, last, fall, what, there, well, firm, pique, firm, done, far, de, well, sold, sold**

(d) **Interruption**—The examination of the witness shall not be interrupted for the purpose of enabling the Magistrate or Judge to attend to other business unless such business is an urgent nature.

(e) **Violation of rules to be reported.**—It shall be the duty of every Appellate Court subordinate to the High Court to examine the memorandum of the evidence made by the subordinate Court, and to report to the High Court cases in which it shall appear that the above rules have not been strictly and properly attended to.

(f) **Evidence to be in presence of deciding officer.**—The evidence of every witness shall invariably be recorded in the presence of the officer who may decide the case except in the cases provided by ss. 349 and 350 of the Code, in which the recalling and re-examination of the witnesses is optional with the superior Magistrate. No more than one deposition should be written on each sheet of paper.

(g) **Trial of inquiry.**—After the examination of witnesses has commenced the trial or preliminary inquiry under Chap XVIII should be proceeded with until all the witnesses in attendance have been examined for the prosecution being first examined and if any witness be detained for a longer period than two days the Magistrate should record a memorandum stating the reasons of such detention.

(h) **Adjournment.**—When it is deemed necessary to adjourn the hearing of a case the adjournment shall be for as short a time as possible and no person accused of any offence shall be remanded to custody for any period exceeding 15 days (s. 344).

(i) **Hour of business.**—Every Sessions Judge and Magistrate shall sit daily and punctually at the hour appointed for the opening of his Court unless prevented by circumstances which are to be recorded in the proceedings of the Court. *Wilkins 6*

3. **Witnesses not to be kept waiting.**—(a) The evidence of witnesses should invariably be recorded as soon as possible after their attendance. If from unavoidable causes an adjournment is indispensable, there should be no unnecessary delay. Witnesses remaining over one day should as a rule be examined at the first sitting of the Court on the following day. By this means the public will be put to no inconvenience and justice will be administered in a prompt and satisfactory manner.

(b) **Supervision.**—Chief Magistrates of Districts should carefully supervise the returns of their subordinates as they will be held responsible for the correction of irregularities the prompt discharge of witnesses and the early completion of all trials. *Wilkins 7*

4. **Remand without taking evidence.**—A prisoner arrested under a warrant should be promptly brought before a Magistrate who has then no authority to detain him further in custody or to remand him to prison without some reason being made manifest to him either in the shape of sworn testimony given before him or in some other form which can be put upon the record and which is sufficient to justify him in sending the prisoner to prison and there to be detained for a limited period for further examination a period which is never in any case to exceed 15 days. 20 W R 23, also 6 M 53 and 69. See s. 344 and Notes thereunder.

5. **Precautions to be taken in granting further periods of remand.**—In Police prosecutions the general rule is that when an accused person is brought before a Magistrate and a remand is required by the prosecutor it is ordinarily sufficient to show by evidence that the accused is a person of whom it is believed to be reliable that the accused will appear after remand and a further remand by the Magistrate to justify him in refusing bail and with each remand the necessity for production of evidence of guilt becomes stronger. 6 M 69, 36 C. 174 and Notes to s. 344.

6. **Preliminary inquiry to be in the presence of the accused.**—Where a Magistrate recorded evidence in the absence of the accused and committed him for trial it was held that his procedure was illegal. *Ref. H 239, 3 C. W. N 110*

7. **Duty of Magistrate to make full inquiry and take all evidence.**—In every inquiry into a Sessions case a Magistrate is bound to make full inquiry and draw up a charge to take all such evidence as may be produced (1) in support of the prosecution (2) on behalf of the accused and (3) as may be called for by the Magistrate. If he does not take all the evidence he errs unless he can justify his procedure on some such ground as the evidence of a witness is obviously irrelevant or that he considers the fact in issue between the parties proved by evidence already produced. 10 A L J 144 = 13 Cr L J 443. As all the evidence is ready at the trial it is the duty of a committing Magistrate to make full and careful inquiry and to record the testimony of witnesses. He ought to do this even if the evidence is not in dispute.

iron 11

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 3 A f e l g l e also a check him
 pause (Ude)
 3 s a mine u (Def) A plant of cert.
 The veins dis al u n jas mine

Jew 1

Jew 1

The e of rare o e
 And jewels of n b and exquisite
 Sw cl are the us e of adven y
 V hult. In the full sa yu s venomous
 Y ears yet a precious jewel in his head.
 3 A precious stone, a gem
 3 A object regarded with spec al aff ction or
 a precious thing Our pri re
 31
 31
 31

s melting judicious u u u u
 cito laughter

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 Jew

The R al tioneable gentleman is to
 for his e and will a magnanimous for e
 of all the s of had honest e d
 bare u s nait or s aco nful

3 The object of laughter or a

Preceded a series a u u s
 degraded by long turns, into a Jew

Cymb. 1 of the same

2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, long; 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45, 46, 47, 48, 49, 50, 51, 52, 53, 54, 55, 56, 57, 58, 59, 60, 61, 62, 63, 64, 65, 66, 67, 68, 69, 70, 71, 72, 73, 74, 75, 76, 77, 78, 79, 80, 81, 82, 83, 84, 85, 86, 87, 88, 89, 90, 91, 92, 93, 94, 95, 96, 97, 98, 99, 100

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‡ The words in brackets were added by Act XLIII of 1913.

Jög'gle-piræ, n. (Arch.) A truss post whose shoulders and sockets receive the lower ends of the

sive cracks or seams transferred to the stratification
of the rocks } The place where the ends of two
= = ul. or the sp ice that fastens them.

Ibid.

Juk'ing ly, adv. In a joking way.
Jule, n. The same as JOWL. See JOWL.
Jule, { s i To strike against any thing, to cast
Jull, { with violence. (164)

John Dūry [Formed from *Fr* *jaune dorée*, golden yellow, *dorée*, i. e., gilt (see *la poisson*, fish). See **DORÉE**] (*fish*) A small golden-colored sea-fish. SEE DORY

us all.²⁰
Joint, & f

the fielding

Made friends of them, joining their force *gust* *Comar* *Shad*.
 2 To provide with a joint or joints, to articulate.
 The fingers are *jointed* together for motion. *Eag*.
 3 To separate the joints of, to divide, to cut up,
 as meat, to disjoint.
 He *jointed* the neck, and with a stroke so strong
 The helm flew off and bore the head along. *Dryden*.

2. Expressing mirth, or inspiring it, without mirth and gaiety.
And in his jolly pipe delights the groan. * *Præ*
Their jolly notes they cheered loud and clear. *For ad.*

3. Of fine appearance, but false, sly, &c.
You jolly knight be warned. *Spencer*

Jōhns'-wort, n. See **BT JOHN'S WORT.**
John (35), *c* & *t* [imp & p **JOINED**, p pr & 3rd n.
JOINING] [*Fr* **joindre**, *it* **joindre**, *joindre*, *joindre*,
it **joindre**, from *Lat* **joungere** to yoke, bind to-
 gether, *sp.* & *lg* **junior** also from *Lat.* **joungere**,
joungere].

Figure 1

that plants' metabolism is strengthened by

1. To bring together literally or figuratively, to

Syn.—To add annex unite, connect, combine
consociate couple LINK. see ADD
Join v t To be contiguous close or in contact,
to form a league or contract together to become
associated to unite,—often followed by with
Should we again break the commandments, and was he
anxiety in the people of these abominations? *Ezekiel 14*
Nature and fortune seemed to take their course. *Shak*

which the survivor takes the whole. *Life estate*
Joint tenant, a (Last) One who holds an estate by joint tenancy
Jointly (33) a. (Ex. 1000) To be taken by two or more persons

200'gler, n. [Fr jongleur] A juggler, a clown.

Bullinger,
Syn.—See **Carpenter**

2. What is

In Jahr 19

Juke & J

to rally, to
 make it

Umsatz 2010

Jul'ev, M. A.

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(Ichikawa) A similar case was reported by

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3 The part or space included between two joints, knots or articulations as a *joint* of cane or of

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Concurrent jurisdiction of Magistrate and Coroner.—An inquisition made by a Coroner, has the effect of a valid commitment to the High Court in Calcutta or Bombay when the High Court accepts the commitment. **31 C. 1.** But the power to commit has been taken away. See s 25 of the *Coroners Act, 1871*, Appendix VIII.

4 Effect of committal by Magistrate not empowered.—Under s 532 if any Magistrate purporting to exercise powers duly conferred which were not so conferred commits for trial, the Court to which the commitment is made may accept the commitment if it considers that the accused was not injured thereby and no objection was taken to the authority of such Magistrate but if it considers that accused was injured or that objection was taken, the Court shall quash the commitment and direct a fresh inquiry. Where a Magistrate without jurisdiction commits an accused to the Sessions Court, such commitment is void and no reference to the High Court is necessary to have it set aside, **11 C. L. R. 55**. But a commitment made with jurisdiction can only be quashed by the High Court on a point of law under s 215. See s 532 as to the validation of irregular commitments under certain circumstances. See *Ratanlal* 922.

5 Committal by Magistrate not having local jurisdiction.—Where a Magistrate duly empowered to commit makes an order of committal in respect of an offence over which he has no territorial jurisdiction, such commitment is valid unless such irregularity has in fact occasioned a failure of justice. See s 531, **28 M. 640**, **17 M. 403**, **7 Bar. L. T. 26 = 15 Cr. L. J. 270**. In **11 C. L. R. 55** such a commitment was, however, held to be void. If a Magistrate commits to a Court of Session without having any jurisdiction over the offence or the offenders the commitment is clearly invalid and the Sessions Judge, if satisfied by the evidence before him on these points could, notwithstanding the commitment, discharge the accused. If however, the illegality affects the procedure of the Magistrate and does not affect the jurisdiction of the Sessions Judge, a reference to the High Court under s 215 was the only way to set aside a duly made commitment, *Ratanlal* 922.

6. Committal to Court having no local jurisdiction.—If the committal is made to a Court having no local jurisdiction under s 177 over the offence, the Bombay and Allahabad High Courts are of opinion that the commitment ought not to be set aside unless there has been a failure of justice. See **8 B. 312**, **16 B. 200**, **16 A. 350**, but the Madras High Court held in **36 M. 337**, that such a commitment must be set aside. See Note 8 to s 177 and Notes to s 331.

7. Interference of District Magistrate with the discretion of other Magistrates as to commitment.—If for purposes of commitment a Subordinate Magistrate is duly empowered has equal powers with the District Magistrate and the latter cannot give instructions to the Subordinate Magistrate regarding a judicial proceeding, e.g., the commencement of the preliminary inquiry or the desirability of commitment. If the District Magistrate desires to interfere he must first withdraw. *See Note 1 to the first class who conducted a preliminary inquiry to a Deputy Commissioner with special power either to discharge or to commit the accused to the Court of Sessions, but that he had no authority to act in the way he did. The accused who had been convicted were however, held not prejudiced by such irregular commitment. 7 C. W. N. 457.*

8 Power to commit includes power to dispose of the case.—The powers conferred under this section convey authority to carry into effect any of the provisions of Chapter XVIII of the Code, **6 A. 477**.

207 The following procedure shall be adopted in inquiries before Magistrates where the case is triable exclusively by a Court of Session or High Court or, in the opinion of the Magistrate, ought to be tried by such Court.

Procedure in inquiries preparatory to commitment

Notes 1—The following procedure shall be adopted—The language is imperative. S 347 ought not to be construed to override the terms of this section. See Note at the head of this Chapter.

2. Cases which ought to be tried by such Court.—The words *ought to be tried by the Court of Session* in this section and in s 347 must be read with s 254, and a case which ought to be tried by a Court of Session is one which the Magistrate is not competent to try or in which in his opinion adequate punishment cannot be inflicted by him. **4 Bom. L. R. 85**, where **24 C. 429** and *Ratanlal* 110 are referred to. See also **16 B. 530**; **11 A. L. J. 439 = 16 Cr. L. J. 204**. If the case be one which the Magistrate is both competent to try and can adequately punish he has no discretion to commit it to the Court of Session, **6 B. L. R. 23 = 15 Cr. L. J. 584**.

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This section is apparently to be interpreted in the light of s 254 so that a case which is brought to be tried by the Court of Session, as contemplated by the former section, must be taken to be a case in which adequate punishment cannot be awarded by the Magistrate, and not merely one which, for any other reason he may think it desirable that the Court of Session should try—*C P Cr Cr* Part II, No 30

3. Is commitment of case not exclusively triable by Sessions Court bad?—*See* Note 4 to s 215

4. Joint inquiry into the case of several accused persons.—There is no provision in the Code which requires a separate inquiry in respect of each accused person, as the provision contained in s 233 relates to separate trials only. The trial no doubt could not be joint, but there is no objection to a joint inquiry on the ground that the inquiry was conducted against the accused jointly with others, 7 Bom L.R. 457 = 2 Cr L.J. 432; 26 M. 592, 1900 A.W.N. 206. *See* Note 7 (i) to s 215

5. Object of preliminary inquiry—The object of the law in providing that the inquiry shall be held by the Magistrate before the accused has to undergo a trial in the Court of Session seems to be to prevent the commitment of cases in which there is no reasonable ground for conviction, 5 A. 161 at p. 162; and the Code seems to have been carefully framed with a view to provide that no one shall be committed for trial without having previously had a fair opportunity of meeting the charge upon which he is to be committed, 10 B.L.R. 285 at p. 289. *See* also 3 M. 351. The legislature has laid down provisions for procedure before commitment, some of which were obviously intended for the benefit of accused persons. The object of its provision that all the accused shall be made aware of all the evidence against them and that there are not sufficient reasons and hearing defence term possibly *See* 5 Bar.

L. T. 239 = 13 Cr. L. J. 877.

208 (1) The Magistrate shall, when the accused appears or is brought before him, proceed to hear the complainant (if any), and taken in manner herein after provided all such evidence as may be produced in support of the prosecution or in behalf of the accused, or as may be called for by the Magistrate.

Taking of evidence produced.

(2) The accused shall be at liberty to cross-examine the witnesses for the prosecution and in such case the prosecutor may re-examine them

(3) If the complainant or officer conducting the prosecution or the accused applies to the Magistrate to issue process to compel the attendance of any witness or the production of any document or thing, the Magistrate shall issue such process unless for reasons to be recorded he deems it unnecessary to do so

Process for production of further evidence

(4) Nothing in this section shall be deemed to require a Presidency Magistrate to record his reasons

Notes.—1. Sub-sec. (2) incorporates the decision in 21 C. 662, and merely re-enacts the provisions of s. 198 of the Evidence Act.

2 Rules for the examination of complainants and witnesses framed by the Calcutta High Court.

(a) Examination to be *viva voce* in Court.—Every witness shall be examined *viva voce* in open Court.

(b) No other business to be attended to.—A Magistrate or Judge shall not be engaged in any other business whilst the examination of the witness is going on, or whilst any documentary evidence is being read.

(c) Supervision of examination.—If, after examination of a witness has commenced, the Magistrate or Judge is compelled to attend to any other business the examination of the witness shall be suspended so far as such other business is being attended to

Violets dim
Not sweeter than the side of Juno's eyes
Shut

of a court that is, within it

in others, even when they do not possess it

Jūpe, n. The same as JUPON.
Jūpiter, n. [Lat. from Jovis
pater See LOVE]
1 (Rom Myth) The supreme
deity the son of Saturn Jove
heaven



Just, adj. & adv.
Justly, adv.

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Jū'stī's pū'dēnt
juris pū'tēnt, n. & adj. Skilled by jurisprudence
jurisprudent See JURIST Understanding
law jurisprudent
Jū'stī's pū'dēnt, n. One who understands or is
skilled in law
jurisprudent. In particular had been pronounced by
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(d) **Interruption.**—The examination of the witness shall not be interrupted for the purpose of enabling the Magistrate or Judge to attend to other business unless such business is of an urgent nature.

(e) **Violation of rules to be reported.**—It shall be the duty of every Appellate Court subordinate to the High Court to examine the memorandum of the evidence made by the subordinate Court, and to report to the High Court cases in which it shall appear that the above rules have not been strictly and properly attended to.

(f) **Evidence to be in presence of deciding officer.**—The evidence of every witness shall invariably be recorded in the presence of the officer who may decide the case except in the cases provided by ss. 349 and 350 of the Code, in which the recalling and re-examination of the witnesses is optional with the superior Magistrate. No more than one deposition should be written on each sheet of paper.

(g) **Total of inquiry.**—After the examination of witnesses has commenced, the trial or preliminary inquiry under Chap XVIII should be proceeded with until all the witnesses in attendance have been examined, those for the prosecution being first examined and if any witness be detained for a longer period than two days, the Magistrate should record a memorandum stating the reasons of such detention.

(h) **Adjournment.**—When it is deemed necessary to adjourn the hearing of a case the adjournment shall be for as short a time as possible and no person accused of any offence shall be remanded to custody for any period exceeding 15 days (s. 344).

(i) **Hour of business.**—Every Sessions Judge and Magistrate shall sit daily and punctually at the hour appointed for the opening of his Court unless prevented by circumstances which are to be recorded in the proceedings of the Court. *Hilkins 6*

3. **Witnesses not to be kept waiting.**—(a) The evidence of witnesses should invariably be recorded as soon as possible after their attendance. If from unavoidable causes an adjournment is indispensable, there should be no unnecessary delay. Witnesses remaining over one day should, as a rule, be examined at the first sitting of the Court on the following day. By this means the public will be put to no inconvenience and justice will be administered in a prompt and satisfactory manner.

(b) **Supervision.**—Chief Magistrates or Districts should carefully supervise the returns of their subordinates, as they will be held responsible for the correction of irregularities, the prompt discharge of witnesses and the early completion of all trials. *Hilkins 7*

4. **Remand without taking evidence.**—A prisoner arrested under a warrant should be promptly brought before a Magistrate who has then no authority to detain him further in custody or to remand him to prison, without some reason being made manifest to him either in the shape of sworn testimony given before him or in some other form which can be put upon the record and which is sufficient to justify him in sending the prisoner to prison and there to be detained for a limited period for further examination, a period which is never in any case to exceed 15 days. *20 W. R. 23; also 6 M. 53 and 69. See s. 344 and Notes thereunder.*

5. **Precautions to be taken in granting further periods of remand.**—In Police prosecutions it is that when an accused person is brought before a Magistrate and it is ordinarily sufficient to show by the evidence of a Police-officer that he is believed to be reliable that the accused has committed an offence up after remand and a further remand is needed some direct evidence by the Magistrate to justify him in refusing bail and with each remand the necessity for production of evidence of guilt becomes stronger. *6 M. 69, 38 C. 174 and Notes to s. 344.*

6. **Preliminary inquiry to be in the presence of the accused.**—Where a Magistrate recorded evidence in the absence of the accused and committed him for trial, it was held that his procedure was illegal. *Wells II 259, 5 C. W. N. 110.*

7. **Duty of Magistrate to make full inquiry and take all evidence.**—In every inquiry into a Session case a Magistrate is bound before he draws up a charge to take all such evidence as may be produced (1) in support of the prosecution (2) on behalf of the accused and (3) as may be called for by the Magistrate. If he does not take that evidence, he errs unless he can justify his procedure on some such ground as the evidence of a witness is obviously irrelevant or that he considers the fact in issue between the parties proved one way or the other by the evidence already produced. *10 A. L. J. 146—13 Cr. L. J. 463.* As all the evidence and not merely a part should be ready at the trial it is the duty of a committing Magistrate to make full and careful inquiry into the alleged offence and to record the testimony of witnesses. He ought to do this even

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Relating to the doctrines or philosophy of a German philosopher in

Kakashi *n.* (Zoo) An animal of the monkey tribe (As its larders) of a bluish brown color about three feet in height when erect and remarkable for the great skill of some. It is a native of Borneo, very curious in its habits, and of great activity, it is known as a key.



Kakashi *v.* To know to know (as a key) or **Kakashi** *n.* See **Kakashi**

Kakashi *n.* (Zoo) An animal of the monkey tribe (As its larders) of a bluish brown color about three feet in height when erect and remarkable for the great skill of some.

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when confession of the accused had been recorded as there are many cases to show that confessions are often retracted at the trial *Ratanlal 842*. It is the duty of the committing Magistrate to place before the Sessions Court all the evidence procurable *Bar B.R. 533*. A commitment made without examining all the witnesses for the prosecution is illegal *4 M 277*. A commitment made without taking any evidence on a preliminary is illegal *Ratanlal 100*. A committing Magistrate cannot discharge before examining all the witnesses for the prosecution, *4 M 329*.

8. Prosecution bound to produce all the available evidence—The prosecutor is bound to produce all the evidence in his favour directly bearing upon the charge. He is not free to choose how much evidence he will bring before the Court. It is *prima facie* his duty accordingly to call those witnesses who prove their connection with the transaction in question and who must be able to give important information. *Per Wilson J* in *8 C. 121* at p. 124. See also *10 C. 1070*, *14 C. 245*, *14 A 521*, *15 A 6*. See *13 P R 196* = *17 Cr L J 267*.

In a trial before a Court of Session or the High Court if a Public Prosecutor is of opinion that a witness is a false witness or is likely to give false testimony if examined he is not bound to call that witness or to tender him for cross-examination. In cases in which the prisoner is undefended the presiding Judge should look at the deposition of any witness appearing in the Calendar as a witness for the Crown and not called as such or tendered for cross-examination in order to ascertain whether he should not himself take action under s. 540 *16 A 84* at p. 87. See Notes under s 286.

9. Magistrates duty to take evidence for the defence in a Session case—Procedure—Sub-sec. (1) contemplates the production of evidence by the prosecution or by the accused without the aid of the Magistrate, sub-sec. (3) contemplates the intervention of the Magistrate to secure the attendance of witnesses and in regard to this evidence the Magistrate has a discretion for reasons to be recorded by him to refuse to issue process if he deems unnecessary to do so. The distinction between the duty of the Magistrate in regard to the evidence produced before him by the accused and evidence not produced before him but which the accused desires to obtain by issue of process must be borne in mind. Ss. 209 and 210 do not require the Magistrate to record the evidence of witnesses whom in the exercise of the discretion given by sub-sec. (3) he has deemed it unnecessary to summon. It is open to a Magistrate to decline to issue summonses where the application has been delayed until the last minute before the charge, *33 M 321*, *42 C. 608*. See Note 7(v) to s 215. A Magistrate inquiring into a case under this Chapter is not empowered to frame a charge or make out an order of commitment until and after he has taken all such evidence as the accused may produce before him for hearing *20 A 254*. A Magistrate investigating a case and committing the accused to the Sessions without examining the witnesses applied for by the accused acts erroneously under sub-sec. (3) of this section and the order of commitment must be set aside as bad in law *26 A 177*. Where a Magistrate after recording the evidence for the prosecution had summoned witnesses for the defence and had consented to make a local inspection also but in pursuance of a direction of the Sessions Court committed the accused without examining the defence witnesses or making the local inspection held that the commitment was bad in law *1906 A W N 306* = *4 Cr L J 432*, but see *15 Cr L J 704 (M)* *46 A 137*.

10. Witnesses who fail to appear must be compelled to attend—The accused has further the right to call upon the Court to compel the attendance of witnesses who have been summoned and who have neglected to attend *1 C. W N 543*. The accused ought to have an opportunity of adducing evidence on his behalf before the Magistrate and which the Magistrate cannot refuse to take without recording his reasons *Ratanlal 100*. A Magistrate going on leave exercises an improper discretion in committing to the Court of Session a case properly triable by the Magistrate merely on the ground that the witnesses for the defence are not in attendance and that it would be inconvenient for his successor to commence the trial *new Ratanlal 110*.

11. Right to cross-examine when to be exercised—Fox C.J., of the Burma Chief Court is of opinion that as this Chapter contains no provision similar to that in s. 256 (1) for recalling prosecution witnesses for cross-examination the proper time for cross-examining a witness in an inquiry under this Chapter is in the ordinary course immediately after the witnesses examination, *5 Bur L T 239* = *13 Cr L J 877*. It is impossible to construe this section as conferring upon an accused the right, if he thinks fit, to ask for an order and to have an order made that the cross-examination of the witnesses for the prosecution may be reserved until after all the prosecution witnesses have been examined in chief *14 M L T 532* = *15 Cr L J 29*. See also *36 C. 48*. As each witness is examined he should then and there be cross-examined and re-examined and allowed to go home. It is illegal for a Magistrate not to allow any cross-examination before he frames a charge or till such

time that the examination in chief of all witnesses for prosecution is over 10 A L J 144 = 13 Cr L J 443. But it is open to a Magistrate to allow cross-examination of witnesses for the prosecution even after a charge is drawn up 39 C 825. See also 5 C W N 110.

12 Effect of not allowing cross examination—When depositions of witnesses for the prosecution were taken without any cross-examination being allowed held that such depositions were improperly treated as evidence in the Sessions trial as they had not been duly taken within the meaning of s 288 21 C 642 and see Notes to s 288.

13 Is Magistrate committing under s 347 not bound to allow cross examination and hear defence evidence?—Section 347 is not to be read as subject to the provisions of this section and it is not imperative on the Magistrate to allow the accused to cross-examine the witnesses for the prosecution or to call witnesses in his defence before ordering commitment under that section 35 C 843, Ratanlal 975, 15 Cr L J 704 (M). This view was not accepted by the Madras High Court 36 M 321, and by the Burma Chief Court in 6 L B R 129 (F B) = 3 Bur L T, 239 = 13 Cr L J 877. See Note under s 347 and the Note at the head of this Chapter.

14 Evidence to be recorded in manner hereinafter provided—See Chapter XXV ss 356 357 359 and 360 s 363 makes a special provision for the recording of evidence by the Presidency Magistrate.

15 Evidence of an accused person—An accused person cannot be admitted as an approver in a preliminary inquiry against others jointly accused with him until he is either discharged or pardoned 7 W R 41.

16 Attendance of respectable Hindu ladies as witnesses—The attendance of Hindu ladies of secluded habits and respectability as witnesses should not be insisted upon when no distinct charge is made out 3 W R 46.

209 (1) When the evidence referred to in section 208 sub-sections (1) and (3) has been taken and he has (if necessary) examined the accused for the purpose of enabling him to explain any circumstances appearing in the evidence against him such Magistrate shall, if he finds that there are not sufficient grounds for committing the accused person for trial record his reasons and discharge him unless it appears to the Magistrate that such person should be tried before himself or some other Magistrate in which case he shall proceed accordingly.

(2) Nothing in this section shall be deemed to prevent a Magistrate from discharging the accused at any previous stage of the case if for reasons to be recorded by such Magistrate he considers the charge to be groundless.

1 Examination of accused before committal absolutely necessary—It is the duty of a Magistrate before committing accused persons for trial to examine them for the purpose of enabling them to explain any circumstances appearing in the evidence against them. The effect of this section is that it is not left to the discretion of a Magistrate who intends to commit to examine the accused persons. He is bound to examine the accused and if he makes an order of commitment without examining him the order is irregular and might be quashed if the irregularity has occasioned a failure of justice 23 M 636. But see 2 W R 50.

2 Extent and scope of the examination of the accused—See s 342. The real object of the Law in allowing the accused to be examined is to enable the Judge to ascertain from time to time from a prisoner particularly if he is undefended what examination he may desire to offer regarding any fact stated by the witness or after the close of the case how he can meet what the Judge may consider to be damning evidence against him per IRVING J in 6 C L R. 521 at p 527. See also 2 C. W N 702 5 A. 243 at p 256. A Magistrate has no power to order the accused to file a written statement in proceedings under this Chapter Weir II, 235. But if the accused desires to make a statement it is not competent to the Magistrate to refuse to allow him to do so 10 C L R. 54.

3. Power of examining accused not to be abused—The accused should never be examined with a view to filling up gaps in the evidence for the prosecution 26 C. 49, or to supplement the evidence where it is deficient 1 C L R. 436. The Code empowers the Magistrate to commit without inquiring into the defence of the accused. The Magistrate should therefore be careful not to abuse the discretion given by this section to examine the accused 14 W R 16 and 1 B L R (54 N) 16. The discretionary power given by this section should be used to ascertain from the prisoner how he may explain facts in evidence appearing against him.

that those facts should not stand against him unexplained, but not to drive him to make self-criminating statement, 1 M. H. C. R. 199; 1 G. L. R. 436, 6 C. L. R. 521; 25 W. R. 57; 8 W. R. (F.B.) 47; 6 C. L. R. 431; 6 C. 279 = 7 C. L. R. 335; 17 C. W. N. 355 = 14 Cr. L. J. 429. The proceedings should not be of an inquisitorial nature. See also 3 B. H. C. R. Cr. Ca. 51. The accused need not be examined at all, when the evidence is not sufficient to charge him with the offence, 10 W. R. 25. A commitment without examining the accused is bad in law, 23 M. 636.

4. May discharge at any stage.—Sub-sec. (2) of this section and s. 253 (2) relieve a Magistrate from the necessity of going on with an inquiry or trial when he is reasonably convinced on what has been already deposed to, that a criminal charge cannot be sustained, Ratanlal 201. Where a Government officer has been discharged, on an application by the head of the Department, a copy of the order of discharge shall be given free of cost.—*Government of India*, 31st August, 1899

5. Magistrate may proceed for minor offence summarily.—Where in the opinion of the Magistrate the evidence is not sufficient to justify a committal, but discloses an offence over which he has summarily jurisdiction, it is competent for him to deal with the case summarily and in such a case he cannot be said to disregard that part of the charge which takes the case out of his summary jurisdiction for the purpose of dealing with the case summarily, 22 M. 439

6. Conviction for minor offence when evidence discloses graver offence, not invalid.—But where a complaint was laid of an offence under s. 409, I P C., and the accused was tried and convicted for that offence, and on appeal the contention was set up that the Magistrate who convicted had no jurisdiction, because the evidence disclosed an offence under s. 466, I P C., triable exclusively by the Court of Session, *held per* KNOX, J., that the complaint gave the Magistrate jurisdiction to try the accused for the offence complained of and if it was established, to convict him and that the Magistrate was not bound to commit, merely because the evidence disclosed another offence triable exclusively by the Court of Session, 27 A. 62. See 24 M. 675; 22 M. 439; 2 M. L. T. 495 = 7 Cr. L. J. 215; 27 A. 69; 25 B. 90; but see Note 20 at p. 604

7. Magistrate ought not to treat a grave offence as a less grave offence to elude jurisdiction.—A Magistrate should not treat a grave offence beyond his jurisdiction as a less grave offence in order to bring it within his jurisdiction, nor should he ordinarily go into the defence evidence in a case triable exclusively by a Court of Session and in which a *prima facie* case for committal has been made ought by the prosecution, since to do so is to take upon himself the function of a superior Court, (1910) M. W. N. 852 = 12 Cr. L. J. 20.

8. Procedure when several persons are charged and the offence of one or more of them is beyond the Magistrate's cognizance.—When several persons are charged with different offences arising out of one act or transaction one or more of which are beyond the cognizance of the Magistrate, and the rest within his cognizance, he shall not try the persons accused of the offences within his cognizance, and commit the other accused persons, but commit the whole of them to the Sessions Court.—*Oudh Cr. Dig* at p. 8; *Wilkins*, at p. 108. See Note 6 to s. 210

9. No compensation when accused discharged in a sessions case.—Although a first-class Magistrate discharges the accused under this section on account of the charge being vexatious, yet if the offence charged be triable exclusively by the Court of Session, the Magistrate cannot award compensation under s. 250 to the accused, Ratanlal 961; 40 A. L. J. 435.

10. Discharge of accused before recording any evidence and without recording any reasons therefore whether legal.—Competency of discharged to accused to testify.—Though a Magistrate has power to discharge an accused even before recording evidence he should then and there record his reasons for so doing, but if he omits to do so, the discharge is not illegal. Where one of two accused persons sent up by the Police was discharged by a Magistrate without recording evidence and without recording any reasons and the discharged person was examined as a witness against the co-accused, *held*, that his evidence was admissible, 23 B. 313 followed 4 L. R. 362 = 6 Cr. L. J. 370.

11. Effect of discharge on subsequent inquiry for the same offence.—The discharge of a person accused of an offence triable exclusively by the Court of Session is no bar to his being brought up again with a view to commitment before a Magistrate who may proceed without an order for further inquiry. An order of discharge might be passed at any stage of the case and does not amount to an acquittal, 8 W. R. 61. See also 10 B. 319; 9 B. 100; 28 C. 397; 24 M. 134; 26 C. 633; 23 M. 725. In 28 C. 397 it was laid

down that in order under s. 437 would be necessary in such a case. But now see 29 C 728 (FB), 28 C. 652; 27 B 84 and 28 M 310, where it¹ was held no order under s. 437 was necessary. But evidence must be taken *de novo* 5 C 121 = 4 C. L. R. 303 See Notes 27 and 28 to s. 203

A Court which has passed an order of discharge cannot re-open the same case but there is no bar to a second case being instituted the order of discharge does not stand in the way of such proceedings being taken 21 A. L. J. 215

12 Remedy for improper exercise of discretion by inquiring Magistrate—The remedy for an erroneous exercise of discretion is provided for in ss. 436 and 437. But in considering whether an accused has been improperly discharged within the terms of s. 436 a Sessions Judge or District Magistrate is bound to consider all the grounds upon which the discharge has been passed including the evidence which has not been disbelieved or held to be sufficient to establish a *prima facie* case before ordering a commitment or directing a further inquiry 7 C. W. N. 77. See also 9 B. 100, 5 A. 161, 9W. R. 5, 2 C. 110 and 28 C. 397.

13. Superior Courts power of interference to be exercised in clear cases only—See s. 436 and Notes thereto. The fact that the District Magistrate or Sessions Judge might be disposed to take the view that the Magistrate discharging an accused discredited the prosecution evidence for insufficient reasons and discharging the accused without committing him for trial is no ground for interference by it, Weir II, 255. Where a Sessions Judge acting under s. 436 directs a Magistrate to commit on evidence which is unreliable and insufficient it was held the High Court had authority to set aside the commitment on the merits of the case 7 C. W. N. 327; 39 M. 224, 15 Cr. L. J. 373 (M).

14 Power of High Court to revise an order of discharge by a Presidency Magistrate—The Madras High Court has held that it has power under the Code to interfere with an order of discharge made by a Presidency Magistrate which contravenes an express provision of law or where on the merits the order of discharge was wrong. Weir II, 255, 27 B. 84 36 C. 994 dissenting from 33 C. 1282; 6 C. L. J. 703 and 27 C. 126. See also 14 M. L. T. 200 = 14 Cr. L. J. 529

15 Refusal of Magistrate to charge accused with an offence triable exclusively by Court of Session amounts only to discharge—Where a Magistrate on a complaint charging the accused with offences under ss. 879 and 477 I. P. C. tried and acquitted them of the charge under s. 379 but refused to charge them with the offence under s. 477 held that such refusal was in substance an order of discharge under sub-sec. (1) of this section as there is no other provision of the Code for dealing with a case where the Magistrate is of opinion that there is no evidence of an alleged offence exclusively triable by a Court of Session and as he could not proceed to act under the latter part of sub-sec. (1) until he had discharged the accused under the former part of the sub-section a Sessions Judge had jurisdiction to make an order under s. 436 in respect of the offence under s. 477 I. P. C. 24 M. 136 where 20 C. 633 and 23 M. 225 are dissented from.

FUNCTION OF AN INQUIRING MAGISTRATE—SESSIONS CASES.

16 Magistrate must make a thorough inquiry and sift every fact bearing upon the case—I have for some time felt from examination of criminal trials that any Magistrates are too hasty in making commitments or rather that they do not make the thorough inquiry which I think they ought to make previous to commitment. In a case of murder more especially there can be no doubt that it is the duty of the Magistrate to sift every fact bearing on the case in order to ascertain whether the accused is guilty or innocent and to examine the accused on the facts which bear against him. One of the points of the evidence in this case which led to the presumption of the accused's guilt was that he had been absent about the time the murder was committed. His statement as to where he was at that time should have been recorded and should also have been thoroughly inquired into. It is not sufficient to say that the accused might bring witnesses to prove his innocence at the trial. It is possible that the accused may not know the names of witnesses and, if the witnesses can give evidence in his favour to exculpate him he should not be committed. A long time elapses before a trial at the Session comes on and witnesses cannot then give as clear evidence more especially as to time and duty as when the facts have only lately occurred. I think every inquiry should have been made previous to commitment to ascertain not only whether there was presumption of the guilt of the accused but also whether he was innocent. It is the duty of the Police and the Magistrate not only to bring the parties suspected of being guilty to trial but also to ascertain whether the suspected can clear themselves from the crime of which they are accused. There is a clause in the Procedure Code which empowers Magistrate to commit inquiry to the defence of the accused. I believe the discretion given by this clause is much abused. It may be applied in certain cases but in serious charges of murder when the life of the accused is at stake I think the

clause should not be acted upon, because no certainty of the accused's guilt can arise until his defence is negatived, and proof that his defence is false is frequently very strong evidence in favour of the prosecution of the result of the inquiry into the defence leaves the matter in doubt, it is the duty of the Magistrate to commit and leave the Sessions Court to decide which is the true story. *Per JACKSON, J.*, in 14 W. K. 16. 1891

17. If no evidence against accused is forthcoming, Magistrate is bound to discharge him.—Where the accused, who has been duly summoned or arrested under a warrant, is present to meet any charge, and no evidence is forthcoming against him owing to the absence of the prosecutor and his witnesses, if it be not shown to the Magistrate that the case is one in which he ought to adjourn the inquiry under s. 344, he is bound to discharge such accused person, 15 W. R. 53. A commitment to the Sessions would not be justifiable unless the committing Magistrate considers that a *prima facie* case had been made out, which in his judgment ought to be tried at the Sessions, 15 M. 39. Superior Magistrates ought not in any way to fetter the discretion of their subordinates in this matter. A commitment must depend on the evidence before the Court and not on evidence which may be given in the future, 16 Cr. L. J. 5 (C.); 37 A. 355.

18. Magistrate must decide whether or not there are sufficient grounds to commit and not whether accused is innocent or guilty.—A committing Magistrate has no doubt to perform the task of weighing the evidence before him with a view to decide a particular question, but the question he has to decide is not whether the accused is innocent or guilty, but whether or not there are sufficient grounds for committing the accused for trial, i.e., whether or not there was sufficient legal evidence or reasonable ground of suspicion. 26 A. 564.

19. When Magistrate may commit or discharge.—The law requires that a Magistrate should take not merely all the evidence produced in support of the prosecution, but also that produced on behalf of the accused. He is also empowered to examine the accused. Even after framing a charge a Magistrate is entitled upon consideration of the evidence, adduced before him by the accused to cancel the charge and discharge the accused s. 213 (2). A Magistrate is not justified simply because there is evidence before him which seeks to lay to the charge of an accused person an offence triable by a Court of Session, in committing the accused, 1899 A. W. N. 135; nor is he justified in a grave case triable by the Court of Session, when the prosecution evidence pointed both to a dacoity having been committed and to the accused having been the persons concerned in the dacoity, in discharging the accused without there being any rebutting evidence because the evidence seemed to him improbable and exaggerated, 26 A. 564; 11 B. 372. It is not possible to fix positively the limits within which the Magistrate should exercise his discretion and different Judges have laid down various tests (some of them conflicting) which should guide a Magistrate in committing or discharging. One of the tests suggested is.—If there is sufficient evidence to go to the jury the Magistrate must commit.—

I should prefer to express the rule negatively by saying that he must not in any way encroach upon the functions of a jury. BAKERWELL, J. in 14 M. L. T. 200 = 14 Cr. L. J. 529, 15 Cr. L. J. 373 (M). "The test which should be applied to decide whether a committal ought or ought not to be made on the facts is this—Assuming that the whole of the evidence telling against the accused is true, is there a case which a Judge at a trial could leave to a jury? If the evidence is such that a Judge would have been bound to rule that there was no evidence on which a jury could convict, then a committal ought not to be made. If there was any evidence which called for an answer, however great the preponderance in favour of the prisoners might be, then the committal was proper."—*Per HARRINGTON, J.*, in 9 C. W. N. 819. "The object of the preliminary inquiry in a criminal case is to ascertain whether there is any real case against the accused before a commitment is made and if all that can be said is that there is a mere *scintilla* of evidence, there should be no commitment."—*Per HENDERSON, J.* *ibid.*, see also 11 B. 372. Another rule laid down is where a *prima facie* case is made out against the accused and credible witnesses have given evidence, he must be committed. The duty of the committing officer is to ascertain whether by the evidence of the prosecution a *prima facie* case is made out

on them to satisfy themselves fully of its correctness. Where there is a sufficient ground for commitment, and he has discharged all the accused, he is liable to be punished. But a Magistrate will not be justified in making a commitment to the Sessions, unless he considers that a *prima facie* case has been made out, which in his judgment ought to be tried at the Sessions, 15 M. 39. In *Wale II, 653*, the Madras High Court observed "that a Magistrate is justified in committing an accused person for trial by a Court of Session where a *prima facie* case is made out that the accused has committed an offence cognizable by a Court of Session. In other words, where there is evidence not obviously false and on which, if it be accepted as reliable, a Court of Session might

convict an accused person, the Magistrate is justified in sending up the case for trial and if the case is triable by a Court of Session only, he is bound to do so' See also *Weir II, 542*. Where in an inquiry into a case triable by the Court of Session the prosecution evidence pointed both to a dacoity having been committed and to the accused having been the persons concerned in the dacoity, but the Magistrate considering the evidence improbable and exaggerated, rejected it and discharged the accused without there being any rebutting evidence, it was held that the Magistrate ought not to have discharged the accused as by thus pronouncing upon evidence merely because it did not commend itself to his mind he really tried the case and not merely considered whether there were sufficient grounds for committing the accused for trial, *25 A. 564* See however, the cases cited in Note 17

20. In grave offences it is better to commit the accused.—Where it appears from some of the evidence the accused might have been charged with an offence beyond the jurisdiction of the Magistrate to take cognizance of, an officer invested with powers under s 34 should rarely, if ever, try a case himself under this section *10 C. 85 = 13 C. L. R. 373, Wilkins, 112* See also *13 B. 502; 25 M 675, 25 B. 90; 3 P. R. 1891* and *1 P. R. 1893*.

(i) *Where death is caused by violence, Magistrate ought to commit.*—The accused threw his wife down and deliberately kicked her several times thus inflicting injuries which caused her death. The first class Magistrate convicted him of voluntarily causing hurt, and sentenced him to five months simple imprisonment. Held that in such a case, where death is caused by violence, the accused ought not finally to have been dealt with by the Magistrate, but should have been committed to the Court of Session *Ratanlal 352. Instructions as to cases where death has ensued*—In cases where death appears to have resulted from injuries voluntarily inflicted by the accused party, Magistrate ought to be very careful not to take it upon themselves to absolve the accused from the graver charge, and convict him of hurt or grievous hurt only unless they are quite clear that there is no sufficient evidence to warrant a commitment to the Sessions for murder, or culpable homicide not amounting to murder, *Wilkins 112, 10 C. 85 = 13 C. L. R. 373; Ratanlal 352, 13 B. 502. 3 P. R. 1891*, and where the act amounts to an attempt to commit murder, *5 M. L. T. 257 = 9 Cr. L. J. 224*

(ii) *Attempt to murder*—Where the act of the accused amounts *prima facie* to the evidence to an attempt to murder a Magistrate should commit the case and not try the case himself. Where he did so the conviction was set aside and the accused committed to the Sessions, *5 M. L. T. 257 = 11 Cr. L. J. 196*

(iii) *Grievous hurt and robbery must be committed*—If a Magistrate finds on accused person has caused grievous hurt in committing robbery, he is bound to commit him to the Court of Session under s 397, I. P. C. It is illegal to treat the grievous hurt as simple hurt and convict the accused under s 394 I. P. C. *Ratanlal 376*

(iv) *False charge of rape*—The offence of making a false charge of rape are triable by a Sessions Court exclusively therefore a first class Magistrate has no power to convict the accused under s 378 I. P. C., but must after framing charge commit him to the Sessions, *Ratanlal 593, 5 M. L. T. 257 = 9 Cr. L. J. 224*

21 Where the question of discharge or commitment is one merely of probabilities better to commit.—A Magistrate has in cases triable by a Court of Session a wide discretion in the matter of weighing the evidence produced on one side or the other, but if in the exercise of such discretion the question of discharge or commitment is one merely of probabilities, the Magistrate ought rather to commit than to make an order of discharge *25 A. 564, 1904 A. W. N. B., 14 P. R. 1908 = 8 Cr. L. J. 263* An order of discharge in a case inquired into under this Chapter is proper if the Magistrate had applied his mind to the evidence, and the order shows on the whole that he came to the conclusion that no *prima facie* case has been made out, *Weir II, 253* See Notes to s 210

22. Duty of Magistrate in dealing with the evidence adduced before him—It is in laying down the principles which should guide a Magistrate in dealing with the evidence adduced before him that there appears to be a sharp line of difference of opinion. On the one hand it is laid down that a Magistrate must decide only on the possibility of conviction and not weigh the evidence. A Magistrate ought to commit a case to the Court of Session when the evidence is enough to put the party on his trial and such a case obviously arises when credible witnesses make statements which, if believed, would sustain a conviction. Weighing of their testimony with regard to improbabilities and apparent discrepancies is more properly the function of the Court having jurisdiction to try the case, *Ratanlal 319*. Where there is evidence on which a conviction is possible in law the Magistrate has sufficient grounds for committing and he is bound to commit. The weighing of evidence to arrive at an opinion as to the guilt of the accused is the function of the Court having jurisdiction

to try the case, 27 B 84. *Sufficient ground for committing* means not ground for convicting but when the evidence is sufficient to put the accused on his trial, and such a case arises when credible witnesses make statements which, if believed would sustain conviction. The weighing of their testimony with regard to improbabilities and apparent discrepancies is in re properly a function of the Court having jurisdiction to try the case. Where, therefore a Magistrate holding a preliminary inquiry, could not believe the statement of witnesses, who saw the accused setting fire to the complainant's crop or immediately afterwards, and discharged the accused the High Court set aside the order of discharge and directed the commitment of the accused remarking that it was not alleged that the three witnesses for the prosecution were of infamous character nor does it appear that any evidence was adduced tending to show that they cannot possibly have spoken the truth 11 B 372; 27 B 84; 16 P. R. 1908 = 8 Cr. L. J. 263. " Although a Magistrate has large powers of discharging the accused he should only exercise it when he is clearly of opinion that the evidence for the prosecution is untrustworthy. If it is a matter of weighing probabilities he would be well advised in leaving the case to the Court which alone is empowered to try it, and should not discharge the accused because in his opinion the accused ought to have the benefit of the doubt. *VIKRAM J 28 A 884 1908 A W N 5; 1899 A W N 135; 9 Bom. L. R. 225 = 5 Cr. L. J. 213; 12 Bom. L. R. 923 = 11 Cr. L. J. 692* The existence of a possible ground of defence is not a sufficient reason for a Magistrate to refuse to commit a person for a trial against whom a *prima facie* case is made out, otherwise the thief found in the possession of jewels recently stolen ought never to be committed for trial since it is always possible that the jewels might have been foisted on him without his knowledge. It is ordinarily for the Court that has power to try the case, not for the Magistrate who makes the preliminary inquiries, to determine whether, having regard to all the facts and probabilities guilt is brought home to the accused. *BENSON, J., in 14 M. L. T. 200 = 14 Cr. L. J. 529* Magistrate's duty is to determine whether the accused should be put on his trial and to commit if he is satisfied that there are credible witnesses to facts which if believed by a jury, would justify the conviction of the accused of the offence complained of. If he proceeds to weigh the evidence to accept some statements and reject others to deal with probabilities or to draw inferences as to knowledge or intention he is in reality dealing with the question of the guilt or innocence of the accused and is usurping the functions of a trial Court. *PER BAKERWELL J. Ibid.* The Magistrate ought to commit when the evidence is enough to put the party on his trial, and such a case obviously arises when credible witnesses make statements which if believed would sustain a conviction. The weighing of their testimony with regard to improbabilities and apparent discrepancies is more properly a function of the Court having jurisdiction to try the case 11 B 872 This case was considered in 3 B 163.

On the other hand it is laid down that a Magistrate must weigh the evidence and need not commit if the evidence will not justify a conviction — A Magistrate conducting an inquiry may, if he is convinced that the case against the accused is false discharge him at an early stage of the case, but he has to hear all the evidence produced before him by whichever side and it is only after recording that evidence he can consider whether there are or are not sufficient grounds for committal and has no power whatever to pronounce a definitive judgment on the question whether the accused is guilty or innocent. The discretionary power should be exercised with caution but there is nothing in the law which prohibits the discharge of the accused even though the evidence against him is that of professed eye-witnesses but whom the Magistrate entirely discredits. The object of the law in providing that the inquiry shall be held by the Magistrate before the accused has to undergo a trial in the Court of Session seems to be to prevent the commitment of cases in which there is no reasonable ground for conviction. The provision of the law is calculated on the one hand to save the subjects from prolonged anxiety of undergoing trial for offences not brought home to them and, on the other hand to save the time of the Court of Session from being wasted over cases in which the charge is not obviously supported by such evidence as would justify a conviction. Taking this view of the law, I am of opinion that the power given to Magistrates under this section extends to weighing of evidence and the expression " *sufficient grounds* " must be understood in a wide sense. I must not however, be understood to lay down that this discretionary power should be exercised by the Magistrate without due caution or that he should take upon himself to discharge the accused in Sessions cases in the face of evidence which might justify a conviction of the Magistrate, it cannot prohibit the discharge of the accused, themselves to be eye-witnesses, but whom the Magistrate entirely discredits. *PER MAHYOOD J 5 A 161* It is not incompetent to a Magistrate hold a preliminary inquiry into Sessions cases to examine the credibility of evidence adduced in the course of inquiry. Such Magistrate should not commit the accused if he be of opinion that evidence adduced against the accused the prosecution case is improbable and the ev

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unleadedly, fully, as an argument

148 (Lah. Cr. F. 14822)
the a layer of coal lying over
in plates or plate like sub-
strata and the like
+ part of a bone resembling
as the calciform plate of the
ferr.

La'nah n. [Thabet, 11 mm] pronounced
a high priest

A, E, I, O, U, long; A, E, I, O, U, short, care, far, last, fall, what, there, very, terms, plique, firm, ...

W. N. 117 = 6 Cr. L. J. 406. "I am invited to lay down the general proposition that a Magistrate having before him formally and categorically evidence which discloses a case for trial in some Court to which such Magistrate might in his discretion commit, is bound to so commit and that he is wrong in point of law in exercising a discretion and considering the sufficiency of evidence. The proposition is dangerously large. It is not the practice of Magistrates within the range of my experience, nor have I heard the law so laid down in England." **PER BLAIR, J., in 21 A. 263.** A Magistrate need not commit merely because there is evidence sufficient to put the case to the jury. An accused person is entitled to adduce evidence before an order of committal is made, either in order to show that the evidence adduced for the prosecution is quite untrustworthy or to show that the facts proved by the prosecution are consistent with his innocence when taken in conjunction with other facts proved by him in his defence. A Magistrate need not make an order of committal when, in his judgment, the evidence adduced for the prosecution is clearly insufficient to justify the conviction of the accused and the prosecution evidence is clearly untrustworthy (*see 7 C. W. N. 77*). He should, no doubt realize that it is not his duty to form a final conclusion on the evidence for the prosecution whether the conviction of the accused if committed is reasonably certain but it is his duty to be satisfied whether there are fair grounds for concluding that the accused is guilty, so far as appears from the evidence put before the Court. It is only then that sufficient grounds can be said to exist for committing the accused for trial. **PER SUNDARA IYER, J., in 14 M. L. T. 200 = 14 Cr. L. J. 529.** A Magistrate in considering the sufficiency of grounds, may properly consider whether on the evidence before him, it is probable that a conviction will be arrived at, **1 S. L. R. 103 = 8 Cr. L. J. 369, 14 W. R. 16; 7 C. W. N. 77.** *See also Ratanlal 746, 10 P. R. 1909 = 11 Cr. L. J. 18; 215 P. L. R. 1910 = 11 Cr. L. J. 761, 9 M. L. T. 71 = (1910) M. W. N. 352 = 12 Cr. L. J. 20.* Where the Magistrate finds that there are not sufficient grounds for committing the accused person for trial, he is bound to discharge. He may so find either because there is no evidence whatever or because the evidence tendered by the prosecution appears to him to be totally unworthy of credit. Where, however, the Magistrate entertains any real doubts as to the weight or quality of the evidence, the task of resolving the doubt and assessing the evidence should be left to the Court of Session **33 B. 163.** Where most of the important witnesses are totally unworthy of credit and the case itself bristles with improbabilities the Magistrate would be right in discharging the accused, **15 Cr. L. J. 373 (M).** When a Magistrate has heard the evidence for the prosecution with entire disbelief, when he considers himself in a position to show that the prosecution witnesses are totally unworthy of credit and *a fortiori* when, after examining certain witnesses named on behalf of the accused he has come to the conclusion that the evidence given by them is reliable and disproves that given by the prosecution witnesses, he is well within his discretion in discharging the accused **37 A. 355.** A committing Magistrate is well within his powers in cross-examining the prosecution witnesses to find out the truthfulness of the witnesses and is discharging the accused because the evidence adduced is not reliable and not creditable. The chief business of the Magistrate is to see whether the evidence is credible or not. If it is not credible, he is bound to discharge the accused on the face of it absolutely. **15 Cr. L. J. 307. See also 12 A. L. J. 80 = 12 Cr. L. J. 234.** In **17 Bom. L. R. 910 = 16 Cr. L. J. 747, 35 B. 163** was followed and it was held that the Magistrate was well within his power in cross-examining the prosecution witnesses and if the evidence tendered is totally unworthy of credit it was not only within his power but it is his duty to discharge the accused under s. 209. *See also 20 C. W. N. 732 = 17 Cr. L. J. 202, 44 A. 5746 A. 537, 43 M. 874 = 49 M. L. J. 155; 4 Lah. 64.*

23. English authorities appear to lay down the true principle—*See the Indictable Offences Act 11 and 12 Vic. c. 42,* for the duties and functions of the Justices of the Peace for holding a preliminary trial and discharging the accused or committing them for trial. When all the evidence has been heard the examining Justices then present who have heard all the evidence must decide whether the accused is or is not to be committed for trial. If the Justices are of opinion that a *prima facie* case has not been made out against the accused by evidence entitled to a reasonable degree of credit, they must forthwith order him to be discharged as to the information then under inquiry. If they are of opinion that the evidence is sufficient, or if the evidence raises a strong or probable presumption of his guilt they must commit him to prison to take his trial or must admit him to bail.

The examining Justices must take into account any evidence that is given for the defence. There may be cases where the evidence for the prosecution is sufficient to justify a commitment, *e.g.*, where it raises a presumption of guilt as is the case when on a charge of larceny possession of stolen goods soon after a theft is proved against accused. In such case the presumption of guilt may be rebutted by the evidence for the defence *e.g.* if the accused person found in possession of stolen goods recently stolen gives a satisfactory account of his coming into possession of them and although the Justices have not to try the case yet if the

11

Lander

runner from land and water
 [A TRAP] A vagabond or vagrant one who has
 a grand

[Scot]

Live one time If a car



Land-grab (became a slur)

The House of Commons must consist for the most part, of

evidence for the defence is such in their opinion that there is a strong or probable presumption that the jury would acquit the accused if he were committed they should dismiss the charge, *R. v. Cardew* (1899); 8 Q. B. D. 1, per COCKBURN, C. J., at p. 6. See also *Cox v Coleridge* (1822) 1 B. and C. 37 at p. 80 and *Halsbury's Laws of England* Vol. IV, p. 320. The sort of *prima facie* case that warrants a committal, is defined by the Statute s. 25, as one "that is sufficient to put the party on his trial for an indictable offence."

23A. Function of a Magistrate in a case exclusively triable by a Court of Session.—In a case exclusively triable by a Court of Session a Magistrate is not empowered to write a judgment. All that he is empowered to do is to record reasons of discharge if he makes such an order and to pass the order of discharge. 40 A. 615 = 16 A. L. J. 456

MAGISTERIAL CASES

24. It is extremely undesirable that any case should be committed which the Magistrate can deal with.—It is for several reasons extremely undesirable that any case should be committed to the Sessions which can be adequately dealt with by the Magistrate. The witnesses are unnecessarily harassed, the time of the Sessions Judge and that of the assessors are needlessly taken up, the Government is put to unnecessary expense in travelling and diet expenses and the lapse of time which often occurs before the Sessions trial, introduces special risks of failure of justice. All cases which are ordinarily triable by the Court of Session, but can be disposed of by the District Magistrate under the provisions of s. 30 *supra*, should be kept by the latter on his own file and not made over to a Subordinate Magistrate. If a Subordinate Magistrate finds, in the course of a trial before him, that the case is one which should, in his opinion, be dealt with by the District Magistrate under s. 30, he should, though he may have power to commit to the Court of Session, stay proceedings, and submit the case, under the provisions of s. 346, to the District Magistrate. *C P Cr Cr.*, Part II, No 30. See 1 B. L. R. 103 = 8 Cr. L. J. 360; 10 P. R. 1909 = 11 Cr. L. J. 18.

25. Careful exercise of discretion necessary—only cases which Magistrates cannot adequately punish should be committed.—It is only where the Magistrate is of opinion that adequate punishment cannot be inflicted by him that he should commit 4 Bom. L. R. 85. Reading ss. 251 and 207, it would seem that the Legislature has given to a Magistrate discretion to commit to a Court of Session only such of those cases as he is competent to try as, in his opinion, ought to be tried by such Court because the offence cannot be adequately punished by himself. If a case be one which a Magistrate is both competent to try and can adequately punish, then apparently he has no discretion to commit it, 8 B. L. R. 23 = 25 Cr. L. J. 654. *When a Magistrate could commit a magisterial case*—A case shown in Col. 8, Sch. II, as triable by a Magistrate only might, yet be committed to the Court of Session, for although the maximum sentence of imprisonment that can be passed may be within the Magistrate's power, if there is no limit to the amount of fine by which the offence is punishable, as the Magistrate's power in this respect is limited, the commitment may be made to obtain a sentence of fine in a higher amount by the Court of Session, 24 C. 429. The order of commitment should specifically state that the case had been committed with a view to the infliction of a heavier sentence of fine than the Magistrate is competent to inflict otherwise, the committal is liable to be quashed. See also 2 A. 39, and Notes 9 to 215

26. Case which he can adequately punish ought not to be committed—In committing cases not exclusively triable by the Court of Session, Magistrates should exercise a proper discretion and give adequate reasons for making commitment to the Court of Sessions. Where a Magistrate finding that there was a *prima facie* case against an accused person under ss. 352 and 447, I P. C. committed the accused to the Court of Session, it was held that the commitment was wrong on a point of law because (1) there was no warrant for the commitment of such cases and (2) the maximum punishment under each offence was one which the Magistrate could inflict, 1906 A. W. N. 28 = 3 A. L. J. 14 = 3 Cr. L. J. 94; 13 Bom. L. R. 998 = 2 Bom. Cr. Ca. 165; 8 B. L. R. 23 = 15 Cr. L. J. 664.

27. Magistrate must give reasons.—The Magistrate must give his reasons so as to enable the High Court to judge whether the commitment is made in the sound exercise of the discretionary power vested in him by law, 11 Bom. L. R. 18 = 9 Cr. L. J. 163. The Magistrate should specially state that the case has been committed with a view to the infliction of a heavier sentence than he is competent to inflict, 24 C. 429. If the Magistrate does not give adequate reasons, the commitment may be quashed, 1906 A. W. N. 28 = 3 A. L. J. 14 = 3 Cr. L. J. 94; 6 A. L. J. 989 = 11 Cr. L. J. 8; 13 Bom. L. R. 998 = 2 Bom. Cr. Ca. 165 = 14 Cr. L. J. 657; 8 B. L. R. 23 = 15 Cr. L. J. 664.

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hrotyces or passing away, as, t

Lap=dōg, n. A stone.

contain
 Lāp'l-āde, n. [Lat lapicida, lapicida from *lapis*,
 stone and *cadere*, to cut] A stone-cutter {Obs}
 Lāp'l-āde'ri an, n. Inscribed on stone, as, a lap
 idarian record
 Lāp'l-āde'ri-āns, n. [Lat lapidarius, from *lapis*,
 stone and *ducere*, to lead] A stone-cutter

lapid
 4 (Theol) (n) The fall or apostasy of Adam
 5 (Theol) (n) A fall or apostasy but not miraculous, influence

depend upon

10 Fr larege (Colgrass), 11 larut Ep

Lāp'l-āde, n. f. [Lat lapidare lapidatum also
 i pis stone It lapidare, fr & U Ep lapidare Fr
 i d]

or for other cause

Lāpae v f To cause to slide or fall, it

with hard, to grease
 The hardest thing on loaded drum had
 2 To fatten, to enrich
 The oak with his nuts, hard I mean a color
 3 To mix with something by way of improve



consisting of small



ous alliance or a
 feel and its softness against
 OLITT
 n Oil which is obtained from hard
 [Fr lardons, from *lard*, hard, it is
 bit of bacon
 A larder [Obs]
 See LARD Learning, doctrine love
 her a schoolmaster - also a counselor or ad

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large field

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large cup

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by a horse

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 education

Lāp'pet, n. f. [Lat lapidare lapidatum also
 Lāp'ping n. A kind of small line knit or wrap-
 ping material used by calico-printers. Simmons
 Lāp'pet n. f. [Lat lapidare lapidatum also
 Lāp'pet n. f. [Lat lapidare lapidatum also

PORT - 1000

A, B, C, D, E, F, G, H, I, J, K, L, M, N, O, P, Q, R, S, T, U, V, W, X, Y, Z, short, chre, fkr, lakt, fall, what, there, vgl, thern, pique, firm, dōne, fur, dg vgl, fdd, foot

28 Offence exclusively triable by Magistrate cannot be committed—A commitment of the accused charged under s 9 of Act I of 1878 (*Opium*) is bad in law as under that section the conviction if there be one, must be before a Magistrate 19 A 463, 1 W R. 3, 5 M H C R 277

210. (1) When upon such evidence being taken and such examination (if any) being made, the Magistrate is satisfied that there are sufficient grounds for committing the accused for trial he shall frame a charge under his hand declaring with what offence the accused is charged

When charge is to be framed
Charge to be explained and copy furnished to accused

(2) As soon as *such charge has been framed it shall be read and explained to the accused, and a copy thereof shall, if he so require be given to him free of cost

1 Upon such evidence being taken.—A commitment made without taking any evidence on a preliminary inquiry is illegal and ought to be quashed *Ratanlal* 100 Having regard to s 208 a Magistrate inquiring into a case under this Chapter is not empowered to frame a charge or make out an order for commitment until he has taken all such evidence as the accused may produce before him 20 A. 264, 26 A 177 This section does not require a Magistrate to record the evidence of witnesses, whom in the exercise of the discretion given by sub-sec (3) of s 208 he has deemed unnecessary to summon 36 M 321 But when an accused person wishes to make a statement the Magistrate is bound to record it 10 C L R 54 though an omission to comply with s 342 might be treated as an irregularity 23 M 636 See Notes 7 to 10 to s. 208

Magistrate may commit on evidence recorded by another Magistrate—After the prosecution evidence was recorded by a second class Magistrate the District Magistrate transferred the case to a first-class Magistrate who acting on the evidence already recorded by the second class Magistrate committed the accused *held* the order of commitment was not illegal 35 A 315

2 Discretion of the inquiring Magistrate ought not to be fettered by superior Magistrate.—A District Magistrate is not justified having regard to the express language of the section in calling on a Subordinate Magistrate to commit a case unless it can be shown that if that Magistrate was not satisfied as required by this section he ought to have been satisfied 9 Bom L R. 225 = 5 Cr L J 213, where 11 B 372 and 27 B. 84 are referred to

Adding charges merely for the purpose of committing is bad—The practice followed by some Magistrates of adding charges apparently for the purpose of enabling them to commit those cases to the Court of Session without any reasonable ground for the addition is to be highly deprecated 11 Bom L R 18 = 9 Cr L J 163


4 Magistrate should frame a charge before commitment—If no charge is framed the procedure under s 226 will have to be observed In the Code generally the word *charge* is used as a statement of a specific offence and not as indicating the entire series of offences of which a person is accused 8 B 200 See definition of charge s 4 (c).

5 Even after framing a charge Magistrate can make an order of discharge—See s 213 (2). A Magistrate framed certain charges against the accused intending to commit the case to the Court of Sessions On objection being taken that a charge was bad for want of sanction the Magistrate amended the charges and expressed his desire to hear the case himself It was then contended that the Magistrate could not amend the charge and proceed with the case himself when once he had committed to the Court of Sessions and s. 215 was relied on *held* that the mere framing of a charge does not amount to an order of commitment under s. 213 or s. 214 which takes effect after framing a charge under s. 210 it is open to the Magistrate to consider whether he ought to commit or not 12 Bom L R 521 = 11 Cr L J 436, 5 C. W N 110; 39 C 833, U B R (1915) 3rd Cr 29 See however *Ratanlal* 161 where it was *held* down that the drawing up of a charge must always follow the determination of a Magistrate to commit a case to the Court of Sessions which determination when duly expressed the Magistrate

* The words such charge have been substituted for the words the charge by Act XVIII of 1923

1 (Mark) A machine tool for slaying or knot wool, metal or other substance by cutting it to revolve while acted on by a cutting tool held either by the hand or a slide rest, — called also *l'arrêteur*.

2 The revolvable swing frame of a loom carrying the reed for separating the warp threads and binding up the weft, — called also *hij and guiter*.



Lathe (the tool in it)

Blanchard's *lathe* is a lathe turning lathe, — a lathe in which the work is turned by a cutting tool held by the hand or a slide rest, — called also *l'arrêteur*. It is used chiefly for turning metal cutting wheels, and the fixed head stock. It carries the spindle and the face plate. It is usually called *lathe*, — called also *lathe*.

Latent *by, out* In a secret or concealed manner, invisibly.

Lat, L, S, R, long; A, T, L, R, S, short; care, far, last, salt, what, there, yell, term, plaque, firm, done, for, dig, welf, fowl, fowl

becomes *functus officio* as to that matter. Where therefore, a Magistrate first drew up a charge directing the commitment of the accused, and afterwards, taking further evidence, discharged them. *Held* that the order of discharge is illegal and the case should be committed for trial to the Court of Session. *See* Note 4 to s. 213.

6 Persons implicated in the commission of the same offence should all be tried or committed together.—When several persons are accused of the commission of the same offence it would be obviously inconvenient if a Magistrate were to punish some and commit others to the Court of Session, and as the Code does not seem to contemplate such a procedure, Magistrate should, if he considers the case to be one for the Sessions commit all those concerned for trial before that tribunal. *Watkins*, 109; *Qadh Cr. Dig.*, at p. 8, 1881 A. W. N. 6. But the mere fact that the accused who have been committed to the Sessions were acting in concert with those who have not yet been arrested is no reason for quashing the commitment, 7 M. L. T. 187 = 41 Cr. L. J. 333. *See also* *Wells*, 443, where it was *held*, that where two or more persons are jointly indicted and the jurisdiction of the Magistrate is ousted in the case of one, the proper course is to commit both or all for trial before the Court of Session. *See also* 15 Bom. L. R. 995 = 2 Bom. Cr. Ca. 165 = 14 Cr. L. J. 637.

7. Charge when framed shall be read to the accused.—The Magistrate when he has prepared the charge is bound to read it to the accused and to ask him if he wishes to have any witnesses summoned to give evidence on his behalf at the Sessions. 2 W. R. 50.

8 Sessions Judge must either accept or frame other charges.—Where a Magistrate gives reason for committing a case for trial in a certain way, the Sessions Judge must either accept the charge as framed or frame others himself. He is not authorised by the Code to insist on a re-drawing of the charge by the Magistrate unless he specifies the charge which he wishes to be sent up, 25 W. R. 17.

9. Remission of Court-fee on copy of charge.—In the exercise of the powers conferred by s. 35 of *The Court Fees Act* (VII of 1870), the Governor General in Council is pleased to remit the fee payable on a copy of a charge or translation thereof when the copy is given to an accused person. *Notification, Government of India* No 310 of 21st January, 1886, *Watkins*, 177, *Adden*, 153.

211. (1) The accused shall be required at once to give in, orally or in writing, a list of the persons (if any) whom he wishes to be summoned to give evidence on his trial.

(2) The Magistrate may, in his discretion allow the accused to give in any further list of witnesses at a subsequent time, and where the accused is committed for trial before the High Court nothing in this section shall be deemed to preclude the accused from giving, at any time before his trial, to the clerk of the Crown a further list of the persons whom he wishes to be summoned to give evidence on such trial.

Notes—1. Accused is entitled to have the witnesses named in the list summoned to attend at the trial.—Section 291 lays down that an accused shall not be entitled of right to have any witness summoned other than the witnesses named in the list except as provided by this section and s. 231. *See* s. 216 as to duty of the Magistrate. An accused person is entitled to have his witnesses summoned and examined even though they were named as implicated in the offence with which he is charged, 6 B. L. R. Appx. 65 = 15 W. R. 7; 19 M. 375 and even when the Magistrate entertains doubts as to the value of their evidence, as it is impossible to state beforehand what credit will be given to their evidence 6 B. L. R. Appx. 78 = 15 W. R. 15. As a matter of right, a prisoner is entitled to have the witnesses in the list, which he delivers to the Magistrate, summoned and examined, 23 W. R. 56; 2 W. R. 6; 3 W. R. 36.

2 Duty of Magistrate to call upon the accused specifically to give in the list.—The question by the Magistrate to the accused "have you any evidence?" is not a sufficient compliance with this section. It is ambiguous and might suggest to the accused only an enquiry as to whether he had witnesses ready in Court. What the Magistrate is bound to do under this section is to require the accused to give a list of the witnesses he desires to call, 7 Bom. L. R. 723. Though the language of the section is thus imperative, there is nothing in it which leaves it open to a Magistrate to prevent a prisoner from reserving his defence for the Court of Session, 4 B. L. R. Appx. 1.

3 Accused's right to reserve defence and not to disclose names of his witnesses—An accused person may reserve his defence and also refuse to furnish the Magistrate with a list of his witnesses as for instance for fear that his witnesses might be tampered with. In such a case he might bring his own witnesses but is not entitled as of right to have the assistance of the Court to compel their attendance **14 A 242**

4 Witnesses' list may be filed after commitment—Committing Magistrates cannot force the accused to disclose either the names of their intended witnesses or what those witnesses would be called to prove **14 A 232**

5 Accused has no right to have his witnesses summoned after committal—If an accused person on being called upon under this section to give a list of witnesses whom he wishes to be summoned to give evidence on his trial declines to give in such list he cannot compel the Magistrate after committal to issue any summons for witnesses on his behalf. Neither under such circumstances will the Sessions Judge be obliged to issue summonses for the attendance of such witnesses unless he is satisfied that their evidence may be material **19 A 502**

6 Grounds of refusal to summon defence witnesses must be stated.—See Note 9 to s. 108. When a prisoner under this section gives in a list of witnesses he wishes to summon after his case has been committed the Magistrate is bound to exercise his discretion upon the point and to state whether he will summon the witnesses or not and he ought to state his reasons for not doing so. If he thinks the witnesses were included in the list for the purpose of delay he should proceed under the second proviso of s. 210 **16 W. R. 14**. There is no reason to refuse an application for summons simply because a large number of witnesses is mentioned therein **11 C 784** at p. 780

Power of Magistrate to examine such witnesses s. 200 para. 2.

212. The Magistrate may in his discretion summon and examine any witness named in any list given to him under section 211

Notes—1 Object of the section—The object of this section is to prevent the concoction of false evidence after commitment. This is a discretion that should be rarely exercised for the inconsiderate examination of witnesses cited for the defence at the trial may seriously prejudice the accused person and harass the witnesses. But if he examines such witness at his own motion or at the request of the accused and is satisfied from such evidence that there is no sufficient ground for committing the accused then s. 213 (2) enables him to cancel the charge and discharge the accused.

2 Examination of defence witnesses by Magistrate when defence reserved—The fact that an accused person committed to a Court of Session by a Magistrate has reserved his defence does not preclude the Magistrate from acting under this section. The section gives the Magistrate the widest possible discretion to summon and to examine any witness named in any list given to him under s. 211. The Code does not require a Magistrate to record his reasons. He is given a discretion which he may be trusted to use properly and it will be for a person impugning his order to prove that a judicial discretion is not used before the High Court will interfere **18 A 380; 4 B L R Appx. 1**.

3. Legality as commitment without such examination when Magistrate intended to examine—Where the evidence for the prosecution had been recorded and certain witnesses for the defence had been summoned and the Magistrate at the request of the accused had also consented to make a local inspection but finally at the direction of the Sessions Judge committed the case to the Sessions without examining any of the defence witnesses and without making the intended local inspection held the commitment was bad in law and ought to be quashed **1906 A W N 306 = 4 Cr L J 452**. In **13 Cr L J 704 M** it was held that s. 212 shows that it is not imperative on Magistrate to examine any defence witnesses after reaching the stage of framing a charge under s. 210 and it does not matter that summonses have been issued to the witnesses. This case was committed under s. 347. See Note 7 to s. 215

4. Witnesses not to be unfairly dealt with—When witnesses for the defence do attend it is illegal on the part of the Court to threaten them with penalties of the law unless they are evidently giving wilfully false evidence or persistently refusing to give evidence of facts which must be within their knowledge, **18 A 242**

213. (1) When the accused on being required to give in a list under section 211 has declined to do so or when he has given in such list and the witnesses (if any) included therein whom the Magistrate desires to examine have been summoned and examined under section 212 the Magistrate may make an

Order of commitment.

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order committing the accused for trial by the High Court or the Court of Session (as the case may be) (and unless the Magistrate is a Presidency Magistrate) shall also record briefly the reasons for such commitment.

(2) If the Magistrate, after hearing the witnesses for the defence is satisfied that there are not sufficient grounds for committing the accused he may cancel the charge and discharge the accused.

Notes.—1 Commitment must be to the Sessions Court having local jurisdiction.—The expression 'the Court of Session' here can only mean the Court of Session having jurisdiction to try the case under s. 177. Section 63 of Act X of 1872 provided that Magistrates shall ordinarily commit to the Court of Session for the Sessions division in which the district to which they appointed is situated. But the present Code contains no similar provision. Where a commitment is made to a wrong Sessions Court it must be set aside notwithstanding the provision of s. 531. *35 M 331 dissenting from 5 B 312 and 13 A 330*

2. Magistrate not bound to examine witness for the defence.—Sections 212 and 213 do not compel a Magistrate to summon and examine witnesses for the defence after a charge has been drawn up or even before the charge is drawn up if the Magistrate for reasons to be recorded deems it unnecessary to do so. *s. 208 (3) 36 M 321 See Note 8 under s. 203 and Note 7 to s. 215*

3. Cross-examination of prosecution witnesses may be allowed even after charge.—The words 'witnesses for the defence' in sub-sec. (2) are wide enough to cover evidence extracted by cross-examination from witnesses for the prosecution. It is therefore open to the Magistrate to allow cross-examination of the prosecution witnesses even after a charge had been framed and on consideration of such evidence cancel the charge. *39 C. 885; 5 C. W. N. 110 referred to See Note 11 to s. 208. S. 347 cannot be read as subject to s. 208 so as to render it imperative on a Magistrate after he has decided to commit the case to the Sessions to allow the accused to cross-examine the prosecution witnesses and to call witnesses in his defence. 36 C. 43; Ratanlal 975, 12 Bom. L. R. 923 = 11 Cr. L. J. 692 See however Note 13 to s. 208*

4. Until commitment a Magistrate may cancel the charge.—It is only the order of commitment under s. 213 or s. 214 which takes away the Magistrate's power of further proceeding with the case. Even after framing a charge under s. 210 it is open to the Magistrate to consider whether he ought to commit or not. *5 C. W. N. 110; 12 Bom. L. R. 521 = 11 Cr. L. J. 436*—But if he commits he has no longer the power to discharge nor is a Magistrate who has pronounced the order of commitment competent to try the accused for an offence triable by him by cancelling the charges of offences beyond his jurisdiction. *2 C. L. J. 33. See 1 L. B. R. 346* as to the scope of sub-sec. (2). The ruling in *Ratanlal 151* of the year 1881 which seems to lay down that an order of commitment must follow the making of a charge does not seem to be correct having regard to sub-sec. (2). *See Note 5 to s. 210*

5. Case compounded after commitment, discharge illegal.—Where a Magistrate after committing a person for trial on a charge of adultery immediately afterwards on the representation of the prosecutor that he wished to withdraw from the prosecution discharged the accused it was held that the order of discharge was bad as under this section a commitment once made can be quashed by the High Court only. The order of discharge was therefore quashed and the case sent back to the Sessions Judge directing him to examine the complainant and then take such further proceedings as to him might seem fit. *4 A. 150*

6. Power to commit after cancelling discharge.—Where a Magistrate after examining four witnesses for the prosecution discharged the accused but subsequently on becoming aware that there was a fifth witness present cancelled his order of discharge took further evidence and committed the accused for trial to the Court of Session held that the commitment was good. *7 M. H. C. R. Appx. XL, 23 C. 211*

7. Magistrate must marshal the evidence.—In preparing the reasons for commitment the committing Magistrate should marshal the evidence in the order in which it should come under judicial precision the proof against each particular
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8. Magistrate must give reasons for commitment.—Failure of the Magistrate to give reasons for commitment in a case which he could deal with may amount to an illegality and the High Court may set aside the commitment. *15 Bom. L. R. 898 = 2 Bom. Cr. Ca. 165 = 14 Cr. L. J. 637 and see Note 27 to s. 209*

3. Accused's right to reserve defence and not to disclose names of his witnesses—An accused person reserves his right to reserve his defence, and to reserve his witnesses, as for instance for his own witnesses, but is not bound to do so. **15 A. 242**

4. Witnesses' list may be filed after commitment—Committing Magistrates cannot force the accused to disclose either the names of their intended witnesses, or what those witnesses would be called to prove, **14 A. 242**

5. Accused has no right to have his witnesses summoned after committal—If an accused person on being called upon under this section to give a list of witnesses whom he wishes to be summoned to give evidence on his trial, declines to give in such list, he cannot compel the Magistrate after committal to issue any summons for witnesses on his behalf. Neither under such circumstances will the Sessions Judge be obliged to issue summonses for the attendance of such witnesses unless he is satisfied that their evidence may be material, **19 A. 302**

6. Grounds of refusal to summon defence witnesses must be stated.—See Note 9 to s 208. When a prisoner under this section gives in a list of witnesses he wishes to summon, after his case has been committed, the Magistrate is bound to exercise his discretion upon the point, and to state whether he will summon the witnesses or not and he is not bound to state his reasons. **W. R. 14** There is no objection to the Magistrate's refusing to summon witnesses if he is satisfied that their evidence is not material.

therein **11 C. 764** at p 760

Power of Magistrate to examine such witnesses, s 200 para. 2

212. The Magistrate may, in his discretion, summon and examine any witness named in any list given to him under section 211

Notes—1. Object of the section—The object of this section is to prevent the concoction of false evidence after commitment. This is a discretion that should be rarely exercised, for the inconsiderate examination of witnesses cited for the defence at the trial, may seriously prejudice the accused person and harass the witnesses. But if he examines such witness at his own motion or at the request of the accused and is satisfied from such evidence that there is no sufficient ground for committing the accused then s 213 (2) enables him to cancel the charge and discharge the accused.

2. Examination of defence witnesses by Magistrate when defence reserved—The fact that an accused person committed to a Court of Session by a Magistrate has reserved his defence does not preclude the Magistrate from acting under this section. The section gives the Magistrate the widest possible discretion to summon and to examine any witness named in any list given to him under s 211. The Code does not require a Magistrate to record his reasons. He is given a discretion which he may be trusted to use properly and it will be for a person impugning his order to prove that a judicial discretion is not used, before the High Court will interfere, **18 A. 380, 4 B L R Appx. 1**

3. Legality of commitment without such examination when Magistrate intended to examine—Where the evidence for the prosecution had been recorded and certain witnesses for the defence had been summoned and the Magistrate at the request of the accused had also consented to make a local inspection, but finally at the direction of the Sessions Judge committed the case to the Sessions without examining any of the defence witnesses, and without making the intended local inspection, *held* the commitment was bad in law and ought to be quashed, **1906 A. W. N. 306 = 4 Cr. L. J. 452**. In **15 Cr. L. J. 704 (M)** it was *held* that s 212 shows that it is not imperative on Magistrate to examine any defence witnesses after reaching the stage of framing a charge under s. 210 and it does not matter that summonses have been issued to the witnesses. This case was committed under s 347. See Note 7 to s 215

4. Witnesses not to be unfairly dealt with.—When witnesses for the defence do attend it is illegal on the part of the Court to threaten them with penalties of the law, unless they are evidently giving wilfully false evidence or persistently refusing to give evidence of facts which must be within their knowledge, **14 A. 242**

213. (1) When the accused on being required to give in a list under section 211, has declined to do so, or when he has given in such list and the witnesses (if any) included therein whom the Magistrate desires to examine have been summoned and examined under section 212, the Magistrate may make an

Order of commitment

order committing the accused for trial by the High Court or the Court of Session (as the case may be), and (unless the Magistrate is a Presidency Magistrate) shall also record briefly the reasons for such commitment.

(2) If the Magistrate, after hearing the witnesses for the defence, is satisfied that there are not sufficient grounds for committing the accused, he may cancel the charge and discharge the accused.

Notes.—1. Commitment must be to the Sessions Court having local jurisdiction.—The expression 'the Court of Session' here can only mean the Court of Session having jurisdiction to try the case under s. 177 Section 63 of Act X of 1872 provided that Magistrates shall ordinarily commit to the Court of Session for the Sessions division in which the district to which they appointed is situated. But the present Code contains no similar provision. Where a commitment is made to a wrong Sessions Court, it must be set aside notwithstanding the provision of s. 531, 35 M. 387 dissenting from 8 B. 312 and 18 A. 330.

2. Magistrate not bound to examine witness for the defence.—Sections 212 and 213 do not compel a Magistrate to summon and examine witnesses for the defence after a charge has been drawn up or even before the charge is drawn up if the Magistrate for reasons to be recorded deems it unnecessary to do so, s. 208 (3), 35 M. 321. See Note 8 under s. 203 and Note 7 to s. 215.

3. Cross-examination of prosecution witnesses may be allowed even after charge.—The words 'witnesses for the defence' in sub-sec. (2) are wide enough to cover evidence extracted by cross-examination from witnesses for the prosecution. It is therefore open to the Magistrate to allow cross-examination of the prosecution witnesses even after a charge had been framed and on consideration of such evidence cancel the charge, 39 C. 883; 5 C. W. N. 110 referred to. See Note 11 to s. 203. S. 347 cannot be read as subject to s. 208, so as to render it imperative on a Magistrate after he has decided to commit the case to the Sessions to allow the accused to cross-examine the prosecution witnesses and to call witnesses in his defence, 35 C. 48; Ratanlal 975; 12 Bom. L. R. 923 = 11 Cr. L. J. 692. See, however, Note 13 to s. 208.

4. Until commitment a Magistrate may cancel the charge.—It is only the order of commitment under s. 213 or s. 214 which takes away the Magistrate's power of further proceeding with the case. Even after framing a charge under s. 210 it is open to the Magistrate to consider whether he ought to commit or not 5 C. W. N. 110; 12 Bom. L. R. 521 = 11 Cr. L. J. 495. But if he commits, he has no longer the power to discharge, nor is a Magistrate who has pronounced the order of commitment, competent to try the accused for an offence triable by him by cancelling the charges of offences beyond his jurisdiction, 2 C. L. J. 33. See 1 L. B. P. 345 as to the scope of sub-sec. (2). The ruling in Ratanlal 161 of the year 1881 which seems to lay down that an order of commitment must follow the making of a charge does not seem to be correct having regard to sub-sec. (2). See Note 5 to s. 210.

5. Case compounded after commitment, discharge illegal.—Where a Magistrate after committing a person for trial on a charge of adultery, immediately afterwards on the representation of the prosecutor wished to withdraw from the prosecution discharged the accused, it was held that the order of discharge was bad, as under this section a commitment once made can be quashed by the High Court only. The discharge was therefore quashed and the case sent back to the Sessions Judge, directing him to complainant and then take such further proceedings as to him might seem fit, 4 A. 150.

6. Power to commit after cancelling discharge.—Where a Magistrate after examining the prosecution discharged the accused but subsequently on becoming aware that the accused had present cancelled his order of discharge, took further evidence and committed the accused to the Court of Session, held that the commitment was good, 7 M. H. C. R. Appx. XL; 23 C. 211.

7. Magistrate must marshal the evidence.—In preparing the charge the committing Magistrate should marshal the evidence in the order in which it is given by the witnesses.

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8. Magistrate must give reasons for commitment.—Failure of the Magistrate to give reasons for commitment in a case which he could deal with may amount to an illegality 81, 82, 83, 84, 85, 86, 87, 88, 89, 90, 91, 92, 93, 94, 95, 96, 97, 98, 99, 100, 101, 102, 103, 104, 105, 106, 107, 108, 109, 110, 111, 112, 113, 114, 115, 116, 117, 118, 119, 120, 121, 122, 123, 124, 125, 126, 127, 128, 129, 130, 131, 132, 133, 134, 135, 136, 137, 138, 139, 140, 141, 142, 143, 144, 145, 146, 147, 148, 149, 150, 151, 152, 153, 154, 155, 156, 157, 158, 159, 160, 161, 162, 163, 164, 165, 166, 167, 168, 169, 170, 171, 172, 173, 174, 175, 176, 177, 178, 179, 180, 181, 182, 183, 184, 185, 186, 187, 188, 189, 190, 191, 192, 193, 194, 195, 196, 197, 198, 199, 200, 201, 202, 203, 204, 205, 206, 207, 208, 209, 210, 211, 212, 213, 214, 215, 216, 217, 218, 219, 220, 221, 222, 223, 224, 225, 226, 227, 228, 229, 230, 231, 232, 233, 234, 235, 236, 237, 238, 239, 240, 241, 242, 243, 244, 245, 246, 247, 248, 249, 250, 251, 252, 253, 254, 255, 256, 257, 258, 259, 260, 261, 262, 263, 264, 265, 266, 267, 268, 269, 270, 271, 272, 273, 274, 275, 276, 277, 278, 279, 280, 281, 282, 283, 284, 285, 286, 287, 288, 289, 290, 291, 292, 293, 294, 295, 296, 297, 298, 299, 300, 301, 302, 303, 304, 305, 306, 307, 308, 309, 310, 311, 312, 313, 314, 315, 316, 317, 318, 319, 320, 321, 322, 323, 324, 325, 326, 327, 328, 329, 330, 331, 332, 333, 334, 335, 336, 337, 338, 339, 340, 341, 342, 343, 344, 345, 346, 347, 348, 349, 350, 351, 352, 353, 354, 355, 356, 357, 358, 359, 360, 361, 362, 363, 364, 365, 366, 367, 368, 369, 370, 371, 372, 373, 374, 375, 376, 377, 378, 379, 380, 381, 382, 383, 384, 385, 386, 387, 388, 389, 390, 391, 392, 393, 394, 395, 396, 397, 398, 399, 400, 401, 402, 403, 404, 405, 406, 407, 408, 409, 410, 411, 412, 413, 414, 415, 416, 417, 418, 419, 420, 421, 422, 423, 424, 425, 426, 427, 428, 429, 430, 431, 432, 433, 434, 435, 436, 437, 438, 439, 440, 441, 442, 443, 444, 445, 446, 447, 448, 449, 450, 451, 452, 453, 454, 455, 456, 457, 458, 459, 460, 461, 462, 463, 464, 465, 466, 467, 468, 469, 470, 471, 472, 473, 474, 475, 476, 477, 478, 479, 480, 481, 482, 483, 484, 485, 486, 487, 488, 489, 490, 491, 492, 493, 494, 495, 496, 497, 498, 499, 500, 501, 502, 503, 504, 505, 506, 507, 508, 509, 510, 511, 512, 513, 514, 515, 516, 517, 518, 519, 520, 521, 522, 523, 524, 525, 526, 527, 528, 529, 530, 531, 532, 533, 534, 535, 536, 537, 538, 539, 540, 541, 542, 543, 544, 545, 546, 547, 548, 549, 550, 551, 552, 553, 554, 555, 556, 557, 558, 559, 560, 561, 562, 563, 564, 565, 566, 567, 568, 569, 570, 571, 572, 573, 574, 575, 576, 577, 578, 579, 580, 581, 582, 583, 584, 585, 586, 587, 588, 589, 590, 591, 592, 593, 594, 595, 596, 597, 598, 599, 600, 601, 602, 603, 604, 605, 606, 607, 608, 609, 610, 611, 612, 613, 614, 615, 616, 617, 618, 619, 620, 621, 622, 623, 624, 625, 626, 627, 628, 629, 630, 631, 632, 633, 634, 635, 636, 637, 638, 639, 640, 641, 642, 643, 644, 645, 646, 647, 648, 649, 650, 651, 652, 653, 654, 655, 656, 657, 658, 659, 660, 661, 662, 663, 664, 665, 666, 667, 668, 669, 670, 671, 672, 673, 674, 675, 676, 677, 678, 679, 680, 681, 682, 683, 684, 685, 686, 687, 688, 689, 690, 691, 692, 693, 694, 695, 696, 697, 698, 699, 700, 701, 702, 703, 704, 705, 706, 707, 708, 709, 710, 711, 712, 713, 714, 715, 716, 717, 718, 719, 720, 721, 722, 723, 724, 725, 726, 727, 728, 729, 730, 731, 732, 733, 734, 735, 736, 737, 738, 739, 740, 741, 742, 743, 744, 745, 746, 747, 748, 749, 750, 751, 752, 753, 754, 755, 756, 757, 758, 759, 760, 761, 762, 763, 764, 765, 766, 767, 768, 769, 770, 771, 772, 773, 774, 775, 776, 777, 778, 779, 780, 781, 782, 783, 784, 785, 786, 787, 788, 789, 790, 791, 792, 793, 794, 795, 796, 797, 798, 799, 800, 801, 802, 803, 804, 805, 806, 807, 808, 809, 810, 811, 812, 813, 814, 815, 816, 817, 818, 819, 820, 821, 822, 823, 824, 825, 826, 827, 828, 829, 830, 831, 832, 833, 834, 835, 836, 837, 838, 839, 840, 841, 842, 843, 844, 845, 846, 847, 848, 849, 850, 851, 852, 853, 854, 855, 856, 857, 858, 859, 860, 861, 862, 863, 864, 865, 866, 867, 868, 869, 870, 871, 872, 873, 874, 875, 876, 877, 878, 879, 880, 881, 882, 883, 884, 885, 886, 887, 888, 889, 890, 891, 892, 893, 894, 895, 896, 897, 898, 899, 900, 901, 902, 903, 904, 905, 906, 907, 908, 909, 910, 911, 912, 913, 914, 915, 916, 917, 918, 919, 920, 921, 922, 923, 924, 925, 926, 927, 928, 929, 930, 931, 932, 933, 934, 935, 936, 937, 938, 939, 940, 941, 942, 943, 944, 945, 946, 947, 948, 949, 950, 951, 952, 953, 954, 955, 956, 957, 958, 959, 960, 961, 962, 963, 964, 965, 966, 967, 968, 969, 970, 971, 972, 973, 974, 975, 976, 977, 978, 979, 980, 981, 982, 983, 984, 985, 986, 987, 988, 989, 990, 991, 992, 993, 994, 995, 996, 997, 998, 999, 1000.

9 Magistrate must sign warrant of commitment.—The signature of the Magistrate to the warrant of commitment should not be affixed by a stamp, 6 M 396

10 Commitment in the absence of the accused.—Where one of the accused is absent when the proceedings are held at which the order of commitment is made, the order is illegal, 5 C W. N. 110. But where a person, who was allowed under s 285 to appear by agent was committed, the High Court held that the commitment was not necessarily illegal, but as the agent had not been required to give in a list of witnesses whom he wished to have summoned for his principal, the Court directed the Magistrate to make the demand, 2 W. R. 50. See also 17 C. W. N. 1243.

11. Joint indictment of two or more persons.—When two or more persons are jointly indicted and the jurisdiction of the Magistrate is ousted in the case of one, the proper course is to commit both or all for trial before the Court of Session, Welr I, 448. But the adoption of a different course by the committing Magistrate is not in contravention of any provision of law, Welr II, 258. See Note 6 to s. 210

12. Opposing fractions not to be jointly committed.—Where riot is charged and the Magistrate is about to commit the contending parties for trial, not only should separate charges be drawn up against each party, but separate trials should be held, since the offences of each party are distinct and separate and both the parties have not the same common object, 8 W. R. 47; 9 W. R. 33; 6 C 96; 14 C. 338; 20 C. 537; 8 C. W. N. 180. But the ruling in 25 M. 61 (P.C.) does not apply to preliminary inquiries prior to commitment, 26 M. 592. In cases of joint commitment, the Sessions Judge should frame separate charges and try separately. See Note 7 to s. 215

13 High Court's power of quashing commitment.—A commitment made under this section can be quashed by the High Court under s 215 only on a point of law, 15 A. L. J. 756. Absence of evidence to warrant commitment is a point of law and may furnish good ground for quashing commitment, U. B. R. (1917) 3rd 2r. 29. But a commitment made under s 436 is liable in revision to be set aside by the High Court on the merits, &c., where it is made on evidence which is insufficient and unreliable, 7 C. W. N. 327.

214. [Repealed by Act XII of 1923] See Chapter XXXIII.

215. A commitment once made under section 213* by a competent Magistrate† or by a Civil or Revenue Court under section 478, can be quashed by the High Court only, and only on a point of law

Notes.—1. Section applies only to commitments made under the four sections specified.—This section does not deal with commitments directed by the District Magistrate or Sessions Judge under s 436, 31 C. 1; 7 C. W. N. 327; 30 M. 224; 27 M. 54. An order passed by the High Court directing a commitment under s 526 (i) (iv) is not at all subject to its revisional powers, nor is this section applicable to such a commitment 27 M. 54

2 Section does not apply to directions to commit but High Court may revise.—This section only applies to a commitment actually made and not to a case where under s. 436, a Sessions Judge has merely directed a commitment to be made, 30 M. 224, where 7 C. W. N. 327; 15 C. 621 and 14 M. 334 are referred to, such directions are subject to the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court under ss. 435 and 439 and may be quashed on the merits. An order of commitment made by a District Magistrate in direct contravention of the provisions of s. 436 (a) in committing the accused without allowing them an opportunity to show cause against the commitment is bad in law and must be quashed, 28 P. W. R. 1913 = 14 Cr. L. J. 605; 15 M. L. J. 373 = 2 Cr. L. J. 774; 6 M. 372

3 Does this section oust the general revisional jurisdiction of the High Court?—In 2 A. 398, STUART, C. J. (SIANKIE, J., *doubting*), was of opinion that the terms of the section were not used in any exclusive sense so as to deprive the High Court of its large powers of revision

4. Jurisdiction of the Criminal Appellate Bench of the High Court to quash the commitment made to it in its original criminal jurisdiction.—It is doubtful if the Criminal Appellate Bench of the High Court has jurisdiction to quash a commitment made to the High Court for trial under its ordinary original criminal jurisdiction. The practice has been to apply to the Judge exercising the original criminal jurisdiction of the High Court, 36 C. 45.

* The words and figure "or section 214" have been omitted by the Criminal Law Amendment Act 1923

† The words "or by a Court of Session under section 477" have been omitted by the Criminal Procedure (Amendment) Act 1923

5. *High Court alone can quash commitment.*—Except the High Court no other authority is competent to quash any commitment, even in a compoundable case, 4 A. 180; 16 M. L. J. 525; Weir II, 252. If in the opinion of the Sessions Judge, commitment made to his Court is illegal, he should refer the case for the orders of the High Court, the insufficiency of the legal evidence against the prisoner is no ground for such a reference 1 W. R. 8. In such cases it may sometimes be advisable to bring the matter to the notice of the District Magistrate with a view to his instructing the committing Magistrate to obtain additional evidence.

6. *No application to quash commitment will lie after commitment of trial.*—This section is inapplicable to a case in which a reference is made to quash the commitment after the accused has been put on his trial before the Court of Session and pleaded *not guilty* and has been tried with the aid of assessors, Weir II, 262; 12 C. L. R. 120; 9 L. J. 230 (Bind). See *contra* 6 C. 354, where it was held that the High Court can quash a commitment at any stage of the case.

7. *Irregularities in procedure how far vitiate a commitment.*—The principles laid down in s. 537 should in general guide the High Court in dealing with an application under this section, 12 Cr. L. J. 320 (Bind).

(i) *Joint inquiry does not vitiate commitment.*—There is no provision of law requiring separate inquiry in respect of each accused person. S. 233 refers to trials only. Though the trial could not be joint there can be no objection to the proceedings prior to commitment, on the ground there was misjoinder of offences or offenders at the preliminary inquiry, 7 Bom. L. R. 457 = 2 Cr. L. J. 432. The ruling of the Privy Council in 23 M. 61 cannot be extended to a preliminary inquiry leading up to a commitment so as to render the commitment itself illegal because there was misjoinder of offences or offenders. S. 233 and the succeeding sections apply to joint trials only. In such a case the Sessions Court ought to frame separate charges and try the accused separately as if there were two or more commitments, 26 M. 592, 17 Cr. L. J. 369. See also 1920 A. W. N. 206, where it was held that the fact the Magistrate had wrongly committed jointly three persons charged with offences under ss. 212 and 216, I. P. C., to the Sessions, when they should have been committed separately under s. 233 was not a sufficient ground for quashing their commitment under this section. A commitment is not vitiated because charges are framed in respect of offences which cannot be tried together (1916) 2 M. W. N. 179 = 17 Cr. L. J. 369. Where, however, a Magistrate held a joint investigation in the case of four accused persons who were charged with different offences under ss. 211, 214, 465 and 193, I. P. C. Held, that the procedure was illegal and so much to the prejudice of the accused that the commitment must be quashed, Ratanlal 925. See Note 4.

(ii) *Issuing a warrant instead of a summons.*—The error of a Magistrate in proceeding by a warrant instead of by a summons is not an error for which the commitment is quashed.

(iii) *Installing instead of signing the warrant of commitment* is not material. 12 Cr. L. J. 320 (Bind).

(iv) *Want of sanction under s. 195.*—Unless the accused have been prejudiced and there has been a failure of justice, a commitment ought not to be quashed merely because of the absence of sanction under s. 195. See 12 Cr. L. J. 320 (Bind), and Note 23 to s. 195 and 24 M. 121. See however, 6 A. 98.

(v) *Refused by the Inquiring Magistrate to allow cross examination or to examine witnesses of the accused under s. 208.*—A Magistrate in making a commitment must follow the provisions of this Chapter. Where he has not carried out the imperative provisions of law laid down in s. 208 before committing the accused for trial, the case come before the Sessions Court in a manner not contemplated by law and the commitment is illegal and must be quashed. A Magistrate is bound under s. 208 to take all the evidence which may be produced by the prosecution, to allow all the witnesses of the prosecution to be cross-examined by the accused, and to take all such evidence as might be produced on behalf of the accused. A commitment made without complying with these provisions is illegal and will be quashed 6 L. B. R. 129 = 5 Bur. L. T. 239 = 10 Cr. L. J. 877 (F.B.) ROBINSON, J., *dissenting*. But where as under s. 208 (3) and ss. 212 and 213 the law allows a Magistrate a discretion and does not compel him to summon and examine witnesses for the defence and a Magistrate refused to summon certain witness for the accused on the ground that the application for summoning the witnesses was made too late, the commitment is valid, 36 M. 321; 42 C. 608. A Magistrate is not empowered to frame a charge or make out an order for commitment until and after he had taken all such evidence as the accused had before him for hearing, 20 A. 264; 26 A. 177. In these two cases the rule is stated in terms wider than those of the Code and no reference is made to the discretion of the Magistrate. See also 1906 A. W. N. 306 = 4 Cr. L. J. 452. A Magistrate errs if he does not take all the evidence produced before drawing up a charge unless he can justify his procedure on some such ground as the evidence of a witness is obviously irrelevant or that he considers the fact in essence between the parties proved one way or the other by the evidence already produced 10 A. L. J. 144 = 13 Cr. L. J. 443. In Ratanlal 975 and 36 C. 43, it was held that under the provisions of

dissertation

1 Low, poor, — in opposition to rich or great;
as, a *lean action* [*care*]

Syn — Slender spare thin, or lank skinny
gaunt

Lean n That part of flesh which consists of muscle

L

Leisure

2 To gain or receive knowledge, to receive in
struction to take pattern, — with of.

Take my yoke upon you and learn of me; for I am meek

th
was I ever in a
-wa d il see who

son {like}
yester
on other at all
do I know

{like} Swir
is some weak
may, vague, un-
known

a little but trench

if I hear further
= 11

22

2 space passed by leaping

To the convenient leap I mean to try Dryden

3 A hazardous or venturesome act a step

4 A pulsation with or without a female head.

5 {Vieling} An abrupt shift in the position of a
mineral vein

6 {Mas} A passing from one note to another by
an interval especially by a 1 mg one or by one in
cluding several other and intermediate intervals

Leap, n. {L S} 1 A basket. {R S} If ye give

2 A wicker net in which fish are taken

{True Fay}

3 Any tenure by grant or permission, the time

for which such a tenure holds good

4 A high placed blacketh

Small like the nose of nature

Leather-mouthed, —

like leath r, that is, smooth and without teeth

By leather-mouthed fish 2 areas such as have 2 rows of
to their throat, as the chub.

Stink

L, S, l, S, G, F, long, L, S, l, S, G, F, short, c&re, f&r, l&st, f&ll, what, th&re, v&ll, t&rm, p&que, f&rm, d&ne, f&r, d&g, v&ll, f&nd, f&ut;

s. 347 a Magistrate was not bound to examine the witnesses of the accused and a commitment was not illegal because the Magistrate refused to do so. These cases were not followed in the Burma Full Bench Case. In 36 C. 48 the accused did not cross-examine the prosecution witnesses immediately after their examination in chief, but applied to cross-examine the witness after the prosecution closed its case. The decisions may be supported though the reasoning is open to question. In 15 Cr. L. J. 704 (M.) it was held following 36 C. 48 and dissenting from 20 A. 264 and 26 A. 177 that the Magistrate has a discretion to examine witnesses or not after he reaches the stage of framing a charge under s. 210.

(vi) *Not giving reasons may invalidate commitment*—See Note 9 below

8. **Insufficiency of evidence, how far a ground for quashing commitment.**—A commitment can be quashed on a point of law only. An order of commitment cannot be quashed on the ground that there is no evidence on the committing Magistrate's record to sustain the charges, 13 Bom. L. R. 201 = 12 Cr. L. J. 356; 7 Bur. L. T. 26 = 15 Cr. L. J. 270. In 27 M. L. J. 593 = 15 Cr. L. J. 665, it was held following 13 Bom. L. R. 201 that it is not open to a High Court to quash a commitment on the ground that there is no evidence to justify the commitment and in such a case the accused ought not to be deprived of the benefit of an acquittal, the case in 6 A. 93 was not followed. A commitment made without direct evidence and merely on presumption is not erroneous in point of law, and as such cannot be quashed under this section. Where there is evidence that a forged document was used on behalf of an accused person with his knowledge or under his instructions or with his approval, which might be proved by the conduct of the accused, it cannot be said that there is no evidence upon which commitment could be made, 4 C. W. N. 116. But where the order of commitment rests upon a misapprehension and there is no evidence upon which it could be supported, Welr 11, 282; or accepting the evidence as true if it does not necessary establish an offence, 2 C. L. J. 46 = 2 Cr. L. J. 333; or there is no evidence to connect the accused with the charge, 6 A. 93, the commitment may be quashed. In 5 C. W. N. 411 and 9 C. W. N. 829, the Calcutta High Court has laid down that whether there is or is not sufficient evidence to warrant a commitment is a question of law within the meaning of this section. Commitments duly made could be quashed under this section, when the evidence stopped short of a case which could properly be left to a jury. Under the Code, a Sessions Judge has not the power to withdraw a case from the jury on any account whatsoever. But if the evidence in a case is such that the presiding Judge would, if he had the power, withdraw it from the jury, the High Court (which alone has the power to quash a commitment) ought not to allow the commitment to stand. But it is questionable, how far it is for the benefit of the accused to object to the commitment. The result of the trial would be an acquittal, but by obtaining an order under this section, he would be liable under s. 403 to further proceedings if evidence is found against him which was overlooked before 2 A. 398. See also 1836 A. W. N. 256.

9. **That the case is triable by a Magistrate whether a ground for quashing commitment.**—If a Magistrate thinks that a case not exclusively triable by the Court of Session must be committed, he must state his grounds in the order to enable the High Court to judge whether the commitment is made in the sound exercise of the discretionary power vested in him by law, 11 Bom. L. R. 18 = 9 Cr. L. J. 163; 15 Bom. L. R. 998 and 997 = 14 Cr. L. J. 657; 24 C. 429; 8 B. L. R. 23 = 15 Cr. L. J. 664. The mere fact that the offences disclosed by the evidence

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not interfere as there is no point of law, 11 A. L. J. 439 = 14 Cr. L. J. 304. A Magistrate going on leave exercises all improper discretion in committing to the Court of Session a case properly triable by the Magistrate, merely on the ground that the witnesses for the defence are not in attendance, and that it would be inconvenient for his successors to commence the trial anew, but in so doing he does not commit such illegality as will justify the High Court in quashing the commitment, Ratanlal 110. Where a Magistrate committed the accused on a charge under s. 323, I. P. C., triable by any Magistrate, held that the words 'ought to be tried' in ss. 207 and 247 of this Code must be read with s. 254 and a case which ought to be tried by a Court of Session is one in which the Magistrate is either not competent to try or is one in which, in his opinion, adequate punishment cannot be inflicted by him. As this was not the opinion of the Magistrate, the Bombay High Court in the case of *Purni Ramchod* (3rd January, 1902) quashed the commitment, holding the same illegal and directed the Magistrate to dispose of the case according to law. But where there were counter-charges of not one of which resulted in homicide and the Magistrate committed both cases although the charge under s. 143, I. P. C., in one case was purely magisterial, the High Court refused to quash the commitment as it was not illegal and the Magistrate's discretion ought not to be lightly interfered with, 1888 A. W. N. 356; 1900 A. W. N. 206. In 1908 A. W. N. 28

3 A. L. J. 14=3 Cr. L. J. 94 and 8 A. L. J. 989=11 Cr. L. J. 81, it has, however, been held where a Magistrate finding there was a *prima facie* case against an accused person under ss. 352 and 447, I P. C., committed the accused to the Court of Session held the commitment was wrong on a point of law, because (i) there was no warrant for the commitment of such case and (ii) the maximum punishment under each offence was one which the Magistrate could inflict.

10 Grounds held sufficient to quash a commitment.—(i) *That the Sessions Court has no territorial jurisdiction over the offence*—In 8 B. 312 and 18 A. 350, it was held that though commitment to a Sessions Court having no jurisdiction to try the case is illegal, yet the High Court may direct the case to the Court having jurisdiction, but in 36 M. 387, however, it was held that the High Court cannot uphold the commitment by directing the transfer to the Court having jurisdiction.

(ii) *Commencement of prosecution six months after sanction*, s. 195 (6).—When prosecution is commenced after expiration of six months from the date of sanction given under s. 195 and proceedings are carried on in spite of the objection of the accused and he is committed to the Sessions the High Court will quash the commitment 22 C. 176; s. 537 cannot cure such a defect.

(iii) *Quashing of the commitment of the European British subject jointly charged*—If the commitment of an European British subject be quashed on account of any irregularity in the proceedings *e.g.* want of sanction, the commitment of a person jointly charged with him must be quashed also 9 B. 288 at p. 200 *Per SARKISANT C. J.*

(iv) *Commitment without the exercise of judicial discretion but at the suggestion of another Magistrate*—Where a commitment is made by a Magistrate without exercising his judicial discretion, but at the suggestion of the District Magistrate, held that the commitment must be quashed, 15 M. 39. An order directing a Magistrate to commit an accused person who has been discharged by him, simply because the offence is triable exclusively by the Court of Session is bad in law, *Weir II*, 260; 9 Bom. L. R. 225=3 Cr. L. J. 213.

(v) *Commitment of approver along with co-accused*—Secs. 337. A Magistrate believing that an approver to whom pardon had been tendered had given false evidence in the case declared the tender forfeited and committed him along with others to the Court of Session. Held that the commitment must be quashed and that nothing could be done against such person till after the case in the Sessions Court against his co-accused had finished and that then his trial should be commenced *de novo* if it is deemed necessary to take proceedings against him 23 B. 493; 24 M. 321, 14 W. R. 10; 19 W. R. 43, 25 B. 675. Where the conditional pardon tendered to an accused person was forfeited and he was committed to the Sessions Court for trial along with the others charged with the same offence, the commitment was quashed because he had not had an opportunity of cross-examining the witnesses 20 A. 529. The Sessions Judge has no power himself to direct the trial of such a person or to try him at once with the others for under s. 193 except as otherwise specially provided a Sessions Court cannot take cognizance of an offence without a committal 22 C. 50, 15 M. 352. A preliminary inquiry should therefore precede the commitment. See Notes to ss. 337 and 339.

(vi) *Commitment of approver before trial of other accused liable to be quashed*—There may arise cases in which owing to the absconding of the offenders the trial of an approver who may not have complied with the conditions of pardon will appear to be necessary or expedient and in such cases the result of the trial of the principals may not be waited for. But still as a general rule the provisions of s. 337 must be complied with and ordinarily in every such case he should be examined as witness and until he has been so examined,

18 A. 1.

(vii) *Commitment in the absence of or without notice to the accused liable to be quashed*.—A commitment based on evidence recorded in the absence of the accused is illegal *Weir II*, 259; it is illegal to make an order of commitment in the absence of the accused 5 C. W. N. 110, 6 M. 372, see also Note 10 to s. 213. But see 12 C. L. R. 120.

(viii) *Committing two accused for reason that one or other of them is guilty*—Where a Magistrate by the same committal order commits two sets of accused on the ground that one or other of them is guilty of the murder of a boy the commitment is illegal 17 M. L. J. (S. N.) 46.

(ix) *Commitment made under the mistaken view that the Magistrate has no jurisdiction to try*—When a Magistrate committed a case under s. 147, I P. C. owing to a mistaken view of a High Court Circular which he thought prevented him from trying the case the commitment was quashed. 24 C. 429.

§ 347 a Magistrate was not bound to examine the witnesses of the accused and a commitment was not illegal because the Magistrate refused to do so. These cases were not followed in the Burma Full Bench Case. In 36 C. 38 the accused did not cross-examine the prosecution witnesses immediately after their examination in chief, but applied to cross-examine the witness after the prosecution closed its case. The decisions may be supported though the reasoning is open to question. In 15 Cr. L. J. 705 (M) it was held following 36 C. 48 and dissenting from 20 A. 264 and 26 A. 177 that the Magistrate has a discretion to examine witnesses or not after he reaches the stage of framing a charge under s. 210.

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Head of Herring Gull
 (Larus argentatus)

m, 2, 3, 5, 6, 7 long; 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45, 46, 47, 48, 49, 50, 51, 52, 53, 54, 55, 56, 57, 58, 59, 60, 61, 62, 63, 64, 65, 66, 67, 68, 69, 70, 71, 72, 73, 74, 75, 76, 77, 78, 79, 80, 81, 82, 83, 84, 85, 86, 87, 88, 89, 90, 91, 92, 93, 94, 95, 96, 97, 98, 99, 100

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(vi) *Commitment of approver before trial of other accused, liable to be quashed*.—There may arise cases in which owing to the absconding of the offenders, the trial of an approver who may not have complied with the conditions of pardon, will appear to be necessary or expedient and in such cases, the result of the trial of the principals may not be waited for. But still as a general rule, the provisions of s. 337 must be complied with and ordinarily in every such case he should be examined as witness and until he has been so examined, his trial for any offence connected with the one in respect of which pardon has been granted should not take place. In 14 A. 336, the Allahabad High Court in a murder case, quashed the commitment of an approver made before the completion of the trial of the principal offenders charged with the murder.

(vii) *Commitment in the absence of or without notice to the accused liable to be quashed*.—A commitment based on evidence recorded in the absence of the accused is illegal, Weir II, 259; it is illegal to make an order of commitment in the absence of the accused, 5 C. W. N. 110; 6 M. 372, see also Note 10 to s. 213. But see 12 C. L. R. 120.

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(ix) *Commitment made under the mistaken view that the Magistrate has no jurisdiction to try*.—When a Magistrate committed a case under s. 147, I P. C., owing to a mistaken view of a High Court Circular which he thought prevented him from trying the case, the commitment was quashed. 24 C. 429.

(x) *Commitment on the request of the accused.*—The committal of an accused to the Court of Session, either on his own request or because the case has created sensation in his community or on the ground that the amount involved is large, is not proper and is liable to be set aside by the High Court. 28 Bom. L. R. 293.

11. What are not proper grounds for quashing a commitment.—

(i) *That the committing Magistrate had no territorial jurisdiction.*—If the commitment is valid on the face of it, a Sessions Judge cannot refer the case to the High Court simply because the accused were not British subjects and the offence with which they were charged was committed out of British India. He should dispose of the case according to law. Should he, after taking evidence, find that he has no jurisdiction over the accused by reason of their being foreign subjects and the offence being committed in foreign territory, he must discharge the accused. *Ratanlal 922*. A commitment ought not to be quashed for want of territorial jurisdiction on the part of the committing Magistrate unless a failure of justice has in fact been caused, 7 Bar. L. T. 26=15 Cr. L. J. 370. See also 16 B. 204; 26 M. 640. The facts that the committing Magistrate had no territorial jurisdiction over the place in which the alleged offence was committed and that the Sessions Judge did not quash the commitment under s 532, even though objection was taken prior to commitment, were held to be no grounds for setting aside the conviction of the Sessions Court, 17 M. 402. See Notes under s 531.

(ii) *That the committing Magistrate was not duly empowered.*—See s. 531 and Notes 2 to s. 207.

(iii) *That the committal has been made after a previous discharge.*—Where a Magistrate, after examining four witnesses for the prosecution, discharged the accused, and subsequently, on becoming aware that there was a fifth witness present, cancelled his order of discharge, took further evidence, and committed the accused for trial to the Court of Session, held, that the commitment was good, 7 M. H. C. R. App. XL. Similarly a commitment by a Presidency Magistrate on fresh evidence was held legal, although the accused may have been discharged by another Presidency Magistrate and the order of discharge had not been set aside, 5 C. W. N. 169. The discharge of an accused by a Sessions Judge on appeal on the ground that the trying Magistrate had no jurisdiction, is no bar to a Court of competent jurisdiction taking fresh proceeding and in cases exclusively triable by the Court of Session, committing the accused, 29 C. 411. The failure on the part of the Sessions Judge to order a re-trial is not a defect of law for which the High Court would quash the commitment under this section.

(iv) *Filing of regular suit to establish genuineness of document is no ground for quashing commitment.*—The fact that a regular suit has been filed to establish the genuineness of a transaction is not sufficient to enable the High Court to quash a commitment regularly made by a Subordinate Judge to the Sessions Court or to direct the trial to be adjourned pending the hearing of the civil suit or appeal therefrom, 18 B 581, 31 C. 858. But it was held in *Weir II*, 260 that where a complaint of forgery of a document has been dismissed by a Magistrate and the question of its genuineness is pending in a suit in the Civil Court though subsequently brought, it is desirable to postpone further criminal proceedings in respect of the complaint of forgery.

(v) *Discovery of fresh evidence after commitment.*—Where a Magistrate after commitment made, held further inquiry and recorded that if the inquiry had been previously made he would not have committed, the High Court refused to quash the commitment but ordered the trial to proceed 1885 A. W. N. 53. The proper course for the Magistrate under such circumstances would be to instruct the Public Prosecutor to withdraw from the prosecution under s 494 with the consent of the Sessions Judge. But the Public Prosecutor ought not to abandon the case without the sanction of the Court at the mere direction of the District Magistrate, as that would amount to the indirect reversal of the order of the committing Magistrate of which the direct reversal would have been illegal.

(vi) *Committal in cases of perjury, to the very Judge before whom false evidence is given not bad.*—An accused having been committed to the Sessions Court on a charge under s. 193, I P C, for having given false evidence in a judicial proceeding before the same Sessions Judge, held that the commitment could not be quashed, because there was no error in law, but in the absence of an Additional or Assistant Sessions Judge, the case was transferred to another Sessions Court, 1 B. 311; 4 A. 150.

(vii) *Omission to inquire into false charge brought by accused will not invalidate commitment.*—A commitment for trial under the provisions of s. 211, I P C, for knowingly instituting a false charge is not illegal, merely because the complaint which the accused made had not been judicially inquired into, but is based on the report of the Police that the case was false, 6 C. 582.

(viii) *Simultaneous commitment of robber and receiver of stolen property not illegal.*—The commitment for trial in one and the same case of accused, some for the offence of robbery, and the rest for receiving property stolen in that robbery, not being illegal cannot be quashed under this section, *Ratanlal 915*.

(1r) *That a number of the joint offenders have not been arrested.*—The fact that some of the accused were committed while other persons acting in concert were not yet arrested is not a ground for quashing the commitment, 7 M L T 187 = 11 Cr L J 333.

(2) *Commitment of European British subjects in British Baluchistan to a Court of Sessions.*—A commitment of an European British subject to the Court of Session by the Extra Assistant Commissioner Quetta, is proper and cannot be quashed under this section, as the Court of Sessions in Baluchistan have by Regulation VIII of 1896 jurisdiction to try European British subjects duly committed 5 P R 1907 = 6 Cr L J 108

(3) *Commitment on evidence recorded Magistrate from where file case is transferred.*—It is open to a Magistrate to commit an accused on evidence recorded by another Magistrate from whose file the case was transferred under s 529 S. 350 applies to such a case, 38 A. 315

12 *Sessions Judge must forthwith examine the record of commitment.*—Sessions Judges shall carefully examine the record of each case committed in order to satisfy themselves that Magistrate have carried out the requirements of the law, and the instructions issued by the Judicial Commissioner. This should be done immediately on receipt of the record so that it may be at once returned to the committing Magistrate to supply the deficiencies if there are any *Oudh Cr Dig* at p 10

13. *When Court of Session can discharge without trial.*—It is only when the charge attributes acts which do not constitute an offence that the Court of Session can discharge without a trial. But in all other cases where a prisoner has once been committed for trial on a certain charge the Court of Session is bound to require him to plead to the charge however insufficient the evidence may appear to be. Where the order of commitment rests upon a misapprehension and there is no evidence upon which it could be supported the High Court alone can under this section set aside the order and quash the commitment *Weir II, 262*

14. *Court of Session has no power to remand case committed, for further evidence.*—A Court of Session to which a case may be committed for trial has no power to remand it to the committing Magistrate for the cross-examination of the prosecution witnesses whose cross-examination may have been reserved by the accused for the Sessions Court *Weir II, 260*

216. When the accused has given in any list of witnesses under section 211 and has

summons to witnesses for defence when accused is committed.

been committed for trial the Magistrate shall summon such of the witnesses included in the list as have not appeared before himself to appear before the Court to which the accused has been committed

Provided that where the accused has been committed to the High Court the Magistrate may in his discretion leave such witnesses to be summoned by the Clerk of the Crown and such witnesses may be summoned accordingly

Provided also that if the Magistrate thinks that any witness is included in the list for the purpose of vexation or delay, or of defeating the ends of justice the Magistrate may require the accused to satisfy him that there are reasonable grounds for believing that the evidence of such witness is material and if he is not so satisfied may refuse to summon the witness (recording his reasons for such refusal) or may before summoning him require such sum to be deposited as such Magistrate thinks necessary to defray the expense of obtaining the attendance of the witness and all other proper expenses

Refusal to summon unnecessary witness unless deposit made

Notes—1 *Refusal to summon witnesses for defence.*—A Magistrate is not justified (except on grounds of vexation, delay, etc.) in refusing to summon witnesses named for the defence merely because the evidence appears to him (the Magistrate) not to be material or reliable *Weir II, 263*. A prisoner is entitled as a matter of right to have any witnesses named in the list he delivers summoned and examined 23 W R 56; 2 W R 6, 3 W R 36 The Magistrate must deal with the application for summonses and not merely direct it to be filed 6 C. W N 548 See Note 1 under s. 213

2. *Reasons for refusal must be recorded.*—When he does refuse he must record his reason for such refusal. They must show that the witnesses not material. Simply saying that the reasons assigned for application to have a certain witness summoned as a defence witness were insufficient, does not show that

witness's evidence was not material, and is, therefore, not a proper ground for refusing the application, 8 A. 668; nor the fact that the accused stated that he did not wish to examine certain witnesses, when he required them to be summoned again to meet fresh evidence given subsequent to the defence being closed, 5 C. 714 = 8 C. L. R. 70.

3. When such order is improper.—An order by a Magistrate refusing to summon witnesses for the defence without their expenses being paid by the accused, though legal, should be passed very sparingly, and is an improper order in a case in which the accused is unable or unwilling to deposit money, and the result is that he is convicted without his witnesses being heard, especially if the case is one in which severe sentence is inflicted, 7 P. R. 1898.

4. A Magistrate cannot inquire into the nature of defence.—Proviso 2 of this section is not intended to enable the Magistrate to inquire into what the defence of the accused person is to be, and to consider whether on learning the nature of the defence he is absolutely to abstain from summoning the whole of the witnesses cited by the accused, 3 C. 573 = 2 C. L. R. 62.

5. Magistrate ought to fix the amount to be despoiled.—Though a Magistrate is at liberty under this section to decline to summon the person named in the list when the prisoner declines to satisfy him that they are material witnesses, yet he ought to fix the amount which he considers necessary to defray the cost of the attendance of the persons named and intimate to the prisoner his readiness to issue summonses on that amount being deposited, 4 M. H. C. R. 81. The amount may include not only the process-fee, but also travelling and diet allowances of and all other proper expenses such as the fee of experts.

6. A Magistrate cannot order deposit money to be credited to Government.—A Magistrate has no jurisdiction to order a sum of money deposited (for the expenses of witnesses), for the refund of which an application is made, to be credited to Government, 6 M. H. C. R. Appx. IX.

7. A Magistrate is bound to re-summon absent witness, when absence is due to delay in service of summon.—The last proviso is clearly inapplicable where a witness, though once summoned, failed to appear on the day fixed on account of some delay in the service of the summons. In such a case it was held, the Magistrate was bound to make a further attempt—the first being a nominal one only—to secure the attendance of the absent witness, 4 A. 53.

8. Deciding credit to be attached to evidence before hearing.—It is not open to a Judge to decide on the credit to be attached to the evidence of a witness before he had an opportunity of hearing it. By doing so he simply exceeds the discretion given to him by law, 19 M. 375; 6 B. L. R. Appx. 65 = 15 W. R. 7.

217. (1) Complainants and witnesses for the prosecution and defence whose attendance before the Court of Session or High Court is necessary and who appears before the Magistrates, shall execute before him bonds binding themselves to be in attendance when called upon at the Court of Session or High Court to prosecute or to give evidence, as the case may be.

bond of complainants and witnesses

(2) If any complainant or witness refuses to attend before the Court of Session or High Court, or execute the bond above directed, the Magistrate may detain him in custody until he executes such bond, or until his attendance at the Court of Session or High Court is required, when the Magistrate shall send him in custody to the Court of Session or High Court, as the case may be.

Detention in custody in case of refusal to attend or to execute bond.

Notes.—1. Witnesses whose attendance is necessary.—It is not necessary for the Magistrate to bind over every witness who is examined before him. He is only bound to bind over those whose evidence is material to the case. It is always open to the accused or the Sessions Judge to procure the attendance of such of the Crown witnesses as have been examined at the preliminary inquiry and who do not appear at the trial, 1893 A. W. N. 37.

2. Binding of medical witnesses.—The attention of Magistrates is called to s. 509, Cr. P. C., and they are informed that a committing Magistrate should not, except for some special reason, bind over a medical witness, whose evidence he has taken to appear in the Sessions Court. It is very undesirable that medical men in the districts should be taken away from their dispensaries more frequently or for a longer period than is absolutely necessary.—*Bom. H. C. Cr.*, p. 18.

3. Witnesses cannot be asked to furnish sureties.—Under this section, Magistrates have no jurisdiction to call for bonds with sureties, nor have they power to require recognizances from defence witnesses who have never appeared before them. A complainant who withdraws from his charge after commitment will forfeit his recognizance, 2 W. R. 57.

218. (1) When the accused is committed for trial, the Magistrate shall issue an order * to such person as may be appointed by the Local Government in this behalf notifying the commitment, and stating the offence in the same form as the charge, unless the Magistrate is satisfied that such person is already aware of the commitment and the form of the charge, and shall send the charge, the record of the inquiry and any weapon or other thing which is to be produced in evidence, to the Court of Session or (where the commitment is made to the High Court) to the Clerk of the Crown or other officer appointed in this behalf by the High Court

Commitment when to be notified.

Charge etc. to be forwarded to High Court or Court of Session.

English translation to be forwarded to High Court.

(1) When the commitment is made to the High Court and any part of the record is not in English, an English translation of such part shall be forwarded with the record

Note.—Completion of the record of commitment.—A committing Magistrate is bound to make his record complete if he fails in the first instance to get all the necessary evidence down, he should discover his own mistake when he is preparing the calendar, and if he thus made the order of commitment under s 213 he can still take further evidence under s. 219 without any order from the Sessions Judge.—*Pun Cr, Chap LIV, para. 11 A, p 235, Oudh Cr Dig, p 10*

219. (1)† “The committing Magistrate or, in the absence of such Magistrate, any other Magistrate empowered by or under section 206” may, if he thinks fit, summon and examine supplementary witnesses after the commitment and before the commencement of the trial, and bind them over in manner herein before provided to appear and give evidence

Power to summon supplementary witnesses.

(2) Such examination shall, if possible, be taken in the presence of the accused and, where the Magistrate, is not a Presidency Magistrate, a copy of the evidence of such witnesses shall, † be given to the accused free of cost †

Note.—‘We have given effect to the suggestion of the Calcutta High Court that powers under s 219 should only be exercised by Magistrates who are empowered to commit for trial. (Report of Select Committee)’

Notes.—1 Directing committing Magistrate to take additional evidence after commencement of trial is illegal.—After a Sessions trial has commenced the Sessions Judge can only cause witnesses to be summoned before himself, or under certain circumstances have them examined by commission. He has no authority to direct the committing Magistrate, or any other person to call additional witnesses and hold an inquiry. Such Magistrate's authority ceases with the commencement of the trial, 20 P. R. 1833. But see 6 C. 744 = 8 C. L. R. 70 as to power of Magistrate to record evidence at any time after commitment, but before commencement of trial under s 540. If additional evidence is recorded under this section an opportunity should be given to the accused to cite witnesses to meet such evidence. See also 5 A. 688.

2. Proper course for taking evidence after commitment.—If on receiving the order of commitment a Sessions Judge in view of Magistrate's recorded opinion thinks that further evidence should be taken, the proper course is to point out to the committing Magistrate that he could summon and examine any supplementary witness who could give evidence and bind them over under s. 219 to appear at the trial, and not to send the case to the Magistrate after the conclusion of the trial and the opinions of the assessors have been taken 4 P. R. 1892

* See Sec V, Form XXVII

† The words “The committing Magistrate ..” by Act XII of 1923

† The words “be given free of cost” to him by Act XVIII of 1923

sect on 206 “whereas substituted for the words “the Magistrate”

free of cost” were substituted for the words “if he appears or requires to be given

witness's evidence was not material, and is, therefore, not a proper ground for refusing the application, 8 A. 663; nor the fact that the accused stated that he did not wish to examine certain witnesses, when he required them to be summoned again to meet fresh evidence given subsequent to the defence being closed, 6 C. 714 = 8 C. L. R. 70.

3. When such order is improper.—An order by a Magistrate refusing to summon witnesses for the defence without their expenses being paid by the accused, though legal, should be passed very sparingly, and is an improper order in a case in which the accused is unable or unwilling to deposit money, and the result is that he is convicted without his witnesses being heard, especially if the case is one in which severe sentence is inflicted, 7 P. R. 1898.

4. A Magistrate cannot inquire into the nature of defence.—Proviso 2 of this section is not intended to enable the Magistrate to inquire into what the defence of the accused person is to be, and to consider whether on learning the nature of the defence he is absolutely to abstain from summoning the whole of the witnesses cited by the accused 3 C. 573 = 2 C. L. R. 62.

5. Magistrate ought to fix the amount to be deposited.—Though a Magistrate is at liberty under this section to decline to summon the person named in the list when the prisoner declines to satisfy him that they are material witnesses, yet he ought to fix the amount which he considers necessary to defray the cost of the attendance of the persons named and intimate to the prisoner his readiness to issue summonses on that amount being deposited, 4 M. H. C. R. 81. The amount may include not only the process-fee, but also travelling and diet allowances of and all other proper expenses such as the fee of experts.

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bond of complainants and witnesses

(2) If any complainant or witness refuses to attend before the Court of Session or High Court, or execute the bond above directed, the Magistrate may detain him in custody until he executes such bond, or until his attendance at the Court of Session or High Court is required, when the Magistrate shall send him in custody to the Court of Session or High Court, as the case may be.

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Notes.—1. **Witnesses whose attendance is necessary.**—It is not necessary for the Magistrate to bind over every witness who is examined before him. He is only bound to bind over those whose evidence is material to the case. It is always open to the accused or the Sessions Judge to procure the attendance of such of the Crown witnesses as have been examined at the preliminary inquiry and who do not appear at the trial. 1893 A. W. N. 37.

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ligum wood, and ferre, to bear)

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Likelihood n. Likelihood
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Commitment when to be notified.

Charge etc. to be forwarded to High Court or Court of Session.

English translation to be forwarded to High Court.

(1) When the commitment is made to the High Court and any part of the record is not in English, an English translation of such part shall be forwarded with the record

Note.—Completion of the record of commitment.—A committing Magistrate is bound to make his record complete if he fails in the first instance to get all the necessary evidence down, he should discover his own mistake when he is preparing the calendar, and if he thus made the order of commitment under s. 213 he can still take further evidence under s. 219 without any order from the Sessions Judge.—*Pun Cr, Chap LIV, para. 11 A, p 235, Oudh Cr Dig, p 10*

219. (1)† “The committing Magistrate or, in the absence of such Magistrate, any other Magistrate empowered by or under section 206* may, if he thinks fit, summon and examine supplementary witnesses after the commitment and before the commencement of the trial, and bind them over in manner herein before provided to appear and give evidence

Power to summon supplementary witnesses.

(2) Such examination shall if possible, be taken in the presence of the accused and, where the Magistrate, is not a Presidency Magistrate, a copy of the evidence of such witnesses shall, “† be given to the accused free of cost”

Note.—‘We have given effect to the suggestion of the Calcutta High Court that powers under s. 219 should only be exercised by Magistrates who are empowered to commit for trial. (Report of Select Committee.)

Notes.—1 Directing committing Magistrate to take additional evidence after commencement of trial is illegal.—After a Sessions trial has commenced the Sessions Judge can only cause witnesses to be summoned before himself, or under certain circumstances have them examined by commission. He has no authority to direct the committing Magistrate, or any other person to call additional witnesses and hold an inquiry. Such Magistrate’s authority ceases with the commencement of the trial, 29 P R. 1888. But see 5 C. 714 = 8 C. L. R. 70 as to power of Magistrate to record evidence at any time after commitment, but before commencement of trial, under s. 540. If additional evidence is recorded under this section an opportunity should be given to the accused to cite witnesses to meet such evidence. See also 8 A. 668.

2. Proper course for taking evidence after commitment.—If on receiving the order of commitment a Sessions Judge in view of Magistrate’s recorded opinion thinks that further evidence should be taken, the proper course is to point out to the committing Magistrate that he could summon and examine any supplementary witness who could give evidence and bind them over under s. 219 to appear at the trial, and not to send the case to the Magistrate after the conclusion of the trial and the opinions of the assessors have been taken 4 P. R. 1892

* See Sch. V, Form XXVII

† The words “The committing Magistrate” by Act XII of 1923

† The words “be given free of cost” to him by Act XVIII of 1923

sect on 206 were substituted for the words ‘the Magistrate’

[illegible][illegible][illegible]

3. Preliminary inquiry to be full and complete—Where there is nothing to show that the committing Magistrate had declined to record any evidence offered for the prosecution, the High Court held that s 215 did not empower it to quash the commitment, but it directed the Magistrate to act under this section by taking full examination of persons acquainted with facts, even where the accused had confessed, *Ratanlal 842*

4 Copies to be given free of cost—Under s 35 of the *Court Fees Act VII of 1870* copies of the evidence of witnesses given to an accused person under this section are exempt from Court fees.—*Government of India Notification, 21st January, 1886*

Custody of accused pending trial
Act of 1875 s 26

220. Until and during the trial the Magistrate shall, subject to the provisions of this Code regarding the taking of bail, commit the accused, by warrant, to custody

Note.—As to bail see Chap XXXIX, and as to place of imprisonment, s 541

CHAPTER XIX.

OF THE CHARGE

Form of Charges

Charge to state offence

221. (1) Every charge under this Code shall state the offence with which the accused is charged,

Specific name of offence sufficient description.

(2) If the law which creates the offence gives it any specific name, the offence may be described in the charge by that name only.

How stated where offence has no specific name

(3) If the law which creates the offence does not give it any specific name, so much of the definition of the offence must be stated as to give the accused notice of the matter with which he is charged

(4) The law and the section of the law against which the offence is said to have been committed shall be mentioned in the charge

What implied in charge

(5) The fact that the charge is made is equivalent to a statement that every legal condition required by law to constitute the offence charged was fulfilled in the particular case

Language of charge

(6) In the Presidency towns the charge shall be written in English, elsewhere it shall be written either in English or in the language of the Court

Previous conviction when to be set out

(7) If the accused* having been previously convicted of any offence, is liable by reason of such previous conviction, to enhanced punishment or to punishment of a different kind, for a subsequent offence, and it is intended to prove such previous conviction for the purpose of affecting the punishment which the Court may think fit to award for the subsequent offence, the fact date and place of the previous conviction shall be stated in the charge. If such statement† has been omitted, the Court may add it any time before sentence is passed

Illustrations

(a) A is charged with the murder of B. This is equivalent to a statement that A's act fell within the definition of murder given in ss 299 and 302 of the Indian Penal Code, that it did not fall within any of the general exceptions of the same Code, and that it did not fall within any of the five exceptions to s 300 or that if it did fall within exception 1 one or other of the three provisos to that exception applied to it.

* The words in inverted commas were substituted by Act XVIII of 1923

† The words has been omitted were substituted for the words is omitted by Act XVIII of 1923

(b) *A* is charged, under s. 326 of the Indian Penal Code, with voluntarily causing grievous hurt to *B* by means of an instrument for shooting. This is equivalent to a statement that the case was not provided for by s. 335 of the Indian Penal Code, and that the general exceptions did not apply to it.

(c) *A* is accused of murder, cheating, theft, extortion, adultery or criminal intimidation, or using a false property mark. The charge may state that *A* committed murder, or cheating, or theft, or extortion, or adultery or criminal intimidation, or that he used a false property mark, without reference to the definitions of those crimes contained in the Indian Penal Code, but the sections under which the offence is punishable must in each instance, be referred to in the charge.

(d) *A* is charged, under s. 184 of the Indian Penal Code, with intentionally obstructing a sale of property offered for sale by the lawful authority of a public servant. The charge should be in those words.

Notes.—1. For forms see Schedule V, No XXVIII. See s. 75, I P. C., and s. 4 of the *Whipping Act*, 1909, Appendix III as to when previous conviction affects punishment.

2. **What is a charge?**—A charge may be defined to be a written document containing the description of the offence which the Court, either in an inquiry or trial, finds *prima facie* proved by evidence before it to have been committed by the accused, so as to require him to defend himself. In spite of the definition in s. 4 (c), the Code uses the term throughout as the statement of a specific offence and not as indicating the entire series of offences of which a prisoner is accused, 8 B. 200. One count charging each separate offence and describing it with a reasonable degree of certainty is sufficient, 5 W. R. 7. See also 9 A. 525.

3. **Drawing up charges not governed by English authorities as to indictments.**—As respects the framing of charges, the Courts in this country are governed by the provisions of the Code which are not and do not purport to be an exact reproduction of the English rules as to indictments, and indeed were expressly framed in such a manner, as to give no room for merely technical objections not going to the merits of the case, 32 M. 384. See also 32 M. 3 and 19 C. W. N. 72 = 16 Cr. L. J. 41.

4. **Charge under I. P. C. how to be drawn up.**—Sections 221, 222 and 223.—If the law does not give the offences (e.g., offences under ss. 124 A and 153-A, I P. C.) any specific name, then under s. 221 (3), so much of the definition of the offence must be stated as to give the accused notice of the matter with which he is charged. Then under s. 222 the charge must contain particulars as to the time and place of the alleged offence and under s. 223, when the offence is such that the particulars in ss. 221 and 222 do not give the accused sufficient notice of the matter with which he is charged, the charge shall contain such particulars of the manner in which the offence was committed as will be sufficient for that purpose. *Per* WALLIS, J., in 32 M. 384, p. 393. The charge of an offence under the I P. C. should be drawn up in the words of the section defining the offence, 5 C. P. Cr. 18. The models of charge given in Sch. V, contain or imply the setting forth with reasonable particularity of the matters alleged to constitute the offence, 2 B. 142 at p. 144.

5. **Cases where no charge need be framed joint trial of warrant and summons-cases.**—See ss. 177 (2), 242 and 263. See 29 C. 481, Note 3 under s. 225 and Note 3 to s. 233. Where a warrant-case and summons case are tried together at one trial, the trial of the two together forms only one case and not two, and as the case relates to an offence punishable with more than six months' imprisonment, it is a warrant-case. The fact that it relates to some other offence also does not alter its nature and so formal charges ought to be framed for both offences. Thus, where the accused had committed the offences of mischief and insult on two different occasions, charges of the two offences could not be tried together, as they did not form parts of one transaction within the meaning of this section, 3 L. B. R. 113 = 3 Cr. L. J. 350.

6. **Useless details must not be inserted.**—A common fault in the framing of charges is the insertion of useless details. It should be remembered that nothing, which is not essential to the offence, should be included in the charge, except such details of time and place as are sufficient to give the accused notice of the matter with which he is charged. It is unnecessary, for instance, to specify in a charge of murder the weapon with which the murder was committed. In prosecutions for giving false evidence under ss. 193, 194 and 195, I P. C., the particular statements alleged to be false must invariably be set out in the charge, to enable the accused to fully understand the offence with which he stands charged.—*C. P. Cr. Cir., Part II, No 18* Unnecessary allegations may be treated as surplusage, 4 Bom. H. C. R. 17.

7. **Accused entitled to know exact value of charge made against him.**—An accused is entitled to know with certainty and accuracy the exact value of the charge brought against him, and unless he has this knowledge he must be seriously prejudiced in his defence. This is true in all cases, but it is more especially true in case where it is sought to implicate him for acts not committed by himself, but by others with whom he is in company, 11 C. 106. See also 22 C. 276; 391 at p. 402 and 4 C. W. N. 196; 42 C. 957. Thus in

529, the accused was summoned for storing wool and was convicted of storing cotton. *Held*, that the conviction could not be upheld as the accused had no proper notice and no proper opportunity of answering the charge of storing cotton. Similarly, where the accused is liable to be punished under the *Whipping Act*, the charge must state the liability, 5 M. 153. See also 17 C. W. N. 419 = 14 Cr. L. J. 212; 12 C. W. N. 577. An accused is entitled to know with certainty and accuracy the exact value of the charge brought against him. But where the accused fully understood the nature of the offence with which they were charged they had clearly not been prejudiced by the omission of the words "unlawfully and maliciously" and "in British India" occurring in section 4 (b) of Act VI of 1908. Such an omission can be cured by the verdict. *The Queen v Manslow*, (1893) 1 Q. B. 758, referred to, 42 C. 957.

But where in a charge of cheating, the manner of the cheating was set out to be "by deceiving with false representations and promises as well as by conduct," held that the expressions used were too vague and indefinite to give the accused proper notice of the manner of the cheating and was so dangerously wide as might include almost anything. An accused person is entitled to know with certainty and accuracy the exact value of the accusation brought against him, 29 C. W. N. 403.

8. Charge must refer to the law and section and the words of the statute must be adhered to.—A charge should be so framed as to refer to the section of the Penal Code under which the offence charged is punishable, 9 W. R. 33, but omission to comply with the requirement will not invalidate the commitment, 1 In. Jur. N. 8. 43. Where there are several parts to a section (s. 175, I. P. C.) the charge should be framed in parts of the term applicable, 15 B. 189. It is a wholesome rule that the Court should adhere to the language of the statute as far as practicable, when a charge is drawn up, nothing is gained by a paraphrase, while opportunity is afforded to the accused to take exception to the form of the charge, 42 C. 957.

9. Aggravating circumstances have to be set forth in the charge.—When an offence falls within the provisions of a section like s. 397, I. P. C., which on account of the existence of aggravating circumstances provides a minimum punishment for the offence, the existence of such aggravating circumstances should be set forth in the charge so that the accused person may know what it is to which he pleads guilty and the full effect of such plea, or in the event of his pleading not guilty may know what the material facts are which he is called upon to rebut, *Ratanlal* 55. Similarly in respect of a charge of cheating, see s. 223, *illus* (b). In a charge of rioting under s. 147, I. P. C. the common object should be stated, 9 C. W. N. 599.

10. What is previous conviction?—A previous conviction for the purpose of affecting the punishment which a Court is competent to award, is a conviction the penalty following which had been undergone by the accused (in whole or in part) at the time when he committed the offence for which he is being tried.—*C P Cr. Part II, No. 19*. Even though the accused has not been sentenced, but dealt with under s. 562 yet the particulars required as to the previous conviction must be stated in the charge.

11. Particulars of previous convictions necessary to be stated in the charge.—A mere allegation that at the time when the prisoner committed the offence (no offence whatever being mentioned in the charge) he has been previously convicted of offences punishable under the Indian Penal Code (22 W. R. 39) or that he "is an old offender," does not satisfy the requirements of this section, as that does not bring home to the accused person the particular offence or class of offences which renders him liable to a more severe sentence than would otherwise be imposed. The prosecution is bound to prove the previous convictions and that the accused was the person so convicted, *Weir II, 266*. When the previous convictions are not stated in the charge as required by this section, they cannot be used for the purpose of the enhancing the sentence, *Ratanlal* 70; 7 M. L. T. 77 = 11 Cr. L. J. 217. A previous conviction which it is intended to prove for the purpose of affecting the punishment should be entered in the charge and the accused should be called on to plead thereto. His mere admission that he had been to jail once is insufficient to show that he pleaded guilty to a previous conviction in respect of an offence rendering him liable to whipping, 4 Bom. L. R. 177. An order under s. 565 is not such a punishment as is meant by the words in s. 221 (7), 9 N. L. R. 89 = 14 Cr. L. J. 390. The liability to whipping as an additional punishment under s. 3 of the *Whipping Act* and the liability to enhanced punishment under s. 75, I. P. C., are distinct liabilities and may or may not co-exist in any particular case. Either or both liabilities must be set out in the charge according as they arise or not in the circumstances of each particular case, *Weir II, 267*.

If a prisoner is to be tried under s. 75 I. P. C., a separate charge under that section must be framed and recorded, 9 M. 284. The charge should state the fact, date and place of the previous conviction—otherwise the accused is not amenable to the terms of s. 75, I. P. C., 1883 A. W. N. 110. See, however, 1831 A. W. N. 32 where the accused was held not prejudiced by the omission as he was then actually undergoing the sentence imposed on the previous conviction. See 29 B. 326 and 1916 M. W. N. 327 = 17 Cr. L. J. 238.

12. Effect of omission to state previous conviction.—Where previous conviction of theft is not mentioned in a charge, the award of the sentence of whipping in addition to imprisonment is illegal, *Weir II, 265*. But when the sentence passed is one which the Magistrate is competent to pass for theft, the omission formally to charge the accused with a previous conviction does not render the sentence illegal, notwithstanding that the previous conviction affected the sentence, *Weir II, 264*. In another case, where the previous conviction did not form part of the charge, the enhanced sentence was set aside and the Sessions Judge directed to re-open the trial with the same set of jurors, on that charge giving the accused an opportunity of making a fresh defence to it *21 W. R. 40*. Mere omission to set out the previous conviction is not sufficient reason for interfering in appeal or revision with the sentence passed unless there has been a failure of justice caused by such omission, *7 M. L. T. 77 = 11 Cr. L. J. 217*.

13. Charge of previous conviction may be added at any time before sentence.—The previous conviction if not stated in the charge cannot be used for the purpose of enhancing the punishment. If it is omitted, it may be added at any time before the sentence is passed, and not afterwards, *19 W. R. 41, 10 B. L. R. Appx. XXXVI; Ratanlal 52 and 70*.

14. Sentence on charge of previous conviction not to be separate.—Where previous conviction is proved for the purposes of s. 75, I P C., the prisoner cannot be dealt with under s. 35 as if he had been convicted of two offences, *11 A. 393*.

15. Previous conviction is a question of fact.—The question of proof of previous conviction is one of fact which ought to go to the jury, and must be determined by a jury, *21 W. R. 40*.

16. Proof of previous conviction.—A previous conviction may be charged and proved in the ordinary manner in cases in which the Magistrate, while not thinking it necessary that increased punishment should be imposed, nevertheless desires to obtain information as to the accused's antecedents for the purpose of determining the duration of the sentence, *Weir II, 265*. See also s. 511.

17. Duty of the Police regarding proof of previous convictions.—It is the duty of the Police, in conducting the investigation, to take proper steps to establish the identity of an accused person, and to obtain and produce evidence of previous convictions against him.—*Pien Gir*, p. 314, *Ratanlal 437 and 438*. Demand should be asked for, when the particulars of the previous conviction are to hand, but the requisite copy of the sentence or certificate is not ready—*C. P. Pol. Man.*, p. 207.

18. Evidence of previous conviction when to be taken.—The law strictly enjoins that evidence of previous convictions cannot be allowed except where after the accused has been found guilty, it is necessary to receive it for the purpose of s. 75, I P C., or where the accused having given evidence of good character, the prosecution desires to adduce the evidence of previous convictions as proof of his bad character, *5 Bom. L. R. 1034*.

19. Powers of Appellate Court regarding plea of guilty of being previous convict.—Where a charge has been framed against an accused person under s. 221 (7) and such person has pleaded guilty to the charge that he is a previous convict, the Appellate Court under s. 412 of the Code is precluded from opening the question whether the accused is a previous convict, *4 N. L. R. 163 = 9 Cr. L. J. 58*.

222. (1) The charge shall contain such particulars as to the time and place of the alleged offence and the person (if any) against whom, or the thing (if any) in respect of which, it was committed as are reasonably sufficient to give the accused notice of the matter with which he is charged.

Particulars as to time, place and person.

(2) When the accused is charged with criminal breach of trust or dishonest misappropriation of money, it shall be sufficient to specify the gross sum in respect of which the offence is alleged to have been committed, and the date between which the offence is alleged to have been committed, without specifying particular items or exact dates, and the charge so framed shall be deemed to be a charge of one offence within the meaning of section 234.

Provided that the time included between the first and last of such dates shall not exceed one year.

Notes.—1. **Charge must contain time, place, person and circumstances of the offence.**—A conviction for unlawful offence under s. 377, I P C., cannot be sustained on a charge which does not specify the time when place where, or any known or unknown person with whom the offence was committed, the only fact

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† a retreat or refuge as (a) A-
or forest.

(b) The house of the rice keepers
estate (c) A lion cave
one of the French name (d) I like
also the place in which I am
or stay in an open house

Maldives a famous lagoon
Lodge's big

Lodge 1 a (Her) 11/10/20

Lodgepole-gate is a passage of
entrance gate near the lower

Judge *n* **by** **Lottery**
Judge *n* **L** One who lives at
board or in a household

board, or in a hired room or who has a bed in another's house for a night.

2 One who resides in any part
of a time

lodging is in place of residence for a time temporary habitation.

3 Place of residence on 10/1/1911

Lodging house a place where

Disbursement in [Vrijzen met 1/2]

ment. See *La per e*
1. The following

1. The act of lodging or the state of
being placed or deposited at rest for
a time or for permanent use.

2 1 lodging place room
3 Accumulation of roll class of ar

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1. The first step is to identify the problem or question that needs to be answered. This involves understanding the context and the specific requirements of the task.

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Elevation of character or sentiment

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1. *Chlorophyll a* and *Chlorophyll b* were determined by the method of Arar and Collins (1971).

for the wife food, fuel,

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Provided that the time included between the first and last of such dates shall not exceed one year.

Notes.—1. Charge must contain time, place, person and circumstances of the offence.—A conviction for unnatural offence under s. 377, I P. C., cannot be sustained on a charge which does not specify the time when, place where, or any known or unknown person with whom the offence was committed, the only fact

proved against him being that he habitually wore women's clothes and exhibited physical signs of having committed the offence, **6 A. 204**. Sufficient particulars of time, place, person and circumstance as will give each of the accused notice of the matter with which he is charged must be inserted in the charge (ss. 330 346, 348, 1 P. C.), **15 B. 491**; name of person cheated and the manner of cheating must be set out in a charge of attempt to cheat, **8 C. W. N. 278**. A charge under s. 406, 1 P. C., in respect of 'some deeds,' dated 21st June, was set aside when there were no documents bearing that date, **12 C. W. N. 577 = 7 Cr. L. J. 372**. In a case in which, the charge (s. 193, 1 P. C.) did not contain such particulars, as to time and place as were reasonably sufficient to give notice to the accused of the matter with which he was charged, the accused was acquitted by the High Court, **25 W. R. 46**. See **7 B. L. R. Appx. LXVI**; **17 Cr. L. J. 411**.

1-A. Particulars of time in a charge of adultery.—A charge of adultery committing commission of offences between two dates is legal where it is impossible in the circumstances of the case to assign particular dates on which sexual intercourse took place, **51 C. 438**.

2. Theft and house-breaking.—A charge of theft and house-breaking is bad for vagueness if it does not specify the articles stolen or the name of the person whose house was broken into and the place of the offence, **28 M. L. J. 381 = 16 Cr. L. J. 298**.

3. Where necessary intention must be specified in the charge.—A charge under s. 467 must set out the intention, **17 C. W. N. 354 = 14 Cr. L. J. 129** (see, however, **6 M. L. T. 266**). A conviction for lurking house-trespass by night under s. 456 of the 1 P. C., is not bad for want of the specification, of the intention in the charge, but one under s. 457 cannot be sustained without such specification. In a charge under the former section, though a guilty intention must be proved, it is not necessary to prove which of the several guilty intentions the accused had. It will be enough if it is shown that the intention must have been one or other of those specified in s. 441, though it may not be certain which it was, **22 C. 391**; **20 C. W. N. 1075** where **16 W. R. 63** is referred to. See also **23 P. W. R. 1911 = 12 Cr. L. J. 493**. In a charge under s. 4 (b) of the *Explosive Substances Act*, 1908, it must be stated that it was the intent of the accused to endanger life in British India, but the omission is not material, **42 C. 957**. See Note 8 to s. 221. In a charge under s. 411, 1 P. C., it must be averred that the accused dishonestly received the property knowing or having reason to believe that the same had been stolen, **1898 A. W. N. 70**.

4. What is reasonably sufficient to give the accused notice.—The reasonableness of the notice is the criterion by which the validity of the charge must be judged and this must be done in each case on the circumstances. In one case it may be necessary to specify accurately the time and place, while in another it may be unreasonable to require the prosecution to do so, **Ratanal 659**. Courts have wide discretion in the matter and no general rule as to the particularity required can be laid down, **1 B 610**.

CHARGES OF EMBEZZLEMENT.

6. Effect of sub-sec. (2).—It supersedes the ruling in **2 C. W. N. 341**, and modifies s. 234 in respect of charges of criminal breach of trust or dishonest misappropriation of money. The conflicting judgments in **19 B. 749**; **17 A. 153**; **18 A. 116** and **24 C. 193** need no longer be considered. This provision is merely enabling. The sub-section does not prohibit the prosecution from choosing some only out of the various sums misappropriated and framing charges in respect thereof, **12 Bom. L. R. 226 = 11 Cr. L. J. 337**.

7. Sub-sec. (2) deals with breach of trust or misappropriation of 'money' only.—A person cannot be charged and convicted at one trial of the offences of mischief and criminal misappropriation in respect of a large number of trees cut by him at different times in one year, and there is nothing to show that all the cuttings were so connected as to form part of the same transaction, **(1911) 2 M. W. N. 467 = 12 Cr. L. J. 567, 26 C. 560**.

8. Sub-sec. (2) applies to a single accused only.—The wording of s. 222 refers to a single accused, and it must be so because it is impossible to hold that two persons can be guilty of misappropriation of the same parcel of money. S. 239 has no application in such a case, **16 C. W. N. 600 = 13 Cr. L. J. 806**.

9. Charge need only mention the aggregate sum without enumerating the particular items.—The section does not require any particular formulation of the accusation but only enacts that it is sufficient to show the aggregate sum without specifying the details. It dispenses with the necessity for amplification.

does not prohibit the enumeration of the particular items in the charge, 30 B. 49. The section applies not only to cases where there is a general deficiency and the prosecution is unable to specify the particular items but also to cases where the items may be, but are not specified, 29 M. 558; 33 A. 36. The fact that the charge is more specific than it need have been is only an irregularity which could not have prejudiced the accused. Thus where an accused person is charged with the misappropriation of an aggregate sum of money, the whole sum having been wrongly dealt with by the accused within a period of one year, the mere fact that the items comprising such aggregate sum are specified and may be more than three in number will not render the charge obnoxious to the prohibition implied by s. 234, 24 A. 254; 27 A. 69; 1 B. L. R. 35 = 8 Cr. L. J. 160. In a charge of criminal misappropriation it is enough to mention the gross sum of money in respect of which the offence was committed. The mention of the specific instances which go to make up the gross sum, in addition, is superfluous, but will not vitiate the charge even though the instances are more than three, 31 C. 928. See also 41 C. 722. But see 42 A. 572 = 18 A. L. J. 633, where it was held that s. 222 (2) of the Code was meant to provide for the case of an agent or subordinate whose duty it might be merely to receive sums of money from time to time and to account for them. It is not suitable to the case of an agent whose employment involves the expenditure of money belonging to the principal as well as its receipt (33 A. 36 distinguished). In such a case it is not sufficient to charge a net balance as having been misappropriated.

10 Charge framed under cl. (2) constitutes only one offence within the meaning of s. 234.—The subsection clearly admits of the trial of any number of acts of breach of trust within the year as only amounting to one offence, 33 B. 49. Thus where a charge of criminal misappropriation consisted of three counts alleging misappropriation on three different occasions, and two of these items were made up of three smaller sums of money each and the accused was convicted on all the three counts, it was contended in revision that the accused was really tried for seven offences and not three and that the trial was illegal. Held, the conviction was not illegal having regard to subsec. (2) of this section, 27 A. 69, where 24 A. 254 is followed. In 33 A. 36, it was held that where a man in a certain capacity is entrusted from time to time with various sums of money commits criminal breach of trust in respect thereto, he may be charged with an offence with respect to the gross sum embezzled and it is not necessary to specify the particular items embezzled or the exact dates on which they were so embezzled and that the charge so framed shall be deemed to be a charge of one offence, provided the period within such embezzlement has taken place is not more than one year. Section 234 (2) is qualified to some extent by s. 222, 24 A. 254; 27 A. 69, 31 C. 928, 32 C. 1085, 29 M. 558 followed, 12 Bom. L. R. 226 considered. Where a person was put upon his trial for embezzlement of three sums of money within one year and a single charge was drawn up in which all the three sums and the persons from whom he collected them were specified, but he was not charged with three offences under s. 409, I P C., but one offence and was convicted of one offence and sentenced to one term of imprisonment held that the charge was not illegal under s. 233 as it was in accordance with this section and s. 234, 32 C. 1085. Under this section a charge of criminal breach of trust in respect of a gross sum without specifying the items is a charge for one offence within the meaning of s. 234. The joinder in one trial of charges of criminal breach of trust in respect of two distinct items with a charge in respect of a gross sum (the item constituting which may be, but are not specified) is a joinder of only three charges and is not bad as contravening s. 234, 29 M. 558 where 25 M. 61 is distinguished, see also 30 M. 328. An Inamidar, the owner of a forest, obtained in October, 1891, a book of passes authorizing him to issue for the same the transit of the forest produce belonging to himself. Between October, 1891 and March, 1892 he issued passes covering forest produce belonging to Government. But it could not be made out what particular pass or passes covered the produce belonging to the Inamidar. The charge as framed by the Magistrate was in general terms with reference to all the transactions between October 1891 and March, 1892. Held that the general charge as framed by the Magistrate was correct, Ratanlal 659.

In a case of criminal breach of trust, a general charge of embezzlement mentioning the gross sum misappropriated, as laid down in subsec. (2) is sufficient, but it is defective and must fall through when the accused appears to have been prejudiced by not having any definite charges to answer, 16 P. W. R. 1907 = 6 Cr. L. J. 137.

11. Distinct breaches of trust though committed in one year cannot be deemed one transaction.—It is true this subsection provides for a charge being framed in respect of a gross sum misappropriated within 12 months from first to last and enacts that a charge so framed shall be deemed to be a charge of one offence within the meaning of s. 234, but it does not provide that the acts so charged shall be deemed to be one transaction within the meaning of s. 235. See also 18 Cr. L. J. 310 as to distinct charges of theft and misappropriation hence where a man was tried at one trial for three distinct criminal breaches of trust and three separate

falsifications of account, the trial was *held* bad for misjoinder of charges, 30 M. 328; (1911) 2 M. W. N. 536 = 13 Cr. L. J. 21. S 222 does not cover two sets of offences any number of which may be tried together, 31 C. 722. See Note 16 under s 233 and Note 8 under s 235

12 Where the misappropriation extends beyond one year, trial altogether illegal.—The charge ought not to refer to items which extend over a period of more than one year and a trial was held illegal and the conviction set aside where the charge related to items misappropriated during a period extending over two years, 14 P. R. 1905 = 64 P. L. R. 1905, where 25 M. 61 (P.C.) is followed See also 11 C. 106.

It is not enough to know that there was embezzlement at some time before, during or after the period charged, because the charge was framed under the special provisions in s 222 (2) and it is at any rate necessary to show an act or acts of embezzlement in respect of the gross sum named in the charge or some part of it committed within the space of one year, 17 C. W. N. 479 = 14 Cr. L. J. 219.

13. Sub-sec. (2) does not cover cheating or falsification of accounts.—The alteration in law made by para 2 of this section does not apply to a charge under s 477 A, I P C. It applies only to criminal breach of trust or dishonest misappropriation of money, 26 C. 560; 41 C. 722, 13 A. L. J. 1059; 4 Bom. L. R. 433. Similarly, a charge of *cheating* relating to the sum total of different items, about 26 in number, said to have been taken by the accused on false representations from the complainant on different occasions is contrary to law. Such a charge is not justified by this section and a conviction on such a charge cannot be upheld, 1 A. L. J. 599. See Notes 7 and 8 to s 234.

14. Charge for criminal misappropriation how to be framed when several persons are implicated—Where two persons are implicated in a case of criminal misappropriation or breach of trust with respect to a betment in the other
i.e., of misappropriation

“ . . . ” (:)

223. When the nature of the case is such that the particulars mentioned in sections 221 and 222 do not give the accused sufficient notice of the matter with which he is charged, the charge shall also contain such particulars of the manner in which the alleged offence was committed as will be sufficient for that purpose

When manner of committing offence must be stated

Illustrations

(a) A is accused of the theft of a certain article at a certain time and place. The charge need not set out the manner in which the theft was effected

(b) A is accused of cheating B at a given time and place. The charge must set out the manner in which A cheated B

(c) A is accused of giving false evidence at a given time and place. The charge must set out that portion of the evidence given by A which is alleged to be false

(d) A is accused of obstructing B, a public servant, in the discharge of his public functions at a given time and place. The charge must set out the manner in which A obstructed B in the discharge of his functions.

(e) A is accused of the murder of B at a given time and place. The charge need not state the manner in which A murdered B

(f) A is accused of disobeying a direction of the law with intent to save B from punishment. The charge must set out the disobedience charged and the law infringed

Notes—1 Particular in charges of unlawful assembly, rioting and under s. 149, I. P. C.—*Common object*.—In every charge of rioting and unlawful assembly, the common object must be set out in the charge, 22 C. 276; 26 C. 630; 11 C. 106 and a conviction of rioting on a charge which does not state the common object is liable to be set aside, 3 C. W. N. 605; 33 C. 293; but as the offence of rioting can be legally described by its specific name and the question whether any further particulars are necessary under s 223 must be a question of discretion in each case 39 C. 781, but where there is evidence on the record to show what the common object was and the accused have not been prejudiced the conviction will not be bad, 21 C. 827; 9 C. W. N. 599; 38 P. W. R. 1907, if the variance between the common object charged and the common object found is material

the conviction will be set aside, 38 C. 265, but if not material the conviction will not be set aside, 37 C. 340; 35 C. 354. In every charge under s. 149 I P C, it is absolutely necessary that the common object must be set out.—There is no specific name for the offence and the fact that any offence is committed in prosecution of the common object is of the essence of the case and there could be no conviction for any offence committed with a different common object. It is therefore obligatory to set out the common object in a charge under s. 149 unless it has been already specified in the main charge under s. 147, 39 C. 781. The accused is entitled to know with certainty and accuracy the exact value of the charge brought against him where it is sought to implicate him for acts not committed by himself but by others with whom he was in company, 11 C. 106. The omission to mention the common object in the charge-sheet does not necessarily vitiate the trial, 17 Cr. L. J. 92 = 32 In. Ca. 634 (C.).

Property—Where the common object is alleged to be to take possession of certain property, the property must be specified, 33 C. 295. See Notes under ss. 235 and 239.

2. Particulars in a charge of perjury.—Charges of perjury should contain a distinct assertion with regard to each statement intended to be characterized as perjury, that it was made—that it is untrue in fact, and that the accused knew it to be so when he made it, 9 W. R. 54.

(i) *Date must be given.*—The charge should disclose the exact date on which the offence was committed, 16 W. R. 47; 7 B. L. R. Appx. LXVI.

(ii) *Court.*—The Court or other officer before whom the offence was committed must be specified, 16 W. R. 47.

(iii) *Stage of the judicial proceeding.*—The particular stage of the judicial proceeding should be specified, 1 B. L. R. Appx. XIII; 10 W. R. 37.

(iv) *Exact words of the statement alleged to be false must be set out in the charge.*—See 23 W. R. 28; 5 W. R. 71; Ratanlal 152; 9 W. R. 14 and 25; 36 C. 808; 1 L. B. R. 268. Where the charge was "you, on or about the 7th May, 1904, at L gave false evidence in a judicial proceeding, namely, in a case under s. 133, I P C, and thereby committed an offence punishable under s. 193," it was held that the charge was vague and the conviction set aside, 10 C. W. N. 1099 = 4 Cr. L. J. 227 = 4 C. L. J. 559. But compare 13 C. W. N. 685 (P C) where it was stated that the whole evidence of a witness was a tissue of falsehood and it was held that the charge did not admit of being formulated in a series of specific allegations of perjury, but the gist of the accusation was sufficiently clear to the accused.

3. Charge of attempt to cheat.—Where a charge under ss. 417 and 511, I P C, was silent both as to the person upon whom the alleged attempt to cheat was made and also as to the manner in which it was intended by the accused to influence the conduct of that person and these omissions were not remedied until the close of the prosecution held that the omission was a somewhat serious defect and placed the accused at a considerable disadvantage in the conduct of his defence, 8 C. W. N. 278.

4. Charges under s. 124-A, I P C, for seditious writing on speeches.—Where an offence under s. 122 A, I P C is alleged to have been committed by words spoken then the charge is defective if it does not set out the speeches or words alleged to be seditious. As the accused has not been prejudiced the defect was held not to vitiate the charge, 32 M. 3. But the actual words need not be set out, the requirements of the law are satisfied if the charge gives such a description of the words used as is reasonably sufficient to enable the accused to know the matter with which he is charged that is if the charge states the words used with substantial, though not absolute accuracy. *Per WALLIS and BENSON JJ*, 32 M. 384.

SANKARAN NAIR, J, *contra*, held that where the charge under s. 124 A, I P C, is for exciting disaffection of bringing His Majesty into hatred, the culpability consists in the disastrous consequences brought about by the words of the accused and the charge need not set out the words nor need the words themselves be proved as the gist of the offence in that case would be exciting disaffection, not the uttering of seditious words, and the speaker may be guilty even though his words may be innocent or uttered in a sense different from that in which they were understood by the audience. But where the charge is for attempting to create disaffection, the facts to be proved by the prosecution are entirely different. The section shows that a person must (a) speak or write certain words and (b) by such words attempt... and to judge whether the words are seditious, it is essential that the words themselves used by the speaker must be proved otherwise it would be impossible for him to know what he is to defend. Therefore, in that case, as the words written or spoken are the gist of the offence, they ought to be set out in the charge, and those words themselves, whether set out **be proved**

another common object, that being an offence in respect of which they have had no opportunity of defending themselves, 27 C. 890; 2 C. L. J. 516. The essence of the offence defined by s. 114, I. P. C., is the common unlawful purpose, and an accused person cannot be convicted, if the common object proved is different from the common object charged.—*PER SANKARAN NAIK, J.*, 8 M. L. T. 17; 40 C. 168. But when the difference is only slight and the accused has not been prejudiced the conviction is good 33 C. 354. See also 11 C. 106; 22 C. 391 and 38 C. 153. It is not a general proposition of law that a conviction under s. 147 of the Penal Code cannot be supported whenever the common object, as stated in the charge, is not precisely made out. The question in each case is whether the common object established agrees in essential particulars with that laid in the charge. Where the common object set out in the charge was to assault the complainant and his party, who were cutting the paddy of their land and, thereby to forcibly oust them but the common object established by the facts found by the Sessions Judge was to maintain possession of the land by the accused. *Held*, that the common object in the charge had not been substantially made out, and that the conviction under s. 147 of the Penal Code was, therefore, bad, 38 C. 865. See 11 P. W. R. 1915 = 16 Cr. L. J. 354, Note 9 under s. 223 as to defects in a charge of conspiracy.

But in a Bombay case it is decided that the omission in a charge to state a common object of an unlawful assembly is not fatal to the trial, where it is specified in the complaint and found by the Court, 25 Bom. L. R. 497.

Duty of Appellate Court—Where a charge, as drawn up by the Magistrate, alleges several alternative common objects of the unlawful assembly, it is incumbent on the Appellate Court to determine whether it is sustainable, and, if so, which of the common object stated has been made out, 35 C. 718. But when the common object is mentioned in the charge but there is no finding as it was not disputed, the conviction is good, 36 C. 158.

2. **Test as to whether accused had been prejudiced.**—In determining whether any error, omission or irregularity has occasioned a failure of justice, the Court should have regard to the fact whether the objection could and should have been raised at an earlier stage in the proceedings and to the manner in which the accused person has conducted his defence. It is for the Court to decide whether the accused has been misled, 10 B. H. C. R. 373; 42 C. 937. See also 32 M. 3; 25 B. 90; 32 M. 394, cited in Notes 4 and 5 to s. 223 where defective charges were held to be cured by this section. See also 10 B. 124. Where the charge was that the accused had committed criminal breach of trust in respect of certain deeds but the accused was convicted of embezzling not the deeds but the amount obtained by them, *held*, the conviction was bad, 12 C. W. N. 577 = 7 Cr. L. J. 372.

3. **In joint trial of warrant and summons-cases separate charge should be framed for the summons-case also.**—Where a person is being tried on a charge framed for a warrant-case, if it is intended to try him on a summons-case as well, the offence in the latter case should also form a portion of the charge. Any omission in this respect, prejudicially affecting the accused in his defence in the summons-case would make the conviction in respect thereof bad, 29 C. 451. See Note 5 at p. 624.

4. **Duty of Magistrate when charge found to be defective.**—A charge of house-breaking with intent to commit theft broke down but the Magistrate convicted the accused finding that he had another object, the High Court quashed the conviction and *held* that where it appeared that there was another object, it was the bounden duty of the Magistrate to have given the accused notice of that, by drawing up a charge clearly stating what it was that he was accused of doing, 41. C. 743.

226. When any person is committed for trial without a charge, or with an imperfect or erroneous charge, the Court or, in the case of a High Court, the Clerk of the Crown, may frame a charge, or add to or otherwise alter the charge, as the case may be, having regard to the rules contained in this Code as to the form of charges

Procedure on commitment without charge or with imperfect charge

Illustrations

1 A is charged with the murder of C. A charge of abetting the murder of C may be added or substituted.

2 A is charged with forging a valuable security under s. 467 of the Indian Penal Code. A charge of fabricating false evidence under s. 193 may be added.

3 A is charged with receiving stolen property knowing it to be stolen. During the trial it incidentally appears that he has in his possession instruments for the purpose of counterfeiting coin. A charge under s. 235 of the Indian Penal Code cannot be added.

LUNARA [Ola] Luna

1 (Anat) One of the two organs of respiration in an air-breathing animal, each of which occupies a large cavity in the thorax. The lungs are composed of a mass of cells or cavities in which the air is held.



11 A Sp. lup. no. 1 (Bot) A leucorrhous plant of the wolf-bean. (Bot) A leucorrhous plant of the wolf-bean, having showy rays.

11 A Sp. lup. no. 1 (Bot) A leucorrhous plant of the wolf-bean. (Bot) A leucorrhous plant of the wolf-bean, having showy rays.

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Notes—1. Signification of the word "charge."—In the Code generally the word "charge" is used as the statement of a specific offence, and not as indicating the entire series of offences of which a prisoner is accused. There is nothing in the Code to indicate that the word is to have a different construction in ss 226 and 227 from what it has in other sections. *Per* SARGENT, C J, and BAILY, J, 8 B. 200. The word 'charge' is used in the Code, both as indicating the whole series of counts or heads of charge, and also as indicating a charge of one specific offence. In s. 227 it is used in the latter sense. *Per* SCOTT, J, 8 B. 200. The latter construction was evidently approved by the Legislature when the word 'or add to' were added in s. 227 by the 1898 Code, 16 Cr. L. J. 573 (Sindh). See definition of charge s 4 (c).

2. "Without charge."—These words will apply not only to the case in which there is no charge at all, but also to the case in which there is no charge in respect of such offence as the Sessions Judge or Clerk of the Crown may think the prisoner ought to be tried for, 8 B. 200. In 27 M. 54 it was pointed out that no charge need be framed when a commitment is made under s 436 or under s 526 (i)–(iv).

3. Sessions Court has no power to expunge a charge altogether.—When an accused person is committed to take his trial on specific charges before the Sessions Court, the Judge has no power under this section to expunge a charge before calling on the accused to plead to it, 7 C. L. R. 143.

4. Power of Sessions Judge to add charge at any stage.—The combined effect of ss. 226 to 231 is to confer a very wide jurisdiction upon the Court of Session. At the beginning of the trial, if the Judge finds that the Magistrate has omitted to frame a charge, he may supply the omission and frame the charge that is made out on the evidence recorded by the Magistrate. If the charge framed by the Magistrate is imperfect or erroneous, the Judge may alter or add to the charge having regard to the offences disclosed in the evidence recorded by the Magistrate. Again, if in the course of the trial evidence is recorded which shows that the offences are different in character from those charged or that other offences also have been committed, the Judge may alter the charge or add to the charge and include the offences so disclosed. The material on which the Judge acts under s 226 is the evidence recorded by the Magistrate and under s 227 is the evidence recorded by himself in the course of the trial. Either under s 226 or s 227 charges for different offences may be added to the original charge and ss 228 to 231 do not imply that this power is limited in any way. The provisions for adjourning the trial, for directing a new trial, for recalling witnesses and even for obtaining sanction to the prosecution indicate very clearly that there need not necessarily be any connection between the added charge and the original charge. But the added charge must be for an offence made out by the evidence recorded before the Magistrate, s. 226 or by the evidence recorded by the Judge in the course of the trial, s 227, and secondly the accused must not be prejudiced and the trial on the added charges must not contravene the provisions of ss 233 and 239, 16 Cr. L. J. 573 where 8 B. 200 and 11 Boma. H. C. R. 278 are referred to with approval, 3 M. 351 is distinguished, and 8 A. 665, 32 C. 22 disapproved see 28 C. W. N. 561.

(a) *Is the power of Sessions Court to add a charge limited by s 193?*—The "addition" of a charge when not supported by evidence before the committing Magistrate, is not merely an error of procedure, but an improper assumption of jurisdiction although such charge may arise out of the same circumstances as the charge on which the accused has been committed. The object of restricting a Sessions Court from taking cognizance of any offence (except as provided in ss 480, 477 and 478) unless the accused person has been committed by a Magistrate, is to secure to the prisoner a preliminary inquiry which affords him an opportunity of becoming acquainted with the circumstances of the offence imputed to him and enables him to make his defence, 3 M. 351, 8 C. W. N. 784, 32 C. 22, but see 8 A. 665 and judgment of SCOTT, J, in 8 B. 200.

(b) *Must the added charge be cognate to the charge on which committed?*—Where a Sessions Judge altered a charge under ss 417 and 511, I P C., into one under ss 420 and 511, I P C., in that the accused attempted to cheat a Loan Office and convicted him, held that the conviction must be set aside as there was no complaint by the Loan Office but that the prosecution was instituted by a person in respect of a different matter

not with reference to an
diction and though
e to the immediate

subject of the prosecution and committal and not with regard to a matter not covered by the indictment. Matter not covered by the charge before the Court cannot be made the subject of an additional charge, 32 C. 22, 20 P. W. R. 1900 = 11 Cr. L. J. 131. Where a of the same circumstances, was distinct and inasmuch as the charge so added

witness not examined at the preliminary inquiry by the Magistrate was for the first time examined by the Sessions Court, and, on her evidence alone, the conviction on the added charge was based. *Held* that the conviction was bad as the action of the Judge in adding the charge was *ultra vires*, and was not merely an error of procedure but an improper assumption of jurisdiction, 3 M. 331. See also 31 B. 218; 21 C. 97; 3 H.-W. H. C. R. 337; 23 C. W. N. 551.

5. When committed for an offence against A, it is illegal to add a charge of offence against B.—It is not open to a Sessions Judge in a commitment of the accused for the offence of the murder of A to add a charge under s. 326, I P C., for causing grievous hurt to B, 20 F. W. R. 1909 = 11 Cr. L. J. 131. Where a person was charged with having caused hurt to one person but was convicted of having hurt another person, the conviction was set aside, 14 C. W. N. 243. But in 8 A. 655 such an addition was *held* to be a mere irregularity which had not prejudiced the accused. Three persons were committed to the Court of Session two of them

as, or immediately after, the attack which resulted in the death of J. *Held*, that the case did not come within the terms of the section and the adding of the charge was an irregularity, but as the accused were not prejudiced in their defence, the High Court declined to interfere, 8 A. 655.

6. Application of evidence taken upon charge under one section to a wholly different offence.—Three persons were charged under s. 372 I P C., and also separately under s. 109 of the same Code. After their commitment, but before the commencement of the Sessions, supplementary evidence was incorporated in the case as to the age of the minor. At the commencement of the trial, the Sessions Judge was asked to allow a charge of abetment of rape to be entered founded upon that additional evidence—evidence taken only after the Sessions had commenced and after the Judge at the trial had drawn attention to the fact that the original depositions contained no evidence of age whatever. *Held* that under the circumstances of the case, it would not be right to include the charge of abetment of rape, or apply the evidence taken upon a charge under one section to a wholly different one, 21 C. 87.

7. Dismissal of complaint by Magistrate is no bar to Sessions Judge's adding new charge.—Where new heads of charges are proposed to be added before the Sessions Judge, the fact that a complaint regarding them was made to and dismissed by a Magistrate is no bar to the Sessions Judge's adding them.—*Per TELANG, J.*, 15 B. 414.

8. Adding a fresh charge at the third trial.—Where an accused was tried twice under s. 409, I P C. and acquitted and the Sessions Judge in the third trial added an entirely new charge under s. 477 A, I P C. the High Court observed: "We think that it is doubtful whether on the former reference the parties ever contented that under the order of the Court an entirely new charge might be framed but looking to the terms of the order we cannot say that the Magistrate and the Sessions Judge overstepped the limits of their powers." Anyhow the charge newly framed was held irregular though not absolutely illegal 26 C. 560 at p. 563.

9. Power of otherwise altering the charge.—The power to alter ought to be used with great caution 6 B. H. C. R. Cr. Ca. 76 and discretion 6 C. W. N. 72. The Sessions Judge might withdraw a charge which he himself has framed and added to those already sent up by the committing Magistrate, 12 A. 551. Or the omission on the part of the Magistrate to frame a charge so as to contain a separate head for each offence may be remedied by the Sessions Judge, 7 W. R. 8; but not after delivery of the verdict, 5 B. H. C. R. Cr. Ca. 9. He could also substitute charge of abetment for the substantive offence, 11 B. H. C. R. 278. See also 10 C. W. N. 551 as to the circumstances under which the Sessions Judge could amend the charge.

227. (1) Any Court may alter or add to any charge at any time before the charge is pronounced, or, in the case of trials before the Court of Sessions, before the Court before the verdict of the jury is returned or the assessor's assessor's are expressed

(2) Every such alteration or addition shall be read and explained to the accused.

Notes—1 Addition of charge at the trial.—If the word 'alter' is used, the addition must be an addition to some specific charge in the nature of an amendment of a new charge 8 B. 200. *Contra* see 9 A. 525, where it was *held*, that on a trial the

and 471 of the I P C, the Court had power, under this section, to add a charge under s. 113 of the I P C, upon which the prisoner had not been committed for trial. See also 3 N.-W. P. H. C. R. 337 and 8 A. 665. The conflict of decisions found in these rulings has now been removed by the words "or add." Amendment in a charge ought to be made formally and should appear on the face of the record, 9 W. R. 14 and whenever a Sessions Judge may see cause to amend a charge the reasons for such amendment, or at all events a statement that such amendment has been found to be necessary, should also form part of the record, 1 Agra 67. See also 17 B. 849 3 as to the alteration of a major offence (dacoity) which is extraditable into a minor offence (theft) which is not extraditable. See Note 4 to s. 226 as to the power of the Sessions Court to add a charge during the trial.

2^o Section does not warrant the striking out of a charge to cure an illegality when the mischief has been done.—Where a person was charged with and tried for four offences committed all within a year, it is not open to a Magistrate purporting to act under this section to strike out one of the charges and convict the accused on the remaining three. Although the words of this section are wide enough to warrant a Court in altering a charge by striking out one of the charges at any time before judgment yet the section does not warrant the striking out of a charge for the purpose of curing an illegality already committed and after the mischief which the Legislature intended to guard against had been done, 29 M. 569; 49 M. L. J. 93.

3. When the additional charge would prejudice the accused, it should not be added.—While the law empowers a Sessions Judge to add a charge at any time before judgment is delivered, he must in doing so exercise a sound and wise discretion. Where therefore in a Sessions trial, after the prosecution case had been closed and defence witnesses examined, the Judge suddenly added a grave charge like *dacoity*, proceeded with the trial without even granting an adjournment and convicted the accused on the newly added charge, *held*, the Judge had altogether failed to exercise a proper discretion, 6 C. W. N. 73. The accused was committed to the Court of Sessions on the specified charge that he gave false evidence in his deposition before the Sessions Judge. In the Sessions trial, the Judge added a charge of giving false evidence by reason of the alleged contradictory statements, *viz.*, one before a Magistrate under s. 164 and another before a Sessions Judge. The trial was confined to proving in evidence the two statements alleged to be contradictory, and the accused was acquitted. *Held*, reversing acquittal and ordering re-trial, that the accused was prejudiced, inasmuch as he had no notice, until the new charge was added, that he would have to meet the charge of making contradictory statements and he was at an obvious disadvantage in defending himself against that charge either by cross examining the Magistrate, who was called as a witness for the Crown or by calling witnesses to show that what he said before the Magistrate had been misunderstood or had otherwise been incorrectly recorded, 1899 A. W. N. 39. Where an accused was tried twice under s. 409, I P C and the Judge in the third trial added a charge under s. 447 A, I P C. *Held* that he had not exceeded his powers under the law, 26 C. 560 and see Note 8 to s. 226. But where the accused was committed to the Sessions on charges under ss. 363 and 366, I P C, and at the late stage, after the prosecution case had closed and the defence evidence recorded, the Court of its own motion added a charge under s. 498, I P C, and convicted the accused on all three charges. *Held*, that the procedure followed by the Sessions Judge was not regular. The additional charge framed at the stage it was framed was prejudicial to the accused and therefore the conviction under s. 498, I P C, was set aside and a re-trial ordered on the other charges, 31 B. 218. See also 29 C. 415 which follows 5 A. 233. An accused would be seriously prejudiced by the addition of a charge under s. 143, I P C, to charges under ss. 428 and 451, I P C, 16 Cr. L. J. 737 (M) see 26 C. W. N. 344.

4. Application for alteration when to be made.—The application for alteration of the charge should be made immediately after the charge has been read and explained by the Magistrate, 27 C. 839 (F.B.). Such an application should be considered at once and not deferred until the conclusion of the trial before the Sessions Court, 15 B. 415.

(1) *Alteration of charge after verdict*—On a trial by jury the Sessions Judge has no power to alter the charge after the delivery of the verdict, 5 B. H. C. R. Cr. Ca. 9. These words "return of verdict" mean return of the final verdict which the Judge is bound to record, 8 B. 200, nor has he power to do so after the assessors have given their opinion, 17 Cr. L. J. 434.

(2) *Alteration after presentation of petition of compromise*—Where a Court has drawn up a charge of an offence compoundable without sanction of Court and this charge having been read and explained to the accused has been pleaded to that Court should upon the presentation to it of a petition of composition, at once accept the petition and acquit the accused and has no power to alter the charge already drawn up, 29 P. R. 1914 = 16 Cr. L. J. 81.

5. **Effect of omission to read out and explain additional charge.**—When the accused is defended, and his counsel is present in Court the omission to read out and explain the additional charge is an irregularity which unless it has prejudiced the accused does not affect the result of the trial 8 B. 200. See also 7 C. 96 9 M. 81.

6. **'Alter' includes 'withdrawal' of charge.**—The word 'alter' includes withdrawal by the Sessions Judge of a charge added by him to the charge on which the commitment was made, 12 A. 551. But it does not warrant the striking out of a charge for the purpose of curing an illegality which had been committed, as for instance when a person is charged with and tried for four offences committed in the same year, to strike out one of the charges and convict the accused on the remaining three, 29 M. 581.

7. **Power to add charge is not limited by the terms of the certificate under s. 183.**—Once a certificate has been granted the Court has power to add any charges arising out of the facts, 33 A. 514 and see Note 11 to s. 183.

8. **Duty of Magistrate when altering charge.**—When a Magistrate amends the charge he should not write over the original charge, but should leave it on the file for reference, if necessary and should write the new charge separately and correctly date it, 8, Bar. L. T. 17 = 16 Cr. L. J. 2.

228. If the charge framed or alteration or addition made under section 226 or section 227 is such that proceeding immediately with the trial is not likely, in the opinion of the Court, to prejudice the accused in his defence or the prosecutor in the conduct of the case, the Court may, in its discretion, after such charge or alteration or addition has been framed or made, proceed with the trial as if the new or altered charge had been the original charge

229. If the new or altered or added charge is such that proceeding immediately with the trial is likely, in the opinion of the Court, to prejudice the accused or the prosecutor as aforesaid, the Court may either direct a new trial or adjourn the trial for such period as may be necessary

Notes.—1. New trial may be waived.—Where the accused was not called on to plead to a new charge but his counsel on being asked did not require a new trial, it was held he was not prejudiced by the omission, 8 B. 200. See also 5 M. 20 and 11 B. H. C. R. 273, but if the trial itself is illegal, no waiver on the part of accused can cure the illegality, 20 M. L. J. (8th N.) 1.

2. Where new trial directed, evidence at the old trial cannot be referred to unless put in.—Where a new trial has been directed under this section the Magistrate holding the new trial is not justified in referring to the former record as a whole but only to such portions of it as have been especially put in evidence before him, 7 C. L. R. 193.

3. Proceeding to trial immediately on amendment of charge.—Where the original and amended charges were so nearly related that the trial might be deemed to have been a trial on the amended charge from the commencement and where no objection was raised by the pleader of the accused as to the admissibility of the confession of a co-accused on the original charge held that the prisoner was not prejudiced, 11 B. H. C. R. 273. See also 1914 M. W. N. 332 = 15 Cr. L. J. 622. Where, however, the new charge would raise different question of law or would admit of a different defence on the facts the Court should always act under s. 229 6 B. H. C. R. Cr. Ca. 76. See 6 C. W. N. 72 See also 31 B. 218 referred to in Note 3 to s. 227

Stay of proceedings if prosecution or offence in altered charge require previous sanction.

230. If the offence stated in the new or altered or added charge is one for the prosecution of which previous sanction is necessary, the case shall not be proceeded with until such sanction is obtained unless sanction has been already obtained for a prosecution on the same facts as those on which the new or altered charge is founded

Note.—No fresh sanction necessary for a different offence on the same facts.—This section incorporates, 11 B. H. C. R. 34 The expression "on the same facts" is important. Thus where prosecution of a Sub-Registrar was sanctioned for offence under ss. 468 and 417, I P. C., and the Sub-Registrar was convicted under ss. 468 and 109 of the abetment of forgery for the purpose of cheating, and it was contended

...the principal fact, as the
...the principal land;

Major

The year
...er n. Master, [00]
...the year

...the year
...the year

1 The quality or condition of being major or
...er, superiority, high rank, especially,
(a) The military rank of a major. (b) The con-
dition of being of full age, or authorized by law to
manage one's own concerns.
...er number, more than half, etc.

gnity; elevation of mind

...the year

He is furnished with a grating box, which is
...er, a grating box, which is
(b) To produce, as something artificial, unnatural,
or false.

And Art, with her countenance so chaste
To excel the natural with words and actions
(c) To bring about, to be the cause or agent of, to
effect, do, perform, or execute, — after a word with a
noun to form a phrase equivalent to the simple noun
that corresponds to such noun as, to make com-
plaint, for to complain, to send, record of, for to
record, to make single, for to divide, &c.

Call the Sanson, that he may make us stout.
Wealth mislead many friends.
I will neither plead my age nor askance in cause of the
faulx which I merit.

(d) To gain, as the result of or a effort, to get, to
profit, to make acquisition of, to have acquire to
one as, to make money, to make a huge profit,
partly, to have result to one as a loss or misfortune,
to suffer.

He secures his title justly who makes this track a new
end time.

(e) To find, as the result of calculation or compari-
son; to ascertain by enumeration, to find the
number or amount of, by reckoning, weighing,
measurement, and the like; as, he made the distance
about fifty pounds. (f) To pass over the distance
of, to travel over, as, the ship makes ten knots an
hour, he made the distance in one day. (g) To put
in a desired or desirable condition, to cause to
thrive.

When a river is run with a mill or dam.

To support by assertion
by intellectual means

either party
...the year
...the year

...the year
...the year

...the year
...the year

that the conviction cannot stand as there was no sanction for the abetment. *Held*, that the original sanction covered the new charge as the charge of abetment was based on the same facts for which sanction had been granted **30 C. 305**

231. Whenever a charge is altered or added to by Court after the commencement of trial, the prosecutor and the accused shall be allowed to recall or re-summon, and examine with reference to such alteration or addition any witness who may have been examined, and also to call any further witness whom the Court may think to be material.

Charge altered after commencement of trial—accused not allowed to re-examine effect of.—*Held* that where after the evidence of the prosecution a charge was framed and after the evidence for the defence was concluded, the Magistrate altered the charge without giving an opportunity to re-examine the witnesses or to produce further evidence for the defence, it was entirely illegal on the part of the Magistrate to order commitment under the circumstances and it was set aside by the High Court, **23 A. L. J. 233.**

232. (1) If any Appellate Court, or the High Court in the exercise of its powers of revision or of its powers under Chapter XXVII, is of opinion that any person convicted of an offence was misled in his defence by the absence of a charge, or by an error in the charge, it shall direct a new trial to be had upon a charge framed in whatever manner it thinks fit

(2) If the Court is of opinion that the facts of the case are such that no valid charge could be preferred against the accused in respect of the facts proved it shall quash the conviction

Illustration

A is convicted of an offence under s 196 of the Indian Penal Code, upon a charge which omits to state that he knew the evidence which he corruptly used or attempted to use as true or genuine was false or fabricated. If the Court thinks it probable that *A* had such knowledge and that he was misled in his defence by the omission from the charge of the statement that he had it, it shall direct a new trial upon an amended charge but if it appears probable from the proceedings that *A* had no such knowledge, it shall quash the conviction

Notes 1 Scope of the section.—Apart from the general powers given to an Appellate Court to order a re-trial under s 423 (1) (b) this section gives an Appellate Court or High Court power to direct a re-trial on the ground that the accused has been misled in his defence by the absence of a charge or a defect in the charge. Where certain owners of land were convicted under ss. 154 and 155 I P C., for acts or omission on the part of their agents but the charges framed by the Magistrate referred only to the knowledge or belief and acts or omissions of the accused themselves and not of their agents, and on appeal the Sessions Judge was of opinion that by reason of the omission to insert the word "*or their Agents or Managers*" in the charges, the accused had been seriously prejudiced in their defence, *held* he was competent to set aside the conviction and order a re-trial under this section **7 C. W. N 301 See also 29 C. 431**

2. Conviction for an entirely different offence when there is no charge framed for it is bad—A complaint was lodged against one *G* for offences under ss 499 and 471, I P C. At the trial evidence was directed principally to the charge under s 471, and at the close of the trial the Magistrate suddenly turned round and convicted the accused under s 499 although there was no charge of that offence before him. On appeal the Sessions Judge not finding sufficient evidence to establish that offence ordered under s. 423 (1) (b) a new trial. *Held* on revision, that this section rather than s 423 (1) (b) applied and the order of the Judge for new trial was proper. But as there was nothing on the record to show that any valid charge could be preferred against the accused, further proceedings in the matter should be stopped, **28 C 62**. On appeal the Appellate Court has, under this section, power to order a new trial of a case. The accused was charged with criminal breach of trust under s 406 I P C., in respect of amount deposited with him as security. The Magistrate found that the accused misappropriated the security money and convicted him both under s 406 and 420 I P C. *held*, that the conviction under s. 420 I P C to which the accused was not called on to plead was illegal, **9 Cr. L. J 405 (M)**. Where a Magistrate charged and convicted the accused of *robbing* the Sessions Judge on appeal acquitted them on this charge, but convicted them of *house-trespass* and *hurt*

Held, the conviction was wrong, as the offences were distinct and should have formed the subject of separate charges and the accused had been materially prejudiced by the omission of those charges, 30 C. 233. When a Court draws up a charge under s. 323 read with s. 149 I P C. it clearly intimates to the accused persons that they did not themselves cause grievous hurt to anybody, but that they are guilty by implication of such offence inasmuch as somebody else in prosecution of the common object of the riot in which they were engaged did cause such grievous hurt. Therefore when these accused persons are acquitted of rioting obviously all the offences which they are said to have committed by implication disappear and the defence cannot be called upon to answer to the specific offence of causing grievous hurt simply because it may have appeared in the evidence 18 C. W. N. 1077 = 13 Cr. L. J. 502. See also 18 C. W. N. 1276 = 13 Cr. L. J. 704; 18 C. W. N. 1276 = 16 Cr. L. J. 42 and 41 C. 682.

3. **Accused prejudiced.**—In 8 C. 211 the charge being defective and in exact as regards the second and third clauses of the definition of murder s. 300 I P C., the High Court set aside the conviction and sentence for murder but convicted the prisoner on his own confession and the evidence of two other persons under s. 326, I P C. See also 30 C. 233 and 7 C. W. N. 74. But where the accused had been convicted of an offence under s. 211, I P C., instead of the abatement of that offence the High Court in revision refused to interfere, as there was no prejudice, 7 C. W. N. 856.

4. **Vagueness in charge of perjury**—In a case where a conviction for perjury was set aside on account of the vagueness of the charge see 10 C. W. N. 1099 = 4 C. L. J. 558 = 4 Cr. L. J. 277. See Note 2 under s. 223.

5. **Charge of one offence and conviction for another is bad.**—The accused was summoned to answer a charge of storing wool but on his godown being inspected at his request, some loose cotton was found there. He was convicted for storing cotton contrary to the Act. *Held* reversing the conviction and sentence that the accused had no proper notice, and no proper opportunity of answering the charge of storing cotton Ratanlal 529. When two accused were charged under s. 324 I P C. and one charge was framed against them that they voluntarily cause hurt to B S and L by a *dao* a cutting instrument and one of the accused was convicted of using a *lathi* against two of the persons the conviction was set aside 17 C. W. N. 419 = 16 Cr. L. J. 212. and see Notes 1 and 3 under s. 225.

Joinder of Charges

233. For every distinct offence of which any person is accused there shall be a separate charge, and every such charge shall be tried separately except in the cases mentioned in sections 234 235 236 and 239.

Separate charges for distinct offences.

Illustration

A is accused of a theft on one occasion and of causing grievous hurt on another occasion O must be separately charged and separately tried for the theft and causing grievous hurt.

OBJECT OF SECTION

Notes.—1. **Necessity for separate charge for each offence.**—This section contains the general law

at p 177. *Per* PETHERAM C J. The charge says JACKSON J in 21 W. R. 72 at p 82. I take to be first a notice to the prisoner of the matter whereof he is accused and it must convey to him with sufficient clearness and certainty that which the prosecution intends to prove against him and of which he will have to clear himself. It is an information to the Court which is to try the accused of the matters to which evidence is to be given. In the first place to give an accused person notice of the charge so that he is not embarrassed by having to meet charges in no way connected with the charge. *Per* J. in 19 C. W. N. 972. The rule is 'separate trials. Joint trial is only by virtue of the exceptions quoted in s. 233. The basis of the rule is that the accused should not be prejudiced by being accused of several things at once 15 B. 491. See also 23 M. 61, as to the necessity for this salutary rule.

APPLICATION OF SECTION

2. **Section does not apply to preliminary inquiries.**—Sections 232 and 239 relating to joinder of charges refer to the trial of the accused. The Privy Council Ruling in 23 M. 61 = 23 I. A. 257 cannot be extended to preliminary inquiries held by committing Magistrates so as to render the commitment itself illegal, because

there was misjoinder of offences or offenders in the preliminary inquiry. See 35 M. L. J. 239. It is open to the Sessions Judge to frame separate charges and try separately as if there had been two commitments, 26 M. 592; 17 Cr. L. J. 359; 7 Bom. L. R. 457, but this procedure is not calculated to advance justice. *Per* SESHAGIRI AYYAR, J., in 29 M. L. J. 101 = 18 M. L. T. 93 = 16 Cr. L. J. 593 (F.B.). See Note 7 to s. 215 and Note 7 to s. 229.

3. Does the section apply to security proceedings under Chapter VIII?—The law as to joinder of charges against a person accused of definite offences has no application to an inquiry under s. 110, 11 G. W. N. 789 = 5 Cr. L. J. 1; 11 Bom. L. R. 740 = 10 Cr. L. J. 375, but see Notes 39–41 under Heading VI to s. 123.

4. Section applies to summons-cases where no charge is framed.—The accused were tried and convicted for an encroachment on a grazing ground. It was found that each of the accused cultivated a separate piece of land and that they did not all join together to cultivate the same piece in common. The question being raised as to whether the section applied to a summons-case in which no formal charge was necessary, *held*, that a charge is an essential element in any trial and if the provisions as to joinder of charges do not apply to summons-cases, there are no other provisions of law to guide Magistrates, 3 L. B. R. 52 = 2 Cr. L. J. 739 (F. B.). In a summons-case, it is not necessary to have a charge embodied in writing but nonetheless this section applies to summons-cases also, so also when an accused is charged with a summons-case and a warrant-case, 3 L. B. R. 113 = 3 Cr. L. J. 350. The fact that the trial has taken place in a summons-case does not exclude the application of s. 233, 41 G. 694 following 3 L. B. R. 52 (F. B.) = 2 Cr. L. J. 739. See also (1912) 1 M. W. N. 69 = 13 Cr. L. J. 124, where it was *held* that each levy of excess toll constitutes a separate offence which should be tried separately.

5. Section does not affect simultaneous trial of cross-cases.—See 8 C. W. N. 344 where 25 M. 61 (P. C.) and 13 C. L. R. 275, are distinguished and Notes under Heading VI to s. 537 and Note 9 to s. 239.

SEPARATE CHARGE FOR EACH DISTINCT OFFENCE.

6. What is a distinct offence?—"I understand, when two offences have been committed and each of these two offences has no connection with each other they are distinct offences. The section does not say 'for every offence' but 'for every distinct offence'. The illustration to the section indicates the meaning of 'distinct offence'. In the illustration, the two offences were committed on two different occasions, one was theft and the other was grievous hurt. *Per* SHARFUDDIN, J., in 19 C. W. N. 972 = 16 Cr. L. J. 651. See also Notes under Heading III to s. 36.

7. Separate offences ought not to be lumped together in a single charge.—Three separate offences—

not of head o
C. R. 3-4
so as
one charge of two distinct offences (two acts of extortion), though arising out of the same transaction is an illegality fatal to the trial. 10 C. W. N. 55 = 3 Cr. L. J. 141. Two distinct offences of criminal breach of trust (s. 409 I P C.) ought not to be included in one charge, 17 C. W. N. 147. See also 10 C. W. N. 520 = 2 C. L. J. 618 = 3 Cr. L. J. 111 where *distinguishing* 27 B. 135, a joinder in one charge of two attempts to cheat committed on two different dates, one following the other was held to vitiate the whole trial, and so also though offences committed on the same date. In 6 C. L. J. 757 = 6 Cr. L. J. 442 two persons were charged in one charge for misappropriation of three sums of money collected in accordance with their duty from three persons and convicted, the conviction was set aside though the Judges disapproved of the length to which the rule in the 25 M. 61 (P. C.) was carried, as the accused had in fact been prejudiced. So, too, where theft and escape from lawful custody are joined, because none of the sections referred to in this section will cover such a case, 3 L. B. R. 221 = 4 Cr. L. J. 369, 1 L. B. R. 361. In 13 C. W. N. 1067 = 10 Cr. L. J. 469 the accused was charged with cheating and one charge alleging delivery of property on three different dates was framed and held to be bad and the conviction was set aside. In 40 C. 846 the trial of the accused on one charge with misappropriating a sum of money made up of two sums collected on different dates was held to be an illegality. See also 18 C. W. N. 133. Where, however, under an agreement made with the concurrence of their pleaders, the accused were tried for three offences committed against three different persons on the same date and forming part of the same transaction and one charge was framed against them instead of three and it ran thus — 'That you on or about the 3rd day of July at B committed theft of paddy from the fields of (a) S. D., (b) J. P., (c) L. P. and thereby committed an offence under s. 379 I P C. etc.' *Held* that although strictly speaking, three separate charges

should have been drawn up in identical terms for the three offences under s. 379, 1 P. C., yet as in the one charge framed, the three offences had been kept separate and were distinguished by the letters (a), (b) (c), the error in framing one charge was an error in form rather than in substance and as such did not amount to an illegality but was a mere irregularity curable under s. 537 unless it was shown that the accused had been prejudiced or that a failure of justice had been occasioned. In consequence thereof, 11 C. W. N. 54 = 4 Cr. L. J. 415, where 10 C. W. N. 55 = 3 Cr. L. J. 141 and 33 C. 292 are distinguished. See also 1907 A. W. N. 225 = 6 Cr. L. J. 215. Three separate but similar complaints of cheating were laid against the accused by three persons, but only one charge was framed setting out only one offence of cheating in respect of all the three complaints and the accused was convicted. Held that the Magistrate should have drawn up three charges and if he had done so there was no obstacle to the disposal of all three cases at one trial. As, however, the accused had not been prejudiced the error was cured by s. 537. The defect was one of duplicity, not of misjoinder and the case was not covered by 21 M. 61 (P. C.), 41 C. 68. Only one charge was framed in respect of the hurt caused to two persons and the accused convicted, but it was held (1 LUTCHER, J., dissenting) that the irregularity was cured by s. 537 and that the case of 25 M. 61 (P. C.) was not an authority for the proposition that failure to observe the first part of s. 233 is fatal to the trial, 19 C. W. N. 972 = 15 Cr. L. J. 641. There is no doubt that according to the general principle, a duplicity of the charge is not allowed. The indictment must not be doubted, that is to say, no one count of the indictment should charge the accused with having committed two or more offences, for instance, with having committed murder and robbery or the like. But where the offence charged, whether felony or misdemeanour, is one single act, it may be made the subject of a single count. So the indictment may charge the prisoner in the same count with felonious acts with respect to several persons, as in robbery with having assaulted A and B and stolen from A one shilling and from B two shillings, if it was all in one transaction (see Archbold's 1910, p. 75). Per SHARFUDDIN, J., in 19 C. W. N. 972 = 15 Cr. L. J. 641. Reference was also made *R v Giddins*, (1842) Car. and Mar. 634 R. v J. A. Thompson, (1914) 2 K. B. 99.

JOINDER OF CHARGES.

8. Though any two out of three charges may stand together, it does not follow that all the three may be tried together.—Although the first (s. 409 1 P. C.) and the second (s. 477 A) charges could properly be tried together as forming part of the same transaction under s. 235 (1), and the second and third charges (s. 477 A) could likewise be tried at one trial under s. 234 *non constat* that all the three are triable simultaneously. The joinder of three must be brought within the scope of ss. 234, 235, 236 or 239 and when there is nothing to justify the joinder of the third charge with the first, *ergo* the first charge cannot be tried along with the third and either the first or the third must go and the whole trial is invalid, 40 C. 318.

9. What offence cannot be jointly charged against the same person —

(i) *A substantive offence and abetment thereof cannot be jointly charged against the same individual* — An accused can no more be charged as an abettor as well as a perpetrator of the offence abetted, not in the alternative but cumulatively, than he can be charged with an attempt to commit an offence and the commission of that very offence, 24 M. 523 at p. 547. See also judgment of DAVIES, J., in 25 M. 61 and 42 C. 957.

(ii) *A thief cannot be charged with theft and disposal of stolen property* — The real thief cannot be charged with offences under ss. 379 and 215, 1 P. C., 14 Bar. L. R. 67; 12 Cr. L. J. 72 (Ind).

(iii) *A murderer cannot be charged with causing evidence to disappear by concealing the corpse*, s. 201, 1 P. C. — 7 W. R. 52; 8 Bom. H. C. R. 126; 2 A. 713; 6 C. 789; 7 A. 749. 8 A. 252, 22 C. 633; 27 M. 271; 8 Bom. L. R. 538 = 4 Cr. L. J. 89.

10. What are not distinct offences — The mere fact that only a single act was committed does not necessarily mean that only one offence has been committed.

(i) *Making number of false statements in one deposition is one offence* — The making of any number of false statements in the same deposition is one aggregate case of giving false evidence, and that charges of false evidence cannot be multiplied according to the number of false statements contained in the deposition, 36 C. 803 following 6 Mad. H. C. 27.

(ii) *Filing three forged documents simultaneously is one using* — When three forged receipts are filed at one time with a written statement in three different cases, on three different occasions, and there was nothing to show that any of the documents had been used at any other time, held that it is one using only, and it is not necessary to frame three separate charges in respect of each receipt, 20 C. 413. See, however, 14 C. L. J. 652 = 13 Cr. L. J. 62.

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(iii) *Receiving bribes in one lump*—See Note 13 below

(iv) *Receiving of properties stolen from different persons*—When a person is charged with receiving on one occasion various items of stolen property, the result of several distinct thefts, he ought to be convicted of only one offence under s 411, I P C, 3 Bom. L. R. 187; unless it appears that articles for possession of which the accused is charged came into his possession at different times, the trial is not irregular on account of the fact that the articles were stolen from several persons at different times, 36 P. L. R. 1910. See, however, 13 C. W. N. 418 = 9 Cr. L. J. 277 where following 11 C. W. N. 1123 it was held that one trial for having been found in possession of stolen property belonging to two different persons and stolen at two different times is illegal. The case in 9 C. 371 was held to have been overruled by 25 M. 61.

(v) *Misappropriation of several sums of money*—See 29 M. 558; 7 A. L. J. 897 = 11 Cr. L. J. 442 and Note 9 under s 234. Embezzlement of two separate sums on two different occasions in regard to the same individual is really only one offence, 14 C. 129. A *Kyandangy* having no authority to collect capitation tax collected the tax from three separate tax payers leading them to believe that he had authority from the *thugyi* to collect. After collection he paid over to the *thugyi* only a portion of his collection from each tax payer and dishonestly misappropriated the remainder. Held that he could not be punished for three separate offences of criminal breach of trust under s 40a, I P C, in the absence of any evidence to show that there were three separate and distinct acts of misappropriation, 1 Bur. S. L. 492.

(vi) *Misappropriating several books of account is but one offence*—When an executor in charge of an estate for several years was charged with having committed offences under s. 405, I, P C, in respect of large number of account books of the estate which were found locked up in two boxes and it was contended that there was a separate offence in respect of each book and that the accused could not be tried for more than three of such offences held, such contention was untenable. They formed one set of books and may be regarded as one item of property which the accused was dealing in one way, 17 C. W. N. 479 = 14 Cr. L. J. 219.

(vii) *Stealing several articles at one time*—The stealing of several bullocks from the same herdsmen at the same time is one offence, (1881) A. W. N. 154. See Note 6 (ii) and (iii) to s 235.

(viii) *Receiving a bribe partly on one day and partly another is but one offence*—5 C. W. N. 332

(ix) *Separate acts committed under the Bombay District Municipalities Act constitute one offence only*—In 4 Bom. L. R. 942, accused owned a shop which was divided into four compartments, three of which were occupied by himself and the fourth by his tenant. To all these compartments was attached one continuous board which projected into the public street. The accused was charged and convicted under the *Bombay District Municipalities Act* of two offences, one for affixing a board to the portion in his own occupation and the other for affixing a board to the portion let out. Held, there was only one offence as there was only one board and the conviction was accordingly set aside and the case sent back for re-trial.

(x) *False information against several persons*—False information in one statement to the Police that property would be found in the houses of two persons is one false statement and the accused could be charged and convicted for only one offence, 13 C. 270.

(xi) *Cheating a number of persons*—See 10 C. W. N. 520

(xii) *Making a number of false entries to cover one defalcation*—See 41 C. 722

11. *Several dacoits cannot be charged and tried together.*—Where the accused is alleged to have committed three if not four dacoities in the course of the same night and the charge against him was to the effect that they on or about the 12th of December committed dacoity at *Dabri* and thereby committed an offence punishable under s. 395, I P C, held that the conviction was unsustainable as the charge ought to have specified each alleged dacoity separately and the omission cannot be said to be a mere irregularity, even if the dacoities were all so connected together as to form part of the same transaction, 25 A. 193. Accused cannot be charged at one time with more than three dacoities in all and the dacoities must be particularly specified, 1912 M. W. N. 49 = 13 Cr. L. J. 125. See also 14 A. 502, and 28 M. L. J. 331 = 16 Cr. L. J. 298. In 7 P. R. 1901, three accused were charged with three dacoities committed in a course of a single day and in addition one of them was charged with rescuing a prisoner from Police custody, with the murder of a constable and with taking part in the dacoity in which the constable was murdered, held, that the joint trial was a mere irregularity curable by s 537. This was before the Privy Council decision in 25 M. 61. See later Rulings in 5 P. R. 1900; 17 P. R., 1903 and 16 P. R. 1902.

1. The first step is to identify the key components of the system. This includes understanding the hardware, software, and data involved.

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THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

Journal of Management Studies, 19(6), 701-718
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3. Any thing made from raw Australia wool
by machinery or by art as cut & from wool

It is made or fabricated from raw materials by the hand or by art or machinery and work in a factory, and is intended for use, as to manufacture cloth and so on.

2. To work as raw materials into suitable forms for use, as to : in facture wool cotton silk or iron

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7. The following information is provided for the year ended 31 December 2014:

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12. Alternative charge for making contradictory statements but one offence.—Conviction for intentionally giving false evidence may be had upon an alternative charge though the false statement had been made in one deposition. This section does not affect the matter. *Per WILSON and TOTTENHAM, J* (NORRIS, J, *dissenting*), 10 C. 937. An alternative charge is not a charge of two offences, but of one, 13 B. L. R. 324 = 21 W. R. 72. Now see s. 236 and Note 17 thereto.

13. Joinder of charge in cases of bribery.—s. 161, I. P. C.—Each distinct act of receiving an illegal gratification must form the subject of a separate charge except in cases falling under ss. 234 and 235, see 23 M. 61. It is illegal to try in one and the same trial, eight distinct charges of offences under s. 161, I. P. C. 7 A. L. J. 19 = 11 Cr. L. J. 51. Where a bribe was collected from certain inhabitants of a village by subscription and handed over to the recipient in a lump sum, it was held the recipient could not be charged under s. 161 I. P. C., with the receipt of the whole sum collected, but that he must be charged in respect of not more than three separate items constituting the total collection and that the ruling in 26 M. 61 applied 1904 A. W. N. 223. Again, where an accused person attempts to cheat a whole body of villagers and speaks to them in a body and not to each individual villager for the purpose, it was held he may be tried in one charge for each attempt to get money from them, 10 C. W. N. 520 = 2 C. L. J. 618 = 3 Cr. L. J. 111.

Where, however, certain sums of money were collected from landholders of various villages and where paid in the case of each village in a lump sum by the persons who collected them to the accused, a Zilladar in the Irrigation Department, with the object of inducing the accused to show favour in his official capacity to each village as a whole and the accused was charged and convicted in respect of such a lump sum under s. 161, I. P. C., and it was contended that the offence under s. 162, I. P. C., was in respect of every item of money contributed by various persons and the actual charge against him of having received a certain lump sum of money from the landholders of a village so and so is illegal on two grounds, (1) that it ignores the fact that the offence was the doing of something in his official capacity for the benefit of each individual landholder who subscribed to the fund and (2) that the Court had thereby joined a number of perfectly distinct offences into one general charge, held that the charge as framed was legal and correct, as the motive of the petitioner was to obtain sums of money from each village by promising to show favour to inhabitants of those villages generally, (1904) A. W. N. 223 discussed, 11 P. R. 1911 = 143 P. L. R. 1911 = 12 Cr. L. J. 217. The question in each case is one of fact. Where, therefore, a Sub-Registrar was convicted on a charge that he attempted to obtain Rs. 2 from one S and six others as a motive for registering seven sale-deeds executed in their favour by R and it was contended that since R sold portions of his land to seven different persons by seven different sale-deeds and though they were presented for registration at the same time, and the accused refused to register them unless he was paid in the aggregate a sum of Rs. 14 at a rate of Rs. 2 for each sale-deeds and this amounted to seven offences and having regard to s. 235 the accused could not be tried with respect to all of them at one trial, held that whether the allegation in the charge amounted to seven offences is one of fact. If the accused attempted to obtain Rs. 2 separately from each of the seven purchasers and was willing to register any one purchaser's sale-deed if that purchaser paid him Rs. 2 then the contention of the accused should prevail. But if on the other hand the Registrar treated this as one transaction and was not willing to register any one of the documents until all the seven purchasers have paid Rs. 2 each, that would be one offence and no question of misjoinder would arise, 13 C. W. N. 1062 = 10 Cr. L. J. 463. See also 10 C. W. N. 520 = 2 C. L. J. 618 = 3 Cr. L. J. 111.

14. What are distinct offences that cannot be tried together.—The following offences have been held to be distinct offences for which there should be separate charges and separate trials—

(a) Ss 167 and 466, I. P. C., 8 C. 450 = 10 C. L. R. 421

(b) Ss 411 and 413, I. P. C., 8 C. 634 = 10 C. L. R. 466

(c) Ss 380 and 411, I. P. C., 1 C. W. N. 35; 6 C. L. R. 245; 28 C. 10, 3 P. R. 1905, or ss 380 and 414, I. P. C., 6 Bom. L. R. 725, or ss 395 and 412, I. P. C., 11 C. L. J. 182 = 11 Cr. L. J. 244

(d) Ss 272 and 273, I. P. C., 12 M. 273

(e) Ss 380 and 224, I. P. C., 3 L. B. R. 221 = 4 Cr. L. J. 339, 11 M. 441.

(f) Ss 411 and 480, I. P. C. 6 C. W. N. 550

(g) Ss 409 and 479-A. Three distinct criminal breaches of trust and three distinct falsification of account, 30 M. 323; (1911) 2 M. W. N. 536 = 13 Cr. L. J. 21, and so also three distinct acts of criminal misappropriation and two distinct offences of forgery to conceal the two acts of criminal misappropriation, 30 A. 351 = 32 A. 219

(g) *Distinct acts of misappropriation*—The accused was charged and convicted at one trial of offences under ss. 403 and 426, I P C., in respect of a large number of trees cut by him between March 1909 to April 1910, the evidence showed that the fellings took place on some eight or nine occasions and the charge did not allege that the various fellings so connected together as to form one transaction under s. 235, *held* that the conviction must be set aside even though no objection was taken at the trial, as the charge was framed contrary to the rule laid down by s. 233, (1911) 2 M. W. N. 467 = 12 Cr. L. J. 567.

(h) Three men *F*, *M* and *J* were sent up for trial under s. 392 I P C. Some stolen property was found in the possession of *F* and *M*. Soon after dacoity other property such as locks and ball cartridges, which had no connection with the dacoity, was found in the possession of *J*, for which he was convicted under s. 379, I P C., and the *Arms Act*. *Held*, that the trial was irregular, and the defect was not cured by s. 537, 5 P. R. 1900.

(i) *B*, *M*, *K* and *R* were jointly tried, *B* for receiving stolen property under s. 411, I P C., and the others for theft, *held*, that the joinder of charges was illegal and the conviction bad, 1 C. W. N. 35, 3 P. R. 1905.

(j) Where fourteen persons charged with distinct offences under ss. 290 and 291, I P C., and were tried together, *held*, that it was an irregularity calculated to prejudice the accused, 5 M. 20.

(k) *False evidence—separate charge against each accus d*—In prosecutions for giving false evidence under s. 193, I P C., even arising out of the same case, the case of each person accused should be separately inquired into, and if committed for trial should be separately tried. It is wholly erroneous to include them in one joint charge, 5 A. 17; 6 M. 232; 10 C. 405, *Ratanlal* 31; 4 A. 233, 4 Bom. L. R. 33 and 53; 39 P. R. 1935. The false evidence given by one witness is a transaction complete in itself and not connected with false evidence given by another witness even though in the same case and on the same point 5 S. L. R. 129 = 13 Cr. L. J. 23. Each act of giving false evidence is a separate offence, 3 M. H. C. R. Appx. XXXII; unless a conspiracy is proved 4 Bom. L. R. 53. *But see* 14 Bom. L. R. 932 = 1 Bom. Cr. Ca. 216 = 13 Cr. L. J. 833 and Notes 28 to s. 239. *See also* 21 C. W. N. 766.

(l) Kidnapping a boy and assaulting the mother who went to demand the boy, 26 M. 434.

(m) Ss. 454 and 325, I P C. 2 L. B. R. 19; 5 Bar. L. T. 191 = 13 Cr. L. J. 435.

(n) Ss. 182 and 500, I P C., 37 C. 604.

(o) Stealing certain articles and assaulting the owner who went to demand them, 14 C. W. N. 183.

(p) A person accused of an offence under s. 3 of the *Gambling Act* III of 1867 cannot be tried with others charged under s. 4 of the same Act, 5 P. W. R. 1910 = 11 Cr. L. J. 211.

(q) Where accused was tried for (i) abetment of falsification of a document, (ii) fraudulent destruction and secretion of the document and (iii) abetment of criminal breach of trust, the conviction was set aside for non-compliance with this section, 25 M. 125.

(r) Joint trial of a person for abetment of criminal breach of trust and for offences under ss. 388 and 411, I P C. which were quite unconnected with the act of criminal breach of trust was held illegal 5 C. W. N. 294.

(s) Where the accused was charged under ss. 467 and 477, I P C., and ss. 468 and 477, I P C., in respect of an alleged forgery of a *Kabala* and under s. 82 of the *Registration Act* and ss. 467 and 477, and s. 471, I P C., with reference to a mortgage bond, with an attempt to cheat 477, I P C., *held* the trial was bad for misjoinder of charges, 30 C. 822. *See also* 2 P. R. 1905.

(t) Offences under s. 125 of the *Railway Act* and under s. 225, I P C. 29 C. 585.

(u) Ss. 380 and 245 I P C. Theft and receiving illegal gratification for the restoration of stolen property, 14 Bar. L. R. 67.

(v) Where the accused were charged with murder and of causing grievous hurt while removing the dead body, *held* the offences were distinct, 10 P. R. 1906 = 4 Cr. L. J. 235.

15 Joint trial of offences under ss. 124-A and 153-A, I P C.—For joinder of charges and trial of offences under ss. 124-A and 153-A, *vide* Note 13 under s. 264 and Note 19 below.

16. Court not ousted of jurisdiction by reason of same facts disclosing another offence not triable by it.—Where the same facts disclose two distinct offences triable by two different Courts, the two offences can be separately tried and the trial by one Court of the offence triable by itself is not illegal, 6 C. W. N. 550.

3 Hence, that which disguises, a pretext or subterfuge.

3 A festive entertainment of dancing or other diversions, in which the company all wear masks a masquerade, lince, a revel, a buntic; a piece of mummery

This same truth is a naked and open daylight to it doth not
show the male and no minner and thing as of the world
half so plainly and clearly as candle-light. *Lucan.*

4 A dramatic performance written in a tragic style, without attention to rules of composition or

2 Surprising belief not to be literally credited, partaking of the character of miracle, or supernatural power. Incredible

The *unintentional* (Rhet. A. Cratylus) that which exceeds natural power, or is preternatural — opposed to the *prodigal*.

1. It is common on surface of the soil and on the walls of the house, etc.

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3 A Spanish diver ran on horseback
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SCOPE OF SECTION AND EXCEPTIONS

17 When resort must be had to the rules laid down by s. 233 and when to the exceptions.—This Code requires that for every distinct offence of which any person is accused there should be a separate charge and that every charge should be tried separately. This is a broad rule and applies to all trials for offences under the criminal law. In section 233 this rule is made subject to four exceptions. But a Court cannot and ought not to treat a case before it as an exception to the general and broad rule unless it is satisfied that in the case before it the charge should be brought within one of the four exceptions and it would be safer if the Magistrate or the Sessions Judge showed in the charge-sheet or in his judgment that he had reason for bringing the case before him under one of these separate sections 11 A L J 155—14 Cr L J 116. But the Legislature having specially empowered the Courts with large powers as regards joinder of persons and joinder of charges resort must be had to those powers. The object was clearly to avoid the necessity of the same witnesses giving the same evidence two or three times over in different trials and to join in one trial those offences with regard to which the evidence would overlap 18 L R 73—8 Cr L J 191. However even where several criminal acts can be included in the same transaction no joinder of charges of trials should be permitted which will result in bewildering any of the accused *ibid*. If in any case either the accused are likely to be bewildered in their defence by having to meet many disconnected charges or the prospect of a fair trial is likely to be endangered by the production of a mass of evidence leading by its mere accumulation to induce an undue suspicion against the accused, the propriety of combining the charges may well be questioned 15 B 491.

18 ss. 234 to 239 do not bar separate trial for each single offence.—The exceptions embodied in s. 234 etc. although authorizing the combination of three charges at one trial does not bar the separate trial of the accused for each separate offence. So when the prosecution has made its election under s. 222 cl. (2) and the proviso thereto by choosing some out of the different amount misappropriated during the periods they are not stopped by the provisions of s. 403 from instituting any further prosecution in respect of any fresh items covering the same period 12 Bom L R 226—11 Cr L J 337; 16 Cr L J 717 (M); 8 C 431. See Note 1 to s. 234 and Note 2 to s. 239 and Note 2 to s. 235.

19 Are the exceptions mutually exclusive?—The words of this section do not favour the view that the exceptions mentioned are mutually exclusive. If it had been intended that section 235 (2) or s. 236 could not be made use of in co-operation with s. 234 this intention could have been easily expressed. If the exceptions are mutually exclusive the provisions of s. 236 or s. 237 could never be invoked to prevent the miscarriage of justice arising from a failure to make good all the details of a charge joined with two other charges under s. 234. It is difficult to believe that the Legislature intended that a joint trial of three offences under s. 234 should prevent the prosecution from establishing at the same trial the minor or alternative degrees of criminality involved in the acts complained of. For these reasons the exceptions are not necessarily exclusive and ss. 235 (2) and 236 may be resorted to in framing additional charges where the trial is of three offences of the same kind committed within the year. Where the exercise by the Court of the permissive powers conferred by these sections may produce embarrassment the Court may decline to avail itself of its full powers. In this case a charge was framed against the accused for an offence under s. 124 A I P C., in respect of an article in his newspaper and also two other charges for offence under ss. 124 A and 153-A I P C. with regard to another article of a different date in the same paper were framed and the accused was tried at one trial and convicted and sentenced under each of the charges. It was contended that the trial was bad on the ground of his joinder of charges as none of the exceptions taken singly applied to the case and that the exceptions should be taken *singly* and not *cumulatively held*, that there was no irregularity in the trial on the ground of misjoinder of charges (33 B 77 approved); 33 B 221. In 32 A 219, however the decision in 33 B 221 was criticised and it was held down that s. 235 (1) and s. 234 are mutually exclusive and that it would be straining the language of s. 234 beyond all bounds to hold that it covered all offences committed in the course of three similar but separate transactions when the number of offences was more than three. The facts of the case were that the accused was charged and tried at one and the same trial for three offences of criminal breach of trust under s. 408 I P C. and three offences of forgery under s. 467 I P C., committed within a period of one year. The accused was convicted and sentenced in respect of all the six offences. It was contended in support of the conviction that s. 235 (1) must be read with s. 234 and that the three offences mentioned in the latter section must be deemed to include all the offences in three similar transactions such as are contemplated by s. 235 (1) but it was *held following* 23 M 61 (P G.) that the trial was

of kidnapping together and s 235 would allow the trial of kidnapping with respect to one girl and cheating with respect to the same girl in one trial but the operations of two sections could not be combined because they are mutually exclusive and therefore the whole trial was vitiated by illegality 24 A. L. J. 239.

EFFECT OF MISJOINDER.

20. **Joint trial of distinct offences not falling within the exceptions illegal.**—Privy Council view in *N. A. Subrahmanya Aiyar's Case*—An accused person was tried for several distinct offences covering a period beyond 12 months from first to last at one trial. The Full Bench of the High Court considered this an irregularity curable by s. 537, but on appeal to the Privy Council it was laid down that (a) the disobedience to an express provision of law as to a mode of trial is not a mere irregularity which could be cured by s. 537 (b) Such a phrase as "irregularity" is not appropriate to the illegality of trying an accused person for many different offences at the same time and those offences being spread over a longer period than by law (s. 234) could have been joined in one indictment. (c) Nor could such an illegal procedure be amended by arranging afterwards what might or might not have been properly submitted to the jury. To allow this would be to leave to the Court the functions of the jury and the accused would never have been really tried at all upon the charge arranged afterwards by the Court. (d) Nor can the trial be made good by confining the verdict of guilty given by the jury to such part of the charge as might have been legally joined, 25 M. 61—23 I A 237 which renders 16 C. 128 and 395 and 22 C. 176 good, while *overruling* 27 C. 839 and 23 C. 7 and 10 and *Ratanlal* 212. Five persons were charged with having committed the offence of rioting on the 5th December, four out of those persons and one F were charged with having committed the offence of criminal trespass on the 9th December. These two cases were taken up and tried together in one trial, and were decided by one judgment. *Held*, that the trial was absolutely illegal, it having been a trial which is prohibited by the terms of this section, 14 C. 395. See 11 M. 441 and 20 C. 527. This decision was *disapproved* of in 27 C. 839 (F.B.). But the Privy Council pronouncement in 25 M. 51 renders obsolete the Calcutta Full Bench view. A Magistrate framed two separate charges and numbered them as distinct cases, but when the witnesses came to be cross-examined, he lost sight of the necessity for keeping the two trials separate and allowed the witnesses to be cross-examined promiscuously in respect of both the charges and both cases were disposed of by one judgment. *Held* that there was only one trial and the joint trial offended against the provisions of s. 233 and the illegality could not be cured, by s. 537, 29 M. L. J. 101 = 18 M. L. T. 95 = 16 Cr. L. J. 593 (F.B.); 29 C. 395 and 41 C. 722 referred to. See also, 19 C. L. J. 633 = 15 Cr. L. J. 472.

21. **Fact accused did not object to misjoinder, will not validate trial**—Where, in one trial the accused was charged with (i) abetting the falsification of a document s. 471A, I P.C., (ii) fraudulent destruction of a document and the fraudulent secretion of other documents, s. 477, I P.C., and (iii) abetting criminal breach of trust, s. 485 and it was urged on behalf of the prosecution that the different offences were alleged in the charge to have been committed at or about the same time and place and that the objection of misjoinder was not taken before the Sessions Judge. *Held*, that the conviction must be set aside, as the offences charged do not form parts of the same transaction, 26 M. 125. See also 3 M. L. T. 407 = 18 M. L. J. 530 = 8 Cr. L. J. 152; 28 M. L. J. 397 = 17 M. L. T. 242 = 16 Cr. L. J. 323. In any case it is open to question whether consent of pleaders could validate a trial which was illegally constituted, *per* BEACHCROFT, J., 19 C. W. N. 972 = 16 Cr. L. J. 641.

22. **When the conviction need not be set aside**—

(i) *If accused has pleaded guilty*—If the accused has pleaded guilty and not applied to set aside the conviction and no injustice has resulted the conviction need not be set aside, 4 L. B. R. 315 = 9 Cr. L. J. 15. (F.B.) See also 4 L. B. R. 49 and 5 P. R. 1906, 33 C. 161; 1907 A. W. N. 208 = 6 Cr. L. J. 215; 7 L. B. R. 273 = 16 Cr. L. J. 44. But in 3 M. L. T. 407 = 18 M. L. J. 330 = 8 Cr. L. J. 152, it was *held* that an accused person cannot waive the benefit of the legal provision relating to the trial and where there has been a misjoinder, the conviction must be set aside. See 26 M. 125; 4 P. L. R. 1905 = 2 Cr. L. J. 30.

(ii) *If the failure has only been to observe the first part of s. 233*—Failure to observe the first part of s. 233 is only a defect in the form of charge which is covered by ss. 535 and 537. The defect is one of duplicity not of misjoinder, 41 C. 65. What their Lordships of the Privy Council in 25 M. 61 have prohibited is if law expressly provides a particular mode of trial, disobedience of that law vitiates the whole trial. It is doubtful if the framing of charges is a mode of trial but joint trial of charges as to distinct offences would be a mode of trial. Omission to frame two charges instead of one is an irregularity covered by s. 537, 19 C. W. N. 972 = 16 Cr. L. J. 641 (FLITCHER, J., *dissenting*).

(iii) See also the opinion of SIR HENRY PRINSEP, 5 P. R. 1906, the opinion of NAPIER, J., in 29 M. L. J. 101 = 16 Cr. L. J. 593 and the opinion of the majority in 19 C. W. N. 972 = 16 Cr. L. J. 641 as to the construction of 25 M. 61 (P.C.).

23. Illegality is not cured by failure of or striking out additional charges.—The defect cannot be cured by merely striking out the additional charges after the mischief which the Legislature intended to remedy had been done **29 M 562**. Even if some of the charges illegally joined have failed and the accused have been acquitted of those charges, still if the joinder of those charges was in violation of the law the accused must have been considerably embarrassed in their defence on the remaining charges and their acquittal on the charges which the prosecution failed to prove cannot make valid the trial if it was illegal *ab initio* and the conviction on the remaining charges must be set aside **83 M 502**.

234. (1) When a person is accused of more offences than one of the same kind committed within the space of twelve months from the first to the last of such offences* whether in respect of the same person or not he may be charged with and tried at one trial for any number of them not exceeding three

(2) Offences are of the same kind when they are punishable with the same amount of punishment under the same section of the Indian Penal Code or of any special or local law

† Provided that for the purpose of this section an offence punishable under s 379 of the Indian Penal Code shall be deemed to be an offence the same kind as an offence punishable under s 380 of the said Code and that an offence punishable under any section of the Indian Penal Code or of any special or local law shall be deemed to be an offence of the same kind as an attempt to commit such offence when such an attempt is an offence

Note.—1 Scope of the section.—S 234 does not say that at most a trial must be limited to three charges. It says it must be limited to three offences and that the offences must be of the same kind. The "offence" as defined by the Code itself is the act or omission made punishable. The offences in this case were two in number namely the publication of two articles on two different dates. Thus two offences were, as charged punishable under the same section of the Indian Penal Code and were therefore offences of the same kind. The word "section" in the above section is not invariably to be read as singular. It is not the intention of the Code either express or implied to exclude from the operation of s 234 an offence because it is made the subject of more than one charge. Charging one act or series of acts under more than one section of the Indian Penal Code is a proceeding provided for in s 235 (cl 2) and in s 236 and is also provided for in s 71 I P C. The Court may charge an offence twice over under two different sections but by so doing it cannot increase the sentence which may be imposed. That principle is not offended by trying together separate offences for each of which there is more than one charge.—*Per HEATON J* S 234 of the Criminal Procedure Code does not apply to a single charge under s 401 I P C or belonging to a gang of persons associated for the purpose of habitually committing theft. The charge relates to one offence though based on evidence of several offences of theft. The gist of the offence under s 401 is association for the purpose of habitually committing theft or robbery **47 C 154**.

There is nothing in the Code which directs that where an accused person is alleged to have done two or more acts each of which may fall within the definition of an offence under one or another section of the Indian Penal Code the section or sections in either case being the same the joinder of the charges under those sections is illegal. Substantially the acts amount in such a case to offences punishable under the same sections of the Indian Penal Code and therefore they are offences of the same kind.—*Per CHANDAMARKAR J* **33 B 77** and see also **33 B 221**

2 Section applies only to the trial of a single accused.—See Note 3 to s 239. Two persons accused of offences under ss 379 and 380 I P C for committing theft of the same complainant's property in a building and of his paddy in a field on two successive days cannot be charged with and tried at one trial under s 234 for both the offences **20 C W N 672 = 47 Cr L J 224**. But see **20 M L T 234, 17 P R. (1917) Cr**. But as under the new amendment all offences under s. 379 and s. 380 I P C are to be deemed to be offences of the same kind, it is submitted that **20 C W N 672** is no longer good law. See also cl (c) of section 239 **46 A 54**.

* The words "whether in respect of the same person or not" were inserted by Act XVIII of 1923

† The proviso was added by Act XVIII of 1923

3. **Object of section to provide statutory limit to number of charges at single trial.**—This section modifies s. 233 which requires a separate charge and a separate trial for every distinct offence, by allowing three charges of three distinct offences of the same kind and committed within one year of each other to be tried at the same time, but this does not mean that, if at one time or within one year a man commits fifty distinct offences of the same kind, he shall not in one day be prosecuted for more than three of such offences. This is clear from illustration (d), s. 230. This section simply places a statutory limit on the number of charges which may legally form part of a single trial. There is nothing in the section, however, to prevent an accused from being separately charged and tried on the same day for any number of distinct offences of the same kind committed within the year, 3 C. 540 = 1 C. L. R. 478.

4. **"Offences of the same kind" may be in respect of different persons.**—This is a novel definition 9 C. 371 = 11 C. L. R. 522, where it was *held* dissenting from 4 A. 147 and 1833 A. W. N. at pp. 12 and 39, that the words "offences of the same kind," are not limited to offences against the same person. Where a public servant dishonestly misappropriated sums of moneys placed in his hands by three different persons on three different occasions in one year, *held*, that the offences of which such person is accused being the dishonest misappropriation of public moneys (for they lost their private character on coming to the hands of the accused) such offences were "of the same kind," and that such person might be charged with and tried at one trial for all the offences, 7 A. 174 (F.B.); 17 Cr. L. J. 479. S. 234 is not limited to cases where the offences have been committed against the same person, 2 Pat. L. J. 209. It applies where the complainants are different persons, but must be used cautiously, 19 C. W. N. 557. See also Ratanlal 331, where it was *held* that an accused charged with two offences of the same kind within the definition of sub-sec. (2) of this section, was rightly tried for both the offences at one trial, although the offences were committed against different persons. See also 9 C. L. J. 149 = 13 C. W. N. 507, 41 C. 66; 43 C. 13; 33 A. 437; 33 A. 438 where 4 A. 147 was overruled. But, see 11 C. W. N. 1123, where it was *held* that the joint trial of three distinct complaints of three distinct complainants though against the same is illegal, and also 13 C. W. N. 418 = 9 Cr. L. J. 277.

5. **Offences not of the same kind.**—Charges of adultery and bigamy are not of the same kind and being distinct offences, cannot be tried at one trial, Ratanlal 4. Murder and voluntarily causing hurt are not of the same kind, 11 A. L. J. 188 = 14 Cr. L. J. 116 and so offences under ss. 167 and 465, I P C., are not of the kind 8 C. 450. Falsification of accounts, s. 477 A, I P C., is not of the same kind as a criminal breach of trust, s. 409, I P C., 30 M. 323. Where at the same trial an accused person was charged with two offences under s. 178, I P C., and two offences under s. 179, I P C., *held*, the case was not governed by this section and there was no I P C., 80 M. 323. Where at the same trial an accused person was charged with two offences under s. 178, I P C. misjoinder, 35 C. 161. See also 13 C. W. N. 804 = 9 Cr. L. J. 447. See Note 14 to s. 233 at p. 648 and 649 or other examples. As to theft and subsequent retention by another not being offences of the same kind, see 21 C. W. N. 111. See also 10 B. L. R. 192.

6. **Where charge bad for multiplicity—offences unconnected with each other.**—Where the accused was charged with threatening more than three persons with injury if they did not pay him bribes or with instigating the obtaining of bribes from more than three persons and was tried at one trial on such charge *Held*, the charge was bad for multiplicity and that the trial was in contravention of this section, *Wair II*, 299; 11 C. W. N. 1123. The joinder of six charges—one under s. 201, I P C., and two under s. 193 I P C. relating to a report and evidence about the death of one person, and similarly three charges relating to a report and evidence about the death of another person—is illegal, 14 Bar. L. R. 242 (F.B.) = 4 L. B. R. 294 = 8 Cr. L. J. 497. A woman being a member of the dancing girl caste, obtained possession of a minor and employed her for the purpose of prostitution, she subsequently obtained in adoption another minor girl from her parents, who belonged to the same caste. She and the parents of the second girl were charged together under ss. 372 and 373 of the Penal Code. The charges related to both girls. *Held* that the two charges should not have been tried together, 12 M. 273; 11 C. W. N. 274. See also 30 A. 351; 4 L. B. R. 313 (F.B.). Where *M* was charged with three separate acts of criminal breach of trust and *B* with abetment of those acts and also in the alternative under ss. 411 and 380, I P C., in respect of a document said to have been found in his house which had no connection whatever with the charge of criminal breach of trust and *M* made a full confession implicating *B* therein, and it was consequently taken into consideration against him *held* that the joint trial of the 2nd accused was bad and that it prejudiced the case against *B* on the second charge as the confession of *M* was used against him and treated as a very substantial part of the evidence in support of the second charge, 5 C. W. N. 294. The accused persons were tried upon twenty-seven charges, comprising the offences of theft abetment of theft, and receiving stolen property in 1872-73 similar offences in 1873-74 and 1874-75 the giving and receiving of gratifications to and by public servants in 1874-75, and

MY VOLUME

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2 That branch of science which relates to the prevention, cure, or alleviation of diseases of the human body, as, the study of medicine, or a study of medicine.

M. 1. 1. 1.

Meditation [Ode]

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the remainder of life in a state of anarchy.

arrive to design to scheme to h. read.

[Let me! into, for meditative]

the act of meditating, close or cool and thought.

the turning or revolving of a subject in the mind
serious contemplation reflection, musing

my mouth and it is a measure of my heart

right O Lord, my strength and my help

M. 1. 1. 1.

M. 1. 1. 1.

M. 1. 1. 1.

Finally the fabrication and admission of false evidence in 1878. One of the accused was convicted on two heads of charge and the rest acquitted. *Held*, on appeal, that the trial was irregular under s. 452 Act X of 1872; and so would be the hearing of the appeal. The High Court, however, heard the appeal in respect of offences in 1871-75 only the charge in respect of which was as follows (That you between the 31st October, 1874 and 30th October, 1875, did commit theft of certain property, *viz.*, 27,524 *Ahandis* of wood, or thereabouts, being the property of Government, from the Government forests of the villages, etc., in the Koliba Collectorate, and have thereby committed an offence punishable under s. 379 I P.C.), it appearing that this course did not prejudice the accused persons who had been fully and fairly tried for those offences, 1 B 610. See also 8 C. 459 and 834, and now see 25 M. 61 (P.C.). In 4 Bom. L. R. 440 *L* was tried at one trial on a charge under s. 471 I P.C., in respect of one document, a charge under s. 464, I P.C., in respect of another and one charge under s. 477 A. *Held*, that the trial was illegal. The last mentioned offence not being of the same kind as these mentioned in the other two charges, ought to have been tried separately. See 44 P. R. 1917 Cr.

Several accused persons were tried at one trial for offences under s. 197 and 325 I P.C., committed on 24th January, and for offences under s. 147, 323 and 342 I P.C., committed on the 25th of January; *held* that the whole trial was invalid and must be set aside because ss. 234 and 239 of the Criminal Procedure Code cannot be combined, 45 A. 54.

7. Whether more than three falsifications of account can be joined together in one charge and tried?—Each act of falsification of a book of account amounts to a separate offence s. 477, I P.C., and an accused person can only be charged with and tried at one trial for any number of offences of the same kind not exceeding three committed within the space of one year. The explanation appended to s. 477 A, does not purport to override this section, 25 C. 560. When a person who was sent up for trial under s. 477-A, I P.C. was charged with having wilfully altered and mutilated certain accounts between the years 1907 and 1909 and the evidence showed that the subject matter of the charge was practically the series of entries in certain sets of books. *Held* the charge was bad for misjoinder, 32 A. 57; but if the several false entries were made in the course of one transaction a count charging six separate falsifications of account is illegal, (1912) M. W. N. 545 = 13 Cr. L. J. 251. See also 40 C. 318. A series of alterations in accounts made to cover a defalcation might all be charged in one charge and they are not distinct offences committed by an accused person merely by reason of the fact that he makes more than one false entry to cover one defalcation. But the false entries in that case can only relate to one defalcation. It is impossible to take a series of false entries referring to three different defalcations in one charge, or to try a whole series of falsified accounts in one charge, 41 C. 722.

8. Falsification of account and breach of trust are distinct offences.—When a person is tried for criminal breach of trust in respect of seventeen sums of moneys received by him between 16th March, 1901 and 8th May, 1901, and he was also charged with seventeen falsifications of account under s. 477 A. *Held*, the trial was illegal and the conviction was quashed. 4 Bom. L. R. 433, 2 P. R. 1905; 25 C. 560, 30 M. 323, (1911) 2 M. W. N. 538 = 13 Cr. L. J. 21, 30 A. 351, 32 A. 57; 16 Cr. L. J. 313 (A); 12 Bom. L. R. 226 = 11 Cr. L. J. 337, 33 A. 26 and see Note 11 to s. 222. See 27 Bom. C. R. 1343.

9. Effect of s. 222 on this section.—This section must be read subject to the special provision of subsec. (2) to s. 222. See 27 A. 69, 24 A. 254, 33 A. 36 but see 12 Bom. L. R. 226 = 11 Cr. L. J. 337. Where there have been defalcations in the course of twelve months in respect of different items, then the Court can try a man in respect of three offences by selecting different items, combining these items into one lump sum, and making the selection so as to get at three sums, the appropriation of each constituting an offence by itself. S. 222 (2) modifies the general rule, that at a trial certain particulars must be given in the charge as to charges of criminal breach of trust, but does not restrict in any way the scope and object of s. 234. 12 Bom. L. R. 226 = 11 Cr. L. J. 337. See Notes under s. 403.

10. Embezzlement of a gross sum is only one offence within the meaning of this section.—See Notes 9 and 10 to s. 222.

11. Single charge sufficient in cases of embezzlement.—See Notes 8 and 9 to s. 222.

12. The word 'offences' not to be extended to mean three separate series of offences each set forming a single transaction.—Where the accused was charged and convicted at one trial for (a) forging (s. 467), three cheques on three different dates, (b) cheating (s. 420) the bank by cashing the cheques on the said dates, and (c) falsifying account books (s. 477 A) in the course of the commission of the said forgeries and it was contended that s. 235 must be read with this section and under their combined effect, the three forgeries and the acts closely connected with each of the forgeries could be rightly tried at one trial. *Held* following 25 M. 61 (P.C.) that the trial was bad. The word *offence* in this section cannot be held to mean not only the three

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3. **Object of section to provide statutory limit to number of charges at single trial.**—This section modifies s. 233 which requires a separate charge and a separate trial for every distinct offence, by allowing three charges of three distinct offences of the same kind and committed within one year of each other to be tried at the same time, but this does not mean that, if at one time or within one year a man commits fifty distinct offences of the same kind, he shall not in one day be prosecuted for more than three of such offences. This is clear from illustration (d), s. 235. This section simply places a statutory limit on the number of charges which may legally form part of a single trial. There is nothing in the section, however, to prevent an accused from being separately charged and tried on the same day for any number of distinct offences of the same kind committed within the year, 3 C. 540 = 1 C. L. R. 478.

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finally the fabrication and abetment of false evidence in 1878. One of the accused was convicted on two heads of charge and the rest acquitted. *Held* on appeal that the trial was irregular under s. 452 Act V of 1872 and so would be the hearing of the appeal. The High Court however heard the appeal in respect of offences in 1874-75 only the charge in respect of which was as follows (That you between the 31st October 1874 and 30th October 1875 did commit theft of certain property *viz.*, 27,524 *handis* of wood or thereabouts, being the property of Government from the Government forests of the villages etc. in the Kolaba Collectorate, and have thereby committed an offence punishable under s. 379 I P C.) it appearing that this course did not prejudice the accused persons who had been fully and fairly tried for those offences, 1 B 810. See also 8 C. 450 and 834, and now see 25 M 61 (P.C.). In 4 Bom L R 440 Z was tried at one trial on a charge under s. 471 I P C., in respect of one document a charge under s. 468, I P C. in respect of another and one charge under s. 477 A. *Held* that the trial was illegal. The last mentioned offence not being of the same kind as these mentioned in the other two charges ought to have been tried separately. See 44 P. R. 1917 Cr.

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8 Falsification of account and breach of trust are distinct offences.—When a person is tried for criminal breach of trust in respect of seventeen sums of moneys received by him between 16th March 1901 and 9th May 1901 and he was also charged with seventeen falsifications of account under s. 477 A. *Held* the trial was illegal and the conviction was quashed 4 Bom L R 433, 2 P R 1905, 23 C 560, 30 M 323, (1911) 2 M. W N 538 = 13 Cr L J 21, 30 A 351; 32 A 57 16 Cr L J 313 (A); 12 Bom L R 226 = 11 Cr L J 337; 33 A 36 and see Note 11 to s. 22. See 27 Bom C. R 1343.

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10 Embezzlement of a gross sum is only one offence within the meaning of this section.—See Notes 8 and 10 to s. 222.

11 Single charge sufficient in cases of embezzlement.—See Notes 8 and 9 to s. 222.

12 The word 'offences' not to be extended to mean three separate series of offences each set forming a single transaction.—Where the accused was charged and convicted at one trial for (a) forging (s. 467) three cheques on three different dates (b) cheating (s. 420) the bank by cashing the cheques on the said 11 dates and (c) falsifying account books (s. 477 A) in the course of the commission of the said forgeries and it was contended that s. 235 must be read with this section and under their combined effect the three forgeries and the acts closely connected with each of the forgeries could be rightly tried at one trial. *Held* for leaving 25 M 61, P. C.) that the trial was bad. The word *offence* in this section cannot be held to mean not only the three

brance a monument. "A more desirable memorial
of his friend."

Flurrah also names some as monuments of peace and of
wisdom, some of the lovely

3 A note or hint to assist the memory, a memo-

in menace or threatens
in a threatening manner
w/ {Fr menace a house-
hold, menasconducere, etc

1. Belonging to, or resembling a membrane, consisting of membranes, as, a serous antrum covering
Each of prey have membranaceous stomachs, not muscular

• *Lacoma*

315 10000 1

entire

Memorable *In a memorable manner*

Mĕm'or-a-ble In a mĕm'or-a-ble mān-er

Lai pi Mĕ-mo-rā-n'dā Lai so re-thing-to be
re-mem'ber'd from mĕ-mo-rā-n'dā, p p ol new rare
Me-mo-ra-ble!

1 A record of something which it is difficult to remember, a note to help the memory

I entered a memorandum in my pocket book. CHARLES

and dogs before their use
ing to vertebrae, or domestic animals,
or, in an
attendance performs only the most menial of
work

offences mentioned there, but also every act in itself an offence, which is so connected with each of those offences as to form part of the same transaction as each offence, 2 P. R. 1905 followed in 30 M. 328; 32 A 219. See also 4 Bom L R. 433 and Note 19 to s. 233

13. Four charges in respect of two offences under ss. 124-A, and 153-A, I. P. C.—The accused was convicted of offences under ss. 124 A and 153-A of the Indian Penal Code in respect of each of two articles that appeared in his newspaper. The Magistrate, who tried the case, had framed a charge, with two heads—one bearing on each article, and each head mentioned that the accused was punishable under ss. 124 A and 153-A for publishing the article. It was contended on behalf of the accused that the trial of four offences at one trial was illegal. *Held*, that the trial was not bad as there had been no misjoinder of charges. *Per CHANDAVARKAR, J.*—‘It is true that the Magistrate framed two charges, one with respect to each of the two articles. But in each charge the offences are mentioned as being those punishable under ss. 124 A and 153-A, I. P. C., so that the accused had distinct notice of the charges he had to answer, and he could hardly have been prejudiced by the somewhat informal mode in which the charges were drawn up. The defect, if any, was no more than a mere irregularity, cured by the provisions of s. 225, 33. B 77; 33 B. 221 and see Notes 1 and 19, to s. 223’

14. Procedure—when offences similar It is undesirable that each should be tried separately.—An accused person committed thirteen offences in the course of two months. The Magistrate, who tried him summarily, convicted him and sentenced him to two months rigorous imprisonment for each offence. The High Court pointed out this course, though not illegal, to be undesirable, and suggested that the accused might have been tried and convicted in one trial of any three of these offences, and sentence of six months’ imprisonment passed for each of those offences, such sentences running concurrently—*Mad H C Pro*, 19th August 1886. See Note 2 to s. 235

235. (1) If, in one series of acts so connected together as to form the same transaction, more offences than one are committed by the same person he may be charged with and tried at one trial for, every such offence

(2) If the acts alleged constitute an offence falling within two or more separate definitions of any law in force for the time being by which offences are defined or punished the person accused of them may be charged with and tried at one trial for each of such offences

(3) If several acts of which one or more than one would by itself or themselves constitute an offence, constitute when combined a different offence, the person accused of them may be charged with, and tried at one trial for the offence constituted by such acts when combined, and for any offence constituted by any one, or more, of such acts

(4) Nothing contained in this section shall affect the Indian Penal Code, section 71

Illustrations

to sub-section (1)—

(a) A rescues B, a person in lawful custody, and in so doing causes grievous hurt to C a constable in whose custody B was. A may be charged with and convicted of offences under ss. 225 and 233 of the Indian Penal Code. (See also 31 M. 43 for joint trial of offences under ss. 183 186 355 and 323, I. P. C.)

(b) A commits house-breaking by day with intent to commit adultery, and commits in the house so entered, adultery with B’s wife. A may be separately charged with and convicted of, offences under ss. 454 and 497 of the Indian Penal Code

(c) A entices D, the wife of C, away from C with intent to commit adultery with B, and then commits adultery with her. A may be separately charged with and convicted of offences under ss. 498 and 497 of the Indian Penal Code

(d) A has in his possession several seals knowing them to be counterfeit and intending to use them for the purpose of committing several forgeries punishable under s. 466 of the Indian Penal Code. A may be separately charged with and convicted of, the possession of each seal under s. 473 of the Indian Penal Code

(e) With intent to cause injury to B, A institutes criminal proceeding against him, knowing that there is no just or lawful ground for such proceeding and also falsely accuses B of having committed an offence

knowing that there is no just or lawful ground for such charge. *A* may be separately charged with, and convicted of two offences under s. 211 of the Indian Penal Code

(f) *A* with intent to cause injury to *B*, falsely accuses him of having committed an offence knowing that there is no just or lawful ground for such charge. On the trial *A* gives false evidence against *B*, intending thereby to cause *B* to be convicted of a capital offence. *A* may be separately charged with and convicted of offences under ss. 211 and 194 of the Indian Penal Code (7 W R 59; 8 C. 718; 10 B. 234).

(g) *A*, with six others commits the offences of rising, grievous hurt and assaulting a public servant endeavouring in the discharge of his duty as such to suppress the riot. *A* may be separately charged with and convicted of offences under ss. 147, 325 and 152 of the Indian Penal Code.

(h) *A* threatens *B*, *C* and *D* at the same time with injury to their persons with intent to cause alarm to them. *A* may be separately charged with and convicted of, each of the three offences under s. 506 of the Indian Penal Code.

The separate charges referred to in illustrations (a) to (h), respectively may be tried at the same time to sub-section (2)—

(i) *A* wrongfully strikes *B* with a cue. *A* may be separately charged with and convicted of offences under ss. 332 and 323 of the Indian Penal Code

(j) Several stolen sacks of corn are made over to *A* and *B*, who know they are stolen property, for the purpose of concealing them. *A* and *B* thereupon voluntarily assist each other to conceal the sacks at the bottom of a grain pit. *A* and *B* may be separately charged with and convicted of offences under ss. 411 and 414 of the Indian Penal Code.

(k) *A* exposes her child with the knowledge that she is thereby likely to cause its death. The child dies in consequence of such exposure. *A* may be separately charged with and convicted of offences under ss. 317 and 304 of the Indian Penal Code

(l) *A* dishonestly uses a forged document as genuine evidence, in order to convict *B*, a public servant of an offence under s. 167 of the Indian Penal Code. *A* may be separately charged with and convicted of offences under ss. 471 (read with s. 468) and 196 of the same Code.

to sub-section (3)—

(m) *A* commands robbery on *B*, and in doing so voluntarily causes hurt to him. *A* may be separately charged with, and convicted of offences under ss. 323, 392 and 394 of the Indian Penal Code

Notes.—S. 71, I P C., is as follows —

Limit of punishment of offence made up of several offences—Where anything which is an offence is made up of parts, any of which parts is itself an offence the offender shall not be punished with the punishment of more than one of such of his offences unless it be so expressly provided.

Where anything is an offence falling within two or more separate definitions of any law in force for the time being by which offences are defined or punished or

where several acts of which one or more than one would by itself or themselves constitute an offence constitute when combined, a different offence

the offender shall not be punished with a more severe punishment than the Court which tries him could award for any one of such offences

Illustrations

(a) *A* gives *Z* fifty strokes with a stick. Here *A* may have committed the offence of voluntarily causing hurt to *Z* by the whole beating and also by each of the blows which make up the whole beating. If *A* were liable to punishment for every blow, he might be imprisoned for 50 years one for each blow. But he is liable only to one punishment for the whole beating

(b) But if, while *A* is beating *Z*, *Y* interferes and *A* intentionally strikes *Y* here, as the blow given to *Y* is no part of the act, whereby *A* voluntarily causes hurt to *Z*, *A* is liable to one punishment for voluntarily causing hurt to *Z* and to another for the blow given to *Y*

1 Scope of the section as compared with ss. 35 and 71, I P C.—This section should be read with ss. 35 and 71, I P C. Clause (1) of this section corresponds to the first clause and cl. (2) to the first part of cl. (3) to the second part of the second clause of s. 71 I P C. While this section prescribes rules for

pleading and the procedure to be followed in the trial of offences falling within its provisions, ss 35 and 71, I P C, deal with the assessment of punishment of those offences. The application of sub-sec. (1) to this section and of para 1 of s. 71, I P C, is illustrated by the case in 16 C. 442, which approves of 6 A. 121 and overrule 11 C. 349. See also 8 C. W. N. 344; 9 W. R. 33; 10 W. R. 63; 13 W. R. 42, 7 A. 414 (F.B.); 12 C. 493; 23 C. 174; 17 B. 260 and 23 B. 706. Sub-secs. (1) and (2) deal with 'one series of acts so connected together as to form the same transaction,' while sub-sec. (3) deals with 'several acts.' It is very easy to raise confusion and difficulty by raising quibbles which are made possible by the infirmities of language. S 235 must be interpreted in a broad and commonsense way when reading the section with s. 71 we get a fourfold result. *Firstly*—A repetition in the same transaction of several criminal acts of exactly the same character may constitute one crime e.g., a number of blows on one person, etc., that is a case covered by s. 71, I P C. *Secondly*—A single transaction may give rise to either—(1) several offences of a different character each complete in itself and distinct from the other e.g., criminal breach of trust accompanied by falsification of account—(2) several offences of the same character but affecting different persons, e.g., a gunshot which injures two or more persons. Such cases come under the first sub-sec. of s. 235. Separate sentences must follow, 38 C. 453. *Thirdly*—The same series of acts may constitute different offences. A may be charged for all, but only one offence can be regarded as committed for the purpose of inflicting punishment, e.g., a person who sets fire to a warehouse commits offence under ss 435 and 436, I P C. This falls under s. 235 (2) and 71, I P C. *Fourthly*—An act in itself an offence may become either an aggravated form of that offence, or a different offence when combined with some other acts innocent or criminal. Here we have a combined offence which as well as its component minor offence may be charged under s. 235 (3) and again s. 71 controls the punishment. These provisions of law must not be confused with the provisions laid down in s. 35. *Separable offences* which come under s. 71, I P C., and may be charged under s. 235 (2) and (3) are not distinct offences within the purview of s. 35 while s. 235 (1) seems to refer to distinct offences which are separately punishable. See Notes to s. 35.

2. *The provisions of this section are not imperative, but enabling*—The accused were charged with the offence of house-breaking in order to the commission of an offence and convicted under s. 454, I P C., though the facts showed, that they also committed theft in a dwelling house punishable under s. 380, I P C. *Held*, that the accused could have been tried under two heads of a charge, Ratanlal 307. It is not illegal to try an accused for different offences separately 8 C. 491, 6 A. 121, 12 Bom. L. R. 226, 31 M. 43. The prosecution is entitled to ask the Court to go into the whole matter at a single trial, provided it takes upon itself the burden of proving that all the facts alleged against the accused forms part of one transaction or otherwise triable at a single trial under the provisions of ss 235 and 236, 16 Cr. L. J. 795 (A). See Note 14 to s. 234, and Notes 17 and 18 to s. 233 and Note to s. 239.

3. *Application and object of s. 235 (1)*—Sub-sec. (1) applies to cases where on some of the facts so connected together as to form the same transaction one offence may be charged against an accused person and on other facts forming part of the series of acts another offence may be charged against him. See ill. (b) to s. 403. The sub-section is inapplicable when the accused is sought to be charged with another offence on the identical facts on which he was charged before with one offence, 36 M. 308. Further, it may be noted that this section provides for (1) plurality of acts, (2) plurality of aspects, and (3) organic connection of acts with a result differing from the elements. Illustrations (a) to (h) treat of plurality of acts committed in the course of one transaction where, though the goal is one, different acts committed in the course of reaching it, form by themselves or in combination with others, different offences, while in illustrations (i) to (f) though the act is one, yet when seen through different aspects it constitutes more offences than one. Illustration (m) affords an instance where, although there is organic connection between the elements which constitute the offence of robbery, the result of their combination is neither the one nor the other, i.e., it differs from its component parts, so in such a case it is necessary to charge the accused separately with the elements as well as with the offence resulting from their combination. The object of this section is that when different acts or different parts of the same act constitute an offence, the accused should be charged separately for each of such offences, so that if he is guilty of any one of them he should not go unpunished because he was not charged with it (*Mad H C Pro*, 30th March, 1863). When one act or series of acts forming part of the same transaction constitutes one or more offences and the accused is charged with one offence only, and it is proved in evidence that he was guilty of another offence, he would go unpunished if the offence is not of a cognate nature, e.g., a complaint was lodged against one G, under ss. 499 and 471 I P C, i.e., for the offences of defamation and of dishonestly using as genuine of forged document. The alleged forgery consisted in

affixing a false signature to a letter on which the charge of defamation proceeded. At the trial he was charged under s. 471, I. P. C., but the Magistrate suddenly changed his mind and convicted him under s. 499 although he was not charged with that offence, 4 C. W. N. 129. This irregularity would have been avoided if there had been a charge also under s. 499, I. P. C.

4 Significance of the phrase, 'same transaction'—The expression 'same transaction' used in ss. 235 and 239, is an expression which from its very nature is incapable of exact definition, and must have been advisedly used because it had this quality. In 15 B. 491, BIRDWOOD, J., deduced from the illustration to ss. 235 and 237 the following tests for the sameness of a transaction: (1) that the offences (1) formed part of a continuous series of acts. Illustrations (a), (b), (c) to s. 235 or (2) were committed at the same time. Illustrations (d) (g) (h), (3) were connected with the same specific criminal intent. Illustrations (e) (f) or (4) are connected by the fact that one was committed in the course of the commission of the other, see illustrations (b) and (c) to s. 239, and held that s. 239 cannot be applied to several different thefts committed on different dates and at different places by different members of a gang of thieves who were all out on the same marauding expedition. In 27 B. 133, it was held, the real and substantial test for determining whether several offences are connected together so as to form the same transaction depends upon whether they are so related to one another in point of purpose or as to cause and effect or as principal and subsidiary acts, as to constitute, one continuous action. A mere interval of time between the commission of one offence and another does not by itself necessarily import want of continuity, though the length of the interval may be an important element in determining the question of the connection between the two. Where therefore, the accused was charged at one trial (i) under s. 486, I. P. C., for having sold on the 7th October a number of articles with a counterfeit trade-mark (ii) under s. 486, I. P. C., for having in his possession on the 9th October for sale a number of articles of the same description and (iii) under s. 481 I. P. C., for being in possession of instruments for counterfeiting trade-marks, on the 9th October. Held, there was no illegality in the trial as there was a community and also continuity of purpose in the possession and sale, the possession of the instruments was the cause the possession of the articles and their sale, the effect and both the possession and the sale had one intention and aimed at one result, of deceiving a buyer into purchasing what was not the genuine article. 29 B. 449 followed the above rulings and imposed the further imitation that 'the persons to be jointly tried must have been associated from the first in the series of acts which form the transaction' and in 30 B. 49 it was held as follows: "According to its etymological meaning the word *transaction* means *carrying through* and suggests not necessarily proximity in time, so much as continuity of action and purpose, a series of acts separated by intervals of time are not excluded, provided that those jointly tried have been directed throughout to one and the same objective. If the accused started together for the same goal, this suffices to justify the joint trial even if incidentally one of those jointly tried has done an act for which the other may not be responsible. The foundation for the procedure is the association of two persons concurring from start to finish to attain the same end. Where, therefore, two persons who were jointly in charge of a trust fund, carried out their scheme of breach of trust by successive acts done at intervals alternately taking the benefits, this circumstance did not prevent the unity of project from constituting the series of acts one transaction, i.e. carrying through of the same object which both had from the first act to the last. 30 B. 49 was followed in 18 P. W. R. 1903 = 8 Cr. L. J. 75. If a series of acts are so connected together by proximity of time, community of criminal intent, continuity of action and purpose or by the relation of cause and effect as to constitute, in the opinion of the Court one transaction, then the accused may be charged with and tried at one trial for every offence committed in such series of acts. It would also include such subsidiary acts as would make the co-accused *particeps criminis* or an accessory after the fact. If more persons than one are accused of different offences in a series of acts so connected, they may be tried together, 18 L. R. 73 = 8 Cr. L. J. 191. The word transaction in sub-sec. (1) suggests not necessarily proximity in time, so much as continuity of action and purpose (30 B. 49 at p. 54), i.e. it is not necessary that the act should have been committed all on the same occasion but it is sufficient that though separated by a distinct interval of time they are closely connected by continuity of purpose or progressive action towards a single object. Thus where the prisoner, for the removal of a cart he had stolen broke into the cattle-shed of a neighbour of the cart-owner, took out two bullocks and drove off the cart to a certain place for selling the same, held the two thefts constituted parts of one transaction within the meaning of this section and the circumstances of the theft of the bullocks prefaced by house-breaking, essential to the perpetration of the entire offence, could make no difference and that the two offences were therefore rightly tried together as unmistakably forming parts of one single transaction, 2 N. L. R. 147 = 4 Cr. L. J. 420 (where 27 B. 133; 15 B. 491; 16 B. 414; 25 M. 61 and 15 C. P. L. R. 53, are referred to). Where the accusation against the accused persons is that they carried out a single scheme by successive acts done at intervals, but there was

complete unity of project and the whole series of acts were so linked together by one motive and design as to constitute one transaction within the meaning of s. 239, a joint trial is not only legal but is demanded in the interest of public time and convenience, 14 Bom. L. R. 972 = 1 Bom. Cr. Ca. 216 = 13 Cr. L. J. 833. Proximity of time between acts does not necessarily constitute such acts parts of the same transaction, 5 Bur. L. T. 101 = 13 Cr. L. J. 485. In 33 M. 502, *ANDUR RRRH, J.*, discussed the meaning of the phrase 'same transaction' 'The idea conveyed by the words 'same transaction' seems to be obvious enough and it may be doubted whether it can be compendiously expressed in simpler and clearer language, and generally speaking there can be very little difficulty in arriving at a proper conclusion in a concrete case. For instance in this case what is said to connect the different acts charged into one transaction is the allegation that these acts were committed by the six accused in pursuance of a systematic scheme for defrauding those members of the public who joined the fund. If this contention were sound then if the company was carried on for 10 or 20 years and a hundred acts of embezzlement were committed during that period, the accused would be liable to be tried for all the offences. Obviously this cannot be the scope of s. 235. No doubt proximity of time any more than unity of place is neither a necessary nor decisive test of what constitutes the same transaction, though such proximity often furnishes good evidence of the connection which unites several acts into one transaction (see 26 M. 125). I think, the effect of the decisions in 27 B. 135; 30 B. 49; 15 B. 491; 16 B. 414 is that community of purpose or design and continuity of action are essential elements of the connection necessary to link together different acts into one and the same transaction. In such cases the acts alleged to be connected with each other must have been done in pursuance of a particular end in view and as accessory thereto or perhaps as suggested by the circumstances in which the acts in pursuance of the original design were done and in close proximity of time to those acts. But mere community of purpose is not sufficient, there must also be continuity of action. For it may happen that an act is done with a particular objective in view but the final aim is abandoned for some time and pursued afterwards. For instance supposing a man forges a document with a view to cheat a certain individual and then foregoes his intention for two years and afterwards reverts to his original intention and uses the document for the original purpose he had in mind when he committed forgery, it would be difficult to say in such a case that the offences of forgery and of cheating by means of the forged document were committed in the course of the same transaction. As regards the community of purpose it would be going far to lay down that the mere existence of some general purpose or design such as making money at the expense of the public is sufficient to make all acts done with that view part of the same transaction. If that were so the results would be startling, for instance supposing it is alleged that A for the sake of gain has for the last 10 years been committing a particular form of depredation on the public viz, house-breaking and theft in accordance with one consistent systematic plan it is hardly conceivable that he could be tried at one trial for all the burglaries he committed in the 10 years. The purpose in view must be something particular and definite such as where a man with the object of misappropriating a particular sum of money or of cheating a particular individual of certain amount falsifies books of account or forges a number of documents'. In this case six accused were charged as Directors of a Provident Fund with having committed breaches of trust in respect of three sums of money alleged to belong to the Company, viz, Rs. 679 between 30th September, 1905 and 25th March, 1906, Rs. 4 639 between 25th March, 1906 and 25th March, 1907, and Rs. 5 226 between 25th March, 1907 and 18th September, 1907, the misappropriations thus covering a period of nearly two years. The 4th and 6th accused were also charged with having falsified accounts by making two false entries on two dates and these two and the 1st accused with having falsified another document on another date. The 6th accused was further charged with cheating two persons once on the 6th March and the other on the 20th March. Those among the six who were not charged with the substantive offences of falsifications of accounts and cheating were charged with having abetted the commission of those offences. All the accused were acquitted of all charges relating to falsifications of account and cheating, but were convicted of the offences of criminal breaches of trust. The joinder of charges was attempted to be justified that the Provident Fund was a bogus concern and the object with which it was set on foot by its promoters, the six accused was to defraud the public, various offences charged against them came within the purview of s. 235 (1). *Held* the trial was void "*ab initio*," 33 M. 502. Mere interval of days will not disturb the oneness of the transaction nor necessarily the fact that different sets of persons were engaged on different occasions. But if the aim of the accused on the different occasions is directed towards effecting different purposes, the transactions are different, 25 M. L. J. 297 = 16 Cr. L. J. 324. In deciding whether offences are so connected as to form one and the same transaction, the determining factor is not so much proximity in time as continuity and community of purpose and object, 19 C. W. N. 672 = 21 C. L. J. 195 = 16 Cr. L. J. 3. See also 17 O. C. 276 = 15 Cr. L. J. 643; 19 A. L. J. 392. See 48 M. L. J. 308 = 49 M. 74.

(a) *Whether the acts alleged constitute the same transaction is a question of fact*—In each case it is a question of fact whether the acts are so connected together as to form part of the same transaction and the word transaction should be read in the ordinary sense of a completed act, 7 M. L. T. 367 = 1910 M. W. N. 541 = 11 Cr. L. J. 293. A comprehensive formula of universal application cannot be framed regarding the question whether two or more acts constitute the "same transaction;" the circumstances which must bear on its determination in each individual case are proximity of time, unity or proximity of place, continuity of action, and community of purpose or design, 42 C. 957.

5. *Cases where facts held not to form one transaction.*—(a) Where several accused more than five in number obstructed the execution of a Civil Court decree and after holding a consultation, all of them with exception of one or two proceeded to the Kutchery of the decree-holder in order to beat his son and the Tahsildar and took the Tahsildar to the judgment-debtor's house where they had obstructed the execution of the decree and there assaulted the Tahsildar, *held*, that the two occurrences, one of obstructing the execution of the decree, and the other of assaulting the Tahsildar, did not form one transaction and that the accused could not be tried at one trial on charges arising out of both the occurrences, 13 C. W. N. 1113 = 10 Cr. L. J. 452, but compare 6 M. L. T. 17 = 11 Cr. L. J. 30. Where the accused were charged with having entered the house of the third prosecution witness with a view to coerce the deceased person and his brother to deliver certain promissory notes and receipts, and later in the evening obstructed the complainant's party when they proceeded to prefer a complaint in regard to what the accused did in the morning, *held*, that the accused cannot be charged together for their action in the morning and in the evening in one and the same trial. The joinder amounts to an illegality and cannot be cured by the application of s 537, 28 M. L. J. 397 = 16 Cr. L. J. 823. A joinder of charges under ss. 454 and 325, I P C. is not warranted by s. 235 especially where the offence of house-trespass is clearly distinct from a subsequent attack on the complainant while on his way to inform the Police, 2 L. B. R. 19 referred to, 5 Bur. L. T. 101 = 13 Cr. L. J. 435. See Note 8 under s 239.

(b) *Misappropriation and cheating*—Where an accused was directed to cash a cheque and pay the proceeds to a Railway Company for freight and take delivery of certain goods and the accused cashed the cheque and misappropriated the money and thereafter on a different day fraudulently induced the Railway Company to deliver the goods and was charged and tried in one trial under s. 408, I P C., for criminal misappropriation and under s. 420, I P C., for cheating the Railway Company. *Held* that the trial was bad for misjoinder, as the offences were not committed in the same transaction, 13 C. W. N. 1089 = 10 Cr. L. J. 477.

(c) Joinder of a charge under s 406, I P C (criminal misappropriation), in a trial under s 307, I P C., 6 A. L. J. 697.

(d) *Ss 3 and 4 of the Gambling Act*—The keeping of a gambling house (s 3 of the Gambling Act) and being present in it at the time of a Police raid cannot be said to be part of the same transaction, 35 P. R. 1914.

(e) *Murder and causing disappearance of evidence of murder*—Charges under ss 302 and 201, I P C., cannot be combined, Weir II, 801, where 8 A. 252 and 22 C 633 are referred to 11 P. R. 1913. But see contra 1 S. L. R. 73 = 8 Cr. L. J. 191, 4 S. L. R. 174 = 11 Cr. L. J. 731. See also 20 C. W. N. 166.

(f) *Murder and grievous hurt in removing dead body*—Murder and causing grievous hurt caused in removing dead body cannot be tried together, 10 P. R. 1906 = 4 Cr. L. J. 285.

(g) *Kidnapping a minor, wrongful confinement and assault on mother*—Where M formed an intimacy with H, a widow, who took to living openly in M's house and H's relations attacked the house of M, beat him and his brothers and carried off H and were convicted under s. 452, I P C., and two years later they were again charged under s 365 I P C., for carrying off and secretly confining H. *held* the previous

and assault did not constitute a series of acts, so connected as to form one transaction, 26 M. 454; 27 C. 1041 (F.B.).

(h) *Manufacturing, etc., and attempting to render fit for human consumption denatured spirit, Bengal Excise Act V of 1909*—The acts of manufacturing the excisable articles seized and brought into Court bottling it possessing it selling from time to time various other articles not before the Court and of attempting to render denatured spirit fit for 'human consumption' do not constitute the same transaction, 41 C. 694.

(i) Preparation of balance sheets under the Companies Act, s. 282 (VII of 1913) for two years — *Held* to be a case of misjoinder of charges, for the preparation for the years 1912 and 1913, could not be regarded as one transaction within the meaning of this section, 21 Bom. L. R. 732.

(j) Five murders in two sets.—A triplemurder was committed by the accused in the forenoon and a double murder in the afternoon and there was no apparent connection between the two sets of murder. The accused was charged, at one and the same trial with the commission of five murders and convicted, *held* that the trial contravened the provisions of ss. 233, 234 and 235, and therefore, the conviction was set aside and a re-trial on charges properly framed was ordered, 17 A. L. J. 614.

6. Cases where acts held to form one transaction.—

(i) *Transfer of property to several persons on one day is one transaction*—Where a committing Magistrate framed a general charge under s. 206, I P C, against an accused person of several fraudulent transactions, and the Sessions Judge limited the prosecution to three or four of the case as to intention and similarity of action and in the words "same transaction," in this section, and that the accused should be tried for every such offence, 16 B. 414.

(ii) *Single theft from several owners*—As there appears to be a difference of practice in respect of treating thefts as single or several, if in one transaction things belonging to different owners have been stolen it is necessary to issue some instructions for the guidance of the Police when registering such cases in the Crime Register, or when sending them up for trial, and for the guidance of Magistrate when deciding whether a single trial or distinct trials are required. At the same time, nothing that is here set out can in any way control the discretion given to Magistrates by this section with regard to the framing of separate charges or the holding of separate trials, whenever it appears appropriate to do so. If the property, which it was the thief's intention (as shown by the circumstances or by his admission) to take, consisted of a number of contiguous articles, which were reached by one and the same act of trespass or which were the subject of single enterprise, the moving of each article, in the course of the removal of the whole bulk of property, cannot ordinarily be considered to be a distinct theft. The thieving project in such a case was single, although it may have been achieved in detail and the fact that the spoils taken consisted of several things whether belonging to the same or to different owners, does not necessarily break up the unity of the transaction. If on the other hand, the property taken consisted of a number of articles so distantly or diversely situated as to require a distinct act of trespass or a distinct enterprise for the removal of each the transaction must ordinarily be held to have been not single but complex and its achievement to have involved the commission of more than one separate theft.

The following examples will make the distinction clear —

(a) A thief goes to a threshing floor where the grain of four cultivators is stored, and steals a little from every heap. Unless it is shown that he had distinct designs against the several owners, it is plain that there was but one act of thieving accomplished through one and the same trespass.

(b) In a crowded place, a thief picks the pockets of A, B and C, in succession. Three thefts have been committed — C P Cr Cir, Part II, No 20. See also 26 P. R. 1889.

(iii) *Stealing at the same time two bullocks of different owners is one transaction*—Stealing at the same time two bullocks which belonged to two different owners, and which had been tied to the yoke of a cart, constitutes one offence of theft only, Ratanlal 927; 1881 A. W. N. 154.

(iv) *Receiving stolen property and assisting to conceal*—Receiving some property stolen on a particular occasion (s. 411, I P C) and assisting to conceal some other property stolen on the same occasion (s. 414, I P C) is in course of the same transaction, 28 A. 313; 49 B. 878.

(v) *Dacoity and murder may form parts of the same transaction as principal and subsidiary acts*—A gang of dacoits, who were hiding in a jungle were accidentally discovered by an old woman who was set upon and murdered by some of them to prevent her raising a hue-and-cry. Subsequently they committed a dacoity in a village some distance from the scene of the murder. *Held* that the joint trial of all the accused for an offence under s. 395, I P C, and some of them in addition under s. 302 I P C, was perfectly legal as the murder was committed in order to commit dacoity and the two offences formed parts of the same transaction & Bom. L. R. 789. See however 14 A. 502, where robbery and murder did not form parts of the same transaction.

MILESIA

MILLEPORE

from King Milesius of Spain
 toward the island of
 Mille'sian
 is a small

from King
 miles of King Ml

(imp & p MILKED (milk) n m b

3 An engine or machine for grinding or com-
 minuting any substance, as grain, by rolling it
 crushing it between two hard, indented rollers,
 generally of stone or metal, usually having a
 word prefixed denoting the particular object to
 which it is applied, as, a *grain-mill*, a *bark-mill*, a
 coffee-mill, a *potato-mill*, a *oil-mill*.

seeds, as, a *military crop*

the
 apply with milk to mingle milk with, to
 milk(n) a Cone
 One who milks
 or n (let)
 receives the first

milesian

Open plant cloth To pass through a *rolling mill*, to full

one, as *military tactics*
 b. Conformance to the customs or rules of armies
 in militia as, the conduct of the officer was not
 in *city*
 c. Performed or made by soldiers as a *city*
 action
 Military term, the term of service or condition of ser-
 vice in a *land service*
 Ml'sian n.
 1. See *my*

along D's mode

is made by brushing with the
 milk of almonds produced by pounding almonds
 with sugar and water

WIS 24

(vi) *Conspiracy to wage war and conceal the existence thereof*, ss 121-A and 123 I P C.—When person engaged in a conspiracy within the meaning of s. 121 A, I P C, in furtherance of their object conceal the existence of their conspiracy from the authorities a charge under s. 123, I P C, may be legally joined with one under s. 121 A, I P C., 37 C. 467; 18 C. W. N. 1105 = 15 C. L. J. 517 = 13 Cr. L. J. 609.

(vii) *Extortion and false personation*—Offences under ss 170 (false personation of a public servant) and 380 (extortion), I P C, have been held to constitute one transaction, because but for the personation, the accused would not have been in a position to commit the act of extortion complained of, 10 A. 58. In 15 C. W. N. 732 = 12 Cr. L. J. 346, it was held following 10 A. 58, that there was no misjoinder of charges, where accused was charged with personating a Police-officer under s. 170, I P C, and thereby, in such assumed character, doing or attempting to do an act under the colour of his office, and was further charged with three acts of extortion in respect of three sums, and in the alternative, on three charges of cheating, in respect of the three sums and finally of an attempt at extortion under ss 384 and 511, I P C, these offences having been committed in the same transaction.

(viii) *Defamation and using criminal force*—Where the accused was in the first instance charged with defamation, but the complainant in the course of his deposition further charged him with using criminal force and the Magistrate tried for both offences jointly at one trial held that the procedure was legal, 3 Bom. L. R. 675.

(ix) *Distinct offences of perjury may constitute but a single transaction*—Where a witness gives false evidence before the committing Magistrate and in the Court of Session, if the statements are regarded as so connected together as to form parts of one and the same transaction, this section will apply and at one trial the accused may be charged with any number of false statements, Ratanlal 336. See also Note 10 to s. 233

(x) *Grievous hurt and making false entries*, ss 193, 218 and 331, I P C—Accused was charged with voluntarily causing grievous hurt to person with view of extorting information from him and was also charged with making a series of false entries so as to attribute another cause for the death of that person who died from the effects of the injuries inflicted by the accused. The accused was tried at one trial for offences under ss 193, 218, 331 and 330 114, I P C, and convicted of offences under ss 183, 218 and 331, I P C. It was contended that there was misjoinder of charges held, that there was no misjoinder as the case fell within s. 235, and illustration (f) The act of making a series of false entries so as to attribute another cause for death was in continuation and pursuance to the transaction of causing grievous hurt with a view to extort information and the two acts formed part of the same transaction, 14 Bom. L. R. 41 = 1 Bom. Cr. 72 = 13 Cr. L. J. 137.

(xi) Five accused persons A, B, C, D and E finding that a robbery had been committed and that cash and ornaments worth a very large sum had been stolen aided and abetted each other inducing a young man F whom they know to be entirely innocent of the offence for the consideration of a bribe of Rs. 180, falsely to confess to complicity in the crime and to acquiesce in being prosecuted for it, the object being to share the loot with the real thieves. To this end the accused wrongfully confined F, fabricated false evidence in order to procure his conviction knowingly instituted a false prosecution against him and in that prosecution gave false evidence in order to secure his conviction, A was charged and convicted under ss 195, 347, 211 and 195, I P C, B and C under ss 145/109 and 357/109, D under ss. 281/109 and 347/109 and E under ss 195 for the offence of giving false evidence held, that the joint trial was legal, 30 B. 49 followed.

(xii) In 35 C. 161, it was held that the trial of an accused person for two offences under s. 178, I P C, with two offences under s. 179 I P C, was not illegal.

(xiii) On the 14th December certain Mahomedans who were alleged to have slaughtered a cow were wrongfully confined by the accused who fined them and realised a certain portion of the fines and released them on their promising to pay the balance of the fine three days later, but on their failing to do so they were again confined and maltreated by the accused on the 18th December. The accused were charged under ss. 347, 352 and 352, 114, I P C. Held the occurrence that took place on 14th and the one that took place on the 18th formed part of one and the same transaction. The maltreatment after the release from the wrongful confinement was the concluding portion of the same transaction. All were confined for one purpose, namely for the purpose of extorting money, 42 C. 760 where 30 B. 49 and 27 B. 133 were followed.

(xiv) *Using as genuine a forged document and the abetment of forgery*—The series of acts beginning with the forgery and ending with the user of the forged document in a Civil Court to support the civil claim must be regarded as so connected together as to form the same transaction or carrying through of a single predetermined plan, 16 Cr. L. J. 761 (B).

1. *Believe me to me that though I pray you, I fear shall prove as hard to you as it is hard to me.*
 2. *Choice Inclination, desire, liking, intent, purpose, will*
 3. *The sacrifice of the wicked is abominable: on how much more will it be sought after with a wicked man.*
 4. *Courage spirit.*
 5. *Memory, remembrance*
 6. *much practice as, to be sure or less in you, to be in mind, to put in mind, and the like*
 7. *To make (to one's) mind, to come to an opinion or resolution*
 8. *And . . .*

[illegible]

MINIMUM

2 To mix confusedly, irregularly, or promiscuously
3 There was no mingling with the bad. It is a relationship
4 To associate or unite in society or by ties of relationship
5 The holy seed here mingled themselves with the people of those lands
6 To deprive of purity by mixture, to contaminate, to pollute
7 The best of us appear content to be mingled with
8 To mix confusedly, irregularly, or promiscuously

... to determine
 ... to come to an opinion or de
 ...

2. ³ ⁴ ⁵ ⁶ ⁷ ⁸ ⁹ ¹⁰ ¹¹ ¹² ¹³ ¹⁴ ¹⁵ ¹⁶ ¹⁷ ¹⁸ ¹⁹ ²⁰ ²¹ ²² ²³ ²⁴ ²⁵ ²⁶ ²⁷ ²⁸ ²⁹ ³⁰ ³¹ ³² ³³ ³⁴ ³⁵ ³⁶ ³⁷ ³⁸ ³⁹ ⁴⁰ ⁴¹ ⁴² ⁴³ ⁴⁴ ⁴⁵ ⁴⁶ ⁴⁷ ⁴⁸ ⁴⁹ ⁵⁰ ⁵¹ ⁵² ⁵³ ⁵⁴ ⁵⁵ ⁵⁶ ⁵⁷ ⁵⁸ ⁵⁹ ⁶⁰ ⁶¹ ⁶² ⁶³ ⁶⁴ ⁶⁵ ⁶⁶ ⁶⁷ ⁶⁸ ⁶⁹ ⁷⁰ ⁷¹ ⁷² ⁷³ ⁷⁴ ⁷⁵ ⁷⁶ ⁷⁷ ⁷⁸ ⁷⁹ ⁸⁰ ⁸¹ ⁸² ⁸³ ⁸⁴ ⁸⁵ ⁸⁶ ⁸⁷ ⁸⁸ ⁸⁹ ⁹⁰ ⁹¹ ⁹² ⁹³ ⁹⁴ ⁹⁵ ⁹⁶ ⁹⁷ ⁹⁸ ⁹⁹ ¹⁰⁰ ¹⁰¹ ¹⁰² ¹⁰³ ¹⁰⁴ ¹⁰⁵ ¹⁰⁶ ¹⁰⁷ ¹⁰⁸ ¹⁰⁹ ¹¹⁰ ¹¹¹ ¹¹² ¹¹³ ¹¹⁴ ¹¹⁵ ¹¹⁶ ¹¹⁷ ¹¹⁸ ¹¹⁹ ¹²⁰ ¹²¹ ¹²² ¹²³ ¹²⁴ ¹²⁵ ¹²⁶ ¹²⁷ ¹²⁸ ¹²⁹ ¹³⁰ ¹³¹ ¹³² ¹³³ ¹³⁴ ¹³⁵ ¹³⁶ ¹³⁷ ¹³⁸ ¹³⁹ ¹⁴⁰ ¹⁴¹ ¹⁴² ¹⁴³ ¹⁴⁴ ¹⁴⁵ ¹⁴⁶ ¹⁴⁷ ¹⁴⁸ ¹⁴⁹ ¹⁵⁰ ¹⁵¹ ¹⁵² ¹⁵³ ¹⁵⁴ ¹⁵⁵ ¹⁵⁶ ¹⁵⁷ ¹⁵⁸ ¹⁵⁹ ¹⁶⁰ ¹⁶¹ ¹⁶² ¹⁶³ ¹⁶⁴ ¹⁶⁵ ¹⁶⁶ ¹⁶⁷ ¹⁶⁸ ¹⁶⁹ ¹⁷⁰ ¹⁷¹ ¹⁷² ¹⁷³ ¹⁷⁴ ¹⁷⁵ ¹⁷⁶ ¹⁷⁷ ¹⁷⁸ ¹⁷⁹ ¹⁸⁰ ¹⁸¹ ¹⁸² ¹⁸³ ¹⁸⁴ ¹⁸⁵ ¹⁸⁶ ¹⁸⁷ ¹⁸⁸ ¹⁸⁹ ¹⁹⁰ ¹⁹¹ ¹⁹² ¹⁹³ ¹⁹⁴ ¹⁹⁵ ¹⁹⁶ ¹⁹⁷ ¹⁹⁸ ¹⁹⁹ ²⁰⁰ ²⁰¹ ²⁰² ²⁰³ ²⁰⁴ ²⁰⁵ ²⁰⁶ ²⁰⁷ ²⁰⁸ ²⁰⁹ ²¹⁰ ²¹¹ ²¹² ²¹³ ²¹⁴ ²¹⁵ ²¹⁶ ²¹⁷ ²¹⁸ ²¹⁹ ²²⁰ ²²¹ ²²² ²²³ ²²⁴ ²²⁵ ²²⁶ ²²⁷ ²²⁸ ²²⁹ ²³⁰ ²³¹ ²³² ²³³ ²³⁴ ²³⁵ ²³⁶ ²³⁷ ²³⁸ ²³⁹ ²⁴⁰ ²⁴¹ ²⁴² ²⁴³ ²⁴⁴ ²⁴⁵ ²⁴⁶ ²⁴⁷ ²⁴⁸ ²⁴⁹ ²⁵⁰ ²⁵¹ ²⁵² ²⁵³ ²⁵⁴ ²⁵⁵ ²⁵⁶ ²⁵⁷ ²⁵⁸ ²⁵⁹ ²⁶⁰ ²⁶¹ ²⁶² ²⁶³ ²⁶⁴ ²⁶⁵ ²⁶⁶ ²⁶⁷ ²⁶⁸ ²⁶⁹ ²⁷⁰ ²⁷¹ ²⁷² ²⁷³ ²⁷⁴ ²⁷⁵ ²⁷⁶ ²⁷⁷ ²⁷⁸ ²⁷⁹ ²⁸⁰ ²⁸¹ ²⁸² ²⁸³ ²⁸⁴ ²⁸⁵ ²⁸⁶ ²⁸⁷ ²⁸⁸ ²⁸⁹ ²⁹⁰ ²⁹¹ ²⁹² ²⁹³ ²⁹⁴ ²⁹⁵ ²⁹⁶ ²⁹⁷ ²⁹⁸ ²⁹⁹ ³⁰⁰ ³⁰¹ ³⁰² ³⁰³ ³⁰⁴ ³⁰⁵ ³⁰⁶ ³⁰⁷ ³⁰⁸ ³⁰⁹ ³¹⁰ ³¹¹ ³¹² ³¹³ ³¹⁴ ³¹⁵ ³¹⁶ ³¹⁷ ³¹⁸ ³¹⁹ ³²⁰ ³²¹ ³²² ³²³ ³²⁴ ³²⁵ ³²⁶ ³²⁷ ³²⁸ ³²⁹ ³³⁰ ³³¹ ³³² ³³³ ³³⁴ ³³⁵ ³³⁶ ³³⁷ ³³⁸ ³³⁹ ³⁴⁰ ³⁴¹ ³⁴² ³⁴³ ³⁴⁴ ³⁴⁵ ³⁴⁶ ³⁴⁷ ³⁴⁸ ³⁴⁹ ³⁵⁰ ³⁵¹ ³⁵² ³⁵³ ³⁵⁴ ³⁵⁵ ³⁵⁶ ³⁵⁷ ³⁵⁸ ³⁵⁹ ³⁶⁰ ³⁶¹ ³⁶² ³⁶³ ³⁶⁴ ³⁶⁵ ³⁶⁶ ³⁶⁷ ³⁶⁸ ³⁶⁹ ³⁷⁰ ³⁷¹ ³⁷² ³⁷³ ³⁷⁴ ³⁷⁵ ³⁷⁶ ³⁷⁷ ³⁷⁸ ³⁷⁹ ³⁸⁰ ³⁸¹ ³⁸² ³⁸³ ³⁸⁴ ³⁸⁵ ³⁸⁶ ³⁸⁷ ³⁸⁸ ³⁸⁹ ³⁹⁰ ³⁹¹ ³⁹² ³⁹³ ³⁹⁴ ³⁹⁵ ³⁹⁶ ³⁹⁷ ³⁹⁸ ³⁹⁹ ⁴⁰⁰ ⁴⁰¹ ⁴⁰² ⁴⁰³ ⁴⁰⁴ ⁴⁰⁵ ⁴⁰⁶ ⁴⁰⁷ ⁴⁰⁸ ⁴⁰⁹ ⁴¹⁰ ⁴¹¹ ⁴¹² ⁴¹³ ⁴¹⁴ ⁴¹⁵ ⁴¹⁶ ⁴¹⁷ ⁴¹⁸ ⁴¹⁹ ⁴²⁰ ⁴²¹ ⁴²² ⁴²³ ⁴²⁴ ⁴²⁵ ⁴²⁶ ⁴²⁷ ⁴²⁸ ⁴²⁹ ⁴³⁰ ⁴³¹ ⁴³² ⁴³³ ⁴³⁴ ⁴³⁵ ⁴³⁶ ⁴³⁷ ⁴³⁸ ⁴³⁹ ⁴⁴⁰ ⁴⁴¹ ⁴⁴² ⁴⁴³ ⁴⁴⁴ ⁴⁴⁵ ⁴⁴⁶ ⁴⁴⁷ ⁴⁴⁸ ⁴⁴⁹ ⁴⁵⁰ ⁴⁵¹ ⁴⁵² ⁴⁵³ ⁴⁵⁴ ⁴⁵⁵ ⁴⁵⁶ ⁴⁵⁷ ⁴⁵⁸ ⁴⁵⁹ ⁴⁶⁰ ⁴⁶¹ ⁴⁶² ⁴⁶³ ⁴⁶⁴ ⁴⁶⁵ ⁴⁶⁶ ⁴⁶⁷ ⁴⁶⁸

It shows what she was, upon her height

1. ¹He and a ²lotch potch of ³is ⁴is ⁵is ⁶is ⁷is ⁸is ⁹is ¹⁰is ¹¹is ¹²is ¹³is ¹⁴is ¹⁵is ¹⁶is ¹⁷is ¹⁸is ¹⁹is ²⁰is ²¹is ²²is ²³is ²⁴is ²⁵is ²⁶is ²⁷is ²⁸is ²⁹is ³⁰is ³¹is ³²is ³³is ³⁴is ³⁵is ³⁶is ³⁷is ³⁸is ³⁹is ⁴⁰is ⁴¹is ⁴²is ⁴³is ⁴⁴is ⁴⁵is ⁴⁶is ⁴⁷is ⁴⁸is ⁴⁹is ⁵⁰is ⁵¹is ⁵²is ⁵³is ⁵⁴is ⁵⁵is ⁵⁶is ⁵⁷is ⁵⁸is ⁵⁹is ⁶⁰is ⁶¹is ⁶²is ⁶³is ⁶⁴is ⁶⁵is ⁶⁶is ⁶⁷is ⁶⁸is ⁶⁹is ⁷⁰is ⁷¹is ⁷²is ⁷³is ⁷⁴is ⁷⁵is ⁷⁶is ⁷⁷is ⁷⁸is ⁷⁹is ⁸⁰is ⁸¹is ⁸²is ⁸³is ⁸⁴is ⁸⁵is ⁸⁶is ⁸⁷is ⁸⁸is ⁸⁹is ⁹⁰is ⁹¹is ⁹²is ⁹³is ⁹⁴is ⁹⁵is ⁹⁶is ⁹⁷is ⁹⁸is ⁹⁹is ¹⁰⁰is ¹⁰¹is ¹⁰²is ¹⁰³is ¹⁰⁴is ¹⁰⁵is ¹⁰⁶is ¹⁰⁷is ¹⁰⁸is ¹⁰⁹is ¹¹⁰is ¹¹¹is ¹¹²is ¹¹³is ¹¹⁴is ¹¹⁵is ¹¹⁶is ¹¹⁷is ¹¹⁸is ¹¹⁹is ¹²⁰is ¹²¹is ¹²²is ¹²³is ¹²⁴is ¹²⁵is ¹²⁶is ¹²⁷is ¹²⁸is ¹²⁹is ¹³⁰is ¹³¹is ¹³²is ¹³³is ¹³⁴is ¹³⁵is ¹³⁶is ¹³⁷is ¹³⁸is ¹³⁹is ¹⁴⁰is ¹⁴¹is ¹⁴²is ¹⁴³is ¹⁴⁴is ¹⁴⁵is ¹⁴⁶is ¹⁴⁷is ¹⁴⁸is ¹⁴⁹is ¹⁵⁰is ¹⁵¹is ¹⁵²is ¹⁵³is ¹⁵⁴is ¹⁵⁵is ¹⁵⁶is ¹⁵⁷is ¹⁵⁸is ¹⁵⁹is ¹⁶⁰is ¹⁶¹is ¹⁶²is ¹⁶³is ¹⁶⁴is ¹⁶⁵is ¹⁶⁶is ¹⁶⁷is ¹⁶⁸is ¹⁶⁹is ¹⁷⁰is ¹⁷¹is ¹⁷²is ¹⁷³is ¹⁷⁴is ¹⁷⁵is ¹⁷⁶is ¹⁷⁷is ¹⁷⁸is ¹⁷⁹is ¹⁸⁰is ¹⁸¹is ¹⁸²is ¹⁸³is ¹⁸⁴is ¹⁸⁵is ¹⁸⁶is ¹⁸⁷is ¹⁸⁸is ¹⁸⁹is ¹⁹⁰is ¹⁹¹is ¹⁹²is ¹⁹³is ¹⁹⁴is ¹⁹⁵is ¹⁹⁶is ¹⁹⁷is ¹⁹⁸is ¹⁹⁹is ²⁰⁰is ²⁰¹is ²⁰²is ²⁰³is ²⁰⁴is ²⁰⁵is ²⁰⁶is ²⁰⁷is ²⁰⁸is ²⁰⁹is ²¹⁰is ²¹¹is ²¹²is ²¹³is ²¹⁴is ²¹⁵is ²¹⁶is ²¹⁷is ²¹⁸is ²¹⁹is ²²⁰is ²²¹is ²²²is ²²³is ²²⁴is ²²⁵is ²²⁶is ²²⁷is ²²⁸is ²²⁹is ²³⁰is ²³¹is ²³²is ²³³is ²³⁴is ²³⁵is ²³⁶is ²³⁷is ²³⁸is ²³⁹is ²⁴⁰is ²⁴¹is ²⁴²is ²⁴³is ²⁴⁴is ²⁴⁵is ²⁴⁶is ²⁴⁷is ²⁴⁸is ²⁴⁹is ²⁵⁰is ²⁵¹is ²⁵²is ²⁵³is ²⁵⁴is ²⁵⁵is ²⁵⁶is ²⁵⁷is ²⁵⁸is ²⁵⁹is ²⁶⁰is ²⁶¹is ²⁶²is ²⁶³is ²⁶⁴is ²⁶⁵is ²⁶⁶is ²⁶⁷is ²⁶⁸is ²⁶⁹is ²⁷⁰is ²⁷¹is ²⁷²is ²⁷³is ²⁷⁴is ²⁷⁵is ²⁷⁶is ²⁷⁷is ²⁷⁸is ²⁷⁹is ²⁸⁰is ²⁸¹is ²⁸²is ²⁸³is ²⁸⁴is ²⁸⁵is ²⁸⁶is ²⁸⁷is ²⁸⁸is ²⁸⁹is ²⁹⁰is ²⁹¹is ²⁹²is ²⁹³is ²⁹⁴is ²⁹⁵is ²⁹⁶is ²⁹⁷is ²⁹⁸is ²⁹⁹is ³⁰⁰is ³⁰¹is ³⁰²is ³⁰³is ³⁰⁴is ³⁰⁵is ³⁰⁶is ³⁰⁷is ³⁰⁸is ³⁰⁹is ³¹⁰is ³¹¹is ³¹²is ³¹³is ³¹⁴is ³¹⁵is ³¹⁶is ³¹⁷is ³¹⁸is ³¹⁹is ³²⁰is ³²¹is ³²²is ³²³is ³²⁴is ³²⁵is ³²⁶is ³²⁷is ³²⁸is ³²⁹is ³³⁰is ³³¹is ³³²is ³³³is ³³⁴is ³³⁵is ³³⁶is ³³⁷is ³³⁸is ³³⁹is ³⁴⁰is ³⁴¹is ³⁴²is ³⁴³is ³⁴⁴is ³⁴⁵is ³⁴⁶is ³⁴⁷is ³⁴⁸is ³⁴⁹is ³⁵⁰is ³⁵¹is ³⁵²is ³⁵³is ³⁵⁴is ³⁵⁵is ³⁵⁶is ³⁵⁷is ³⁵⁸is ³⁵⁹is ³⁶⁰is ³⁶¹is ³⁶²is ³⁶³is ³⁶⁴is ³⁶⁵is ³⁶⁶is ³⁶⁷is ³⁶⁸is ³⁶⁹is ³⁷⁰is ³⁷¹is ³⁷²is ³⁷³is ³⁷⁴is ³⁷⁵is ³⁷⁶is ³⁷⁷is ³⁷⁸is ³⁷⁹is ³⁸⁰is ³⁸¹is ³⁸²is ³⁸³is ³⁸⁴is ³⁸⁵is ³⁸⁶is ³⁸⁷is ³⁸⁸is ³⁸⁹is ³⁹⁰is ³⁹¹is ³⁹²is ³⁹³is ³⁹⁴is ³⁹⁵is ³⁹⁶is ³⁹⁷is ³⁹⁸is ³⁹⁹is ⁴⁰⁰is ⁴⁰¹is ⁴⁰²is ⁴⁰³is ⁴⁰⁴is ⁴⁰⁵is ⁴⁰⁶is ⁴⁰⁷is ⁴⁰⁸is ⁴⁰⁹is ⁴¹⁰is ⁴¹¹is ⁴¹²is ⁴¹³is ⁴¹⁴is ⁴¹⁵is ⁴¹⁶is ⁴¹⁷is ⁴¹⁸is ⁴¹⁹is ⁴

Mind, I To be in-lined or disposed, to
 One of them said I go into me him
 I must to tell to plainly what I think
 Mind'd or Disposed in-lined If may
 me I'd to live virtuously
 Joery was minded to put her away by vily
 Till
 Mind'd in much used as can practice, as high
 mind'd but me led to live me def. other
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mindful of a attentive regard in with care ear
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 I promise to be ful of your an in love Hammond
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(xv) Where an accused person was charged with cheating under s. 420 by giving the complainant base alloy as pure silver and also with theft under s. 380 by subsequently stealing the alloy to remove the evidence against him, and was tried at one trial and convicted *held* that though it was difficult to find that the two offences were committed in one series of acts so as to form the same transaction, the evidence for s. 380 would have been admissible as showing the conduct of the accused in the trial under s. 420, that the accused was not therefore prejudiced by the joinder of charges and that the sentences being concurrent accused was not otherwise prejudiced, 20 A. L. J. 324

7. Conspiracy and the offences to which the conspiracy was entered into form one transaction.—*A* and *B* conspire to cheat *X*, in pursuance of that conspiracy and in fulfilment of its object *A* cheats *X* on a specific occasion. The position may clearly be maintained that the two different offences of conspiracy to cheat committed by *A* and *B* and the offence of cheating committed by *A* alone have been committed in the same transaction, 19 C. W. N. 672 = 21 C. L. J. 193 = 16 Cr. L. J. 3 and 21 C. L. J. 201 = 16 Cr. L. J. 9 *referred to*. If *A*, *B* and *C* conspire to make, or have in their possession or under their control, an explosive substance within the meaning of the *Explosive Substances Act*, and, if in pursuance of such conspiracy *A* makes or has in his possession or under his control an explosive substance, they may, if the Court thinks fit, be charged and tried together under s. 120 B, I P C., and s. 4 (b) of Act VI of 1908, 42 C. 937. *M M* an employee of a Railway Company, *D* a consignor and *N* his gumastha were charged that they had entered into a conspiracy to defraud the Railway in respect of freight payable on goods consigned and *M M* was further charged with receiving an illegal gratification and in consideration of that sum and in pursuance of that conspiracy he was further charged with having understated the weight of a consignment in a consignment note and defrauded the Railway of a certain sum. The charges against *M M* were under ss. B, 420 and 161, I P C. *D* and *N* were charged under ss. 120-B, 429 and 161/109, and all the three were jointly tried. *Held* the joint trial was valid as all the offences were committed in one transaction, 19 C. W. N. 672 = 21 C. L. J. 193 = 16 Cr. L. J. 3; 49 C. 573, 46 C. 712; 49 M. 74

8. Separate retention of the proceeds of the same theft or dacoity—Duty of prosecution to make out facts justifying joinder.—Separate retainers by different persons of separate articles at different places, although the articles may have been the proceeds of one dacoity, cannot be said to be in the course of the same transaction and person charged with such retention cannot be tried jointly, 33 C. 1256. One trial for having been found in possession of stolen properties belonging to two different persons and stolen at different times is illegal 18 C. W. N. 418 = 9 Cr. L. J. 277. Similarly, where two persons were charged under s. 411, I P C., in respect of articles at different times and without any connection with one another, 29 B. 449. Where the accused in one count was charged under s. 411, I P C., with having dishonestly received or retained eight sets of cooking utensils stolen from eight different persons on eight different dates and in another count were charged with having aided and abetted one another in the commission of the said offence. *Held*, that in the absence of evidence that the acts of receiving were so connected together as to form one transaction the charges framed and the single trial held with respect thereto were illegal, that the mere fact that there was no evidence of separate receipt or retention did not justify the joinder of charges and that it lay upon the prosecution to establish the facts which would justify such a procedure. Further, the dishonest receipt or retention of each article constituted a separate offence and the accused could only be tried for three of such offences committed within one year, unless it were shown that the receipt or retention of all the articles were so connected as to form one transaction, 9 C. W. N. 1027. *See* also 6 W. R. 83; 11 C. W. N. 1128; 16 Cr. L. J. 270 (O). *See* Note 35 to s. 239. But under clause (e) of the amended s. 239 what is necessary for a joinder of accused persons is, that one offender should commit theft and the other receive the stolen property. It is not, now necessary that the offence of theft and the offence of the receipt of stolen property should form one and the same transaction or be the result of the same conspiracy, so the above cases, viz., 33 C. 1256, 29 B. 449; 46 C. 741 are no longer good law.

9. Joinder of charges of criminal misappropriation or criminal breach of trust and falsification of accounts.—Where the falsification of account is made to cloak an embezzlement then the two offences have been committed in the same transaction and under s. 235 (1) they can be tried together, 40 C. 318; but a charge of criminal breach of trust cannot be tried jointly with an independent falsification of account, 40 C. 318. So also three distinct criminal breaches of trust, s. 409 I P C., and three distinct falsifications of account cannot be jointly tried, 20 M. 328; (1911) 2 M. W. N. 538 = 13 Cr. L. J. 21, 41 C. 722, 13 A. L. J. 1039. *See* Note 10 (v) to s. 233 and Note 8 to s. 234. *See* 44 A. 550

10. **Effect of s. 222 (2) on charges of embezzlement.**—S 222 provides for a charge being framed in respect of gross sums appropriated within 12 months from the first to the last and enacts that a charge so framed shall be deemed to be a charge within the meaning of s. 234, but it does not provide that acts so charged shall be deemed to be one transaction within the meaning of s. 233, 30 Cr. 820. See also 29 Cr. 558 and Notes to s. 222 at p. 549 and Note 8 to s. 234.

11. **Multiplicity of charges to be avoided unless intimate connection established.**—In 30 Cr. 822 the accused had executed a sale-deed of lands in favour of D and was alleged to have forged the registration endorsement on the back thereof. Next he forged a mortgage-deed in favour of D of the identical lands and got it registered by making a false statement before the Registrar. Next he attempted to raise a loan from a Loan office on the forged mortgage-deed. At one trial the accused was tried for offences ss. 467, 467/104, 468, 468/109, I P C., in respect of the endorsement on the sale-deed, under ss. 467, 467/109 and 471, I P C., in respect of the mortgage-deed under s. 82 of the *Registration Act* in respect of the false statement and under ss. 471 and 417/109, I P C., in respect of the attempt to cheat the Loan Office. *Held* there was misjoinder. The forgery of the endorsement on the sale-deed and the presentation of the mortgage-deed before the Loan Office were not parts of the same transaction, though it might be contended that the forgeries of the endorsement on the sale-deed and of the mortgage-deed formed part of one transaction, the object of which was to deny the genuineness of the sale-deed and also the forgery of the mortgage-deed and the presentation thereof to the Loan Office was one transaction in which the object was to cheat the Loan office. See 18 Cr. L. J. 739 where the trial of an accused in respect of four distinct offences committed at different times at different places and against different persons in one trial was held illegal. See 18 P. R. 1902; 7 P. R. 1901. But where an accused person pretending to be able to get a post for the complainant in Government service wrote letters on various pretexts obtained several sums of money and used forged documents, the various incidents extending over a period of five or six weeks and the accused was tried on seven charges three under s. 420 and the rest ss. 466, 468, 471 and 419, I P C., *held* the joint trial of all these charges was perfectly legal under this section, as the offence with which the accused were charged all formed one transaction, 11 Cr. W. N. 715 = 5 Cr. L. J. 494, where 30 Cr. 822 and 2 Cr. L. J. 34 are distinguished and 27 B. 133 followed. See also 18 P. W. R. 1908 = 8 Cr. L. J. 75.

12. **Joint trial of offence committed by different accused against different persons at different times.**—Four persons, members of the Police Force, were charged with ill treating the complainant H, his wife R and his son in law during the course of the Police investigation. They were committed for trial in two separate cases for the following offences—

(1) All the four accused persons for an offence under s. 330, I P C., committed against one Hanma, the charge covering several acts of violence alleged to have been committed against Hanma during his illegal confinement which forms the subject of the second head of the charge.

(2) All the accused for an offence under s. 348, I P C., committed against Hanma between the 5th and 18th January, 1889.

(3) Accused Nos. 1 and 3 for an offence under s. 318, I P C. committed against the deceased Rakhava wife of Hanma on the 15th January, 1889.

(4) Accused No. 3 for an offence under s. 330 I P C., committed against the deceased Rakhava on the 14th January, 1889.

(5) All the accused for an offence under s. 330 committed against Yella in the interval between the 15th and 23rd January, 1889.

(6) All the accused for an offence under s. 348, committed against Yella during the same period.

(7) Accused Nos. 1, 2 and 3 for an offence under s. 346 I P C., committed against Yella between the 8th February and 9th March, 1889.

The committing Magistrate committed the accused in two separate cases which were tried together by the Court of Session under this section and s. 239 as the same four persons were accused in both cases and were under this section charged with different offences committed in what was virtually one transaction viz., a Police investigation into an alleged theft at Bagadgeri. On appeal to the High Court it was *held* that

(1) Though the members of a Police Force who had conspired to maltreat suspected persons in the course of an investigation, could under certain circumstances be dealt with under the provisions of this section

and s 239, for a series of oppressive acts of which they were guilty in the prosecution of their common object still it would be necessary to consider carefully whether the alleged acts were, as a matter of fact, so connected together in one series as to form essentially and strictly the same transaction.

(2) If in any case either the accused are likely to be bewildered in their defence by having to meet many disconnected charges or the prospect of a fair trial is likely to be endangered by the production of a mass of evidence directed to many different matters and tending by its mere accumulation to induce an undue suspicion against the accused, then, the propriety of combining the charges may well be questioned.

(3) All the several acts of violence alleged to have been committed against Hanma during his illegal confinement could be rightly regarded as constituting a single transaction. But the act of violence said to have been committed against Rakmaya at a different place could not be regarded as a part of that transaction. Nor was the wrongful confinement of Rakmaya by the accused Nos 1 and 3 on the 15th January a part of the transaction constituted by the hurt which was caused to her by the accused No 3 on the previous day. In the same way, all acts of hurt caused to Yellia during his first period of wrongful confinement would, with the confinement be a part of the same transaction. But the second period of confinement which is said to have commenced some time after the termination of the first period of confinement, would be a separate transaction.

(4) The combination of the two cases by the Sessions Judge necessarily prejudiced the accused by making it possible for the prosecution to bring forward a mass of evidence at the trial, relating to many matters, some only remotely connected with relevant questions, which must, to some extent, have had the effect of embarrassing and confusing the accused.

(5) The omission to specify in the first head of charge the several hurts caused to Hanma and in the fifth head the several hurts caused to Yellia must also have added to the accused's difficulty in making their defence. 15 B. 491.

13 Where one offence in the same transaction not cognizable for want of sanction, trial may proceed for the others.—The accused by certain acts abetted an offence under s. 422, I P C., and by the same acts he also abetted the offence of dacoity under s. 395, I P C. Though under sub-sec. (2) of this section the accused could be tried for both of those offences, yet as this section is controlled by s. 196 its operation in this case is restricted to the minor offence for which the accused could legally be charged and tried 25 B. 90. Where offences punishable under ss. 183 and 186, I P C., were committed and in committing those, offences under ss. 355 and 323 were also committed, the latter offences may under this section be separately charged and no sanction is necessary, 31 M. 43.

14 Alternative charge in case of distinct transactions is bad.—Neither this section nor s. 236 relates to two acts which form two distinct transactions or empowers a Court to say in a charge to an accused person, "Either on one day at one place you did an act which constituted one of several offences, or on another day at another place you did a different act constituting a different offence and therefore you are guilty of some one or other of all the offences specified," 43 P. R. 1887.

PUNISHMENT.

15 When charges are for distinct offences, whether separate convictions and sentences are legal?—In 7 A. 757, where the accused in the course of robbing constructively caused hurt it was held that separate punishments for the offences of robbing and hurt were not legal, as it was found that none of the accused had individually committed any act which amounted to voluntarily causing hurt. With reference to sub-sec. (2) it may be pointed out as a general rule that when, in the same penal statute, there are two clauses applicable to the same act of an accused person, the punishments are not to be regarded as cumulative, unless it be so expressly provided, Ratanlal 506. Accordingly, a prisoner cannot be at the same time punished for committing an offence by fire with intent to destroy a warehouse under s. 436 I P C., and for the offence of mischief by fire with intent to cause damage to property above the value of Rs. 100 under s. 435 I P C., 11 B. H. C. R. 13. Again the application of sub-sec. (3) is exemplified in illustration (iv) in which the case is put of a person committing robbery on B, and in doing so, voluntarily causing hurt to him. Here the hurt constitutes the element of force which converts theft into robbery. Lastly, it should be noted that s. 71 I P C., makes no provision for a series of acts, one part of which constitutes one offence and another part a separate offence but which when combined do not constitute a third offence. Illustration (d) to this section however shows what should be done in such cases. This class of cases is governed by this section and separate sentences may be passed for each of such offences. See 10 B. 493; 12 M. 88; 23 B. 706.

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(F. B.). When the trial proceeds on two separate charges for two distinct offences and convictions are recorded on both, separate sentences ought to be passed, *Ratanlal 369*. The accused was convicted by a first class Magistrate of offences under ss. 467 and 380, I P C., and sentenced to one and two years' imprisonment for each of the offences. On a reference from the District Magistrate that sentences exceeded the powers of the trying Magistrate, viz., two years, *held*, that under cl. (1) of this section the accused could legally be tried at one trial for those offences and separate convictions were illegal [see *Illustr (b)*] inasmuch as though nothing contained in this section affects s. 71, I P C., still as the accused committed distinct offences, which when combined are not punishable under any single section of the I P C., s. 71 does not apply, *Ratanlal 223*. See also 10 B. 493. But now when read in the light of explanation to s. 35, the offences under ss. 451 and 380 are not distinct offences, therefore the offender cannot be punished with a more severe punishment than the trying Court could award for any one of such offences. Where a person was convicted under s. 457, I P C., and was also convicted in the same trial under s. 354 and received separate sentences of 12 months and 6 months' rigorous imprisonments respectively, *held*, that the separate sentences were not sustainable, 12 C. W. N. 187. When an accused person is convicted and punished for murder or voluntarily causing grievous hurt with a dangerous weapon, he cannot also be punished by fine for rioting when all the offence formed part of the same transaction, *Ratanlal 493*. See also cases under s. 33. Where the charge against the accused is founded upon one single continuous transaction, the first thing to be ascertained is what is the principal legal offence involved in the conduct of the accused which would subject him, if convicted, to the greatest amount of punishment? That being ascertained, the object of adding others is not the accumulation of punishments, but to provide against the event of the evidence failing to establish the principal charges. The most convenient course (with reference to appeals is to enter up findings on all the counts)—*Mad H C Pro*, 30th March, 1883.

16. **Separate punishment cannot be awarded where offence is so compounded that the aim of one substantive offence is the perpetration of some other offence**—This section, taken with illustrations, forbids two punishments for an offence so compounded that one substantive offence is the aim of the other, and evidentiary matter of the intent necessary to constitute that other. Therefore, a person who has been tried and convicted under s. 369, I P C., or abducting a child with the intent or dishonestly taking movable property, cannot also be punished for the theft of a part of the movable property which he intended dishonestly to take through means of abduction, 7 M. H. C. R. 375; followed in *Ratanlal 159*. House breaking by night with intent to commit theft and theft in the building *Ratanlal 79* and 95. Kidnapping with intent to steal and theft, 1 Bur. S. R. 475, 11 W. R. 33 or riding a horse furiously and knocking down a bystander and causing hurt to him, *Ratanlal 159*. If in the same transaction two different offences are committed separate sentences must follow, 38 C. 453. On the question of punishment see 2 A. 101 and 644, 6 A. 121, 7 A. 29; 1 B. 214; 10 B. 493; 6 C. 718 = 8 C. L. R. 390; 9 A. 645, 10 A. 83 at p. 67, 10 A. 146, 32 P. R. 1835, 31 P. R. 1894, 23 B. 906; 12 C. 493, and Notes to s. 35 *contra* 1 Bur. 271. These decisions were given with reference to illustrations (e) and (h) of s. 454 or Act of 1872 which are not reproduced under the present section.

17. **The major offence to be looked to**—Prisoner was squabbling with the husband or the witness at the door of the house. Witness remonstrated and abused the prisoner when he merely entered the house for the purpose of committing an assault upon her and in carrying out that intention caused her grievous hurt. *Held* that his conviction for the substantive offence of grievous hurt was right, but not of house-trespass, 2 W. R. 29.

18. **For offences falling within two definitions.**—See 10 C. W. N. 518 = 3 Cr. L. J. 338 dealing with offences under ss. 201, 202 and 176, I P C., and 24 M. L. J. 463 = 14 Cr. L. J. 214 and Notes under s. 403.

236. If a single act or series of acts is of such a nature that it is doubtful which of several offences the facts which can be proved will constitute, the accused may be charged with having committed all or any of such offences, and any number of such charges may be tried at once, or he may be charged in the alternative with having committed some one of the said offences.

Where it is doubtful what offence has been committed

Illustrations

(a) A is accused of an act which may amount to theft, or receiving stolen property or criminal breach of trust or cheating. He may be charged with theft, receiving stolen property, criminal breach of trust and cheating, or he may be charged with having committed theft or receiving stolen property, or criminal breach of trust or cheating.

(d) A states on oath before the Magistrate that he saw B hit C with a club. Before the Sessions Court A states on oath that B never hit C. A may be charged in the alternative and convicted of intentionally giving false evidence, although it cannot be proved which of these contradictory statements was false.

Notes —1. Scope and application of section —S 236 contemplates a state of facts constituting a single offence but it is doubtful whether the act or acts involved may amount to one or other of several cognate offences, 23 C. 174—176. See also 21 C. 955; 8 M. 296 and 12 Bom H. C. R. 1 as to construction of s. 236. See Note 19 to s. 233 as to whether the exceptions to s. 233 are mutually exclusive.

S 236 is the only section under which an alternative charge can be framed. The section provides for cumulative as well as for alternative charges and in s. 403 it is contrasted with s. 235 (1) which also provides for cumulative charges. The offences under s. 235 (1) are referred to in s. 403 as distinctive offences while that expression is not used in regard to the offences falling under s. 236. Under s. 235 (1) the offences are committed in a series of acts. They are distinct offences. Under s. 236 the offences arise out of a single act or out of a series of acts. The offences are not distinct. S 236 does not apply to distinct offences. It applies as shown by ill. (a) and (d) to s. 403 to offences of the same kind but which differ only in degree. The difference and degree depend upon some added circumstance of aggravation, e.g., that the thief was the servant of the complainant or to a difference in the intention imputed to the accused as in the case of culpable homicide amounting to murder. But both these cases are cases not for alternative charges but of cumulative charges under s. 236. An alternative charge cannot be framed in respect of distinct offences nor in respect of cognate offences when the difference is one of degree, i.e., as to the intention imputed or as to some circumstance of aggravation. An alternative charge under s. 236 can be framed only in those rare cases in which the prosecution cannot establish exclusively any one offence, but are able on the facts which can be proved, to exclude the innocence of the accused and to show that he must have committed one of two or more offences. The prosecution establish a *corpus delicti* on the facts which can be proved and the facts which cannot be proved are subsidiary facts important only to this extent that they decide under which penal provision the *delictum* falls. Offences charged in the alternative arise out of the same *delictum* and are therefore necessarily cognate offences. Where the facts constituting *corpus delicti* are doubtful no charge in the alternative can be framed. *Per PRATT, J.*, in 5 S. L. R. 16 = 12 Cr. L. J. 224. *CROUCH, A J C.*, however, differed from *PRATT, J.* and held that there is no authority for asserting that the alternative offences must at best be offences dealt with in the same chapter of the *Penal Code* or "cognate" in any other technical sense. The section is nothing more than a permissive rule of procedure. Whether it is expedient to frame a charge in the alternative or whether it will unfairly embarrass the accused in the conduct of his defence are two of the most important questions which should be answered satisfactorily, before the procedure is followed. The doubts for which s. 236 seeks to provide are doubts as to what inferences will be drawn from the evidence if believed. The doubt which of several offences the facts proved will constitute must arise from the very nature of the acts of which it is intended to offer evidence.

Ss. 226 and 237 are merely provisions against the defeat or justice on technical grounds. Where an offence is proved by the evidence but its legal definition is doubtful or has been incorrectly given in the charge then s. 226 or s. 237 may be resorted to. They really deal with particular instances which the language of s. 235 might fail to cover, 9 N. L. R. 26 = 14 Cr. L. J. 135. In 10 B. 125 the section was held not applicable to different transactions see Note 20.

2. Section applies only where the application of law to the proved facts is doubtful and not where the facts are doubtful.—This section relates not to distinct acts, but to a single act or series of acts where the facts being ascertained it is doubtful which of several sections is applicable 43 P. R. 1387. See 14 A. L. J. 587. This section applies to cases in which the law applicable to certain set of facts is doubtful by reason of the nature of the single act or series of acts done, and in which it is charged or found proved (as the case may be) that the act or series of acts constitute one or more or some one of several offences, the doubt being on a matter of law only. Therefore a person cannot be charged with murder or alternatively of culpable homicide not amounting to murder, 11 P. R. 1387. Where the doubt in the mind of the Judge was not whether on the facts which were held to be proved, the accused's act fell within the purview of s. 302 or s. 201 1 P. C., but whether there was sufficient proof that the accused had in fact committed the murder of the deceased or had merely been guilty of causing evidence of murder to disappear an alternative conviction for both the offences is not contemplated by law 11 P. R. 1913, 20 C. W. N. 166. Where the accused was charged under two heads of charge with dacoity in each of two adjacent houses, and the Sessions Judge was unable to determine into which house he entered, held that he was wrong in finding

him guilty upon an alternative finding. The Code only contemplates an alternative finding when the facts are ascertained and it would follow beyond doubt that the facts proved constitute one or two offences under one section of the Penal Code, or when the evidence proves the commission of an offence falling within one of the sections of the Code, and it is doubtful which of such sections is applicable, *Ratanlal* 20. This section applies to cases in which the facts are not doubtful, but the application of the law to the facts is doubtful. Judgment in the alternative cannot be passed in cases in which it is doubtful of which of those offences the accused is guilty, 7 N.W. F. H. C. R. 137. See also 12 C. W. N. 530 = 7 Cr. L. J. 362; *Weir* 11, 301. S. 236 applies only to cases in which there is a single act or a series of acts of such a nature that it is doubtful which of several offences is constituted by the criminal act or acts. It has no application when there is no doubt as to which of several offences the accused has committed if the facts as alleged by the prosecution are established 13 C. L. J. 574 = 15 Cr. L. J. 41, 16 Cr. L. J. 761 (B); 5 S. L. R. 15 = 12 Cr. L. J. 224.

3. **Alternative charge cannot be framed in respect of an offence under the Penal Code and an offence under a Special Law.**—Both the provisions of the law as to judgment and punishment in the case of an alternative charge are limited to offences of the *Penal Code*. S. 367 (3) contains an express limitation to that effect and s. 72, I P. C., is by s. 40 limited to offences under the *Penal Code*. The word 'offence' in s. 236 includes offences under Special Laws and such offences may be charged cumulatively. But the limitations in s. 367 (3) and s. 72, I P. C., seem to indicate that an alternative charge cannot be framed in respect of an offence under the *Penal Code* and an offence under a Special Law, 5 S. L. R. 15 = 12 Cr. L. J. 224. In this case the charge was in the alternative under s. 409 I P. C., or s. 52 of the *Post Office Act* in that he either dishonestly converted to his own use Rs. 2 and As. 13 proceeds of the bearing letters entrusted to him or that he threw away the bearing letters.

4. **'Several offences' include offences under the same section.**—*i.e.*, not merely several offences (*i.e.*, two or more) punishable under different sections, but also two or more offences punishable under the same section, whether under the same part, or under different parts of the same section, 32 P. R. 1859. The offences mentioned in this section are not in fact offences of the same kind arising out of a single act or set of acts and committed at one and the same time 9 C. 371 = 11 C. L. R. 522, but offences of different kinds.

5. **Mode of framing charge in case of stolen property.**—Where an accused person is found in possession of several stolen articles belonging to A and B at one and the same time, the proper course is to frame two charges, in respect of the property of A one under s. 379 and one under s. 411, I P. C., expressed either alternatively or cumulatively, and two similar charges in respect of property of B. The reason for the double charge in both cases is that the Court is not in a position to affirm positively that C has stolen the property, rather than he received it, and reason for framing distinct sets of charges as to the property of A and the property of B is that the Court is not in a position to affirm that the property of A and B, supposing that it may have been received or retained by C, and not stolen by him came into his possession by a single act of receiving. *PER FLOWDEN*, J. 26 P. R. 1839.

6. **Alternative charge of murder and of causing disappearance of the evidence of the murder.**—The joinder of charge of murder, s. 302, I P. C., and of causing disappearance of the evidence of the murder, s. 201, I P. C., in the alternative is legal, 4 S. L. R. 174 = 11 Cr. L. J. 731 following 1 S. L. R. 73. See, however, 20 C. W. N. 166. In 11 P. R. 1913 it was suggested that if *in fact* it was doubtful which of two offences the accused committed, the proper course would be to give the accused the benefit of doubt of the offence of murder. See Note 1 above.

7. **Charge of alternative common object when allowable in rioting cases.**—In a case of an unlawful assembly, if it be the opinion of the Judge that there is ground for charging the accused with a common object different from that alleged by the prosecution, he should add a separate count or counts to the charge so that a separate verdict could be taken upon it. This section only authorizes a charge in the alternative when it is doubtful which is several offences the facts which can be proved will constitute—not there may be a doubt as to the facts which constitute one of the elements of the offence, 21 C. 955.

8. **Alternative charge under s. 189 or s. 211, I P. C., if good.**—In 20 P. R. 1910 = 30 P. W. R. Cr. L. J. 420, it is held that offences under ss. 182 and 211 I P. C., are essentially distinct and there a charge in the alternative under these sections.

9. **Alternative charges where death is caused.**—A, without provocation stabbed B with a penetrated the cavity of the chest and caused B's death. The Sessions Judge found the case did not clauses 1 to 3 of s. 300, I P. C., and therefore acquitted A of the charge of murder on which she was

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(b) *A* states on oath before the Magistrate that he saw *B* hit *C* with a club. Before the Sessions Court *A* states on oath that *B* never hit *C*. *A* may be charged in the alternative and convicted of intentionally giving false evidence, although it cannot be proved which of these contradictory statements was false.

Notes.—1. **Scope and application of section.**—S 236 contemplates a state of facts constituting a single offence, but it is doubtful whether the act or acts involved may amount to one or other of several cognate offences, 23 C. 174—176. See also 21 C 955; 8 M. 296 and 12 Bom. H. C. R. 1 as to construction of s 236. See Note 19 to s. 233 as to whether the exceptions to s. 233 are mutually exclusive.

S 236 is the only section under which an alternative charge can be framed. The section provides for cumulative as well as for alternative charges and in s 403 it is contrasted with s 235 (1) which also provides for cumulative charges. The offences under s 235 (1) are referred to in s 403 as distinctive offences while that expression is not used in regard to the offences falling under s 236. Under s 235 (1) the offences are committed in a series of acts. They are distinct offences. Under s 236 the offences arise out of a single act or out of a series of acts. The offences are not distinct. S 236 does not apply to distinct offences. It applies as shown by ill (a) and (d) to s. 403 to offences of the same kind, but which differ only in degree. The difference and degree depend upon some added circumstance of aggravation, e.g., that the thief was the servant of the complainant or to a difference in the intention imputed to the accused as in the case of culpable homicide amounting to murder. But both these cases are cases not for alternative charges but of cumulative charges under s 236. An alternative charge cannot be framed in respect of distinct offences nor in respect of cognate offences when the difference is one of degree, i.e., as to the intention imputed or as to some circumstance of aggravation. An alternative charge under s 236 can be framed only in those rare cases in which the prosecution cannot establish exclusively any one offence, but are able on the facts which can be proved, to exclude the innocence of the accused and to show that he must have committed one of two or more offences. The prosecution establish a *corpus delicti* on the facts which can be proved and the facts which cannot be proved are subsidiary facts important only to this extent that they decide under which penal provision the *delictum* falls. Offences charged in the alternative arise out of the same *delictum* and are therefore necessarily cognate offences. Where the facts constituting *corpus delicti* are doubtful no charge in the alternative can be framed. *Per PRATT, J.*, in 5 B. L. R. 16 = 12 Cr. L. J. 224. *CROUCH, A. J. C.*, however, differed from *PRATT, J.*, and held that there is no authority for asserting that the alternative offences must at best be offences dealt with in the same chapter of the *Penal Code* or 'cognate' in any other technical sense. The section is nothing more than a permissive rule of procedure. Whether it is expedient to frame a charge in the alternative or whether it will unfairly embarrass the accused in the conduct of his defence are two of the most important questions which should be answered satisfactorily, before the procedure is followed. The doubts for which s. 236 seeks to provide are doubts as to what inferences will be drawn from the evidence if believed. The doubt which of several offences the facts proved will constitute must arise from the very nature of the acts of which it is intended to offer evidence.

Ss 236 and 237 are merely provisions against the defeat of justice on technical grounds. Where an offence is proved by the evidence but its legal definition is doubtful or has been incorrectly given in the charge then s. 236 or s. 237 may be resorted to. They really deal with particular instances which the language of s. 235 might fail to cover, 9 N. L. R. 26 = 14 Cr. L. J. 135. In 10 B. 124 the section was held not applicable to different transactions, see Note 20.

2. **Section applies only where the application of law to the proved facts is doubtful and not where the facts are doubtful.**—This section relates not to distinct acts, but to a single act or series of acts where the facts being ascertained it is doubtful which of several sections is applicable, 43 P. R. 1887. See 14 A. L. J. 587. This section applies to cases in which the law applicable to certain set of facts is doubtful by reason of the nature of the single act or series of acts done, and in which it is charged or found proved (as the case may be) that the act or series of acts constitute one or more or some one of several offences the doubt being on a matter of law only. Therefore a person cannot be charged with murder or alternatively of culpable homicide not amounting to murder 11 P. R. 1887. Where the doubt in the mind of the judge was not whether on the facts which were held to be pursuant of s. 302 or s. 201, I. P. C., but whether there was sufficient proof of the murder of the deceased, or had merely been guilty of causing native conviction for both the offences is not contemplated by law, the accused was charged under two heads of charge with dacoity in each of two adjacent houses, and the Sessions Judge was unable to determine into which house he entered, held that he was wrong in finding.

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him guilty upon an alternative finding. The Code only contemplates an alternative finding when the facts are ascertained and it would follow beyond doubt that the facts proved constitute one or two offences under one section of the Penal Code, or when the evidence proves the commission of an offence falling within one of the sections of the Code, and it is doubtful which of such sections is applicable, *Ratanlal 20*. This section applies to cases in which the facts are not doubtful, but the application of the law to the facts is doubtful. Judgment in the alternative cannot be pressed in cases in which it is doubtful of which of those offences the accused is guilty, *7 N.-W. F. H. C. R. 137*. See also *13 C. W. N. 530 = 7 Cr. L. J. 362; Weir II, 301*. S 236 applies only to cases in which there is a single act or a series of acts of such a nature that it is doubtful which of several offences is constituted by the criminal act or acts. It has no application when there is no doubt as to which of several offences the accused has committed if the facts as alleged by the prosecution are established *18 C. L. J. 574 = 15 Cr. L. J. 41; 16 Cr. L. J. 761 (B); 5 S. L. R. 15 = 12 Cr. L. J. 224*.

3. Alternative charge cannot be framed in respect of an offence under the Penal Code and an offence under a Special Law.—Both the provisions of the law as to judgment and punishment in the case of an alternative charge are limited to offences of the *Penal Code*. S 367 (3) contains an express limitation to that effect and s. 72, I P C., is by s 40 limited to offences under the *Penal Code*. The word 'offence' in s 236 includes offences under Special Laws and such offences may be charged cumulatively. But the limitations in s 367 (3) and s. 72, I P C., seem to indicate that an alternative charge cannot be framed in respect of an offence under the *Penal Code* and an offence under a Special Law, *5 S. L. R. 16 = 12 Cr. L. J. 224*. In this case the charge was in the alternative under s. 409 I P C., or s. 52 of the *Post Office Act* in that he either dishonestly converted to his own use Rs. 2 and As 13 proceeds of the bearing letters entrusted to him or that he threw away the bearing letters.

4. 'Several offences' include offences under the same section—i.e., not merely several offences (i.e., two or more) punishable under different sections, but also two or more offences punishable under the same section, whether under the same part, or under different parts of the same section, 32 P. R. 1859. The offences mentioned in this section are not in fact offences of the same kind arising out of a single act or set of acts and committed at one and the same time *9 C. 371 = 11 C. L. R. 522*, but offences of different kinds.

5. Mode of framing charge in case of stolen property.—Where an accused person is found in possession of several stolen articles belonging to *A* and *B* at one and the same time, the proper course is to frame two charges, in respect of the property of *A* one under s 379 and one under s 411, I P C., expressed either alternatively or cumulatively, and two similar charges in respect of property of *B*. The reason for the double charge in both cases is that the Court is not in a position to affirm positively that *C* has stolen the property, rather than he received it, and reason for framing distinct sets of charges as to the property of *A* and the property of *B* is that the Court is not in a position to affirm that the property of *A* and *B* supposing that it may have been received or retained by *C*, and not stolen by him came into his possession by a single act of receiving. *Per FLOWDEN, J. 26 P. R. 1889*.

6. Alternative charge of murder and of causing disappearance of the evidence of the murder.—The joinder of charge of murder, s 302, I P C., and of causing disappearance of the evidence of the murder, s 201, I P C., in the alternative is legal, *4 S. L. R. 174 = 11 Cr. L. J. 731 following 1 S. L. R. 73*. See however, *20 C. W. N. 166*. In *11 P. R. 1913* it was suggested that if *in fact* it was doubtful which of two offences the accused committed, the proper course would be to give the accused the benefit of doubt of the offence of murder. See Note 1 above.

7. Charge of alternative common object when allowable in rioting cases.—In a case of an unlawful assembly, if it be the opinion of the Judge that there is ground for charging the accused with a common object different from that alleged by the prosecution he should add a separate count or counts to the charge, so that a separate verdict could be taken upon it. This section only authorizes a charge in the alternative when it is doubtful which is several offences the facts which can be proved will constitute—not when there may be a doubt as to the facts which constitute one of the elements of the offence, *21 C. 955*.

8. Alternative charge under s. 189 or s. 211, I P C., if good.—In *20 P. R. 1910 = 30 P. W. R. 1910 = 11 Cr. L. J. 420*, it is held that offences under ss 182 and 211 I P C., are essentially distinct and there could not be a charge in the alternative under these sections.

9. Alternative charges where death is caused.—*A*, without provocation stabbed *B* with a knife which penetrated the cavity of the chest and caused *B*'s death. The Sessions Judge found the case did not fall within clauses 1 to 3 of s. 300, I P C., and therefore acquitted *A* of the charge of murder on which she was committed,

some, from moles, a heavy mass, load, burden] To trouble, to disturb, to render uneasy, to vex

They have molested the church with needless opposition.

Syn — To try to disturb, incommode, to inconvenience, annoy, vex, tease

Molestation, n [Fr & Pr *molestation* See *supra*] The act of molesting, or the state of being molested, disturbance, annoyance, uneasiness given

Molester, n One who molests.

Molestation, n Troublesome

Molester, n Molestation, trouble, vexation

[Obs] **Mole-tree**, n (Bot) A biennial plant of the genus *Chaerophyllum*

Mole-warren, n A mole See MOLE and MOLD

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sequence, weight or value

It is an abstract speculation, but also of far less moment to be than the others

4. An essential element, a deciding point, fact, or consideration, essential or influential circumstance

5. (Math) An infinitesimal change in a variable quantity, an increment or decrement. [Obs]

6. (Mech) Tendency, or measure of tendency, to produce motion, especially motion about a fixed

but convicted her under s. 326 of voluntarily causing grievous hurt with an instrument used for stabbing. Held that A should have been charged alternatively under ss. 302, 394 and 326, and that if the Judge found the case did not fall within any of the four clauses of s. 300, and that the exceptions to that section did not apply, he should then have considered the charge under s. 303, and found whether or not A knew she was likely to cause death, the charge of causing grievous hurt being altogether inapplicable to cases which a person causes death by an unlawful act which he knows likely to cause death., 1 Bar. S. R. 300.

10 Effect of conviction or acquittal after a trial on a charge under this section.—This section contemplates a state of facts constituting a single offence, but where it is doubtful whether the acts or act involved may amount to one or another of several cognate offences. Where that is the case, the accused may be simultaneously charged with and tried for the commission of all or any of such offences, and after acquittal or conviction cannot again be tried on the same facts, either for the specific offence or offences for which he has already been tried, or for any other offences for which he might then have been tried under the provisions of the section, 23 C. 174 at p. 178, 26 Bom. L. R. 440.

11. The reversal of verdict sets free all the charges.—Where an accused person is charged with and tried for various offences arising out of single act or series of acts, it being doubtful which of those offences the act or acts constitute and where he has been acquitted by a jury of some of those offences and convicted of others, but the Appellate Court reverses the verdict and orders a re-trial without specifying the charges on which the re-trial is to be held, then such re-trial must be taken to be on all the charges as originally framed and the acquittal by the jury at the previous trial on some of such charges is no bar to the accused being tried on them again 22 C. 377; 23 C. 975.

12. Definite finding on each count should be given.—Where accused is charged on the same facts in the alternative on a graver and on a less serious count, the Court should record a definite finding on each count, 1 Bar. S. R. 374.

13. Powers of Appellate Court—It is not competent to a Judge in appeal to alter a charge under s. 376, I P. C. into one under s. 366, I P. C., because a charge under the latter section involves different elements and different questions of facts from one under s. 376, I P. C., 8 Bom. L. R. 120 = 3 Cr. L. J. 240.

ALTERNATIVE CHARGES IN CASES OF PERJURY.

14. Law as to contradictory statements.—Illustration (b) which is new is proposed to settle the law that contradictory statements by a witness which are irreconcilable constitute the offence of intentionally giving false evidence, though it cannot be proved which of the two statements is false. *Statement of Objects and Reasons* See Ratanlal 26. The illustration adopts the Full Bench view in 21 W. R. 72 (F.B.). *Scope of illustration (b)* In 15 K. L. R. 148 = 2 Cr. L. J. 590, it is laid down that this illustration must be strictly confined to the case of two contradictory statements of the same kind and cannot be applied to statements falling under the two different parts of s. 193 I P. C. Therefore the accused making a false statement in an investigation under s. 175, and a contradictory statement before a Magistrate could not be convicted in the alternative, 48 B. 377 and 28 B. 533 relied on. This view, however, seems to be erroneous. See 5 M. L. T. 356; 22 A. 115, 1908 A. W. N. 73.

15. Effect of change of the Law.—In a charge under s. 193, I P. C., it is not necessary to allege which of two contradictory statements upon oath is false, but it is sufficient (unless some satisfactory explanation of the contradiction should be established) to warrant a conviction of the offence of giving false evidence to show that an accused person has made one statement upon oath at one time and a directly contradictory statement at another, 7 A. 44

The cases in Ratanlal 518 and 336 and 18 B. 377 are now superseded to this extent.

16. Form of charge under this section.—Form XXVIII (u) 4 is referable to this section and is intended to be exemplar of a charge in the alternative under this section, 32 P. R. 1855

17 Alternative charge in cases of contradictory statements—Prosecution on alternative charges of persons who make contradictory statements to the Police and to a Court has its conveniences, but it has also its drawbacks. It is not a prosecution to be encouraged and is justifiable only when the prosecution is unable to prove which of the contradictory statements was false, 27 P. R. 1890; 11 Cr. L. J. 734 (Burma); 3 L. B. R. 204 = 4 Cr. L. J. 469. The accused must have been under a legal obligation to speak the truth on both the occasions, 4 C. W. N. 249; 10 B. 124; 11 B. 702, 18 B. 377; 27 C. 455. It must be remembered that the accused might have made two statements, in perfect good faith, and yet quite irreconcilable, 28 B. 533. Where a person was

some, from moles a heavy mass, load, burden } To
trouble, to disturb, to render uneasy, to vex

They have molested the church with needless opposition on
Husker

molested, disturbance, annoyance, uneasiness
given

Molester *n* One who molests.

Molestation *n* Troublesome

Molestation, *n*. Molestation, trouble, vexation

Mole-tree, *n*. (Bot.) A biennial plant of the genus

Fuphorbia

Mole *n* A mole See MOLE and MOLD

M

important

Moline *n* (Lat. *molinia* *molinia*)

grind } The ground iron that supports the upper

in stone

Molinian, *n* (Eccl Hist) The doctrines of the

some what resembling the tenets of the

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like as the *Sceloporus* and *Furcata*



3 Hence, sequence, weight or value

It is an abstract speculation, but also of the has moment to

as the others.

4 An essential element, a deciding point fact,

or consideration, essential or incidental circumstance

5 (With) An instant actual change to a varying

quantity, an increment or decrement. (See)

6 (Arch) Tendency, or measure of tendency

to produce motion, especially motion about a fixed

being mollified

Mollification *n* (Fr. *mollification*, *c* *mollification*, *c* *mollification*)

mollification *n* Mollification, *n* See infra } the

act of mollifying, or the state of being mollified,

in (the) *n*

Mollifier *n* One who or that which mollifies,

Mollification

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convicted of giving false evidence upon an alternative charge, *held* by the majority of the Court (JACKSON and PHEAR, JJ., *dissenting*), that the conviction was good, notwithstanding the jury had not distinctly found which of the two statements charged was false 21 W. R. 72 = 13 B. L. R. 324 (F. B.). But an accused should never be called upon to plead in the alternative, but separately to each of the heads of a charge, *Ratanlal* 377. Two distinct charges ought to be framed, one relating to each statement and such evidence as is procurable should be adduced to prove the falsity of one or the other of the statements, *Weir* II, 299; *Ratanlal* 386. It is only when it is found impossible to say which of the conflicting statements was false and the two could not be reconciled, the prisoner should be convicted in the alternative on a charge framed under this section *Weir* II, 300, which follows 15 B. 377. See also *Ratanlal* 386. If each of the statements is found to be false, then conviction should follow on both heads of the charge. See Note 13 to s. 233 at pp 647 and 648

Although a statement which is made in the course of a Police investigation under s 164 of this Code is not evidence in a stage of judicial proceedings but comes within the words "evidence in any other case" in s 193 I P C., yet it can be linked with a statement which is in evidence in a stage of the judicial proceeding following on the investigation, so that the two can be said to be a series of acts on which an alternative charge can be framed under this section of intentionally giving false evidence under s. 193, I P C *Held*, by MACLEOD, C. J., PRATT FAWCETT and SETALVAD, J (SHAH, J., *dissenting*), 18 B. 377 (F.B.) *overruled* 33 Bom. L. R. 1 (F.B.).

18. Accused should have an opportunity of explaining contradictory statements.—Where there is a trial on a charge of giving false evidence by reason of contradictory statements is of the first importance (1) that there should be clearest and most precise evidence of what the statements alleged to be contradictory really are, and (2) that accused should have every possible opportunity of explaining the statements in question and of showing that the alleged contradiction does not really exist. Where the accused had not such opportunity, the High Court ordered a re-trial, *Per* STRACHEY, C J, 1899 A. W. N. 39. Extreme care has to be taken that the accused person really understands the nature of the case against him and the circumstances which he is asked to explain. *Per* KNOX, J, *ibid* Every presumption in favour of the possible reconciliation of the statements must be made, 10 B. 126; 7 A. 45 3 C. W. N. 81. See Notes 130-132 to s 195

19. The two contradictory statements might have been in the course of the same deposition.—The

fully satisfied that the statements are from every point of view irreconcilable and it is the duty of the Court to see whether the statements can be reconciled or not. *Per* CHANDAVARKAR J 28 B 533

20. Charge in alternative of two different offences under two different sections of the Penal Code is bad in law.—The accused was charged in the alternative, by the trying Magistrate as follows —

"I, W W DREW, Magistrate of the first class hereby charge you Ramji Sajabarao as follows — That you on or about the 13th day of October 1882 at Nandarpada stated that you had seen Vishnu Vaman and Mahadu Lakshman carrying teakwood from Gohe Forest to Narayan Ramachandra, Range Forest Officer, and on 14th February, 1885 you stated on oath before the first-class Magistrate at Pen, at the trial of these persons, that you did not see where they had brought the wood from, and thereby committed an offence punishable under s 182 or s 193 of the I P C, and within my cognizance, and I hereby direct that you Ramji Sajabarao, be tried by the said Court on the said charge

At the trial the accused asserted the truth of the former of these two statements and denied having made the other. The Magistrate was unable to find which of them was false, and convicted the accused, in the alternative either under s 182 or s. 193 of the I P C *Held*, that the charge was bad in law, being an alternative charge in a form forbidden by s 233 which directs that, for every distinct offence of which any person is charged, there shall be a separate charge. Nor could the accused be tried upon a charge framed in the alternative as in the Form XXVIII, Sch. V of the Code. For, upon the facts alleged, there was no way of charging him with one distinct offence on the ground of self-contradiction. He could not successfully be charged under s 193 I P C., on contradictory statements, because he only made one deposition in which there were no discrepancies, and, similarly, he could not be charged under s 182 of the I P C., for he only once gave information to a public servant. *Held*, also, that having regard to ss 225, 232 and 537 of the Code, the accused, convicted upon a such a charge, must be held to have been misled in his defence, and his conviction and sentences were set aside 10 B. 124. See 15 B 491 and 14 A. 502.

237. (1) If in the case mentioned in section 236, the accused is charged with one offence, and it appears in evidence that he committed a different offence for which he might have been charged under the provisions of that section he may be convicted of the offence which he is shown to have committed although he was not charged with it

When a person is charged with one offence he can be convicted of another

Note—Subsection (2) of this section has been omitted by Act XVIII of 1923 But it is re-enacted as subsection (2A) to s 238

Illustration

A is charged with theft. It appears that he committed the offence of criminal breach of trust or that of receiving stolen goods. He may be convicted of criminal breach of trust or of receiving stolen goods (as the case may be) though he was not charged with such offence. (*See 17 M L J 219 = 5 Cr L J 479*).

Note—1 The effect of the removal of sub-sec. (2) from this section —section 403 (1) refers to ss 236
does no longer apply
For this see Note

2 Can a person be convicted of the abetment of an offence when charged with the principal offence only?—Ordinarily the facts required to prove the abetment would not be included in the facts constituting the principal offence. The abetment would precede the commission of the principal offence itself where it consists of the abettor being a party to a conspiracy in or investigating the principal offence or help in the commission of it. Therefore when the charge is of the principal offence only it cannot be said that he has to meet facts which occurred before the principal offence. *WEST J* in *11 Bom H C R. 250* held that it is not open to a Court to find a man guilty of the abetment of offence on a charge of that offence itself. When a man is accused of murder he may not be conscious that he will have to meet an imputation of collateral circumstances constituting an abetment of it which may be quite distinct from the circumstances constituting the murder itself. A charge of the offence simply as such gives no imputation of a trial to be held for the abetment. In *33 M 265* the Court held that when a person has been charged with a certain offence (ss 467 and 468 I P C.) and has been convicted of that offence the Appellate Court cannot on finding the conviction is not sustainable convict the accused of the abetment of that offence. *See also 13 Cr L J, 203 (M)*. In *23 M L J 722 = 13 Cr L J 453* *SUNDARA IYER J* after referring to the above cases stated as follows — I do not think that *23 M 265* intended to lay down a universal rule that in no case can a conviction for abetment be possible where the charge was only of the principal offence. The question is what the facts charged were. If on those facts two charges could be framed namely the commission of the principal offence and the abetment thereof by virtue of provisions of s 237 the accused may be convicted of the offence of the abetment though it was not separately charged against him. The Code lays down no specific provision with respect to the question decided here but the principle is laid down in ss 236 and 237. Applying that principle I come to the conclusion that in this case the accused may be convicted of the abetment of criminal breach of trust. In *16 Cr L J 676 (Burma)* the Full Bench was of opinion that it would not in all cases be illegal to convict a person of the abetment of an offence when the charge is for the offence itself. In that case the verdict of a jury convicting a person of the abetment of robbery on a charge of dacoity was upheld. *See also 25 Cr. 207* where a conviction under s 467/114 was held to be improper and the conviction was changed to s 467/109 I P C.

3. Conviction for substantive offence when charged with abetment only—Four persons were charged under ss 232 and 235 I P C for coming false rupees not for the purpose of making gain by passing them off on the public as good rupees but for the purpose of getting them secretly into the house of the corner's house enemies against whom they were making a charge of theft to the Police accompanied by a request for search and the accused were convicted under ss 235 and 196/107 I P C. The High Court while acquitting the accused under s 235 I P C, altered the conviction under s. 195/107 I P C to one under 195 I P C. The course was justified under this section. There can be no doubt that the accused might have been charged under s. 195 on strength of s. 236 for the whole story of the plot to fabricate false evidence which plot I have found proved was detailed in the case for possession and formed an integral part of that case. The accused were aware that this was a part of the case against them all through and through and they have suffered no prejudice. *43 P L R. 1912 = 17 P W R. 1912 = 13 Cr L J 252*

4. Conviction for offence not charged is legal, if the facts which accused would have to meet on such an offence, be the same as on the offence charged.—(i) *Breach of trust and cheating*.—Where a person was charged with (1) attempting to commit criminal breach of trust, (2) framing as a public servant an incorrect document to cause an injury, (3) framing as such public servant an incorrect document to save a person from punishment, and was acquitted on the ground that he was not a public servant though the Judge found that he had framed the document with a fraudulent intent, *held*, that he ought to have been convicted of attempting to cheat, as the facts he would have had to meet on that charge were the same as he had to meet on the charge of criminal breach of trust 12 B. H. C. R. 1. See also 8 B. 200 and 17 B. 369. (ii) *Receiving stolen property and theft*. A person charged and tried under s 441 I P C, may without altering the charge be convicted of an offence under s 379, I P C, though the proper course would be to alter the charge under s 227, 1893 A. W. N. 116 See also 17 M. L. J. 219 = 5 Cr. L. J. 479. (iii) *Charges under s 124 A, conviction under s 153-A, I P C*.—An accused tried and charged with an offence under s 127 A in respect of an article in a newspaper may be convicted under s 153 A in respect of the same article even though not charged with it 38 B. 77 and see also 33 B. 221. See the same cases noted under s. 234

5. Operation of section limited to cognate offences.—Where charges are not *ejusdem generis*, i.e., of the same nature, a Magistrate should not amend them at the last stage of the inquiry. The powers given by ss. 236 and 237, do not justify such amendment so as to prejudice the case for the prosecution. *Per* RANADE, J., 19 B. 51 at p. 71. (i) *Murder and theft*.—This section and s. 236 refer to cognate offences, but do not relate to offences of so distinct a character as murder and theft. Where, therefore, a person charged with murder, was acquitted of that offence, but convicted of theft with reference to the provisions of this section, *held* the conviction was altogether unwarranted, 1893 A. W. N. 95.—(ii) *Rape and Kidnapping*. A person charged with rape cannot be convicted of kidnapping, 8 Bom. L. R. 120 = 3 Cr. L. J. 240 (iii) *Sr 193 and 211, I P C—Unconnected offences*.—A person charged with dacoity, cannot be convicted of dishonestly receiving stolen property (s. 412, I P C) which had not been shown to be a part of the property taken in the dacoity, *Ratanlal* 34. See 95 P. L. R. 1904, 5 C. 871; 8 B. 200; 22 C. 1006. In the trial on a charge of abetment of forgery under s 467 I P C read with s. 109 I P C, the accused cannot be convicted of using a forged document under s 471, I P C, ss. 236 and 237 of the Code do not warrant such a conviction, the offence of abetment of forgery is complete when the document is written and signed but the user is a distinct and separate offence, 30 C. W. N. 432.

6. Where offences are distinct, trials should be separate.—(i) *Two sets of accused*.—Two acts of abduction, separate and distinct, on one and the same girl were alleged to have been committed by two sets of persons of different dates. There were also charges against members of both the sets of having concealed the kidnapped girl and the charges were all tried together. The jury returned a verdict of "not guilty" against one person and they found the others to have abducted the girl from the guardianship of her parents and that it was not proved that the girl was below 16 years in age. *Held* that the trial of these distinct offences by separate sets of persons was illegal and must be set aside and the re-trial of each of the offence with which the accused were charged was ordered 1 C. L. J. 455 = 2 Cr. L. J. 393. See also 23 C. 104. (ii) *Distinct offences against two persons*.—Where the accused was charged with assaulting a public servant, i.e., a Police constable, and in the trial a witness deposed he was assaulted by the accused and the accused was found not guilty of having assaulted the constable, he cannot be convicted of having assaulted the witness without any complaint by the witness. Section 190 (c) does not authorise the Magistrate to convict him of such an offence, as in that case further proceedings must be taken under s 191 before conviction, 6 C. W. N. 203.

7. Charge under s. 323 read with s. 149, I. P. C.—Conviction under s. 323, I P. C.—A person charged for offences under s. 147 and for offences ss. 304, 325 and 323 read with s. 149 I P C, cannot in the event of the charge not being made out, be convicted of an offence under s. 325, I P C, 34 C. 698, 6 C. W. N. 98, 17 C. W. N. 53; 15 C. W. N. 1077 = 13 Cr. L. J. 502. In 15 C. W. N. 244, a conviction was upheld on the ground that in the circumstances of that case the offence under s. 326 was included in the constructive offence under s. 326/149 and see Note 10 to s. 238. See Note 2 to s. 232 and Notes 5 and 6 to s. 227 and also 41 C. 682.

8. Charge under s. 141, I. P. C.—Conviction for common object different from that set out in the charge.—See 35 C. 855, 6 M. L. T. 17 = 11 Cr. L. J. 30; 40 C. 168; Note 1 under s. 225 and Note 13 under s. 239

9. In a case tried with assessors their opinion must be obtained in respect of the offence not charged.—It is very doubtful if this section applies to a case in which the true nature of the offence is not open to reasonable doubt, *Welz* II, 301. In this case it was further ruled that a person cannot be convicted of an offence with which he has not been charged, but which the evidence shows he has committed in a case tried with the aid of assessors, when the opinion of the assessors has not been taken with regard to such offence. But see Notes to s. 236.

10. Effect of ss. 237 and 238 on powers of Appellate Court.—The powers of the Appellate Court under s. 423 (a) are not qualified by ss. 237 and 238. The finding which an Appellate Court may alter under s. 423 (b) may relate either to an offence with which the accused was separately charged in the Lower Court or to one of which he might be convicted without a distinct charge. In cases not falling under ss. 237 and 238 no doubt the Appellate Court cannot convict a person of an offence which he was not charged in the first Court but where he has been charged and the first Court has recorded a finding on the charge there is no reason for holding that the Appellate Court cannot alter the finding because the offence of which he was acquitted by the Lower Court was not an offence which did not fall under ss. 237 and 238, 23 Cal 975; 27 C. 172 followed, 21 M. L. J. 805 = (1911) 2 M. W. N. 106 = 10 M. L. T. 66 = 12 Cr. L. J. 259. See s. 423. Where the prosecution has established the necessary facts the Appellate Court may alter charge or finding, without directing a new trial provided the accused be not prejudiced, 25 B. 863. In 41 C. 537, the High Court on revision quashed the conviction under ss. 46 and 52 of the *Bengal Excise Act* and convicted the accused under s. 61 of the same with which he was not charged, holding that was a case to which ss. 236 and 237 applied. See also 33 M. 244; 18 C. W. N. 1276 = 15 Cr. L. J. 704.

238. (1) When a person is charged with an offence consisting of several particulars, a combination of some only of which constitutes a complete minor offence, and
 When offence proved included in offence charged such combination is proved, but the remaining particulars are not proved, he may be convicted of the minor offence, though he was not charged with it.

(2) When a person is charged with an offence and facts are proved which reduce it to a minor offence, he may be convicted of the minor offence, although he is not charged with it.

* (2A) When a person is charged with an offence, he may be convicted of an attempt to commit such offence although the attempt is not separately charged.

(3) Nothing in this section shall be deemed to authorise a conviction of any offence referred to in section 198 or section 199 when no complaint has been made as required by that section.

Illustrations

(a) A is charged under s. 487 of the Indian Penal Code, with criminal breach of trust in respect of property entrusted to him as a carrier. It appears that he did commit criminal breach of trust under s. 406 in respect of the property, but that it was not entrusted to him as a carrier. He may be convicted of criminal breach of trust under s. 406.

(b) A is charged, under s. 325 of the Indian Penal Code, with causing grievous hurt. He proves that he acted on grave and sudden provocation. He may be convicted under s. 335 of that Code.

Notes.—1. Scope of the section.—This section applies to cases in which the charge is of an offence which consists of several particulars, a combination of some only of which constitutes a complete minor offence. The graver charge in such a case gives to the accused notice of all the circumstances going to constitute the minor one of which he may be convicted. The latter is arrived by mere subtraction from the former. But when this is not the case, when the circumstances embodied in the major charge do not necessarily and according to the definition of the offence imputed by that charge constitute the minor offence also the principle no longer applies, because notice of the former does not necessarily involve notice of all that constitutes the latter. The section is not intended to apply to a collateral offence. It is not open to a Court to find a man guilty of the abetment of an offence on a charge of the offence itself, 11 Bom. H. C. R. 240. Though an accused may be charged in the alternative with either of two offences under s. 236 or may be convicted under s. 237 of the second offence when charged with the other, the two sections must be read along with s. 238, 911 U. B. R. 98 = 13 Cr. L. J. 429. But this is merely an enabling section. Its provisions are not imperative and therefore where the accused was charged and convicted under s. 454, I P C., the conviction was held good, though the facts disclosed also an offence under s. 380, I P C., and the accused should have been tried for charges under both the sections, Ratania 307, 26 Bom. L. R. 823. But see 3 Rang 11 (contra).

Note.—1A. The effect of the insertion of sub-sec. (2) (A) relating to the charge of an attempt.—For this see Note 32 A to s. 403 and 43 M. 774.

2. "Minor offence"—These words are not defined by law. They are to be taken not in any technical sense but in their ordinary sense. Therefore, where the accused was charged under ss. 366 and 376, I P C., *held* that he could be convicted under s. 395, I P C., 22 C. 1006. On a charge under s. 457, I P C., a man may be convicted of an offence under s. 456, I P C., 20 C. W. N. 1075.

3. Conviction for major offence not allowed on a charge of minor offence—There is no provision of law which allows a conviction of a major offence on a charge of minor offence, 1 Bom. L. R. 813

4. Offences not falling within the scope of the section —

(i) *House-breaking by night and theft in a dwelling house are not included in the offence of robbery or* ss. 397, I P C.—The accused were charged with and tried by the Sessions Court under s. 397, I P C. for committing robbery and using a deadly weapon (sword) at the time of committing and the jury returned a verdict of not guilty of the offence charged, but found No 1 guilty of house-breaking by night and theft in a dwelling house, and No 2 guilty of abetting those offences. *Held*, that the verdict was bad and should be reversed, as the accused were not charged with those offences, and that as all the particulars constituting the minor offences were not included within that under s. 397, I P C., or within the definition of robbery, the accused could not be convicted under this section, Ratanlal 211. But see 1 B. 60.

(ii) *Murder and Kidnapping*—Where the accused was charged with murder, but the evidence established the offence of kidnapping from lawful guardianship with which he was, however, not charged, *held* that the latter offence was not a minor offence within the meaning of this section of which he could be convicted Weir II, 302

(iii) *Criminal trespass and dacoity or riot*.—The offence of criminal trespass is no part of the offence of dacoity or riot and therefore without a specific charge of that offence a person under trial for dacoity and riot cannot be properly convicted of criminal trespass, 23 W. R. 59. See also 18 Cr. L. J. 860.

(iv) *Extortion and theft*.—It is wholly illegal to convict and punish a man for a grave offence as extortion, s. 384, I P C., involving many totally different ingredients on a charge of theft under s. 379, I P C., only 13 Cr. L. J. 597 (G).

(v) *Sections 201 and 202, I P C.*—Where a person charged under s. 201, I P C., for giving false information as to the cause of a death was acquitted of that charge, but was convicted of an offence under s. 202, I P C., without a charge being framed, *held* that an offence under s. 202, I P C., could not be treated as a minor offence included in the offence under s. 201, I P C., as the essential ingredient of the offence under s. 202 is the legal duty of the accused to give information and this is no part of the offence under ss. 201 and 228 of this Code does not apply and the conviction is bad 5 B. L. R. 123 = 13 Cr. L. J. 18

(vi) *Sections 392 and 458 I P C.*—Where a person has been charged under s. 392 I P C., he cannot be convicted of the offence under s. 458 I P C. 1911 U. B. R. I 98 = 13 Cr. L. J. 429. See also 1 L. B. R. 17.

(vii) *Rape and adultery*.—An offence under s. 498 is not a minor offence or offences under ss. 363 and 366, I P C., and therefore even the formal addition of a fresh charge under s. 498, at a late stage of the trial, is opposed to the spirit of this section, when the trial has commenced on charges under s. 366 only, 31 B. 218. See also 20 A. 166. A person charged with rape committed on a married woman cannot be alternatively charged with committing adultery with the same woman and on the same facts, 5 A. 233 followed in 27 M. 61. See 29 C. 415.

(viii) *Ss. 376 and 366 I P C.*—It is not competent for a Judge in appeal to alter a conviction under s. 376 into one under s. 366, because a charge under the latter section would involve very different elements and different questions of fact from a charge under s. 376, I P C., 8 Bom. L. R. 120 = 3 Cr. L. J. 240.

(ix) *Sections 211 and 182, I P C.*—Can a Magistrate convict a person under s. 211, I P C., when he is only charged with an offence under s. 182, I P C.? FAWCETT, J.C., referring to 5 C. 184 and 32 C. 180; *held* that an offence under s. 211 includes an offence under s. 182, I P C., while COUCH, A.J.C., stated that he was not prepared to accept that as a general rule of universal application, 8 B. L. R. 179 = 15 Cr. L. J. 104. See also Note 8 to s. 236

(x) *Sections 147 and 447 I P C.*—A person who is charged for rioting under s. 147, I P C., with common object of taking forcible possession of his neighbour's land and of assaulting him cannot be con- of criminal trespass under s. 447 without a charge being framed, as it is not a minor offence within the of subsec. (2). If the common object was to commit criminal trespass, then a conviction under s. 18 C. W. N. 992 = 15 Cr. L. J. 183. See Note 7 to s. 237 and Note 10

MO GHER

After church the central or oldest church or one from which other churches have had their origin — especially applied by its adherents to the church of Rome.

Let a good man obey every good motion rising in his heart. For every such motion proceeds from God. Sound

It moves. By motor Fr moteur | One who is that which imparts motion a source or originator of mechanical power, a moving power, as water steam animal strength, &c.

Motor { a. [Lat. *motor* from *motor* See
 { supra.] having motion pertaining
 { supra.] of motion, as, *motor*
 { Of or pertaining to motor-

For the first six days of the study, the

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5. When offence is composite, the accused may be convicted on any element of it.—The accused was charged and convicted under s. 457, I P C. On appeal the Appellate Court altered the conviction to one under s. 414, I P C. *Held*, that the offence under s. 417 being composite, the Appellate Court could record a new finding and sentence on any element of the composite offence, *Ratanlal 293*. A person charged under ss. 304 and 325, I P C., may be convicted under s. 323 though not charged, *34 C. 325*. So also dishonestly retaining of property in British India acquired by dacoity committed in a foreign State being included in the more comprehensive charge of dacoity the accused could be convicted under s. 412, I P C., when the conviction for dacoity had to be set aside for want of jurisdiction, *1 B. 50*. Where the offence of rioting is not proved the accused may be convicted of assault, *7 M. 454*. Certain subjects of the *Gaekwar* who had committed a crime within British territory were extradited for trial before the Sessions Court on a charge of dacoity. They were acquitted of dacoity and the Sessions Judge was of opinion that the evidence proved the accused guilty of theft, but that he had no power to try or convict the accused on any charge but that mentioned in the extradition proceedings. *Held*, that the Judge's view of the law was wrong, and that this Code was applicable *as lex fori* and that he ought to have charged and convicted the accused of the minor offence which the evidence had established, *17 B. 369*.

6. Conviction for adultery without complaint.—In sub-sec. (3) the word complaint means a complaint as defined in s. 4 (h), *30 C 910 (F.B.)*. It was *held* at one time that where the accused was charged by the husband of a woman under s. 366, I P C., a conviction under s. 498, I P C., may properly be had if the evidence be such as to justify a conviction for the minor offence and yet insufficient for a conviction for the graver offence, *20 C 483*. But this case has been *doubted* in *22 C. 1006* and *disapproved* in *27 M. 61 following 5 A. 233*. See Notes 2 and 3 to s. 199.

8 A. Conviction for minor offence for which complaint is necessary under s. 195 (1) (A), when such offence is included in the major offence charged.—Sub-sec. (3) of s. 238 mentions two cases of complaints under ss. 198 and 199 of the Criminal Procedure Code, in which a conviction for offences mentioned in those sections is illegal when the offence charged includes the offence for which conviction is made, but for which complaint is necessary under ss. 198 and 199, the specific mention of ss. 198 and 199 raises the question, whether section 238 authorises a conviction of minor offences, for which there ought to be a complaint on sanction under sections 195, 196 or 197 but for which no such sanction or complaint is given or made, and which are included in the offences charged for which no sanction or complaint is necessary. But now it is *held*, that the provisions of s. 195 of the Code cannot be evaded by the device of charging a person with an offence to which that section does not apply and then convicting him of an offence to which it does, upon the ground that such latter offence is a minor offence of the same character, *47 A. 114*.

7. Charge under s. 149, I P C., conviction for the common object.—See Note 7 to s. 237, and Notes 4 (1) and 10.

8. Competency of jury to return verdict on offence proved though not independently charged.—The accused were charged under s. 143, coupled with s. 325 of the I P C., with, while being members of an unlawful assembly, committing grievous hurt. The jury disbelieved the evidence as to the unlawful assembly, but unanimously found two of the accused guilty of grievous hurt under s. 325. *Held*, that such verdict was legally sustainable although that offence did not form the subject of a separate charge. This section enables a verdict to be given on some of the facts which are a component part of the original charge, provided that those facts constitute a minor offence, *5 C. 871 = 6 C. L. R. 349*. See also *20 B. 215* and *3 C. 169*, where it was *held* that when the jury acquitted the prisoners on the charges framed, but found certain facts which amounted to another offence and omitted to convict the prisoners of that offence as provided by this section, the High Court could, on the case coming to it under s. 307, find the prisoners guilty of such offence. See, however, *12 C. W. N. 530 = 7 Cr. L. J. 562*. There an accused person was charged with committing offences under ss. 304 and 326, I P C., and tried before a jury and the latter found him *not guilty* under s. 304, but returned a verdict of *guilty but not voluntarily* under s. 326, and the Judge without asking the jury to explain the verdict discharged them and then convicted and sentenced the accused under s. 833 of the Penal Code. *Held* that the Judge was wrong in doing so as the verdict amounted to one of not guilty. So also in *41 C. 662* it was *held following 34 C. 698* and *18 C. W. N. 1077* that it was not open to a jury to convict under s. 326, I P C., when the offence charged is under s. 325 with s. 149 I P C. See Note 10 below and Notes to s. 301. *28 Bom. C. R. 610*.

9 Power of jury to return verdict on minor offence not triable by jury.—Sub-sec. (1) of this section invests a jury empanelled to try an offence triable by a jury to find as an incident that the only facts proved amount to a minor offence and return a verdict of guilty or not guilty of such offence though such offence may

not be triable by jury, Sessions Judges in such case should specially draw the attention of the jury to such power, 23 M. 213; see also 21 M. 13, 24 M. 611; 13 Cr. L. J. 739 (M.), 16 Cr. L. J. 676 (M.).

✓ 10. Conviction for minor offence where evidence insufficient to prove graver offence.—If the accused are charged under ss. 304 and 325, 1 P. C., they may be convicted under s. 323, 1 P. C., though no charge under that section has been drawn up against them 34 C. 325. But when they are charged under ss. 304 and 325 read with s. 149 1 P. C., in respect of an offence alleged to have been committed by another person and the commission of the riot is disbelieved they should not be convicted under s. 323 in respect of their individual acts with which they are not charged and which are not imputed to them in the Judge's charge to the jury, 34 C. 325. It is now settled law that when a person is charged by implication under s. 149, he cannot be convicted of the offence, 18 C. W. N. 1077 = 13 Cr. L. J. 502; 41 C. 662. See also 34 C. 698, 17 C. W. N. 63 where it was held following 6 C. W. N. 93 that under no reasonable construction of this section or ss. 236 and 237 could causing grievous hurt be regarded as minor to or included in a charge under s. 325/149, 1 P. C. See, however, 6 C. 871 and Note 7 to s. 237 and Note 4 (x). When an accused was tried on a charge under s. 304 1 P. C., he can be convicted of an offence under s. 304 A, 1 P. C. if the facts disclose that offence, 17 Bom. L. R. 217 and 26 Bom. L. R. 510, when an accused is tried under s. 302 1 P. C., he may be found guilty of an offence under s. 304 A, 1 P. C., if the evidence is justifying such a conviction, 29 C. W. N. 842.

What persons may be charged jointly * 239. The following persons may be charged and tried together, namely —

(a) persons accused of the same offence committed in the course of the same transaction,
(b) persons accused of an offence and persons accused of abetment, or of an attempt to commit such offence,

(c) persons accused of more than one offence of the same kind within the meaning of section 234 committed by them jointly within the period of twelve months,

(d) persons accused of different offences committed in the course of the same transaction,

(e) persons accused¹ of an offence which includes theft, extortion or criminal misappropriation, and persons accused of receiving or retaining, or assisting in the disposal or concealment of, property possession of which is alleged to have been transferred by any such offence committed by the first named persons, or of abetment or of attempting to commit any such last named offence,

(f) persons accused of offences under sections 411 and 414 of the Indian Penal Code or either of those sections in respect of stolen property the possession of which has been transferred by one offence, and

(g) persons accused of any offence under Chapter XII of the Indian Penal Code relating to counterfeit coin, and persons accused of any other offence under the said Chapter relating to the same coin or of abetment or of attempting to commit any such offence, and the provisions contained in the former part of this Chapter shall so far as may be, apply to all such charges.²

Note.—S. 239 is thoroughly re-drafted. The actual changes made by the new amendment are the addition of clauses (c), (e), (f) and (g). Under the old Code, s. 234 applied only to the case of one accused person committing several offences of the same kind within a year, but where several persons committed several offences of the same kind such persons could not be tried jointly under the old law. Under the new section several dacoits jointly committing three dacoities on three different dates within a year and at separate places may be now charged and tried together under clause (c) of s. 239. So cases like 19 A. L. J. 796 holding to the contrary are, it is submitted, not good law now.

Note.—1 Same transaction. See Notes 3 and 6 under s. 235.

CONSTRUCTION OF SECTION.

2. Section 239 is merely an enabling section.—Section 239 is merely an enabling section and does not in any way trammel the discretion of the Court, 21 C. L. J. 195 = 19 C. W. N. 672 = 16 Cr. L. J. 3.

5 When offence is composite, the accused may be convicted on any element of it.—The accused was charged and convicted under s 457, I P C. On appeal the Appellate Court altered the conviction to one under s 414, I P C. *Held*, that the offence under s 417 being composite, the Appellate Court could record a new finding and sentence on any element of the composite offence, *Ratanlal 293*. A person charged under ss 304 and 325, I P C., may be convicted under s 323 though not charged, *34 C. 325*. So also dishonestly retaining of property in British India acquired by dacoity committed in a foreign State being included in the more comprehensive charge of dacoity the accused could be convicted under s 412, I P C., when the conviction for dacoity had to be set aside for want of jurisdiction, *1 B. 50*. Where the offence of rioting is not proved the accused may be convicted of assault, *7 M. 454*. Certain subjects of the *Gaekwar* who had committed a crime within British territory were extradited for trial before the Sessions Court on a charge of dacoity. They were acquitted of dacoity and the Sessions Judge was of opinion that the evidence proved the accused guilty of theft, but that he had no power to try or convict the accused on any charge but that mentioned in the extradition proceedings. *Held*, that the Judge's view of the law was wrong, and that this Code was applicable as *lex fori* and that he ought to have charged and convicted the accused of the minor offence which the evidence had established, *17 B. 369*.

6. Conviction for adultery without complaint—In sub-sec. (3) the word complaint means a complaint as defined in s 4 (h), *30 C. 910 (F.B.)*. It was *held* at one time that where the accused was charged by the husband of a woman under s 366 I P C., a conviction under s 498, I P C., may properly be had if the evidence be such as to justify a conviction for the minor offence and yet insufficient for a conviction for the graver offence, *20 C. 493*. But this case has been *doubted* in *22 C. 1006* and *disapproved* in *27 M. 61 following 5 A. 233*. See Notes 2 and 3 to s 199.

6-A. Conviction for minor offence for which complaint is necessary under s. 193 (1) (A), when such offence is included in the major offence charged.—Sub-sec. (3) of s 233 mentions two cases of complaints under ss 198 and 199 of the Criminal Procedure Code, in which a conviction for offences mentioned in those sections is illegal when the offence charged includes the offence for which conviction is made, but for which complaint is necessary under ss 198

authorises a conviction

195, 196 or 197 but for


offences charged for which no sanction or complaint is necessary. But now it is held, that the provisions of s 195 of the Code cannot be evaded by the device of charging a person with an offence to which that section does not apply and then convicting him of an offence to which it does, upon the ground that such latter offence is a minor offence of the same character, *47 A. 114*.

7. Charge under s 149, I. P. C., conviction for the common object—See Note 7 to s 237, and Notes 4 (1) and 10

8. Competency of jury to return verdict on offence proved though not independently charged—The accused were charged under s 149, coupled with s 325 of the I P C., with, while being members of an unlawful assembly, committing grievous hurt. The jury disbelieved the evidence as to the unlawful assembly, *yes*.

Held, that such verdict was legally large. This section enables a verdict of guilty on a charge, provided that those facts constitute a minor offence, *5 C. 871 = 6 C. L. R. 349*. See also *20 B. 215* and *3 C. 169*, where it was *held* that when the jury acquitted the prisoners on the charges framed, but found certain facts which amounted to another offence, and omitted to convict the prisoners of that offence as provided by this section, the High Court could, on the case coming to it under s 307, find the prisoners guilty of such offence. See, however, *12 C. W. N. 830 = 7 Cr. L. J. 352*. There an accused person was charged with committing offences under ss 304 and 325 I P C., and tried before a jury and the latter found him *not guilty* under s 304, but returned a verdict of "guilty but not voluntarily" under s 325 and the Judge without asking the jury to explain the verdict discharged them and then convicted and sentenced the accused under s 833 of the Penal Code. *Held*, that the Judge was wrong in doing so as the verdict amounted to one of not guilty. So also in *41 C. 662* it was *held following 34 C. 698* and *18 C. W. N. 1077* that it was not open to a jury to convict under s 325, I P C., when the offence charged is under s 325 with s 149, I P C. See Note 10 below and Notes to s 301. *28 Bom. C. R. 610*.

9 Power of jury to return verdict on minor offence not triable by jury—Sub-sec. (1) of this section invests a jury empanelled to try an offence triable by a jury to find as an incident that the only facts proved amount to a minor offence and return a verdict of guilty or not guilty of such offence though such offence may



banana and plant
and *La rd*
" *gū'ceous a*
(*But*) Of pertaining
to or resembling
plants of an order of
" in the genus *Mu*
" " *pe*
" " *Perum*
" " *Makes, or*
" " *{ Jar }*
" " *An ill*
" " *ician who*
" " *the m*
" " *erly very*
" " *a Europe*



(and they murder thy breath in the middle of a word) And
 Syn - To kill, assassinate also see but

slayer
Murderess *n* A female who commits murder
Murdering-piece *n* A small piece of ordinance
murterer {*GB*}
Murderment, *n* Murder {*GL*} *J* after
Murderous *n* A Guilty of murder, *ns*, the

not be triable by jury, Sessions Judges in such case should specially draw the attention of the jury to such power, 23 M. 243; see also 21 M. 15; 21 M. 611; 13 Cr. L. J. 739 (M.), 16 Cr. L. J. 876 (M.).

✓ 10. Conviction for minor offence where evidence insufficient to prove graver offence.—If the accused are charged under ss. 304 and 325, 1 P. C., they may be convicted under s. 323, 1 P. C., though no charge under that section has been drawn up against them 35 C. 325. But when they are charged under ss. 304 and 325 read with s. 149, 1 P. C., in respect of an offence alleged to have been committed by another person and the commission of the riot is disbelieved they should not be convicted under s. 323 in respect of their individual acts with which they are not charged and which are not imputed to them in the Judge's charge to the jury, 31 C. 325. It is now settled law that when a person is charged by implication under s. 149, he cannot be convicted of the offence, 16 C. W. N. 1071 = 13 Cr. L. J. 502; 41 C. 662. See also 34 C. 698; 17 C. W. N. 63 where it was held following 6 C. W. N. 93 that under no reasonable construction of this section or ss. 236 and 237 could causing grievous hurt be regarded as minor to or included in a charge under s. 325/149, 1 P. C. See, however, 5 C. 871 and Note 7 to s. 237 and Note 4 (x). When an accused was tried on a charge under s. 304, 1 P. C., he can be convicted of an offence under s. 304 A, 1 P. C., if the facts disclose that offence, 17 Bom. L. R. 217 and 28 Bom. L. R. 610, when an accused is tried under s. 302, 1 P. C., he may be found guilty of an offence under s. 304 A, 1 P. C., if the evidence is justifying such a conviction, 29 C. W. N. 842.

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(c) persons accused of more than one offence of the same kind within the meaning of section 234 committed by them jointly within the period of twelve months,

(d) persons accused of different offences committed in the course of the same transaction,

(e) persons accused¹ of an offence which includes theft, extortion or criminal misappropriation, and persons accused of receiving or retaining, or assisting in the disposal or concealment of, property possession of which is alleged to have been transferred by any such offence committed by the first named persons, or of abetment of or attempting to commit any such last named offence,

(f) persons accused of offences under sections 411 and 414 of the Indian Penal Code or either of those sections in respect of stolen property the possession of which has been transferred by one offence, and

(g) persons accused of any offence under Chapter XII of the Indian Penal Code relating to counterfeit coin, and persons accused of any other offence under the said Chapter relating to the same coin or of abetment or attempting to commit any such offence, and the provisions contained in the former part of this Chapter shall, so far as may be, apply to all such charges."

Note.—S. 239 is thoroughly re-drafted. The actual changes made by the new amendment are the addition of clauses (c), (e), (f) and (g). Under the old Code, s. 234 applied only to the case of one accused person committing several offences of the same kind within a year, but where several persons committed several offences of the same kind such persons could not be tried jointly under the old law. Under the new section several dacoits jointly committing three dacoities on three different dates within a year and at separate places may be now charged and tried together under clause (c) of s. 239. In cases like 10 A. L. J. 790 holding to the contrary are, it is submitted, not good law now.

Note.—1. Same transaction. See Notes 3, 4 and 6 under s. 235

It is open to the Court even when the names of all the conspirators are known and are even mentioned in the charge to place the co-conspirators on their trial separately, the trial of some without the others is not vitiated, **42 C. 957**, where reference is made to *Russell on Crimes* (1909) 149, 180 and other authorities. See Note 18 to s. 233 and Note 2 to s. 235

3. First two clauses are not mutually exclusive. Two accused may be jointly charged with the same offence and one with a different offence in the same transaction.—The opinion of Mr MAYNE in the Criminal Law, 2nd edn, p. 941, that, "In order to enable several persons to be tried together under the second clause of s. 239, it is necessary to show that they were engaged in the same transaction with such a common intention as would make each person liable for the acts of the other under s. 34, I P. C." does not seem to be warranted by the section. See ill (b). The two clauses of s. 239 are not mutually exclusive. If A induced B to cheat and B attempted to cheat in consequence, A and B may clearly be tried together for abetment of, and attempted to cheat respectively. If, in the course of the same transaction, A committed the separate offence of criminal breach of trust in furtherance of the conspiracy to cheat, A may clearly be charged with that offence at the same trial, **38 C. 453**. See illustrations (b) and (c). Accused who was a ticket-collector in the East Indian Railway at Sheoraphuli was charged with criminal breach of trust under s. 408, I P. C., for having handed over used tickets to the second accused, who was his friend, and with abetment of cheating under s. 420 read with s. 109, I P. C., for employing the second accused, to claim a refund on those tickets at Hanpal, the station where these tickets were issued, by representing that they were purchased in the morning and had not been used, and was tried jointly, with the second accused, who was charged with attempt at cheating under s. 420, I P. C., read with s. 311. It was contended that there had been misjoinder of charges, *held*, that the transaction was clearly one and fell within the purview of s. 239, **38 C. 453**. See also **42 C. 957**; **19 C. W. N. 121**. Although s. 239 is the only section which refers to the joinder of two accused in one trial, yet even in that case charges against each accused may be combined under the proceeding sections subject only to the condition imposed by s. 239, that the offences charged arise out of the same transaction or that the one offence was the attempt to commit or abetment of the other.—*Per PRATT, J.*—Two accused could be tried together when charges in the alternative were combined against one of them, provided the offences occurred in the same transaction as the offence charged against the other accused, **1 B. L. R. 73 = 8 Cr. L. J. 11**; **19 C. W. N. 121**. See **46 A. 55**.

4. What provisions in the former part of this Chapter apply to this section.—Does s. 234 apply.—See Note 2 to s. 234. This section does not apply to a charge against several persons accused of several offences, unless the acts constituting these offences form the same transaction in respect of all these persons, **33 C. 292**. Here the events of two different dates were not parts of the same transaction and that the trial was bad for misjoinder, **33 C. 292**. Section 234 does not apply when more persons than one are tried jointly under s. 239, **168 P. L. R. 1918 = 37 P. W. R. 1911 = 12 Cr. L. J. 266**, **122 P. L. R. 1911 = 28 P. W. R. 1911 = 12 Cr. L. J. 208**; **7 L. B. R. 272 = 16 Cr. L. J. 44**. See also **33 C. 1726**. In such cases the Magistrate must decide whether he will make use of s. 234 or s. 239, but

for that would necessarily express any opinion to enable more persons than one to be charged and tried together for more offences than one, the offences must all form part of the same transaction. S. 233 lays down the general rule. Ss. 234 to 238 apply to cases where one person may be dealt with at one trial for more than one offence. S. 239 applies to the trial of more persons than one jointly. The last words of s. 239, viz., and the provisions contained in the former part of the Chapter, etc., do not mean that ss. 239 and 234 are to be read together. They only refer to the part headed 'Form of charges' ss. 221 to 232 inclusive, **7 L. B. R. 272 = 16 Cr. L. J. 44**. *Contra*, s. 239 has this limitation attached to it that the provisions contained in the former part of this Chapter apply to all charges falling under s. 239. But s. 239 is in turn governed by s. 234 and s. 235, **11 A. L. J. 183 = 14 Cr. L. J. 116**. But under the present amendment it appears that sections 234, 235 and 239 must be read together, that is to say, the operation of one set of sections is governed in turn by the other. This is apparent from the enumeration of the different cases under which persons may be charged and tried together, being given in subjects (a) to (g) to s. 239 by the Legislature. See **11 A. L. J. 183**.

5. For persons to be jointly tried, the association need not be continuous from start to finish.—In **29 B. 449** and **30 B. 49**, *BATTY, J.* laid down that the accused should have been jointly associated in the series of acts constituting the transaction from first to last but there is

essentia
wise mib.

smell. It is a native of
North America.

Its popular name
in America is muskrat.



Musk-rat (O. fiber).

It
is
a
native
of
North
America.

It
is
a
native
of
North
America.

Mute a. {
O Fr mul mu, N Fr mu f }
1 Incontinent from speaking, kept in silence,
uttering no sound, silent

2 Incapable of speaking dumb

My speech is lost, my reason is a brute
3 Not uttered, unpronounced, silent also pro-
duced by complete closure of the mouth or, an-
critically interrupting the passage of breath, — and
of certain letters

In law a prisoner is said to stand mute when
upon being arraigned he either makes no answer or does
not plead guilty, or is not just before on trial

Syn. — A silent dumb speechless — MUTE SILENT
1. One is silent who does not speak, one is dumb
who can not speak, one is speechless who cannot
speak

and for the first time, we speak of a person
as dumb with an emphasis. One is dumb who
cannot speak by some physical cause, as is
the case with those who are born dumb, or who
become dumb through some disease of the brain,
or who are dumb because they have never learned
to speak, or who are dumb because they are
deaf and cannot hear, or who are dumb because
they are too shy to speak.

2. A person is said to stand mute when
upon being arraigned he either makes no answer or
does not plead guilty, or is not just before on trial

3. A person is said to be dumb when he is
incapable of speaking, or when he is so shy that
he cannot speak, or when he is so deaf that he
cannot hear, or when he is so shy that he cannot
speak.

4. A person is said to be speechless when he
is unable to speak, or when he is so shy that
he cannot speak, or when he is so deaf that he
cannot hear, or when he is so shy that he cannot
speak.

5. A person is said to be silent when he
is unable to speak, or when he is so shy that
he cannot speak, or when he is so deaf that he
cannot hear, or when he is so shy that he cannot
speak.

2 A term of endearment

shores, and are used for
natives

It is a native of
North America.

Its popular name
in America is muskrat.

73 = 8 Cr. L. J. 91; 33 M. 502 and 10 M. L. T. 23 = (1911) 2 M. W. N. 189 = 12 Cr. L. J. 268. Where the first accused seized a woman with the intention of forcibly having sexual intercourse with her and was attacked by her husband and the second and third accused thereupon appeared and assaulted the husband, *held* that in the absence of proof that the three accused were acting for a common purpose in execution of a common design, a joint trial in which the first accused was charged under s. 354 of the Penal Code and the second and third accused under s. 323 was illegal, 5 Pat. L. J. 11.

In 23 A. L. J. 5 where several people were tried together for committing different offences all committed on their own account it was *held* that they could not be tried jointly. Further *held* that the accused not having acted in the course of the same transaction (because having no intention in common) could not be tried jointly.

6. The words 'accused for the same offence' imply that all accused should have acted in concert.—The words imply that all the accused should have acted in concert or association. They do not apply to a case in which the allegations against the accused are mutually exclusive. Where two accused were tried together on a charge of having caused grievous hurt to a person and the allegation was that either one or the other committed the crime, and the Magistrate discharged one of the two accused and convicted the other, *held* that the joint trial was bad. The two men should have been separately tried, 7 L. B. R. 68 = 6 Bur. L. T. 191 = 14 Cr. L. J. 563. See Note 30.

APPLICATION OF SECTION.

7. Section does not apply to preliminary inquiries.—This section does not deal with joint inquiries. There can be no objection to proceedings prior to commitment being joint, 7 Bom. L. R. 457. Ss 233 to 239 of the Code apply to the trial of the accused and not to preliminary inquiries and commitment. The Sessions Court is competent to try separately prisoners who have been committed together as if there had been two or more commitments, 26 M. 592; Ratanlal 915; 11 W. R. 16; (1900) A. W. N. 206. See Note 22 to s 233, see 42 M. 561.

8. Section has been applied to security proceedings—Chap. VIII.—The provisions of this section are applicable to cases under s. 107, 9 A. 452; 8 C. W. N. 180. Where more persons than one are called upon to show cause why they should not execute bonds for good behaviour each person arraigned should be tried separately, Ratanlal 585; 14 C. 358. Where two persons were brought before a first-class Magistrate under s. 109 and they were tried together and discharged under s. 119, *held*, that the said two persons should not have been tried together, Ratanlal 558. See Notes at p 171, under Heading VI.

9. Section does not apply to trial of cross-cases.—But where two cross noting cases were instituted before the same Magistrate and tried, almost simultaneously, a few witnesses in each case being examined every day, *held* the trial was not bad, 31 C. L. R. 275; 8 C. W. N. 345, where 25 M. 51 (P.C.) is distinguished. See also 6 C. 95; 1881 A. W. N. 23; 12 C. W. N. 153; 9 A. 452—457.

9-A. Trial with the aid of assessors of an offence triable with the aid of assessors—Accused found guilty of a minor offence triable by jury—Conviction for minor offence valid.—On the trial of an accused by a Sessions Judge with the aid of assessors for an offence so triable, it is competent to the Judge to convict the accused of a minor offence, though the minor offence is triable only by a jury, 43 B. 619 = 22 Bom. L. R. 1241.

EFFECT OF MISJOINDER.

10. Misjoinder renders the trial illegal.—The joint trial of several accused renders the trial invalid except in the cases falling under s. 239, 4 N. L. R. 71 = 8 Cr. L. J. 11. A trial which takes place in defiance of the express provisions of s 239 must be held to be a void trial, 15 Cr. L. J. 420 (O). The disregard of a plain direction cast by law cannot be condoned with reference to s. 537, 28 M. L. J. 381 = 16 Cr. L. J. 298. See also 25 M. 21 (P.C.) and Notes under s. 233. There can be no waiver, 6 C. 95; 4 Bom. L. R. 53; 26 M. 125. See also 1911 W. N. 65 = 7 M. L. T. 299 = 11 Cr. L. J. 258; 11 A. L. J. 188 = 5 Cr. L. J. 116.

11. Joint trial of accused charged with different offences.—Where three persons were charged with different offences and were tried jointly, it was *held* that the trial was illegal, 11 Cr. L. J. 116.

12. The trial to be separate not only in form but in substance.—Where four persons were charged with different offences and were tried jointly, it was *held* that the trial was illegal, 11 Cr. L. J. 116. Where four persons were charged with different offences and were tried jointly, it was *held* that the trial was illegal, 11 Cr. L. J. 116. Where four persons were charged with different offences and were tried jointly, it was *held* that the trial was illegal, 11 Cr. L. J. 116.

Myrris (myr) n. (Fr. *myrris*,
It. *myrris*, & *myrris* Pg. & Lat.
myrris Or *myrris* Lib. var.
Ar. *myrris* from Lib. var. *myrris*,
myrris, bitter, from myrris, to be
bitter.) A transparent gum
resin usually of an amber
color of an aromatic odor and
a bitter slightly pungent taste.
It is used for its odor and for its
medicinal properties. It exudes
from the bark of a shrub of *Ab-
rysolia* and *Arabis*.
Myrris a Pertaining to, or
obtained from, myrris.
Myrris a (Lat. *myrris*,
myrris, for myrris.) Made of
the myrris stone, or fluoride
of calcium. It is a fluor-spar.



Myrris (*Abrysolia*
myrris).

And a very medicinal and supernatural powder. And a sharp can be

2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45, 46, 47, 48, 49, 50, 51, 52, 53, 54, 55, 56, 57, 58, 59, 60, 61, 62, 63, 64, 65, 66, 67, 68, 69, 70, 71, 72, 73, 74, 75, 76, 77, 78, 79, 80, 81, 82, 83, 84, 85, 86, 87, 88, 89, 90, 91, 92, 93, 94, 95, 96, 97, 98, 99, 100

together, and was an improper mode of procedure, 10 C. 405; 15 B. 491; 3. M. H. C. R. Appx. XXXII; Weir II, 304; Ratanlal 31. See 29 M. L. J. 101 = 18 M. L. T. 95 = 16 Cr. L. J. 593 (F.B.) and Note 20 to s 233

CASES WHERE JOINT TRIAL HELD VALID.

13 Joint trial of persons taking part in a riot with different common objects.—In a case of riot, one set of accused were charged under ss. 141 and 142, I P C, for taking part in the riot with the common object of setting fire to public buildings and another accused was charged with being member of the unlawful assembly with the common object of closing by force a college and all the accused were jointly tried and convicted. It was contended that the trial was illegal on account of misjoinder and as there was a difference in the common object the transaction was not the same, *held* by BENSON and MUNRO, JJ that the proceedings of the mob consisting of several minor transactions from first to last showed such continuity of purpose and of action, and were united in such proximity in time as to form one transaction within the meaning of ss 234 and 239 of the Code so as to render all the rioters liable to be tried at the same trial for the acts done by each of them. SANKARAN NAIR, J *Contra*—That the closing of the college and setting fire to public buildings were different common objects and did not form the same transaction and the conviction should be quashed, 6 M L. T. 17 = 11 Cr. L. J. 30 and see also 1883 A. W. N. 28.

14 Joint trial of principal and agent—principal and abettor.—S 239 clearly allows an agent to be tried in the same trial as the principal. A licensed vendor who is punishable by implication under s 56 of the *Bengal Excise Act* 1909 may be tried together with his agent who commits the offence. The case is one of abetment by implication, 15 C. L. J. 692 = 13 Cr. L. J. 255. Where a person who had a license for the sale of opium allowed another who had no license to sell the drug, their joint trial and conviction under s 9 of the *Opium Act* was held good, the transaction in respect of which the accused were convicted being the same, 113 P. L. R. 1906 = 4 Cr. L. J. 178.

15. Paying bribe through another.—Where an illegal gratification was given to accused No 2 and accepted by accused No 1 and they were charged under ss 162 and 161, I P C, respectively, *held* the joint trial was good as the offences formed part of the same transaction, 7 Bom. L. R. 637.

16. Joint trial of the keeper of a gaming-house and a player therein.—The offences of the keeper of a gaming house and a player therein arise out of facts so inseparably connected together as to form a single transaction and, therefore, the housekeeper who commits one offence in that transaction and his customer who commits another are clearly within the purview of s 239 and may be jointly tried, 9 N. L. R. 68 = 14 Cr. L. J. 293 where 5 P. W. R. 1910 = 11 Cr. L. J. 211 was dissented from. *Contra*—The keeping of a gaming house and being present in it at the time of a Police raid cannot be said to form part of the same transaction. The joint trial of a person or keeping a gambling house under s 3 of the *Gaming Act*, 1867, with others under s 4 for frequenting it is illegal 35 P. R. 1914 = 16 Cr. L. J. 220; 5 P. W. R. 1910 = 11 Cr. L. J. 211.

17. Joint trial of thief and receiver of stolen property.—Where two persons are charged, the one with theft and the other with receiving the stolen property knowing it to be stolen, they may be tried together under this section, 6 C. L. R. 245; 6 Bom. L. R. 361. Twenty five persons were charged with dacoity—s 395, I P C, and two more for abetting the same, s 395/109, and there were further alternative charges under ss 411 and 412, I P C, against three of the accused for having dishonestly retained articles stolen in the dacoity and all the 27 were jointly tried and convicted, *held*, that the fact that three of the accused were also charged under ss 411 and 412 on the strength of an incident which is part of the evidence against them on the charge under s 395 could not vitiate the trial 11 C. L. J. 182 = 12 Cr. L. J. 244. Similarly, the joint trial of a person who commits a criminal breach of trust and of the persons who the proceeds of the breach of trust, is good. The receivers knowledge through the tainted channel of theft or criminal breach of trust which connects him with the transaction of theft or criminal breach of trust so as to make him a *particeps criminis* and that connection is sufficient to constitute both the theft or criminal breach of trust and the receipt one transaction whether the two acts take place simultaneously or not 6 Bom. L. R. 517, which is followed in 29 B. 449. Ordinarily theft and the disposal of the proceeds would be parts of the same transaction, and is proximity of time between two acts does not necessarily constitute them parts of the same transaction an appreciable interval of time between the two acts, otherwise connected, does not prevent them from continuing to be parts of the same series of connected events, and hence it is not necessary to show that the theft and disposal occurred within a few hours or even a few days of each other 1907 U. B. R. 5 = 14 Bur. L. R. 88 = 6 Cr. L. J. 29; 4 Bur. L. T. 263 = 13 Cr. L. J. 39. See also Note 37. It is stated in 39 A. 331 that the practice in that

province is the same as prevails in Bombay, namely, that when practical the thief and the person who receives the stolen property are tried together and such trial does not contravene the provisions of s 239, 44 A. 276.

Contra—For joint trial, receipt should be immediately after theft. The offence of dishonestly receiving stolen property from a person who has stolen that property cannot be regarded as an offence committed in the same transaction as the theft itself unless it be in a case where simultaneously with the offence of theft the offence of receiving stolen property is committed 1 C. W. N 35; 28 C. 10; 29 M. L. J. 331 = 16 Cr. L. J. 298; 27 C. 839; 23 C. 7. Where five persons were jointly tried four of them on a charge of theft and the fifth for receiving stolen property the act of receipt not being simultaneous with the theft, *held* that the offences of stealing and receiving stolen property were not parts of the same transaction and that the joint trial was illegal 3 P. R. 1905 = 21 P. L. R. 1905 = 21 Cr. L. J. 37; 1914 M. W. N. 352 = 15 Cr. L. J. 256. See also the foot note under 3 P. R. 1905; 3 P. R. 1900; 7 P. R. 1903. See also 17 Cr. L. J. 477. But under the present amendment it will be seen that the receipt of stolen property and theft though not parts of the same transaction may be joined together in one trial under clause (e) of s 239. Therefore the above cases holding to the contrary have become obsolete.

18. Joint trial of disposer and receiver of stolen property.—The offences under ss 412 (criminally disposing of stolen articles) and 411, I P C., may be jointly tried, the offences forming part of the same transaction and having occurred at the same time and places, 6 Bom. L. R. 361. Thus where two persons were jointly tried and convicted under ss. 411 and 414, I P C., both of them being charged in respect of a currency note for Rs 500 and also each of them in respect of a different note for Rs. 100 *held* that though in respect of the note for Rs. 500, the accused might be tried together, the other charges in respect of the two notes for Rs. 100 each could not be tried together as the transactions were separate and distinct. The conviction was therefore annulled for misjoinder of parties and retrial ordered 23 C. 104. See also 4 A. 147, 14 C. 395 and 15 B. 491. But now under cl. (f) of this section 23 C. 104 and 49 C. 565 are no longer good law.

For the joint trial of persons charged with dacoity and persons charged with the receipt of property stolen in the dacoity. See 45 A. 223.

19. Joint trial for possession and delivery of counterfeit coin.—C who was in possession of 104 counterfeit coins, delivered 50 of them to P to pass off for him. At one trial C was tried under s 240, I P C., and P under s. 243, I P C., *held*, that the joint trial was perfectly valid under this section read with sub-sec (1) of s 235, *supra* inasmuch as P received the coins with the deliberate intention of fraudulently passing them off as genuine, 31 C. 1007. See cl (g) of s 239.

20. Murder and causing disappearance of evidence.—Accused 1 to 3 were charged under s. 302 for murder and accused 3 was further charged in the alternative under s. 201, I P C. for helping accused 1 and 2 in disposing of the corpses with the intention of screening the offenders, *held* the trial was not illegal for misjoinder of persons, 1 S. L. R. 73 = 8 Cr. L. J. 191.

21. Joint trial of persons habitually associated for the purpose of dacoity—s 400, I. P. C.—Fourteen persons were tried at one trial and convicted of an offence under s. 400 for having formed a gang for the purpose of habitually committing dacoity between 7th March, 1908 and 15th December 1909, four serious dacoities, having been committed at four different places and the accused it was alleged and proved took part in one or more of those dacoities, *held* that the joint trial of all the accused though not illegal, was improper, 68 P. L. R. 1911 = 42 Cr. L. J. 260.

22. Joint trial in cases of conspiracies—See Note 7 to s 235

(i) Sections 121 A, 121 and 126, I P C.—Where about twenty accused were all alleged to have been members of a secret society, with its headquarters in Manicktolla in the suburbs and its places of meeting in Calcutta and elsewhere, and to have joined in the unlawful enterprise, and with others known and unknown to have conspired to wage war or to deprive the King of the sovereignty of British India and to have collected arms and ammunition with such intent and to have actually waged war. *Held* that joint trial of the accused on charges under ss. 121, 121 A, 122 and 123 I P C., was not bad for misjoinder of persons or charges 27 C. 467; 16 C. W. N 1105 = 15 C. L. J. 517 = 13 Cr. L. J. 609; 11 P. W. R. 1915 = 16 Cr. L. J. 354.

(ii) It is legal to try together charges of conspiracy and offences committed in carrying out the objects of the conspiracy. The transaction is not completed as soon as the offence is committed. It is clear that so long as the conspiracy continued, the transaction which began with the forming of the common intention continued and the offences committed in the course of the same transaction, 16 Cr. L. J. 19 = 19 C. W. N 706 = 21 C. L. J. 201.

(22) But it should be observed that if a conspiracy is entered into in district *A* and acts are committed in pursuance of the conspiracy in district *B*, the Magistrate of district *A* can try the offence of conspiracy, but cannot try the accused in the same trial for offences committed outside his district. S 239 of the Code cannot give jurisdiction to a Magistrate who has no jurisdiction to try the offence under the provisions of Chapter XV of the Code, 23 G. W. N. 975.

(iv) See 18 A. 88.

(v) *Perjury*—See Notes 28 and 29

CASES WHERE JOINT TRIAL HELD ILLEGAL.

23. **Fight between contending parties not one transaction**—In case of a fight between two opposing parties, the law as contained in this section is that opposing parties cannot regularly be charged in one and the same trial, 20 C. 537. Where the members of opposing factions are charged with rioting each party must be tried separately, 6 C. 96 = 6 C. L. R. 521; 1391 A. W. N. 28; 8 W. R. 47; 9 W. R. 33; 12 W. R. 75; 22 and 26 P. R. 1881; 5 P. R. 1906 = 4 Cr. L. J. 75. Where two parties are arraigned against each other in a riot, it cannot be said that the offence of rioting was committed by both the parties in the same transaction within the meaning of this section so as to justify a joint trial of the persons on both sides. The offence of rioting committed by each side, forms a separate transaction, 15 P. R. 1882, 5 P. R. 1906 = 4 Cr. L. J. 73; 14 C. 358.

25. **Conversion of counter-cases of assault into a single case of affray.**—Where complaints and cross-complaints of hurt or assault are instituted (the complainant in the one case being the accused in the other and *vice versa*) and after taking in each case the evidence in support of the prosecution, the Magistrate is of opinion that the accused have jointly committed an affray, he cannot convict them of that offence on the evidence so recorded. He may call upon them to show cause why they should not be convicted of affray, but should they deny the commission of the offence, then it must be proved in the regular way, and without reference to the evidence previously recorded.—*C P Cr Cr*, Part I, No 5

25. **Defamation and publication thereof.**—*A, B and C* passed certain resolutions defamatory of the complainant and published those resolutions and *D* transmitted the resolutions to a newspaper. All the four persons were tried together and convicted. But it was not shown that *A, B, C* instigated *D* to write the letter to the paper or that they had any common purpose nor was it shown that the offences were committed in one and the same transaction, *held* the trial was bad, 7 M. L. T. 127 = 11 Cr. L. J. 133.

25-A. Joint trial for offences under ss 500 and 501 of the I. P. C.—A joint trial of the author of a book under s 500, I P C, and of the printer is illegal when there is no evidence to show that there was conspiracy between them. 50 G. 159.

26. **Distinct offences of contempt of Court**—It is illegal to try conjointly in one trial several persons accused of distinct substantive offences of contempt of Court. Such procedure is obviously prejudicial to the accused, for they are precluded from calling each other as witnesses in support of their various and distinct pleas of not guilty. 1883 A. W. N. 25.

27. **Joint trial for giving false information bad.**—Where a Deputy Collector, acting under the *Land Acquisition Acts*, laid a charge against the lessor and lessees of certain lands that they had given false information in certain written statements, *held* that though the complaint was laid against the parties jointly, any offence committed by each is a distinct and separate offence and should be tried separately, **27 C. 883**. But where a false charge of stealing goats was made by one accused on one day, and by the other accused on the following day and they were both convicted in a joint trial, the Madras High Court *held* that they were properly tried together as the offence, *viz*, a false charge that certain persons stole certain goats was the same, **27 M. 127**.

23. **Joint trial of several accused for perjury.**—Where two persons are severally charged with giving

against him or be the subject of a prosecution on that account, 7 B. L. R. Appx. LXVI—18 W. R. 47. Not even the consent of the accused ~~can~~, having regard to 25 M. 81 (P.G.) legalise such a joint trial 4 Bom. L. R. 53. But

where there was one sustained and continuous plot for a certain purpose, *viz.*, of exposing an innocent man in a false charge and to secure this end various means had to be resorted to and one of such was two persons giving false evidence *held* they could be jointly tried, 14 Bom. L. R. 972 = 1 Bom. Cr. Ca. 216 = 13 Cr. L. J. 833.

29. Mere allegation of conspiracy will not validate joint trial for perjury.—Where the accused were convicted at one trial of giving false evidence in a case of dacoity on the ground that they had conspired to give such false evidence and they were neither charged with nor convicted of so conspiring, *held* that the joinder of accused was illegal, since the words *the same transaction* in this section cannot embrace the examination of all the witnesses throughout a trial but could apply only to the examination of each witness as such separately, 3 L. B. R. 231 = 4 Cr. L. J. 439, where 25 M. 592 and 1 L. B. R. 268 are referred to. Similarly, where two persons were jointly tried one on a charge under s 471, I P C, and the other for giving false evidence in the suit in which the forged document was used the trial was held bad for misjoinder of accused, 1883 A. W. N. 188. But where several persons jointly filed a written statement signed by all and one of them gave evidence in support thereof it was *held* the joint commitment of them all, the deponent under s. 193, I P C and the others under s. 193 207, I P C, was good, 1884 A. W. N. 52.

30. Joint trial of two accused not desirable when each tries to throw blame and responsibility upon the other.—Two persons A and B were jointly tried under s. 408, I P C, for criminal breach of trust and each tried to throw responsibility upon the other and charges were framed against both. The cross-examination on behalf of A was conducted first and then it was conducted on behalf of B, and on what was elicited at this latter examination B was acquitted without being called to enter upon his defence, and the statements so elicited in this latter cross-examination were used against A without his having had an opportunity of explaining them, or further cross-examining the same witness on those new points, *held*, that though it cannot be said that the accused were not properly tried in one case, still in the circumstances of the particular case A had been prejudiced at this trial held jointly with another, 3 C. W. N. 277. See Note 6. Such trials are not necessarily illegal, 168 P. L. R. 1911 = 12 Cr. L. J. 266.

31. Sameness of charge cannot justify joint trial of several accused.—(i) Where fifteen persons were jointly tried and convicted of distinct offences of committing nuisance, *held* that the conviction was illegal as the accused must have been prejudiced in their defence, 5 M. 20; 33 C. 292.

(ii) Where there was no joint action on the part of the accused and each acted independently of the rest and made different defence, *held*, that the joinder of a number (*viz.*, 62) of charges against 62 persons in one charge was a material irregularity which rendered necessary the setting aside of the conviction, *Wells* II, 303. But where the charges involve a conspiracy between the several accused, they may all be jointly tried 16 A. 88.

(iii) Where the complaint was that the coolies in a colliery had decamped with the tools supplied to them and they were all jointly tried under s 408 I P C *held* that the trial was bad, 13 C. W. N. 151. See also 13 C. W. N. 151.

31-A. Joint trial of persons with joinder of charges.—Where all the accused were charged in one count with the murder of seven persons, to support which there was no evidence against any of them, in two counts with the murder of two others, committed only by two of them, respectively, and in another count with mischief by fire caused by another accused only. Held even though ss 235 and 239 of the Code justify joinder it should not be resorted to if there is risk of embarrassment charges of murder of several persons and of arson must embarrass the accused in their defence and confuse the jury, 52 C. 253 = 29 C. W. N. 173.

32. Joint trial of an offender and those that rescue him from custody.—Where the offence of each of the accused is separate and there is no common offence in which all join, it is quite irregular to try all the accused together. A person charged with the offence of theft and another charged with rescuing him from lawful custody, cannot be tried together in one trial, 11 M. 441. To enable the Court in the same trial, to try

wrongfully confining the complainant and rescuing the first accused from custody was *held* illegal, 12 C. W. N. 15. Where one of the accused caught in the act of theft was rescued by others while being taken to the *thana* by the complainant and some of the rescuers snatched away some clothes from the person of the complainant,

that runs in regular but crooked order

He that thinks he can afford to be negligent is not far from
being poor. Luther
Be thou ever full of love. Scott

Syn — Iniquitous detestable horrible dreadful,
atrocious infamous impious, heinous
Heinously, adv. With extreme wickedness,
abominably
Heinousness, n. The quality of being heinous

dealing and management
Cromwell had appeared in the town of the day
ago, the more and more the most indispensable part of
the

3 To transfer for a valuable consideration

Joint Sessions Judge on the following charges —All the accused on a charge under s. 401, accused Nos. 3 and 4 on joint charges under ss 328 and 380 No 4 on two separate charges under s. 411, No 1 on charges under ss. 23 and 380, Nos. 1 and 2 on two joint charges under ss 328 and 380 of the I P C The Judge tried all these charges together, as s. 235 seemed to him to favour such a course. *Held* (1) that the trial of all the accused on all the heads of the charge was opposed to this section (2) but that, though it was unnecessary for the Judge to try the accused on the separate heads of charge under ss 328 380 and 411 of the I P C, it was not only permissible, but even necessary to record evidence under those heads in order to prove the charge under s. 401, I P C. *Ratanlal 509, 46 C. 712* Where five dacoities were committed by several persons and persons implicated in one dacoity were not in the other and the dacoities did not amount to the same transaction. *Held*, that they could not be tried jointly, 19 A. L. J. 610. So where two persons were tried jointly one for murder under s. 302 and the other for omission to give information in respect of the same murder it was *held* that the joint trial was illegal as the two offences were not committed in the same transaction, 19 A. L. J. 915

So also, three persons each of whom is found in separate possession of some article or other of property stolen during a certain burglary, none of the articles being in their joint possession cannot be tried together at one trial under s. 411, I P C, 19 A. L. J. 815.

35. **Joint trial of several receivers of stolen property from different persons at different times and places illegal** —Where the 1st accused received stolen property from certain thieves and delivered over to the 2nd accused a portion of the same in satisfaction of a debt and accused No 3 was found in possession of other property identified to be stolen, but there was nothing to show when and from whom he received it and the three accused were jointly tried at one trial on charges under s. 411 I P C. *held per* BATTY and RUSSELL, JJ (ASTON, J, *dissenting*), that the three offences charged against the three accused were distinct offences, which could not be regarded as forming parts of the same transaction within the meaning of this section and that the joint trial of the three accused was illegal being in contravention of this section and s. 233, 29 B. 449, where 6 Bom. L. R. 351 is *distinguished* and 15 B. 491 is *followed*. See also 23 C. 104; 2 C. 23, 3 B. L. R. 20 Where the case for the prosecution was not that the persons charged with possession of stolen property had actually taken part in the commission of the burglary but only that each of them was in possession of same property stolen during the commission of the burglary, and it was possible that disposals were separate and unconnected with each other, *held* the joint trial was illegal 16 Cr. L. J. 270 (O). See also 33 C. 1256 where it was also *held per* HARRINGTON and STREPHEN, JJ (BRETT J, *dissenting*), that separate retention by different persons of separate articles at different places, although the articles might have been the proceeds of the same dacoity cannot be said to be in the course of the same transaction and that persons charged with such retention cannot be tried jointly. The Madras High Court held that where all the accused are charged jointly with theft and in the alternative with receiving stolen property and are tried together the trial cannot be said to be illegal having regard to s. 237 and even if there be any defect s. 531 would cure it 17 M. L. J. 219 = 15 Cr. L. J. 479 In 4 Bur. L. T. 263 = 13 Cr. L. J. 39 where four persons were tried together P under s. 380 M under s. 396 411, I P C and K and T under ss. 411, and 414, I P C, and it was contended on the authority of 29 B. 449 that the conviction of P and M was bad for misjoinder, *held* that in this case all the stolen property for receiving or disposing of which the four accused were charged had been traced to the possession of 1st accused and that the possession by the 1st accused P as stolen property not long after the theft took place and the disposal of it by the agency of M to K and T were parts of one and the same transaction and 14 Bur. L. R. 38 = 6 Cr. L. J. 28 was *followed*. See Notes 8 to s. 235 In 3 C. L. R. 16 = 6 Cr. L. J. 411, the joint trial of three accused for the retention of one item of stolen property and of two of the accused for retention of another item of stolen property to another occasion was *held* to be bad. See also Note 17 But now under the recent amendment the two offences of theft and receiving stolen property need not be committed in the same transaction or as a result of one concerted action, it is enough under cl. (e) that one offender should commit theft and the other should have received the stolen property for charging and trying them jointly. So it is submitted that the above rulings have become obsolete.

36. **Receiving stolen property and lurking house trespass** —Two persons were charged by the Police under s. 458, I P C, and tried jointly, one of them being convicted under s. 411, I P C, and other under s. 458 I P C, *held* that the joint trial was illegal and that when the Magistrate found that s. 458 was not applicable to one of the accused, he should have tried the two separately, 51 P. R. 1905 = 185 P. L. R. 1905 = 3 Cr. L. J. 76. Again, where the petitioner and four others were jointly tried under s. 454, I P C, the other four convicted of an offence under that section and the petitioner of the abetment of that offence, but on appeal, the conviction of the petitioner was altered to one under ss. 411 and 414, I P C, *held* that the conviction could not be sustained because the petitioner could not have been tried under ss. 411 and 414, I P C, jointly with four others charged

e, e, i, u a y long e i i u a y short, cure, fur, last fall, what, there, yell, terms; plique, firm; dôme for de well, pour, pour

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under s. 454, 1 P C, and the power conferred on Appellate Courts by s. 423 (1)(b) of altering the finding while maintaining the sentence, does not empower it to act in contravention of the provisions of this section 83 P. R. 1905 = 115 P. L. R. 1905 = 2 Cr. L. J. 694; but see 15 Cr. L. J. 680 (M) as to the powers of Appellate Court

MISCELLANEOUS.

37. Charge need not set out that the transaction is one and the same.—It is not necessary that the charge should contain the statement as to unity of transaction. It is sufficient for the purpose of justifying a joint trial, that the accusation alleges that the offences committed by each accused to have been committed in the same transaction. It is the tenor of the accusation and not the wording of the charge that must be considered as a test, 30 B. 49

38. Where joint trial involves questions of jurisdiction as to same.—Questions of jurisdiction might arise when several persons are charged in the same proceedings for having committed different various offences in the same transaction and some of such cases may be covered by Chapter XV. If the charges can properly be made in the same proceedings, the irregularity as to jurisdiction might be within s. 531 or s. 532, 18 A. 350

39. Charge where several persons are suspected of a single act of misappropriation or breach of trust.—Where the charge is one for criminal misappropriation this section has no application, because the misappropriation of the actual money must be the act of a single person. To be tried under this section the charges against the two persons must be of misappropriation in the case of one and of abetment in the other, and it is open to the Court to frame charges in the alternative, *re* of misappropriation or if abetment, 16 C. W. N. 600 = 13 Cr. L. J. 506, see Notes to s. 222

40. Majoinder of parties to be carefully avoided where one of the accused makes a confessional statement which would be evidence against his co-accused.—*M* was charged with three separate acts of criminal breach of trust and *B* with the abetment of those acts and also in the alternative under ss. 411 and 380 1 P. C, in respect of a document said to have been found in his house and which had no connection whatever with the charge of criminal breach of trust. Both the accused were jointly tried and *M* made a full confession implicating *B* and it was consequently taken into consideration against him, held that the joint trial of the two accused was bad and that it prejudiced the case against *B* on the second charge as the confession of *M* was used against him and seems to have been treated as a very substantial part of the evidence in support of the second charge, 5 C. W. N. 294.

41. Joint trial of approver and other accused.—An approver whose pardon was forfeited may be tried along with the other accused, 5 A. L. J. 691 = 1908 A. W. N. 259 = 8 Cr. L. J. 435. But see Notes under s. 339

42. Judgment in cases of joint trial.—The judgment must show on the face of it that the case of each accused has been taken into consideration and should state reasons as far as may be necessary to show, that the Court has devoted judicial attention to case of each accused, 33 C. 138

240. When a charge containing more heads than one is framed against the same person

and when a conviction has been had on one or more of them, the complainant, or the officer conducting the prosecution, may with the consent of the Court withdraw the remaining charge or charges, or the Court of its own accord may stay the inquiry into, or trial of such charge or charges

Such withdrawal shall have the effect of an acquittal on such charge or charges, unless the conviction be set aside, in which case the said Court (subject to the order of the Court setting aside the conviction) may proceed with the inquiry into or trial of the charge or charges so withdrawn

Notes.—1. Scope of the section.—This section applies only to charges formally framed under Chapter XIX of this Code 10 C. P. 1. This section applies to a case where a person is accused of several offences and not to a case where several formal charges have been drawn up by the Court against him. It may also apply to a case when there are charges of several distinct offences constituted by separate acts or series of acts *e.g.* charges falling under s. 234 or s. 235 sub-sec (1). But it does not apply when there are several formal charges founded upon the same act or series of acts regarded in different aspects as, *e.g.* charges under s. 235, sub-sec. (2) and (4) or s. 236. In the two former instances, *re*, under ss. 234 and 235, sub-sec (1) the charges really are distinct and are capable of being tried separately in the latter instances, *re*, under s. 235,

burning in the night.

the fact that they were not there with them.



Him alone, for, did, well found last

sub-sec. (1) and (2) and s. 233 there is really but one charge with several distinct heads of charge collected under it, either cumulatively or in the alternative, and there can be but one trial. In the first head of cases each charge depends upon different evidence, in the latter the evidence is the same. Therefore, where any accused person was charged under ss. 204 and 409, I P C., and the Magistrate upon a conviction of the former offence considered the proceedings under the latter as withdrawn, *held* that the Magistrate having convicted the accused under s. 204, I P C., it was open to him to convict or acquit under s. 409 according as he considered the offence under that section proved or not proved, but there was no proper occasion for taking action under this section, 24 P. R. 1889. The authorities responsible for carrying out the prosecution of offenders should not be compelled by the Court to revive a prosecution which they may not consider it expedient to revive or to carry it out in a particular way, 4 N. L. R. 71 = 8 Cr. L. J. 11

2. Permission of withdrawal is allowable in the same case only.—The permission to withdraw one of several charges against an accused person allowed by this section only applies to charges against an accused in the same case and not to separate charges of distinct offences in different cases. Therefore, where an accused person was tried by the Sessions Judge and was sentenced to three years rigorous imprisonment under ss. 380 and 75, I P C., and the Public Prosecutor with the consent of the Court withdrew another charge under ss. 511 and 457, I P C. against the same accused in another case, the order was reversed *Ratanlal 362*; and therefore it is illegal for a Court to stay the trial in a case, pending appeal against the conviction in another case, 6 M. L. T. 90 = 9 Cr. L. J. 495. Accused was sent up for trial by the Police on eight distinct charges, three of which were for an attempt to rob or extort when armed with a deadly weapon, and five for robbery, the accused being in each case armed with deadly weapon. The first class Magistrate inquired into two of the latter cases, convicted the accused of two offences under s. 392 I P C., and stayed the inquiry into the other six cases purporting to act under this section, *held*, that this section only applied to charges in the same case and had no application to separate cases, *Ratanlal 977*. As to necessity for consent by the Court for withdrawing charges, *see* 19 P. R. 1888.

3. Charge cannot be withdrawn after verdict is given.—Where the accused were found guilty by the jury of offences under ss. 366, 380 and 323 I P C., and the Judge passed sentence on them under s. 366 only, the other charges being withdrawn *held* that the charges under the other sections could not properly be withdrawn after the accused had been found guilty on those charges. Concurrent sentences would have been proper in such a case, *Ratanlal 288*.

4. Charge ought not to be withdrawn from jury after taking evidence and hearing pleaders.—This section applies to cases where more charges than one are made against an accused person. If he is convicted on one of those charges before the other charges are tried such other charges may be withdrawn. But when the evidence on all the charges is recorded and the pleaders heard the Sessions Judge must under s. 297, sum up the whole of the evidence, and the jury should then be required, under s. 303 to return a verdict on all the charges, *Ratanlal 288*.

5. Best course to convict on all heads and pass concurrent sentences.—When a Court considers the evidence sufficient to convict an accused person under more than one head of the charge, and considers a certain term of imprisonment adequate to meet the offence under each head, it should not record a formal conviction under the first head and drop the others, but its best procedure is to convict on each head of the charge and pass concurrent sentences, *Ratanlal 19*. But concurrent sentences are opposed to s. 397 when the trials are separate, though held on the same day, 15 C. P. R. 57.

6. High Court may on appeal direct withdrawal.—Where the accused was charged with ten offences of the same nature under s. 408, I P C., and was tried and convicted for only three of them. On appeal the High Court confirmed the conviction and directed that no proceedings against the accused in any criminal Court in respect of the offences be taken, 9 C. L. J. 257 = 10 Cr. L. J. 452.

CHAPTER XX.

OF THE TRIAL OF SUMMONS-CASES BY MAGISTRATES

Procedure in summons-cases.

241. The following procedure shall be observed by Magistrates in the trial of summons-cases

Notes.—1. *Summons-cases not to be committed to Court of Session.*—In 1906 A. W. N. 26, it was *held* that the commitment to the Court of Session of a summons-case under ss. 352 and 447, I P C., shou

be quashed, *first*, because there is no warrant for such commitment, it being a summons-case, and, *secondly* because the Magistrate can adequately punish the offender

2 Chapter not applicable when warrant case and summons-case are jointly tried—In the investigation of a complaint which forms the subject of two distinct charges arising out of the same transaction, one of which is a summons case and the other a warrant-case the procedure should be that for warrant-cases 11 C. 91; 3 L. B. R. 113 = 3 Cr. L. J. 350. A warrant-case being a graver offence cannot be tried under this Chapter, as it deals with the trial of summons-cases only 7 M. 454. See Note 4 to s. 251

Effect of trying a warrant case under this Chapter—See Note 4 to s. 251

3. Chapter is applicable when warrant case is added without any foundation—See 1885 A. W. N. 43; 22 W. R. 40 and also 7 M. 434.

4 Accused not to be prejudiced by application of this Chapter when trial begun as a warrant case—Where an inquiry commenced in a warrant case and the accused curtailed their cross-examination of the prosecution witnesses under the impression that they could have a further opportunity of cross-examining them, but no offence triable as a warrant-case having been disclosed, the Magistrate closed the case and convicted the accused *held* that it was the duty of the Magistrate to allow the accused an opportunity of completing their cross-examination before proceeding with the case 18 Cr. L. J. 250 (M). Where a Magistrate while trying a summons-case and a warrant-case against certain accused in one trial dismissed the complaint in respect of the warrant-case and proceeded with the complaint in respect of the summons-case and where on being requested by the accused to recall the prosecution witnesses for their further cross-examination refused to do so *held* that refusal was illegal and that the accused must certainly have been prejudiced by the same *held* further that the privilege conferred by s. 256 was a substantial one and when denied it was for the prosecution to show that there was no prejudice 18 M. L. T. 92 = 16 Cr. L. J. 540

242. When the accused appears or is brought before the Magistrate the particulars of

Substance of accusation to be stated

the offences of which he is accused shall be stated to him and he shall be asked if he has any cause to show why he should be convicted, but it shall not be necessary to frame a formal charge

Notes.—1 Points necessary to be explained to the accused—It is very often urged in appeal that the accused did not understand what he was required to disprove or was not asked what evidence he could give to rebut the case for the prosecution. These points should be as clearly explained to persons accused of criminal offences as are the issues to the parties in a civil suit and all Magistrates should devote particular attention to this matter in future—*Pen. Cr.* p. 241. It is necessary that the accused should have a clear statement made to him (a) that he is about to be put on his trial and (b) as to the offence or facts constituting the offence with the commission of which he is accused. Where certain persons had been brought before the Magistrate for other purposes while he was in camp and these circumstances were not made known to them, their conviction was quashed as improper 3 C. L. R. 57

2 Substance of accusation to be explained to accused—When an accused person is called upon to make his defence if such accused person is unrepresented by competent counsel, the trying officer should explain the strong points against him, and ascertain whether he fully comprehends them in order to give him a fair opportunity of rebutting or denying the charge.—*Oudh Cr. Dig.*, p. 11

3. Rules as to joinder of charges to be observed in the trial of summons cases also—The provisions of s. 233 as to joinder of charges apply to summons-cases as well because a charge is an essential element in any trial and although no formal charge need be framed in writing if the provisions as to joinder of charges do not apply to summons-cases there are no other provisions of law to guide the Magistrate, 3 L. B. R. 52 (F. B.). See Note 3 to s. 233 and 19 C. L. J. 53.

4 Charge for summons-case necessary to be reduced to writing, if tried jointly with a warrant-case—When a warrant-case is being tried if it is intended to proceed against the accused also for an offence triable as a summons-case that offence should also form part of the charge. Where therefore, the accused who were summoned for offences under ss. 143 and 379, I. P. C., were tried on a charge drawn up only for the offence under 379 but were convicted only of the offence under s. 143 the conviction was set aside as bad as the accused misled their defence by the absence of a charge under s. 143 29 C. 431. See also Note 12 to s. 235

5. Charge must be framed when accused is an European British Subject. See s. 451 (4).

6 Section applies to summary proceedings under s. 117—The procedure laid down in this section should be followed in proceedings under s. 117. See Note 30 at pp. 186-187

Conviction on admission of truth of accusation

243. If the accused admits that he has committed the offence of which he is accused his admission shall be recorded as nearly as possible in the words used by him and if he shows no sufficient cause why he should not be convicted the Magistrate* may convict him accordingly

Notes—1 Compare cases under ss. 255 and 271 for 'plea of guilty'

2 Magistrate bound to convict on plea of guilty—Where the accused pleads guilty and there is nothing to show that the plea was not an unreserved and voluntary one the accused must be convicted **8 S. L. R 213=16 Cr L J 238**

2 A. Plea of guilty by a pleader or estate agent.—Where the Court dispenses with the personal attendance of the accused and permits him to appear by a pleader under s 205 of the Code. It can act upon a plea given by his pleader in a case falling under ss 242 and 243 of the Code. Where the personal appearance of the accused is dispensed with and he appears by his pleader or by his estate agent the fact of such appearance should be taken note of by the Court. Under the new amendment of the definition of pleader by Act XXXV of 1923 it is competent to an accused person to appoint his estate manager to appear in his stead and to plead and do other acts on his behalf in the case against him. It is equally open to the Court to permit an estate manager to represent the accused as a pleader provided that such fact is clearly noted on the record **50 B 230**

3. Admission by accused must be recorded at the time of the trial.—The admissions of the accused should be recorded at once at the time of the trial and not afterwards from rough notes nor from Magistrate's memory **15 M 83** When a written defence is tendered in a case tried under this Chapter the Magistrate is not bound to take down the defence of the accused by personally examining him **15 W R 53, 2 P R 1890**

4. Importance of taking down accused's statement in his own words.—It is of the utmost importance that the terms of this section shall be most strictly complied with because the accused's right of appeal depends on whether he has really pleaded guilty or not. *See* s 412. It was no doubt for that reason that the Legislature required that the exact words used by the accused in his plea should as nearly as possible be recorded **1889 A W N 81** When an accused person makes an exculpatory statement before the framing of a charge Magistrates would do well to take down the plea of guilty in the form of question and answer and in the exact words used by the accused in answer to the charge. It is desirable that the plea of guilty should be so recorded as far as possible to save all misapprehension and mistake **5 Bom L R 999, 2 P R 1890**

5 Section not applicable to a warrant case.—When a Magistrate tried a warrant-case (under s 9 of the *Opium Act I of 1878*) without recording any evidence in support of the prosecution as required by s. 252 and merely calling upon the accused to plead to the charge committed him on his own admission as under s 243 without even framing a formal charge held that the procedure adopted was more than a mere irregularity and the conviction was set aside on the ground that it had occasioned a failure of justice to the accused **29 M 372. See also 17 P R 1887**

6. Willingness of person directed to furnish security to be duly recorded.—An admission by a person required to furnish security under Chapter VIII expressing willingness to furnish security should be duly recorded under this section **17 M L J 433=6 Cr L J 332. See Note 44 to s. 123 at p 190**

244. (1)† If the Magistrate does not convict the accused under the preceding section or if the accused does not make such admission the Magistrate shall proceed to hear the complainant (if any) and take all such evidence as may be produced in support of the prosecution and also to hear the accused and take all such evidence as he produces in his defence

Procedure when no such admission is made

† Provided that the Magistrate shall not be bound to hear any person as complainant in any case in which the complaint has been made by a Court

(2) The Magistrate may if he thinks fit on the application of the complainant or accused issue 'a § summons to any witness directing him to attend or to produce' any document or other thing

(3) The Magistrate may, before summoning any witness on such application require that his reasonable expenses, incurred in attending for the purposes of the trial, be deposited in Court.

This section does not make the examination of the complainant in a summons-case absolutely necessary, 24 C. W. N. 139.

Notes.—Magistrate must examine complainant and his witnesses.—When a case has not been disposed of under s 203 and the complainant's witnesses have been summoned, the Magistrate is bound to examine the witnesses tendered by the complainant and is not entitled to acquit the accused on a consideration of complainant's statement alone, 20 M 339. It is not open to a Magistrate under this section, to dispense with any witness whom a complainant may wish to examine, *Weir II*, 305. The acquittal of the accused without examining the complainant and his witnesses is illegal, *Ratanlal 539*; 2 B. L. R. (S.N.) 15; 18 A. 221.

2. Dismissal of complaint on failure to pay process-fee.—When a complainant fails to pay fee for summoning witnesses the Magistrate must deal with the case on such evidence as he may have before him. He cannot dismiss it for default, 8 M. 160.

3. Duty of complainant to prove his case.—Where an accused person denies the truth of the complaint made against him, the Magistrate ought, under this section, to hear the complainant and his witnesses in support of the complaint and also the accused and his witnesses in his defence, 6 W. R. 73.

Prosecution must examine all persons having knowledge of the offence—It is *prima facie* the duty of the prosecution to call all the witnesses who prove their connection with the transaction connected with the prosecution and who must be able to give important information. If such witnesses are not called without sufficient reason being given, the Court may properly draw an inference adverse to prosecution, 8 C. 121; 14 A. 521, 14 C. 245; 13 A. 6. No corresponding inference can be drawn against the accused, 7 A. 904; 8 C. 121. In conducting a case for prosecution all the persons who are alleged or known to have knowledge of the facts ought to be brought before the Court and examined, 10 C. 1070, unless they are known to be false witnesses, 16 A. 84.

4. Magistrate must examine defence witnesses.—A Magistrate is bound to examine all the witnesses whom an accused person may produce for his defence, 13 W. R. 63. See also 18 A. 221; 4 M. H. C. R. Appx. XXIX. Where a Magistrate refused to allow the examination of a witness, who had been tendered on behalf of the accused *held* that the conviction was bad and must be set aside, 4 B. L. R. Appx. LXXVII = 12 W. R. 77.

5. Magistrate has ample discretion as to issuing process.—A complainant in a case who mentioned the names of several witnesses on his behalf was required to produce them on a certain date. But he produced only two witnesses and they were examined. *Held*, that the Magistrate was not wrong in law in deciding the case only on the evidence of the two witnesses, 15 W. R. 87. He is not bound to issue process to the other witnesses, 4 M. H. C. R. Appx. XXIX. It is the duty of the accused to produce his witnesses on the day of trial. If he requires process for their attendance he should apply beforehand, so that the witnesses may be present on that day. The law leaves it to the discretion of a Magistrate to issue a process or not, 14 W. R. 76. See also 36 A. 13. The Magistrate must either grant or refuse the application and not merely "*file*" it, 6 C. W. N. 543. There is no provision of law obliging a party to a case to make a written application for the summoning of witnesses or to put in a written list of witnesses, L. B. Ct. Manual (1905), O. 167.

6. No such discretion as to compelling the attendance of witnesses already summoned.—This section does not give a discretionary power to refuse to compel the attendance of a witness upon whom the Court has already issued process, 30 C. 121. The party at whose instance the process was originally issued has a right to call upon the Court to compel their attendance, 6 C. W. N. 543.

7. Power of making accused pay for processes to his witnesses to be exercised with caution and discretion.—An order by a District Magistrate refusing to summon witnesses for the defence without their expenses being paid by the accused, although legal, should be passed very sparingly, and it is an improper order in a case where the accused is unable or unwilling to deposit the money, and the result is, he is convicted without his witnesses being heard, especially if the case is one in which a severe sentence is inflicted, 7 F. R. 1278.

8. When accused to be allowed opportunity to summon absent witnesses.—The accused is primarily responsible for the production of his evidence on the day of hearing, but the Court should, as a matter of precaution at the conclusion of the case for the prosecution, ascertain from the accused whether he has any witness, and not refuse to give him a further opportunity of bringing or summoning witnesses who may not be

present in Court, unless it appears that they are not material or that the accused has been wilfully negligent in the matter. In every summons-case in which no witnesses are produced for the defence, the Court should record either that the accused does not wish to call witnesses or that for reasons stated he has been refused an opportunity of doing so—*Punj Cr.*, p 231. But where there was nothing on the record to show that any inquiry was made from the accused as to whether they had evidence to produce the Chief Court set aside the conviction and directed the Magistrate to take defence evidence, 7 P. R. 1833

9. Evidence of seemingly perjuring witness to be taken at length.—When, during the investigation of a complaint it may appear to the Magistrate that a witness is giving false evidence, so that criminal proceedings against such witness are likely to be necessary the Magistrate will exercise a sound discretion in taking down under s 359 at least the evidence of this particular witness at length in the manner prescribed in ss. 356, 357 and 360—*Wilkins*, 112

10. Statements made out of Court are not to be relied upon.—It is extremely improper for a Magistrate in disposing of a case, to rely in any way on statements made to him out of Court, 14 B. 372.

11. Power to require payment of the expenses of citing witnesses is confined to summons-cases only.—*See* 8 N. L. R. 65 = 13 Cr. L. J. 554, and Note under s. 256

245. (1) If the Magistrate upon taking the evidence referred to in section 244 and such further evidence (if any) as he may of his own motion, cause to be produced, and (if he thinks fit) examining the accused finds the accused not guilty he shall record an order of acquittal.

(2) * Where the Magistrate does not proceed in accordance with the provisions of section 349 or section 562 he shall, if he finds the accused guilty, pass sentence upon him according to law.

Notes.—1. *See* Form XXIX, Schedule V for form of a warrant of commitment, s. 250 for compensation

2. No discharge in summons-case.—In a summons-case, a Magistrate is bound to proceed under this section 24 G. 429. If a Magistrate does not find the accused guilty he must record an order of acquittal. No order of discharge can be passed in a case coming under this section, 19 P. R. 1900

3. Discharge in summons case tried as a warrant-case amounts to acquittal.—If a Magistrate trying a summons case whatever the procedure he adopts finds no case made out against the accused and lets him go unconditionally he acquits him though he may style his order of acquittal an order of discharge and tack on to it the number of section of the Code which deals with discharges. The accused is nonetheless in law acquitted for the Code contemplates no other order in summons-cases. That being so the Sessions Judge has no power to take action under s 437 against a person alleged to be discharged 8 M. L. T. 78 = 11 Cr. L. J. 358

4. Order of acquittal under this section cannot affect a warrant-case.—An order of acquittal, passed under this section cannot operate in regard to an offence which is triable only as a warrant case 1835 A. W. N. 260

5. Further inquiry under s 437 cannot be directed in case of an order under this section.—Powers of High Court.—*See* Notes to s 437 and as to the powers of the High Court to revise orders of acquittal *see* Notes to s 439

6. Award of Court fee to complainant upon conviction of accused.—Under the provisions of s 31 of the *Court Fees Act* if a person is convicted of an offence other than an offence for which Police-officers may arrest, without warrant, the Court must order him to repay the fee paid by the complainant on his petition or on reduction of his examination into writing as the case may be as well as the fee if any, paid by the complainant for service of process.—*Oudh Cr. Dig.* p 11 1 Bur. S. R. 409. A general order to pay costs in addition to fine is bad. The precise amount should be specified, 1 Bur. S. R. 618.

7. On conviction the Magistrate must pass some sentence.—When a Magistrate convicts the accused he is bound to pass some sentence if only a nominal one 4 M. H. C. R. Appx. LXVI; 2 Bom. L. R. 611. This is no longer the invariable rule now, *see* s. 562 and proposed amendment.

8. Order of acquittal cannot be passed without taking evidence for prosecution.—Where a Magistrate passed an order of acquittal without examining the complainant and his witnesses, the High Court reversed the

* This subsection was substituted by Act XVIII of 1923

order of acquittal and directed the Magistrate to inquire into the case according to law, *Ratanlal* 539. See Note 2 at seq to s. 243

9. Procedure on conviction of certain classes of Government servants, etc.—Where any Government officer is judicially convicted of an offence, a copy of the decision should be sent to the Head of the Department in which he is employed in order that such action as may be deemed proper may be taken at once—*Government of India*, 7th August 1863

Whenever any officer, enlisted soldier or sepoy is sentenced in any Criminal Court to a fine of Rs. 200 or upwards or to imprisonment, otherwise than in default of paying a fine not amounting to Rs. 200, the Court should *pro prio* send a copy of its final order to the superior of the person convicted—*Government of India*, 3rd October, 1871

If a recruit of the Native Army is sentenced by any Criminal Court to imprisonment for any term exceeding three months, a report should be sent to the Officer Commanding the Reserve Centre—*Government of India* 6th July, 1895

246. A Magistrate may, under section 243 or section 245 convict the accused of any offence triable under this Chapter which from the facts admitted or proved he appears to have committed, whatever may be the nature of the complaint or summons

Notes.—1 Scope of this section—This section enables the Magistrate to proceed in regard to any other offence, *prima facie* established by the evidence for the prosecution. But if the Magistrate in the exercise of his discretion thinks fit to do so he must proceed as set out in s. 242 and state to the accused the particulars of such offence, so as to enable him to make out his defence, if any See 22 W. R. 30.

2 Magistrate may convict of other offence forthwith without re-opening trial—It is open to a Magistrate to convict the accused of the offences of assault (s. 352, I P C) and mischief (s. 426, I P C), although they had been summoned to answer a charge of criminal trespass only (s. 447, I P C) The Magistrate is not bound, when he thinks that other offences have been proved, to re-open the trial and follow the procedure of ss. 243 and 244 Such a view would necessitate a re-hearing of all the evidence in the same trial, and is clearly opposed to the manifest intention of the Legislature, 36 C. 669. PRINSEP'S view to the contrary, stated in his commentary, was not approved See also 28 Bom L. R. 291.

247. If the summons has been issued on complaint, and upon the day appointed for the appearance of the accused, or any day subsequent thereto to which the hearing may be adjourned, the complainant does not appear the Magistrate shall notwithstanding anything hereinbefore contained, acquit the accused, unless for some reason he thinks proper to adjourn the hearing of the case to some other day

Non appearance of complainant

Provided that, where the complainant is a public servant and his personal attendance is not required, the Magistrate may dispense with his attendance, and proceed with the case

Notes.—1 Magistrate ought to reasonably exercise his discretion in adjourning cases—In a case where the complainant is prevented from attending by circumstances beyond his control, as for instance by a heavy flood, the Magistrate ought to exercise his discretion and postpone the hearing 23 W. R. 54; 5 W. R. 51; 1882 A W. N. 229. In a trial under this Chapter it is not an irregularity to adjourn a trial for the purpose of allowing the accused to secure the attendance of his witnesses 16 W. R. 21. But if it is refused, the High Court may not interfere, 10 W. R. 26.

2 On non-appearance of complainant complaint must be dismissed—The section is peremptory On non-appearance of complainant, the Magistrate ought to acquit the accused, he is not entitled to record the order "struck off," 10 Bom L. R. 628 = 8 Cr. L. J. 139. Nor should he adjourn the hearing unless for some reason he thinks proper to adjourn the hearing to another date The fact that the accused has been guilty of the contempt of the processes of the Court is no good reason for proceeding with the case, 17 C. W. N. 159.

3 "Struck off" does not amount to disposal.—A summons-case was, owing to the absence of the complainant ordered to be struck off by the Magistrate under s. 247 of the Cr P C A fresh complaint was filed but the Magistrate acceded to the argument that he could not entertain it as he had already once passed

side by which the inclination to the plane of the orbit is constantly varying by a small amount. (See) The motion of a swimmer following the surface movement of the sun from the east in the morning to the west in the evening.

Nut-bone n (Far) A small bone at the inferior side of the posterior joint.

Nut-batch n The nut batch.

Nut-brown n Brown as a nut-brown left and dried. The spiny nut-brown ale.

Nut-cracker n A instrument for cracking nuts.

Nut (Orn th) A European nut-bred (Vespertilio europaeus) a long leg to the crown finally b. having many of it. (See) A nut-brown ale.

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Nut-brown ale n (Far) A small bone at the inferior side of the posterior joint.

Nut-batch n The nut batch.

Nut-brown n Brown as a nut-brown left and dried. The spiny nut-brown ale.

Nut-cracker n A instrument for cracking nuts.

Nut (Orn th) A European nut-bred (Vespertilio europaeus) a long leg to the crown finally b. having many of it. (See) A nut-brown ale.

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an order under s. 247 in the case, and acquitted and discharged the accused, *held*, that neither order was correct in form. The Magistrate was not entitled under s. 247 to record the order "struck off" nor was he in a case which he had not tried, entitled to record the order of acquittal on the second complaint. The most he could do would be to record an order of discharge, 10 Bom. L. R. 628 = 8 Cr. L. J. 139.

4. Must the accused be acquitted on death of complainant?—On a complaint made by a servant for maiming his master's elephant the Magistrate without inquiring whether the animal had been actually maimed or not issued process under s. 426, I P C., and when the case came up for disposal, dismissed the complaint and acquitted the accused though he knew the complainant was dead. A fresh complaint was made on the same facts by another servant, *held*, the order of acquittal was wholly without jurisdiction and did not operate as a bar to the trial of the accused on the second complaint. 18 C. W. N. 1211 = 15 Cr. L. J. 726. In 19 C. W. N. 334 = 16 Cr. L. J. 323, however, it was *held* that where a complainant of an offence under s. 352, I P C., died, the Magistrate ought to have dismissed the complaint under this section even though some one had applied to be brought on the record in place of the deceased. In 20 C. W. N. 862 it was doubted whether s. 247 applied to a case where the complainant was dead.

The death of a complainant in a non-cognizable case *eg* under ss. 143 and 426, I P C., does not put an end to the prosecution the trying Magistrate has a discretion in a proper case to allow the complaint to continue by a proper and fit complainant if the latter is willing. 28 Bom. L. R. 238.

5. Dismissal of complaint in the absence of parties on an adjourned date of which they had no notice is improper.—When the order of adjournment is not made in the presence and hearing of the parties, *held* that the order of dismissal of complaint is illegal, 8 M. H. C. R. Appx. Y. Where a case was adjourned *sine die* and in consequence of the absence of the complainant on the day on which it was resumed the accused was acquitted under this section the order of acquittal was set aside as illegal. 16 W. R. 53. An order of dismissal passed on a date which was not fixed for the hearing and on which date the complainant is necessarily absent is no order at all, *Weir II*, 307; when such an order is entered by mistake, the Magistrate may disregard the order and proceed with the trial, 18 C. W. N. 1180 = 16 Cr. L. J. 143.

6. Adjournment for the production of defence witnesses is not irregular.—In a trial under this Chapter it is not an irregularity to adjourn the trial for the purpose of allowing the accused to secure the attendance of his witnesses, 16 W. R. 21.

7. Is the complainant bound to be present at every adjourned hearing?—Where a complainant failed to appear on a date to which a trial had been adjourned to secure the attendance of defence witnesses and the Magistrate dismissed the complaint, it was *held* that the discretion vested in the Magistrate by the section had been misapplied. Where a complainant has done all that is necessary for him to do to establish his case, the complaint ought not to be dismissed in default of his attendance unless the Magistrate had specially required his attendance on the adjourned date. *Weir II*, 306. A Magistrate may dismiss the complaint if the complainant does not appear on the day to which the hearing has been duly adjourned even though the complainant and his witnesses have been examined and their further attendance seems unnecessary, 22 W. R. 40, and this case was followed in 19 C. W. N. 834 = 15 Cr. L. J. 163 where the case was adjourned merely for argument and the High Court refused to set aside the acquittal, though it was pointed out that there was no provision in the Code for the hearing of argument in summons-cases.

8. Appearance by Vakil.—Unless the Court has otherwise specially allowed the same, the appearance of the complainant's Vakil is not equivalent to the appearance of the complainant within the meaning of this section, *Weir II*, 309.

9. Dismissal of complaint when complainant is 'present in Court.'—A case having been transferred

plaintiff having been present in the Court house, the provisions of this section had been improperly applied, 13 C. L. R. 303. See also 24 C. L. J. 414 and 47 C. 147.

10. Dismissal of complaint for failure to pay process-fee.—See s. 204 and Note 3 to s. 244.

11. Dismissal improper when summons not served on accused.—When summons has not been served on the accused, a complaint cannot be dismissed on the ground that the complainant has not appeared on the day fixed for the hearing. *Weir II*, 307, and see also 36 M. 315. See, however, Note 5 above.

order of acquittal and directed the Magistrate to inquire into the case according to law, *Ratanlal 539*. See *Notes et seq* to s. 247

9. Procedure on conviction of certain classes of Government servants, etc.—Where any Government officer is judicially convicted of an offence a copy of the decision should be sent to the Head of the Department in which he is employed in order that such action as may be deemed proper may be taken at once—*Government of India*, 7th August, 1863

Whenever any officer, enlisted soldier or sepoy is sentenced in any Criminal Court to a fine of Rs 200 or upwards or to imprisonment, otherwise than in default of paying a fine not amounting to Rs 200, the Court should *pro prio motu* send a copy of its final order to the superior of the person convicted—*Government of India*, 3rd October, 1871

If a recruit of the Native Army is sentenced by any Criminal Court to imprisonment for any term exceeding three months, a report should be sent to the Officer Commanding the Reserve Centre—*Government of India*, 6th July, 1895

246. A Magistrate may, under section 243 or section 245, convict the accused of any offence triable under this Chapter which from the facts admitted or proved he appears to have committed, whatever may be the nature of the complaint or summons

Finding not limited by complaint or summons

Notes.—1. *Scope of this section.*—This section enables the Magistrate to proceed in regard to any other offence, *prima facie* established by the evidence for the prosecution. But if the Magistrate in the exercise of his discretion thinks fit to do so he must proceed as set out in s 242 and state to the accused the particulars of such offence, so as to enable him to make out his defence, if any See 22 W. R. 40.

2. *Magistrate may convict of other offence forthwith without re-opening trial.*—It is open to a Magistrate to convict the accused of the offences of assault (s. 352, I P C), and mischief (s. 426, I P C), although they had been summoned to answer a charge of criminal trespass only (s. 447, I P C). The Magistrate is not bound, when he thinks that other offences have been proved, to re-open the trial and follow the procedure of ss 243 and 244. Such a view would necessitate a re-hearing of all the evidence in the same trial, and is clearly opposed to the manifest intention of the Legislature, 36 C. 869. PRINSEP'S view to the contrary, stated in his commentary, was not approved See also 29 Bom. L. R. 291.

247. If the summons has been issued on complaint, and upon the day appointed for the appearance of the accused, or any day subsequent thereto to which the hearing may be adjourned, the complainant does not appear, the Magistrate shall notwithstanding anything hereinbefore contained, acquit the accused, unless for some reason he thinks proper to adjourn the hearing of the case to some other day

Non-appearance of complainant

Provided that, where the complainant is a public servant and his personal attendance is not required, the Magistrate may dispense with his attendance, and proceed with the case.

Notes.—1. *Magistrate ought to reasonably exercise his discretion in adjourning cases.*—In a case where the complainant is prevented from attending by circumstances beyond his control, as for instance by a heavy flood, the Magistrate ought to exercise his discretion and postpone the hearing, 24 W. R. 64; 5 W. R. 51; 1893 A. W. N. 229. In a trial under this Chapter it is not an irregularity to adjourn a trial for the purpose of allowing the accused to secure the attendance of his witnesses, 16 W. R. 21. But if it is refused, the High Court may not interfere, 10 W. R. 36.

2. *On non-appearance of complainant complaint must be dismissed.*—The section is peremptory. On non-appearance of complainant, the Magistrate ought to acquit the accused; he is not entitled to record the order "struck off," 10 Bom. L. R. 628 = 8 Cr. L. J. 139. Nor should he adjourn the hearing unless for some reason he thinks proper to adjourn the hearing to another date. The fact that the accused has been guilty of the contempt of the processes of the Court is no good reason for proceeding with the case, 17 C. W. N. 139.

3. *"Struck off" does not amount to disposal.*—A summons-case was, owing to the absence of the complainant ordered to be struck off by the Magistrate, under s. 247 of the Cr. P. C. A fresh complaint was filed but the Magistrate acceded to the argument that he could not entertain it as he had already once passed

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an order under s. 247 in the case, and acquitted and discharged the accused, *held*, that neither order was correct in form. The Magistrate was not entitled under s. 247 to record the order "struck off" nor was he in a case which he had not tried, entitled to record the order of acquittal on the second complaint. The most he could do would be to record an order of discharge, 10 Bom. L. R. 628 = 8 Cr. L. J. 139.

4 **Must the accused be acquitted on death of complainant?**—On a complaint made by a servant for maiming his master's elephant the Magistrate without inquiring whether the animal had been actually maimed or not issued process under s. 426, I P C., and when the case came up for disposal, dismissed the complaint and acquitted the accused though he knew the complainant was dead. A fresh complaint was made on the same facts by another servant, *held* the order of acquittal was wholly without jurisdiction and did not operate as a bar to the trial of the accused on the second complaint 18 C. W. N. 1211 = 15 Cr. L. J. 726. In 19 C. W. N. 334 = 16 Cr. L. J. 323, however, it was *held* that where a complainant of an offence under s. 352, I P C., died, the Magistrate ought to have dismissed the complaint under this section even though some one had applied to be brought on the record in place of the deceased. In 20 C. W. N. 852 it was doubted whether s. 247 applied to a case where the complainant was dead.

The death of a complainant in a non-cognizable case *e.g.* under ss. 143 and 426, I P C., does not put an end to the prosecution the trying Magistrate has a discretion in a proper case to allow the complaint to continue by a proper and fit complainant if the latter is willing 28 Bom. L. R. 288.

5 **Dismissal of complaint in the absence of parties on an adjourned date of which they had no notice is improper.**—When the order of adjournment is not made in the presence and hearing of the parties, *held* that the order of dismissal of complaint is illegal, 8 M. H. C. R. Appx. Y. Where a case was adjourned *sine die* and in consequence of the absence of the complainant on the day on which it was resumed the accused was acquitted under this section the order of acquittal was set aside as illegal 16 W. R. 58. An order of dismissal passed on a date which was not fixed for the hearing and on which date the complainant is necessarily absent is no order at all, *Weir II*, 307; when such an order is entered by mistake, the Magistrate may disregard the order and proceed with the trial, 18 C. W. N. 1180 = 15 Cr. L. J. 143.

6 **Adjournment for the production of defence witnesses is not irregular.**—In a trial under this Chapter it is not an irregularity to adjourn the trial for the purpose of allowing the accused to secure the attendance of his witnesses, 16 W. R. 21.

7 **Is the complainant bound to be present at every adjourned hearing?**—Where a complainant failed to appear on a date to which a trial had been adjourned to secure the attendance of defence witnesses and the Magistrate dismissed the complaint, it was *held* that the discretion vested in the Magistrate by the section had been misapplied. Where a complainant has done all that is necessary for him to do to establish his case, the complaint ought not to be dismissed in default of his attendance unless the Magistrate had specially required his attendance on the adjourned date. *Weir II*, 306. A Magistrate may dismiss the complaint, if the complainant does not appear on the day to which the hearing has been duly adjourned even though the complainant and his witnesses have been examined and their further attendance seems unnecessary 22 W. R. 40, and this case was followed in 18 C. W. N. 834 = 15 Cr. L. J. 153 where the case was adjourned merely for argument and the Magistrate refused to set aside the acquittal, though it was pointed that there was no provision in the Code for the hearing of argument in summons-cases.

8 **Appearance by Vakil.**—Unless the Court has otherwise specially allowed the same, the appearance of the complainant's Vakil is not equivalent to the appearance of the complainant within the meaning of this section, *Weir II*, 309.

9 **Dismissal of complaint when complainant is 'present in Court.'**—A case having been transferred from the file of one Magistrate to that of another, was on the day fixed called on for hearing but the complainant not appearing, the case was dismissed under this section. It appeared that the complainant and his witnesses, though not in attendance in the Magistrate's Court, were present in another Court in the same Court house, being under the impression that the case had been transferred to the Magistrate of that Court, *held*, that the complainant having been present in the Court house, the provisions of this section had been improperly applied, 13 C. L. R. 303. See also 25 C. L. J. 444 and 47 C. 147.

10 **Dismissal of complaint for failure to pay process-fee.**—See s. 204 and Note 3 to s. 244.

11 **Dismissal improper when summons not served on accused.**—When summons has not been served on the accused, a complaint cannot be dismissed on the ground that the complainant has not appeared on the day fixed for the hearing, *Weir II*, 307, and see also 36 M. 315. See, however, Note 5 above.

12. Power of acquittal for default of prosecution may be exercised at any stage.—The fact that a Magistrate might have disposed of a case at the first hearing, does not deprive him of his power to acquit the accused under this section, if at the adjourned hearing the complainant again fails to appear, *Weir II, 303*.

13. Magistrate not bound to wait for complainant.—In case of complainant's default a Magistrate is not bound to wait until Court is about to close for the day, *7 M. 336*.

14. Cases under s. 195 cannot be dismissed.—The direction as to dismissal of a complaint on the non-appearance of the complainant is not applicable to cases instituted under s. 195, *Ratanlal 137*.

15. Procedure in composite cases.—In the investigation of a complaint, which forms the subject of two distinct charges arising out of the same transaction, one of which is a summons and the other a warrant-case, the procedure should be that prescribed for warrant-cases. Therefore in such a case, if the complainant be absent the Magistrate ought to pass an order of discharge under s. 253 and not of acquittal, *11 C. 91; 41 M. 771*.

16. Compensation for vexatious complaints after hearing the whole evidence of complainant.—Section 250 authorizes the payment of compensation in cases where the accused had been acquitted under section 245, after the whole evidence in the case had been recorded, *10 B. 199 following 5 M. 381. See also 6 C. 581; 14 P. R. 1834; 6 B. L. R. 295=15 W. R. 9 and 30 C. 123 (F.B.)* But see *44 M. 51* which held that an order for compensation under s. 250 without hearing all the evidence was not illegal but one that should only be made under very exceptional circumstances *39 M. L. J. 484*.

18-A. Absence of complainant on the day to which case adjourned for delivery of judgment.—Such a case does not fall within the provision of this section, *29 C. L. J. 387; 35 C. 867*.

EFFECT OF ACQUITTAL.

17. Acquittal under this section bars trial on the same facts.—When the accused appears and answers to the charge according to s. 242, he is said to be tried, although the case may be dismissed for non-appearance of the complainant, and the result is that he cannot be tried again upon the same facts and for the same offence at the complaint of another person.—*M H C Pro., 27th March, 1886, 1885 A. W. N. 43*. The dismissal of a complaint under this section is a bar to a subsequent trial on the same facts, even if good cause is shown for non-appearance of the complainant, as where such non-appearance has been procured by the fraud on the accused. The Code does not permit the Court which made the order to vacate it on proof of fraud, *26 M. L. J. 160=15 Cr. L. J. 236*. But a dismissal of the complaint when the proceedings have been substantially so irregular as to amount to no trial, will not operate by virtue of this section as an acquittal, *Weir II, 307*, so as to bar a revival of the proceedings, *Ratanlal 59*. Where, however, the case is called on a date not fixed for hearing and dismissed such an order is no order and may be ignored, *18 C. W. N. 1180; 50 M. 976*.

It is that an acquittal under s. 247 of the Code bars further proceedings by virtue of s. 403 of the Code, *45 A. 58*.

18. Effect of order of dismissal on revival of proceedings.—Where a Magistrate dismisses a summons case on account of non-appearance of complainant under s. 203, the effect of the order of dismissal is to bar all subsequent proceeding on the same complainant or based on the same facts until the order of dismissal is set aside by a competent authority, *3 C. W. N. 760*. But where an application under s. 1 of the *Workman's Breach of Contract Act 1859*, is dismissed for default before an order is passed under s. 2 of the Act, the dismissal does not amount to an acquittal as no offence has yet been committed and does not bar further proceeding, *7 L. B. R. 35=14 Cr. L. J. 404*. See Note 20 below.

19. District Magistrate has no power to set aside acquittal by Subordinate Magistrate.—Where under s. 423 (1) (a) a District Magistrate entertained an appeal from an order of acquittal under this section by a second-class Magistrate, reversed it and directed a re-hearing on the ground that the complainant and his *raski* had appeared before the Court shortly after the cases had been dismissed by the second-class Magistrate. *Held* that the order of the District Magistrate was illegal *7 M. 213*. Similarly, in *Weir II, 308* it was held that the District Magistrate had no power to order the entertainment of a complaint dismissed for the non-appearance of the complainant by a Subordinate Magistrate.

20. Misapplication of procedure—Dismissing complaint for default in warrant-case.—A case under s. 420 (1) C cannot be dismissed for default, as by so doing the Magistrate applies to a warrant-case the procedure prescribed for summons-case only, *4 C. W. N. 26; Ratanlal 15 and 23*. Such an order is illegal and a Presidency Magistrate who passes such an order can revive the complaint at the instance of the complainant *29 C. 859 (F.B.)* which follows *28 C. 211 and 1 C. W. N. 49*.

21. Effect of order of dismissal for default when the accused is also absent.—Section 403 bars a fresh trial of an accused who has been acquitted under this section even if he was absent though served with the summons. Dismissal of a case resulting in the acquittal of one of the two accused under this section, on the ground of complainant's absence and purporting to be a termination of all proceedings relating to that matter, will operate also against a co-accused whose attendance could not be obtained and against whom the trial did not proceed, 4 C. W. N. 346. There is nothing in the language of this section limiting the effect of an acquittal only to cases in which the accused appeared in answer to the summons when the case has been dismissed under this section, 34 M. 233. See also 7 C. W. N. 711 and 493.

22. Effect of order of dismissal of complaint on charges not tried.—Where a Magistrate issued processes against and summoned accused persons for one of several offences alleged against them and acquitted them of the offence for which they were summoned no fresh process could in view of s. 403, cl (1) be issued against them in respect of all the offences alleged against them on the previous occasion including the one for which they were summoned and acquitted, 2 C. L. J. 622 = 3 Cr. L. J. 115, where 5 C. W. N. 633 and 15 C. 608 are distinguished. See Note 15 above.

248. If a complainant, at any time before a final order is passed in any case under this

Withdrawal of
complaint.

Chapter, satisfies the Magistrate that there are sufficient grounds for permitting him to withdraw his complaint, the Magistrate may permit him to withdraw the same, and shall thereupon acquit the accused.

Notes.—1. Section applies only to summons-cases.—The only sections of the Code which contemplate the termination of a criminal prosecution by private arrangement are ss. 248 and 345. S. 248 is confined to Chapter XX which deals with summons-cases only, 37 B. 369. Therefore where the offence charged is a warrant-case and not a summons-case, a Magistrate ought to proceed with the inquiry or trial in spite of the withdrawal of the complaint if he finds the elements of an offence, on the facts set forth in the complaint, 8 C. W. N. 548 and 322; 6 M. 316.

2. Complaint cannot be withdrawn in warrant-case.—Magistrate is bound to proceed with the case.—One Manekbai being arrested on a complaint of theft was brought before a Magistrate, who allowed the complaint against her to be withdrawn and made her a witness against one Liladhar Oodhowjee, a co-accused in the same case. *Held*, that the offence with which Manekbai was charged not being one in which pardon could be tendered (s. 337) or in which the Magistrate could permit the withdrawal of the complaint under this section her evidence was not legally admissible, *Ratanlal* 461. This section applies only to a summons-case. Where the offence charged is a warrant-case, a Magistrate ought to proceed with the inquiry or trial in spite of the withdrawal of the complaint, if he finds the element of an offence on the facts set forth in the complaint, 13 B. 600. It is not competent to him to enter an order of acquittal, 37 B. 369, where *Ratanlal* 380 and 1. B. 64 are explained and distinguished.

3. Does the section apply to a withdrawal before process issues to the accused?—Having regard to the language of s. 242, the words 'at any time before any final order is passed' do not apply to a time before the accused has been ordered to appear. An order of acquittal passed on a withdrawal application before issue of process is unmeaning and of no avail, 36 M. 315.

4. Complainant alone can withdraw.—In cases of contempt of the lawful authority of a public servant, the complainant referred to in this section is the public servant whose authority has been resisted, and without whose sanction no criminal proceedings can be instituted against the offender, and not the person injured by the resistance, 2 B. 653. Where a Municipal Secretary authorized under s. 280 of the *Madras District Municipalities Act* 1884, instituted a complaint, *held* the Municipal Council was not competent to withdraw the same, 27 M. L. J. 617 = 13 Cr. L. J. 299.

5. Withdrawal of complaint by person setting the Police in motion.—[Having regard to the next section, it is certain that this section is to be limited to cases instituted upon complaints in the strict sense. Where a Magistrate took cognizance of a complaint upon Police Report made in consequence of information supplied to the Police by one A and passed an order under this section permitting the complaint to be withdrawn on the application of A, it was *held* that the order allowing withdrawal was bad, for the reason that there was no complaint in the case as defined in s. 4 (h) and consequently the Magistrate in purporting to act under this section, acted in excess of his powers. 23 M. 626.

6. District Magistrate cannot revive a withdrawn complaint.—Where a Deputy Magistrate allowed a complaint to be withdrawn, a District Magistrate has no jurisdiction to revive the case against the accused,

populace, multitude and *kratos* to be strong to rule is *kratos*, strength. Fr. *ochlocratic*, *lit. uolo* *crasis* } A form of government in which the multitude or common people rule.

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1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17. 18. 19. 20. 21. 22. 23. 24. 25. 26. 27. 28. 29. 30. 31. 32. 33. 34. 35. 36. 37. 38. 39. 40. 41. 42. 43. 44. 45. 46. 47. 48. 49. 50. 51. 52. 53. 54. 55. 56. 57. 58. 59. 60. 61. 62. 63. 64. 65. 66. 67. 68. 69. 70. 71. 72. 73. 74. 75. 76. 77. 78. 79. 80. 81. 82. 83. 84. 85. 86. 87. 88. 89. 90. 91. 92. 93. 94. 95. 96. 97. 98. 99. 100. 101. 102. 103. 104. 105. 106. 107. 108. 109. 110. 111. 112. 113. 114. 115. 116. 117. 118. 119. 120. 121. 122. 123. 124. 125. 126. 127. 128. 129. 130. 131. 132. 133. 134. 135. 136. 137. 138. 139. 140. 141. 142. 143. 144. 145. 146. 147. 148. 149. 150. 151. 152. 153. 154. 155. 156. 157. 158. 159. 160. 161. 162. 163. 164. 165. 166. 167. 168. 169. 170. 171. 172. 173. 174. 175. 176. 177. 178. 179. 180. 181. 182. 183. 184. 185. 186. 187. 188. 189. 190. 191. 192. 193. 194. 195. 196. 197. 198. 199. 200. 201. 202. 203. 204. 205. 206. 207. 208. 209. 210. 211. 212. 213. 214. 215. 216. 217. 218. 219. 220. 221. 222. 223. 224. 225. 226. 227. 228. 229. 230. 231. 232. 233. 234. 235. 236. 237. 238. 239. 240. 241. 242. 243. 244. 245. 246. 247. 248. 249. 250. 251. 252. 253. 254. 255. 256. 257. 258. 259. 260. 261. 262. 263. 264. 265. 266. 267. 268. 269. 270. 271. 272. 273. 274. 275. 276. 277. 278. 279. 280. 281. 282. 283. 284. 285. 286. 287. 288. 289. 290. 291. 292. 293. 294. 295. 296. 297. 298. 299. 300. 301. 302. 303. 304. 305. 306. 307. 308. 309. 310. 311. 312. 313. 314. 315. 316. 317. 318. 319. 320. 321. 322. 323. 324. 325. 326. 327. 328. 329. 330. 331. 332. 333. 334. 335. 336. 337. 338. 339. 340. 341. 342. 343. 344. 345. 346. 347. 348. 349. 350. 351. 352. 353. 354. 355. 356. 357. 358. 359. 360. 361. 362. 363. 364. 365. 366. 367. 368. 369. 370. 371. 372. 373. 374. 375. 376. 377. 378. 379. 380. 381. 382. 383. 384. 385. 386. 387. 388. 389. 390. 391. 392. 393. 394. 395. 396. 397. 398. 399. 400. 401. 402. 403. 404. 405. 406. 407. 408. 409. 410. 411. 412. 413. 414. 415. 416. 417. 418. 419. 420. 421. 422. 423. 424. 425. 426. 427. 428. 429. 430. 431. 432. 433. 434. 435. 436. 437. 438. 439. 440. 441. 442. 443. 444. 445. 446. 447. 448. 449. 450. 451. 452. 453. 454. 455. 456. 457. 458. 459. 460. 461. 462. 463. 464. 465. 466. 467. 468. 469. 470. 471. 472. 473. 474. 475. 476. 477. 478. 479. 480. 481. 482. 483. 484. 485. 486. 487. 488. 489. 490. 491. 492. 493. 494. 495. 496. 497. 498. 499. 500. 501. 502. 503. 504. 505. 506. 507. 508. 509. 510. 511. 512. 513. 514. 515. 516. 517. 518. 519. 520. 521. 522. 523. 524. 525. 526. 527. 528. 529. 530. 531. 532. 533. 534. 535. 536. 537. 538. 539. 540. 541. 542. 543. 544. 545. 546. 547. 548. 549. 550. 551. 552. 553. 554. 555. 556. 557. 558. 559. 560. 561. 562. 563. 564. 565. 566. 567. 568. 569. 570. 571. 572. 573. 574. 575. 576. 577. 578. 579. 580. 581. 582. 583. 584. 585. 586. 587. 588. 589. 590. 591. 592. 593. 594. 595. 596. 597. 598. 599. 600. 601. 602. 603. 604. 605. 606. 607. 608. 609. 610. 611. 612. 613. 614. 615. 616. 617. 618. 619. 620. 621. 622. 623. 624. 625. 626. 627. 628. 629. 630. 631. 632. 633. 634. 635. 636. 637. 638. 639. 640. 641. 642. 643. 644. 645. 646. 647. 648. 649. 650. 651. 652. 653. 654. 655. 656. 657. 658. 659. 660. 661. 662. 663. 664. 665. 666. 667. 668. 669. 670. 671. 672. 673. 674. 675. 676. 677. 678. 679. 680. 681. 682. 683. 684. 685. 686. 687. 688. 689. 690. 691. 692. 693. 694. 695. 696. 697. 698. 699. 700. 701. 702. 703. 704. 705. 706. 707. 708. 709. 710. 711. 712. 713. 714. 715. 716. 717. 718. 719. 720. 721. 722. 723. 724. 725. 726. 727. 728. 729. 730. 731. 732. 733. 734. 735. 736. 737. 738. 739. 740. 741. 742. 743. 744. 745. 746. 747. 748. 749. 750. 751. 752. 753. 754. 755. 756. 757. 758. 759. 760. 761. 762. 763. 764. 765. 766. 767. 768. 769. 770. 771. 772. 773. 774. 775. 776. 777. 778. 779. 780. 781. 782. 783. 784. 785. 786. 787. 788. 789. 790. 791. 792. 793. 794. 795. 796. 797. 798. 799. 800. 801. 802. 803. 804. 805. 806. 807. 808. 809. 810. 811. 812. 813. 814. 815. 816. 817. 818. 819. 820. 821. 822. 823. 824. 825. 826. 827. 828. 829. 830. 831. 832. 833. 834. 835. 836. 837. 838. 839. 840. 84

100

According to the above, the number produced by the 10th power is the number raised by a unit, the 40th power is raised according to the 10th power, the 10th power is raised by a unit.

the number of the month of the year which began with twenty seven letters annexed. See NUMERATION.

2 The tenth month of the
ing it into a lake

e to dī'g'i mai (dī' i mā
Sp orthocentum, fr Lat or
Lat to dī'g'i mai (dī' i mā

prism of the middle part I is a light face and the two summits together 2a faces
e to dig i and a {see of a} Formed of sheets folded so as to make eight leaves of or equal

1. The size of one leaf of a notebook is 18 cm by 25 cm. If the notebook has 20 leaves, how much paper is needed to make the notebook?

1 A book composed of sheets folded so as to make eight leaves an octodecimo book.
2 The size of a book thus composed - usually 10 1/2 x 14 1/2 x 1 1/2.

to den-tate d [d] n den-tis and den-tis toothed. See DENTATE.] Having eight teeth.
e to-ŏd'ri-cal, a The same as OCTAHEDRAL.
[ŏla] 2 no one

e to fid a [From Lat octo eight, and f were
 tis topt t Fe oct stle] (fot) Left or separated
 into left arguments as follows
 e to g a m] n [Gr octo eight and gape, to
 marry] (f) a marcing eight times [f re]

e-10g'e-na ry or de'to ge-na ry (Synop. §130)
a [im] octo; rurs from a fog of a grey color.

Octogenaria {*a* *cent*} *l*: *octogēnariū* } Of eighty years
of age.
octogénary, or *ōct'ogēnary*, *n*. An in-
strument of eight strings.

o-to-Gild n (Lat. octo= eight, and A S gild= or
gild payment) (Engl^o-Saxon Law) A pecu-
nary compensation for an injury, of eight times the value
of the thing
e t^o-g^o-n^oal, a The same as OCTAGOVAL, q v

e-lōg; *noḡa* *n* 101 seven, eight and 72nd a female; (1 of) Having eight plaths or styles
e-toḡa *lar* *n* (1 at *e* to *e* 81 and locusus, diminish of locus *plach*) (1 of) Having eight

o'to na-ry a (Lat *octonarius* from *octo* eight
each from o to, eight. It, *octonarius*) Belonging
to the o-n bar eight
o'to na-ry a (Lat *octonarius* from *octo* eight
each from o to, eight. It, *octonarius*) Belonging
to the o-n bar eight

to petal-ions o [Or ear o eight and re-
to leaf Pr octopetale] (But) having eight
petals on flower base

Octopoda, *n.* [Or *Arctopoda*, from *Arctos*, eight, and *poda*, pedic foot for *octopoda* is *ctiopoda*] (*Zoö*)
A mollusk or insect having eight feet or legs

[illegible]

2 1
 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 100 101 102 103 104 105 106 107 108 109 110 111 112 113 114 115 116 117 118 119 120 121 122 123 124 125 126 127 128 129 130 131 132 133 134 135 136 137 138 139 140 141 142 143 144 145 146 147 148 149 150 151 152 153 154 155 156 157 158 159 160 161 162 163 164 165 166 167 168 169 170 171 172 173 174 175 176 177 178 179 180 181 182 183 184 185 186 187 188 189 190 191 192 193 194 195 196 197 198 199 200 201 202 203 204 205 206 207 208 209 210 211 212 213 214 215 216 217 218 219 220 221 222 223 224 225 226 227 228 229 230 231 232 233 234 235 236 237 238 239 240 241 242 243 244 245 246 247 248 249 250 251 252 253 254 255 256 257 258 259 260 261 262 263 264 265 266 267 268 269 270 271 272 273 274 275 276 277 278 279 280 281 282 283 284 285 286 287 288 289 290 291 292 293 294 295 296 297 298 299 300 301 302 303 304 305 306 307 308 309 310 311 312 313 314 315 316 317 318 319 320 321 322 323 324 325 326 327 328 329 330 331 332 333 334 335 336 337 338 339 340 341 342 343 344 345 346 347 348 349 350 351 352 353 354 355 356 357 358 359 360 361 362 363 364 365 366 367 368 369 370 371 372 373 374 375 376 377 378 379 380 381 382 383 384 385 386 387 388 389 390 391 392 393 394 395 396 397 398 399 400 401 402 403 404 405 406 407 408 409 410 411 412 413 414 415 416 417 418 419 420 421 422 423 424 425 426 427 428 429 430 431 432 433 434 435 436 437 438 439 440 441 442 443 444 445 446 447 448 449 450 451 452 453 454 455 456 457 458 459 460 461 462 463 464 465 466 467 468 469 470 471 472 473 474 475 476 477 478 479 480 481 482 483 484 485 486 487 488 489 490 491 492 493 494 495 496 497 498 499 500 501 502 503 504 505 506 507 508 509 510 511 512 513 514 515 516 517 518 519 520 521 522 523 524 525 526 527 528 529 530 531 532 533 534 535 536 537 538 539 540 541 542 543 544 545 546 547 548 549 550 551 552 553 554 555 556 557 558 559 560 561 562 563 564 565 566 567 568 569 570 571 572 573 574 575 576 577 578 579 580 581 582 583 584 585 586 587 588 589 590 591 592 593 594 595 596 597 598 599 600 601 602 603 604 605 606 607 608 609 610 611 612 613 614 615 616 617 618 619 620 621 622 623 624 625 626 627 628 629 630 631 632 633 634 635 636 637 638 639 640 641 642 643 644 645 646 647 648 649 650 651 652 653 654 655 656 657 658 659 660 661 662 663 664 665 666 667 668 669 670 671 672 673 674 675 676 677 678 679 680 681 682 683 684 685 686 687 688 689 690 691 692 693 694 695 696 697 698 699 700 701 702 703 704 705 706 707 708 709 710 711 712 713 714 715 716 717 718 719 720 721 722 723 724 725 726 727 728 729 730 731 732 733 734 735 736 737 738 739 740 741 742 743 744 745 746 747 748 749 750 751 752 753 754 755 756 757 758 759 760 761 762 763 764 765 766 767 768 769 770 771 772 773 774 775 776 777 778 779 780 781 782 783 784 785 786 787 788 789 790 791 792 793 794 795 796 797 798 799 800 801 802 803 804 805 806 807 808 809 810 811 812 813 814 815 816 817 818 819 820 821 822 823 824 825 826 827 828 829 830 831 832 833 834 835 836 837 838 839 840 841 842 843 844 845 846 847 848 849 850 851 852 853 854 855 856 857 858 859 860 861 862 863 864 865 866 867 868 869 870 871 872 873 874 875 876 877 878 879 880 881 882 883 884 885 886 887 888 889 890 891 892 893 894 895 896 897 898 899 900 901 902 903 904 905 906 907 908 909 910 911 912 913 914 915 916 917 918 919 920 921 922 923 924 925 926 927 928 929 930 931 932 933 934 935 936 937 938 939 940 941 942 943 944 945 946 947 948 949 950 951 952 953 954 955 956 957 958 959 960 961 962 963 964 965 966 967 968 969 970 971 972 973 974 975 976 977 978 979 980 981 982 983 984 985 986 987 988 989 990 991 992 993 994 995 996 997 998 999 1000 1001 1002 1003 1004 1005 1006 1007 1008 1009 1010 1011 1012 1013 1014 1015 1016 1017 1018 1019 1020 1021 1022 1023 1024 1025 1026 1027 1028 1029 1030 1031 1032 1033 1034 1035 1036 1037 1038 1039

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2. A further cause of the ... of

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in imitation of quatuor} (Mus) The same as (A-
TEXT (Rare)
De'tu or m. {Dart, wrongly formed from uce, in
in imitation of quatuor} (Mus) The same as (A-
TEXT (Rare)

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De'l late }
De'l late }
De'l late }
De'l late }

2. Having eyes seen it like the eye
Ge'd il fōm a {p & p} a l r s for I at
I s the eye and a shape / In the form of an
I s the eye and a shape / In the form of an

De'as hat (kh. yu hat) n. {Fr. oculiste sp. & It. oculista from Lat. oculus, the eye} One who treats diseases of the eye, or one who refracts

to cure them
G's p'dian m (Gr water swab, and a 6, roots
foot) (Zw.) One of
a tribe of crabs, &
which live in lakes in

the sand along the shore and which run very rapidly,--whence the name.

passage] A force of
pos 1 by Kellebach
and will is to produce the
Corydalis (Corydalis serotina)
the 11th of June of 1880
the 11th of June of 1880

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a & Snowling.

1. *Isa Husein* a Turk who had properly chamber company
 a black chamber room } a female slave or two who
 in the harem of the Turk abductions [We

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Cathayana, on the 1st of March

empty O D and and id. Excl. weather. (both, neither, desert solitary)

or d by the U. S. alone
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to get a value fragmentary intelligence
in 10 minutes, at a time

And a 9 long & 2 1/2 in short edge for that fall what there will turn up the flap, above, for 20, with 1000

25 W. R. 63, *see* also 10 C. 551. The same principle applies when the case has been compounded under s. 345. An order of discharge under this section amounts to an acquittal. *See* 25 B. 412.

7. *Where Magistrate had no jurisdiction, withdrawal of complaint no bar to re-entertainment of fresh complaint.*—Where a Magistrate took cognizance of complaint without previous sanction, when such sanction was required, and discharged the accused, *held* he was competent after sanction had been obtained, to re-entertain the complaint and that the previous order of discharge did not operate as an acquittal, 22 B. 711.

8. *Award of compensation on withdrawal of a complaint.*—Formerly compensation could not be awarded to an accused person acquitted under this section upon a withdrawal of the complaint, Ratanlal 492. *See*, however, s. 250 which does not limit the award of compensation (like the repealed s. 250 of Act X of 1832) to acquittals, under s. 245 or s. 247, therefore this ruling will not now prevail, and a Magistrate can now award compensation even if the acquittal takes place by withdrawal of complaint. *See* also 56 P. R. 1837; 19 P. R. 1893 and 30 P. R. 1910.

9. *Withdrawal of complaint and composition of offence compared.*—The withdrawal of a complaint ought to be distinguished from the compounding of offences. A withdrawal must be by intimation to the Magistrate holding the trial and is permissible only in a summons-case, 21 C. 103. *Withdrawal of complaint* is the act of only one party to the proceeding, *viz.*, the complainant, whereas the composition of an offence obviously requires the co-operation of both parties, for a person is said to compound an offence when he forbears to prosecute the offender in consideration of some reward or advantage for his forbearance. It is quite intelligible, therefore, why in the former case, *viz.*, the withdrawal of a complaint, the Legislature should have imposed the necessity of obtaining the permission of the Magistrate. Had such a restriction not been imposed, a person might be harassed by a perfectly vexatious criminal proceeding from which the complainant having put the accused to as much inconvenience and degradation as he could, might then calmly withdraw. To prevent the processes of Criminal Courts from being thus abused, and at the same time of placing a ready means of summary redress in the hands of the Magistrate trying the case, the Legislature enacted ss. 248 and 250, the provisions of which contain a reasonable protection for accused persons.

But the case of "*composition*" stands on totally different grounds. The Legislature having determined to allow certain offences which principally concerned the injured person as an individual and not the public at large, to be compounded, the composition as the act of both parties concerned works its own end, and there is no such abuse of process to be guarded against as in the case of simple withdrawal. As soon as a composition (where permissible) is voluntarily effected it operates (*vide* s. 345) as an acquittal of the accused, and the Magistrate has no power to deny any further with the case. But an acquittal under s. 345 is a very different thing from an acquittal under either s. 245 or s. 247, and it is only in acquittals under one or other of the sections last mentioned that the Magistrate has been empowered to award compensation. An acquittal under s. 245 or s. 247 is the result of a purely magisterial act, but an acquittal under s. 345 results by an operation of law upon the act of composition, and is thus quite irrespective of any magisterial decision. *Per RATTIAN, J.*, in 19 P. R. 1888. *See* also 20 C. W. N. 1209.

10. *Magistrate alone competent to authorize withdrawal.*—This section does not empower any Police-officer to entertain an application for the withdrawal of a complaint. The permitting of a complainant to withdraw is a judicial act, the exercise of which is vested in the Magistrate by this section and the Police have no authority to interfere in such matters, Ratanlal 51.

Under s. 248 of the Code a Magistrate alone is competent to authorize withdrawal and can even refuse application for withdrawal filed by the complainant so it was held in 30 C. W. N. 593 that no absolute power of withdrawal is given to the Calcutta Corporation under s. 537 of the Calcutta Municipal Act unless the withdrawal is permitted by the Magistrate.

11. *Accused against whom case is withdrawn, competent witness against co-accused.*—*See* 25 B. 422.

12. *Whether withdrawal of complaint against one amounts to a withdrawal of the complaint against all.*—Where the complainant withdrew his complaint against one of the five accused and the Magistrate proceeded against the other four held in revision by the High Court that though the complainant used the phrase "withdraw the complaint" he in fact meant that the offence had been compounded with the accused concerned. Further held that under cl. (6) of s. 345 of the Code as amended a composition has the effect of an acquittal of the accused with whom the offence has been compounded, but does not affect the case as against the other accused 5 Lah. 239.

(t) Denoting passage from one state to another {Old} 1 O mischievous (happy) Denoting relation to place or that Athens the people of the middle ages

that which proceeds from or is produced by a person or thing which has had, or still has a connection with the same and hence the word was applied to cases of mere connection not involving at all the idea of separation or departure

Of late recency in time not long past -- Of old former in time long past

It offense, or --
1 To be act of offending
act of displeasing or

Weapons of offense those which are in distinction from those of defense which a
Byn -- Displeasure unpleasure even
mild manner to pass transgressor
omit sin crime affront insult or
Offenseful, a. Giving displeasure
(Old)
Offenseless, a. Unoffending

Giving offense, cause

(It offense, or offense, or of
the offense)
pleasure or some degree of anger,
rude behavior is offense to men,
rude us to use offensive words
or unpleasant sensations dis-
offense little or small an offen-
sive words are offenses to the

3 Causing evil or injury injurious

To offend, rubbish
Offense is a piece separate
which is cut off
Offenseful, a. Be Offenseful
Offenseful, a. Inclined to
offend

2 To Displease to make angry to affront

The company was grievously offended with them who had
bet such a great deal

The heathen women under the Moral, offer themselves to
the service of the death of their husbands

Let's office
5 Hence the company or corporation whose
place of business is their office as I have no bed
the office I have abandoned my vessel to the
incurred in such an office

6 (pt) (Domestic work) The apartments to
which the domestics belong the several duties
attached to the service of a house as kitchen, par-
lor and the like stables barns, &c. of a house
7 (Ec) The service is pointed for a particular
occasion as the office of a mass the fire for the
burial of the dead, a prescribed form of act of de-
votion

4, 1, or 2, long, 3, 4, 5, short, care, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45, 46, 47, 48, 49, 50, 51, 52, 53, 54, 55, 56, 57, 58, 59, 60, 61, 62, 63, 64, 65, 66, 67, 68, 69, 70, 71, 72, 73, 74, 75, 76, 77, 78, 79, 80, 81, 82, 83, 84, 85, 86, 87, 88, 89, 90, 91, 92, 93, 94, 95, 96, 97, 98, 99, 100

249. In any case instituted otherwise than upon complaint a Presidency Magistrate a Magistrate of the first class or with the previous sanction of the District Magistrate any other Magistrate may for reasons to be recorded by him stop the proceedings at any stage without pronouncing any judgment either of acquittal or conviction and may thereupon release the accused

Power to stop proceedings when no complainant.

Notes—1 Scope of section—This section applies only to cases instituted otherwise than on a complaint 9 P R 1913 = 8 P W R, 1913 = 13 Cr L J 860 The section though occurring in Chapter XX seems to be applicable to warrant-cases also But see 5 Patna 243 which holds that the section does not apply to warrant cases and that an order under s. 249 in a warrant case would be quite illegal and void.

2 Stop order does not bar re trial—The order under this section is specifically excluded by the explanation to s. 403 from being an acquittal and further proceedings in accordance with law are not barred 9 P R, 1913 = 13 Cr L J 360

3. No further inquiry under s. 437 in case of a stop order—As an order under this section does not amount to a dismissal of a complaint or a discharge no order under s. 437 can be passed directing further inquiry 9 P R 1913 = 13 Cr L J 860

Frivolous Accusations in Summons and Warrant-cases

250. *(1) If any case instituted upon complaint or upon information given to a Police-officer or to a Magistrate one or more persons is or are accused before a Magistrate of any offence triable by a Magistrate and the Magistrate by whom the case is heard discharges or acquits all or any of the accused and is of opinion that the accusation against them or any of them was false and

False frivolous or vexatious accusations.

either frivolous or vexatious the Magistrate may by his order of discharge or acquittal if the person upon whose complaint or information the accusation was made is present call upon him forthwith to show cause why he should not pay compensation to such accused or to each or any of such accused when there are more than one or if such person is not present direct the issue of a summons to him to appear and show cause as aforesaid

(2) The Magistrate shall record and consider any cause which such complainant or informant may show and if he is satisfied that the accusation was false and either frivolous or vexatious may for reasons to be recorded direct that compensation to such an amount not exceeding one hundred rupees or if the Magistrate is a Magistrate of the third class not exceeding fifty rupees as he may determine be paid by such complainant or informant to the accused or to each or any of them

(2 A) The Magistrate may by the order directing payment of the compensation under sub-sec (2) further order that in default of payment the person ordered to pay such compensation shall suffer simple imprisonment for a period not exceeding thirty days

(2 B) When any person is imprisoned under sub-sec (2 A) the provisions of sections 68 and 69 of the Indian Penal Code shall so far as may be apply

(2 C) No person who has been directed to pay compensation under this section shall by reason of such order, be exempted from any civil or criminal liability in respect of the complaint made or information given by him

Provided that any amount paid to an accused person under this section shall be taken into account in awarding compensation to such person in any subsequent civil suit relating to the same matter

* Sub-sections (1) to (2c) have been substituted for old sub-secs. (1) and (2) by the Cr. Pro. (Amendment) Act of 1921

(3) A complainant or informant who has been ordered under * "sub-sec (2)" by a Magistrate of the second or third class to pay compensation † "or has been so ordered by any other Magistrate to pay compensation exceeding fifty rupees" may appeal from the order, in so far as the order relates to the payment of the compensation, as if such complainant or informant had been convicted on a trial held by such Magistrate

(4) When an order for payment of compensation to an accused person is made in a case which is subject to appeal under sub-section (3), the compensation shall not be paid to him before the period allowed for the presentation of the appeal has elapsed, or, if an appeal is presented, before the appeal has been decided and, where such order is made in a case which is not so subject to appeal, the compensation shall not be paid before the expiration of one month from the date of the order.

† * * * *

Note.—Referring to the amendment of this section the Select Committee say —

"We think that the words 'or to a Magistrate' near the beginning of this clause were left out on the ground that information to a Magistrate from any person other than a Police-officer must be a complaint. We think that this view overlooks the words 'with a view to his taking action under this Code,' which occur in the definition of 'complaint.' We also think that there is some force in the fact pointed out by the Calcutta High Court that s. 190 (1)(c) seems to draw a distinction between information received and a complaint. We have, therefore, restored the words 'or to a Magistrate' "

"Sub sec (1) as re-drafted does not provide for the case where the complainant is absent at the time judgment is delivered and we think power should be given in such a case to summon him to appear and show cause "

"We think that there is some anomaly in enabling a Magistrate who cannot impose a fine of more than Rs. 50 to award compensation up to Rs. 100 and we have, therefore, proposed to reduce the amount of compensation which third-class Magistrates can award to Rs. 50 "

"In view of s. 547 we do not see any necessity to provide in the new sub-sec. (2 A) that compensation should be recoverable as if it were a fine "

"We have re-drafted the proposed addition to sub-sec. (4) to make the intention clearer "

"We discussed at some length the various merits of the phrases—"frivolous or vexatious" as in the present Code, "false and either frivolous or vexatious" as in the Bill and "false or vexatious, to the knowledge of the party" as in Act IX of 1922 recently passed to provide for compensatory costs in respect of false claims and defences. On the whole, we are in favour of the Bill as drafted. We do not think that the procedure of s. 250 should be used in every false case unless the case is also either frivolous or vexatious. In more serious cases it is desirable that the Magistrate should act under s. 476 with a view to the institution of a prosecution "

Notes.—1. See s. 545 as to payment of expenses and also compensation in cases not provided for by this section, and s. 547 for power to enforce refund of compensation.

2. **History of section.**—This section which was originally s. 250 in the Code of 1882 was repealed and replaced by Act IV of 1891, s. 2 as s. 560 in the 1882 Code. It is now re-transferred to its old place capped with the present heading. The section which originally applied to Sessions cases was made applicable to all cases except such as are triable exclusively by a Court of Session of High Court. In the present Code "*heard*" has been substituted for the word "*tried*" and the heading is new. In the 1881 Code the words were "*frivolous and vexatious*."

OBJECT OF SECTION.

3. **Object of section not punitive—Compensation not fine.**—The object of this section is not to punish the complainant but to award by a summary order some compensation to the person against whom a frivolous or vexatious complaint is brought, leaving it to him to obtain further redress against the complainant by a regular

* The word and figure in the inverted commas were substituted for the word and figure sub-section (1) by Act XLIII of 1923.

† These words in inverted commas were substituted for the words "to an accused person" by *ibid*

‡ Sub-section (3) has been omitted by Act XVIII of 1923

civil suit or criminal prosecution"—*Per BANERJEE, J.*, in 30 C. 123 at p. 129 (F.B.) An order of compensation is not a fine and if passed by a Magistrate of the first class is not appealable, whatever the amount awarded. Such an order passed in the form of a sentence of fine, the amount of which was to be paid as compensation to the accused, was held to be legal in substance though illegal in form 8 C. P. Cr. 13. The compensation which the Court is empowered to award is not a fine, but is in the nature of damages for malicious prosecution although it is made recoverable in a summary manner as if it were a fine, 25 M. 127. A Magistrate cannot award compensation by way of fine, 2 N.-W. P. H. C. R. 430; though the amount is recoverable in the same way as fine, 13 A. 96; A. 112. In awarding compensation the Magistrate must be strictly guided by the loss or inconvenience which the accused person has obtained, 1881 A. W. N. 167.

AT WHAT STAGE COMPENSATION MAY BE ORDERED.

4. No compensation where case dismissed before issue of process.—Compensation cannot be awarded in cases in which complaint is dismissed without issue of process for compelling the attendance of the accused. It is a condition precedent to the grant of compensation under this section that the case shall have been heard by the Magistrate and that he shall have discharged or acquitted the accused, 8 and 14 P. R. 1897; 29 A. 137. Compensation can be awarded only where there had been a discharge or acquittal after a frivolous or vexatious charge had been heard. Where a complaint was dismissed under s. 203, the fact that the accused was present with a pleader at the inquiry under s. 202 will not enable the Magistrate to award compensation, 3 P. R. 1906 = 84 P. L. R. 1906 = 4 Cr. L. J. 36.

5. Complete discharge or acquittal necessary to grant compensation.—When the accused is charged with offences, e.g., ss 352 and 379, I P C., and one only of them is proved, compensation cannot be given to the accused as the complaint was at any rate partly true. In order to enable a Magistrate to pass an order for compensation, there must be complete discharge or acquittal, 25 C. 53. But a complaint may be well founded as regards some of the accused and frivolous or vexatious as regards the others so as to render the complainant liable to make compensation to those others, 5 M. 381; 15 P. R. 1877. But the substitution of the word "heard" for "tried" renders a complete trial no longer necessary. An order under this section may be made after hearing only part of a case, but evidence must be heard 10 W. R. 61. See Note 16 to s. 247, 44 M. 51; 40 A. 610.

6. Framing of charge no bar to compensation.—The fact that a Magistrate has framed a charge under s. 254 against an accused person does not of itself prevent him from holding, after full inquiry, that the charge is frivolous and vexatious under this section, Ratanlal 734. But when a Magistrate considers evidence sufficient to justify the framing of a charge and subsequently changes his opinion, he must give reasons for so changing. Compensation for a frivolous and vexatious complaint may be awarded after the evidence for the defence had been heard, because it is quite possible that the Magistrate might not be able to detect the frivolous or vexatious nature of the complaint until the defendant has had an opportunity of explaining the real circumstances in making his defence Weir II, 316, 10 B. 199.

7. Compensation may be directed on acquittal.—An order for compensation against a complainant may be made on an order of acquittal, 6 C. 381. The fact that the accused was tried and acquitted is no bar to the award of compensation, 5 M. 381. This case was followed in 10 B. 199. See also 6 C. 531; 14 P. R. 1884; 6 B. L. R. 296 = 15 W. R. 9 and 30 C. 123.

Compensation on withdrawal of complaint—See Notes 8 and 9 to s. 248

Compensation when acquittal owing to absence of complaint—See 1884 A. W. N. 115, 1891 A. W. N. 120, 63; 14 P. R. 1888

8. Award of compensation illegal when acquittal results from composition.—Though the composition of an offence under this section has the effect of an acquittal yet it is not such an acquittal, as brings the case within the provisions of this section. Therefore, where on an offence under s. 323, I P C., being compounded the trying Magistrate ordered the complainant to pay one of the accused Rs. 25 as compensation, his order was reversed as illegal, Ratanlal 957; 19 P. R. 1893; 30 P. R. 1910 = 41 P. W. R. 1910 = 11 Cr. L. J. 638. Where the conduct of the accused has not been straightforward throughout, the order awarding compensation is liable to be set aside, 65 P. L. R. 1901. Where an offence is compounded under s. 345, compensation under this section cannot be awarded, as there is neither a discharge nor an acquittal but only a composition. This section does not apply so as to enable the Magistrate to award compensation to the accused, 7 C. P. 2 and Ratanlal 957 and 700, and 10 Bom. L. R. 1056.

9. Compensation may be awarded in cases tried summarily.—S 262 renders applicable, in the case of summons-cases tried summarily, all the provisions of s 250 and it is open to a Magistrate to award compensation in all cases whether tried summarily or not in which he acquits and his opinion that the complaint was frivolous or vexatious, 11 M. 142

IN RESPECT OF WHAT CASES COMPENSATION MAY BE ORDERED

10 In cases either frivolous or vexatious.—It is sufficient to support an order under this section that the complaint is either frivolous or vexatious and whether it is the one or the other is a question of fact. Thus, where a complainant not satisfied with the conviction and punishment by a Village Magistrate of the person complained against, complained to a second-class Magistrate in the same matter, it was held that the compensation was rightly awarded inasmuch as the complaint whether frivolous or not, was certainly vexatious and improper, *Weir II*, 319. But under the new amendment s 250 is applicable to cases which must be false and either frivolous or vexatious also

In 23 A. L. J. 1054 it appears to have been held that for the application of s 250 as amended the complaint should be false, frivolous or vexatious.

But in a later decision in 24 L. J. 161 it was held that under the alteration made in the old Code in respect of s. 250 it is now necessary for the award of compensation under the new section it is necessary that the complaint should be false and either frivolous or vexatious

11. Accusation must be the committing of an "offence."—See definition of complaint s 4 at pp. 6—10 and 36 A. 378; 45 A. 363.

(i) No compensation for false information under ss 107 and 110.—To justify the application of this section, a person must be accused before a Magistrate of an offence triable by a Magistrate which an institution or proceedings under s 107 for taking security to keep the peace, is not, 25 B. 43 which follows 15 A. 365; 4 P. R. 1896; 37 P. R. 1884; 16 P. R. 1893; 33 P. R. 1902. See also 7 A. L. J. 743 = 11 Cr. L. J. 446 and 36 A. 382 and Note 149 at p 216, 20 A. L. J. 624; 21 A. L. J. 207.

(ii) No compensation where application is for maintenance under Chapter XXXVII.—An application for maintenance is not a complaint of an offence or an accusation of an offence and no order for payment of compensation can be made under this section, 6 M. L. T. 261 = 11 Cr. L. J. 156 and see also Heading I to s 488.

(iii) No compensation where complaint is as to the use of a house as a brothel.—Section 41 of the *Bombay District Police Act* does not make the use of a house as a brothel an offence, so in a case where such a complaint is made and dismissed no compensation can be awarded, 6 S. L. R. 254 = 14 Cr. L. J. 320.

(iv) No compensation for cases under Act XIII of 1859.—Compensation cannot be awarded under this section to a person against whom a complaint has been made under cl (1) of s 2, Act XIII of 1859, for, as neglect or refusal to perform work according to a contract is not made punishable by that clause a complaint of such neglect or refusal is not a complaint of an offence under s. 4 (h) and this section *Ratanlal* 617; 4 C. W. N. 233, 4 M. 234; 17 A. L. J. 165.

(v) No compensation for a complaint under the *Public Conveyances Act*, s 28.—Such a proceeding is not a complaint of an offence within s 250 Hence no compensation can be awarded, 22 Bom. L. R. 195.

12 Compensation may be granted only in cases ordinarily triable by a Magistrate and not in Sessions Cases.—The words triable by a Magistrate mean triable under s 26 and the provisions of this section are confined to cases specified in the 8th column of Schedule II as triable by a Magistrate Hence a Magistrate who is specially empowered under s. 30 is not competent to make an order for compensation under this section in a case triable by a Court of Session as specified in column 8, Schedule II, 26 P. R. 1902, 1 P. R. 1919 (Cr.) and 15 P. R. 1919 (Cr.) Similarly, even where a Magistrate discharges the accused in a case triable exclusively by the Court of Session, he has no power to order the complainant to pay compensation, *Weir II*, 315 Although a first-class Magistrate discharges the accused under this section on account of the charge being vexatious, yet if the offence charged be triable exclusively by the Court of Session the Magistrate cannot award compensation under this section to the accused *Ratanlal* 961, 14 P. R. 1902; 91 P. W. R. 1910 = 11 Cr. L. J. 396, 19 Bom. L. R. 60; 18 A. L. J. 466; 20 A. L. J. 433 = 40 A. 615 But see 45 M. 29 where a Magistrate tried an accused person for an offence under a less serious section of I P C, when really the offence fell under a more serious section which was beyond his competence his proceedings were not illegal and an award of compensation under s 250, Cr P C, was not illegal although the offence was really exclusively triable by a Court of Session = 41 M. L. J. 393; 43 A. 166 = 26 A. L. J. 1036.

13. Compensation may be ordered for false complaint of wrongful seizure of cattle.—It was formerly held that on the dismissal of a complaint of wrongful seizure of cattle, it is not competent to a Court to act under this section and award compensation to the person against whom complaint is made, 18 A. 353; 23 C. 248; 9 M. 102 and 374. These cases were decided under the Code of 1882. Now the definition of the word "offence" is made to "include any act in respect of which a complaint may be made under s. 20 of the *Cattle Trespass Act*, 1871," therefore, dismissal of a complaint of wrongful seizure of cattle is equivalent to discharge or acquittal and consequently it seems compensation is now awardable. The distinction should, however, be kept in mind between compensation under this section and under s. 22 of the *Cattle Trespass Act*, under this section compensation is to the accused, while under s. 22 it is to the complainant and an appeal lies under s. 407. From an order under this section, there is no appeal under s. 407, 29 M. 517.

13-A. When there were two charges and there was conviction as to one and acquittal as to another, held, that to order compensation to be paid in respect of the charge as to which there was an acquittal is illegal, 16 A. L. J. 499.

14. No compensation for cases instituted on Police report.—The operation of this section is restricted to cases instituted by complaint as defined in the Code or upon information given to a Police-officer or Magistrate, or on information given by **¶ 142 and 6 A. 96.** But where information given to a Police-dealt with under s. 250, 14 C.

W. N. 326 = 11 Cr. L. J. 201. No compensation can be ordered against a person whose statement is an inquiry instituted by the Police formed the basis of the further proceedings. 1 Patna L. J. 106 = 17 Cr. L. J. 336.

15. No compensation for cases instituted under s. 476.—Where a case is sent for trial under s. 476 to a Magistrate, the Magistrate cannot pass an order under this section directing the person at whose instance the case was sent to pay compensation as no case was instituted either by complaint or by information given to a Police-officer or to a Magistrate. 14 Bom. L. R. 116 = 1 Bom. Cr. Ca. 237 = 14 Cr. L. J. 1.

15-A. Compensation can be awarded in a case originated by a complaint before a Village Magistrate—1917 M. W. N. 156.

15-B. A complaint under s. 28 of the Bombay Public Conveyances Act, 1863, is not a complaint in respect of an offence within the meaning of s. 230 Cr P C. The Court has therefore no power to make an order under s. 250; 44 B 463.

WHO MAY BE MADE TO PAY COMPENSATION.

16. Compensation for information given subsequent to complaint.—The accusation against the accused was not made on the information on which the case was instituted but the arrest of the accused was due to clues subsequently furnished by the complainant or other persons interested in the case, and it was argued that it was only the accusations in the first information that could be dealt with under this section. Held, that though the original complainant may not be liable for all accusations made by others interested in the case in its course, yet where the original complainant himself is the author of the subsequent accusations he may be dealt with under s. 250, 14 C. W. N. 326 = 11 Cr. L. J. 201.

17. Person giving information to Village Magistrate, which the Village Magistrate is bound to pass on to Police.—A man who complains to a Village Magistrate of a non bailable offence, knowing that the latter must in the ordinary course of his duty report the substance of the complaint to the Police gives information to the

See Note 14 45 M. L. J. 255

18. A person who institutes a complaint under the orders of a superior officer cannot be ordered to pay compensation.—A Magistrate can order compensation to be paid by a person to the accused only when the prosecution of the accused was on the complaint of that person or on information given by that person to a Police-officer or to a Magistrate within the meaning of this section. (i) A *Karkun* or a process server on the establishment of a Civil Court, entrusted with the execution of a writ, reported to the Court that a particular person

Orangeat (fr an shu't) n [Fr from orange]
 1 Orange peel covered with candy
 2 Orangeade
Or = rai nred (or'len khl urd), n Having the
 3

Orange-plant n [Fr from orange]
 1 Orange tree
 2 Orange tree
 3 Orange tree

Orange-tawny n, a. Of a color between yellow and brown.
Orange-yellow n, a. A color between yellow and brown.

Orange-wife n A woman who sells oranges.
Orange-fruit n (Spon. 130) n [Malayan fr. g. hana, g. mas of the wood of g. hana and g. hana, a forest wood wild savage] (Zool.) A large monkey (the 8 m) (or 1 f. leu) (Spon.) In many respects approaching with more closely than any other known monkey. It is about 18 in height and covered with coarse hair of a brownish red or black color and has a bare face and a beardless chin. Its arms are very long reaching to the ankles. The animal is a native of Sumatra and Borneo.

Orange-fruit n [Fr from orange]
 1 Orange tree
 2 Orange tree
 3 Orange tree

Orator n [Lat orator] A person who speaks in public.
Oratorical a. [Lat orator] Pertaining to oratory.

Oratorical a. [Lat orator] Pertaining to oratory.

Oratorical a. [Lat orator] Pertaining to oratory.

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Oratorical a. [Lat orator] Pertaining to oratory.

chapel or small room
 lions

Do not send the prayers for want of a good orator to pray in.

Such is domestic oratory small.

For prayer in the name of the Father.

Oratorical (fr an shu't) n [Fr from orange]
 1 Orange tree
 2 Orange tree
 3 Orange tree

Oratorical a. [Lat orator] Pertaining to oratory.

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Orange-fruit



Orchilla

30. Whether order for payment of compensation must form part of the order of discharge or acquittal—It should be noted carefully that under the newly amended s 250 it is only the order calling upon the complainant to show cause why he should not pay compensation which has to be contained in the order of discharge and not the order for payment of compensation which has necessarily to be a subsequent order. So now the order for the payment of compensation cannot form part of the order of discharge or acquittal, 7 LAL 121. One of the two accused was discharged and the case was against the other accused was adjourned when he was acquitted and the Magistrate called upon the complainant to show cause against an order for compensation being passed and directed the complainant to pay compensation to each of the accused that under s 250 as now amended the procedure adopted was now illegal. The case against the accused who was discharged was at an end when the order of discharge was made and the order to show cause under s 250 so far as payment of compensation to him was concerned should have been made along with the order of discharge. 23 C. W. N. 127. In view of the latest amendment as the order for the payment of compensation cannot form part of the order of discharge or acquittal, the following cases have lost much of their force.

A Magistrate in making an order under this section must do so in passing the order of discharge or acquittal. Where a Magistrate happened to make an order by way of separate proceedings on a date subsequent to the date of the discharge of the accused held that the order was made without jurisdiction, as there is nothing in the Code which authorizes the Magistrate to hold an inquiry on a subsequent date and make an order under this section. 25 A. 315, 34 A. 354. An order of compensation passed not at the time of the discharge of the accused but days after, at the time when the co-accused was acquitted, is made without jurisdiction, 10 N. L. R. 8 = 15 Cr. L. J. 290. Where a Magistrate discharged the accused in the absence of the complainant on a subsequent date after that the order was made in the case without discharge.

1905 = 3 Cr. L. J. 123, 11 A. L. J. 110 = 55 F. L. R. 1913 = 14 Cr. L. J. 48. See also 23 M. L. J. 5h. N. 21. A Magistrate in the same order discharged the accused and called on the complainant to show cause why he should not pay compensation of Rs 20 and subsequently after hearing him made an order for payment of Rs 10, held though the procedure seemed to be perfectly fair and reasonable it did not fulfil the requirements of s 250. What that section evidently contemplates and expressly requires is that, before a Magistrate makes it the ground for discharging a person complained against, on a ground that the complaint was frivolous or vexatious he shall hear the complainant on that aspect of the case and unless he does this the whole proceeding is void, 38 C. 302. Where however, a Magistrate by the same order discharging the accused declared the case to be vexatious and directed the complainant to pay a compensation of Rs. 50 to the accused subject to any cause to be shown by him and on the following day made the order absolute held distinguishing 38 C. 302, that the requirements of s 250 has been strictly complied with. The provisions of this section are complied with if the Magistrate fixed the compensation in his order of discharge. If the complainant was not in Court at the time the order of discharge is passed, the Magistrate would not be justified in keeping the accused in custody with the charge hanging over him while the complainant is being fetched to show cause. It might be that the complainant could not be procured for a month. The proviso to the section contemplates that the direction in the first paragraph of the section is conditional or in the nature of a rule and that the rule shall not be made absolute until the complainant has shown cause. 18 C. W. N. 702 = 15 Cr. L. J. 150.

It is enough if the order for compensation is substantially a continuation of the order of discharge or acquittal and part of the same proceedings—The trying Magistrate signed and dated his order of discharge, then recorded an order calling on the complainant to show cause why he should not be directed to pay compensation, recorded and considered the complainant's objections and at once passed an order that compensation should be paid. The entire proceedings followed one another on the same date, held that the order for payment of compensation was substantially incorporated in and made a part of the order of discharge, 8 Bom. L. R. 847 = 4 Cr. L. J. 423. The trying Magistrate incorporated in his order of discharge an order directing the complainant to show cause, then adjourned the proceedings and after considering the complainant's representation passed an order directing compensation, the order of discharge having been passed four days previously, held that even though the proceedings were irregular, there had been a substantial compliance, 36 A. 152. The intention of the Legislature in including the words 'by his order of acquittal' was not so much to secure that the Magistrate should pronounce the order of acquittal and compensation in one breath as might be supposed from the cases cited as to make it clear that the order of compensation should be passed in the same proceedings and not in further independent proceedings involving the recalling and re-examination of witnesses and in fact all the labours of a fresh trial. The result of following the cases in 25 A. 315; 34 A. 354 and 38 C. 302 would be

13. Compensation may be ordered for false complaint of wrongful seizure of cattle.—It was formerly held that on the dismissal of a complaint of wrongful seizure of cattle, it is not competent to a Court to act under this section and award compensation to the person against whom complaint is made 18 A. 353; 23 C. 248; 9 M. 102 and 374. These cases were decided under the Code of 1882. Now the definition of the word "offence" is made to "include any act in respect of which a complaint may be made under s. 20 of the *Cattle Trespass Act*, 1871," therefore dismissal of a complaint of wrongful seizure of cattle is equivalent to discharge or acquittal and consequently it seems compensation is now awardable. The distinction should, however, be kept in mind between compensation under this section and under s. 22 of the *Cattle Trespass Act*, under this section compensation is to the accused, while under s. 22 it is to the complainant and an appeal lies under s. 407 from an order under this section, there is no appeal under s. 407, 29 M. 817.

13-A. When there were two charges and there was conviction as to one and acquittal as to another, held, that to order compensation to be paid in respect of the charge as to which there was an acquittal is illegal, 16 A. L. J. 499.

14. No compensation for cases instituted on Police report.—The operation of this section is restricted to cases instituted by complaint as defined in the Code or upon information given to a Police-officer or Magistrate, and consequently it has no application to a case instituted on a Police report, or on information given by a Police-officer, 21 C. 979; 5 C. W. N. 370; 7 C. W. N. 208; 7 M. 563 and 1901 A. W. N. 162 and 6 A. 86. But where a case is ultimately instituted upon a Police report, but is originally based on information given to a Police-officer, held, that the person who gave the information to the Police-officer may be dealt with under s. 250, 14 C. W. N. 326 = 11 Cr. L. J. 201. No compensation can be ordered against a person whose statement is an inquiry instituted by the Police formed the basis of the further proceedings, 1 Patna L. J. 106 = 17 Cr. L. J. 336.

15. No compensation for cases instituted under s. 476.—Where a case is sent for trial under s. 476 to a Magistrate, the Magistrate cannot pass an order under this section directing the person at whose instance the case was sent to pay compensation as no case was instituted either by complaint or by information given to a Police-officer or to a Magistrate 14 Bom. L. R. 116 = 1 Bom. Cr. Ca. 237 = 14 Cr. L. J. 1.

15-A. Compensation can be awarded in a case originated by a complaint before a Village Magistrate.—1917 M. W. N. 156.

15-B. A complaint under s. 28 of the Bombay Public Conveyances Act, 1883, is not a complaint in respect of an offence within the meaning of s. 230, Cr. P. C. The Court has therefore no power to make an order under s. 250; 44 B. 463.

WHO MAY BE MADE TO PAY COMPENSATION.

16. Compensation for information given subsequent to complaint.—The accusation against the accused was not made on the information on which the case was instituted but the arrest of the accused was due to clues subsequently furnished by the complainant or other persons interested in the case, and it was argued that it was only the accusations in the first information that could be dealt with under this section. Held, that though the original complainant may not be liable for all accusations made by others interested in the case in its course, yet where the original complainant himself is the author of the subsequent accusations he may be dealt with under s. 250, 14 C. W. N. 326 = 11 Cr. L. J. 201.

17. Person giving information to Village Magistrate, which the Village Magistrate is bound to pass on to Police.—A man who complains to a Village Magistrate of a non bailable offence, knowing that the latter must in the ordinary course of his duty report the substance of the complaint to the Police, gives information to the Police just as effectively as if he went in person to the Police-station and if the Police charge the case, it is a case instituted on information given to a Police-officer within the meaning of s. 250. The case would be different if the information was not a matter which the village headman is bound to pass on, 27 M. L. J. 37 = 1916 M. W. N. 804 = 15 Cr. L. J. 431 where 25 M. 667; 21 M. L. J. 138 = 10 M. L. T. 550 = 13 Cr. L. J. 29 and Cr. R. C. 627 of 1913 were distinguished from on the authority of 32 M. 255 (F.B.). See also 16 Cr. L. J. 243 (M.), 17 Cr. L. J. 503; 22 M. L. J. 72. See Note 14 45 M. L. J. 255.

18. A person who institutes a complaint under the orders of a superior officer cannot be ordered to pay compensation.—A Magistrate can order compensation to be paid by a person to the accused or by whom the prosecution of the accused was on the complaint of that person or on information given by that person to a Police-officer or to a Magistrate within the meaning of this section. (i) A *darshan* or a process server on the command of a Civil Court, entrusted with the execution of a writ, reported to the Court that a person

obstructed him in attaching property as commanded by the writ, and a report was thereupon made by the Court to a Magistrate, with a view to proceedings being taken against the obstructor. The Magistrate acquitted the accused and ordered the *karkun* to pay the accused compensation under this section. *Held*, that such last mentioned order was wrong, the *karkun* not being a complainant within the meaning of this section. In such a case as the above the Subordinate Judge should be regarded as the complainant, and he having acted judicially, was not liable to the penalty provided in the section, 1 B. 175; 20 C. 481; 26 A. 183, where 20 C. 481 is followed, 25 P. R. 1910 = 11 Cr. L. J. 634; Weir 11, 318. (ii) Where on the sanction of an Assistant Superintendent of Police to prosecute for an offence, a Station House Officer prepared a charge-sheet which was presented to the Magistrate by a constable, and the Magistrate while discharging the woman made an order under this section directing the constable to pay compensation, *held*, that the order was illegal. The constable was not in such circumstances "the person upon whose complaint or information the accusation was made," 1 B. 175 referred to 21 M. L. J. 844 = 10 M. L. T. 191 = 12 Cr. L. J. 432.

19 Person complaining under the authority of an executive body may be made to pay compensation.—The accused was charged by a municipal peon under the sanction of the municipality with the offence of easing herself within municipal limits of S. The trying Magistrate acquitted the accused, and ordered the peon to pay one rupee as compensation to the accused. The District Magistrate referred the case to the High Court on the authority of the case in 1 B. 175 for reversal of the order of compensation. *Held*, that this case differed from the one cited, as there the complaint was preferred by a Judge acting judicially. An executive body cannot authorize a servant to prefer a wrongful complaint and so screen the complainant from the legal penalty, Ratanlal 309. But this section was held inapplicable where a Municipal *Jamadar* arrested a person whom he considered to be committing in his presence an offence, the person arrested having been sent up for trial in the usual manner by the Police and having been acquitted, 1901 A. W. N. 142.

20. Judicial officer acting as such cannot be ordered to pay compensation.—See Note 18 above

21 Liability of Public officers to pay compensation.—Public officers are not exempted from liability to make compensation for vexatious and frivolous complaints, Weir II, 317. But where a public servant only give evidence as a witness where the proceedings were instituted on the information of his official superior, an order directing the public servant who gave evidence to pay compensation was *held* bad, Weir II, 318. As to Police officers, see Note 14 above

22 Police-officers may be made to pay compensation.—Where a Police-officer is not permitted by this Code to make a report *eg* in a non cognizable case, he may initiate proceedings by laying information before the Magistrate just as any other complainant might do. Such information will be a complaint within the meaning of this section and compensation may be awarded if the complaint is vexatious, 26 B. 150 (F.B.) which overrules 22 B. 934. Following this case it was *held* that where a Police-officer lays information under s. 68 (c) of the *Bombay District Police Act*, it is a complaint and a Magistrate has jurisdiction to grant compensation if he decides that the case was frivolous or vexatious, 6 S. L. R. 82 = 13 Cr. L. J. 752. See, however, Note 14

23. Can a servant be made to pay compensation?—Where a servant complained on behalf of his master, it was *held* that the servant was not liable to pay compensation under this section, 17 P. R. 1879 and 24 P. R. 1869, but it would be different now. See 14 C. W. N. 326 = 11 Cr. N. J. 601, where it was *held* that the question whether a servant can be *held* responsible for information lodged on behalf of his master was a question on fact and depended on the question whether the servant is merely the mouthpiece of the master and is merely giving expression to his master's accusation or whether he joins personally in the accusation himself.

24. Guardian of minor cannot be made to pay compensation.—A guardian or next friend of a minor complainant cannot be ordered to pay compensation to the accused, 1 P. W. R. 1912 = 83 P. L. R. 1912 = 13 Cr. L. J. 138.

25-A. Where a person gives information to another to the effect that a certain constable has committed extortion intending that a complaint should be made on his behalf and the complaint is dismissed as frivolous, *held* that such a person is liable to make compensation to the accused, the fact that he employed another in giving the information being immaterial, 151 A. L. J. 879; 40 A. 79.

WHO MAY ORDER COMPENSATION.

25. It is only the Magistrate that hears the case that can award compensation.—When a Magistrate acquitted the accused and was of opinion that compensation should be awarded subject to complainant showing cause and was transferred before passing final orders and his successor awarded compensation, *held* the order was bad as the successor had not heard the case 1892 A. W. N. 58


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25-A.—Magistrate by whom the case is heard.—Whether Magistrate who decided the case, but has not heard whole of the evidence can order compensation? Where part of the evidence was heard by one Magistrate and then the case was made over to another Magistrate under s. 34b Cr P C., the latter Magistrate heard the rest of the evidence and decided the case, *held* that such Magistrate was competent to order compensation under s. 250, 19 A. L. J. 631.

26. Appellate Court cannot award compensation.—The special provisions of this section are applicable only to original trials. "The Magistrate by whom the case is heard" does not include the Court of Appeal. Therefore a District Magistrate cannot on appeal while setting aside the order of the Subordinate Magistrate convicting the accused, direct the complainant to pay compensation 3 Bom. L. R. 841; 7 Bom. L. R. 998 = 3 Cr. L. J. 88; 8 M. H. G. R. Appx. VII. The Appellate Court in reversing a conviction is not competent to make an order under this section. In view of the express terms "*Magistrate by whom the case is heard*," s. 423 (1) (d) cannot be taken to confer such power on the Appellate Court. The order for compensation must therefore be made by the Original Court 1892 A. W. N. 58; 28 A. 625; *contra* 14 C. W. N. 212 = 11 Cr. L. J. 46. But the Full Bench of the Calcutta High Court (JENKINS, C.J., *dissenting*) reconsidered the decision in 14 C. W. N. 212, and overruling it, *held* that this section, being confined by its terms to the Courts of Magistrates trying cases in the first instance, does not confer on the Appellate Court the power to order compensation to accused. It is not an order "consequential or incidental" to an order under this section but is a special power given to an original Magistrate alone, 39 C. 157 (F.B.); 45 A. 80; 7 Lah. 152.

PROCEDURE IN SECTION TO BE STRICTLY FOLLOWED.

27. Complainant must be called on to show cause and his objections recorded.—In a proceeding under this section, the procedure provided by cls. (a) and (b) should be strictly followed. An order directing payment of compensation ought not to be made without calling on the complainant to show cause against it as required by cl. (a) of this section, and the Magistrate should record and consider any objection which the complainant may urge against the making of the direction, Ratanlal 726; 3 Bom. L. R. 586 and 777; Weir II, 310; 5 C. W. N. 214; 11 C. W. N. 62, 9 A. L. J. 170 = 13 Cr. L. J. 268; 38 C. 302. The provisions relating to summary do not justify a Magistrate in omitting to record the complainant's objections to his order directing payment of compensation under this section and the omission to comply with the proviso to this section is more than a mere irregularity which could be cured by s. 537, 1906 U. B. R. Cr. Pro. 51 = 5 Cr. L. J. 298; 2 S. L. R. 4 and 14 = 10 Cr. L. J. 220 and 229. See also 8 S. L. R. 25 = 15 Cr. L. J. 666. Where owing to the absence of the complainant, the Magistrate made the order absolute stating "complainant is absent. His brother verbally shows cause which is insufficient," *held*, the order was bad as the complainant was in fact given no opportunity of showing cause 18 C. W. N. 1277 = 15 Cr. L. J. 707, 24 Bom. L. R. 805; but see 20 A. L. J. 369 (*contra*).

It is not a condition precedent to the making of an order for compensation under s. 250 of the Code that the Magistrate should issue a formal notice to the complainant to show cause (9 A. L. J. 170 *distinguished*) 43 A. 474.

But where the Magistrate believing that the complainant has deliberately absented himself on the day judgment was delivered ordered the complainant to pay compensation under s. 250 without giving him an opportunity to show cause against the order, *held* that the order was illegal and must be set aside, 24 A. L. J. 170.

28. Magistrate bound to record his reasons.—A Magistrate in ordering a complainant to pay compensation under this section should state his reasons why he deems the complaint to be vexatious and should also state in his judgment the facts of the case with a criticism of the incidents involved in it. The statement that in his opinion the prosecution evidence is highly unsatisfactory and that upon the evidence and the written statement and documents he has no hesitation in saying the case is vexatious, is not sufficient 10 C. W. N. 311; 3 Cr. L. J. 390. The reasons must be contained in the same order discharging or acquitting the accused 18 Cr. L. J. 1913 = 14 Cr. L. J. 43. As to what would be a sufficient compliance with the law as enacted by s. 250 (b) of the proviso, see 8 Bom. L. R. 847 = 4 C. L. J. 423.

29. Complainant cannot adduce further evidence nor is he entitled to an adjournment.—"*consider any objection which complainant may urge*" do not entitle the complainant to adduce further evidence to prove that the charge was a true one. The direction to pay compensation should be made in the same order of discharge or acquittal. This clearly shows that there is not to be a separate inquiry and it is not required that a separate proceeding should be *held* and further evidence taken, 1898 F. T. J. 3. Intention of the Legislature that a complainant should be entitled to an adjournment to produce further evidence much less to an opportunity of producing further evidence 36 A. 192. See also 15 Cr. L. J. 504.

30. Whether order for payment of compensation must form part of the order of discharge or acquittal.

—It should be noted carefully that under the newly amended s 250 it is only the order calling upon the complainant to show cause why he should not pay compensation which has to be contained in the order of discharge, and not the order for payment of compensation which has necessarily to be a subsequent order. So now the order for the payment of compensation cannot form part of the order of discharge or acquittal, 7 *Lah. 121*. One of the two accused was discharged and the case was against the other accused was adjourned when he was acquitted and the Magistrate called upon the complainant to show cause against an order for compensation being passed and directed the complainant to pay compensation to each of the accused that under s. 250 as now amended the procedure adopted was now illegal. The case against the accused who was discharged was at an end when the order of discharge was made and the order to show cause under s 250 so far as payment of compensation to him was concerned should have been made along with the order of discharge 29 *C. W. N. 127*. In view of the latest amendment as the order for the payment of compensation cannot form part of the order of discharge or acquittal, the following cases have lost much of their force

A Magistrate in making an order under this section must do so in passing the order of discharge or acquittal. Where a Magistrate happened to make an order by way of separate proceedings on a date subsequent to the date of the discharge of the accused *held* that the order was made without jurisdiction, as there is nothing in the Code which authorizes the Magistrate to hold an inquiry on a subsequent date and make an order under this section, 25 *A. 315*; 34 *A. 354*. An order of compensation passed not at the time of the discharge of the accused but days after, at the time when the accused was acquitted, is made without jurisdiction 10 *N. L. R. 8 = 15 Cr. L. J. 290*. Where a Magistrate discharged the accused in the absence of the complainants and on a subsequent date after procuring their attendance made an order under this section awarding compensation, *held* that the order was illegal and that the proper course would have been for the Magistrate simply to adjourn the case without discharging the accused, with a view to secure the attendance of the complainant, 57 *P. R. 1905 = 3 Cr. L. J. 123*; 16 *P. W. R. 1913 = 99 P. L. R. 1913 = 14 Cr. L. J. 48*. See also 23 *M. L. J. Sh. N. 21*. A Magistrate in the same order discharged the accused and called on the complainant to show cause why he should not pay compensation of Rs 20 and subsequently after hearing him made an order for payment of Rs 10, *held* though the procedure seemed to be perfectly fair and reasonable it did not fulfil the requirements of s 250. What that section evidently contemplates and expressly requires is that, before a Magistrate makes it the ground for discharging a person complained against, on a ground that the complaint was frivolous or vexatious he shall hear the complainant on that aspect of the case and unless he does this the whole proceeding is void, 38 *C. 302*. Where, however, a Magistrate by the same order discharging the accused, declared the case to be vexatious and directed the complainant to pay a compensation of Rs 50 to the accused, subject to any cause to be shown by him and on the following day made the order absolute, *held distinguishing* 38 *C. 302*, that the requirements of s 250 has been strictly complied with. The provisions of this section are complied with if the Magistrate fixed the compensation in his order of discharge. If the complainant was not in Court at the time the order of discharge is passed the Magistrate would not be justified in keeping the accused in custody with the charge hanging over him while the complainant is being fetched to show cause. It might be that the complainant could not be procured for a month. The proviso to the section contemplates that the direction in the first paragraph of the section is conditional or in the nature of a rule and that the rule shall not be made absolute until the complainant has shown cause 18 *C. W. N. 702 = 15 Cr. L. J. 150*.

It is enough if the order for compensation is substantially a continuation of the order of discharge or acquittal and part of the same proceedings—The trying Magistrate signed and dated his order of discharge, then recorded an order calling on the complainant to show cause why he should not be directed to pay

complainant to show cause, then adjourned the proceedings and after considering the complainant's representations passed an order directing compensation, the order of discharge having been passed four days previously, *held* that even though the proceedings were irregular, there had been a substantial compliance, 35 *A. 132*. The intention of the Legislature in including the words 'by his order of acquittal' was not so much to secure that the Magistrate should pronounce the order of acquittal and compensation in one breath as might be supposed from the cases cited as to make it clear that the order of compensation should be passed in the same proceedings and not in further independent proceedings involving the recalling and re-examination of witnesses and in fact all the labours of a fresh trial. The result of following the cases in 25 *A. 315*; 34 *A. 354* and 38 *C. 302* would be

that the trial would have to be indefinitely protracted if the complainant either could not or would not appear on the day fixed for judgment. Where, therefore the complainant was absent owing to illness on 14th June when the case came to a conclusion and the accused was acquitted and in the order of acquittal it was stated that the case was frivolous and notice was ordered to the complainant why compensation should not be directed and on the 28th June the final order directing payment of compensation was passed, *held* following 8 Bom. L.R. 877 = 4 Cr. L.R. 423, that s. 250 had been substantially complied with, 7 B. L.R. 123 = 15 Cr. L.J. 504. *See* 18 C. W. N. 702 = 15 Cr. L.J. 150 *above*. An order of discharge in which was incorporated an order calling on the complainant to show cause, was followed by an adjournment the complainant showed cause but did not impugn the jurisdiction of the Court and finally an order for compensation was passed *held* that in spite of the adjournment there had been in substance one single proceeding, 1903 A. W. N. 214 = 2 Cr. L.J. 522. *See also* (1916) 2 M. W. N. 159 = 4 L. W. 32 = 12 Cr. L.J. 314; 22 Bom. L.R. 184.

31. Imprisonment in default of the payment of Compensation.—Under the old law it was *held* that the order for imprisonment in default of payment of compensation could not be made until some attempt was made to recover the compensation. But under the new amendment by the addition of sub-sec. (2)(A) the Magistrate is empowered to further order that in default of payment of compensation the person ordered shall suffer simple imprisonment not exceeding thirty days and this can be done now by the order directing payment of compensation under sub-sec. (2). So the following cases holding that imprisonment in default cannot be awarded in the order for payment of compensation have become obsolete, 22 C. 538, 23 C. 251, 19 A. 73, 14 P. R. 1902, 22 C. 139 at p. 163, 18 P. R. 1903, Ratanlal 611.

31-A. Whether term of imprisonment to be undergone in the whole or in respect of each accused.—Where under the provisions of s. 250 (2) of the Code the Court orders the complainant to pay compensation to each of the several accused persons separately and in default to suffer imprisonment, imprisonment may be awarded for default of each such separate payment as ordered. 3 Rang. 93.

32. Warrant of distress to precede order for imprisonment.—A Magistrate in making an order for compensation is ordinarily bound if the amount be not paid, to proceed to the recovery of it by distress and sale of the moveables of the person ordered to pay. It was formerly held that if such person admits that he has no goods and thereby waives the right to have the amount levied by distress, the Magistrate may proceed, to imprison him in jail, and the imprisonment will run out the term ordered, unless the sum be sooner paid, *see*, unless the imprisoned person pays it. But the warrant of distress cannot have currency simultaneously with the imprisonment, because the alternative permitted in case of failure to realise has already been adopted, 23 W. R. 64. But it has now been ruled that even if the person ordered to pay, pleads inability the issue of a warrant under s. 386 is a condition precedent to the making of the order for imprisonment, 28 M. 127. This section construed with s. 388 (2) makes the issue of a warrant for the levy of the amount of the compensation by distress and sale of the moveable property of the complainant a condition precedent to the carrying out of the sentence of imprisonment, 3 L. B. R. 32. *See also* 28 C. 164.

APPEAL AND REVISION.

33. Are appeals under this section governed by Chap XXXI?—S. 250 (3) does not declare what the powers of the Appellate Court are in disposing of appeals, it is therefore necessary to invoke the aid of s. 423 for this purpose. S. 250 is not self-contained, 28 M. L.J. 204 = 16 Cr. L.J. 128. A Sessions Judge is not competent to set aside in appeal the order granting compensation passed by a first-class Magistrate under this section, 1 Bom. L.R. 330.

33-A. Scope of sub-sec. (3) of s. 250.—Sub-sec. (3) of s. 250 of the Code means that whenever a complainant or informant has been ordered under sub-sec. (2) to pay compensation exceeding Rs. 50 the right of appeal is given, whether the compensation has been awarded only to one accused or has to be distributed amongst a number of accused in sums not exceeding Rs. 50. 26 Bom. L.R. 1243 = 49 B. 450, *see also* 24 A. L.J. 167.

34. On appeal, notice should go to accused and Public Prosecutor.—*See* s. 422. Though there is no express provision of law that notice should be given to the accused in an appeal from an order of compensation under s. 150, it is desirable that notice should go to the accused as he will be the party prejudiced, 29 M. 187; but the order on appeal will not be set aside merely because no notice is given to the accused, 33 M. 89. But on general principles '*audi alteram partem*' it would be improper to make an order without notice to the accused, 28 M. L.J. 204 = 16 Cr. L.J. 123. It is, however, imperative that notice of the appeal should be given to the Crown under s. 422, 29 M. 187. In 27 M. L.J. 629 = 16 M. L.T. 426 = 15 Cr. L.J. 643, it was pointed out that under

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the rules of practice notice should go to the District Magistrate but the Court declined to interfere with an order passed without such notice as no one had been prejudiced. When a complainant has been ordered to pay compensation to a person accused by him but acquitted such latter person is not the accused within the meaning of cl. (2) of s 422 and has no right to be heard in a proceeding relating merely to the order for compensation. It is rather the complainant who is the accused within the meaning of that clause he being virtually accused that is convicted and sentenced for making a frivolous or vexatious complaint. He is the person who has to make a defence in such a proceeding and not the person who though once accused has been acquitted and whose acquittal is not in question 14 P R 1838, 41 M L J 172

35 Revisional jurisdiction of the High Court.—An order under this section made by a first-class Magistrate may be revised by the High Court under ss 435 and 439 and when compensation ordered has been paid the amount paid may be recovered under s 547 if the High Court sets aside the order 29 P R 1903, 12 P R 1833 and see also 10 Cr L J 569 (M)

36 Death of accused or complainant pending revision of order.—When a Magistrate awarded compensation under this section to an accused who afterwards died and the complainant in revision applied to the High Court to call for and revise the records it was held that as the accused was dead no order could be made because none could be passed to the prejudice of a person who could not be served with a notice, *Ratanlal* 634 In a similar case where pending revision against the order awarding compensation the complainant petitioner dies the application does not abate but can be prosecuted by his legal representatives 24 P R 1908 = 9 Cr L J 103.

MISCELLANEOUS.

37 Award of compensation followed by granting of sanction to prosecute the complainant is not bad.—In acquitting the accused on a charge of theft which the Magistrate found to be false and malicious he awarded compensation to be paid to each of them by complainant. Subsequently one of the accused applied for and obtained sanction to prosecute complainant under s 211 I P C and it was granted. Held that the order was not illegal 21 M. 237 following 6 B L R 296 = 15 W R 9, *Weir* II, 311 The passing of the order of compensation does not prevent the Magistrate from granting a sanction to prosecute the complainant under s 211 I P C 37 B 376, where 21 M 237 is followed and 26 C. 181 is *dissented from*

38 The grant of sanction no bar to granting compensation.—A Magistrate by granting or by expressing in intention to grant sanction to prosecute the complainant under s. 211 I P C is not precluded from awarding under this section reasonable compensation to the accused 30 P W R 1907 In 21 M 237 the Court *dissented from* the case in 22 C 586, and remarked We do not think that there is anything in s 230 to justify the conclusion that a Magistrate who grants sanction to prosecute for offence punishable under ss 211 and 193 I P C. *ipso facto* debarred from also granting compensation under that section to the person falsely accused. The sanction to prosecute for making a false charge is granted on the grounds of public policy for an offence against public justice. The compensation is granted partly in order to deter a complainant from making vexatious and frivolous complaints and partly in order to compensate the accused for trouble and expense to which he has been put by the complainant. We can see no ground in law or reason why compensation should not be granted in a case in which the Magistrate also directs prosecution for making a false charge. The case in 6 B L R 296 = 15 W R 9 appears to be an authority directly opposed to their conclusion followed 18 P R 1901 There is nothing in the Code which makes it illegal for a Magistrate who takes proceeding under s 476 to award compensation under this section 7 B. L. R. 10 = 14 Cr L J, 337, 10 S L R 162 See also 6 P R 1904. Failure to make an order under this section does not preclude the Magistrate from directing the prosecution of the complainant 4 Bar L T 246 = 12 Cr L J 521

39 Discretionary with the Magistrate what course to adopt in any case.—The question whether the discretion given by this section has been rightly exercised must always depend upon the facts of the particular case. If the false charge is of such a nature that a prosecution is necessary on grounds of public policy it may well be that a Magistrate would exercise his discretion wrongly if instead of sanction a prosecution he awarded compensation. If the false charge is one which does not render it necessary on grounds of public policy that a prosecution should be sanctioned a Magistrate who makes an order for compensation cannot be said to exercise his discretion wrongly 27 M 59 In 1 S. L. R. 23 (F B) = 9 Cr L J 263, it was held following 27 M 29, and overruling 1 S. L. R. 12 = 9 Cr L J 235 that in every case it must in the first instance be left to the discretion of the Magistrate to decide whether a charge which he finds to be false is also vexatious so as to authorize him to award compensation. The words frivolous or vexatious used in this section are not used

ejusdem generis. They are applied to the accusation and not to the offence which it alleges. See 37 B 376. See also 29 C 479, where the order under this section was set aside on the ground that the complaint was of a serious offence, without prejudice to the Magistrate granting sanction for a prosecution under s 211, I P C.

40 Calcutta view—Sanction to prosecute and award of compensation cannot be made at one time—It was never intended that recourse should be had to the provisions of this section in a case in which the trying Magistrate is of opinion that the complaint is wilfully and maliciously false, and that the complainant should be prosecuted for an offence under s 211, I P C. To sanction or direct a prosecution *and also* to proceed to award compensation is an improper use of discretion, 26 C 181. By such action the Magistrate, in fact, prejudices the issue of the charge which he was submitting for trial, 22 C 535. Also 13 P. R. 1896. But this view has not been generally accepted elsewhere. See Notes 38 and 39.

41. The total amount of compensation to be paid under this section.—Under s 250 sub-sec. (2) all that is prohibited is that compensation to the accused or each of them where there are more than one should not exceed Rs 100 in amount. The section does not mean that if there are a number of accused persons the total amount awarded to them must not exceed the maximum. 24 A. L. J. 221.

CHAPTER XXI.

OF THE TRIAL OF WARRANT-CASES BY MAGISTRATES

Magistrates must follow the Code and not any usage of their own.—The provisions of the Code have to be followed and Magistrates are not at liberty to substitute for the procedure of the Code a procedure which has arisen by usage, however convenient the latter may be. A trial conducted in a mode materially different from that prescribed by law is not a proper trial, 17 Bom L R. 490 = 3 Bom Cr. Ca. 59 = 16 Cr. L. J. 533.

Procedure in **251.** The following procedure shall be observed by Magistrates in the
warrant-cases. trial of warrant cases

Notes.—1. **Procedure to be observed by Presidency Magistrates**—A warrant-case must be tried by a Presidency Magistrate in the manner provided by this Chapter, subject only to the special provisions of s. 362 as to the mode of taking down the evidence, Ratanlal 539.

2. Procedure—Combination of summons and warrant-cases.—Two charges were made against the accused arising out of exactly the same state of facts and under the same circumstances. One charge was of voluntarily causing hurt and the other of theft. In such a case when no order is made for a separate trial, it is plain that the mode of trial applicable to such a case is that which is applicable to the greater of the two charges, *see*, the procedure should be that prescribed for warrant-cases, 11 C 91, 18 M L T. 92 = 16 Cr. L. J. 540, 3 L. B. R. 113 = 3 Cr. L. J. 350. See also 29 C. 431 and Note 2 to s. 241.

3. Trial of summons-case commenced as warrant case.—See 16 Cr. L. J. 250 (M.) and 18 M. L. T. 92 = 1915 M. W. N. 546 = 16 Cr. L. J. 840 and Note 4 to s. 241.

4. Trial of a warrant-case as a summons-case illegal—Where a Magistrate tried a warrant-case (under s. 9 of the *Opium Act I of 1878*) without recording any evidence in support of the prosecution as required by s. 252 and merely calling upon the accused to plead to the charge, convicted him on his own admission as under section 243 without even framing a formal charge, *held* that the procedure adopted was more than a mere irregularity and the conviction was set aside on the ground it had occasioned a failure of justice to the accused 29 M. 372. See also 17 P. R. 1887. If a Magistrate tries a warrant-case as a summons-case and professes to deal with it as a summons case, his procedure is wholly irregular and in such trial, if he passes an order of acquittal under s. 245, such order can at best be regarded only as one of discharge under s. 253 and may be dealt with as such under s. 437, 1885 A. W. N. 96 and 260. The mere fact that a summons instead of a warrant had been issued in a case falling under this Chapter will not justify the procedure as in summons-case, 10 W. R. 31, *see* also 5 M. L. T. 205, 7 M. 454.

5. Trial—When commenced.—In one case seven persons were charged by the Police with theft in a building, of dishonest receipt and disposal of stolen property. The Magistrate took evidence against all the seven, discharged two and having come to the conclusion that the disposals of property by the appellant and the remaining accused did not form one transaction, he framed separate charges and tried the appellant separately from the other accused, but without re-hearing the evidence for the prosecution separately, although portion of the evidence which were relevant against the remaining accused, had no connection with the case of

with

Over-set r t [imp] S P P OVERSET P r t
to n OVERTAKING
1 To turn from the proper position, for want
of support, to turn upon the side of a
ward, as, to overset in a battle, etc.

1 To influence or control by
to subject to superior authority
his passion and animosity overruled his conscience
to control in such a way as to bring to
the human spirit

To overthrow as to erect to
 estate, to occur in a number of ps
 To turn or be turned over into
 back or bottom
 1. An upsets & ruins a crown.
 2. superfluity [004]
 of wret hand pond
 all the cross country of the church
 w) r) To now over and over a
 together I drawing in the
 and then pass by the
 do where the tie was [re u]
 vercast
 To ever shade r t to cover with shade being
 with anything that causes darkness or t of it
 of gloomy
 To ever shade w r t [amp & p] overcast
 To ever shade w r t OVERSHADOWING
 OWED p pr & shadow or shade of t to cast

[illegible][illegible]

the appellant *Held*, that the word "trial" includes the taking of evidence in support of the prosecution, as also the whole of the subsequent procedure laid down in Chap XXI of the Code for the trial of warrant-cases and that the appellant should be tried *de novo*. The words "claims to be tried" in s 256 no doubt give colour to the argument that no trial commences until after the accused refuses to plead or does not plead or claims to be tried, but the words do not really raise any doubt that a trial under Chap XXI commences when the accused appears or is brought before a Magistrate under s 252, 3 L. B. R. 280 = 5 Cr. L. J. 417. But see Note (2) under s 4 (4) at p 12, 38 M. 585 and 29 P. R. 1914 = 16 Cr. L. J. 81.

252. (1) When the accused appears or is brought before a Magistrate such Magistrate shall proceed to hear the complainant (if any) and take all such evidence as may be produced in support of the prosecution

* Provided that the Magistrate shall not be bound to hear any person as complainant in any case in which the complaint has been made by a Court

(2) The Magistrate shall ascertain, from the complainant or otherwise, the names of any person likely to be acquainted with the facts of the case and to be able to give evidence for the prosecution, and shall summon to give evidence before himself such of them as he thinks necessary

Notes.—1. Magistrate may issue summons or dispense with the appearance of the accused.—A Magistrate has under s 204 discretion in warrant cases to issue a summons instead of a warrant for the attendance of the accused. See also 6 S. L. R. 206 = 14 Cr. L. J. 272

2. Magistrate not competent to examine how accused "is brought before the Court."—There is no provision of law which requires the Magistrate to examine the question as to how the accused came into the hands of the Police. Therefore, where a foreigner after committing an offence in British Indian territory, fled to his country and was pursued and arrested there by British Police and brought before the Court and convicted *held* that the conviction was legal and valid 6 P. R. 1899, 7 Bur. L. R. 66 at p. 68. See Note 15 at p 84 and Note 1 at p 441

3. Accused cannot be remanded to custody unless there be sworn testimony.—See ss 167 and 344 and Notes thereunder. A prisoner arrested under a warrant should be brought promptly before a Magistrate, who has then no authority to detain him further in custody or to remand him to prison without some reason being made manifest to him either in the shape of sworn testimony given before him, or in some other form which can be put upon the record and which is sufficient to justify him in sending the prisoner to prison, and there to be detained for a limited period for further examination, a period which is never in any case to exceed fifteen days 11 B. L. R. Appx VIII = 20 W. R. 23, 6 M. 69, 36 C. 174, and Notes thereunder

4. Evidence against accused to be recorded as early as practicable.—An accused person has a right to have the evidence against him recorded at as early a period as possible, and the fact that there is or may be a great body of evidence forthcoming against him is not a ground for detention for inordinate period 6 M. 63

5. Accused entitled to inspection of documents filed as exhibits but cannot call for fresh documents.—In a case of criminal breach of trust complainant produced several documents as evidence against the accused and they were admitted as exhibits. The Magistrate refused their inspection by the accused, though he allowed him to take certified copies thereof *held* that the accused was entitled to inspection of all documents filed as exhibits in the case, 1 Bom. L. R. 433. After the examination in-chief of the witnesses for the prosecution had concluded and before any charge was framed, the Magistrate at the instance of the accused made an order requiring the complainant to produce certain records, *held*, the Magistrate was wrong in making such an order at that stage of the case. The accused's right to call evidence, either witnesses or documents does not arise until after the charge has been framed. The right is given to him by s 257 and is subject to the limitations enjoined by that section 8 S. L. R. 267 = 16 Cr. L. J. 245. See Note 3 to s 257

6. Warrant-case cannot be dismissed for non-payment of process fee.—The dismissal of a complaint for non-payment of process-fee is illegal, Weir II, 323. A complainant in a warrant-case is not bound to produce his own witnesses.

7. Right of accused to cross-examine witnesses before framing of charge.—Opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses for prosecution should be given to the accused if they should so desire even though the charge may not be framed, 8 C. W. N. 833. See Note 5 to s 256

* The provision to subsec (1) has been added by Act XV III of 1923

no who owns a rightful property
the legal or rightful title, whether
or not.

n. The state of being an owner with
exclusive right of possession, use
and disposal.

17 Grasso Lat-Gerurus of ALROCHS
Acna ALROCHS {Obs} Chucur pease
n. [see Ooze] Bark of oak beaten
ground small and mixed with water
same as Ooze
Lat-Gerurus of ALROCHS

the bovine genus of quadrup. dae species is who
a full size or nearly so

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[illegible]

A no acid found in many places to which it

Or's li n [See supra] (Eof) A genus of plants

Ox a little (49) n. (Vn) A yellow mineral consisting of exsulate of iron humboldtite. *Dum.*
Ox a white (11cm) A substance obtained by the dissolving of exsulate of samsonite and filtering from it is containing two equal alien a leaf of water. *Dum.*

[illegible]

(5) A plant of the genus *Anthox* (c) A tree
eye daisy or *Chrysanthemum* (d) A part of the
genus *Hil* m sweet wort
2 (Ornith) A bird of the genus *Ferns* (P
major) the greater intestine
3 (x-erph) (id) a Having large full eyes like those
of a crow

〓 A fly 1 a bug under the skin of a 〓
 〓 {From *ox* and *gang* 〓 } (U 〓
 〓 much land 〓 as an *ox* can plow in a 〓
 〓 to be five 〓 acres 〓 or as others allege
 〓
 〓 An instrument with a sharp iron

Dont make a number of the word

3 A measure of land being as narrow as could be
 effected by a hide cut into narrow strips STERN

[illegible]

into an oxide as metals and other substances
combination with oxygen

2nd It differs in ability to make acids from
weak to an acid as in oxides of carbon as ex:
its combination is not sufficient to form an acid.

x) action n. [Fe oxidation, or pl t n sp] The

operation. It usually consists of converting into an oxide an element or a group of elements by combining with it in suitable proportions of oxygen. (Chem.)

The French word was correctly spelt in the
at end of y in the second syllable, till about the
year 1840, when in ignorance of its etymology as of
the true history and composition of the term it is

~~XX~~

8. Duty of prosecution to come fully prepared to prove their case.—Under s. 252 the prosecutor is given full opportunity of substantiating the whole case. But it is expected, and the expectation is a right and proper one, that the prosecutors should come to Court with their case fully prepared and thought out. After the witnesses produced in support of the prosecution are heard, it is the duty of the Magistrate to see that the prosecutors are not allowed to set the Court on to a roaming inquiry, summoning persons in the hope that something may be elicited which would help their case and cases which ought to be heard within a fortnight are spoken out to a period of six weeks and more to the inconvenience of all concerned. There is no section in Code which authorizes a complainant to file a fresh list of prosecution witnesses, 12 A. L. J. 15 = 14 Cr. L. J. 682, but see 11 Bom. L. R. 1153 = 10 Cr. L. J. 830.

9. Magistrate bound to examine all witnesses tendered by the prosecutor.—See Note 2 to s. 253

10. Duty of prosecution in criminal trials.—Although it is for the accused in a criminal trial to establish in his defence any exception on which he relies, it is nevertheless the duty of the prosecution to throw all the light in its power upon all controverted facts relevant to the main issue, 1 P. R. 1884; 14 A. 521; 14 C. 265, 15 A. 6; 16 A. 84; 3 B. L. R. 200 = 11 Cr. L. J. 410. No adverse inference can be drawn against the accused for not having called any particular witness. See Notes 1 and 2 under s. 243

✓ **11. Magistrate must examine complainant.**—See Note 3 under s. 253

✓ **12. Magistrate bound to compel attendance of witnesses summoned—complainant not bound to pay process-fees.**—If, at the instance of one of the parties, a witness has been summoned as a witness and served with process, he has a right to call upon the Court to compel his attendance, 8 C. W. N 549. Where a Magistrate has once issued summonses for the attendance of witnesses, he is bound to have the processes enforced before disposing of the case. See 35 C. 1093; 4 M 329; 10 C. 931. There is nothing in this Code which enables a Magistrate to demand even from a complainant the expenses to be incurred by his witnesses though such a power is conferred by s. 244 (3) in a summons-case, 8 N. L. R. 65 = 13 Cr. L. J. 275.

13. No power to issue a warrant against a witness before issuing summons.—There is no legal sanction for a Magistrate taking cognizance of a complaint under s. 494, 1 P. C., to issue a warrant to compel the complainant's wife to attend as a witness, without first requiring her to attend by a summons as laid down by this section and it is only when the summons is neglected that severe measures can be taken. 22 P. W. B. 1907 = 6 Cr. L. J. 275.

14. Duty of Magistrate before summoning witnesses—witnesses not to be unnecessarily summoned.—On the 10th December, the complainant produced certain witnesses who were examined. On the 28th December, the complainant of his own accord filed a fresh list mentioning the names of 30 witnesses for the prosecution all of whom were summoned but not one was examined. The Magistrate ruled on s. 540 as justifying his action in summoning witnesses. KNOX J while strongly condemning the action of the Magistrate observed that it is the duty of the Magistrate to ascertain from the complainant or otherwise the names of the persons likely to be acquainted with the facts of the case and to be able to give evidence for the prosecution. The Magistrate must exercise his discretion in selecting out of such witnesses those who seem to be necessary and those who seem to be unnecessary. "A witness is not an inanimate being and is not to be moved about as if he were a sack or stone. He is a living person who has his work to do and whose convenience has to be considered. For a Magistrate to send for any person whom the complainant names in a supplementary list is a thoughtless act and in some cases causes very serious inconvenience to persons who ought not to be subjected to such inconvenience." Under s. 540 it was not intended that the Magistrate should exercise his powers at the bidding of any person but the powers are given to prevent any danger of miscarriage of justice just because some particular witness has not been called. 12 A. L. J. 15 = 14 Cr. L. J. 682 where 28 A. 302, 19 A. 502, 21 W. R. 61 and 2 C. W. N 702 referred to

253. (1) If, upon taking all the evidence referred to in section 252, and making such

Discharge of accused examination (if any) of the accused as the Magistrate thinks necessary, he finds that no case against the accused has been made out which, if un rebutted would warrant his conviction, the Magistrate shall discharge him

(2) Nothing in this section shall be deemed to prevent a Magistrate from discharging the accused at any previous stage of the case if, for reasons to be recorded by such Magistrate, he considers the charge to be groundless

Notes.—See Notes to s. 208 as to the duty of a Magistrate in Sessions cases, 340 for examination of accused, s. 259 when complainant is absent.

1. Magistrate has discretion to summon witnesses, but he is bound to examine those present.—It is not incumbent on the Magistrate to summon every person named as a witness by the complainant. This section must be read with s 252 which vests a discretionary power in the Magistrate, 23 W. R. 9. But he is not justified in discharging an accused person under this section without examining all the witnesses for the prosecution who were present and ready to give evidence, 11 C. W. N. 83. A person accused under s 408, I P C, cannot be discharged on the sole ground that the complaint was a mere matter of account.

2. Order of discharge not to be ordinarily made until all the prosecution evidence is taken.—An order of discharge cannot ordinarily be passed until the evidence of all the witnesses named for the prosecution has been taken, 4 M. 329, 20 W. R. 67, 22 W. R. 25; Ratanlal 21, 3 P. W. R. 1908 = 7 Cr. L. J. 272. In (1911) 1 M. W. N. 149 = 99 M. L. T. 302 = 12 Cr. L. J. 105 it was held that 4 M. 329 was passed at a time when the Code had no provision similar to sub-sec (2) and therefore a Magistrate does not act illegally in discharging the accused without examining all the prosecution witnesses. A Magistrate however, should not refuse to examine witnesses simply because their evidence will be to the same effect as that already taken for the prosecution, 3 C. 389, 2 A. 447. But this section and s 209 (2) relieve the Magistrate from the necessity of going on with an inquiry or trial when he is reasonably convinced on what has already been deposed that a criminal charge cannot be sustained, Ratanlal 201. 24 A. L. J. 512.

3. Order without hearing complainant that accused should not be proceeded against is illegal.—On the acquittal of a co accused, the other accused against whom warrants had been issued surrendered before the Deputy Magistrate who had acquitted the co accused. The Deputy Magistrate passed an order at once directing that the accused should not be proceeded against and that the warrant should be withdrawn, held that this order of the Magistrate was bad in law and should be set aside. The proper course for him was to send a notice to the complainant requiring him to proceed with the case and then dispose of the case according to law, 12 C. W. N. 68 = 6 Cr. L. J. 367.

4. Discharge after full inquiry not desirable.—Where there is a body of evidence which if believed justifies conviction, it is far better as a rule to draw up a charge and dispose of the case finally, 18 P. W. R. 1909 = 11 Cr. L. J. 110. See 8 A. L. J. 707 = 12 Cr. L. J. 471, where Knox, J, characterizes the procedure of delaying to frame a charge till all the evidence has been recorded as old fashioned and exploded. See Note 3 to s 254.

5. Not proceeding further against accused after issue of warrant amounts to a discharge.—Where after the issue of warrant of arrest against certain persons the Magistrate does not think it proper to proceed further held that the termination of proceedings against them is in effect an order of discharge, 4 C. W. N. 242.

6. Discharge without considering the evidence on record is illegal.—Where a Deputy Magistrate with drew to his own file a case which had been sent by him for trial to a Bench of Magistrates who had already recorded some evidence and on the day of hearing no evidence being produced, the Deputy Magistrate discharged the accused without taking into consideration the evidence already adduced, held the discharge was illegal as he should have disposed of the case on the evidence already on record, 38 C. 823.

7. In cases of doubt, discharge under this section would be the proper course.—Section 254 requires a charge to be framed only when the Magistrate is of opinion that there is ground for presuming that the accused has committed the offence. But if the evidence recorded does not raise any such presumption, but merely leads to a doubt, the Magistrate ought to discharge under this section and if he framed a charge in the circumstances he would be acting contrary to the spirit of s 254. 2 P. R. 1906 = 37 P. L. R. 1906 = 3 Cr. L. J. 343.

8. What are not proper grounds for discharge.—

(i) *Absence of complainant*.—See s 259. In a warrant case in which, although the complainant's witnesses and accused were present, the Magistrate discharged the accused on the report of a Police-officer, held, that this procedure was illegal, as the Magistrate was bound to take the evidence of the complainant before

4 C. W. N. 26 and 46; W. N. 57. See s 248 and Notes thereto. See also 20 C. W. N. 693 = 17 Cr. L. J. 193.

(ii) *Withdrawal of complaint*.—See 15 Bom. L. R. 61 = 14 Cr. L. J. 77. See s 249 and Notes 1 and 2 thereto.

(iii) *Illegal arrest by Police*.—A Magistrate is not justified in discharging an accused person merely because he has been illegally arrested by the Police without a warrant issued on complaint for a non cognizable offence. Ratanlal 73. See also 17 P. R. 1906 = 60 P. L. R. 1907 = 5 Cr. L. J. 89, and Note 2 to s 252.

(iv) *Want of jurisdiction*.—A Magistrate who finds he has no jurisdiction to try a case cannot discharge the accused under this section, but should proceed under s. 346 *Weir II, 323*.

9 *When reasons for discharge to be recorded*.—It is only where a Magistrate discharges without examining all the witnesses for the prosecution that he is bound under sub-sect. (2) to record his reasons for the discharge. The Legislature does not render the writing of reasons necessary where an accused person is discharged after the trying Magistrate had heard all the evidence for the prosecution. It is however, desirable that the Magistrate should record all his reasons for discharge having regard to the fact that the order is not final 9 *Bom L.R. 230 = 5 Cr L.J. 255*

10 *Taking evidence for defence without framing charge illegal*.—A Magistrate after examining the witnesses for the prosecution and the accused drew no charge but taking evidence for the defence discharged the accused under this section finding the offence not proved. *Held* that the Magistrate acted contrary to law and most unfairly towards the accused who therefore ought to be treated as acquitted under s. 258 29 *P.R. 1893; 1891 A.W.N. 180, 1896 A.W.N. 260; 18 Cr L.J. 1006*

11 *Accused has no right to call for evidence until after charge has been framed*.—See 8 *B.L.R. 267 = 16 Cr L.J. 245, Note 5 to s. 252*.

12. *Further inquiry in cases of discharge*.—As to powers of Sessions Judges and District Magistrates see ss. 436 and 437. As to the powers of the High Court see s. 431

13. *What a District Magistrate can or cannot do*.—A Magistrate of the district has power to order a Subordinate Magistrate to revive a case in which the accused has been discharged even though no additional evidence is forthcoming 32 *M. 220 (F.B.) 14 M. 234, 20 W.R. 46, 18 Cr L.J. 706*, though it is legal for a District Magistrate to order a re-trial on the same evidence such an order is opposed to principle as it is seriously prejudicial to the accused 8 *P.R. 1909, 8 P.R. 1900, 2 P.R. 1901*, but he cannot pass an order of remand directing a Subordinate Magistrate to proceed with the case from the stage at which he left it 20 *W.R. 47, 4 C. 647*. Nor is he competent to withdraw a case adjourned by a Deputy Magistrate for the purpose of framing a charge and then discharge the accused 30 *C. 693*. Nor has he jurisdiction to set aside an order directing that the accused should not be proceeded against (see Note 3 *supra*) and direct a re-trial of the accused as it was not an order dismissing a complaint or discharging the accused 12 *C.W.N. 63*. In exercise of the power to order further inquiry the District Magistrate cannot himself frame the charge or direct the Subordinate Magistrate to frame the charge and to try the accused 32 *M. 220 (F.B.)* but he may himself make the further inquiry and frame the charge.

14. *Re-arrest without notice of accused discharged by another Magistrate illegal*.—If after the discharge of one of the accused the case of others is simply transferred by the District Magistrate to another Magistrate such Magistrate cannot direct the re-arrest and trial of the accused who have been previously discharged as no notice was given to them 1 *Bom L.R. 782*

15 *Issue of warrant before setting aside order of discharge is bad*.—When a District Magistrate had issued notice to the accused to show cause why his case should not be further inquired into he cannot issue warrant for the arrest of the accused until the order of discharge is set aside and the case is taken on his own file 15 *P.R. 1893*

16 *Competency of a Presidency Magistrate to revive a discharged case*.—There is nothing in the Code to the effect that the dismissal of a complaint or the discharge of an accused shall be a bar to a fresh complaint being entertained so long as the order of discharge remains unreversed. Hence a commitment by a Presidency Magistrate on fresh evidence is legal although the accused might have been previously discharged by another Presidency Magistrate and the order of discharge had not been set aside 23 *C. 211*, where 1 *C.W.N. 49* is followed, 24 *C. 528* dissented from and 23 *C. 983 distinguished*. *Semble* on the same evidence no re-hearing should be made of a case which has been disposed of by an order of discharge by a Magistrate of co-ordinate jurisdiction except where there has been manifest error or miscarriage of justice 29 *M. 126 (F.B.)*.

17 *Jurisdiction of Magistrate to re-entertain fresh complaint*.—A Magistrate who has discharged an accused person may re-entertain a fresh complaint on the same facts. It is not necessary to get the first order of dismissal set aside. See Note 3 to s. 437

18 *Magistrate has power to revive proceedings after discharge and to commit*.—There is nothing to prevent a Magistrate after he has discharged an accused person under this section from inquiring again into the case against him. A discharge not operating as an acquittal leaves the matter at large for all purposes of judicial inquiry. There is jurisdiction still vested in all Magistrates including the one who made the previous inquiry

Pac'if i er *n* One who pacifies
Pac'if i fy *v t* [*imp* & *p p* **PACIFIED** *p pr* & *ed*,
n **PACIFYING**] [*Fr* *pacifier* *lr* *fr* *pacifear*,
It. & *Lat* *pacificare*, from *Lat* *paciscus* See *P'a*]

2 A burdensome load, as, a pack of sorrows
 "A pack of blessings" shall
 I: this sense corrupted into peck as a peck of
 trouble

1 Act of feeding or procuring food. Cuckoo
2 Food fodder
Psh'0 lads " " " "

* using those species of parasitic entom
which have broad, shield shaped heads
Pachydictyl " " "

agreement or contract, a pact. [Obs.]

urist marine
 (C. elongata p
 ca) found
 South America
 byline 11

P a
 cine quantities
 Pa'cific, n
 Pa'tent, n
 Pa'tented
 paucity sp pa
 paucity [1]
 Pa'tition n
 pa'tition
 Pa'tion n The

[illegible]

firm, slow, for, by well, good, best;

just as before. But all Magistrates and especially the one who formerly discharged the accused are bound to exercise due discretion to take that discharge into account and to avoid any such oppressive proceedings as may either expose them to punishment under s 219 or s 220 I P C. or to a civil action on the part of the accused Ratanlal 350, 7 M. 454, 31 M 543. See the remarks of PRINSEP J in 28 G. 652 at p 653. See also 29 G. 726, where 23 C. 983 and 24 C. 286 are overruled. As to similar powers of a Presidency Magistrate see 28 C. 652 (P B) GHOSE J dissenting

254. If when such evidence and examination have been taken and made or at any previous stage of the case, the Magistrate is of opinion that there is ground for presuming that the accused has committed an offence triable under this Chapter which such Magistrate is competent to try, and which, in his opinion could be adequately punished by him he shall frame in writing a charge against the accused

Charge to be framed when offence appears proved

Notes—1 Charge should be so framed as not to cast upon the prosecution any unnecessary burden.—According to the Code the duty of framing a charge in all cases where a charge is necessary rests primarily with the Court and not with the prosecutor. And the charge when properly framed upon the materials mentioned in this section while it should allege all that is necessary to constitute the offence charged and all that is requisite in order that the accused may have notice of the matter with which he is charged ought not to allege positively anything of which the allegation in a positive form is not justified by the materials before the Court. It must be remembered that while the prosecution is in all cases bound to prove so much of the matter charged as is necessary to constitute the offence charged it is not bound to prove and cannot by reason of want of care on the part of the Court in framing the charge become bound to prove more than this and may therefore very reasonably insist that the charge be so framed by the Court as not to cast upon it any unnecessary burden. *Per PLOWDEN J* in 26 P R 1889

2 Object of framing a charge at an early stage is to enable the accused to cross examine the prosecution witnesses on their first attendance.—The alteration in this section which enables a Court to frame a charge at any previous stage of the proceedings is intended to enable the accused to cross-examine the prosecution witnesses on their first attendance. This procedure is applicable in the trial of warrant-cases. But where one of the offences with which the accused is charged is triable exclusively by the Court of Session the proceedings would be in the nature of an inquiry under Chapter XVIII and s 208 requires that an opportunity should be given to the accused for cross-examining the witnesses for the prosecution before the stage of proceedings is reached at which it might be found necessary to draw up a charge. If after framing a charge the Magistrate finds on the cross examination of the prosecution witnesses that no case is made out he can cancel the charge under s 213 (2), 5 C. W N 110, 27 G. 370

3. When charge must be framed.—Section 254 in mandatory terms imposes on the Magistrate the duty of trying any warrant case which he is competent to try and which in his opinion can be adequately punished by him 8 S. L R 23 = 15 Cr L J 664.—(i) Charge should be framed only when offence made out.—It is only when the prosecution has proved all the facts necessary to constitute the offence charged against the accused that a charge should be framed. See (1911) 2 M W N 578 = 10 M L T 506 = 12 Cr L J 583, 2 P R 1906 = 3 Cr L J 343 (ii) Magistrate ought not to wait till the prosecution case is completed.—The moment the

= 12 Cr L J 471 The procedure of taking the whole case for the prosecution and then drawing up a charge is old fashioned and exploded. See 18 P W R. 1909 = 11 Cr L J 110 In a petty case under the Penal Code where the offence committed is within the Magistrate's cognizance the accused should not be committed to the Sessions on the ground that the Magistrate was a witness to the identification proceedings. 21 A L J 420

4. When charge not to be framed under the section.—(i) If he cannot adequately punish.—A Magistrate ought not to frame a charge under this section if he be of opinion that he cannot adequately punish the offence Ratanlal 439. It is not irregular for a Magistrate of the second or third class to frame a charge against an accused person in a case which he has jurisdiction to try even though at the time of framing the charge he intends if he is of opinion that the accused is guilty to submit the proceedings to the District or Sub-divisional Magistrate to pass sentence 1905 U B R. 33 = 2 Cr L J 464. But it is a Magistrate's duty to draw a charge in accordance with the offence disclosed and not to consider such consequences as whether he himself has or

has no jurisdiction to try the offence or whether a particular charge will or will not require a committal to the Sessions. In drawing a charge there is one consideration and one only to be entertained and that is what is the offence disclosed 3 P R. 1901; 2 P R 1906 = 3 Cr L. J 345 (ii) *When the Magistrate is of opinion that case ought to be committed.*—See as to procedure ss. 347 and 207 This section must be taken to qualify the meaning of the words ought to be tried in ss. 207 and 347 of the Code 4 Bom L. R. 85; 24 C. 429 When a Magistrate is of opinion that the accused cannot be adequately punished by him he can commit him to the Court of Session although the case may be exclusively triable by the Magistrate 24 C. 429 The Magistrate has to exercise a discretion in the matter which is subject to the Appellate and Revisional Powers of Superior Courts 18 B 580 at p 555 But see 42 M 83 (contra). 3 Rang 42 dissents from 24 C. 429 and follows 42 M 83.

5 *Effect of framing charge.*—(i) *Charge turns inquiry into trial.*—So long as a case continues in the stage of inquiry the duty of the Magistrate is confined to ascertaining whether there is anything that the person accused ought to be called upon to answer but when the charge has been framed and the plea of the accused recorded the inquiry is turned into a trial and evidence in support of the charge already recorded becomes evidence on that trial subject to the right of the accused as declared in ss. 256 and 257 9 A 52 (F B) 38 M 585

(ii) *Magistrate cannot dismiss the case or acquit the accused without hearing evidence.*—When on examining the complainant the Magistrate frames a charge and thereby indicates that a *prima facie* case exists against the accused he cannot then dismiss the case and acquit the accused without hearing the evidence on behalf of the prosecution or of the defence. He is bound to proceed with the case 7 C. W N 521 Where there are two distinct charges against distinct individuals a Magistrate is not entitled to pass one order so as to affect both

(iii) If charge is of a compoundable offence the accused is entitled to an acquittal immediately a composition is filed 29 P R. 1914 = 16 Cr L. J 81 (F B)

6 *Omission to prepare a charge does not invalidate acquittal.*—A Magistrate tried and acquitted a person accused of an offence without preparing in writing a charge against him. *Held* that such omission did not invalidate the order of acquittal of such person and render such order equivalent to an order of discharge 3 A 129

7 *Charge in joint trial of warrant and summons cases.*—When a case is being tried as a warrant case and a charge is drawn of an offence which is triable as a warrant-case if it is intended to proceed against the accused also for an offence triable only as a summons-case that offence should form part of the charge and if the accused had been prejudiced by the absence of such a charge the conviction is liable to be set aside 29 C. 431. Where the complainant charged the accused with defamation (a warrant case) but in her evidence charged him with using criminal force to her (a summons-case) and the Magistrate tried the accused for both the offences and convicted him of *assault* but acquitted him of defamation *held* the procedure was perfectly legal it appearing from the record that the accused understood the new charge cross-examined the witnesses with reference to it and had ample opportunity of meeting it 3 Bom L. R. 675 See Note 4 to s. 233

8 *Court can inquire into offence different from that charged if evidence discloses it.*—If on the evidence a Magistrate finds that an offence different from the one charged had been committed he has power expressly to inquire and proceed against the accused with regard to the other offence without a fresh complaint being made to him 5 B H C. R. Cr Ca 100 and if the other offence is a summons-case he may proceed to try the same in the manner pointed out for the trial of summons-cases 7 M 454. If the Magistrate finds that the facts disclose an offence other than or in addition to that complained of he is bound to adjudicate on the original charge and should not dismiss it with leave to the prosecution to institute a fresh and a more comprehensive complaint 8 W R 82 Thus in 27 A 69 a complaint was laid against the accused of an offence under s. 409 I P C. and he was tried and convicted of that offence by a Magistrate of the first class It was contended on behalf of the accused that the Magistrate had no jurisdiction as the evidence disclosed an offence under s. 406 I P C. triable exclusively by the Court of Session *Held per Knox J* that the complaint gave the Magistrate jurisdiction to try the accused for the offence complained of and if it was established to convict him and that the Magistrate was not bound to commit merely because the evidence disclosed another offence triable exclusively by a Court of Session. See also 21 A 265

9 *Power of Court to examine witnesses.*—A Magistrate cannot properly resort to s. 540 in order to avoid the responsibility of making up his mind as to the value of the evidence for the prosecution. The power conferred by that section upon a Court to summon a witness does not extend to witnesses named for the prosecution or for the defence 11 P R 1886

10 *Duty of Police to test exculpatory statement made by accused.*—It is the duty of the Police officials when an accused person makes an exculpatory statement to test the truth or falsity of such statement without delay and to lay before the Court any evidence which tends to establish its truth or falsity 1 P R. 1888

Plea.

255. (1) The charge shall then be read and explained to the accused, and he shall be asked whether he is guilty or has any defence to make

(2) If the accused pleads guilty, the Magistrate shall record the plea, and may in his discretion convict him thereon

Notes —1. Charge must be explained to the accused.—Magistrates should pay special attention to this direction of the law. Where an offence falls, e.g., within a section like s. 397, I P C., which on account of the existence of aggravating circumstances provides a minimum punishment for the offence, the existence of such aggravating circumstances should be set forth in the charge so that the accused person may know what it is to which he pleads guilty and the full effect of such plea, or in the event of his pleading not guilty, may know what the material facts are which he is called upon to rebut, *Ratanlal 53*, 7 C. 96 = 8 C. L. R. 471; 5 C. 828; 9 M. 61.

2. The accused must be asked and not his pleader.—No pleader can be called upon to plead "guilty" or "not guilty" on behalf of his client and it is improper for a Magistrate to act on such plea, though made in the presence and hearing of the accused. It would be more regular in form, if the Magistrate were to call on the accused to say with his own lips whether he denies the truth of the complaint 6 Bom. L. R. 861. But when an order under s. 205 has been made it involves that the pleader may perform all acts which devolve upon the accused in the course of the trial, such as pleading or refusing to plead under this section, 6 S. L. R. 206 = 14 Cr. L. J. 272.

3. Conviction on a plea of guilty in a warrant-case.—There is nothing in the Code to preclude a Magistrate in a warrant case from convicting the accused on his own plea of "guilty" 3 L. B. R. 279 = 5 Cr. L. J. 418; but a plea guilty can be recorded only after the prosecution has made out a *prima facie* case and the Magistrate has drawn up a charge on the evidence on record. It is highly improper in a warrant-case to convict an accused on his own admission alone, 29 M. 372, where 27 M. 233 is followed. See also 19 M. L. J. 271 = 4 M. L. T. 324 = 8 Cr. L. J. 421, where it was held that a conviction which is illegal cannot be sustained merely on the plea of guilty. The Magistrate is empowered to act under this section and record the plea only after he has followed the procedure laid down in the preceding sections of this Chapter. See also (1911) 3 M. W. N. 576 = 10 M. L. T. 506 = 12 Cr. L. J. 585 and Notes under ss. 342 and 271.

4. Mode of recording pleas.—What kind of admission amounts to a plea of "guilty"—See s. 271 and Notes thereunder. An admission which does not admit all the elements of the charge is not a plea of "guilty" to the charge 25 W. R. 23. Therefore where a person accused of murder, acknowledged having struck his victim but repudiated the intention to murder, it was held the acknowledgment cannot be accepted as a plea of guilty, 4 B. L. R. Appx. C1. In recording the plea, the Court must record the actual words used and not merely record a narrative of what occurred and of the statement of the prisoner 7 C. 96 = 8 C. L. R. 471. In trying a case under s. 143, I P C., the Magistrate declined to take evidence, remarking 'the accused all admit facts that make them out to be members of an unlawful assembly' and convicted them of the offence. Held reversing the conviction and sentence, that an accused person may admit some or even all the facts alleged by the prosecution, but if he pleads "not guilty" the Court trying him is bound to proceed according to law, by examining the witnesses and giving an opportunity to the accused to cross-examine the witnesses for the prosecution, and adduce his own evidence 9 Bom. L. R. 1346 = 6 Cr. L. J. 424. Cases have come before this Court, in which it has been recorded that the accused person pleaded guilty, and in which it appeared that the Magistrate had misapprehended the facts necessary to constitute the offence with which the accused was charged and of which he was convicted on his own plea. It is expedient that the plea of the accused should be recorded as nearly as possible in the words used by him, so that it may be shown clearly that the accused admitted the facts necessary to constitute the offence with which he was charged—C P Cr. Cr., Part II No. 22.

5. Accused throwing himself on mercy of Court.—Where the accused did not formally plead guilty, the fact that he threw himself on the mercy of the Court ought not to prejudice him 12 C. W. N. 180 = 6 Cr. L. J. 434.

*** 255-A.** In a case where a previous conviction is charged under the provisions of section 221, sub-section (7), and the accused does not admit that he has been previously convicted as alleged in the charge, the Magistrate may, after he has convicted the said accused under section 255 sub-section (2) or

Procedure in case of previous convictions.

section 258, take evidence in respect of the alleged previous conviction, and shall record a finding thereon

Note.— It was suggested to us that the new section 255-A is unnecessary on the ground that though a procedure or the proof of previous conviction is necessary in a Sessions Court to prevent the jury or the assessors from being prejudiced by anything they may hear as to the accused's previous record yet in warrant-cases the same considerations do not apply. On the whole, however we think the new section may serve a useful purpose and we have retained it. *Report of the Select Committee, 1922.*

256. (1) If the accused refuses to plead, or does not plead or claims to be tried he shall be required to state * * at the commencement of the next hearing of the case or if the Magistrate for reasons to be recorded in writing so thinks fit forth with whether he wishes to cross-examine any, and if so which of the witnesses for the prosecution whose evidence has been taken. If he says he does so wish the witnesses named by him shall be recalled, and after cross-examination and re-examination (if any) they shall be discharged. The evidence of any remaining witnesses for the prosecution shall next be taken and after cross-examination and re-examination (if any) they also shall be discharged. The accused shall then be called upon to enter upon his defence and produce his evidence.

(2) If the accused puts in any written statement the Magistrate shall file it with the record.

Note.—1 Scope of the section.— After careful consideration we have adopted the re-draft of these clauses suggested by the Judges of the Calcutta High Court. Even under these amended clauses the right of cross-examination may be abused and witnesses unnecessarily harassed but we think on the whole that the possible abuse of the system does not justify us in making any severer restriction on the existing right of the accused. —*See Com Rep.* The procedure laid down in this Chapter does not govern the inquiry in cases triable by a Sessions Court. In such cases the intention of s. 208 is that as each witness is examined for the prosecution he should then and there be cross-examined and re-examined and allowed to go home. 10 A L J 144 = 13 Cr L J 463. See Note 11 at pp 598 and 599.

2. Section inapplicable to proceedings under s. 110—This section has no application to a case under s. 110 and a person called upon to show cause under that section has no right to further cross-examine the prosecution witnesses under this section. 35 C. 243. *Contra* 12 Cr L J 89 (Bar) see also 1 P R 1916. See Note to s. 119.

Section not applicable to proceedings under cl. (8) of the Letters Patent as they are not in the nature of criminal proceedings in the sense that the rules of procedure applicable to a Criminal trial are applicable to them and therefore the respondents (legal practitioners) written statement could not be received. Under this special jurisdiction under cl. (8) of the Letters Patent the High Court is bound to give a proper notice and reasonable opportunity to be heard to the legal practitioner concerned. 4 Lah 271.

3. Claims to be tried—As to the meaning of the expression *claim to be tried* vide 1906 U B R. 51 = 5 Cr L J 298, 3 L B R. 280 = 5 Cr L J 417 noted under s. 251.

4. Right of prosecution to call fresh witnesses—The words *any remaining witnesses* do not limit the witnesses only to those named under s. 252 (2). It is wide enough to include any witness who according to the prosecution is able to support its case though he has not been summoned provided he is not sprung on the defence and sufficient opportunity is given to cross-examine him. 11 Bom L R. 1153 = 10 Cr L J 530. See Note 8 to s. 252 and see also 10 A L J 383.

CROSS-EXAMINATION OF PROSECUTION WITNESSES

5. Section does not prohibit cross examination before framing of charge—Opportunity should be given to the accused should he so desire to cross-examine the prosecution witnesses even though the charge is not framed. 8 C W N 833. This section does not prohibit cross-examination before a charge is framed it permits a further cross-examination expressly directed to the case framed and embodied in the charge and would enable an accused person if he has reserved his cross-examination to exercise his right at that time subject to a discretion given to the Magistrate by s. 257. 21 C 642. See Note 7 to s. 252 and Note 2 to s. 254.

6. Accused is entitled to have prosecution witnesses recalled after charge before commencement of defence—Magistrate has no discretion—On the date when charge was drawn up the accused applied to recall and cross-examine the witnesses for the prosecution. The application was refused in these terms

* The words at the commencement

so that the fit forth with were inserted by s. 72 of Act XVIII of 1923

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parier, to speak, n pr *parlant* See [q/va] Con | larra, in Italy
version, discourse, talk [Ole]

In common parlance, in ordinary phrase, in the u
form of speech.

Parle (pär), n. Conversation, talk, oral treaty
discussion [Ole] See LARLEY

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The prosecution witnesses have already been cross-examined at a reasonable length considering the importance of the case and it is needless in my opinion to recall them refused. *Held* this section gives the Magistrate no discretion in such a matter. The accused is entitled to have the witnesses recalled for purposes of cross-examination. The fact that there has been already some cross-examination before the charge has been drawn up does not affect this privilege. 27 C 370, 20 C 469, 14 Cr L J 383 = 6 Bur L T 67. In 2 Bom L R 542, a conviction without allowing the accused to further cross-examine was set aside as illegal. See also 7 C L J 230 = 7 Cr L J 313 and 8 M L T 367 = 11 Cr L J 520, where the conviction was set aside and a re-trial ordered by a different Magistrate.

7 Magistrate bound to ask whether accused wishes prosecution witnesses to be recalled—After a charge has been framed it is the duty of the Magistrate to require the accused to state whether he wishes to cross-examine the prosecution witnesses already examined. 27 C 370. Where a Magistrate trying a case under s. 208 I P C after framing a charge omitted to ask the accused whether he wished to have the prosecution witnesses or any of them recalled for cross-examination and rejected an application made by the accused with that object on the ground that it was too late *held* that it was impossible to say that by being barred from cross-examining the witnesses called against him the accused did not suffer a substantial injury. 1902 A W N 5. The claim to recall the witnesses for the prosecution is very different from the request made by the accused person to summon a witness under s. 203. 19 W R 53, and an accused is entitled to this privilege even though he does not call any witnesses of his own. Nor does the fact that there has already been some cross-examination before the charge was drawn up affect the privilege. 20 C 469, 6 Bur L T 67 = 14 Cr L J 388. The record should show whether the accused wished to cross-examine any of the witnesses for the prosecution already examined. 4 Bur L T 24 = 12 Cr L J 89.

Right of accused when summons-case is tried under this Chapter—See Note 4 to s. 241.

Effect of omission to ask the accused—It has been usually held that the omission to follow s. 206 involves remand and re-trial of the case from the point of drawing up of the charge. 11 P R 1914 = 16 Cr L J 146. In 16 Cr L J 5 (M) it was held that the omission was a mere irregularity and the conviction was not set aside as the accused had not been prejudiced. See 6 Lah 554.

8 Magistrate bound to recall witnesses for cross examination and cannot call on the accused to defray expenses—It is the duty of the Magistrate to recall the prosecution witnesses which must be done presumably at the public expense. A conviction without allowing the accused a opportunity to examine the prosecution witnesses on the ground that the accused had not paid the necessary expenses for recalling the prosecution witnesses is illegal. 12 P R 1907 = 6 Cr L J 339. After a charge is drawn the accused is entitled to claim as a matter of right under this section to recall and cross-examine any witness for the prosecution although he had an opportunity of cross-examining such witness before. Where therefore a Magistrate refused to re-summon a medical officer for cross-examination unless fees for his attendance were paid the High Court set aside the conviction and sentence and directed the Magistrate to allow process to be issued for the attendance of such witness. 4 C W N 351. The recalling of witnesses for cross-examination must be done presumably at the public expense. 12 P R 1907 = 32 P W R 1907 = 6 Cr L J 339. As a general rule a Magistrate cannot refuse to issue process for the attendance of witnesses for such purpose except on payment by the accused of the costs of their attendance. Such an order can be passed only under s. 257 when the application for recall is made after the accused has entered upon his defence. 2 C L J 17. Where in order to suit the convenience of the Court or for reasons connected with the discharge of other public business the witnesses for the prosecution are allowed to leave before the charge has been framed or the right conferred by this section exercised they must be required to attend again and ordinarily any expenses which may be allowed to them on this score should be paid by Government. 8 N L R 66 = 13 Cr L J 554. See also 43 M 411.

9 Right to further cross-examine when the cross examination before charge was on the understanding that witnesses were not to be recalled—Where the cross-examination of the witnesses for the prosecution before the framing of the charge was on the distinct understanding that the accused would not require the recall of the witnesses for further cross-examination after charge and the Magistrate refused to recall the witnesses. But in the circumstances of the case the accused were directed to pay the expenses incidental to the recall especially as they offered to pay the same. 6 C W N 424. A Magistrate is not competent to refuse to recall the witnesses for prosecution to be cross-examined by the accused and it is not necessary for the accused that he has reasonable grounds for his application. 21 W R 29. A Magistrate cannot refuse to allow witnesses who have been allowed to be cross-examined by the accused previous to the preparation of a charge

3 Special or private peculiarity, concern, character, or the like, individuality. If the *particul-*

For his particular I will receive him gladly. Shot

Particular 2
Particular 1

from despair as not being able to beguile Lysaea by her son; 2 (Zool) A genus of decapodous crustaceans, found in the Indian Ocean 3 One of the acts of discord between Mars and Jupiter, directed by M. Jannet

good."

3 Biased to one party in a cause, than the other, no to justice that a just Self-love will make

3 Having a pre
to favor unreasonable
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84 = 1911 M. W. N. 327 = 12 Cr. L. J. 150. The accused may after the charge is drawn up and the witnesses for the defence have been examined, recall and cross-examine the witnesses for the prosecution, 4 M. 130. Where the trying Magistrate charges the accused at an early stage so as to prevent the necessity for recalling the witnesses for further cross-examination, the accused has no further right to cross-examine the prosecution witnesses after the close of the prosecution case, 63 F. L. R. 1901.

(ii) *It is in the discretion of the Magistrate to recall the prosecution witnesses at a later stage*—As a rule, the proper and convenient time for the purpose of cross-examination of the witnesses for the prosecution is at the commencement of the accused person's defence, though a Criminal Court has discretionary power to allow the accused person to recall and cross-examine the witnesses for the prosecution at any period of the defence, when the Court may think such a course right and proper, 22 W. R. 45. Reading as 255 and 256 of this Code together, it appears that, if an accused person desires to recall and cross-examine the witness for the prosecution, the time at which he should express such desire is when the charge is read over to him and he is called upon to make his defence and although it is in the discretion of the Magistrate to recall the witnesses at a subsequent stage of the case, the accused has no right to insist upon the witnesses being recalled, 7 C. 28. There is no absolute right of cross-examination which would enable the accused to recall and cross-examine the witnesses for the prosecution, no matter how completely and fully they have already been examined. Where, therefore, witnesses for the prosecution were fully cross-examined and a charge framed against the accused, and the witnesses for the defence were examined and cross-examined and on the day on which judgment was to be delivered an application was made on behalf of the accused asking that process should issue for the witnesses for the prosecution to be recalled and further cross-examined held that the Magistrate was right in refusing the application if he was of opinion that it was made for the purpose of vexation, etc., 20 C. 459. Where witnesses for the prosecution were subject to a very lengthy and strict cross-examination upon the matter of the complaint and with the exception of a petition which had nothing to do with their evidence, no fresh evidence was afterwards adduced, the Magistrate, after framing a charge declined to re-summon these witnesses being of opinion that the application was not *bona fide*, but made "for the purpose of vexation, etc." held, that the right to test the truthfulness of the witnesses by cross-examination must not be abused, and that under the circumstances the Magistrate was justified in declining to re-summon these witnesses, Ratanlal 930.

(iii) *Proper reasons must be given for refusing to recall—Slight delay not a sufficient ground*—The mere fact that the witnesses for the prosecution had already been cross-examined is not a sufficient reason for refusing to re-summon them, unless the Magistrate expressly records his opinion that the application for the second cross-examination is for the purpose of vexation or delay, etc., and an order refusing to re-summon witnesses without assigning any such reasons is not proper, and the High Court will set aside the conviction and the sentence and direct the re-opening of the trial, 4 C. W. N. 241. Where a trying Magistrate, after a charge had been framed against the accused, refused to re-summon the complainant and his witnesses for cross-examination the High Court directed the Magistrate to re-open the case from the stage where he made the formal charge and to allow the accused such opportunities of calling and recalling witnesses as the law gives, Ratanlal 723; 14 C. W. N. 250. But it lies upon the party who thinks himself aggrieved to show that the ends of justice have in some way been frustrated in consequence of the refusal to recall the witnesses for the prosecution for cross-examination, 20 C. 459. When an application for re-summoning witnesses for the prosecution was made not on the day the accused were called upon to make their defence, but on the following day, held that the delay of one day was in itself no sufficient reason for refusing the application, 4 C. W. N. 241. See also Ratanlal 723, where it was held that the refusal to re-summon would render it necessary to re-open the case from the stage of the drawing up of the formal charge. See also 5 Pat. L. J. 94.

(iv) *Right of cross-examination may be waived when the accused fails to cross-examine when opportunity is given*—The object of this section is clearly to secure to the accused the opportunity of cross-examining the witnesses for the prosecution after he has been informed as to the nature of the specific charge which he is required to answer. Until he knows this, he is not in a position to decide on what points the evidence for the prosecution is material. If this opportunity be secured, I do not apprehend that he has any further right of recalling the witnesses. If the witnesses for the defence are in attendance, they are to be examined and after that the accused shall be allowed to recall and cross-examine the witnesses for the prosecution. If he refuses to exercise this right after he has entered on his defence, he cannot demand as of right the recall of the witnesses for the prosecution, if the case be adjourned because he has not produced his witnesses. He has had the opportunity intended by the section—*Per SPARKS, J.*, 2 A. 253 at p. 258. The accused elected to reserve the cross-examination of the prosecution witnesses till charge should be framed. After charge was framed, the application of the accused that the case should be committed to the Sessions was refused and the accused who



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7 The act of carrying through all the reforms necessary to give validity, enactment the passage of a law, or of a bill into a law, legislative body.

If a agency is procuring the passage of the stamp

to pass a person from one place to another on the railway

3 to pay regard to, to take notice of, to care, generally with for.

had pleaded not guilty was called on to enter on his defence. He then declined to say anything and represented that he reserved his statement to the Court of Sessions, whereupon the Magistrate again informed the accused that the case would not be committed and called on him to cross-examine the prosecution witnesses. The accused again declined and the Magistrate closed the case and adjourned it for judgment. Before judgment was delivered, the accused applied that the case may be proceeded with in the usual course, but the Magistrate deemed the application unreasonable and vexatious and gave judgment convicting the accused, *held* that the accused was not entitled to recall the witnesses for cross-examination after case had been closed, 21 M. L. J. 283 = 1911 M. W. N. 377 = 12 Cr. L. J. 150; 1912 M. W. N. 1121 = 13 Cr. L. J. 828.

(1) *Waiver by counsel does not prejudice the right of the accused under ss 256 and 257*—Section 256, Cr. Pro. Code confers an absolute and unqualified right on the accused to recall for further cross-examination such witnesses as are still before the Court. After the charge had been framed, the accused pleaded not guilty and mentioned to the Court that he had witnesses to examine. *Held*, that he had entered upon his defence and an application for further cross-examination of a witness discharged from attendance must be deemed to have been made under s. 257. Waiver by counsel of further cross-examination in case a charge is framed cannot prejudice the right of the accused under ss. 256 and 257, 43 M. 411; 5 Pat. 110.

257. (1) If the accused, after he has entered upon his defence, applies to the Magistrate

Process for compelling production of evidence at instance of accused

to issue any process for compelling the attendance of any witness for the purpose of examination or cross-examination, or the production of any document or other thing, the Magistrate shall issue such process unless he considers that such application should be refused on the ground that it is made for the purpose of vexation or delay or for defeating the ends of justice. Such ground shall be recorded by him in writing.

Provided that, when the accused has cross-examined or had the opportunity of cross-examining any witness after the charge is framed, the attendance of such witness shall not be compelled under this section unless the Magistrate is satisfied that it is necessary for the purposes of justice.

(2) The Magistrate may, before summoning any witness on such application require that his reasonable expenses incurred in attending for the purposes of the trial be deposited in Court.

DEFENCE EVIDENCE.

Notes.—1. Taking defence evidence without framing charge is illegal—See Note 10 to s. 253.

1-A. Accused to enter upon defence after cross-examination—An accused person ought not to be called on to enter on his defence before he has cross-examined the witnesses for the prosecution, 8 N. L. R. 65 = 13 Cr. L. J. 554.

2. Accused entitled to adjournment for calling witness—Dilatoriness.—In a warrant case tried summarily, though a formal charge need not be framed the accused person cannot be called dilatory, if he delays to name his witnesses until he has heard the evidence for the prosecution and found that the Magistrate considers that evidence a substantial basis for charging him, Ratanlal 768. Under this section and the next, the accused is entitled as of right to a postponement of the case so as to allow him an opportunity of adducing evidence in support of his defence, 1 C. W. N. 313, even though the case is tried summarily under s. 262(1), 5 L. B. R. 20 = 9 Cr. L. J. 583. See Notes to s. 262.

3. Refusal to summon defence evidence, when to be exercised—It is only after the accused has entered upon his defence that the Magistrate can in his discretion refuse the application of the accused on the ground that it is made for the purpose of vexation or delay or for defeating the ends of justice, 27 C. 370. See Note 5 to s. 252.

4. Magistrate bound to summon defence witnesses unless he records reasons for refusing to summon

conviction of the accused must be set aside, 3 A. 392; 1895 A. W. N. 40. It is the Magistrate's duty to summon witnesses for the accused who can speak to the facts of the case and he ought not to determine beforehand, what credit he would give to their evidence, 6 B. L. R. Appx LXXVIII. Refusal to summon on the ground that the witnesses were implicated in the charge, vitiates the trial and conviction, 6 B. L. R. Appx LXY. The language of

this section is imperative. The Magistrate has no discretion to refuse to issue process to compel the attendance of any witness unless he considers that the application should be refused for any of the reasons specified in the section and which he is bound to record. The Magistrate, therefore, must issue summonses for such witnesses named in the list, unless he takes the responsibility of recording his ground for believing that any particular name is entered for the purpose of vexation or delay or for defeating the ends of justice. The case of each witness must be dealt with individually. The Magistrate has no right arbitrarily to limit the number of witnesses to be called on each point, 20 B. 418; 2 S. L. R. 5. Where an accused put in a list of 72 witnesses and the Magistrate ordered him to cite only any 12 of them, *held*, that the order was not only irregular, but illegal and incurable by s. 537 as it showed that the Magistrate had no objection to any 12 of the 72 of the list on the ground of its being frivolous or vexatious. The Magistrate must base his refusal in regard to any particular witness on the grounds mentioned in the section, 31 M. 131. Where a Magistrate declined to summon the defence witnesses saying that they could not give any reliable evidence one way or the other and it did not appear what means he had for forming this opinion, *held*, that conviction must be set aside. It is more than an irregularity, (1911) 2 M. W. N. 192 = 12 Cr. L. J. 543. Where the accused who was charged with recruiting three coolies from a district, prohibited under the Assam Emigration Labour Act applied for summonses to the coolies to prove his defence that they did not come from the prohibited area, but the Magistrate characterized the application as vexatious and convicted the accused, *held*, that the application should not have been refused and the conviction was set aside (1911) 2 M. W. N. 472 = 12 Cr. L. J. 566. But it is a sufficient compliance with sub-sec (1) of this section if a Magistrate while rejecting an application for summoning further defence witnesses, states facts which have led him irresistibly to the conclusion that the application was for no other purpose than that of vexation or delay or defeating the ends of justice although he does not say expressly that the application was for that purpose, 11 C. W. N. 789 = 6 Cr. L. J. 1. Once the requirements of ss 256 and 257 have been complied with and the accused refuses to state whether he wishes to cross-examine prosecution witnesses or cite defence witnesses, there is no provision requiring the Magistrate to again offer an opportunity to the accused to cite his witnesses, (1912) M. W. N. 1121 = 13 Cr. L. J. 828. Where also a Magistrate rejects an application after recording on it 'too late' *held*, that the Magistrate's reasons though irregularly recorded was a sufficient compliance with this section and could not be set aside as the accused has not been prejudiced, 39 C. 781; 45 M. L. J. 305; 3 Pat. 591.

5. **Refusal to re-summon defence witnesses.**—When a Magistrate has once granted processes for the attendance of the witnesses of the accused he cannot refuse to re-summon them on the ground that being friends of the accused they would have come to Court if the accused had desired them to do so. Having once granted the processes he was bound to assist the accused in enforcing the attendance of the absent witnesses, 10 C. 931, 6 C. W. N. 548, Ratanlal 594, 28 P. R. 1884. An adjournment beyond the day fixed by the summons issued, is however, discretionary 9 C. W. N. 229 and therefore the issue of any further summonses to witnesses not named at the time the defence is entered upon is not obligatory, 7 B. L. R. 568. When a Magistrate refuses to issue summons, he is bound to record his reasons, 4 C. W. N. 241, with respect to each witness 4 Bom. L. R. 38. Summons was ordered to be issued for the attendance of a certain defence witness on a certain day but owing to some delay the summons was not served, and consequently the witness did not attend. The Magistrate refused to re-summon the witness on the ground that in his opinion the witness was named for the purpose of delay and not in good faith. *Held* that the Magistrate was bound to make a further attempt—the first attempt being merely nominal—to secure the attendance of the witness, 4 A. 53. See also 35 C. 1093. Even when a witness appears after the case is closed and the Magistrate is about to deliver judgment, it is incumbent on the Magistrate to record and consider his evidence, 7 B. L. R. 568. See 19 A. L. J. 945; 5 Pat. L. J. 94.

6. **Refusal to examine defence witness.**—Though it is competent to the Magistrate to decline to summon witnesses for the defence under this section, it is not competent for him to decline to examine the defence witnesses cited on the ground that their evidence is not necessary, 14 Bom. L. R. 360 = 1 Bom. Cr. C. 123 = 13 Cr. L. J. 823. Magistrate should always be chary of taking upon themselves the duty of deciding on behalf of the parties which witnesses should be examined 28 M. L. J. 134 = 16 Cr. L. J. 156. See also 35 C. 243; 3 Pat. 591.

7. **Right to cross-examine when prosecution witnesses subsequently called as defence witnesses.**—On a Magistrate refusing to re-summon prosecution witnesses for cross-examination, the accused cited them on his behalf and then requested the Magistrate to allow them to be cross-examined. This application was refused. *Held* that under the circumstances the right of accused to cross-examine these witnesses was not curtailed, 1 C. W. N. 19. See also 17 W. R. 81; 25 W. R. 32; 4 M. 130 and 23 C. 894. In the last mentioned case, when the accused were called upon to cross-examine the witnesses for the prosecution they applied for an adjournment,

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as their counsel was absent which was refused. Subsequently on the day fixed for the defence evidence the prosecution witnesses were re-summoned but the Magistrate refused to allow them to be cross-examined on the ground that they were now summoned as defence witnesses. *Held* that the Magistrate was wrong and counsel for the defence was entitled to cross-examine them.

7-A. Right of accused for process for cross-examination of prosecution witnesses.—Under s. 257 of the Code the accused is entitled after he has entered upon his defence to have the prosecution witnesses summoned for cross-examination unless the Magistrate thinks that the application is merely for purposes of vexation and delay. Omission to record such ground is an illegality vitiating the conviction. The death of the witness does not affect the illegality of the Magistrate's order. **51 C. 1049**

8 The trying Magistrate may himself be cited as a witness—The words 'any witness' would include the trying Magistrate also. In a transfer application under s. 526 the applicants urged that the evidence of the trying Magistrate would be required by the accused touching certain matters connected with the case. *Held* that inasmuch as the Magistrate was bound under this section to issue a summons unless he considered that the application was made for the purpose of vexation or delay or defeating the ends of justice it was not proper to leave the decision of this point to the Magistrate whose evidence was required and the case was accordingly transferred. **26 A. 536**

9 Accused entitled to examine witness present in Court.—It is not open to a Magistrate to refuse to examine a witness for the accused when the witness is present in Court. **4 Bom. L. R. 461**

10 Right of accused to cross examine any witness examined by the Court.—The accused obtained process for the attendance of a witness. But before the appearance of the witness the accused asked the Court to countermand the order for his attendance which the Court refused to do. When the witness attended the accused refused to examine him but the Court examined him and refused to let the accused to cross-examine him. *Held* that the witness could not be regarded as a witness for the defence and that the accused were entitled to cross-examine the witness. **29 C. 337. See also 1 C. W. N. 19**

11 Right of accused person to cross examine the witnesses of a co accused.—One accused person may cross-examine a witness called in his defence by another accused in the same trial when the defence of one accused is adverse to that of the other. **21 C. 401, 1 C. W. N. 19, 28 C. 594. But see 12 W. R. 75**

12 Procedure when it is impossible to procure the evidence of a witness.—When it is impossible to procure the evidence of a defence witness by reason of his absence out of British India the Magistrate would not be justified in acquitting the accused the proper course to be adopted being for the Magistrate to pronounce judgment on the evidence on record. **1891 A. W. N. 33**

13 Accused not to be convicted on charge framed merely because he adduces no evidence.—In a warrant-case a Magistrate is not bound to convict the accused after he had pleaded to the charge and claimed to be tried merely because no evidence is adduced to rebut the evidence for the prosecution. He is bound to acquit if at the time of giving judgment he has reasonable doubt as to the guilt of the accused. **Ratanlal 854.** A prisoner must be convicted upon the strength of the case made against him and not in consequence of his inability to bring forward proof of his innocence. **Ratanlal 5**

14 Right of accused to call witnesses to rebut evidence called by the Court after conclusion of trial.—In a prosecution the case on both sides having been closed the Magistrate summoned a witness to give evidence whereupon the accused prayed to have certain witnesses summoned to rebut the evidence of the Court witness. *Held* that the Magistrate was bound to summon such witnesses and that the fact that the accused at the close of his case had stated that he did not wish to examine any more witnesses was no reason to refuse to summon witnesses to give evidence to rebut that of the Court witness. **6 C. 714 = 8 C. L. R. 70**

15 Reserving cross examination of defence witnesses.—There is no provision in the Code which enables the cross-examination of defence witnesses to be deferred. Deferring cross-examination of defence witnesses until the examination-in-chief of other defence witnesses is wrong. **3 L. B. R. 109 = 3 Cr. L. J. 23.** In **6 M. L. T. 259 = 11 Cr. L. J. 136**, it was however *held* that a Court has discretion for sufficient reason to allow the cross-examination of defence or prosecution witnesses to be reserved until the chief examination of all of them is over there being no provision of law to the contrary but where a charge is framed the defence has the right under s. 256 to recall and cross-examine any of the prosecution witnesses.

16 Right of reply depends on what is done and not on what may be said.—So far as the trial of warrant-cases is concerned there is no provision in the Code under which the accused is asked if he means to call witnesses or not. After the charge is framed the accused is called on to enter on his defence and to produce his evidence but he is not asked whether he means to call evidence. The right of reply would seem

therefore, to depend, not on what may be said, but on what is done, and if no evidence is produced, there should be no right of reply by the prosecutor, *Ratanlal 938. See s 292.*

17. Magistrate must be guided by judgment of Sessions Court in matters of procedure.—The Magistrate being subordinate to the Court of Session, must treat its judgments with respect, and be guided by them on such matters of procedure as arise on the section or as relate to the acts of the Magistrate himself, *Ratanlal 854.*

18. Construction of an accused's written statement.—There are no pleadings in a criminal case similar to those in civil proceedings which are *conclusive* against the party making them. The prosecution has to prove all the facts necessary to constitute the charge against the accused. *Quere* whether if an admission were contained in the accused's written statement, that would relieve the prosecution from the defect in letting in evidence of the facts admitted, 10 M. L. T. 506 = (1911) 2 M. W. N. 576 = 12 Cr. L. J. 535. *See, however, Notes under s 342.*

258. (1) If in any case under this Chapter in which a charge has been framed the Magistrate finds the accused not guilty, he shall record an order of acquittal

Acquittal

*(2) Where in any case under this Chapter the Magistrate does not proceed in accordance with the provisions of section 349 or section 562, he shall, if he finds the accused guilty, pass sentence upon him according to law.

Conviction

Notes.—1 *See s 403* for effect of acquittal and Schedule V, Form XXIX for form of sentence

2. Order of acquittal without framing a charge.—No judgment of acquittal can be recorded unless a charge has been drawn up 22 W. R. 25, but *see* 3 A. 251. A person accused of theft was acquitted by a Deputy Magistrate. The District Magistrate, at the instance of the Police, ordered the case to be retried, as the Deputy Magistrate had not framed any charge against the accused. *Held*, that the terms of s 460, Act X of 1872 (s 403 of this Code) barred any further trial so long as the acquittal remained in force, 3 C. L. R. 131; 9 B. H. C. R. 170.

3. Dismissal of complaint or discharge after charge amounts to acquittal.—An order dismissing a complaint after a charge is framed amounts to an acquittal, 5 C. L. R. 339. Once a charge has been framed and trial begun, the charge cannot be treated as cancelled by reason of a recommencement of the trial under s. 360, the Magistrate who framed the charge having been transferred. Even if the succeeding Magistrate re-hears the witnesses and discharges the accused it must be treated as an acquittal, 38 M. 585, where 14 P. R. 1903 = 175 P. L. R. 1903 is followed, 17 Cr. L. J. 1 (M.).

4. Sameness of Magistrate.—It is not necessary that the conviction or acquittal should be by the Magistrate who drew up the charge, 3 C. 495.

5. Effect of an order of acquittal on other persons charged, but not sent up for trial.—*See* Note 12 to s 403

6. Passing sentence on conviction.—It was formerly held that when a Magistrate convicts the accused he is bound to pass some sentence if only a nominal one, 4 M. H. C. R. Appx. LXVI. But now *see* s 562. *See* 1 B. 218 as to the sentence to be passed when accused is convicted under two different sections of the I P C. *See* also 7 M. H. C. R. 873.

7. Conviction not obligatory if charge is framed.—Although a Magistrate has in a warrant-case thought fit to frame a charge, he is not required to convict the accused person merely because, the latter does not produce any rebutting evidence. He is bound to acquit if, at the time of giving judgment, he has reasonable doubt of the guilt of the accused, *Ratanlal 854.* A prisoner must be convicted upon the strength of the case made against him, and not in consequence of his inability to bring forward proof of his innocence, *Ratanlal 8.*

259. When the proceedings have been instituted upon complaint, and upon any day

Absence of complainant. *fixed for the hearing of the case the complainant is absent, and the offence may be lawfully compounded, if "or is not a cognizable offence" the Magistrate may, in his discretion, notwithstanding anything hereinbefore contained, at any time before the charge has been framed, discharge the accused*

* Sub section (2) has been substituted by s 75, Act XVIII of 1915.

† The words "or is not a cognizable offence" were inserted by Act XVIII of 1915.

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PEARL'-spar, *n* (Min) A crystallized variety of dolomite, having a pearly luster
PEARL'-silk, *n* in ornaments stockings

Pearl Oyster
(*Arca margaritifera*)

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Notes —1 See s 345 and Sch. II col 6 for compoundable offences. A Magistrate cannot act under this section if he took cognizance on a Police report.

2 Issue of summons does not make a summons case—In a warrant-case the mere fact of a summons having been issued in this first instance instead of a warrant does not bring the case within the purview of Chapter XX and thus allow a Magistrate to dismiss the complaint on account of the non attendance of the complainant on the day fixed for hearing. 10 W R 31

4 Discharge under this section a discretionary power—Before discharging under this section the Magistrate is bound to see whether there is a *prima facie* case. If he arbitrarily discharges for the sole reason that the complainant is absent his order is liable to be set aside 1891 A W N 116. The primary reason for the order is that the absence of the complainant raises a presumption that the complainant does not wish to proceed with the prosecution. 12 Cr. L. J 184 (Sindh)

4-A Discharge of accused in the absence of complainant at the hearing in a trial of both offences in one trial one being a summons-case and the other a warrant-case.—Where a complaint was preferred against a person for offences under ss 352 and 351 and the Magistrate discharged the accused owing to the absence of complainant on the day of hearing and a fresh complaint was preferred in respect of the same offences *held* that the procedure in such a trial must be that provided for the trial of a warrant-case and that the discharge of the accused did not amount to an acquittal under s. 352 and was not a bar to the subsequent trial for the same offence. 41 M 721 following 22 B 711

5 Dismissal of complaint in warrant-cases on absence of complainant is improper—A Magistrate is not competent to pass an order of dismissal or discharge in consequence of the absence of the complainant in warrant-cases not coming within this section except in cases coming within the last clause of s 253 10 C. 67 = 18 C. L. R. 408. See also 13 C. L. R. 303 for an instance of improper discharge under this section. There is no warrant in the Code for passing an order staying struck off. Such an order passed on the absence of the complainant will not amount to a discharge if the offence (s. 211 I L C.) was one which could not be lawfully compounded. 17 O C 18 = 15 Cr. L. J 230

6 Magistrate not bound to wait till the end of the day—A Magistrate it has been *held* is not bound to wait till the Court is about to close for the day in order to give an absentee complainant an opportunity of appearing before acting under this section. 7 M 356 and 213, 10 C 551

7 Procedure when complainant absent after charge has been framed—In a warrant-case when a charge is framed and a day fixed for the hearing of the case it is not legal for the Magistrate to acquit the accused or discharge him without hearing the evidence for the defence merely on the ground that the complainant did not appear to prosecute the charge on the day fixed. He ought to admit the accused to bail and enforce the attendance of the complainant and his witnesses under s. 32. *Ratanlal* 524 and 847 and 4 C. W. N. 20. He should not discharge the accused without considering the evidence already on record. 12 Cr. L. J 184 (Sindh)

8 Withdrawal from prosecution in a warrant-case—In a warrant-case in respect of a non-compoundable offence it is not competent to a Magistrate to enter an order of acquittal on a private complainant offering to withdraw from the prosecution. 37 B 369. An order of acquittal would only be pronounced if after the framing of a charge the Magistrate is of opinion that the evidence is insufficient to justify a conviction.

9 In case of improper discharge, District Magistrate should deal with the case himself and not refer it to High Court.—A complaint not being heard on the day fixed the parties were told to come the next day on particular hour being mentioned. The case was not taken up on that day and the parties were again told to come the next day. On the third occasion the case was called on early but neither parties being present the accused was discharged. *Held* on reference that the District Magistrate was competent to deal with the case under s 437 if he thought the accused was improperly discharged. *Ratanlal* 988, 76 and 145, 32 M 220 (F.B.). A District Magistrate is competent to direct a further inquiry even when no fresh evidence is forthcoming. 15 C. 608 (F.B.) 9 A 52 (F.B.) 14 M 334 (F.B.) 10 B. 131. The powers of revisional Court under s 437 are not limited to the consideration of the materials before the Magistrate of directing a further inquiry. Where a complainant was prevented from appearing by flood the order of discharge may be set aside. 12 Cr. L. J 184 (Sindh). S 369 must be read as controlled by s 437 and a Magistrate has power under the latter section to revise a complaint dismissed under this section. 23 C. 102. See Notes 13 and 17 under s 253

10 Power of discharging Magistrate to re-hear without an order for further inquiry—A Magistrate who has made an order of discharge under this section has jurisdiction to re-hear the case on a fresh complaint.

The order of discharge under this section has not the effect of an order of acquittal, 25 M. 310; 25 C. 652; 29 C. 726; 4 C. W. N. 46 having been *overruled*. See also 26 P. W. R. 1908; 29 A. 7, 8 B. L. R. 196 = 16 Cr. L. J. 174, 31 M. 543 and cases noted in Notes 13 and 17 under s. 253. A Presidency Magistrate has the same powers in this respect as a Provincial Magistrate. In the Full Bench case in 29 M. 126, WHITE C.J., and BENSON J. held that there was no distinction between the powers of re-hearing when the discharge had been under this section or under s. 203 or s. 253 while MOORE, J., declined to express any opinion on the point. See also 18 M. L. J. 561 = 4 M. L. T. 140 = 8 Cr. L. J. 208, where WHITE C.J.'s opinion was followed.

11. Revisional powers of High Court.—See 36 G. 994, Notes 30 and 31 at p. 588 and ss. 437–439 12 Cr. L. J. 184 (Sindh).

CHAPTER XXII

OF SUMMARY TRIALS

Power to try summarily

260. (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in this Code —

(a) the District Magistrate,

(b) any Magistrate of the first class specially empowered in this behalf by the Local Government and

(c) any Bench of Magistrates invested with the powers of a Magistrate of the first class and especially empowered in this behalf by the Local Government, may, if he or they think fit try in a summary way all or any of the following offences —

(a) offence not punishable with death, transportation or imprisonment for a term exceeding six months

(b) offence relating to weights and measures under sections 264, 265 and 266 of the Indian Penal Code

(c) hurt, under section 323 of the same Code,

(d) theft under sections 371, 380 or 381 of the same Code, where the value of the property stolen does not exceed fifty rupees,

(e) dishonest misappropriation of property under section 403 of the same Code, where the value of the property misappropriated does not exceed fifty rupees,

(f) receiving or retaining stolen property under section 411 of the same Code where the value of such property does not exceed fifty rupees

(g) assisting in the concealment or disposal of stolen property under section 414 of the same Code, where the value of such property does not exceed fifty rupees,

(h) mischief under section 427 of the same Code,

(i) house trespass, under section 448 and offences under sections 451, "453" * 454,* 456 and 457 of the same Code,

(j) insult with intent to provoke a breach of the peace, under section 504, and criminal intimidation, under section 506, of the same Code,

(k) abetment of any of the foregoing offences,

(l) an attempt to commit any of the foregoing offences, when such attempt is an offence,

(m) offences, under section 20 of the Cattle Trespass Act, 1871

Provided that no case in which a Magistrate exercises the special powers conferred by section 34 shall be tried in a summary way.

* Wherever inserted by the Repealing and Amending Act of 1901. See Part II of the Second Schedule

(2) When in the course of a summary trial it appears to the Magistrate or Bench that the case is one which is of a character which renders it undesirable that it should be tried summarily, the Magistrate or Bench shall recall any witnesses who may have been examined and proceed to rehear the case in manner provided by this Code

Notes—1. Powers under the Chapter to be exercised with great caution.—‘The responsibility thrown on Magistrates, entrusted with summary powers, is very great, and the responsibility of those who have to entrust them with such powers is equally great. Magistrates who are sufficiently alive to the responsibility entrusted to them will take care that the procedure and the record is not made more summary than the law has laid down.’—*Per KNOX, J.*, 21 A. 189, p. 192.

2. Any Magistrate of the first class specially empowered—In Madras every Sub-divisional first-class Magistrate has been invested with the powers under this Chapter *Fort St. George Gazette*, 1874, p. 1136. In the United Provinces, all Magistrates of the first class who are or have been officiating as Joint Magistrates and also all Assistant Commissioners of the first class have been similarly empowered.—*Gazette*, 1888, p. 93

As to powers of Magistrates in (1) Upper Burma, see the *Upper Burma Criminal Justice Regulation V* of 1892, Sch. s. v, (2) in British Baluchistan see *British Baluchistan Criminal Justice Regulation VIII* of 1896, Sch. s. v

3. Summary procedure not applicable to Presidency Magistrates—The provisions of this Chapter do not apply to trials before Presidency Magistrates, *Ratanlal 539*. But all offences under the *Cotton Duties Act XII* of 1896, are, by virtue of s. 26 of that Act, triable summarily by a Presidency Magistrate, the special form of procedure prescribed by that Act, not being affected by the Code. The procedure of Presidency Magistrates is regulated by s. 362.

4. Proceedings of Magistrates not empowered void.—If any Magistrate, not being empowered by law in that behalf, tries a case summarily, his proceedings shall be void. S. 530, cl. (g). See Note 9 under s. 15

5. Inspection of registers of summary trial.—District Magistrates should satisfy themselves from time to time that the law regarding summary trials is properly observed and especially that Magistrates do not exceed their jurisdiction—a duty which may most conveniently be performed by an occasional and not infrequent examination of the registers of summary trials *Wilkins*, 113

6. Trial summary only in respect of record.—A summary trial is summary only in respect of the record of its proceedings and not in respect of the proceedings themselves which should be as complete and as carefully conducted as if they were recorded at length.—*C P Cr Cir*, Part II, No. 23

7. Framing of charge if necessary—misjoinder of charges.—It does not follow that because a case is tried summarily a charge is not necessary. No formal charge need be drawn up, but the accused must be called upon to answer to the particulars of the offence charged, whether the proceedings be summary or otherwise. The offence complained of must be so specified as to give the accused notice of what is charged against him. The same rules of law as apply to charges in warrant-cases must apply to the particulars set out in s. 263 in a summary record. It cannot be said that in a summary trial misjoinder of charges can be made without remedy, 16 C. W. N. 696 = 13 Cr. L. J. 224.

8. Formalities of this Chapter must be strictly observed.—It is absolutely necessary that Magistrates who act under the provisions of this Chapter should most strictly observe the scanty formalities which it provides, 22 W. R. 23. Where the Magistrate fails to ask the accused his plea, or fails to record such plea, if any, the conviction is bad, 9 C. W. N. 76. Where the procedure is of a summary nature, the length and carefulness of the record and decision does not take it out of that category, 24 W. R. 66.

9. Nature of procedure adopted, to appear on the face of the record—Whenever the procedure of summary trial is observed, it must clearly appear on the face of the conviction that the case was dealt with as one of those which come under the purview of this section. In cases of theft, the real value of the property alleged to be stolen should be stated, 20 W. R. 17.

10. Jurisdiction determined by the nature of complaint.—In a case where the accused were first charged under s. 395 I P C., and the proceedings were first conducted under this Chapter, but during the progress of the case the charge under s. 395 was lost sight of, and the accused were charged under s. 143, I P C., for being members of an unlawful assembly *Held*, that as the complaint was on a charge of dacoity under

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... care, far, last, fall, what, there, right, drum, plaque, drum, done, for, do, well, food, foot;

s 395, the Magistrate had no jurisdiction to try the case summarily but should have inquired into it in a regular manner, 21 W. R. 89. Whether a case is triable summarily or not, must be determined by the complaint, not by an estimate formed by the Magistrate (e.g., of the property which the accused is charged with having stolen), after evidence has been recorded and such estimate cannot retrospectively warrant a mode of trial which was originally illegal, 25 W. R. 19. Whether a case is to be tried summarily or not must be determined by the offence complained of and not by the offence proved. In 36 C. 87 it was held that the facts stated in the petition of complaint as well as the sworn statements of the complainant must be taken into consideration in determining whether a case is triable summarily. Where accused were charged with two separate offences of theft under s. 379 in which the value of the property stolen did not exceed Rs. 50, held that it was a case within s. 260 (1) (d), 21 A. L. J. 276. See next Note.


11. **Magistrate acts without jurisdiction in reducing a grave offence into a minor offence so as to try it summarily.**—Where the complaint disclosed certain serious offences not triable summarily, but the Magistrate in examining the complainant recorded only certain statements and issued processes charging the accused with certain minor offences summarily triable and thereupon the accused were summarily tried and convicted. Held, that the conviction must be quashed as the Magistrate acted without jurisdiction. The offences complained of were not summarily triable and the examination of the complainant which was not properly recorded did not show that the offence complained of had not been committed, 29 C. 409. Similarly, where the complainant laid a complaint under s. 392 I P C (robbery with violence), and the Magistrate summarily tried and convicted the accused for an offence under s. 323, I P C, the conviction was set aside and retrial ordered on the ground that the Magistrate was not under this section competent to try the case summarily, 21 P. L. R. 1907. So, too, a first-class Magistrate cannot give himself jurisdiction to try an offence under s. 211, I P C, by treating it as an offence under s. 182, I P C, Ratanlal 670. Where a complaint is made under s. 452, I P C, and there is nothing in the complainant's examination on oath to justify the Magistrate thinking that an offence under s. 451 was committed, the Magistrate acts without justification in trying the case under this chapter, 6 Bar. L. T. 137 = 14 Cr. L. J. 462. See also 5 C. W. N. 252. The offence charged in a complaint was one under s. 325, I P C, and all the facts alleged therein and the evidence, including a medical certificate sought to be adduced, went to show that grievous hurt was actually caused. The trying Magistrate, however, treating the offence as one under s. 323 tried it in a summary way. Held that in the absence of any reason recorded by the Magistrate why he treated the offence as one under s. 313 and tried it in a summary way, or of a statement by him that he discredited any of the allegations in the complaint, he was not justified in trying the case in a summary way, and convicting the accused under s. 323. Ratanlal 988. Similarly, where the offence charged in the complaint on which process was issued was rioting and the examination of the complainant was to the effect that 17 or 18 persons attacked and beat him and the Magistrate tried the case summarily. Held that as on examination of the complainant there was no reason to believe that the complaint was exaggerated or false and process was issued the Magistrate was bound to proceed and regulate his proceedings at the trial, as for the offence made up of the facts complained of and not reduced it so as to give him jurisdiction to try the case summarily, 5 C. W. N. 110. But where a complaint alleged an offence under s. 189, I P C and it was clear from the complaint and the sworn statement of the complainant that the facts stated only amounted to an offence under s. 186 I P C. Held that the Magistrate had jurisdiction to try the case summarily, 36 C. 67 where 29 C. 409 is explained.

12. **Improper to try summarily by arbitrarily reducing value of property stolen.**—Where the accused was charged with having stolen a box worth annas 8 and rupees 50 in cash contained therein, held, that the Magistrate had no authority, without taking evidence as to the value of the box, to throw it out of consideration and thus assume jurisdiction to try the case summarily. Such evidence should have been taken in the same way as the evidence upon the merits of the case, and as the Magistrate failed to do this his proceedings were ultra vires 22 W. R. 85. Since a tenant is entitled to exclusive possession of the whole produce till it is divided under s. 71 of Beng. T. Act, his complaint against landlord for theft for having cut paddy worth Rs. 88 and tried it away cannot be tried under this section as the value of the property in such a case must be regarded as Rs. 88 and not Rs. 44 to which the tenant was entitled under the act. 20 C. W. N. 1212 = 1 Pat. L. J. 230 = 17 Cr. L. J. 473.

13. **Magistrate not to mis-state nature of offence with a view to speedy disposal.**—Where a charge of wrongful confinement (s. 342 I P C) was substantiated against certain prisoners and the Magistrate treated the case as one of unlawful assembly (s. 143 I P C), with the object of disposing of it summarily. Held that the Magistrate was not justified in trying the case summarily, 24 W. R. 21 and 46. Offences should be truly described and not mitigated merely for the purpose of introducing a different jurisdiction or a lower scale of punishment. In applying the summary mode of procedure 5 P. R. 1888.

3 The state of being affected or capable
being affected by something external

by
of
of
of
of



P 111

1 A pole, a long staff, a rod
2 A measure of length containing five yards and
a half a rod, as (a) (fand or)

3 To be affected by to receive impressions
from

open
and
the
the
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the
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to be used in the
to be used in the
to be used in the

of such, care, ill, last, still, what there, well, firm, liquid, firm, alone, for, do, well, food, food,

14. Magistrate cannot split up a charge so as to give himself jurisdiction.—The powers conferred upon Magistrates by this Chapter not to have been intended to give them the power of altering a charge brought against an accused person so as to bring the case within its provision, but when a charge of a serious offence (s. 457 I P C.), one which the Magistrate is not competent to inquire into summarily, is preferred, it is the plain duty of the Magistrate to apply the procedure prescribed for such cases, and either to convict, or acquit or commit for trial the person implicated. The procedure under this Chapter is to be followed only when an offence is plainly and directly one of those specified in this section, 22 W. R. 29; 23 W. R. 31; 5 C. W. N. 252; also 2 C. L. R. 374; *contra* see 6 N.-W. P. H. C. R. 254. But when a Magistrate ascertains that the facts which are alleged to have taken place disclose only an offence triable summarily, he can dispose of such case summarily, and the mere fact that a complainant enumerates sections of the Penal Code relating to offences not triable summarily does not affect the jurisdiction of the Magistrate, unless the facts of which he really complains disclose such offences, 16 C. 715; 1 Bom. L. R. 683. The Bombay High Court in 13 B. 502 and the Madras High Court in 24 M. 675 have on revision refused to set aside proceedings of a Magistrate as without jurisdiction, in which he had convicted a person within his jurisdiction, although the evidence showed the commission of an offence triable only by the Court of Session. See also 2 M. L. T. 493 = 7 Cr. L. J. 215.

15. Splitting up permissible only when some of the component parts unbelievable.—No Magistrate is entitled to split up an offence into its component parts for the purpose of giving himself the summary jurisdiction. If a charge of an offence not triable summarily is laid and sworn to the Magistrate must proceed with the case accordingly, unless he is at the outset in a position to show from the deposition of the complainant that the circumstances of aggravation are really mere exaggeration and not to be believed. Therefore, a Magistrate when he has before him a person charged with having been armed with a deadly weapon, while a member of an unlawful assembly, is not at liberty to disregard that part of the charge which charges the prisoner with having been armed with a deadly weapon, and so to give himself jurisdiction to try the case summarily and then by inflicting a sentence of imprisonment not exceeding three months, to deprive the prisoner of his right of appeal, 4 C. 18 = 3 C. L. R. 44; also 1 C. L. R. 434; 2 C. L. R. 374, 27 C. 983; 11 C. 236; 23 W. R. 19, 21 W. R. 89; 5 C. W. N. 372, 6 C. W. N. 253. But if during inquiry under ss 147 and 324, I P C., the Magistrate after hearing evidence, is of opinion that an offence under s 323, i.e., one triable summarily, is committed, he may adopt the summary procedure, 22 M. 459 which *dissents* from 4 C. 18. See also 26 C. W. N. 831.

16. Procedure when summary offences charged with other offences.—Where an accused person is charged with offences, one of which is triable summarily, and the other not so triable, it is not open to a Magistrate to discard the latter charge and to proceed to try the case summarily, 11 C. 236. The facts that the Magistrate had jurisdiction over both offences, and the accused is not prejudiced by being tried only for the lesser offence, does not meet the objection that the prejudice lies in the different procedure which dispenses with a formal record of the evidence and a formal judgment and abridges the privilege of appeal, 5 P. R. 1889.

17. Complaint including charge not summarily triable, does not necessarily oust summary jurisdiction.—The mere circumstances of a complaint charging an accused person with offences not summarily triable along with other offences so triable, would not necessarily oust the summary jurisdiction of a Magistrate under this section. Whether a complaint affords sufficient grounds for a summary trial, or requires a trial according to the ordinary procedure, must be left in a great measure to the discretion of the Magistrate, exercised with due care according to judicial methods with reference to the circumstances of each case. *Per MAHMOOD, J* in 10 A. 55.

18. Offences triable summarily.—(a) *Under Bengal Abkars Act*—(a) An offence under s. 49 of *Bengal Abkars Act XXI* of 1856, can be tried summarily by a Magistrate under this section, the confiscation provided for by s. 49 is merely a consequence of the conviction, not forming part of the punishment for the offence, 3 C. 366 (F B) = 1 C. L. R. 442 *overruling* 22 W. R. 43 and 23 W. R. 33.

(b) *Cotton Duties Act* II of 1896—All offences against *Cotton Duties Act* (No II of 1896) may be tried summarily by a District Magistrate or Presidency Magistrate or Magistrate of the first class. These offences are mentioned in s. 25 of the said Act, and s. 26 of Act II of 1896.

(c) *Offences under Municipal Acts, e.g.*—Proceedings before a Magistrate for the recovery of Municipal cesses and taxes, under s. 84 of *Bombay Act VI* of 1873 as amended by *Bombay Act II* of 1884, is a criminal prosecution, and must be conducted in the manner prescribed by this Chapter, 17 B. 731.

(d) *The Indian Railways Act* I of 1890, s. 121, 1902 A. W. N. 24.

It is Sp. pericarpis
N. Lat. pericarpis, a s
Gr. rep. ex. r. or from
we (about and ex. or,
fruit) (that) The y
p. or (ovary, the wall
of the fruit.



(e) *Indian Forest Act*, 1878—See s 65 of Act VII of 1878

(f) *Indian Companies Act*, 1882—That the Directors of a Joint Stock Company did not file the balance sheet with the Registrar of Joint Stock Companies An offence under s 74 of Act VI of 1882 may be tried summarily, 35 A. 173.

(g) *Mischief combined with theft*—A charge of mischief, even if combined with theft, is triable summarily under this section 25 W. R. 5.

(h) *Criminal trespass and mischief*—A person may be tried summarily for criminal trespass and mischief, unless there is a *bona fide* claim of right depriving the Magistrate of jurisdiction, 10 C. 408 following 21 W. R. 38.

(i) *Stamp Act*—An offence under s. 75 (a) for failure to grant a receipt for money paid, though demanded, Weir I. 906.

19. **Offences not triable summarily**—(a) *Where there is a previous conviction*—The offence of theft under s. 379, s. 380 or s. 381, I P C., when combined with a charge of a previous conviction of an offence punishable under Chap XVII I P C., is not triable summarily, Weir II, 324; 1 Bar. B. R. 386. (b) *Charge of an illegal demand of toll under Act XIII of 1851*, 22 W. R. 75. (c) *Maintenance cases under s. 488, 20 C. 351; 24 W. R. 61.* (d) *Breach of contract by artificers*—The inquiry to be made under s. 2 of Act XIII of 1859 (punishment for breach of contract by artificer, &c) is not an inquiry into an offence as defined in this Code which may be tried summarily, 4 M. 234; 20 M. 235 at p. 238; 16 B. 369; 27 C. 131; 33 B. 22 and 33 B. 25; 6 S. L. R. 163; 14 Cr. L. J. 256; 5 P. R. 1912 = 13 Cr. L. J. 194 contra see 11 A. 262; 43 A. 281. See also 4 C. W. N. 201 and 253 where it was held that the breach is not an offence (e) *Offences under the Press Act*—The offence of keeping printing press, without making the declaration prescribed by s. 4 of Act XXV of 1867 cannot be tried summarily, 9 P. R. 1889. (f) *Preferring a false charge*—The trial of a complainant for an offence under s. 211, I P C., in a summary manner is altogether improper and open to serious objection. The proper course is for the Magistrate to institute proceedings for an offence under s. 211, I P C. or to grant sanction under s. 195 on an application by the accused, 28 C. 251. (g) *Theft of property valued at more than Rs 50* 22 W. R. 65; 20 W. R. 17 and 25 W. R. 19; 14 N. L. R. 190. (h) *Opium Act*, 1878, s. 9—An offence under s. 9 of this act being punishable with one year's rigorous imprisonment cannot be tried summarily, 4 Bar. L. T. 271 = 13 Cr. L. J. 58. (i) *Cattle lifting*—This is a serious offence and ought not to be tried summarily, 6 S. L. R. 101 = 13 Cr. L. J. 780.

19-A. **District Magistrate and Justice of the Peace in Bangalore cannot try European British subject summarily**.—G O No 680/2 B, dated 19th March, 1912 which regulates the powers of Justices of the Peace beyond British India in regard to European British subjects does not confer power of trying European British subjects summarily on Justices of the Peace. A trial of an European British subject summarily is therefore illegal 16 Cr. L. J. 773 (M.).

20. **Under what circumstances summary trial undesirable though legal**—There are many cases in which though the summary procedure is strictly legal, it is inappropriate, and should therefore not be employed, such are

(a) cases which are *prima facie* likely in the event of a conviction to call for more severe punishment than can be awarded on summary trial as cases of cattle theft and cases against previously convicted offenders,

(b) cases which are *prima facie* likely to be long and complicated,

(c) cases arising out of disputes as to title,

(d) cases in which, for any particular reason, it is desirable that there should be a full record of the evidence for future reference, as cases in which Government servants of any rank are concerned as accused persons.—C P Cr. Cir., Part II No 23

(i) *Government servants*—Summary procedure though legal is most inappropriate in cases in which Government servants, no matter what their rank, are concerned as accused persons 15 P. W. R. 1911 = 18 P. L. R. 1911 = 12 Cr. L. J. 163. Thus, where a case is complicated and a conviction may entail further serious consequences as for instance, where the charge is under s. 202, I P C., against a person who is a *Valadar Kukurni*, summary trial is not the procedure which a Magistrate, in his discretion, should use, Ratanlal 778 and 784. Similarly, where a Head Constable of Police of many years' service was charged with criminal intimidation with

affects sensibly the organs of smelling "An un-
der scent of odorous perfume." *Sillon*
Per fume', v t (to p & p PERFUMED, p pr, &
ed n PERFUMING) [Sp perfumar, Fr parfumer,
It profumare.] To fill or impregnate with a grate-
ful odor, to scent.
And Carmel's bowery top per/fo as the skies. *Pope*
Per fūm'er, n. 1. One who, or that whi h n r

It & Sp. peracarpia,
N Lat. pericarpium,
Gr. nipa lones, from
veg. about and waped,
fruit. (Dof) The ri-
pend ovary, the walls
of the fruit.



It per/fo, Fr p'fok lo l (dofron) That point in
the orbits of a planet or comet, to which it is nearest
to the sun - It is used to a helion.
Per'fū n [Fr f'ri l e -



Per-fūm'lo ri ness, n. Negligent performance

a view to prevent a person from giving evidence against serious offenders and the District Magistrate, tried the case under this section, *held*, that the Magistrate did not exercise a sound discretion in trying the case summarily and depriving the accused of the privilege of an appeal, 6 M. 396.

(vi) *Complicated cases*.—Where a great deal of correspondence has to be gone into and the case is by no means of a simple character it is not advisable to try the case summarily, 35 A. 173. A Magistrate errs in adopting a summary procedure in case involving the decision of questions of title and production of documentary evidence especially when such a procedure has the effect of practically preventing either party from prosecuting the case on appeal, 43 Cr. L. J. 771 (81ndh)

(vii) *Trial lasting long time—(six weeks) is not summary*.—Where a case of theft (s. 379, I P. C.) was tried summarily, but the proceedings lasted from the 20th March to 12th June, and in the course thereof a local inquiry had to be made, and where the value of property stolen was above Rs 50, *held*, that this was not a case which should have been tried summarily, Ind. Jar., Nov. 1891, p. 707; 1891 A. W. N. 183; *dissented from in* 1892 A. W. N. 30. Summary trial implies speedy disposal of a case which can be tried and disposed of *at once*. See also 85 W. R. 65.

(viii) *Deaf and dumb accused*.—A deaf and dumb man ought not to be tried summarily, Bom. L. R. 849 = 4 Cr. L. J. 444.

21. *Impropriety of summary trial where the Magistrate takes cognizance on his own personal knowledge*.—The holding of a summary trial upon inadequate materials by a Magistrate who was himself a principal witness, and without allowing the accused time to consider their defence and the passing of a non-appealable sentence is illegal, 3 C. W. N. 341. In another case where the petitioner was convicted of an offence under s. 6 of Act XI of 1890, the conviction being based on the trying Magistrate's own observation of the condition of certain houses belonging to the petitioner and on no other evidence. *Held*, that the conviction was illegal and that the omission to follow the procedure laid down in ss. 190 (e) and 191 cannot be cured by s. 537 and that the brevity permitted in a summary trial does not mean that there should be no trial at all or that an accused can be heavily fined at a Magistrate's discretion on a personal knowledge, notwithstanding that the law gives the accused the right of demanding that the case should be tried by another Court, 1905 P. L. R. 31 = 2 Cr. L. J. 187. A District Magistrate in a private conversation with his assistant and the Police Superintendent learnt that some persons were committing acts which in their opinion endangered the safety of a large public embankment. He directed some inquiry to be made, and followed up that order by personally visiting the place next morning, and found that they had cut away a portion of the embankment for the purpose of erecting a house and extending a mango garden, and thereby committed mischief under s. 425, I P. C. He tried them summarily and sentenced them to two months' rigorous imprisonment each. *Held*, that as it did not appear that any information was laid by any person against the accused, and that as the case was commenced without complaint and at the instance of the Magistrate himself, he should not have dealt penally with the case and considering the important nature of the case according to the Magistrate's own view he should not have acted under the summary procedure, 24 W. R. 69. See also 1900 P. L. R. 52, where the Punjab Chief Court interfered with the severe sentence of 8 days' rigorous imprisonment awarded on a summary trial by a Cantonment Magistrate for a trivial offence. A Deputy Magistrate being also the Chairman of a Municipality, without issuing process or making a record of proceedings or dismounting from a pony on which he was riding, convicted and fined an inhabitant of a town, who admitted that he had raised the level of a road within the limits of the Municipality which was considered by the Magistrate to amount to the offence of causing an obstruction in a public way. *Held*, the Magistrate's procedure was illegal, and the conviction should be set aside 15 M. 83, presumably because he could not have kept the record contemplated by s. 263 while riding on a pony.

22. *Record must show that charge was explained to the accused*.—All Magistrates trying cases under Chapter XX must be careful not only to state the charge to the accused, but to explain it to him. The record must show that this has been done and must give the answer as nearly as possible in the words used, 1 Bur., S. R. 594.

23. *Nature of re-hearing under sub-section (2)*.—The re-hearing must be *de novo*, as the proceedings hitherto are void under s. 230 (g) 23 W. R. 3.

24. *Compensation is awardable in summary trials*.—The provisions of s. 250 are applicable to summons-cases tried summarily, 11 M. 142.

25. *Interpretation of cl. (a)*.—Clauses (b) to (k) of s. 200 of Act X of 1882 being precisely expressed are not to be governed by cl. (a) but may be given their full effect. Ratanlal 500.

Perk niam
Pér/kin íst'le, a Or,
lam
Pérk'y, a Perk, pert
and perkylarches and
Per la'ceods, a [From
nearly

26. Revision.—When the record does not show that any evidence was taken to prove the ingredients of the offence charged the High Court has power to set aside the conviction even in a summary trial, 35 A 136 In this case it was held that a conviction under s 188, I P C could not be set aside as it was not proved that the order of the public servant was duly promulgated

Power to invest Bench of Magistrates invested with less power

261. The Local Government may confer on any Bench of Magistrates invested with the powers of a Magistrate of the second or third class power to try summarily all or any of the following offences —

(a) offences against the Indian Penal Code sections 277, 278, 279, 285, 286 289, 290 292 293 294 323 334 336 341 352 426 447 and 504, *

(b) offences against Municipal Acts and the conservancy clauses of Police Acts which are punishable only with fine or with imprisonment for a term not exceeding one month "with or without fine" +

(c) abetment of any of the foregoing

(d) an attempt to commit any of the foregoing offences when such attempt is an offence

Notes.—1 Section 277—Fouling the water of a public spring or reservoir 278—Voluntarily vitiating the atmosphere so as to make it noxious to the health of the neighbourhood 279—Rash driving or riding on a public way 285—Negligent conduct with respect to any fire or combustible matter 286—Negligent conduct with respect to any explosive substance. 289—Negligence with respect to any animal. 290—Commission of a public nuisance 292—Sale etc of obscene books 293—Having in possession obscene books for sale or exhibition. 294—Singing obscene songs to the annoyance of others 323—Voluntarily causing hurt. 334—Voluntarily causing hurt on grave provocation. 336—Rashly or negligently endangering human life or the personal safety of others. 341—Wrongful restraint. 352—Using criminal force otherwise than on grave provocation 426—Mischief 447—Criminal trespass

2 **Conservancy clauses of Police Acts.**—As to conservancy clauses, see the *General Police Act V* of 1861 s 34 and s. 61 of the *Bombay Police Act No IV* of 1890 Offences under s 48 of the *Madras Police Act* (ss 3 and 4 of the *Towns Nuisances Act*) are within the cognizance of a Bench of Magistrates coming under cl (b) of this section 13 M 142

3. **Offences a Bench of Magistrates may try.**—A Bench of Magistrates cannot try any offence except those mentioned in s 260 and this section, 21 W R. 12; 9 C. 96 They cannot take proceedings e.g., for security to keep the peace

4 **Summary powers of Benches in Madras.**—In Madras any Bench of Magistrates exercising powers of the first or second class has been empowered to act under this section *Fort St George Gazette* 1891 Pt I p 279

262. (1) In trials under this Chapter the procedure prescribed for summons-cases shall be followed in summons-cases and the procedure prescribed for warrant-cases shall be followed in warrant-cases except as hereinafter mentioned

Procedure for summons and warrant cases applicable.

Limit of imprisonment.

(2) No sentence of imprisonment for a term exceeding three months shall be passed in the case of any conviction under this Chapter

Notes.—1 **Procedure in summary trial of warrant cases.**—To a warrant-case tried summarily the rules about warrant-cases apply under this section. In such a case though a formal charge need not be framed the accused person cannot be called delinquent if he delays to name his witnesses until he has heard the evidence for the prosecution and found that the Magistrate considers the evidence a substantial basis for charging him *Ratanlal* 768 In a warrant-case tried summarily the Magistrate ought to grant an adjournment if desired by the accused to enable him to summon the witnesses for the defence under s 257 unless the application is made for purposes of vexation or delay or for defeating the ends of justice. 5 L B R. 20 = 9 Cr. L 583.

2. **Appeal.**—An appeal lies under s 407 from a conviction by a Bench of Magistrates invested with second or third-class powers 9 M 36, but not from a Bench with first-class powers 9 C. 96

3. High Court can enhance sentence up to two years.—When an accused has been summarily tried the High Court as a Revision Court can enhance the sentence up to two years *re*, the limit to which a first class or Presidency Magistrate can pass sentence, *Bom. H. C. Cr. R.L.*, 30th July, 1883 (*F.B.*).

4. Limit of imprisonment in summary trials.—A sentence of six months' rigorous imprisonment in a summary trial is illegal as no sentence exceeding three months can be passed in such trials, when an adequate sentence cannot be passed, the case ought not to be tried summarily *4 L. B. R. 335 = 9 Cr. L. J. 23*.

5. Limit of three months applicable to substantive sentence only.—The limit of three months mentioned in the last para applies only to substantive sentences of imprisonment and not cases where simple imprisonment is ordered as a process for enforcement of fine, *6 A. 61*.

6. Solitary confinement.—It is not illegal to impose solitary confinement as a part of the sentence in a case tried summarily. The section does not interfere with a Court's power to order solitary imprisonment under s. 73 I P C., or with similar powers given by s. 32 *6 A. 83*.

7. Security for keeping the peace.—Magistrate trying summarily is competent to require security for keeping the peace under s. 106, 1885 A. W. N. 181.

8. Fine of any amount may be imposed.—There is nothing in Chapter XXII which limits the amount of fine that may be imposed in a summary trial, *35 A. 173*.

263. In cases where no appeal lies, the Magistrate or Bench of Magistrates need not record the evidence of the witnesses or frame a formal charge, but he or they shall enter in such form as the Local Government may direct the following particulars —

Records in cases where there is no appeal

- (a) the serial number,
- (b) the date of the commission of the offence,
- (c) the date of the report or complaint,
- (d) the name of the complainant (if any),
- (e) the name, parentage and residence of the accused,
- (f) the offence complained of and the offence (if any) proved, and in cases coming under clause (d), clause (e), clause (f) or clause (g) of sub-section (1) of section 260 the value of the property in respect of which the offence has been committed
- (g) the plea of the accused and his examination (if any)
- (h) the finding and in the case of a conviction a brief statement of the reasons therefor,
- (i) the sentence or other final order, and
- (j) the date on which the proceedings terminated

Scope of the section—Sections 263 and 355 of the Cr Pro Code must be read together. If the Magistrate is unable at the commencement of the trial to determine whether the proper sentence to be passed should be an appealable one or not he must make a memorandum of the substance of the evidence of each witness as his examination proceeds. But if he can at this stage determine that the sentence will be, in any event non-appealable he need not record the evidence. It however, he actually does so the notes of the evidence form part of the record of the case and cannot be destroyed by him. Where a Magistrate destroyed such record the High Court being unable to form an opinion of the propriety of the conviction set it aside, *43 C. 218*

Notes.—1. Record must be explicit about the nature of the offence and its ingredients.—The accused has a right to be informed of the precise nature of the offence with which he is charged. The record should state the offence clearly and distinctly and should be complete in all particulars *1932 A. W. N. 59*. A bare reference to the section of the Penal Code is not sufficient. In a summary trial of a summons-case the Magistrate must be careful not only to state the charge to the accused, but to *explain* it to him, *1 Bar. 6. R. 594*. The facts found by the Magistrate must show what offence has been committed by the accused, *3 C. W. N. 281; 7 P. R.*

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Per
thing
Per valve, a. Tending, or having power, to per

penetrable
A country perilous to the arms and authority of a con
queror
Not less in number were the sparrows down,
Which at it unfolded stand by night by day,
Perous in winds, and open every way
Capable of being penetrated by the mental
sight.
an (rod) whose secrets are here out to

1 That which is pestilent.
2 Especially, the disease known as the plague,
and hence, any contagious or infectious disease that
is epidemic.
3 That which is pestilent or noxious to the world,
that which breeds disturbance or vice

re: us, wry, sinuous [Obs]
Per: us: ion: ally ad 11
Per: us: ion: ally [Obs]
Per: us: ion: ally (n. Tb)
Per: us: ion: ally, vice
Per: us: ion: ally n. Per: us: ion: ally
Per: us: ion: ally n [L. per: us: ion: ally, from per-] unwholesome and per: us: ion: ally occupations "Furke | Per: us: ion: ally n [Fr petard from p: iter, to break wind,
A, S, L, E, G, F, long A, Z, I O, A, P, short, care, far, last, fall, what, there, with, term, pique, firm, done, for, dog, wolf, food, foot,

1887; 5 P. R. 1839. Where after a summary trial the petitioner was convicted of being in possession of a bundle of clothes and there was no evidence to show he had any guilty knowledge, the conviction was quashed on the ground that the proceedings did not disclose any offence against the petitioner. Further, it was held that the Magistrate's record in summary trial however brief, must show the necessary ingredients of the offence charged. It is not necessary even where an appeal lies, for a record of evidence to be made, but under s 264, the substance of the evidence must be embodied in the judgment as well as the particulars referred to in that section, 3 L. B. R. 3 = 2 Cr. L. J. 375. Where in such a case the record omitted to show what account if any the accused at the time of his arrest gave of himself and no reason was given for considering such amount to be unsatisfactory, the conviction was set aside, 12 Cr. L. 280 (Bar.).

2. Record must be sufficiently exact and sufficiently full to enable the Judges of the Revisional Court to say whether the law has been complied with or not on the points to be recorded.—The three things required under this section to be recorded, viz., (i) the offence charged, (ii) the offence, if any, proved, and (iii) the reasons for convicting must be recorded and recorded in such a way as to enable the Court of Revision to say yes or no from within the four corners of the record itself whether the offence charged is an offence in point of law and whether the reasons for conviction are good and sufficient reasons, 10 C. W. N. 79 = 2 C. L. J. 565 = 3 Cr. L. J. 178; Ratanlal 778.

3. Brief reasons for conviction should be recorded.—Although a Magistrate is not required to record any evidence, he should in recording his reasons for the conviction, state them, so that the High Court, on revision, may judge whether there were sufficient materials before him to support the conviction. Where they were not so stated, the High Court, on motion, set aside the conviction, 6 C. 579 followed in 18 B. 97; 3 C. W. N. 231; 6 C. W. N. 40; 2 S. L. R. 3; 1899 A. W. N. 81; 10 A. L. J. 231 = 13 Cr. L. J. 703. "A Magistrate may be very well satisfied in his own mind of the guilt of a person who has been brought before him, but what he should do, and what we must take care he does, is to leave upon records some brief but intelligible reasons for the conclusions at which he has arrived, so that our superintendence of his proceedings may not be defeated"—*Per* STRAIGHT, J., in 1893 A. W. N. 114; 1885 A. W. N. 213; 1885 A. W. N. 188; 7 P. R. 1899; 21 A. 189; 16 O. C. 357 = 14 Cr. L. J. 694. See 31 C. 983; 3 L. B. R. 3. "I think it distinctly desirable that Magistrates should set out under the column reserved for the purpose so much of the reasons that have influenced them as to satisfy the accused that the Magistrate has considered each of the ingredients necessary in law for the conviction to which the Magistrate has proceeded and that, while this should be recorded with brevity, the brevity should not be such as to tend to obscurity. There is no question in my mind from the language used by the Legislature that the intention was that in case of this kind the procedure should be summary and the record should contain the barest particulars. I am therefore not prepared, if I find compliance with these requisites, to interfere and to lay down that facts and reasons should be set out at such length as to make the Court of Revision more or less a Court of Appeal so far as facts are concerned. The law intended the procedure to be summary, and it is not for this Court to lay down otherwise than the law has directed." *Per* KNOX, J., 21 A. 189 at p. 191; 9 S. L. R. 89 = 16 Cr. L. J. 713, see Note 8 to s 260. See, however, 46 M. 253.

But in 26 Bom. L. R. 1236 it is held that the mere omission to comply with the provisions of cl (A) of s 263 on the part of a Bench of Magistrates, amounts to an irregularity which can be cured under s 537, especially where the case is a non-appealable one and there is clear evidence justifying the conviction.

4. Record in appealable cases.—In case where no appeal lies, a Magistrate is bound to record a brief statement of his reasons for convicting the accused 8 C. 193. But he need not record the evidence of witnesses to justify his order, 1903 A. W. N. 143 = 2 Cr. L. J. 335, where 27 C. 450 is distinguished. But where a Magistrate of the first class passes a sentence of imprisonment for one month and fine, his order is appealable. He cannot, therefore, in such a case make up his record in the manner prescribed by this section, 2 C. L. R. 814.

4-A. Record in appealable cases.—Section 253 of the Code applies to cases in which no appeal lies and exempts the Magistrate from framing a formal charge in such cases. But there is no exemption in a case tried summarily in which an appealable sentence is passed, 27 C. W. N. 923.

5. Refusal to hear evidence is illegal.—Recording evidence is not same as hearing evidence.—This section does not excuse a Magistrate from hearing the evidence of all witnesses. It excuses him from recording the evidence of any of the witnesses. But it is an elementary point that recording evidence is not the same as hearing evidence. In all criminal cases, if the accused denies the charge, the complainant and such witnesses as he may produce must be examined and the case must be decided upon the effect of their evidence in order that a finding made without hearing evidence offered by the complainant is clearly illegal, 39 C. 931.

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Red-bellied sparrow (Phalaropus fulicarius)



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6. **Omission may be remedied subsequently.**—An omission by a Magistrate to comply with the requirements of cl. (A) of this section, in a case in which no appeal lies may, in some cases, be remedied at a subsequent period, 6 C. L. R. 273. But where no reasons are given it was recently held in 9 C. W. N. 73 that the defect cannot be cured by the explanation of the Magistrate sent to the High Court in pursuance of a rule issued on him, 26 Bom. L. R. 1236; but see 46 M. 253.

7. **Accused must be examined and plea recorded.**—There must be examination of the accused under s. 342 in all warrant-cases. S. 263 does not give the Magistrate discretion whether he will examine the accused or not. The words 'if any' do not apply to warrant-cases, 41 C. 743. Where a Magistrate altogether omitted to record the plea of the accused, the conviction was set aside, 9 C. W. N. 76.

8. **When deposition may be proved by oral evidence.**—In a summary trial the Magistrate need not record the evidence and where no obligation is laid upon the Judge or presiding officer to reduce depositions or statements to writing, they may be proved by persons who heard them made in order to establish the fact that they were made, Ratanlal 334.

9. **Record must be written by Magistrate.**—The record in non-appealable cases must be written by the Magistrate. He is not authorized, in such cases, to depute that duty to a clerk nor to affix his signature to the record or judgment by a stamp, 6 M. 396; 8 A. 293.

264. (1) In every case tried summarily by a Magistrate or Bench in which an appeal lies, such Magistrate or Bench shall, before passing sentence record a judgment embodying the substance of the evidence and also the particulars mentioned in section 263

Record in appeal
able cases

(2) Such judgment shall be the only record in cases coming within this section

Notes.—1. Contents of judgment in appealable cases.—The judgment required to be drawn up in appealable cases under this section is to contain particulars mentioned in s. 263, and something more, viz., the substance of the evidence on which the conviction was held. But it is not to be entered in the *Register of non-appealable cases*, and is evidently intended to be in a separate form so that, when necessary, it may be submitted to the Court of Appeal, *Wilkins*, 113. A judgment which does not satisfy these particulars is liable to be set aside, Ratanlal 725. The substance of the evidence is a matter quite distinct from the facts which may be considered as proved by the evidence. It should also be recorded in such a way that the Court of Appeal will be able to form an opinion whether the evidence is sufficient to support a conviction. When the record does not fulfil these requirements a conviction cannot be properly upheld on appeal. 4 L. B. R. 338 = 9 C. L. J. 23.

2. **Practice of mutilating registers is highly objectionable and illegal.**—In appealable cases a Magistrate should not make the record required by this section as an entry in the register prescribed by s. 263 and then on the Appellate Court calling for the record of the trial, cut out and send up the portion of the register containing this entry. The practice of mutilating official registers is open to the gravest objection and is strictly prohibited. There is no warrant for it in law, *Wilkins* 113.

3. **General substance of evidence sufficient.**—A Magistrate is not bound to record the substance of every separate deposition but to state generally what is the substance of the witness's evidence. 25 W. R. 6.

4. **Appellate Court must quash conviction if evidence not sufficient.**—When a Sessions Judge on appeal is unable, even with the aid of the Magistrate's finding to form an independent opinion as to the guilt of the prisoners, and when the evidence which came before him is not sufficient to satisfy him reasonably that the prisoners were rightly convicted, held that he ought to have acquitted them, 11 B. L. R. 33 = 20 W. R. 13; *contra* see 1 A. 680. There, under similar circumstances it was held that the Court should not have quashed the conviction merely by reason of such defect, but if it found impossible to dispose of the appeal because of such defects, it should have required the Magistrate to repair the same by recording a judgment in which the substance of the evidence should be fully embodied, and, if necessary, re-examining the witnesses for that purpose to have ordered re-trial with that view. As to when a re-trial is to be ordered, see 2 P. R. 1874. See s. 537 inserted for the first time in the 1882 Code after the Rulings above.

5. **Judgment must be written by Magistrate and not by clerk.**—The judgment in appealable cases must be written by the Magistrate. He is not authorized to depute that duty to a clerk, nor to affix his signature to the record or judgment by a stamp, 6 M. 396.

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Philô's'o phî'tion, n. Philosophical discussion
 (of s) *See* *Phil.* & *Phil.*
 Philô's'o phî'me, n. [Gr *philosophos*, from *philô*
sepein, to love knowledge, to inquire to discuss,

Phê'on n. [Arab O. Fr.] (*Her*)
 The barbed iron head of a dart —
 used also as a royal mark to de-
 note crown property, and termed
 the broad or, or broad arrow



and the like, a vial. *See* VIAL.

being then in bed and this is filled

Passes through the air and then

through a lot of air pur
 by & it filters the
 or earth after, wisdom,
 ledge of phenomena as
 into, causes and reasons,

is deeply and the doctrine is our school.

6 Record to be made up before passing sentence.—The record should be made up at the time of the trial and not at its close from memory or from some rough note 15 M 83.

265. (1) Records made under section 263 and judgments recorded under section 264 shall be written by the presiding officer, either in English or in the language of the Court or, if the Court to which such presiding officer is immediately subordinate so directs in such officer's mother tongue.

Language of record and judgment.

(2) The Local Government may authorize any Bench of Magistrates empowered to try offences summarily to prepare the aforesaid record or judgment by means of an officer appointed in this behalf by the Court to which such Bench is immediately subordinate, and the record or judgment so prepared shall be signed by each member of such Bench present taking part in the proceedings.

Bench may be authorized to employ clerk.

(3) If no such authorization be given, the record prepared by a member of the Bench and signed as aforesaid shall be the proper record.

(4) If the Bench differ in opinion any dissentient member may write a separate judgment.

Note.—A separate judgment may be recorded even though the sentence be unappealable.

CHAPTER XXIII

OF TRIALS BEFORE HIGH COURTS AND COURTS OF SESSION

Notes.—1 Application of Chapter to trials under Criminal Law Amendment Act.—The provisions of this Chapter are applicable to the trials held under the *Indian Criminal Law Amendment Act XIV of 1908*. See s. 14 (2) — When holding a trial under s. 11 the special Bench shall apply the provisions of Chap. XXIII with such modifications as may appear necessary to adapt those provisions to the case of a trial before the High Court without a jury. But s. 14 (1) of that Act lays down that the provisions of the Code shall not apply to proceedings thereunder in so far as they are inconsistent with the special procedure prescribed in that Act.

2 Application to Courts of Session in Burma and Baluchistan.—As to Courts of Session in (1) Upper Burma see Reg. V of 1892 Schedule A, 2 but as to European British subjects see s. 22 *ib* and in (2) British Baluchistan see Reg. VIII of 1896 Schedule, s. 3.

A—Preliminary

266. In this Chapter except in sections 276 and 307 and Chapter XVIII the expression 'High Court' means a High Court of Judicature established¹ under the Indian High Courts Act 1861,² (or the Government of India Act 1915) and includes³ (the Courts of the Judicial Commissioners of the Central Provinces, Oudh and Sind and) * 4 1 * 3 > x < such other Courts as the Governor General in Council may by notification in the *Gazette of India* declare to be High Courts for the purposes of this Chapter * (and of Chapter XVIII).

High Court defined.

Central Provinces

Governor General in Council

Note.—See 4 (j) as to the meaning of *High Court* when used in this Code elsewhere than in this Chapter. The words in brackets were submitted for the words *Court of the Recorder of Rangoon* by the *Lower Burma Courts Act VI of 1900* s. 47 and first Schedule.

¹ The words 'or to be established' were omitted by s. 2 and Sch. of the Amendment Act 1918 (XIII of 1918).

² These words and *Burma* were inserted by s. 2 and Sch. of the Amendment Act 1915 (VIII of 1915).

³ These words have been inserted by Act VII of 1923.

⁴ The words 'the High Court of the Punjab' were repealed by Act XVIII of 1919.

⁵ The words 'the Court of the Recorder of Rangoon' were repealed by Act XI of 1923.

* These words and *Burma* were added by Act XVIII of 1923.

267. All trials under this Chapter before a High Court shall be by jury, and notwithstanding anything herein contained, in all criminal cases transferred to a High Court under this Code or under the Letters Patent of any High Court established under the Indian High Court Act, 1861,^{*} (or the Government of India Act, 1915), the trial may, if the High Court so directs, be by jury.

Notes.—1. Trial in case transferred to High Court.—Where, under s 526 or s 449, a case is transferred for trial before the High Court in its original criminal jurisdiction and no order under this section is made to the contrary the trial shall be with the aid of assessors, if that is the mode of trial in the Court from which the case is transferred.

2. No jury in trials under the Indian Criminal Law Amendment Act, XIV of 1908.—It is enacted by the said Act, s. 11 (2) that no trial under that Act before the Special Bench of the High Court shall be by jury. See Appendix XII

Trials before Court of Session to be by jury or with assessors

268. All trials before a Court of Session shall be either by jury, or with the aid of assessors.

Notes.—1. Trial in Sessions Court ordinarily with assessors.—Under this section in the absence of any notification under s 269 a trial in a Court of Session must be with the aid of assessors 18 P. R. 1883.

2. Distinction between trial by jury and trial with assessors.—A trial by jury or with the aid of assessors begins only when the charge has been read and the accused claims to be tried, 15 B. 514. See also 25 B. 696; 21 A. 108 and 32 M. 220. In a trial by jury, the jury is the real tribunal and is aided by the Judge and in certain matters directed by the Judge. Whereas in a trial with the aid of assessors the Judge is the sole tribunal aided by each of two assessors. Though assessors do not form *members of the Court*, yet it is mandatory that a trial with the aid of assessors should commence with at least two assessors and at least one assessor must attend the trial throughout and give his opinion. The jury form a tribunal or body with a foreman and the verdict is the verdict of the body and when there is no unanimity among the members of the body, the opinion of the majority prevails as the verdict of the body. But in the case of a trial with the aid of assessors, the assessors do not form a body and each acts and expresses his opinion individually, and the Judge is to invite the opinion of each separately and record it. The Judge is the sole Judge of law and fact and the responsibility of the decision rests solely with him, though in the decision of the case he is expected to take into consideration the opinion of each assessor. *Per BHASHYAM AYYANGAR, J* in 24 M. 523 at p. 536. While the individual opinion of each assessor is taken the individual opinions of the member of a jury are never intended to be disclosed, 36 M. 585. See also 13 A. 337 and 6 C. W. N. 715.

(i) *Difference in procedure*—The law makes no distinction as to the procedure at the trial between a trial by a jury and one with the aid of assessors, except as to the summing up in the case of the former, and the manner in which the verdict in the former and the opinion of the assessors in the latter are respectively taken, 33 B. 423.

(ii) *Judge's position therein*—In a trial by jury, the Sessions Judge is exactly in the same position as the jury in dealing with the evidence properly given before him and he is bound to confine his attention solely to that evidence, 27 C. 293. In a trial with assessors, the assessors are, no doubt to assist the Judge but they have no power to appreciate the evidence so as to bind the Judge. The opinion of the assessor must have, no doubt, regard paid to it but after all it is the Judge who has to decide the case on the facts as well as law. His is the final responsibility, 14 Bom. L. R. 710 = 1 Bom. Cr. C. 159 = 13 Cr. L. J. 677.

3. Evidence ought not to be taken in the absence of juror and assessors.—When evidence is taken after discharging assessors, it is recorded *coram non iudice*, i.e., before a tribunal which has no authority to record it and conviction based upon such evidence will be reversed, 15 A. 136; 7 Bom. L. R. 978. Section 537 does not cover such an irregularity. In only one instance is a Court of Session authorized to record evidence in the absence of jury or assessors, and that is when additional evidence is called for by the Appellate Court under s. 428 see 43 A. 225.

^{*} The words and figures "or the Government of India Act 1915," were inserted by Act XIII of 1916

Phytotomy, *n* [Gr *phutō*, plant and *tomē*, cutting, from *temnō*, to cut.] The dissection of plants.

4 ((rent) A kind of type of two sizes, small pica and pica, the former of which is next in size above long primer.

¹⁰ This line is printed in *pica*.

☞ This line is printed in *small pica*.

Pick, n (Fr *pie*, a pickaxe a pick Fr *pie pioche*,
Sp *eliga pico*, It *pizzo* bee supra, and cf *pick*)
1 A sharp-pointed tool, — often used in compo-
sition, as, a tooth pick; a phil-lock; a pickler, a

Pf.

PI 1

brain
P'ta nēu, n. (Eog pie, Lat picā, a pic, and pīcus,
a woodpecker)

era, especially, a plunderer of wrecks, a pirate,
a corsair.
In all wars, Corruca and Majorca have been nests of me-

One who picks or plunders, a

exiles a quarrel between himself

၁ မေလက ? သုတေသန

2 A square open space surrounded by buildings

3 (from Cath Church.) An ordinary table c.

To pick a hole in one's coat to find fault.
 Pick, v t 1 To eat slowly or by morsels, to nibble
 2 To do any thing nicely, or by attending to small things
 3 To steal to pilfer

ä, ê, ê, ô, ö, ū, long, ä, ê, ê, ô, ö, ū, short, care, far, last, fall, what, there, veil, term, plaque, firm, done, for dñ, wolf, food, foot;

269. (1) The Local Government may, by order in the *Official Gazette* direct that the trial of all offences or of any particular class of offences, before any Court of Session, shall be by jury in any district, and may, with the like sanction, revoke or alter such order

Local Government may order trials before Court of Session to be by jury

(2) The Local Government, by like order, may also declare that, in the case of any district in which the trial of any offence is to be by jury, the trial of such offences shall, if the Judge, on application made to him or of his own motion, so directs, be by jurors summoned from a special jury list, and may revoke or alter such order

(3) When the accused is charged at the same trial with several offences of which some are and some are not triable by jury, he shall be tried by jury for such of those offences as are triable by jury, and by the Court of Sessions, with the aid of the jurors as assessors for such of them as are not triable by jury

Notes.—1. *Trial of European British subject*.—As regards European British subjects, this section must be read subject to the provisions of s. 451

2. *Interference with right of trial by jury is not ultra vires of the Indian Legislature.*—The Code in so far as it interferes with the mode of trial by jury is not *ultra vires* under the proviso to s. 22 of the *Indian Councils Act* (24 and 25 Vic. c. 67). *King Emperor v. Kartik Chandra Dutt* followed, *Amcer Khan*, 6 B. L. R. 392 and 439 approved 37 C. 467 at pp. 493 and 516-517.

3. *Particular classes of offences.*

notified that whereas by orders previously issued in the Tinnevely district and that it stood committed for trial and others might thereafter be similarly committed in connection therewith, the Governor-in-Council with the previous sanction of the Governor-General in Council directed under this section that the previous orders be revoked as regards the persons referred to and that such persons should be tried with the aid of assessors and not by jury. Certain persons having been so tried for offences under ss. 148, 454, 395 and 323 I P C. were convicted and sentenced and on appeal it was contended that the class of offences referred to in this section must be ascertained according to some classification recognized by the Legislature—such as is found in the Penal or Procedure Codes, e.g., offences against the State, against the person, etc., or bailable offences, cognizable offences etc. held that there was no reason shown for putting this narrow construction on the words 'class of offences'. But offences might be classified according to the persons who committed them, i.e., the offenders or according to the person or property against whom or which the offences are committed or in regard to the particular occasion in connection with which they are committed. The fact of offences having been committed by old offenders or members of criminal tribes, or against women or against public property would afford reasonable ground for a classification and so would offences connected with an outbreak directed against a certain section of the community and that hence, the offences connected with the particular outbreak had been rightly treated as a 'class of offences' and that it was competent to the Madras Government to revoke the previous notification so far as it related to that class, 23 M. 632.

4. *Procedure at a trial where some of the charges are triable by jury and some with aid of assessors*.—The accused were tried by a jury for an offence under s. 395 I P C., and by the Judge with the aid of the same juror as assessors for offences under ss. 396 and 397, I P C. Exception was taken to the conduct of the trial in that the accused were prejudiced by the simultaneous disposal of a charge triable by a jury and of charges triable with the aid of assessors. Held the trial of all the offences charged together is contemplated by s. 269 (3), 18 Cr. L. J. 717 (M.). A Sessions Judge tried by jury, an accused on two charges—one of which was and the other was not triable by jury, and dissenting from the verdict of the jury referred the whole case to the High Court. Held, that he should have first recorded the opinion of the jury as assessors regarding the charge not triable by jury and the High Court could treat the verdict on the latter charge as valid, *Ratanlal Bhoi*. Again, where at a trial by jury for an offence under s. 397 I P C. and with the aid of assessors for an offence under s. 307, I P C. the accused were acquitted of these offences but the Judge convicted the accused of the offence of causing hurt by a dangerous weapon under s. 324 I P C. without requiring the jury as assessors to give their opinion with reference thereto and recording such opinion is required by s. 309. Held, that the conviction is valid.

1 The words 'with the previous sanction of the Governor-General in Council' were omitted by Act XXXV of 1920

fr. *pignus*, *ignoris* and *pigneris*, a pledge, pawn;
fr. *pign* or *pign* }
1 The act of pledging or pawning

air of the head tied in the form of a pig's

gion }


piece in 7 a

few of 77

3 A fork used in husbandry, a pitchfork { 704 }
4 A pointed or spear like oak, hill or mountain
summit { Rare }

1) A plant of the genus *Ge*
Ar. succoth
Thick, easily brittle
A hole for pigeons to enter
hinge or division in a v or for

from the
light and
shin



Pile
wind
Pile
Moon
cert

Pile
low
Pile
Pile
Pile
One
who
Pile
Pile

on 1 globe } in, a pier or mole of stone, Or miter,
a ball globe }

A, E, I, O, U, Y, long. A, E, I, O, U, Y, short. care, care, last, fall, whist, there, yll, there, plique, firm, done, for, op, wolf, sand, foot,

Weir II, 334. In 9 Bom. L. R. 1057 = 6 Cr. L. J. 236, the accused were tried by the Judge with jury on charges, under ss. 304 and 325 of the Penal Code. The jury found the accused guilty with respect to the charge under s. 325 with this verdict the Judge disagreed, and he referred the case to the High Court under s. 307. *Held*, that the case should be sent back to the Judge who tried it, with a direction, that he should pass orders and dispose of it as in a case tried by him with the aid of assessors on the minor charges against the accused, under s. 325. In 22 M. 15 the accused was charged with dacoity (s. 395—jury case) and murder in dacoity (s. 396—assessors case) and it appeared from a perusal of the preliminary register that the accused were either guilty under s. 396, I P. C., or not guilty at all, but the accused were nevertheless tried by the Sessions Judge and a jury and on the jury finding the accused not guilty of dacoity the Sessions Judge disagreeing with the verdict referred the case to the High Court, *held*, that the procedure adopted by the Judge was wrong and that he should have tried the accused with the aid of assessors. See also 23 M. 632; (1911) 2 M. W. N. 197 = 12 Cr. L. J. 433.

5. All the members of the jury are to be constituted assessors and their opinion taken.—Where the accused were tried at one trial for two offences, one of which alone was triable by jury and the Sessions Judge after taking the verdict of the jury on that charge, took the opinion of two of the jurors only as assessors on the other charge and convicted the accused on both the charges. *Held*, that the conviction on the latter charge must be set aside as the Sessions Judge was bound under sub-sect. (3) of this section to take the opinion of all the jurors as assessors and that his failure to do so cannot be treated as mere omission or irregularity curable under s. 537, 26 M. 598. The accused were charged under s. 395, I P. C., an offence triable by jury and also with offences under s. 147, I P. C., and other sections triable by a Judge with the aid of assessors and were jointly tried, five gentlemen were selected to form a jury and two of them were chosen to help as assessors. In respect of the latter offences the Judge differing from the two assessors convicted them of nothing, *held*, that the Judge was bound to constitute all the members of the jury as assessors from trying the non jury offences and the Judge not having done so, the conviction was illegal, 26 M. 598 followed, 21 M. L. J. 520 = 10 M. L. T. 22 = 12 Cr. L. J. 239. See also 13 M. 426.

6. Trial with assessors of a jury case may be valid if no objection taken.—When a jury case was tried with assessors and no objection was taken at the trial, *held* on appeal that the omission to take the objection at the trial before the Court of Session was fatal to the contention. Section 536 (2) applied, 23 M. 632.

7. Trial by jury of case triable with the aid of assessors is legal and valid.—When an offence triable with the aid of assessors is tried by jury such a trial is a legal and valid trial see s. 536, 4 C. L. R. 405. Unless the accused intervenes before the verdict is delivered and gets the procedure applicable to trial with the aid of assessors enforced, he cannot be heard to complain, 33 B. 423. See also 25 C. 555, 9 M. 42; 3 C. 765. In these cases it was *held*, that a Sessions Judge after he has erroneously taken the verdict of the jury on a charge of an offence not triable by jury but with the assistance of assessors cannot correct his mistake by treating the verdict as opinion delivered by assessors. See 29 B. 696; 1 Bom. L. R. 114, 26 M. 243, 6 M. L. J. 14 = 25 M. 243 (footnote). In such a case, an appeal lies only on a matter of law and not on a matter of fact 25 B. 680 (F.B.) followed in 33 B. 422. But see 24 W. R. 18 and 30; 3 C. 765, 26 M. 243 (per BENSON, J.) and 13 M. 626; 27 Bom. C. R. 1416.

8. Offence triable by jury—(a) Bengal.—Trial by jury has been extended to the district of 24 Pargannas Hooghly, Burdwan, Moorshidabad, Nudderh, Patna and Dacca in the case of offences under Chapter VIII, XI, XVI, XVII, XVIII, *Calcutta Gazette*, 27th March, 1893, and to offences under Chapter XX, I P. C., abetments of and attempts to commit such offences. *Ibid* March, 1895. Trial by jury has been extended to the districts of Chittagong, Mymensing Rajshahi and Jessore in the case of offences abovementioned.—*Calcutta Gazette*, 19th April 1897.

(b) Madras.—Trial by jury is extended to all Courts of Sessions in the Madras Presidency, except those in the Agencies of Ganjam, Godavari and Vizagapatam to the following offences under the I P. C., ss. 379, 380, 382, 392—395, 397—402, 411, 412, 414, 451—459 and 461. G. O. of 20th March, 1883, *Fort St. George Gazette*, Part I, p. 110. It is also extended to attempt to commit and abetments of offences under the abovementioned sections of the I P. C. in all the districts, except those abovementioned. *Ibid*, G. O., 23rd September, 1894, *Fort St. George Gazette*, 1894, Part I, p. 1198.

(c) Bombay.—Trial by jury has been extended to the districts of Thana, Belgaum, Surat and Karachi City, in case of all offences punishable with death, transportation for life or imprisonment of ten years, while in Ahmedabad district only offences punishable with death shall be tried by jury. In Poona district all offences for which under Chapter VIII or XI or XII or XXI or XXIII or under any of the said Chapters taken in connection

and pignora, a pledge, pawn.

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
Pile, wed, pignora, a pledge, pawn.

P

3 A fork used in husbandry, a pitchfork (See)
 4 A pointed or spear like peak, hill, or mountain
 summit (Here)

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with s. 75, I P C the punishment awardable is death transportation for life or imprisonment for a period of ten years or upwards and also all abetments or attempts to commit any of the offences above described are to be tried by jury

(d) **United Provinces and Oudh**—Trial by jury is extended to Allahabad, Benares and Lucknow in the case of the following offences under the Indian Penal Code—(1) Kidnapping and abduction—Sections 383 to 399 (both inclusive) 372 and 373 I P C (2) Rape—Section 376 (3) Theft—Sections 379 380 381 and 382, (4) Robbery and dacoity—Sections 392 to 399 (both inclusive) 397 398 399 and 401 (5) Criminal misappropriation—Sections 403 and 404 (6) Receiving stolen property—Sections 411 to 414 (both inclusive), (7) Mischief—Sections 426 to 432 (both inclusive) 434 435 436 and 440 (8) House trespass—Sections 448 450 to 462 (both inclusive) (9) Offences relating to marriage—Sections 493 to 498 (both inclusive) (10) Abetments of and attempts to commit any of the abovementioned offences—Chapters V and VIII of the Indian Penal Code

(e) **Burma**—Trial by jury has been extended to Rangoon town district of the Pegu division and the Moulmein sub-division of the Amherst district. See *Burma Gazette*, 1900 Part I p 321 for notification issued for the Tenasserim Division

(f) **Assam**—See *Assam Gazette* 1903 Part II p 170 for the notification for the Assam Valley Sessions Court

Trial before Court of Session to be conducted by Public Prosecutor

270. In every trial before a Court of Session the prosecution shall be conducted by a Public Prosecutor

Notes—1 Public Prosecutor—For definition see s 4 (f). It is highly undesirable for the prosecution in Sessions Court to be conducted by officers of Police, 13 W. R. 18 See Chap XXVIII for other provisions dealing with Public Prosecutors.

2 Position of private pleader engaged by party—If any private person instructs a pleader to prosecute in any Court any person in a case of which the Public Prosecutor has charge the Public Prosecutor shall conduct the prosecution and the pleader so instructed shall act therein under his directions—Section 493 The Public Prosecutor may avail himself of the services of the pleader engaged by the complainant, 11 B. H. C. R. 102 and the special authorization of the District Magistrate is not necessary 23 W. R. 14

3. Omission in the appointment of Public Prosecutor—This section can only be reasonably construed as directory. The absence of a Public Prosecutor in a particular case before a Sessions Court whether by reason of an omission on the part of the Government or of the district Magistrate is at most an irregularity which is capable of being cured by s. 537 35 P. R. 1887

4 Private Prosecutor cannot conduct Prosecution—In a criminal prosecution on indictment the prosecutor has no right to address the jury or to conduct the prosecution *A v Brice* 2 B. and Ald 608, *R v Gurney* 11 Cox 414

B—Commencement of Proceedings

Commencement of trial—**271.** (1) When the Court is ready to commence the trial, the accused shall appear or be brought before it, and the charge shall be read out in Court and explained to him and he shall be asked whether he is guilty of the offence charged or, claims to be tried

Plea of guilty (1) If the accused pleads guilty, the plea shall be recorded, and he may be convicted thereon.

Notes—1 Court to be careful to see that the charge has been fully explained—See s. 241 for procedure when accused does not understand proceedings. When arraigning an accused person and before receiving his plea the Court should be careful to insure the explanation of the charge in a manner sufficiently explicit to enable the accused to understand thoroughly the nature of the charge to which he is called upon to plead 5 C. 828; *Walt* II, 336 and 339; 3 Bom. L. R. 439 Simply reading out the charge to the prisoner is not sufficient, but it must be explained to him Where the charge is not explained the conviction will be reversed especially in cases of trial for life 9 M. 61 See also 18 A. L. J. 442.

2. The record must show that charge has been read over and explained and plea taken.—The record must contain the usual entry as to the charge being read over to the accused and as to his plea, though the absence of same will not affect the validity of the trial if it is referred to in the judgment, *M H C Ref trial 17 of 1906*, 21 Cr. L. J. 410.

3. Effect of not recording plea.—If the accused pleads guilty, the plea should be recorded. Where no such plea appears on the record, the conviction is bad, and must be set aside and a new trial ordered on the charge 5 M. L. T. 75; 5 A. L. J. 157—1908 A. W. N 54

4. Accused's statement to be recorded in the language conveyed to the Court.—It is not necessary that the statement of the accused made in a foreign language should be taken down in the words of that language. The language in which it is conveyed to the Court by the interpreter is the language in which it should be recorded, 5 C. 826.

5. Accused must state his plea by his own mouth.—The accused should plead by his own mouth and not through his counsel or pleader, 15 W. R. 42. No pleader can be called upon to plead on behalf of his client 'guilty' or 'not guilty' and it is improper for a Magistrate to act on such plea, 6 Bom. L. R. 881. See Note 2 under s. 255

6. Admissions by pleader appointed by Court not binding on accused.—Admissions made by a pleader appointed by Court to help the accused in his defence are not binding on him. The position of a pleader so appointed to defend a prisoner accused of murder is not the same as that of a pleader appointed by the accused, 2 Bom. L. R. 751.

7. A confessional statement at the close of a trial is not a plea of guilty.—After a prisoner has claimed to be tried, all the evidence, whether the statement of witnesses or admission of the prisoner, should be laid before the jury. Such an admission made at the end of a trial is not a plea of guilty upon which a Sessions Judge could record a finding without taking a verdict of the jury, *Weir II*, 334; 7 Bom. L. R. 731.

8. The accused should never be called upon to plead in the alternative but separately upon each head of charge.—The accused was charged with the offence of culpable homicide not amounting to murder or in the alternative with the offence of grievous hurt. On the charges being read over to the accused, he pleaded guilty to the second head of the charge only, viz., that of causing grievous hurt. The Sessions Judge accepting this plea sentenced him. *Held*, that the accused should never be called to plead in the alternative, but separately to each of the heads of charge, *Ratanlal 327*. See also 10 B. 125

9. Plea of guilty must be distinct admission of each and every fact necessary to constitute the offence charged.—Unless the accused distinctly admits each and every fact necessary to constitute the offence, and unless the Judge himself finds on the admissions made that the offence charged is legally established, he should take the evidence and come to a decision thereon. Where it appeared that the accused had admitted throughout that he beat deceased (his wife) and that she died but it appeared open to question whether he admitted the existence of any connection between the beating and the death, or of any intention to cause such bodily injury as was likely to cause death. *Held*, that the conviction on the plea of guilty of culpable homicide not amounting to murder could not be sustained, *Weir II*, 336. If an accused pleads guilty, the Court ought to satisfy itself that he confesses the full offence charged in the indictment, *R v Goldtham*, C. C. A. 11 Cr. App. R. 79.

A prisoner pleaded guilty to an indictment charging him in first count with stealing horses and in the second count with receiving the horses knowing them to have been stolen. On being asked whether he had anything to say why sentence should not be passed upon him he said that he was guilty of taking the horses not knowing that they were stolen. He was then sentenced.—*Held*, that the plea of 'guilty' was wrongly entered and all proceedings at the trial consequent on that plea were bad, that a plea of 'not guilty' must be entered and the case must go back for trial. *Rex v Ingleson*, (1915) 1 K. B. 512

10. Plea of guilty must be unequivocal and properly taken.—A prisoner charged under s. 211, I P. C., with having brought a false charge with intent to injure, by accusing A of having caused the death of a person under s. 304 A, I P. C., stated at the trial that the original complaint made by him was false, and that he made it unthinkingly. The Sessions Judge treated this statement as a plea of guilty, and convicted him. No record of the prisoner's plea appeared on the proceedings, nor did it appear that the charge had been explained as well as read to the prisoner, and the Judge considered that the original complaint did not amount to a false charge of an offence under s. 304-A. *Held*, that the conviction was bad, 7 C. 96 = 8 C. L. R. 471. In case where an accused person when called upon to plead to a charge before a Court of Session, instead of pleading guilty,

makes a long rambling statement more or less admitting guilt, it would be much safer if the Judge recorded a formal plea of "not guilty" and proceeded to try the case in the ordinary way, recording the evidence, 1905 A. W. N. 54 = 5 A. L. J. 157 = 7 Cr. L. J. 235. See also Notes 11 and 12 below

11. **Statement of accused must be taken as a whole.**—It is not the duty of the Sessions Judge at the time of recording the plea to decide whether any statement which accompanies it, is true or false—any such statement must be regarded as explanatory of the plea, *Ratanlal 532*. In 11 C. 510, an accused person in answer to a charge of murder stated that he had killed his wife, but that he had done so in consequence of his having discovered her in an act of adultery on the previous day. *Held*, that such a statement did not amount to a plea of guilty on the charge, and that it was the duty of the Court to try whether the provocation, therein disclosed was sufficiently grave and sudden to reduce the offence. Also where the prisoner admitted that he had accompanied the dacoits for a short distance, but that he had turned back almost immediately and had had nothing to do with the dacoity that afterwards took place, and did not know that such an offence was in contemplation, *held*, that the statement does not amount to a plea of guilty, 7 W. R. 39. Where a person accused of murder acknowledged having struck his victim but repudiated the intention to murder, and the Sessions Judge accepted this acknowledgment as plea of guilty, and omitted to record any further evidence *held* that the Judge was bound to accept the statement of the accused as a whole if it was taken as a confession at all 25 W. R. 23, 14 B. 555. A prisoner stated before the committing Magistrate that he committed the homicide with which he was charged because of his body being then possessed by the goddess Warsubal. Before the Court of Session though he pleaded guilty, he informed the Judge in reply to the first question put to him that he committed the homicide because he was subject to epileptic fits. *Held*, on appeal that the prisoner could not be held to have pleaded guilty and could not therefore be convicted on that plea, *Ratanlal 539*. When a prisoner pleads guilty, but goes on to say that he did not commit the offence with which he is charged, the plea is really one of *not guilty*, 11 W. R. 53. See also Note 4 to s. 255

12. **Code exhaustive as to 'pleading'—plea of 'not guilty' not recognized by the Code.**—Ss. 271 and 272 contain all that is necessary as to pleading and there is no need to supplement their contents by a reference to any other system of judicature. The accused can plead guilty under s. 271, he can claim to be tried or he can refuse to plead which is taken to be same as claiming to be tried. The plea of 'not guilty' is thus one not recognized by the Code. This is intentional and designed to get rid of a great mass of English law relating to criminal pleading. It is open to the accused to make any answer to an indictment except guilty or a claim to be tried 41 C. 1072.

13. **Where a plea of guilty is upon a specific charge, conviction upon another charge is bad in law.**—Where an accused person pleads guilty to the specific offence with which he is charged, he cannot, on such plea, be convicted of an offence other than that specifically charged, *Wells II, 333 (1881)*. Thus where an accused person was charged with the offence of murder and the charge was not proved, but the Court convicted her of the offence of concealment of birth which it considered was admitted by her in her examination by the Court it was *held*, that such conviction was illegal. A charge of concealment of birth should have been framed and the accused tried thereon, *Ratanlal 355*. Again, where an accused person pleaded guilty to the charge of culpable homicide not amounting to murder, but the Sessions Judge, having regard to the evidence before the committing Magistrate, convicted him of grievous hurt instead of culpable homicide not amounting to murder on his own plea. It was *held*, that the Sessions Judge should have tried the case. It was illegal to convict the accused of an offence of which he did not plead guilty and for which he was not tried, *Ratanlal 413*.

14. **Plea of guilty of the offence of murder is not sufficient to establish offence of culpable homicide not amounting to murder.**—Where accused has pleaded guilty to a charge of murder, conviction of culpable homicide not amounting to murder is illegal, 35 A. L. R. 38 = 10 Cr. L. J. 5. Where there is clear *prima facie* case of murder, a Sessions Judge cannot legally, without trying the case, accept a statement made by the accused who is charged with the offence of murder, as sufficient to establish his plea of guilty of the offence of culpable homicide not amounting to murder on the ground of grave and sudden provocation, and convict and sentence him accordingly for such offence on his own plea, *Ratanlal 410*.

15. **Trial does not end with the plea of guilty—Discretionary with Court to continue trial or accept plea.**—If the Judge does not think fit to convict the prisoner on the charge to which he has pleaded guilty, he should proceed to try him and thereupon he will have to take all the evidence in order to determine whether the prisoner has committed the offence to which he had pleaded guilty or any other offence with which he is charged.

etc. under

Pitched battle a battle in which the hostile forces have met by surprise and slain to death

GRADE

It is a small oval body on the lower margin, only supposed by the ancients to be the nostril.

[Lat *infusus*, It & Sp *infuso* - see supra] Consisting of or te or much, exhibiting the effects

OF A SET PASSING OF TWILIGHT

when the poor lendeth to the Lord.

That he is old, the more is the pity his white hairs do witness.
Reassure him.

3 A call for pity

I am not prone to weeping as our sex
Commonly are the want of which vain dew,
Perchance shall dry your eyes.

Shel

Section

[imp & p p FITED p pr & to n
[sic *supra*. O Tr polymer]
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mpose onate to have tender feelings to
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end under water, and observing the
height to which the fluid rises on a
graduated scale.

"wretched, miserable
 sorrowful, mournful. That piteous strain
 voice"

17. 18. 19. 20. 21. 22. 23. 24. 25. 26. 27. 28. 29. 30. 31. 32. 33. 34. 35. 36. 37. 38. 39. 40. 41. 42. 43. 44. 45. 46. 47. 48. 49. 50. 51. 52. 53. 54. 55. 56. 57. 58. 59. 60. 61. 62. 63. 64. 65. 66. 67. 68. 69. 70. 71. 72. 73. 74. 75. 76. 77. 78. 79. 80. 81. 82. 83. 84. 85. 86. 87. 88. 89. 90. 91. 92. 93. 94. 95. 96. 97. 98. 99. 100. 101. 102. 103. 104. 105. 106. 107. 108. 109. 110. 111. 112. 113. 114. 115. 116. 117. 118. 119. 120. 121. 122. 123. 124. 125. 126. 127. 128. 129. 130. 131. 132. 133. 134. 135. 136. 137. 138. 139. 140. 141. 142. 143. 144. 145. 146. 147. 148. 149. 150. 151. 152. 153. 154. 155. 156. 157. 158. 159. 160. 161. 162. 163. 164. 165. 166. 167. 168. 169. 170. 171. 172. 173. 174. 175. 176. 177. 178. 179. 180. 181. 182. 183. 184. 185. 186. 187. 188. 189. 190. 191. 192. 193. 194. 195. 196. 197. 198. 199. 200. 201. 202. 203. 204. 205. 206. 207. 208. 209. 210. 211. 212. 213. 214. 215. 216. 217. 218. 219. 220. 221. 222. 223. 224. 225. 226. 227. 228. 229. 230. 231. 232. 233. 234. 235. 236. 237. 238. 239. 240. 241. 242. 243. 244. 245. 246. 247. 248. 249. 250. 251. 252. 253. 254. 255. 256. 257. 258. 259. 260. 261. 262. 263. 264. 265. 266. 267. 268. 269. 270. 271. 272. 273. 274. 275. 276. 277. 278. 279. 280. 281. 282. 283. 284. 285. 286. 287. 288. 289. 290. 291. 292. 293. 294. 295. 296. 297. 298. 299. 300. 301. 302. 303. 304. 305. 306. 307. 308. 309. 310. 311. 312. 313. 314. 315. 316. 317. 318. 319. 320. 321. 322. 323. 324. 325. 326. 327. 328. 329. 330. 331. 332. 333. 334. 335. 336. 337. 338. 339. 340. 341. 342. 343. 344. 345. 346. 347. 348. 349. 350. 351. 352. 353. 354. 355. 356. 357. 358. 359. 360. 361. 362. 363. 364. 365. 366. 367. 368. 369. 370. 371. 372. 373. 374. 375. 376. 377. 378. 379. 380. 381. 382. 383. 384. 385. 386. 387. 388. 389. 390. 391. 392. 393. 394. 395. 396. 397. 398. 399. 400. 401. 402. 403. 404. 405. 406. 407. 408. 409. 410. 411. 412. 413. 414. 415. 416. 417. 418. 419. 420. 421. 422. 423. 424. 425. 426. 427. 428. 429. 430. 431. 432. 433. 434. 435. 436. 437. 438. 439. 440. 441. 442. 443. 444. 445. 446. 447. 448. 449. 450. 451. 452. 453. 454. 455. 456. 457. 458. 459. 460. 461. 462. 463. 464. 465. 466. 467. 468. 469. 470. 471. 472. 473. 474. 475. 476. 477. 478. 479. 480. 481. 482. 483. 484. 485. 486. 487. 488. 489. 490. 491. 492. 493. 494. 495. 496. 497. 498. 499. 500. 501. 502. 503. 504. 505. 506. 507. 508. 509. 510. 511. 512. 513. 514. 515. 516. 517. 518. 519. 520. 521. 522. 523. 524. 525. 526. 527. 528. 529. 530. 531. 532. 533. 534. 535. 536. 537. 538. 539. 540. 541. 542. 543. 544. 545. 546. 547. 548. 549. 550. 551. 552. 553. 554. 555. 556. 557. 558. 559. 560. 561. 562. 563. 564. 565. 566. 567. 568. 569. 570. 571. 572. 573. 574. 575. 576. 577. 578. 579. 580. 581. 582. 583. 584. 585. 586. 587. 588. 589. 590. 591. 592. 593. 594. 595. 596. 597. 598. 599. 600. 601. 602. 603. 604. 605. 606. 607. 608. 609. 610. 611. 612. 613. 614. 615. 616. 617. 618. 619. 620. 621. 622. 623. 624. 625. 626. 627. 628. 629. 630. 631. 632. 633. 634. 635. 636. 637. 638. 639. 640. 641. 642. 643. 644. 645. 646. 647. 648. 649. 650. 651. 652. 653. 654. 655. 656. 657. 658. 659. 660. 661. 662. 663. 664. 665. 666. 667. 668. 669. 670. 671. 672. 673. 674. 675. 676. 677. 678. 679. 680. 681. 682. 683. 684. 685. 686. 687. 688. 689. 690. 691. 692. 693. 694. 695. 696. 697. 698. 699. 700. 701. 702. 703. 704. 705. 706. 707. 708. 709. 710. 711. 712. 713. 714. 715. 716. 717. 718. 719. 720. 721. 722. 723. 724. 725. 726. 727. 728. 729. 730. 731. 732. 733. 734. 735. 736. 737. 738. 739. 740. 741. 742. 743. 744. 745. 746. 747. 748. 749. 750. 751. 752. 753. 754. 755. 756. 757. 758. 759. 760. 761. 762. 763. 764. 765. 766. 767. 768. 769. 770. 771. 772. 773. 774. 775. 776. 777. 778. 779. 780. 781. 782. 783. 784. 785. 786. 787. 788. 789. 790. 791. 792. 793. 794. 795. 796. 797. 798. 799. 800. 801. 802. 803. 804. 805. 806. 807. 808. 809. 810. 811. 812. 813. 814. 815. 816. 817. 818. 819. 820. 821. 822. 823. 824. 825. 826. 827. 828. 829. 830. 831. 832. 833. 834. 835. 836. 837. 838. 839. 840. 841. 842. 843. 844. 845. 846. 847. 848. 849. 850. 851. 85

u, ū, ē, ē, y, long, a, ~~ay~~, ā, y, short, care, kare, fast, fall, what, there, vell, tērm, pique, flem, dōne, fūr, do wōll, fōod, fōot,

4 B. L. R. Appx. C1. Thus there need not necessarily be a conviction on the plea. The Code draws a clear distinction between conviction and sentence, **8 B. 85; 7 A. 160.** After a plea of guilty a trial may be continued to ascertain the actual part taken by the accused in order to assess the punishment, **23 A. 53.** The trial of an accused person does not necessarily end if he pleads guilty, but evidence may be taken (especially in cases of murder), as if the plea had been one of not guilty and the case decided upon the whole of the evidence including the accused's plea. A trial does not strictly end until the accused has been either convicted or acquitted or discharged, **23 M. 151.** See also **19 B. 195;** and **13 C. W. N. 552 = 9 C. L. J. 291 = 10 Cr. L. J. 434; 37 A. 247.**

16. In capital cases, desirable not to accept plea of guilty.—'It is not in accordance with the usual practice to accept a plea of guilty in a case where the natural sequence would be a sentence of death.' Where on a trial for murder the accused was put some questions in answer to which he said he hit the deceased and the Sessions Judge, treating the statement as a plea of guilty convicted the accused of murder, it was *held* (i) that it was not in accordance with the sequence would be a sentence of death without necessarily admitting that he (ii) intention or a certain knowledge, **8 Bom. L. R. 245.** In capital cases where there is any doubt as to whether an accused person fully understands the meaning and effect of a plea of guilty it is advisable for the Court to take evidence and not to convict solely on the plea of the accused, **19 A. 119.** A plea of guilty should not be accepted in capital offences **54 P. R. 1905; 19 Bom. L. R. 356; 20 A. L. J. 320.**

17. Trial to be full and complete, where accused not convicted on his plea.—In a trial by jury the plea of the accused was recorded by the Judge as follows — 'The accused makes a statement admitting the fact, but alleging provocation.' Jurors were selected and after some adjournment, one witness was examined for the defence and pleaders on both sides heard and the Judge in charging the jury observed 'the evidence for the accused was so overwhelmingly strong that I had no hesitation in accepting his full statement of the facts given by the accused in this Court.' The jury returned a verdict of guilty and the accused was convicted. *Held*, that there was no legal trial and that the conviction must be set aside. If the Judge was of opinion that the plea of the accused was one of guilty, he ought to follow the procedure laid down in this section, but if he decided that the plea did not amount to a plea of guilty, the trial ought to have proceeded in the usual way under s. 272 and the verdict of the jury ought to have been taken upon the evidence and not upon the Judge's view of the strength of the evidence, **6 Bom. L. R. 671.** Where a prisoner had admitted before the Court of Session that he had killed his wife no assessors were empanelled. At the end, however, of his confession he stated that he was not in his right mind at the time. The Judge therefore proceeded to record medical and other evidence on the point, and having come to the conclusion that there was no reason to doubt from the prisoner's conduct either prior or subsequent to the murder, that in committing the murder, he knew that he was doing a wrong act convicted the prisoner. *Held*, that the plea, was, in effect one of not guilty and that the trial should not have proceeded without assessors and that it should be quashed, **5 N.W. P. H. C. R. 110.** In another case the accused confessed having killed his wife and pleaded guilty at his trial for murder. The Sessions Judge recorded briefly the evidence of two prosecution witnesses to determine whether the offence committed was or was not culpable homicide amounting to murder. He found the offence was murder and sentenced the accused to transportation for life on the ground that the accused, 'without being actually insane so as not to be aware of what he was doing, appears to be decidedly a man of weak intellect.' On appeal it was urged that the accused was insane or at any rate incapable of understanding the charge against him and the Chief Court accordingly set aside the conviction and ordered a re-trial and an inquiry under s. 465 **51 P. R. 1905 = 3 Cr. L. J. 82.**

18. Practice if plea not accepted—When a Judge decides to try a case in spite of the plea of guilty, it is directed to enter a plea of not guilty. The case is meaningless unless he accepts it. If on appeal the Crown and the prisoner, which he had to try, **9 C. L. J. 55 = 10 Cr. L. J. 329; Weir II, 335 (1856); 19 B. 195; 23 A. 53; 13 C. W. N. 552 = 9 C. L. J. 291 = 10 Cr. L. J. 434.** The proper course to be adopted when an accused person who is tried with others pleads guilty is either to convict him on his plea and remove him from the dock, in which case his trial would manifestly be at an end so as to warrant his being called as a witness either for or against any person who has been accused along with him, or to allow the trial to go on as if the plea had been one of 'not guilty' in which case the trial does not end with the plea of guilty and therefore any confession made by the person so pleading could

into consideration under s. 30 of the *Indian Evidence Act* against any other person who was being jointly tried with him for the same offence, 23 M. 151. But if the plea of guilty is accepted, the accused pleading guilty is not jointly tried along with others and this confession cannot be taken into consideration against the others, 15 P. R. 1911 = 12 Cr. L. J. 605. See also 11 P. R. 1900; 37 A. 237.

19. It is unfair to postpone conviction on plea of guilty solely with the view of using the confession against a co-accused.—It is unfair to deter the conviction of the accused solely with the view of having his confession considered against his co-accused who have pleaded 'not guilty,' 23 A. 53. But it could not be properly held, that the accused who confessed before a Magistrate and had pleaded guilty before the Sessions Court was under trial with the others, so as to make his confession admissible under s. 30, *Indian Evidence Act* against them, 15 B. 66; 19 B. 195; 4 C. 493 (F.B.), 2 C. W. N. 749, 17 A. 524; 22 A. 445; 7 M. 102; 22 M. 491 and 11 P. R. 1800. It is against the spirit of law to postpone the conviction so that the person who has pleaded guilty may technically be said to be tried jointly for the same offence and thus create an opportunity for the purpose of allowing the statements he may have made to be considered against the co-accused 30 A. 630, 13 C. W. N. 522 = 9 C. L. J. 291 = 10 C. L. J. 484; 12 A. L. J. 1239 = 16 Cr. L. J. 103.

20. Test for finding whether plea accepted or not.—The question whether an accused who pleads guilty was being jointly tried with the other accused who did not plead guilty, so that his evidence could be taken into consideration against them under s. 30, *Indian Evidence Act* appears to depend upon whether the Judge accepted the plea of guilty or not. The test seems to be whether in fact, the trial proceeded as against the accused who had pleaded guilty as if he had not done so, i.e., whether for instance he cross-examined or was given the opportunity of cross-examining the witness, whether he was examined himself (and in a case where there are assessors), whether their opinion was taken as to guilt, U. B. R. (1913) 2nd Qr., 170 = 14 Cr. L. J. 565. The test is whether the judgment discussed the guilt of the person pleading as an open question to be decided on the evidence on record 15 P. R. 1911 = 12 Cr. L. J. 605.

21. Effect of partial plea of guilty.—When a person is charged with having made two contradictory statements, he may plead guilty of having falsely made one statement. Here both statements may be false so that because the prisoner pleaded guilty to one charge he should not of necessity be acquitted of the other. Looking at the special nature of such charges the prisoner ought not to be allowed to elect which statement he shall admit to be false. The fact should be tried as under s. 272 it is optional with the Court to do so 8 W. R. 6 (Cr. Let.).

22. Where plea, in effect, is one of not guilty, conviction upon a confession before the committing Magistrate is bad.—A Sessions Judge, after a prisoner upon his trial has pleaded what in effect amounts to a plea of not guilty is not justified in convicting the prisoner solely upon a confession made before the committing Magistrate, 2 N. W. P. H. C. R. 479. Some corroborative evidence is necessary to warrant the Court of Session in acting upon a confession made before the committing Magistrate but retracted at the trial 1886 A. W. N. 21, 23 B. 316.

23. Plea of guilty when no assessors.—Where the accused pleads guilty, his conviction is valid, although there are no assessors 10 W. R. 43 = 2 B. L. R. 23 (F.B.) 5 W. R. 21 (Cr. Let.), but the plea must be recorded, 5 M. L. T. 216.

24. Form of proceedings in trials before the Court of Session see B. H. C. Cr. Cir., p. 26, *Wilkins* 220

272. If the accused refuses to, or does not, plead, or if he claims to be tried, the Court shall proceed to choose jurors or assessors as hereinafter directed and to try the case

Refusal to plead or claim to be tried.

Trial by same jury or assessors of several offenders in succession.

Provided that, subject to the right of objection hereinafter mentioned the same jury may try, or the same assessors may aid in the trial of, as many accused persons successively as the Court thinks fit.

Notes.—1 If the accused refuses to, or does not plead.—When the accused person makes no answer to the enquiry whether he is guilty or has any defence to make it should be ascertained whether he is obstinately mute or dumb *ex vi ratione Dei*. If he be found to be obstinately mute the plea of 'not guilty' should be recorded and the trial should proceed. If he be found to be dumb *ex vi ratione Dei* an enquiry should

height much exceeds its projecture, such as the face of an architrave. (b) The lintel of a door or window. (c) A list or fillet between the gutings

and the like

2 The art of forming plantations of trees [Eng]
 Plint'less a Having no plants, destitute of vège

Plash, n [D 2 has a puddle. See splash]
 1 A small collection of standing water,
 2 These shallow *plashes*
 3 A dash of water, a splash
 3 [See LASH v t] The branch of a
 cut or lopped, and bound to other branch

we've twist]

and the like
 Plash'out, n [See LASH v t]
 1 A dash of water, a splash
 2 The branch of a cut or lopped, and bound to other branch

Plas'matic {a (Gr. *shapen*), etc. an
 Plas'matic {a, {pru}

WHICH ARE USED IN THE
 The Nabirek's *plaf* / *ra* the platform of a political

z, s, i, b, g, f, long; a, c, i, b, g, f, short, care, far, last, full, what, there, well, term, pique, firm, done, for, ag, well, food, root,

be made as to whether he is sane or insane or incapable of being tried. If found sane, a plea of 'not guilty' shall be recorded, and the trial should proceed, but if found to be insane, the procedure laid down in Chap. XXXIV should be followed, *Ratanlal 19*.

2. Commencement of trial—The actual trial does not begin until the charge has been read and the accused claims to be tried, 15 B 516; 25 B. 694 and see 31 M. 220 (see Note 5 to s. 251). If the accused refuses to plead or claims to be tried, the Court must proceed to try the case and where the trial is not by jury, it must be conducted with the aid of two or more assessors as members of the Court, 2 B. L. R. 23 (F.B.). The accused person shall not be examined by the Sessions Judge immediately after he has been called upon to plead, if his plea be 'not guilty,' 3 Agra H. C. R. 85

3. Where there is no evidence for prosecution Judge is bound to find not guilty.—In trials before a Sessions Judge with assessors, when the prisoner pleads not guilty and the Public Prosecutor does not offer evidence in support of the charge the Judge ought to instruct the assessors that they are bound to find the prisoner not guilty, 4 M. H. C. R. Appx. XXXIX, see also 15 W. R. 19.

4. Jury cannot try two cases simultaneously—'By the same jury may try as many cases, etc.' we understand that one trial is to follow the other, i.e., that on the conclusion of one trial the same jury may proceed to try the accused in the next case. The law does not contemplate that two trials shall be conducted piecemeal in such a manner that at their conclusion the jury shall be called upon to decide at one and the same time upon two distinct classes of evidence which, though they have points in common require careful discrimination as bearing upon the guilt or innocence of two sets of accused. Independently of the irregularity of the proceeding, no jury ought to be placed in such an embarrassing position. 'It is only fair to the prisoners that the sole issues on which they are to be tried and the evidence bearing upon those issues, should be laid before the jury, and that the minds of the jury should not be encumbered by the consideration of foreign and irrelevant matter'—*Per PRINSEP, J.*, in 6 C. 95 p. 99 = 6 C. L. R. 521.

5. Plea of 'not guilty' not recognised by the Code.—See Note 12 to s. 271

273. (1) In trials before the High Court, when it appears to the High Court, at any time before the commencement of the trial of the person charged, that any charge or any portion thereof is clearly unsustainable, the Judge may make on the charge an entry to that effect

Entry on unsustainable charges

Effect of entry

(2) Such entry shall have the effect of staying proceedings upon the charge or portion of the charge, as the case may be

Note.—Effect of an entry under this section—An entry under this section has not the effect of an acquittal for the purpose of s. 403 but it cannot be revised by the High Court under ss. 435 and 439. Applications to the High Court under this section should be disposed of by it in the exercise of its ordinary original criminal jurisdiction, 9 C. 337, see 21 C. 97 for the exercise of the power under this section. Under s. 494, the Public Prosecutor may also with the permission of the Court withdraw from the prosecution of any person or the power of the Advocate-General to enter *non prosequi* vide s. 333 and the effect thereof

C—Choosing a Jury

274. (1) In trials before the High Court the jury shall consist of nine persons

Number of jury

(2) In trials by jury before the Court of Session the jury shall consist of such uneven number, not being less than five or more than nine, as the Local Government, by order applicable to any particular district or to any particular class of offences in that district, may direct

† Provided that, where any accused person is charged with an offence punishable with death, the jury shall consist of not less than seven persons and, if practicable, of nine persons

* The word "five" has been substituted for the word "three" by Act XII of 1923

† This proviso has been added by Act XII of 1923.

Notes.—1. The numbers fixed by Government Notification to be strictly adhered to.—Where the Local Government has, by notification, fixed the number of the jury at five, a trial had before a so-called jury composed of seven was held bad as it was before a tribunal not properly constituted 26 A. 211.

2 Number of jury.—In *Bengal* where the accused is not an European or American the jury should consist of five persons, in the *United Provinces of Oudh and Agra* of seven persons, in *Madras* of five in *Punjab* nine, in the Districts of *Lahore Delhi, Rawalpindi and Peshawar* five, in the Districts of *Ambala, Multan and Siakot* and in the other districts three, in *Bombay* before the *Poona Court of Session* of offences under Chapters VIII, IX XII, XVII XVIII, I P C the jury must consist of five persons But in *Bombay* five has been fixed as the number for the jury in which an European (not being an European British subject) or an American is the accused person

*** 275.** (1) In a trial by jury before the High Court or Court of Session of a person who has been found under the provisions of this Code to be an European or Indian British subject, a majority of the jury shall if such person before the first juror is called and accepted so requires, consist, in the case of an European British subject, of persons who are Europeans or Americans and, in the case of an Indian British subject, of Indians

(2) In any such trial by jury of a person who has been found under the provisions of this Code to be an European (other than European British subject) or an American, a majority of the jury shall, if practicable and if such European or American before the first juror is called and accepted so requires, consist of persons who are Europeans or Americans

Notes.—1. The most difficult question for the Committee to decide is that of trial by jury of European British subjects This is the point on which non-official European opinion is most emphatic namely, that it is essential that a mixed jury should be retained We have decided accordingly that the mixed jury should remain both in the High Court and in the Sessions Court in all cases which are to be tried by jury under our proposals, subject however to certain provisions and safeguards, namely —the same law as to the composition of the jury shall apply to Indians as to Europeans, that is to say, the majority of the jury, if an Indian accused so desires shall consist of persons who are not Europeans or Americans This is already the law in Sessions Courts, and s. 275 should be so amended as to make it apply to the High Court also Report of the Racial Distinctions Committee, paragraph 25

A Judge is not bound to try a Native Christian with the aid of Christian jury, 1 W. R. 2

2. See for the meaning and scope of this section and ss 443 and 446 and for the meaning of the phrase 'Ordinary course' in the proviso to s. 446, 5 Lab 513.

276. The jurors shall be chosen by lot from the persons summoned to act as such, in such manner as the High Court may from time to time by rule direct

Provided that—

Existing practice maintained *first* pending the issue under this section of rules for any Court, the practice now prevailing in such Court in respect to the choosing of jurors shall be followed

persons not summoned when eligible, *secondly* in case of a deficiency of persons summoned, the number of jurors required may, with the leave of the Court be chosen from such other persons as may be present,

thirdly, in a trial before any High Court in the town[†] which is the usual place of sitting of such High Court,

trials before special jurors. (a) if the accused person is charged with having committed an offence punishable with death, or

^{*} S. 275 has been substituted for the old s. 273 by Act XII of 1922

[†] Subst. substituted for the words 'in the Presidency towns' by Act XVIII of 1923.



Plant, a. [Fr plant, p pr of pier, to bend, noc
synon]

The will was then more ductile and pliant to right reason

Took once a
Good means
Of farrest

3 Totell to dra
with Steady Illigent
Plead, i f To tree
Barefoot p

ed We plow the watery wave. Pope
up and devastate, to dig into or lay
at the places / low Rome Shad
trim, as paper, with a knife or press.
recovery plowing as to plow in wit
e hard, to scourge to make or to per
sent. Fr exix 3 = To plow up or out
the ground by plowing - To plow with
deat with the wife to obtain something
id. Judges xiv 15

1 To labor with a plow
plowmen should plow in hope 1 Cor ix 30
me by plowing, or in spite of obsta.

folded manner
Plex-ation n. (O Fr plect on,
from Lat plectre, to fold) A fold
ing or fold



chicuous one
I have overbored a plot of death.

cles
Cruled by faith and matchless fortitude
To peace and truth thy glorious way hast plowed. Milton

pable of belg
a penny formerly
plow land to st u
Co old
Wood or timber
want for the re
ices or gulches a
a rustic buy
land, a cultiva
bottom part of a

FLOW-GATE

PLOT v t [from PLOT, p pr, & t b n] husbandman

PLOTTING
1 To plan
unprofitable
oil ra
2 To make
To plot fort

Is lant

PLOT/ful n. A plot or dangerous state

plows or white a
stor of grain, a

By n. a. ce says
1. Thus which is exposed to risk that which
serves to plot or plodge security since That
Lord whose hand must take my pl m Shad
d. Asjowed cond thin risky or dangerous state

A, E, Y, O, G, F, long, A, E, Y, O, G, F, short, care, far, last, fall, what, there, yell, term, plique, firm, done, for, dg, welf, food, foot;

(b) if in any other case a Judge of the High Court so directs, the jurors shall be chosen from the special jury list hereinafter prescribed, and

fourthly, in any district for which the Local Government has declared that the trial of certain offences may be by special jury, the jurors shall, in any case in which the Judge so directs, be chosen from the special jury list prescribed in section 325

Notes.—1. Mode of choosing jury.—This section contemplates that the names of the jury to be "chosen by lot," shall be drawn out of one box containing the names of all persons summoned to act as jurors, 1 B. 462.

2. Conviction in a case tried by a jury not chosen by lot is illegal.—Effect of Judge selecting a jury instead of choosing by lots.—The object of this section coupled with ss. 279 and 326, is to secure an impartial trial by rendering impossible any intentional selection of jurors to try a particular case, and an accused person has a right to claim to be tried by a jury chosen with strict regard to all the safeguards provided by law to secure perfect impartiality. On the day fixed for trial, there was not a sufficient number of jurors in attendance and the Judge summoned from among the residents of the town contrary to s. 326, other men, *held*, that when a Judge fails to obtain a panel in the manner provided by ss. 277 and 326 (by lot) it is his duty to postpone the trial until the requisite number of jurors have been obtained in the manner provided by law. Where instead of choosing jurors by lot and then hearing and deciding objection as provided by ss. 276—279, the Judge proceeded at once to exempt some of the persons present, merely on their own representation and tried the accused with the rest, and where it further appeared that the persons summoned to serve as jurors had not been selected in the manner provided by s. 326, *held*, that such a grave irregularity in the selection of the jurors affects the proper constitution of the Court and is not rectified by s. 537, 7 C. W. N. 188; where 8 C. 739, is *not followed*. Where ten European jurors were summoned for the trial of a person who was entitled to a majority of three European jurors, but only three out of the ten were present and all were empanelled, *held* that the European jurors not having been chosen by lot, the trial was illegal. Jurors are Judges of facts and in the absence of a properly constituted jury the violation of the provisions of this section is of such a serious nature as cannot be cured by s. 537, 33 A. 385. See also 12 Cr. L. J. 537 (Oudh) and 26 A. 211; (1917) M. W. N. 1.

2-A. Selection of jurors from outsiders in a case of deficiency.—In a case of deficiency of persons summoned, the number of jurors required may be chosen from such other persons as may be present in Court. These may not be chosen by lot and may not be at all in the jury list. 29 C. W. N. 652.

3. Effect of empanelling a juror not summoned.—When in the course of a trial it was discovered that a person was on the jury who was not on the jury panel, and who had been by mistake summoned as a jurymen, the jury was discharged and a fresh jury constituted by taking another jurymen in the place of the one who had served by mistake, *R v Phillips*, 11 Cox 142. In *Hill v Yates*, 12 East 229, it was held that the grant of a new trial because a juror not summoned had served was discretionary and if no injustice had resulted, a new trial should be refused. *Archbold*, p. 237. See, however, Note 7 to s. 234

4. Rules for selecting jury by lot.—

(a) Bengal Rules.

For Courts of Session—(i) In order to nominate jury for the trial of any prisoner or other person to be tried by jury, the Sessions Judge shall cause to be put together in one box cards or pieces of paper containing the names of all the persons summoned to attend, except such of the said persons as shall have been excused by the Sessions Judge from serving on that day in consequence of their having served as jurors on the previous day, or for any other cause. Such cards or pieces of paper shall be, as nearly as may be of equal size, and each shall bear the name, of one person summoned to attend. The Sessions Judge shall then, in open Court, draw, or cause to be drawn, out of the said box, one after another, as many of the said cards or pieces of paper as may represent the number of jurors required to try the case, and if any of the jurors whose names shall be so drawn shall not appear, or if any be objected to and the objection be allowed, then such further number shall be drawn as may be necessary to complete the number of jurors required for the case.

(ii) In cases in which not less than one-half of the jury must be Europeans (ss. 460 and 451 read with s. 7, Act III of 1884) or both Europeans and Americans (s. 451 read with s. 7, Act III of 1884) the jurors shall be chosen as follows—

First.—Not less than one-half of such jury shall be chosen by lot, in the manner prescribed by Rule I from a box containing the names of only Europeans or Americans, or Europeans and Americans, until the necessary majority is complete.

Se Ma a [Fr] pneumatic; not a
 pneumatic, made or determined by a

South.

marine Bab, somewhat
 Curio.
 Lat plus more, quam,
 imperfect. [are]



3 To pitch or throw one's self headlong, as a | Plu to'plian a [Fr. Plu-

Plum'py a Wet [Oks] Chaucer | Plu'to-nism a [Fr. Plutonisme.] The doctrines
 Plu'm'py a [O Eng blend a light blue color of the Plutonists]

Ma, f, S, a, y, long. Ma, f, i, S, a, y, short. care, sur, last, fall, what, there, well, firm, pique, firm, done, for, de wolf, food, food.

Second—To the names of jurors not so chosen shall then be added the names of all the other jurors summoned to attend and the number necessary to complete the jury shall then be chosen by lot in the manner prescribed by Rule 1.

(112) In cases in which not less than one-half of the jury must be neither Europeans nor Americans (s. 27a) the jurors shall be chosen as follows—

First—Not less than one-half of such jury shall be chosen by lot in the manner prescribed by Rules from a box containing the names only of such persons as are neither Europeans nor Americans until the necessary majority is complete.

Second—To the names of jurors not so chosen shall then be added the names of all the other jurors summoned to attend and the number necessary to complete the jury shall be chosen by lot in the manner prescribed by Rule 1.

(113) (1) When the jurors have been finally selected their names shall be entered on the flyleaf prescribed for records of Sessions trials (p. 220 Cr R. and O.) the FOREMAN (s. 280 Cr P C.) being specially designated as such.

2. *District Magistrate's Court*—The above rules *mutatis mutandis* shall apply to the selection of jurors in cases before District Magistrates in which the accused is an European British subject and claims to be tried by a mixed jury [s. 451 (a) Cr P C.] Such jurors shall be selected from the persons summoned under the provisions of s. 462 of the Code to attend for the purposes of the trial—*Rule No 4 of 25th June 1885 Wilkins Addenda p. 90.*

(b) Madras Rules

1. As to Madras rules for selecting jury by lot see *the High Court Proceedings No 1353 dated 11th April 1883*

2. As to the applicability of jury rules to trials by jury of European British subjects before District Magistrates under Act III of 1884 embodied in the present Code see *the High Court Proceedings No 2584 dated 4th September 1884*

(c) Bombay Rules

1. The list of jurors shall be prepared published and revised in the manner laid down in ss. 321 322 323, 324 and 325 of the Code of Criminal Procedure in the month of January of each year or as soon thereafter as may be convenient.

2. No one shall be included in the jury list who does not possess a knowledge of the English language provided that if a sufficient number of persons acquainted with English cannot be obtained the jury list may be completed by the addition of the necessary number of persons not acquainted with English.

3. A week before the commencement of the Sessions folded papers bearing the names of the jurors in the list aforesaid shall be put into a ballot box and as many of them as the Sessions Judge may deem necessary shall be drawn by lot in open Court. The names of such persons as have served within six months of the date of the commencement of the Sessions are to be excluded from the ballot.

4. When the number of jurors required to serve is found insufficient the names of the persons who have served within six months of the commencement of the Sessions shall be drawn as above directed so far as may be necessary to complete the required number.

5. A precept shall then be addressed to the District Magistrate requiring him to summon the jurors so drawn to attend on the day the Sessions commence.

6. At the commencement of the Sessions the names of the jurors summoned to attend shall be put into the ballot box and as many of them as the Court may think necessary shall be drawn to sit as jurors for the trial of the case coming on first.

7. The rest of the jurors summoned shall be asked to attend at such time as the Court may specify and the requisite number shall be selected from amongst them at the beginning of each case or day the manner above specified to serve as jurors in the case or cases standing for trial.

8. It shall be in the discretion of the Court to excuse the attendance of any person whose name has been drawn either before or after he is summoned and to direct another name to be drawn.

at 1000 for workers and others — called also

point to die

Gr: XIV 32

DELIC.

lingu used for poetic, as in the
or a riter

Post fourate a poet employed to compose poems for
the birthdays of a prince, or other special occasions. See

an argument of an expression or discusion

Stagny for it and new
Doctrine which we would know whence learned. M'lon.
10 Hence a lively turn of thought giving vivacity
to a discourse
W th per oia, po us, and troupe he slurs his enemies. Dryden

a pin
2 To direct toward an object to aim as to
point of a musket at a wolf to point of a cannon at a
gate
3 To direct attention toward to lead to the no
tice of
When overthrown I begu d-d through his back by 12 nerve
and pointed to every acute of them would see nothing but sub-
side in a hope

denso
2 Expressed in poetry or measure as a poetical

7 To indicate or discover by a new way, as
same
8 (Life entry) To fill the points of with mortar
on] smooth them with the point of a trowel as to

verce
Poet ship : the state of a poet a poet
Poet-suckler : A suckling poet a young or
immature poet — so called in contempt (H. r. a. i.)

bitter
Newt, natural y showed and dry became more dry and
poignant
Poignant ly (poa ant ly) a l Is a poignant

prick to prick
1 That which pricks or pierces especially the
sharp end of a piercing instrument, as of a needle
as a thorn an awl a sword and the like
2 Hence sometimes an instrument which pricks
or pierces as a sort of needle used by engravers

a 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45, 46, 47, 48, 49, 50, 51, 52, 53, 54, 55, 56, 57, 58, 59, 60, 61, 62, 63, 64, 65, 66, 67, 68, 69, 70, 71, 72, 73, 74, 75, 76, 77, 78, 79, 80, 81, 82, 83, 84, 85, 86, 87, 88, 89, 90, 91, 92, 93, 94, 95, 96, 97, 98, 99, 100

9 When the name of a Government servant who is absent on duty is drawn such servant shall ordinarily be deemed not available and it shall be within the discretion of the Court to direct that he shall not be summoned or if already summoned to excuse his attendance

10 The power of choosing jurors from amongst persons present in Court shall be exercised by the Judge or by such person as the Judge may appoint for that purpose under the superintendence of the Judge.

(d) Allahabad Rules

For rules made under this section in conjunction with s. 313 by the Allahabad High Court see *United Provinces and Oudh Gazette* 1902 Pt. II p. 539

277. (1) As each juror is chosen, his name shall be called aloud and upon his appearance the accused shall be asked if he objects to be tried by such juror

(2) Objection may then be taken to such juror by the accused or by the prosecutor and the grounds of objection shall be stated

Provided that in the High Court objections without grounds stated shall be allowed to the number of eight on behalf of the Crown and eight on behalf of the person or all the persons charged

Notes.—1. Procedure prescribed by this section to be strictly followed—Where instead of at once proceeding to choose a jury by lot from among the jurors who were present subject to objections if any under this section and deciding and recording his decision as to each person objected to as provided by s. 279 the Judge exempted most of the jurors present merely on their own representations and no reasons were stated as against each of them nor any formal decision recorded held the proceedings were irregular *7 C. W. N. 188*

2. Effect of omission to give the accused opportunity to challenge the jurors.—Though the High Court failed to give him an opportunity to challenge the jurors set aside the proceedings might be quashed on writ of error and a *venue de novo* awarded. *Gray v R* 6 St. Tr. (N.S.) 117, *Archbold* p. 207

3. Jurors when to be challenged—According to English practice when a full jury has appeared and before any juror is sworn the proper time comes for the exercise of the right of challenge or exception to the juror's returned to pass upon the trial. *Archbold* p. 207 Under the N Y Cr Pro. Code s. 371 a challenge must be taken when the juror appears and before he is sworn but the Court may in its discretion for good cause set aside a juror at any time before evidence is given in the action. The administering of the oath to each juror as he is found competent is a lawful mode of swearing and precludes a subsequent peremptory challenge to such juror—*People v Carpenter* 4 N Y Cr Rep. 39, 38 Hun 491 A juror may be peremptorily challenged at any time before he is sworn whether he has taken his seat in the jury box or not (*People v Carpenter* 3 N Y Cr Rep. 923. In that case during the selection of the jury the trial Judge stated that all challenges must be exhausted before the jurors took their seat in the box. Defendant's counsel then said he accepted a certain juror. After the jury had been completed and had taken their seat in the box but had not been sworn defendant's counsel peremptorily challenged the juror whom he had previously accepted. His number of peremptory challenges had not been exhausted. The Judge refused to allow the challenge and said it was too late held that the defendant had not waived his right to peremptory challenge and that the ruling was erroneous. See Note 1 to s. 231

4. Grounds for challenging under the New York Code.—Under the N Y Cr Pro C. s. 374 challenges (i.e., objections) are (a) general or (b) particular Under the former (1) (s. 375) a conviction for felony and (2) want of any of the qualifications prescribed in the Code to render a person a competent juror The latter is again subdivided into (1) implied and (2) actual. Under s. 377 a challenge for implied bias may be taken for all or any of the following causes and no others—

(1) consanguinity or affinity within the ninth degree to the person alleged to be injured by the crime charged or on whose complaint the prosecution was instituted or to the defendant,

end of which the straps for holding back the carriage are attached. (b) A liberty pole, that is, a pole on which the emblems of liberty are suspended. (c) A May pole. See MAY POLE. (d) A bean

What is a bean? A bean is a small, round, white seed, often used in cooking. It is also a slang term for a small, round object, such as a button or a coin. In the context of the text, it is used to describe a small, round object that is used in a game or a contest.

What policy have you to bestow a benefit where it is seen an injury?

A, B, I, O, U, Y, long. A, B, I, O, U, Y, short. càre, fàr, lãst, fãll, v hãt, thêre, vgl, tãrn; pique, firm; dóno, fôr, dg, vglf, fãdd, fãot;

(2) bearing to him the relation of guardian of ward attorney or client or client of the attorney or counsel for the people or defendant master or servant or landlord or tenant or being a member of the family of the defendant or of the person alleged to be injured by the offence charged or on whose complaint the prosecution was instituted or in his employment on wages

(3) being a party adverse to the defendant in a civil action or having complained against or being accused by him in a criminal prosecution

(4) having served on the grand jury which found the indictment or on a coroner's jury which inquired into the death of a person whose death is the subject of indictment

(5) having served on a trial jury which has tried another person for the crime charged in the indictment

(6) having been one of a jury formerly sworn to try the same indictment and whose verdict was set aside, or which was discharged without a verdict, after the cause was submitted to it

(7) having served as a juror in a civil action brought against the defendant for the act charged as a crime

(8) if the crime charged be punishable with death the entertaining of such conscientious opinions as would preclude his finding the defendant guilty, in which case he shall neither be permitted nor compelled to serve as a juror

A challenge for actual bias may be taken for the existence of a state of mind on the part of the juror, in reference to the case or to either party which satisfies the Court in the exercise of a sound discretion that such juror cannot try the issue impartially and without prejudice to the substantial right of the party challenging. But the previous expression or formation of an opinion or impression in reference to the guilt or innocence of the defendant or a present opinion or impression in reference thereto, is not a sufficient ground of challenge for actual bias to any person otherwise legally qualified if he declare on oath that he believes that such opinion or impression will not influence his verdict and that he can render an impartial verdict according to the evidence, and the Court is satisfied that he does not entertain such a present opinion or impression as would influence his verdict (s. 376).

Upon the trial of a challenge to an individual juror the juror challenged may be examined as a witness to prove or disprove the challenge and is bound to answer every question pertinent to every inquiry therein (s. 383).

278. Any objection taken to a juror on any of the following grounds if made out to the satisfaction of the Court shall be allowed —

Grounds of objection.

(a) some presumed or actual partiality in the juror,

(b) some personal ground, such as alienage deficiency in the qualification required by any law or rule having the force of law for the time being in force, or being under the age of twenty-one or above the age of sixty years,

(c) his having by habit or religious vows relinquished all care of worldly affairs,

(d) his holding any office in or under the Court,

(e) his executing any duties of Police or being entrusted with Police duties,

(f) his having been convicted of any offence which, in the opinion of the Court, renders him unfit to serve on the jury,

(g) his inability to understand the language in which the evidence is given or when such evidence is interpreted the language in which it is interpreted,

(h) any other circumstances which in the opinion of the Court renders him improper as a juror

Notes.—1 WHITLEY STOKES is of opinion that the objections for implied bias referred to in the Note to last section with some slight omissions and verbal changes illustrate the presumed partiality mentioned in the section — *Anglo-Indian Codes* Vol II p. 163.

[imp & p p POLED p pr & to n
unish with poles for support, as, to pole
car or convey on poles, as, to pole lay

2. Objection must be made out to the satisfaction of the Court.—The burden of proof of a challenge for cause is on the person who makes it and he is not entitled to question a juror before challenging him. When the challenge has been made, the trial proceeds by witnesses called to support or defeat the challenge, the juror objected to may also be examined on the *voir dire* as to his qualification or the leaning of his affection. But he cannot be interrogated as to matters which tend to his own discredit, nor as it seems whether he has expressed a hostile opinion as to the defendant. *Archbold*, p 215

3. Disqualification by reason of holding office in or under the Court.—The fact that a person is a clerk in the office of the Magistrate of the district is not sufficient to disqualify him from sitting on a jury, 7 C. 42

4. Duty of Court when juror obviously unfit.—The Court, even without challenge taken may and ought to excuse a juror on the panel when called if he is obviously unfit to perform his duty, from physical or mental infirmity or *semble*, from expressed unindifferency *Mansell v R* 8 St Tr (NS) 831, *Archbold* p 217

Decision of objection

279. (1) Every objection taken to a juror shall be decided by the Court, and such decision shall be recorded and be final

(2) If the objection is allowed the place of such juror shall be supplied by any other juror attending in obedience to a summons and chosen in manner provided by section 276, or if there is no such other juror present then by any other person present in the Court whose name is on the list of jurors or whom the Court considers a proper person to serve on the jury

Supply of place of juror against whom objection allowed.

Provided that no objection to such juror or other person is taken under section 278 and allowed

Foreman of jury

280. (1) When the jurors have been chosen, they shall appoint one of their number to be foreman

(2) The foreman shall preside in the debates of the jury, deliver the verdict of the jury, and ask any information from the Court that is required by the jury or any of the jurors

(3) If a majority of the jury do not, within such time as the Judge thinks reasonable agree in the appointment of a foreman, he shall be appointed by the Court

Swearing of jurors.

281. When the foreman has been appointed, the jurors shall be sworn under the Indian Oaths Act, 1873

Notes.—1. **No Challenge after swearing in jurors**—No cause of challenge to the jury can be taken either at arrest of judgment, or otherwise after the jury are sworn, *R v Sheppard, & Leach 1914 R v Sutton*, 8 B and C. 417. See Note 3 to s. 277

2 Form of oath—The Madras High Court has prescribed the following forms of oath and affirmation — 'I shall well and truly try and true deliverance make between our Sovereign Lord the King Emperor of India and the prisoner at the bar and a true verdict give according to the evidence So help me God' or 'I solemnly affirm in the presence of Almighty God that I will judge truly between the King Emperor of India and the prisoner of the bar, and will give a true verdict according to the evidence.' The words in italics may be omitted if the juror objects to this form

282. (1) If, in the course of a trial by jury, at any time before the return of the verdict,

Procedure when juror ceases to attend etc

any juror, from any sufficient cause, is prevented from attending throughout the trial or if any juror absents himself, and it is not practicable to enforce his attendance, or if it appears that any juror is unable to understand the

language in which the evidence is given, or, when such evidence is interpreted the language in which it is interpreted, a new juror shall be added, or the jury shall be discharged and a new jury chosen.

Póly'pary, n. [N Lat polyparium, from Lat polypus bee supra and cf. POLYPTER] Coral, - so called because formed by polyps Dana Polypae (Synop, § 130), n.



word is repeated in different forms cases numbers genders and the like
Póly'pá n Eng pl **póly'pá-es** Lat pl
Póly'pí [Lat polypus & e POLYP]
 1 Something that has many feet or roots
 2 (Zo) A polyp ben POLYP
 3 (Med) A tumor which

entire
 t
 l
 e
 r
 c
 t
 t
 t
 t
 P
 e
 f
 P
 ()
 v
 P
 a
 l
 7
 P
 n
 t
 f
 a
 l
 n
 P
 c
 b
 P
 u
 fi
 n

Pólyph'o-mo'da n The same as POLYTHOVIC
Pólyph'o-by, n The same as POLYTHOVISM
Póly'phure n (Gr polut many and gápu, to bear) (Bot) A receptacle which bears many

and
 gra
 isa
 sec
 nna
 ann
 som
 ep
 gre
 poi
 nnd
 1
 frui
 buo
 gent
 hat
 merr

Cr
 ()
 P
 na
 P
 or li
 apple
 an as

and vowel, case) (Lat) A figure by which a Polyp'o-mo'da, o (Gr polut, many, and rept, |
 s, s, i, s, o, p, long; s, s, i, o, o, p, short, eare, fAr, fAr, fAr, what, there, xgl, terna, pique, frr

(2) bearing to him the relation of guardian of ward, attorney or client or client of the attorney, or counsel for the people or defendant, master or servant, or landlord or tenant or being a member of the family of the defendant or of the person alleged to be injured by the offence charged or on whose complaint the prosecution was instituted or in his employment on wages,

(3) being a party adverse to the defendant in a civil action or having complained against or being accused by him in a criminal prosecution,

(4) having served on the grand jury which found the indictment or on a coroner's jury which inquired into the death of a person whose death is the subject of indictment,

(5) having served on a trial jury which has tried another person for the crime charged in the indictment

(6) having been one of a jury formerly sworn to try the same indictment, and whose verdict was set aside or which was discharged without a verdict, after the cause was submitted to it,

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(8) if the crime charged be punishable with death the entertaining of such conscientious opinions as would preclude his finding the defendant guilty, in which case he shall neither be permitted nor compelled to serve as a juror

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(b) some personal ground, such as alienage, deficiency in the qualification required by any law or rule having the force of law for the time being in force, or being under the age of twenty-one or above the age of sixty years,

(c) his having by habit or religious vows relinquished all care of worldly affairs,

(d) his holding any office in or under the Court,

(e) his executing any duties of Police or being entrusted with Police duties,

(f) his having been convicted of any offence which, in the opinion of the Court, renders him unfit to serve on the jury,

(g) his inability to understand the language in which the evidence is given, or when such evidence is interpreted the language in which it is interpreted,

(h) any other circumstances which, in the opinion of the Court renders him improper as a juror

Notes.—1 WHITLEY STOKES is of opinion that the objections for implied bias referred to in the Note to last section with some slight omissions and verbal changes illustrate the presumed partiality mentioned in the section — *Anglo-Indian Codes* Vol. II p. 163.

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Supply of place of juror against whom objection allowed.

Provided that no objection to such juror or other person is taken under section 278 and allowed

Foreman of jury

280. (1) When the jurors have been chosen they shall appoint one of their number to be foreman

(2) The foreman shall preside in the debates of the jury deliver the verdict of the jury, and ask any information from the Court that is required by the jury or any of the jurors

(3) If a majority of the jury do not within such time as the Judge thinks reasonable agree in the appointment of a foreman he shall be appointed by the Court

Swearing of jurors


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282. (1) If in the course of a trial by jury at any time before the return of the verdict, any juror from any sufficient cause is prevented from attending throughout, the trial or if any juror absents himself and it is not practicable to enforce his attendance or if it appears that any juror is unable to understand the language in which the evidence is given, or, when such evidence is interpreted the language in which it is interpreted a new juror shall be added or the jury shall be discharged and a jury chosen

Procedure when juror ceases to attend etc.



— Hence monstrous prodigious, wonderful,
— used in a bad sense

ships may ride secure from storms an inlet to
cess or cove of water where vessels may find in
safety, a harbor a haven

My waste is:
That knows her port and sail
2 [Fr porte Fr O Sp
N Sp puerta A & port]
place of entrance a gate,
an inclosed place

(2) In each of such cases the trial shall commence anew

Notes.—1 Discharge of jury—If a juror is incapacitated the jury may be discharged and a fresh jury called who may be the remainder of the former jury with another added to their number but the defendant should be given his challenges afresh and all the jurors should be re-sworn the witnesses should be re-sworn and their oral evidence taken again *Halsbury's Law of England* IX p 370 *Archbold* p 236 According to English Law it is for the Judge alone to decide whether a necessity exists for discharging a jury and his decision is not subject to review or appeal

2 The trial shall commence anew—It is irregular for the Judge even with the consent of the defendant to read over from his notes the evidence given before the previous jury *R v Bertrand* (1867) L R 1 P C 520 One of the jurors was added after some of the prosecution witnesses were examined and in the place of another who was discharged The trial was not commenced afresh but the Judge called the witnesses who had been examined read out their statements to them which they admitted to be correct and the trial proceeded *held* there was no valid trial 36 A 481

3. Temporary illness of a juror during trial—After the retirement of the jury on a murder trial one of them was taken very ill he was put in bed in a communicating room and the trial proceeded

See 11 L. J. 402 (L.) Notes 7 and 19, pp 244 and 246 Upon a trial for murder one of the jurymen was taken ill He left the jury box and was taken out of Court accompanied by two medical men and a jury bailiff who however was not sworn for the purpose After the absence of three-quarters of an hour during which time no one but the doctors spoke to him the jurymen rejoined the rest of the jury and trial proceeded The prisoner was convicted *held* that as the evidence showed that there had been no opportunity of tampering with the jurymen the fact that he had left the Court in charge of an unsworn bailiff did not establish that there had been a mis-trial *Rex v Crippen* (1911) K B 149

4 Juror unable to understand the language, etc—This has been interpreted to include the case of a juror who was deaf and partly blind. When this became known to the Sessions Judge he stopped the trial and recommenced a fresh trial with another jury 19 M 375

5 Until the jury is discharged a new jury cannot try the case.—*See 2 C. W. N 481*, where the trial Judge having come to the conclusion in the midst of a trial that he was personally interested and could not go on with the case adjourned the trial without discharging the jury On another Judge being appointed to try the case objection was taken that the first Judge and the jury had still seized of the case. To get rid of the difficulty a *nolle prosequi* was entered

Discharge of jury in case of sickness or prisoner

283. The Judge may also discharge the jury whenever the prisoner becomes incapable of remaining at the bar

Notes.—1 No provisions for discharge of jury for misconduct.—This and the preceding are the only sections which provide for the discharge of the jury before a verdict is returned. They do not provide for a discharge of the jury for improper conduct during trial. In the trial of a case in the Calcutta High Court after the prosecution had closed and the counsel for the defence had declared his intention to call witnesses for the defence the jury wanted to give their verdict against the accused without hearing any defence evidence. The counsel for the defence pressed for their discharge for misconduct citing *R v Fowler* 4 B and Ald. 273 and 1 Q B 370 at p 393 On objection by the prosecution to the adoption of this course a *nolle prosequi* was entered under instructions and on behalf of the Advocate-General under s. 333 7 C. W. N 31 *See Archbold* p 353 for English practice

2 Jury not to be discharged, if a witness is absent.—A trial may be adjourned if from the absence of a witness or any other reasonable cause the Sessions Judge considers it necessary or advisable to do so stating in an order in writing his reasons for doing so but the Sessions Judge cannot on account of the absence of a witness, discharge the jury and direct a fresh trial to be held. Such an order was set aside and the Sessions Judge was directed to proceed with the trial from the stage at which he had discharged the jury 4 Bom. L. R. 939 In England the jury has been discharged on account of the sudden illness of a witness or when in a trial witnesses have been kept away by collusion or even were absent by accident. *See Archbold* p. 237 and *see 283*

D.—Choosing Assessors.

284. When the trial is to be held with the aid of assessors, "not less than three and, if practicable, four shall be chosen * from the person summoned to act as such assessors how chosen.

Notes.—1. Assessors must be treated with consideration and respect.—It is very desirable to maintain the position of assessors in public estimation and to make their duties as little irksome as possible. No assessor should be summoned too frequently. When assessors are summoned the notice should be sent to them in a regular and formal manner, and they should be treated with consideration and respect. A proper place should be provided for them to wait in, when their presence in Court is not necessary.—*Bom H C Cr Cir*, p 25

2. Assessors not members of the Court.—A trial is proper, if commenced with two assessors. When the trial proceeds in the absence of one of the assessors, the absent assessor ceases to occupy the position of one aiding the trial and his opinion ought not to be taken, 6 C. W. N. 715. If he took such opinion into consideration, it is a mere irregularity curable by s 537. See Notes 2 and 4 to s 285

3. Real function of assessors.—The real object of appointing assessors is to assist the Court and the discussion and statement of points by a Judge sitting with assessors cannot be said to be otherwise than in furtherance of the subject of getting the best assistance for the proper adjudication of the case, 7 L. B. R. 63 at p. 63. Until the contrary is shown, it must be presumed that persons who under the law are called upon to act as assessors, will do their duty, 1887 A. W. N. 139.

4. Persons of experience most likely to give efficient assistance must be chosen.—It is desirable that it should be in the power of the Court to select from among the assessors who are in attendance those who may seem most likely to give efficient assistance in any particular case. Though the law provides for the choosing of "two or more," it is not desirable ordinarily that more than two should be chosen, because the larger the number of the assessors selected for each case, the greater the burden on the body of those registered as liable to serve. *C P Cr Cir*, Part II, No 33. The law does not as in the case of jurors provide for objections being made to an assessor. The choice of jurors is by lot, but the choice of assessors is entirely with the Sessions Judge who, in the exercise of this power, should pay every consideration to any reasonable objection raised. In selecting assessors, the Judge must have regard to the nature of the case to the person who is tried, to the nature of the evidence to be brought against him and to the public feeling. The assessors ought not to be pleaders, nor young men fresh from college and devoid of experience. They must be persons of independent condition in life, men of judgment and of experience. *Per JACKSON, J*, in 23 W. R. 35 at p. 39.

5. A trial which begins and ends with one assessor only illegal.—When a trial before the Court of Session begins and ends with one assessor only, it is no legal trial and the whole proceeding is vitiated by error 23 B. 694; 15 B. 514; 21 A. 106; 24 M. 523 or when nominally only there is a second assessor who, by reason or blindness deafness or other such cause, is unable to understand the proceedings, *Weir II*, 340; 19 M. 375. See Note 2 to s. 285 below

6. Trial with the aid of assessors begins only when proceedings are commenced at which assessors can give their aid.—A trial with the aid of assessors does not begin with the reading of the charge, but begins only when proceedings are commenced at which assessors can give their aid. Where, therefore, after an accused person had claimed to be tried, a Sessions Judge chose two assessors, but immediately dispensed with the attendance of one of them who was suffering from fever and proceeded with trial with the aid of the other only, *held*, that the action of the Sessions Judge was illegal. The attendance of the assessors having been dispensed with before such commencement, the trial could not legally be proceeded with unless another assessor were appointed, 15 B. 514 followed in 23 B. 694, where it was held that such a defect as commencing the trial with one assessor vitiates the whole proceedings and the defect could not be cured by s 537. See also 21 A. 106; 6 C. W. N. 715; 15 A. 136; 24 M. 523.

7. Assessors must be chosen 'from the persons summoned to act as such.'—See ss. 321—326 for list of assessors and summonses to them. When one of the assessors was not summoned for the Sessions and whose name was not in the list, *held* that there was no lawful trial before a lawfully constituted tribunal, 35 A. 570; 3 Pat. L. J. 141. Out of six assessors summoned to appear at a Criminal Sessions three absented themselves.

* Substituted for the words "two or more shall be chosen as the Judge thinks fit" by Act XII of 1932

Of the remaining three, the Sessions Judge discarded two as not appearing sufficiently intelligent, and having appointed the third to act as assessor sent for two other persons to fill up the other two places. These two last mentioned persons had not been summoned to act as assessors, nor did it appear that they were competent to act as such, *held*, that under the above circumstances there having been only one properly appointed assessor, all the proceedings conducted with his aid must be set aside, 1894 A. W. N. 207. In the absence of assessors duly summoned the Nazir of the Court was directed by the Judge to act as an assessor and the Judge noted that no objection was taken to the course taken by him, and in the end the accused was convicted, the assessor duly summoned, being of opinion that the accused was not guilty and the Nazir being of opinion that he was guilty, *held*, that the circumstances, the Court was not properly constituted and the defect could not be cured by s. 537. The Nazir was not duly summoned and it was not even proved that his name was in the list of assessors and there was no provision corresponding to s. 276 (2) in respect of trials by jury. The Nazir as an official of the Judge trying the case was a most unsuitable person and the trial must be taken to have been held with one assessor only and therefore illegal. The fact that the accused did not object was immaterial, 13 O. C. 337 = 11 Cr. L. J. 724. Where however, an assessor who was summoned to appear on the 14th June fails to appear on that date, but appeared on the 17th June, when another trial had to commence and was selected to act *held*, that his selection was not improper and the trial was not invalid. The object of the rule is that 'there must be no reason for suspicion that any of the assessors sitting on a particular trial has been, if I may be allowed to use the expression, planted on the Court by any person interested in the success or in the failure of the prosecution' 17 Cr. L. J. 17 (A.). The wording of ss. 326 and 327 lends no colour whatever to the suggestion that an assessor cannot be held to have been lawfully summoned to act as such on a particular day (in the course of a Sessions), unless the summons issued to him was for his attendance on that day and no other

- * **284-A.** (1) In a trial with the aid of assessors of a person who has been found under the provisions of this Code to be an European or Indian British subject, if the European or Indian British subject accused, or, where there are several European British subjects accused or several Indian British subjects accused, all of them jointly before the first assessor is chosen so require, all the assessors shall, in the case of European British subjects, be persons who are Europeans or Americans or in the case of Indian British subjects, be Indians

Assessors for trial of European and Indian British subjects and others

(2) In a trial with the aid of assessors of a person who has been found under the provisions of this Code to be an European (other than an European British subject) or an American all the assessors shall, if practicable and if such European or American before the first assessor is chosen so requires, be persons who are Europeans or Americans

- 285.** (1) If in the course of trial with the aid of assessors, at any time before the finding any assessor is, from any sufficient cause, prevented from attending through out the trial, or absents himself, and it is not practicable to enforce his attendance, the trial shall proceed with the aid of the other assessor or assessors

Procedure when assessor is unable to attend.

(2) If all the assessors are prevented from attending, or absent themselves, the proceedings shall be stayed, and a new trial shall be held with the aid of fresh assessors

Notes.—1. Liability of absenting assessor.—He may be fined Rs. 100 for non-attendance s. 332.

2 Trial must begin with at least two competent assessors.—See Note 5 to s. 284. This section contemplates the case of a trial which had commenced with the aid of two or more assessors, who, at the commencement of the trial were capable of acting as assessors. Therefore, in a case where three assessors were chosen to assist the Court at a trial one was found to be deaf before commencement of the trial, and his services were dispensed with. Of the remaining two one was discovered to be deaf after the Public Prosecutor had closed his case *held* that under these circumstances the trial was really being held with only one capable

assessor, and therefore it must be set aside, 21 A. 106. Where at the close of a trial one of the assessors, was discovered to be so deaf and blind as to be incapable of understanding the proceedings, the trial was held to be null and void, *Weir II, 360; 19 M. 375. See 1894 A. W. N. 207.*

3. At least one assessor must continue throughout the trial, otherwise trial illegal.—During the course of a trial before a Sessions Court with three assessors, one assessor died at an early stage of the proceedings. Later on, another assessor became too ill to take any further part in the trial, and the third assessor was obliged to retire at the beginning of the accused's pleader's address to the Court and did not return until it was finished, *held*, that the law contemplated the continuous attendance of at least one assessor throughout the trial. This condition not having been fulfilled the proceedings before the Sessions Court must be set aside as having (with regard to the provisions of s. 268) been held before a Court not having jurisdiction, 13 A. 837. A Sessions trial began with the aid of two assessors, K and A. On the third day K was absent for an hour but the trial went on with the aid of assessor A. On the fourth day A was absent for 20 minutes during which the trial continued with the aid of K alone. At the conclusion of the trial, the opinions of both the assessors were recorded, *held*, that the proceedings were void as the trial was not held by a properly constituted tribunal. The law requires that a Sessions trial should be held under exceptional circumstances by the Sessions Judge with the aid of at least one assessor sitting throughout the trial and hearing all the proceedings. When a trial is resumed by a Sessions Judge in the absence of one of the assessors, but still with the aid of the other assessor or assessors present, the absent assessor ceases to occupy the position of an assessor during the trial 6 C. W. N. 715

4. Absentee assessor must not be allowed to resume his functions, but the illegality may be cured.—A criminal trial before a Court of Session having commenced with the aid of two assessors one of them was, owing to unavoidable causes, absent during a part of the trial. He was allowed to read the evidence recorded in his absence and resumed his seat during the rest of the trial and gave his final opinion just like the other assessor who was present throughout the trial, *held, per BENSON and BASHAM AYYANGAR, JJ (DAVIES, J, dissenting)*, that though the proper course for the Court was to proceed with the trial without the absentee assessor, the irregularity was one which might be cured under s. 537. *Per BASHAM AYYANGAR, J* In criminal trials with assessors, though assessors merely assist the Court, but do not form part of the tribunal which finally decides the case, the Code prescribes as an essential condition precedent to the exercise of jurisdiction by the Court that the trial should commence with not less than two assessors and that one at least of them should be present throughout the trial and give his opinion. The assessors, unlike the jury give their opinion separately and not as members of a body, and the fact that one of them was wrongly allowed to take part in the trial and give his opinion, will not vitiate the opinion of another assessor which was validly given. *Per DAVIES, J* When the absentee assessor was allowed to resume his seat as assessor the Court ceased to be a Court of competent jurisdiction and the irregularity was not one curable by s. 537, 24 M. 523. Where in a Sessions trial the Judge allowed one of the two assessors to absent himself for one of the days on which the trial proceeded and to return on the following day, *held* that the procedure adopted by the Sessions Judge was contrary to the intention of this section and of s. 295, and the Judge ought either not to have given leave of absence or should have adjourned till a day when both the assessors could attend, *Ratanlal 695*. An assessor who is allowed under the provisions of this section to absent himself during a portion of the trial cannot be allowed to resume his functions afterwards, the portion of the proceedings which had taken place during his absence being read over to him on his return. This procedure is not in accordance with law. Under the section, the trial should have proceeded with the aid of other assessors, 8 C. P. Cr. 9.

5. Procedure where it is discovered that assessor is an interested person.—Where it is discovered, after the trial has begun in a case tried with the aid of assessors that one of them is interested or otherwise unfit to sit as an assessor, there is no provision in the Code to meet such a contingency. In such a case it is proper to refer the case to the High Court to set aside the order appointing incompetent assessor and all the subsequent proceedings in the trial. Then the Sessions Judge ought to be asked to choose another assessor and proceed with trial *de novo*, (1912) M. W. N. 378 = 13 Cr. L. J. 473.

6. Taking evidence after discharging assessors' trial invalid.—If the portion of the trial which consists in the taking of additional evidence, takes place after the discharge of the assessors, the trial will be invalid, 13 A. 136

The same as POUNDANT.

2 Hence, the place where an infected person is

1 To beat or strike with some heavy instrument and with repeated blows, so as to make an impression

apartment, in a soup, or, dusty

to powder

1 Poundage n [From pound]
2 A sum deducted from a pound, or a certain sum

1 tontaging and poundaging of all free spoken truth

1 Poundage n A charge for impounding stray

1 Pound n

o particles into which any substance is ground or into which it falls by decay
-ed thin bones to powder small
all a composition of saltpeter and charcoal mixed and granulated gun

6 Hence also a military or naval force an army or navy, a host

For any force or troops a host
Was led in the body of a host

2 To send forth in a flowing or profuse manner, to emit

3 To give rank to something flowing to utter

4 To throw in profusion or with overwhelming force

5 will shortly pour out my fury upon thee

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Of the remaining three the Sessions Judge discarded two as not appearing sufficiently intelligent and having appointed the third to act as assessor sent for two other persons to fill up the other two places. These two last mentioned persons had not been summoned to act as assessors nor did it appear that they were competent to act as such *held* that under the above circumstances there having been only one properly appointed assessor all the proceedings conducted with his aid must be set aside, 1894 A. W. N. 207. In the absence of assessors duly summoned the Nazir of the Court was directed by the Judge to act as an assessor and the Judge noted that no objection was taken to the course taken by him and in the end the accused was convicted, the assessor duly summoned being of opinion that the accused was not guilty and the Nazir being of opinion that he was guilty, *held*, that the circumstances, the Court was not properly constituted and the defect could not be cured by s. 537. The Nazir was not duly summoned and it was not even proved that his name was in the list of assessors and there was no provision corresponding to s. 276 (2) in respect of trials by jury. The Nazir as an official of the Judge trying the case was a most unsuitable person and the trial must be taken to have been held with one assessor only and therefore illegal. The fact that the accused did not object was immaterial 13 O. C. 337 = 11 Cr. L. J. 734. Where however an assessor who was summoned to appear on the 14th June fails to appear on that date but appeared on the 17th June when another trial had to commence and was selected to act *held* that his selection was not improper and the trial was not invalid. The object of the rule is that there must be no reason for suspicion that any of the assessors sitting on a particular trial has been if I may be allowed to use the expression planted on the Court by any person interested in the success or in the failure of the prosecution 17 Cr. L. J. 17 (A). The wording of ss 326 and 327 lends no colour whatever to the suggestion that an assessor cannot be held to have been lawfully summoned to act as such on a particular day (in the course of a Sessions), unless the summons issued to him was for his attendance on that day and no other

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assessor, and therefore it must be set aside, 21 A. 106. Where at the close of a trial one of the assessors was discovered to be so deaf and blind as to be incapable of understanding the proceedings, the trial was held to be null and void, *Weir II, 340; 19 M. 375. See 1894 A. W. N. 207.*

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6. Taking evidence after discharging assessors' trial invalid.—If the portion of the trial which consists in the taking of additional evidence, takes place after the discharge of the assessors, the trial will be, 15 A. 136.

DD — Joint trials

285-A. In any case in which an European or American is accused jointly with a person not being an European or American or an Indian British subject is accused jointly with a person not being an Indian and such European Indian British subject or American is committed for trial before a Court of Session he and such other person may be tried together, but if he requires to be tried in accordance with the provisions of section 275 or section 284-A and is so tried and the other person accused requires to be tried separately, such other person shall be tried separately in accordance with the provisions of this chapter

Trial of European or Indian British subject or European or American jointly accused with others

E — Trial to Close of Cases for Prosecution and Defence

286. (1) When the jurors or assessors have been chosen the prosecutor shall open his case by reading from the Indian Penal Code or other law the description of the offence charged and stating shortly by what evidence he expects to prove the guilt of the accused

Opening case for prosecution

Examination of witnesses.

(2) The prosecutor shall then examine his witnesses

Notes — As to the mode of recording evidence see Chapter XXV and for power to adjourn see s. 344

Notes.—*Scope of the section.*—Although under s. 342 of the Code the power given to the Court to examine an accused person is one which may be exercised at any stage of the trial in the discretion of the Court this provision must not be regarded as in any way superseding the clear directions contained in s. 286 as to the manner in which a trial at Sessions should be commenced. So when a plea of 'not guilty' is entered by an accused person (particularly in a capital case) after the said accused had admitted his guilt before the Magistrate it is the duty of the trial Court to proceed with the hearing of the evidence the Court cannot and ought not to examine and cross-examine the accused on his confession. The proper time for taking into consideration such confession comes after the entire prosecution evidence is recorded. See 20 A L J 669

1 When the jurors or assessors have been chosen the case must be proceeded with — After the jurors are sworn the trial cannot be postponed to enable the prosecution to examine a witness by commission 19 C 113

2 It is not the duty of the counsel for the prosecution to get a conviction at any price — It is his duty to see that the case against the prisoner is brought out in all its strength but it is not his duty to conceal or in any way to diminish the importance of its weak points. His function is not to inquire into the truth but to put forward with all possible candour and temperance that the part of it which is unfavourable to the prisoner — *Harris Principles of Criminal Law* p. 418 & C. 121. The duty of counsel for the Crown is not to secure a conviction but to assist the Court in arriving at the truth 16 Cr L J 376 (C). See also 42 C 422; 42 C 357

3. Opening case for the prosecution — Counsel for the prosecution opens the case prosecution to the jury by giving the outline of the evidence and the leading features of the case. In doing so he ought to state all that it is proposed to prove, as well as declarations of the prisoners as facts so that the jury may see if there is any discrepancy between the opening statements of counsel and the evidence afterwards adduced in support of them unless such declarations amount to a confession when it would be improper for counsel to open them to the jury the reason being that circumstances under which the confession was made may render it inadmissible in evidence. The general effect only of the confession said to have been made ought to be given *Archbold* p. 218 and 219

4 In opening case prosecutor should give names of witnesses not previously examined. — There is nothing in the Code which restricts the prosecutor at a Sessions trial to witnesses who have been examined in the Court of the committing Magistrate but in fairness to the accused, the prosecutor should state in his opening address the names of witnesses whom he proposes to call who have not already been examined under s. 209 or s. 219 and the purpose for which each is to be produced. The mere fact that a witness has not been examined before a committing Magistrate is no ground for refusing to take the evidence of a relevant

witness tendered for the prosecution 1 P. R. 1839. But in 16 A. 212 it was held that the Public Prosecutor cannot demand as a right, such witnesses should be examined, but that the Court may call and examine such a witness if it considers it to be necessary in the ends of justice. According to English practice notice of intention to call such additional witnesses with a copy of the evidence which it is proposed they should give ought to be given to the prisoner and sent to the Court *Archbold* p 483. But failure to do so does not render the additional evidence inadmissible *Hilsbury* Vol IX p 365.

5 Every witness present at commission of crime should be called, even though he gives different account.—It is *prima facie* the duty of the prosecutor to call all the witnesses who prove their connection with the transaction connected with the case and who also must be able to give important information. If such witnesses are not called without sufficient reason being shown the Court may properly draw an inference adverse to the prosecution. The only thing that can relieve the prosecutor from calling such witnesses is the reasonable belief that if called they would not speak the truth. If such witnesses are not called without sufficient reason being shown (and the mere fact of their being summoned for the defence seems by no means necessarily a sufficient reason) the Court may properly draw an inference adverse to the prosecution. The only legitimate object of a prosecution is not to secure a conviction but that justice be done. The prosecutor is not therefore free to choose how much evidence he will bring before the Court. 8 C. 121 at p. 124 = 10 C. L. R. 151, 16 A. 521, 16 A. 84; 8 P. W. R. 1909 = 10 Cr. L. J. 321. In a trial of the accused under s. 304 1 P. C., certain witnesses who deposed to seeing the homicide take place and who gave evidence before the Magistrate were not called and examined in the Sessions Court, held that every witness who was present at the commission of such offence ought to be called that even if they give different accounts it is fit that the jury should hear their evidence so as to enable them to draw their own conclusions as to the real truth of the matter *Ratanlal* 581. Similarly, the prosecution is bound to examine witnesses present at a search 9 C. W. N. 438. Where a Sessions Judge

Court. In conducting a case for the prosecution, all the persons who are alleged or known to have knowledge of the facts ought to be brought before the Court and examined, 10 C. 1070; 3 B. L. R. 200 = 11 Cr. L. J. 410. It is not within the province of a Judge to dispense with the evidence of any witness for the prosecution and if the Public Prosecutor dispenses with the evidence of witnesses who can speak to material facts he commits a serious error of judgment. The whole evidence should be put before the Court and the Public Prosecutor is bound at least to tender the witnesses bound over to appear at the Sessions for cross-examination *Weir* II, 379. All persons said to have witnessed the murder should have been produced before the Magistrate, though it is not necessary for a Public Prosecutor to tender in the Sessions Court any witness whom he may have reason to believe will give false evidence, 12 P. R. 1916 = 17 Cr. L. J. 267.

6 Public Prosecutor not bound to call witnesses who in his opinion will not speak the truth or support his case.—The Public Prosecutor is not bound to call any witnesses who will not in his opinion, speak the truth or support the points he desires to establish by their evidence but in such circumstances he should explain to the Court what is his reason for not calling these witnesses, and he should offer to put them in the box for cross-examination by the accused at their discretion, 7 A. 904. Even the Court is not competent to pick and choose among the witnesses sent up by the committing Magistrate. It is his duty to examine all the witnesses unless he has good and sufficient cause of the representation of the Public Prosecutor or other wise to believe that the witnesses came into Court-house with a pre-determined intention of giving false evidence 15 A. 6. It is open to the Public Prosecutor to decline to examine at the Sessions trial a witness whom he had examined before the committing Magistrate, but whose cross-examination by the defence was reserved. It is, however, his duty to tender the witness for cross-examination in the Court of Session, and if he declines the Court ought to call the witness for cross-examination 11 Bom. L. R. 1102 = 10 Cr. L. J. 539. In a case in which the prisoner is undefended the presiding Judge should look at the deposition of any witness appearing in the Calendar as a witness for the Crown and not called on behalf of the prosecution or tendered for cross-examination in order to ascertain whether he should not himself taken action under s. 840. All witnesses returned in the Calendar as witnesses for the Crown are whether they are called or not for the Crown bound to be in attendance until the conclusion of the trial unless they are released from attendance by order of the Court, and before releasing them from attendance the Court should satisfy itself that the evidence, will not be required either by the prosecution or by the defence, 16 A. 84 (F.B.). The prosecution is not bound as a matter of procedure to produce at the trial witnesses who have been examined before the committing Magistrate when

there is reason to believe that the evidence of such witness is not true, *Weir II, 378*, it is a sufficient reason for not calling any particular witness on behalf of the prosecution that there is a reasonable belief that he will not if called speak the truth *Weir II, 378*. He is not bound to do more than have all the witnesses called before the Magistrate present in Court for the accused to call them or not as he thinks fit, *14 C. 245; 14 A. 521; 15 A. 6, 5 C. 614; 15 W. R. 34* and see Note 3 under s. 289. See Note 2 above *49 C. 277*.

7. Duty of prosecutor to call his witnesses for cross-examination by accused.—Although in strictness, it is not necessary for the prosecutor to call every witness whose name is on the back of the indictment it has been usual to do so, that the defendant may cross-examine them. If the Counsel will not call the witness, the Judge in his discretion may. Where a witness called before the coroner was not called for the Crown at the trial, the Court has refused to require him to be called, *R v Wiggins, 10 Cox. 562*. However, the prosecutor is not bound to call them all, though he ought it has been said, to have them in Court that they might be called for the defence, if the prisoner chooses *Archbold, p. 483*. There is no provision in this Code analogous to English practice, entitling a prisoner to have a witness for prosecution who is not called, put into the witness-box for cross-examination. The accused might apply to have such a witness examined under s. 291, or might comment on the circumstance of his not being examined by the prosecution or tendered for cross-examination *5 B. H. C. R. Cr. Ca. 85* at p. 96; see also *5 C. 614; 24 C. 288; 7 A. 804; 17 C. 939; 14 C. 245; 11 Bom. L. R. 1162*.

8. The examination of witnesses should be oral.—The examination alluded to in the section means oral examination of the witnesses present (except in cases where evidence is taken by commission, or in any case where a witness is deaf or dumb). Such oral examination is, therefore, the general rule and it is of the utmost importance that the rule should be followed in all cases where the witness is present to be examined. If a witness before a Magistrate gave a true statement, he will probably, if intending to tell the truth, repeat the same statement without substantial difference at the trial. If, on the contrary, his statement, before the Magistrate was not true in important particulars, he may not be able to repeat the same statement, and may omit something important mentioned in his former evidence or may deny on oral examination that he did make a particular statement before the Magistrate. The demeanour of the witness may be important for the assessor or Judge towards forming an opinion of his truth. It is unnecessary to go into the many reasons why this rule should be followed. It is sufficient to say 'it is the rule, and is founded on reason and justice'—*Per KERNAN, C.J.*, in *9 M. 83*.

9. Cross-examination must follow examination and cannot be reserved.—The Judge's procedure at a Sessions trial in allowing all the witnesses for the prosecution to be all examined in one day, but permitting the cross-examination to be reserved to a subsequent date was held irregular, *Weir II, 332*. Where, however, an application is made on reasonable grounds for time to cross-examine the witnesses, the application should be granted especially in capital cases, *41 C. 299*.

10. How to use at the trial evidence given before the committing Magistrate.—It is against the law to read the deposition of a witness previously recorded and then to ask him if it is true. It amounts to putting him a leading question and intimating to him impliedly that the story is expected from him, *5 C. P. Cr. 33; Oudh S. C. No. 86; Weir II, 360*. It is no doubt the distinct duty of a Public Prosecutor to give opportunity to a witness for the Crown to explain discrepancies in his statements before the committing Magistrate and the Sessions Court, *1894 A. W. N. 57*; but it is wrong and highly prejudicial to the accused to allow witnesses to be set straight in their examination-in-chief, and whenever a witness says something that does not exactly tally with what he said before the Magistrate, his memory should be jogged by a reference to his previous deposition, *13 W. R. 18*. See Notes 9 to 14 to s. 288.

11. Ordering witnesses out of Court.—When the case is called on, or at any period during the trial the Court at the request of either party, will order such of the witnesses of the opposite party as have not yet been examined or are not under examination to leave the Court until they shall be called for in their order, so that each witness may be examined out of the hearing of the other witnesses on the same side who are to be examined after him. If after such an order a witness is present during the examination of the other witnesses, the practice is to allow him to be examined, subject to observation as to his conduct in disobeying the order *Taylor (10th Ed.), s. 1401 Archbold pp. 482-483*.

12. Trial ought not to be stopped before the close of the prosecution case.—Where after the examination of some of the witnesses, the Judge asked the jury whether they wished to hear any more evidence and they stated that they did not believe the evidence and wished to stop the case and the Judge recorded a

verdict of acquittal, *held*, that the procedure was wrong and that no final opinion as to the falsehood or insufficiency of the prosecution evidence ought to have been arrived at until all the remaining witnesses had been examined, 20 M. 443

13. Admissibility of post-mortem report in evidence.—The *post mortem* report is not admissible as evidence except to contradict the officer who made it, but it may be used by that officer when under examination for the purpose of refreshing his memory. If it is intended to bring the report as evidence on the record, the officer who made it should be called as a witness, 27 C. 295.

14. Turning out of Court perjuring witness before conclusion of his cross-examination.—A Sessions Judge is not justified in stopping the cross-examination of and turning a witness out of Court because he is of opinion that the witness is not speaking the truth, and no reliance can be placed on the evidence of such a witness, 1900 A. W. N. 149

287. The examination of the accused duly recorded by or before the committing Magistrate shall be tendered by the prosecutor and read as evidence

Notes.—See ss. 209 and 342 for the power to examine the accused, s. 364 for the record of examination of the accused, s. 164 for the power and mode of recording statements and confessions investigation, s. 533 for the provision remedying irregularities in recording such statements and see 271 for recording of plea.

1. Object of examination.—Though it is not imperative on a Magistrate to examine the accused, yet this section and s. 342 contemplate such an examination for the purpose of enabling the accused to explain any circumstances appearing in the evidence against him *Ratanlal 100 and 710; 42 C. 957* and not for the purpose of filling up a gap in the prosecution, 4 L. B. R. 244 = 8 Cr. L. J. 62 and see Note 3 under s. 239 and Note 12, *et seq.* to s. 342.

2. Procedure—Time for tendering certain examinations.—(a) The 'examination of the accused' should be put in *before the accused is called upon to enter upon his defence*, *Weir II, 381*; (b) so also should the deposition of a medical witness which, 'may be given in evidence' (s. 509) and the deposition of a witness in a case in which it may be given in evidence under s. 33, *Evidence Act*, (c) before examinations are received as evidence under any of these three sections care must be taken to see that they are in proper form and duly attested or otherwise strictly proved, (d) such examination when so received are to be detached from the proceedings in the preliminary inquiry and annexed to the record of the trial, *Wilkins, 114*. The Madras High Court has ruled that the examination of the accused persons which this section requires to be given in evidence should be read as part of the case for the prosecution before the defence is entered upon and marked as an exhibit. A note to the effect that this has been done should be entered on the record.—See Madras Criminal Rules of Practice, Rule 241

3. Examination not duly recorded ought not to be put in.—Where the committing Magistrate admitted a confession which was not admissible and examined the accused with respect to it, *held*, that the accused being examined about confession which was not admissible in evidence, the questions and answers to them could not be said to be duly recorded, as the questions were such as were not allowed by the law to be put and that the answers to those questions were not admissible in evidence against the accused, 4 L. B. R. 244 = 8 Cr. L. J. 62.

4. Tender of accused's examination before Magistrate is obligatory.—The examination of the accused before the Magistrate must be given in evidence at the Sessions trial, whether it tells for or against the prisoner, and it is not in the discretion of the prosecution to put in that examination or not, 83 W. R. 63. A Sessions Judge refusing to put on record confessional statement of the person whom he treated as accused commits great irregularity. It is not optional with the prosecution to put in such statements, 15 M. 312; the whole of the statement should be read out, 5 M. H. C. R. Appx. IV. If it is not tendered the Judge is bound to call for it, 15 M. 352

5. Statement made to a Jail Superintendent confirmed before the committing Magistrate.—When the statement and filed it in the case learning that the accused wished to file it, *held*, that the statement was admissible as evidence under this section, 32 M. 3 at p. 15.

6. Not necessary to read out confessional statements.—It is not necessary for a Sessions Judge to read out to prisoners confessions made by them before a magistrate, and ask them if they have any objections to the reception of these confessions. The examination of the prisoners before Magistrate is to be received in evidence and the attestation of the Magistrate is *prima facie* proof of the circumstances, 14 W. R. 9

7. A confession is evidence though retracted or not corroborated—A voluntary and genuine confession is a legal and sufficient proof of guilt, 7 W. R. 41; 6 W. R. 73 and 83. A confession before a Magistrate, though afterwards retracted before the Sessions Court, is evidence against the party making it, 8 W. R. 40, without any other corroboration if properly attested before a Magistrate, 12 W. R. 49; 6 W. R. 78; 21 M. 83 at p 89, 1890 A. W. N. 173. The Judge must be satisfied that it was made voluntarily, 19 B. 728; but not where the Police-officers were guilty of misconduct in having produced evidence with regard to the identification of property which was false, there being no corroboration, 2 C. L. R. 132; 1885 A. W. N. 59. See also Note under Heading VIII—"Retracted confessions" to s 164, at p 373

8. Statement of the accused must be taken in its entirety—See Notes under s 342 and Note 5 to s 255. If the statement made by the accused is to be used against him, it must be taken in its entirety, 8 W. R. 38. Where the prisoner admitted that he had accompanied the dacoits for a short distance, but declared that he had turned back almost immediately, and had nothing to do with dacoity that afterwards took place, and did not know that such an offence was in contemplation *held*, that this statement did not go the length of a confession, and the conviction was, therefore, quashed, 7 W. R. 39; also 7 W. R. 8. When an accused makes two distinct statements—the one amounting to a confession of guilt, and the other repudiating it—if the one statement is taken against the accused, the other also must be taken for what it is worth in his favour. The Court ought to weigh well the relative credibility of the two statements before it. *See Rex v. Jones*, 40 D. L. J. P. 389, 49 A. 70. Where, therefore, the accused admitted

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confession are found to be false, the entire confession should be rejected. After the entire statement of a prisoner has been given in evidence any part of it may be contradicted by the prosecution if they choose to do so and then the whole testimony is left for consideration precisely as in other cases where one part of the evidence contradicts the other. Even without such contradiction it is not supposed that all the parts of a confession are entitled to equal credit. If sufficient grounds exist the part that charges the prisoner may be believed while that which is in his favour may be rejected. *See Rex v. Higgins*, (1829) 3 C. and P. 603; *Rex v. Steptoe*, (1830) 4 C. and P. 397, *Rex v. Clewes*, (1830) 4 C. and P. 221; 40 C. 873. The former refer to these cases only where the conviction is based solely upon the statements of the accused and it is but fair that the statement should be taken in its entirety and do not apply to those cases where there is independent evidence corroborating some of the material parts of the confession.

9. Confession of co-accused.—A confession of a co-accused can only be taken into consideration against the other accused, s. 30 of the *Indian Evidence Act* and is not evidence 15 B. 66. See also 4 C. 433 (F.B.) 2 C. W. N. 749; 7 M. 102; 23 M. 151; 1 A. 664; 10 B. 319. It must be made in the presence of the other accused, 10 C. 970, 7 C. 65; 6 B. 124. A retracted confession of a co-accused should carry practically no weight against any person other than the maker, 28 C. 689. See Note under s. 367. See, however, 16 C. W. R. 689 = 13 Cr. L. J. 571.

10. Deposition of an approver when inadmissible—When the accused person to whom a conditional pardon had been tendered is examined as a witness, the deposition is inadmissible when the deponent, on for feiture of the pardon is tried jointly with the other accused, 11 C. 380; 21 W. R. 5; 7 C. L. R. 66. See Notes to s. 336.

11. "Committing Magistrate."—When a Sub-Magistrate inquired into a case and discharged the accused and the District Magistrate acting under s. 436 committed the accused for trial, *held* that the examination of the accused and statement of the witness before the Sub-Magistrate will be held to have been recorded by or before the committing Magistrate. The phrase "committing Magistrate" in ss 287 and 288 is merely a compendious way of referring to the Magistrate or Magistrates who held the preliminary inquiry on which the commitment was made. 31 M. 40; 7 Lah. 70.

12. Irregularities in mode of recording examination—their effect.—See s. 342 and Notes thereto.

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3. Affectedly nice (opp. in petty) - used in an ill sense
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4. Mean despicable (opp. noble) - used occasionally as a prefix to a noun
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288. The evidence of a witness "duly recorded in the presence of the accused under Chapter XVIII" may in the discretion of the presiding Judge, if such witness is produced and examined be treated as evidence in the case "for all purposes subject to the provision of the Indian Evidence Act 1872"

Note.—The words "under Chapter XVIII" have been used in the place of "the committing Magistrate" to cover the case of evidence recorded by a Magistrate other than the committing Magistrate under s. 219 *See* *Ind. Crim. Rep.*, 1916

Note.—1. *See* Chapter XVII for inquiry preliminary to commitment and ss. 209, 212 and 213 for taking examination of witnesses and s. 240 for commitment on evidence recorded by two Magistrates and s. 33 of the *Indian Evidence Act* for filing depositions of absent witnesses.

2. Object of the section.—This section is intended to provide for the contingency that may arise when a witness, who is produced before the Court of Session holds back information and evidence and tells a different story from that which he gave in the preliminary inquiry before the Magistrate. It is only in extreme cases of delay or expense that the personal attendance of a witness before the Court of Session should be dispensed with and the evidence given by him before the committing Magistrate referred to s. 240. Ordinarily the previous deposition can be used only after the witness has been called and examined. 26 W. R. 11; 23 P. R. 1333.

APPLICATION OF SECTION.

The section does extend to Courts of Magistrates other than the committing Magistrate.—Under the old law this section did not extend to Courts of Magistrates other than the committing Magistrate. Under the newly amended section evidence duly recorded by anybody under Chapter XVIII in the presence of the accused may be treated as evidence by the Sessions Court in the case under the safeguards mentioned in section 288. But it must be borne in mind that the analogy of section 288 is not to be extended to other cases of evidence not duly recorded under Chap. XVIII and in a case not before the Court of Sessions. Where conviction of the accused was really based on the former statements of witnesses made before a Magistrate other than the committing Magistrate, the conviction and sentence and directed the usual manner. *Ratanal 723*. The phrase 'committing Magistrate' is merely a compendious way of referring to the Magistrate or Magistrates who held the preliminary inquiry on which the commitment was made. Where a Subordinate Magistrate recorded the evidence but the District Magistrate made the commitment, it was held that the latter need not have himself recorded any of the evidence or statement of the accused to make them admissible under this section, 31 M. 40. A statement made by a witness at a search though signed by him cannot be used under this section. 36 M. 159.

4. Criminal Law Amendment Act XIV of 1908—Section 13 of that Act lays down the procedure in respect of trials held under that Act. Notwithstanding anything contained in the *Indian Evidence Act* of 1872, the evidence of any witness taken by a Magistrate in proceedings to which this part applies shall be treated as evidence before the High Court if the witness is dead or cannot be produced and if the High Court has reason to believe that his death or absence has been caused in the interest of the accused.

5. Depositions not taken in presence of accused cannot be admitted under this section.—Statements made by a witness in the absence of the accused is not admissible under this section, 35 A. 260. Unless it be that the accused was absconding and the provisions of s. 512 applied to the circumstances of the case (6 C. L. R. 53) the evidence referred to in this section must have been recorded in the presence of the accused. 7 A. 852; 21 A. 111, 22 A. 445, 3 P. R. 1904; 23 C. 361.

6. Section applies only when the witness is 'produced and examined'—To expedite the trial in a Sessions case the attorney for the prisoner suggested to the Court that certain depositions of witnesses for the prosecution taken before the Magistrate should be read out and that he should be allowed to cross-examine the witnesses thereupon to this course the Government Prosecutor and the Court consented.

* Substituted for the words "duly taken in the presence of accused before the committing Magistrate" by Act XVIII of 1923

† Added by Act XI of 1923

held, that this procedure was illegal but that inasmuch as it had not occasioned a failure of justice a new trial should not be granted, 9 M. 89. This section is not an exception to the rule in s 286. It does not dispense with *examination* of the witness directed by s 286. The provision is not the evidence before the Magistrate may be put in as evidence of the witness if he is *tendered for cross-examination* but it is that such evidence before the Magistrate may be trusted as evidence in the case if the witness is *examined* i.e., examined as a witness, not if he is cross-examined or tendered for cross-examination. This section does not provide that the Judge may treat the evidence before the Magistrate of all the witnesses for the prosecution as evidence if all the witnesses are produced and examined. *Per KERNAN, J.*, in 9 M. 83. The previous deposition cannot be filed if the witness is merely produced for cross-examination at the trial and not produced and examined 1915 M. W. N. 544 = 16 Cr. L. J. 615. The section does not permit a Sessions Court to ground its judgment on the depositions taken by the Magistrate without examining the witnesses afresh. The section has no operation whatever unless the witnesses at the trial makes statement inconsistent with his deposition before the Magistrate, 24 W. R. 11. The former deposition ought not to be read until after his examination in Court, 1 W. R. 14; and evidence taken before the committing Magistrate but not used at the trial cannot be referred to an appeal, 8 B. L. R. Appx. LXIII.

7. *Evidence of a witness not allowed to be cross-examined is not duly taken in the presence of the accused*—If a committing Magistrate does not allow the accused to cross-examine the witnesses for the prosecution, the evidence of such witnesses cannot be said to have been duly taken in the presence of the accused. To require the presence of the accused merely to hear the *ex parte* statements of a witness without allowing him to show by cross-examination that the statements are untrue or unreliable defeats the real object of the law, for it deprives the accused of any substantial benefit from being present, 21 C. 642 at p. 665. See also 3 M. 43.

8. *Admissibility of approver's evidence given in preliminary inquiry*.—A deposition made by an accomplice at the preliminary inquiry is capable of being treated as evidence under this section in the Sessions trial, because though an accomplice, he is nonetheless a witness for the matter of this section, 14 P. R. 1894; 15 M. 352; 8 B. L. R. 203 = 16 Cr. L. J. 233; 3 P. R. 1904. The admissibility of statements made by an accused person, under a conditional pardon was no doubt raised in 7 C. L. R. 66 and 13 C. L. R. 326, but not decided until the Allahabad High Court held that repudiation by approver of his statement before the committing Magistrate does not prevent the Sessions Court from considering his evidence under this section, 21 A. 175. But the use of such statement as substantive evidence of the facts alleged by him on the prior occasion is fraught with the gravest peril and could never have been the intention of the Legislature, 22 A. 445, 27 C. 295 and 4 C. W. N. 49; and see Notes to ss 339. But see *contra* 22 C. 50.

MODE OF USING EVIDENCE.

9. *Mode of using in Sessions Court, evidence taken before committing Magistrate*.—This section was never intended to be used so as to enable a Court trying a case to take a witness's deposition body from the committing Magistrate's record, and to treat it as evidence before the Court itself. A Judge is bound to put to the witnesses whom he proposes to contradict by their statements made before the committing Magistrate whole or such portions of their depositions as he intends to rely upon in his decision, so as to afford them an opportunity of explaining their meaning, or denying that they had made any such statements and so forth, 7 A. 382; 21 A. 111. At a trial before a Sessions Court, the attorney who appeared for the prisoner suggested to the Court that to expedite the trial, certain depositions of witnesses for the prosecution taken before the Magistrate should be read, and that he should be allowed to cross-examine the witnesses thereupon to this course the Government Prosecutor and the Court consented. *held* that this procedure was illegal, but that, inasmuch as it had not occasioned a failure of justice a new trial should not be granted, 9 M. 83. The Judge is bound to let his intention or the possibility that he may do so, be known to the accused and the prosecution in order to afford them an opportunity to test such statement by cross-examination otherwise, 1885 A. W. N. 256. So, too the counsel for the prisoner, if he desires to use previous statements to contradict the witnesses for the Crown must draw their attention to such contradiction 31 C. 142 (F.B.) which *overrules* 8 C. L. R. 390 and refers to 11 B. H. C. R. 231. In the Ill Bench Case referred to above, after the case for the prosecution had closed, counsel for the prisoner claimed a right to read to the jury the depositions taken before the committing Magistrate for the purpose of showing that the evidence given at the trial differed from that given before the Magistrate and it was ruled that the counsel for defence had no such right without drawing the particular

witness's attention to the alleged contradiction and affording him an opportunity to explain. Even the Judge would not have the right claimed by the prisoner in the Full Bench Case 8 W. R. 84, being opposed to the Full Bench Ruling. When a counsel or pleader cross-examines a witness with reference to a previous deposition, the parts thereof to which the cross-examination is directed should be set out in Judge's minute of the proceedings. The deposition itself need not, in such a case, be made a portion of the evidence in the Sessions Court, unless the Government Pleader desires that it should be so recorded or the Sessions Judge adopts it under this section. The pleader or counsel for the defence may introduce as part of his own evidence a previous deposition made by a witness, and, in this case, the deposition must be numbered and translated in the minute of proceedings. The prosecuting counsel or pleader has a right in such a case to question the witness as to apparent contradictions and discrepancies between the two statements, *Ratanlal 313*. See also 6 C. W. R. 49; 13 W. 252; 25 A. 883. See Note 1011 & 204.

10. Omission to examine witness on certain facts cannot be made good by filing previous statement.—Where a witness when examined in Sessions Court had shown no disposition in any way to resile from any statement he had made before the committing Magistrate, there is no valid reason for the Sessions Judge to admit the previous statement in preference to the one made before him. Where a witness was not examined in the Sessions Court, with regard to the particular statements made by him before the committing Magistrate, and he did not repeat those statements before the Sessions Court, *Aldi*, 4 C. W. R. 49. Similarly, the evidence of a medical witness before the committing Magistrate and not attested by him is not admissible before the Sessions Court under this section. A *post mortem* certificate would not be admissible as evidence except to contradict the officer who made it or when used by that officer for refreshing his memory, 27 C. 225.

11. Question of admissibility of evidence given before committing Magistrate should be determined immediately on its tender.—When the evidence of a witness taken before the committing Magistrate is tendered in evidence at the Sessions trial, the Sessions Judge should consider the question of its admissibility, and then and there determine the point and record his reasons if he decide to admit the same, 1 Bom. L. R. 158.

12. Admissibility of statement alleged to be made under ill-treatment by Police.—When a witness makes a statement before a Sessions Court different from that made before the committing Magistrate, and alleges that that previous statement was made under Police pressure, that Sessions Judge should make some inquiry by examining the Police-officer regarding the restraint and pressure which is said to have been exercised upon the witness before bringing his previous statement upon the record under this section, 4 C. W. R. 49; 7 C. W. R. 345; 21 A. 415; 27 C. 225. The retracted confessions of an accused standing by themselves uncorroborated, and the statement of witnesses brought in under this section, without independent corroborating testimony, should not both be joined together and held as mutually corroborating each other, so as to justify a conviction based thereon.

13. Practice.—Translation of deposition before a Magistrate in Sessions proceedings.—A Sessions Judge should, in his proceedings, distinctly note that he has admitted, under this section a deposition of a witness taken before the committing Magistrate as evidence in the trial before a Sessions Court, and given the deposition a number in his proceedings and translate it, or the material portions of it in his English minute of the proceedings, *Ratanlal 313*.

14. When deposition is denied prosecution must prove that conditions of this section have been satisfied.—The confession of a witness in the shape of a former deposition can be used as evidence against a prisoner only on the condition prescribed by this section, that is, it must have been duly taken by the committing Magistrate in the presence of the accused person, *i.e.*, the person, against whom it is to be used. The certificate of the Magistrate appended to such confession, in order to afford *prima facie* evidence under s. 80 of the *Evidence Act*, of the circumstances mentioned in it relative to the taking of the statement ought to give the facts necessary to render the deposition admissible under this section. Where the deponent, when examined as a witness before the Sessions Court and asked about his alleged deposition, denies that it was the deposition made by him, the presumption allowed by s. 80 of the *Evidence Act* cannot be made, and it becomes necessary, in order to render the deposition admissible under this section to show by direct testimony that the conditions of that section have been satisfied, 21 W. R. 5.

VALUE OF PREVIOUS DEPOSITIONS.

15. Purposes for which previous deposition may be used—its value.—The provisions of this section enable the Judge to use the deposition or such part of it as is necessary for the purpose of corroborating a

They mistake the nature of criticism who think its business is principally to find fault.

Syn — Chiefly, mainly, essentially, especially, particularly.

Prin'ci pal ness, n. The state of being principal.

See also the nature of criticism, and a thorough principle of criticism.

Prin'ci ple (prin si pl) n [Fr principe li & p] principle, Lat principium, from principis, princ-

ends See Princeps

ment.

copy

See PRIZE

One who contends for a prize, a prisoner.

Marboot.

It is well.

See PRIZE

One who contends for a prize, a prisoner.

Prig māt'le, n [Fr prismatique, Sp. & It. prismático]

1 resembling

or related to a

prism as

prismatic form

2 penetrated

or distributed

by a prism

formed by a

prism as the

prismatic colors

3 (typical

leg) 1 containing

Prismatic Colors.

See PRISM

See PRISM

See PRISM

See PRISM

See PRISM

See PRISM

See PRISM

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witness or, the proper formalities being observed, for the purpose of contradicting a witness, and to permit either the prosecutor or the accused to use it for either purpose. Further it enables the Judge to treat it as part of the material on which he sums up to the jury or assessors under s. 297 or s. 309 at the conclusion of the trial. But see the latest amendment by the introduction of the words for all purposes subject to the provisions of the Indian Evidence Act. See Note 18 below

But there is nothing in the section which prescribes the value or weight to be attached to the evidence thus admitted. Once admitted, the power given by this section in respect of the evidence is exhausted, the discretion of the Judge extending only to the question whether the former evidence is to be treated as evidence in the case. Once admitted it is on the same footing with all other evidence in the case, that is to say, it is to be considered by the jury, or by the assessors and the Judge, according to the nature of the trial, as part of the material upon which the verdict or the finding is to be given. The value of the previous evidence is a matter entirely beyond the scope of the section, as it is also of the *Evidence Act*. Its value is a question in the particular case for the jury or for the assessors, subject to the directions of the Judge in summing up, or for the Judge in cases where he is a Judge of the fact. Whether any portion or the whole of the evidence thus admitted is entitled to credit, and if so, to such a degree that a conviction may be based upon it wholly or in part are very important questions for the jury or assessors or for the Judge as the case may be but they are in no way affected by this section. *Per FLOWDEN, J.*, 51 P. R. 1887. See also 37 P. R. 1917 (Cr.).

16. The discretion of a Judge is open to review by a Court of Appeal.—"The purpose of this section, as amended is to make deposition given before Magistrates in the preliminary inquiry, evidence for the purposes of the trial in the Court of Session, only when the Sessions Judge determines, in the exercise of his discretion, that they are to be used in this way. But we think the exercise of his discretion, considering it as a matter of fact or law, is open to review by this Court in appeal. When the case is under trial in a Court of Session the Sessions Judge has the depositions given in the Magistrate's Court before him. If he finds that the statements of the witnesses in his own Court differ materially from those previously made by the same witnesses it is his duty to examine them as to discrepancies and this is more especially his duty when the prisoners are undefended, and contradictory testimony is given for the prosecution. But if he thus examines the witnesses he ought (see Taylor on evidence, ss 1300 and 1301, and the *Indian Evidence Act*, s 155) in ordinary cases to make the depositions upon which he has examined, evidence in the case he is at liberty to do so, and the power should be exercised so as to bring all relevant matter so far as possible, under consideration in forming a judgment on the case. If the Sessions Judge has omitted to examine witnesses on obvious and important discrepancies in their statements, this Court will, in general direct that such an examination be made, and the Sessions Judge, having the witnesses before him for such purpose, will, in most cases, feel it his duty to make the former depositions evidence *quantum valent* for the purpose of the final adjudication in appeal. The alternative is for this Court in such cases to order a new trial on the ground that there has been a misuse of the Sessions Judge's discretion which may have caused a failure of justice, but a new trial will not be ordered except in special cases. — *Per WEST, J.*, 11 B. C. R. 281. Where a Sessions Judge used as evidence under this section the statement which a witness made before the committing Magistrate, but which he repudiated at the Sessions trial as having been made under improper influence, and the circumstances were such that the Sessions Judge could not properly rely on either of these statements held following 21 W. R. 49 = 12 B. L. R. Appx. XV that the Sessions Judge did not exercise a proper discretion in allowing the former statement to be treated as evidence 7 C. W. N. 343. But see now 53 C. 181 overruling 21 W. R. 49 and 37 C. 205 as a result of the latest amendments. See also Note 18 below

17. Statements by:

certain witnesses who had deceased, withdrew their st

The Sessions Judge considering the evidence given by these witnesses before him to be untrue, and acting under this section admitted in evidence the statements of these witnesses made before the committing Magistrate held that such statements were rightly admitted and when admitted were on the same footing as the other evidence on record 23 A. 683, where 21 A. 111; 1899 A. W. N. 356; 22 A. 443 and 51 P. R. 1887 are referred to and 1 A. 882 overruled. The Calcutta High Court seems to have held that the evidence before the committing Magistrate which was afterwards wholly retracted and repudiated at the Sessions trial cannot be treated as substantive evidence. (See next Note.) But in 24 M. 414, where a Sessions Judge being of opinion that certain prosecution witnesses had been gained over by the defence, allowed their depositions before the

Probate Court or Court of Probate a court for the probate of wills — *Probate duty*, a government tax on property passing by will. [*Lat*] *At nraunda*

2 (*Math*) Any thing which is required to be done as in geometry, to bisect a line to draw a perpendicular or, in algebra, to find an unknown quantity. [*Lat*]

Pro and con, for and against
will may be said or urged for
want of or in favor of — *Pro*
[*Lat*] in proportion, proportion.

Pro Taylor [*Pro Taylor*] *Pro Taylor* [*Pro Taylor*] *Pro Taylor* [*Pro Taylor*]

1. Capable of
2. Having more evidence for than against a proposition by evidence which inclines the mind to believe but leaves some room for doubt, likely.
That is accounted probable which has better arguments in support of it than can be brought against it.
3. I do not say that the principles of religion are merely probable. I have before asserted them to be in reality certain.
4. Tending probable supporting or giving ground for belief but not demonstrating as probable.

in the bladder, and the like. [*Lat*]

to it [*Lat*]

From a to a
being of circumstance
Probably, *ad* in a probable manner to be a
degree as to give ground for belief, in likelihood
Tendency between what may possibly and what will probably be done.

whole-hearted honesty and especially that which excludes all in notice that might favor one's self. It is a peculiar reference to participation in human dealings transfer of property, and the execution of trusts for others.

3. A step taken an act performed a proceeding, the gradual procedure toward their descent and [*Lat*]

2. A, B, C, D, E, F, G, H, I, J, K, L, M, N, O, P, Q, R, S, T, U, V, W, X, Y, Z, short, care, far, last, fall, what, there, will, firm; plus, firm, done, for, do, wolf, food, foot;

committing Magistrate (where cross-examination had been reserved) to be received in evidence under this section, it was *held*, that this section enabled the Court to treat such depositions as substantive evidence in the case at the trial where, for the purposes of justice the adoption of such a course is found necessary by the Judge. Such evidence may be used as much in favour of the defence as of the prosecution and that the Court is not restricted in permitting the production of the evidence before the committing Magistrate, to use it solely for the purpose of contradicting the witness at the Sessions trial. See also 14 P. R. 1896 and 8 P. R. 1904. See Note 18 below for the effect of the amendment of s. 288 by Act XVIII of 1923.

18. The effect of the amendment of s. 288 by the Act XVIII of 1923.—Now it is *held* that the words "For all purposes" were added to s. 288 to remove the limitation to the value of the evidence, admitted under this section, as laid down in 21 W. R. (Cr.) 43 and 37 C. 295. So evidence recorded by the committing Magistrate, if admitted under the amended s. 288 must be treated as evidence for all purposes, even as the basis of the finding or verdict. It stands on the same footing as any other evidence before a Court of Session and is to be considered as proposed material on which the verdict or finding may be given. 53 C. 181 (3 Pak. 781 not relied on); 5 Lah. 326; 27 Bom. L. R. 113; 47 A. 276; 47 M. 232; 2 Pat. 517; 45 M. L. J. 602; 6 Lah. 199.

19. In the absence of an independent inferential circumstance conviction upon a statement absolutely withdrawn is unsafe.—It would be most unsafe to found a conviction upon the statements made before the committing Magistrate when such statements are absolutely withdrawn before the Sessions Court, unless there be independent circumstances from which it may be inferred that the second statements were false and the original statements true. Weir II, 374; Ratanlal 966. But when the conviction is by a jury who believed the statement before the committing Magistrate (although it was absolutely withdrawn at the Sessions trial) it being corroborated to a certain extent by independent evidence before the Sessions Court, it was *held* that the conviction was not illegal. Weir II, 375. When evidence given before the committing Magistrate is retracted in the Sessions Court it would be very unsafe to act upon it unless it is clearly proved to be true by some independent evidence. Ratanlal 966. In 10 C. W. N. 243, the evidence given by a witness before the committing Magistrate and the Coroner as having actually seen the accused murdering the deceased who wholly retracted and repudiated before the Court of Session for the reason that it was given under threat and coercion of the police, *held* following 22 A. 445 that evidence before the Magistrate cannot be treated as substantive evidence under this section and that corroboration on all material particulars was necessary before the accused could be convicted.

20. Admissibility of previous statements of witness.—Previous statements of a witness used at the trial for contradicting his evidence, if not made in the presence of the accused, cannot be used against the accused as independent evidence of his innocence or guilt, 23 C. 381. Such statement can be used under s. 145 of the Evidence Act, solely for contradicting the witness. It cannot be used at all under this section, if the witness is absent, 21 W. R. 12; 35 A. 260. See 5 Bar. L. T. 33 = 18 Cr. L. J. 299 for using the statements of witnesses made to their counsel in giving their proof. Inconvenience to the witness is not one of the grounds allowed by s. 33 of the Evidence Act, 6 A. 224, 21 W. R. 36; 2 A. 846. An accused is entitled to have an opportunity to cross-examine a witness before his evidence can be used against him. Accused are entitled to cross-examine under s. 153 of the Indian Evidence Act the witnesses upon statements made by them in a departmental inquiry, 2 Bom. L. R. 329. Such statements are not privileged, 16 C. W. N. 431 = 13 Cr. L. J. 445.

21. When previous deposition of witness not present at trial may be used.—See s. 33 of the Indian Evidence Act. The application of s. 33, Evidence Act, in criminal cases ought to be confined within the narrowest limits. It can only be in very extreme cases that it is right to make adverse use of the evidence of a witness under s. 33 in a criminal trial when that evidence if true would be extremely material. 17 Bom. L. R. 590.

its evidentiary value was very small. 17 C. W. N. 230 = 14 Cr. L. J. 70. Now the practice in Sessions inquiries is unless, at the conclusion of the case when the charge is drawn himself in the first Court, and, under the new provisions of the Act, the charge cancelled by cross-examining the witnesses and by entering into his defence. But if from the first he takes no such action, although it is clear he has the right

witness or the proper formalities being observed for the purpose of contradicting a witness, and to permit either the prosecutor or the accused to use it for either purpose. Further it enables the Judge to treat it as part of the material on which he sums up to the jury or assessors under s 297 or s 309 at the conclusion of the trial. But see the latest amendment by the introduction of the words for all purposes subject to the provisions of the Indian Evidence Act. See Note 18 below.

But there is nothing in the section which prescribes the value or weight to be attached to the evidence thus admitted. Once admitted the power given by this section in respect of the evidence is exhausted the discretion of the Judge extending only to the question whether the former evidence is to be treated as evidence in the case. Once admitted it is on the same footing with all other evidence in the case that is to say it is to be considered by the jury or by the assessors and the Judge according to the nature of the trial as part of the material upon which the verdict or the finding is to be given. The value of the previous evidence is a matter entirely beyond the scope of the section as it is also of the *Evidence Act*. Its value is a question in the particular case for the jury or for the assessors subject to the directions of the Judge in summing up or for the Judge in cases where he is a Judge of the fact. Whether any portion or the whole of the evidence thus admitted is entitled to credit and if so to such a degree that a conviction may be based upon it wholly or in part are very important questions for the jury or assessors or for the Judge as the case may be but they are in no way affected by this section. *PER FLOWDEN J 51 P R 1837* See also *37 P R 1917 (Cr)*.

16 The discretion of a Judge is open to review by a Court of Appeal — The purpose of this section as amended is to make deposition given before Magistrates in the preliminary inquiry evidence for the purposes of the trial in the Court of Session only when the Sessions Judge determines in the exercise of his discretion that they are to be used in this way. But we think the exercise of his discretion considering it as a matter of fact or law, is open to review by this Court in appeal. When the case is under trial in a Court of Session the Sessions Judge has the depositions given in the Magistrate's Court before him. If he finds that the statements of the witnesses in his own Court differ materially from those previously made by the same witnesses it is his duty to examine them as to discrepancies and this is more especially his duty when the prisoners are undefended and contradictory testimony is given for the prosecution. But if he thus examines the witnesses he ought (see Taylor on evidence ss 1300 and 1301 and the *Indian Evidence Act* s 155) in ordinary cases to make the depositions upon which he has examined evidence in the case he is at liberty to do so and the power should be exercised so as to bring all relevant matter so far as possible under consideration in forming a judgment on the case. If the Sessions Judge has omitted to examine witnesses on obvious and important discrepancies in their statements this Court will in general direct that such an examination be made and the Sessions Judge, having the witnesses before him for such purpose will in most cases feel it his duty to make the former depositions evidence *quantum valeant* for the purpose of the final adjudication in appeal. The alternative is for this Court in such cases to order a new trial on the ground that there has been a misuse of the Sessions Judge's discretion which may have caused a failure of justice but a new trial will not be ordered except in special cases. — *PER WEST J 11 B H C R 281* Where a Sessions Judge used as evidence under this section the statement which a witness made before the committing Magistrate but which he repudiated at the Sessions trial as having been made under improper influence and the circumstances were such that the Sessions Judge could not properly rely on either of these statements held following *21 W R 49 = 12 B L R Appx XV* that the Sessions Judge did not exercise a proper discretion in allowing the former statement to be treated as evidence *7 C W N 345*. But see now *53 C 181* overruling *21 W R 49* and *37 C 205* as a result of the latest amendments. See also Note 18 below.

17 Statements let in under this section may be treated as substantive evidence — In a capital case certain witnesses who had stated before the committing Magistrate that they had seen the accused sinking the deceased, withdrew their statements before the Court of Session and gave evidence exculpating the accused. The Sessions Judge considering the evidence given by these witnesses before him to be untrue and acting under this section admitted in evidence the statements of these witnesses made before the committing Magistrate held that such statements were rightly admitted and when admitted were on the same footing as the other evidence on record *25 A. 683*, where *21 A. 111*; *1893 A W N 356*; *22 A. 445* and *51 P R 1837* are referred to and *7 A. 862* overruled. The Calcutta High Court seems to have held that the evidence before the committing Magistrate which was afterwards wholly retracted and repudiated at the Sessions trial cannot be treated as substantive evidence. (See next Note.) But in *26 M. 414*, where a Sessions Judge being of opinion that certain prosecution witnesses had been gained over by the defence allowed their depositions before the

committing Magistrate (where cross-examination had been reserved) to be received in evidence under this section, it was *held*, that this section enabled the Court to treat such depositions as substantive evidence in the case at the trial where, for the purposes of justice, the adoption of such a course is found necessary by the Judge. Such evidence may be used as much in favour of the defence as of the prosecution and that the Court is not restricted in permitting the production of the evidence before the committing Magistrate, to use it solely for the purpose of contradicting the witness at the Sessions trial. *See also* 16 P. R. 1898 and 2 P. R. 1904. *See Note* 18 below for the effect of the amendment of s. 255 by Act XVIII of 1923.

18. The effect of the amendment of s. 255 by the Act XVIII of 1923.—Now it is *held* that the words "For all purposes" were added to s. 255 to remove the limitation to the value of the evidence, admitted under this section, as laid down in 21 W. R. (Cr.) 42 and 27 C. 225. So evidence recorded by the committing Magistrate, if admitted under the amended s. 255 must be treated as evidence for all purposes, even as the basis of the finding or verdict. It stands on the same footing as any other evidence before a Court of Session and is to be considered as proposed materials on which the verdict or finding may be given. 83 C. 191 (3 Pat. 781 not relied on); 5 Lah. 324; 27 Bom. L. R. 113; 47 A. 278; 67 M. 232; 2 Pat. 517; 45 M. L. J. 602; 6 Lah. 199.

19. In the absence of an independent inferential circumstance conviction upon a statement absolutely withdrawn is unsafe.—It would be most unsafe to found a conviction upon the statements made before the committing Magistrate when such statements are absolutely withdrawn before the Sessions Court, unless there be independent circumstances from which it may be inferred that the second statements were false and the original statements true, *Weir II, 374; Ratanlal 966*. But when the conviction is by a jury who believed the statement before the committing Magistrate (although it was absolutely withdrawn at the Sessions trial) it being corroborated to a certain extent by independent evidence before the Sessions Court, it was *held* that the conviction was not illegal *Weir II, 375*. When evidence given before the committing Magistrate is retracted in the Sessions Court, it would be very unsafe to act upon it unless it is clearly proved to be true by some independent evidence, *Ratanlal 966*. In 10 C. W. N. 243, the evidence given by a witness before the committing Magistrate and the Coroner as having actually seen the accused murdering the deceased who wholly retracted and repudiated before the Court of Session for the reason that it was given under threat and coercion of the police, *held* following 22 A. 443 that evidence before the Magistrate cannot be treated as substantive evidence under this section and that corroboration on all material particulars was necessary before the accused could be convicted.

20. Admissibility of previous statements of witness.—Previous statements of a witness used at the trial for contradicting his evidence if not made in the presence of the accused, cannot be used against the accused as independent evidence of his innocence or guilt 23 C. 381. Such statement can be used under s. 145 of the Evidence Act, solely for contradicting the witness. It cannot be used at all under this section, if the witness is absent 21 W. R. 12; 35 A. 260. *See* 5 Bur. L. T. 35 = 18 Cr. L. J. 299 for using the statements of witnesses made to their counsel in giving their proof. Inconvenience to the witness is not one of the grounds allowed by s. 33 of the Evidence Act, 6 A. 224; 21 W. R. 56; 2 A. 646. An accused is entitled to have an opportunity to cross-examine a witness before his evidence can be used against him. Accused are entitled to cross-examine under s. 153 of the Indian Evidence Act the witnesses upon statements made by them in a departmental inquiry, 2 Bom. L. R. 329. Such statements are not privileged, 16 C. W. N. 431 = 13 Cr. L. J. 465.

21. When previous deposition of witness not present at trial may be used.—*See* s. 33 of the Indian Evidence Act. The application of s. 33, Evidence Act, in criminal cases ought to be confined within the narrowest limits. It can only be in very extreme cases that it is right to make adverse use of the evidence of a witness under s. 33 in a criminal trial when that evidence if true, would be extremely material 17 Bom. L. R. 590.

(1) Accused must have had the right and opportunity to cross-examine.—S. 33 of the Evidence Act says

"Where an accused person is being tried by a Court of Session or a Judge of a High Court or a Judge of a District Court, and the evidence of a witness is given in the presence of the accused, and the accused has had the opportunity to cross-examine the witness, the evidence of the witness shall be admissible."

its evidentiary value was very small, 17 C. W. N. 230 = 14 Cr. L. J. 70. "Now the practice in Sessions inquiries is not to cross-examine the prosecution witnesses unless, at the conclusion of the case when the charge is drawn up, the accused thinks it worthwhile to defend himself in the first Court, and, under the new provisions of the amended Code of Criminal Procedure, he may get the charge cancelled by cross-examining the witnesses and by entering into his defence. But if from the first he takes no such action, although it is clear he has the right

nothing future by signs or symptoms;
as, the prognostic symptoms of a dis-
tinct sign
n. [Lat. prognosticum, Gr. *prognosis*]
2. prognostico, Fr. *prognostic* 'pro-
noscere'

Purr

on; passage, token, indication.
To prognosticate [Obs]
e, a. 'Capable of being prognos-

some,

, Sp

Syn-
proved

ures, { Pro grams, n. the same as PROGRANWY " "

Hospitality sometimes dysprosive (p)

2. An abandoned course of life, extreme vicious
here (profligate)
Prof'it'ations n. [Lat. *profligatio*] Defect
in 'fals'

Pro found' n. 1. The deep, the abyss. Through
the blue air / sea /

Pro found' n. 1. The deep, the abyss. Through
the blue air / sea /

Pro found' n. 1. The deep, the abyss. Through
the blue air / sea /

signere to begin, in. progenitore, fig. progenitor,
to Fr. *progenitor*]. An ancestor in the direct line,
a forefather "And reverence thee their great pro-

progress' n. 1. To make progress, to move forward in space,
to pass, to continue onward in course, to proceed,
to advance, to go on.

as, last, last, what; there, well, there; please, from; done, for, do, well, good, foot,

to do so it can hardly be said that he had the opportunity to cross-examine. We are borne out in this view by the fact that on the record it is stated that a lengthy examination in-chief of the approver was read over to him and admitted to be correct and it does not appear that the accused persons were asked then and there to cross-examine if they wished to. We think in the case of approvers having regard to the difficulty which has arisen in this case that it would be a sound principle for the committing Court to clearly bring to the notice of the defence that it is their duty to cross-examine the approver if they desire to do so directly his evidence is given. **17 C. W. N. 230 = 14 Cr. L. J. 70** Depositions of an absent witness are only admissible when the prisoner has had that right and opportunity to cross-examine, **21 W. R. 12** Inconvenience to witness is no ground **6 A. 224**. The evidence must have been taken before a competent tribunal **3 M. 43**.

(ii) *The witness must be dead etc.*—A mere statement of the Public Prosecutor that the presence of the witness cannot be obtained without an amount of delay or expense which he considers to be unreasonable is not enough. There must be independent evidence before the Judge can exercise the powers under s 33 of the *Evidence Act* **28 M. L. J. 329 = 17 M. L. T. 214 = 16 Cr. L. J. 234**, where **2 A. 646, 3 M. 48; 41 C. 601** were referred to.

22 The mere fact witness tells a different story at trial will not make him a hostile witness.—The fact that a witness at the Sessions trial tells a story different from that told by him before the Magistrate does not render him a hostile witness so as to entitle the prosecutor to cross-examine him. The proper inference to be drawn from such contradiction is not that the witness is hostile to this side or to that, but that he ought not to be believed unless supported by some satisfactory evidence **13 C. 53**. The mere fact that a witness who is examined before the committing Magistrate and who in the opinion of the Public Prosecutor, will not speak the truth in the Sessions Court does not entitle the Public Prosecutor at once to treat him as a hostile witness and begin to cross-examine him. In such cases the duty (if the prosecution is to have such witnesses in attendance so that they could be examined by the defence if necessary though the prosecution is not bound to produce witnesses who are not likely to speak the truth **3 Lab. 144**

23 English practice—The depositions of witnesses taken before a coroner's jury may be used in the cross-examination of the witnesses who made them but cannot be used as direct evidence except to contradict evidence of such witnesses when such contradiction is permissible. *Halsbury* Vol. IX, p. 366 See *Archbold* pp 490—492 as to mode of cross-examining witnesses on their previous depositions.

289. (1) When the examination of the witnesses for the prosecution and the examination (if any) of the accused are concluded the accused shall be asked whether he means to adduce evidence.

(2) If he says that he does not the prosecutor may sum up his case, and if the Court considers that there is no evidence that the accused committed the offence it may then in a case tried with the aid of assessors record a finding or in a case tried by a jury direct the jury to return a verdict of not guilty.

(3) If the accused or anyone of several accused says that he means to adduce evidence, and the Court considers that there is no evidence that the accused committed the offence the Court may then in a case tried with the aid of assessors record a finding or, in a case tried by a jury, direct the jury, to return a verdict of not guilty.

(4) If the accused or anyone of several accused says that he means to adduce evidence, and the Court considers that there is evidence that he committed the offence or if on his saying that he does not mean to adduce evidence the prosecutor sums up his case and the Court considers that there is evidence that the accused committed the offence, the Court shall call on the accused to enter on his defence.

Notes.—1 Duty of prosecution to produce evidence—See Notes 1 to 5 to s 289

2 English practice—When prosecution counsel may sum up case.—According to English practice the right ought to be exercised in exceptional cases such as where erroneous statements have been made and ought to be corrected or when the evidence differs from the instructions. The counsel for the prosecution

A state of being pro-

(1) *promissum* Re

n 1 of more copies than one
in 1) at series in which the
line does not promise re-
turn

3 A binding declaration of something to be done or given for another's benefit, as, the promise of a grant of land.

4 Ground or basis of hope, expectation or that which affords expectat on, of future distinction, as, a youth of great *promise*

My native country was full of youthful promises. If I was
5 Bureaucrat, fulfillment, or grant of what is
promised

He commanded them that they should not depart from Jerusalem but wait for the promise of the Father. Acts 1:4

promise a cessation of hostilities, to promise the payment of money

2 To afford reason to expect to excite the hope or anticipation of, to assure, as, the clouds *promise* rain

3 To make declaration or give assurance of as of some benefit to be conferred to pludge or in guage to bealow, as the proprators promised large

1 of all I have
also that
I promise
nction to

ne who en

TABLE 1

Barrell
1991, 1992, 1993, 1994

1. 2

as to pay to
I there: a
I over 184—
old Story

u, i, o = f, long; a, y, e, o, u, f, short, care, far, fast, fall, what, there, veil, thin, please, stem; dōue, fār, dō, wōlf, sōbō, sōbt;

should state his case before he calls the witnesses, and after the evidence has been given either say simply 'I say nothing' or 'I have already told you what would be the substance of the evidence and you see the statement I made is correct' or, in exceptional cases to say "something is proved different to what I expected" and add any suitable explanation which is required. *R v Holchester* 10 Cox 225. It is not proper to comment on the absence of witnesses for the defence unless it might be fairly expected that witnesses would be called, *Halbury*, Vol. IX p 288. *Archbold* pp 219-220. If by reserving his defence before the justices the prosecution have been prevented from investigating the case set up by the defendant at the trial comment may be made on that circumstance. See also *Denman Act 26 and 29 Vic c 18 R v McNair*, (1909) 25 T. L. R. 225.

3. **Examination of the accused not imperative.**—When the accused had admitted his guilt and had been examined by the committing Magistrate the omission of the Sessions Judge to examine the accused does not constitute an illegality. s 289 clearly indicates that such an examination is not necessary in all cases, 9 C. L. J. 55—10 Cr. L. J. 325. The omission to examine the accused would not constitute an illegality which would vitiate the trial, 27 M. 235.

4. **Accused entitled to be acquitted in absence of prosecution evidence.**—An accused in the absence of evidence on the prosecution side should be acquitted under sub-sec (3) and should not be convicted on the evidence given against him by the witnesses called by the co-accused in his defence, 8 M. L. T. 75—10 Cr. L. J. 68. A gap in the evidence cannot be supplied by examining the accused and so covering up the defect as e.g. in a definition case, by questioning the accused as to whether he published the libel 27 M. 235. See also 28 C. 49. Similarly, where the prisoner was charged with having been previously convicted and there was no evidence of this it could not be supplied by his admission of the fact, 23 C. 639. Witnesses for the defence ought not to be examined until after the close of the prosecution evidence for it is only when sufficient evidence has been produced that he can be called on to enter upon his defence, 4 C. L. R. 335. It is incumbent on the prosecution to prove all the facts necessary to constitute the offence charged against the accused. When the case for the prosecution has been closed the Court should acquit the accused where no evidence of any of the links necessary to establish the offence has been adduced by the prosecution. Any gap in the evidence ought not to be supplied by any statement of the accused 36 M. 437. See also 29 M. 372; 31 M. 235 and Notes to s. 342.

5. **Section applies only when there is "no evidence" that the accused committed the offence.**—These words cannot be extended to mean *no satisfactory, trustworthy or conclusive evidence*. Such a meaning would enable a Sessions Judge to exclude his assessors from their share of the trial whenever he thought the evidence unsatisfactory or inconclusive 10 A. 414; 9 C. 875; 16 W. R. 20. See however, the remarks of JENKINS, C.J. in 19 C. W. N. 653, Note 10 to s. 209 at p. 792. If there is any evidence relevant to the charge preferred, the accused must be called on for his defence and the trial must go on to its close, 16 B. 414; Weir II, 332. The section can only apply when there is no evidence, and will not cover a case when the Court considers that the charge is in itself improper 12 A. 551 at p. 552. The third paragraph of this section means that if at a certain stage of the Sessions trial the Court is satisfied that there is not on record *any evidence* which even if it were perfectly true would amount to perfectly legal proof of the offence charged, then the Court has power without consulting the assessors to record a finding of not guilty, 10 A. 414; Weir II, 332. If the trial was by jury, the Judge need not put the case at all to the jury 16 W. R. 19; 7 W. R. 89. It is not necessary to record the opinion of assessors, 7 Bom. H. C. Cr. Ca. 82, but see 1 A. 610.

6. **Opinion of the jury not to be taken in the middle of the case.**—After taking all the direct evidence in the case, the Sessions Judge is not competent to stop it by asking the jury if they wish to hear more evidence and by this means to obtain the opinion of the jury that they do not believe it. No final opinion as to the fabelhood or sufficiency of the evidence for the prosecution ought to be arrived at by the Judge or jury until the whole of the evidence is before them and has been considered 20 M. 445.

7. **"Not proven"**—There is no legal warrant for a finding not proven. The proper course is to record a finding of not guilty, Weir II 331.

8. **Accused himself must be asked if he means to adduce evidence.**—The question whether the prisoner has any evidence to adduce is one which should be put to the accused himself and not to his pleader and the question and answer should be recorded as required by s 364—*Madras Criminal Rules* p 242. See also 9 M. 224. This is not a mere formality but is an *essential* part of a criminal trial. The High Court held that it would hesitate to apply s 537 although the accused had not cross-examined the Crown witnesses 23 C. 252. When a prisoner is not defended by counsel the Judge should inform him of his right to cross-examine

1. In a proper manner, suitably,
properly supplied, a dress properly

is not, strictly,
is not properly owing to the nearest
half

ly a synonym for petals or quality; but it
is co-extensive with quality in general.

y of

nearness of participation

though the better of what is at it is led to the mean

of principles

Prophecy is a body to compose his subordination of pro-

phetic prophecies.

Prophecy is a body to compose his subordination of pro-

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Prophecy is a body to compose his subordination of pro-

phetic prophecies.

Prophecy is a body to compose his subordination of pro-

phetic prophecies.

Prophecy, and Prophecy, hence to Prophecy, very, as, proper good, proper, and, vulgar.

Prophecy, and Prophecy, hence to Prophecy, very, as, proper good, proper, and, vulgar.

Prophecy, and Prophecy, hence to Prophecy, very, as, proper good, proper, and, vulgar.

Prophecy, and Prophecy, hence to Prophecy, very, as, proper good, proper, and, vulgar.

Prophecy, and Prophecy, hence to Prophecy, very, as, proper good, proper, and, vulgar.

witnesses, to address the jury and to make a statement, but omission to give this information does not invalidate the conviction, *Archbold*, p 220 Entering on the defence marks a special stage in a trial, omission to call upon the accused may occasion failure of justice and is not cured by s. 537 But see 15 A. L. J. 41

9. **Accused not to be prejudiced, if he does not adduce evidence after saying he will.**—Where on being asked under this section the accused had stated that he means to adduce evidence, but on further consideration does not do so, the Court is not at liberty to make a presumption adverse to the accused from the circumstance that he has not adduced evidence, and the accused does not lose his right to the last word, 10 C. 140 = 13 C. L. R. 358

10. **Nature of defence set up must appear from record**—This section provides that the accused is to be called on to enter upon his defence and to produce his evidence If he makes any statement in defence, it ought to be recorded. If he does not voluntarily make any statement and declines to answer any question put by the Court, the fact should be noted and when there is nothing else to show the nature of the defence, a note of the address to the Court if any (under the following section), should be recorded. The record is not complete unless it shows the nature of the defence set up. 15 W. R. 16. There is nothing in the law which prohibits a written defence If presented it should be received 2 Agra H. C. R. 356.

11. **Procedure where defence witnesses are not present**—If the accused has not his witnesses present, the Judge should, if he sees grounds for proceeding first call upon him for his defence and then postpone the case 23 W. R. 58; 6 B. L. R. Appx. LXXXVIII = 15 W. R. 34

12. **Practice—Prosecution witness examined before Magistrate called by defence—his examination**—Where the prosecution declined to call in the Court of Session a witness for the Crown, who had been examined in the Magistrate's Court and such witness is afterwards called in by the defence, the counsel for the defence has no right to commence his examination by questioning him as to what he had deposed in the Magistrate's Court. Questions as to his previous deposition are only admissible by way of cross-examination, with the permission of the Court if the witness proved himself a hostile witness 20 A. 155

13. **If prosecution witness is recalled, opportunity must be given to accused with reference to such evidence.**—Where a witness for the prosecution was recalled after the accused had made his defence and he (the accused) had no opportunity of calling evidence with reference to the evidence of that witness the High Court quashed the conviction and ordered a new trial, 13 W. R. 15 But see *contra* 13 W. R. 36, where the accused had full notice of the nature of the evidence adduced.

14. **Prosecutor's reply.**—As to the prosecutor's right of reply on production of evidence for defence see notes to s. 292. The word prosecutor does not exclude the assistance of counsel 11 B. H. C. R. 102

290. The accused or his pleader may then open his case, stating the facts or law on which he intends to rely, and making such comments as he thinks necessary on the evidence for the prosecution He may then examine his witnesses (if any) and after their cross-examination and re-examination (if any) may sum up his case

Notes.—1 Duty of defendant's counsel—See s. 340 as to the right of the accused to be defended by a pleader The counsel for the prisoner has before him as his subject, the acquittal of the prisoner His duty is to act as an advocate and not to any extent as a Judge He is to put himself in the place of the accused, and so is not under any obligations which the accused would not be under Thus he is not obliged to divulge facts with which he may be acquainted which are unfavourable to the prisoner—*Harris, Prin. of Cr. Law*, v. 419

2. **In opening, counsel ought to state facts which he does not intend to prove.**—In the opinion of the Judges it is contrary to the administration and practice of the criminal law as hitherto allowed that counsel for prisoners should state to the jury as alleged existing facts, matters which they have been told in their instructions on the authority of the prisoner but which they do not propose to give in evidence, *R v Shimmer* 15 Cox 122, *Archbold* p. 222.

3. **Criminal case ought not to be adjudged on mere probabilities.**—The Court ought not to adjudge a criminal case on mere probabilities as if it were a civil action, or contravene the well-known principle of law

This has neither evidence of truth nor
 give it weight!

... on the pencil.
 1. In a proper manner suitably
 adjusted.
 2. In a strict sense, strictly.
 The mischievous of life are not properly owing to the unequal
 distribution of things.
 3 Tailcase (Obs)
 1. The quality of being proper.
 2 Tailcase (Obs)
 3 perfect form handsomeness
 Proper

... essential to it.
 Properly is correctly a synonym for peculiar quality; but it
 is frequently used as co-extensive with quality in

ng [Obs]
 or as a spark
 Burrow

admirer

... artistic passion.
 Here I claim all my paternal care.
 Propinquity and proper y of blood.
 8 A piece of land with the appurtenant buildings
 I at all connect myself to such properties as fall in the
 reach of the

appendages need in a
 is still called the prop-
 2000
 properties.
 2000

weight of printing pub-
 2000 within ge
 To invest with prop-
 appropriate 2000
 also has charge of the
 diamonds

Pro phane' r f f f f Same as Phane' r f f f f

In Athens all was pleasure, mirth, and play
 All proper to the spring and sprightly day
 5. Irregular formal, according to usage, the
 proper word style and the like
 6. Becoming in appearance, well formed
 some 1000

... of principles
 Benevolent selected a body to compose the sacredness of po-
 tential propagation
 Prop'ia's title + f (imp & p p PROPAGATE P
 pr & h u PROPAGATING) [Lat. propagare pro-
 pagandum] 1. To increase Ep. propagare, Et. propa-
 ger]

1. To spread from person to person to extend
 the knowledge of to originate and spread to carry
 from place to place as to propagate a story or
 report, to propagate the Christian religion
 2. To extend to increase (Obs)
 (rich of my own to heavy in my demand,
 which I have with propagation. 2000

Pro'ph'et' r f f f f Same as Phane' r f f f f
 Prop'ia's title + f (imp & p p PROPAGATE P
 pr & h u PROPAGATING) [Lat. propagare pro-
 pagandum] 1. To increase Ep. propagare, Et. propa-
 ger]

1. To foretell, as future, to predict.
 I have been, as he doth not prophesy good concerning me,
 but evil.

h, k, l, n, p, long, h, k, l, n, p, short; c&e, t&e, l&e, f&e, w&e, th&e, v&e, t&e, r&e, p&e, f&e, d&e, t&e, d&e, q&e, w&e, f&e, d&e, f&e, d&e;

that the burden of proof lies on the Crown, not at all on the accused; and, unless the evidence is such as to enable the Court to judge rather the conjecture, the accused should not be called upon to make his defence, *Ratanlal 722 and 779; 6 C. L. R. 335.*

4. Accused has no duty.—On the probabilities a Sessions Judge held that it was more likely that the prisoner rather than the other inmates of his house inflicted injuries which caused his daughter's death, but did not come to any conclusion that his guilt was established by evidence beyond reasonable doubt, *Acid*, reversing conviction and sentence, that the accused being merely on the defensive owed no duty to anyone but himself, therefore, he could not be convicted, because he had not tried to explain to the Court how the death of his daughter had occurred or by whose means *Ratanlal 686. See also 41 C. 350.*

5. Accused not bound to account for his movements.—An accused person is not bound to account for his movement at or about the time an offence was committed, unless there has been given legal evidence, sufficiently *prima facie* to convict him of the offence, *10 C. 970.*

6. No adverse inference can be drawn on failure of accused to produce his witnesses.—If the accused fails to call witnesses on his behalf without sufficient reason being shown, the Court cannot draw an inference adverse to him. The accused is merely on the defensive and owes no duty to anyone but himself. He is at liberty, as to the whole or any part of the case against him to rely on the witnesses for prosecution, or to call witness, or to meet the charge in any other way he chooses, and no inference unfavourable to him can properly be drawn, because he takes one course rather than another, *8 C. 121 at p. 125 — 10 C. L. R. 151.*

7. Trial before the day fixed is irregular.—The trial of the accused in the absence of witnesses for the defence, and before the day fixed in their summonses, is a serious miscarriage of justice or, at all events, is an irregularity sufficient to prejudice the accused in his defence. In such a case conviction will be reversed and a new trial ordered.—*M H C. Pro.*, 1882.

8. One accused may cross-examine the witnesses of co-accused—may give evidence.—One accused may cross-examine a witness called by another for his defence, when the case of the second accused is adverse to that of the first, *21 C. 401.* Also, if the accused are being tried separately, each would be a competent witness at the trial of the other, *23 B. 213; 16 B. 661.*

291. The accused shall be allowed to examine any witness not previously named by him, if

Right of accused as to examination and summoning of witnesses

such witness is in attendance, but he shall not, except as provided in sections 211 and 231, be entitled of right to have any witness summoned, other than the witnesses named in the list delivered to the Magistrate by whom he was committed for trial

Notes.—*See* s. 211 for list of defence witnesses to be given to committing Magistrate or Clerk of the Crown; s. 216 for summons to defence witness by committing Magistrate or Clerk of the Crown; ss. 216 and 544 for expenses of witnesses and deposit and Chap. XL for the commissions to examine witnesses, s. 271 for recalling witnesses when charge altered.

1. Magistrate bound to summon defence witnesses.—A committing Magistrate is bound to take steps to procure the attendance of all the witnesses mentioned by the accused in his list delivered to the Magistrate, *15 W. R. 34; 23 W. R. 66; 2 W. R. 6; 3 W. R. 33.* There is no reason to refuse an application for summons simply because a large number of witnesses is mentioned therein, *11 C. 762.* A conviction had, without summoning and examining the witnesses for the defence is liable to be set aside, *12 W. R. 22.*

2. Adjournment to secure the attendance of defence witnesses.—If before conclusion of the trial the accused requests for adjournment to secure the attendance of his witnesses who had not properly been served, such application is not too late, *Weir II, 333. See 18 W. R. 20; 15 W. R. 34 = 6 B. L. R. Appx. LXXXVII; 12 W. R. 44; 4 Bom. L. R. 939 and see Note 2 to s. 295 at p. 786. 47 C. 758.*

3. Judge has power to summon witnesses other than those named by the accused if he applies.—The summoning of witnesses by an accused person through the medium of Sessions Judge is not a matter of "right," *3 W. R. 29.* Yet the Judge has an inherent power, if he thinks proper to exercise it, to sanction the summoning of witnesses other than those named in the list given to the committing Magistrate, *8 A. 668.*

1 Pertaining to prose, resembling prose, not re-
 2 spective of style; as, a pro-
 3 se style. Ed For
 4 rustic manner
 5 quality of being

State

Pro pte tor n (Eng Universities) An assistant professor
Propt, a pl A certain game played with four shells — much practiced by gamblers

proposition, Pr proposiçao Sp proposition 11
probat 10000

... was captured the rest as well
as ... and
of.

2 Hence language or discourse which evinces little imagination or fire, or which is dull and commonplace.

3 (*From Cath Church*) A hymn introduced into the mass on certain festival days. See HYMN.

Free price in ry. a. [Lat. propretarius] t. =
 pro. [Belonging or pertaining to a proprietor]
 Free proprietor a. [Fr. proprietaire] One =

That which is morally good is to be desired and pursued.
Milton.

3 (Law) To pursue with the intention of punishing, to accuse of some crime or breach of law,

E, ē, ē, ē, ē, ē, long, E, ē, ē, ē, ē, short, cāre, fār, lāst, fāll, whet, thēre, vail, lērm, plique, flrm, dōne, fōr, dē, wōlf, fēd, fōot.

4 Court not entitled to decide how much evidence the accused shall let in.—Though the Sessions Judge could first call upon the accused to state the grounds of his defence (23 W R 58) yet where he refused to summon defence witnesses on the ground that 'it is needless to prove the alleged enmity, there is ample evidence on record about this' held that it was manifestly for the accused person whose interest was concerned and not for the judge to say what amount of evidence it was proper to place before the jury in order to establish the case for the defence 7 C W R 188.

Prosecutor's right of reply

*** 292.** The prosecutor shall be entitled to reply—

(a) If the accused or any of the accused adduces any oral evidence, or

(b) with the permission of the Court on a point of law or

(c) with the permission of the Court when any document which does not need to be proved is produced by any accused person after he enters on his defence

Provided that in the case referred to in clause (c) reply shall unless the Court otherwise permits be restricted to comment on the document so produced

Notes—1 Scope of the amended section—This section is thoroughly re-drafted by Act XVIII of 1923. Under the old law there was a difference of opinion as to whether the prosecutor retained his right of reply when the accused produced certain documents without producing any oral evidence of witnesses. In 30 B 421, it was laid down and held that the section makes the right of reply dependent upon the fact of evidence being adduced. But this interpretation as is pointed out by BEAMAN, J., would include both documentary and oral evidence and the logical effect would be to exclude a large proportion of legitimate cross-examination under pain of forfeiture of right of reply 11 M 339; 16 A. 83 also held that the prosecutor had a right of reply if the accused produced documentary evidence alone. Whereas 14 C. 245 and 17 C. 930 and 16 B 436 held that the production of documentary evidence alone by the accused did not give the prosecutor a right of reply. The present section as amended has tried to do away with the difference of opinion in the High Courts as pointed above especially by the insertion of cl. (c) and the proviso

2 Reason for the rule as to prosecutor's right of reply.—Where the Judge allowed the prosecutor to reply when no evidence for the defence was actually given held though the strict interpretation of s. 289 and of this section warrants this course it was never meant by the Legislature that the prosecutor should have a reply when no witnesses are called for the defence the object of law being evidently to let each side have an opportunity of commenting on the evidence of the other and not to give an additional advantage to the prosecutor 10 C 140 = 13 C. L. R. 358 approved in 30 B 421

3. Has the prosecution any right to reply where the defence puts in documentary evidence through prosecution witnesses?—

(a) **Bombay**—BEAMAN J in 11 L. R. 177 = 9 Cr. L. J. 284 dissented from the judgment of BATTY, J as laid down in 30 B 421, and held that the true principle to apply in deciding whether a reply ought to be allowed is that nothing which the accused can fairly get in to his own advantage by the legitimate employment of cross-examination while the case is in the hands of prosecution, deprives him of his right to the last word. The only practical difficulty which ever arises is this. Sometimes under the guise of cross-examining a prosecution witness counsel for the defence will try to get in a lot of matter, especially documentary matter, which ought to properly come in as evidence in rebuttal. Now although this may be in strictness relevant no Judge who knows his business ought to be in any uncertainty how to deal with it. The Court has only to say this evidence is all very well, but this is not the proper time or proper way to lay it before the Court. "If you really need it you must pay for it." He is of opinion that s. 292 ought to be read with s. 289 and not independently. He disapproves of the test laid down in 1 B. L. R. 91 = 8 Cr. L. J. 215, that when evidence is adduced by the defence through the mouths of the prosecution witnesses, it is for the Court to decide in the particular case whether such evidence is such as to take the prosecution by surprise and to assign the right of reply accordingly.

In 30 B. 421 BATTY J held, that the section as amended was intended to give a right of reply whenever 'at any stage' evidence is recorded for the defence which is not part of that adduced for the prosecution. The

To propose is one's self to intend, to design, to form
a design in the mind.

Propose, v. t. 1. To lay schemes, to intend.

being proso,
 nemo } That
 } bridge
 } prosecutor,
 } or of prose.

Then comes (Hannah More) as

offering

{ Obs }

to introduce
Benedict
(O By propugnaculo
ignaculo, propugnaculo
e supra } A fortress
 } though
 } propugnaculo, B. pro-
 } Defense { Obs } Shok
 } A defender, a vin

dict
In the year 21 the Arian
and and
arrested
pro-
of 22

Having
or having power to
The

Justice }
} The act of prosecuting or dooming to death,
} exile, or outlawry among the ancient Romans the
} Public offer of a reward for the heat of a not least

That which is morally good is to be desired and promoted.

2 To seek to obtain by legal process; as, to pro-
secute a right in a court of law

3 (Law) To pursue with the intention of pun-
ishing, to secure of some crime or breach of law,

Arms, done, for, dg, upis, fofed, fofet,

section makes the right of reply, dependent upon the fact of evidence having been adduced. But this interpretation as is pointed by BRAMAN, J., and by Mr KENNEDY in the 1 B. L. R. 91 case would include both documentary and oral evidence and the logical effect would be to exclude a large proportion of legitimate cross-examination under pain of forfeiture of right of reply)

(ii) *Calcutta*.—During the cross-examination of the witnesses for the prosecution various documents were tendered by the counsel for the defence and were admitted, but no witnesses were called for the defence. *Held*, following 10 C. 226 and *distinguishing* 31 C. 1050, that this did not entitle the prosecution to have the right of reply, as the documents tendered by the defence were such as did not take the prosecution by surprise and that this was the correct test for determining whether the prosecution should have the right of reply, 10 C. W. N. 267. For other Rulings, under the previous Code, see 2 C. W. N. 201; 8 C. W. N. 303, and 8 C. W. N. 309, and also 10 C. 1024; 14 C. 243; 17 C. 930. In 43 C. 126, it was held by SANDERSON, C.J., that s. 292 must be read with s. 289 and must be construed accordingly. Reading the two sections together the right to reply which is given by s. 292 arises only if the accused or any of the accused takes advantage of the right to adduce evidence at the time and in the manner specified by the Code, viz., after the case for the prosecution is concluded and the test was not whether the prosecution was taken by surprise.

(iii) *Madras and Allahabad*.—The Madras and Allahabad High Courts hold that when documentary evidence is put in by the accused during the case for the Crown and before examination of the accused the Crown has the right of reply, 11 M. 339; 14 A. 212; 16 A. 88. These cases were under the previous Code.

(iv) *Sindh*.—"The correct test for deciding in these cases whether the prosecution should get the right of reply, is whether the evidence adduced by the defence was such as to take the prosecution by surprise. It is for the Court to decide in the particular case whether that evidence is such as to take the prosecution by surprise, and to assign the right of reply accordingly. The prosecution must be presumed to have had notice of all relevant facts within the knowledge of its witnesses. Such a presumption need not always arise but it is only in rare and exceptional cases as for example, when the Crown witnesses are openly and undisguisedly hostile to the prosecution and have withheld material facts from the knowledge of the prosecutor, that it would be rebutted," 1 B. L. R. 91 = 8 Cr. L. J. 215.

(v) *Burma*.—In 7 L. B. R. 84 = 15 Cr. L. J. 241, the decisions of the various High Courts were considered, and though HARTOLI, J., felt a doubt as to what meaning should be attached to this section, and was inclined to the view, that it may have been intended that if the accused produced documentary evidence at any stage of the trial the prosecutor would be entitled to reply, yet laid down that the benefit of doubt should be in favour of the accused and the prosecution was not entitled to a reply. The case in 4 L. B. R. 5 = 6 Cr. L. J. 115 was doubted.

4. *What would amount to adducing evidence*.—In a Sessions trial before the High Court, the accused had put in during the cross-examination of a witness the statement made by him under s. 162 to a Police constable, and after the case for the prosecution had closed but before he was asked by the Court under s. 289 whether he meant to adduce any evidence, put in the depositions of certain prosecution witnesses taken by the committing Magistrate, all of whom had been examined at the Sessions trial *held per GEIOT, J.*, that the statement as well as the depositions formed part of the record sent up by the committing Magistrate and cannot be said to be evidence adduced by the accused after the case for the prosecution is closed, that the accused merely applied that the Sessions Judge should exercise the discretion vested in him by s. 288. *Semble*, tender of documents are for forming part of the record sent up by the committing Magistrate might constitute adducing of evidence by the accused, 31 C. 1050. But where in the course of the cross-examination of a prosecution witness in a Sessions re-trial, a newspaper report of the previous trial including the deposition of the witness in the same was put in by the defence and admitted as evidence and where the accused in answer to a question put to him under s. 289 at the conclusion of the prosecution case stated that he meant to adduce no evidence, *held, dissenting* from the above Calcutta Ruling, that the prosecutor had the right of reply by reason of the newspaper having been put in 4 L. B. R. 5 = 6 Cr. L. J. 115, where 11 M. 339; 14 A. 212 and 16 A. 88 are followed. See, however, Note 3 (v). In the course of the cross-examination, a prosecution witness was asked whether he was or was not indebted to the accused and upon his denying the fact a bond alleged to have been executed by the witness in favour of the accused was produced by the counsel for the defence. But the witness not admitting even the bond an expert was summoned at the instance of the defence to give his evidence as to the thumb-mark on the

Prostration, n. [Lat. prostratio] Fr. prostration,
O Sp. prostracion, N. Sp. prostracion, It. prostrazione See 11000

Flavely they exposed.
My journey strange with cautious upsurge
Prostrating late supreme
3. To prove, to show, to give evidence of,
I will prove by cowardice.
To protest a bill or no. 11

Main

tor or

a se-

per prot. of, p. p. of
One under the care and

Story Agent
Protestantism [Hore]
[Lat. protestans, p. pr. of protes-
pra]
a protest
up to the faith and practice of those
against the church of Rome, as, the
igion
n [Fr. protestant] It. & p.

Protestants, n. [Lat. protestans, p. pr. of protes-
pra]
a protest
up to the faith and practice of those
against the church of Rome, as, the
igion
n [Fr. protestant] It. & p.

The same as PROTESTANTISM

and the List of Episcopians and
the Emperor Charles
rel

as the same time avoid ing a direct all men
tion or depul
penser
[See supra] Drawn out of

Protestantism, n. [Lat. protestatio,
Fr. protestacio, Sp. protestacion] It. protestazione

4. **Court not entitled to decide how much evidence the accused shall let in.**—Though the Sessions Judge could first call upon the accused to state the grounds of his defence (23 W. R. 58) yet where he refused to summon defence witnesses on the ground that "it is needless to prove the alleged enmity, there is ample evidence on record about this," *held*, that it was manifestly for the accused person whose interest was concerned and not for the judge to say what amount of evidence it was proper to place before the jury in order to establish the case for the defence, 7 C. W. N. 188.

Prosecutor's right of reply

* 292. The prosecutor shall be entitled to reply—

(a) If the accused or any of the accused adduces any oral evidence, or

(b) with the permission of the Court, on a point of law, or

(c) with the permission of the Court, when any document which does not need to be proved is produced by any accused person after he enters on his defence,

Provided that, in the case referred to in clause (c) reply shall, unless the Court otherwise permits, be restricted to comment on the document so produced

Notes.—1. Scope of the amended section.—This section is thoroughly re-drafted by Act XVIII of 1923. Under the old law there was a difference of opinion as to whether the prosecutor retained his right of reply when the accused produced certain documents without producing any oral evidence of witnesses. In 30 B 421, evidence being nary and oral nation under pain of forfeiture of right of reply, 11 M. 339; 16 A. 88, also *held* that the prosecutor had a right of reply if the accused produced documentary evidence alone. Whereas 14 C. 245 and 17 C. 930 and 14 B. 436 *held* that the production of documentary evidence alone by the accused did not give the prosecutor a right of reply. The present section as amended has tried to do away with the difference of opinion in the High Courts as pointed above especially by the insertion of cl. (c) and the proviso

2 **Reason for the rule as to prosecutor's right of reply.**—Where the Judge allowed the prosecutor to reply when no evidence for the defence was actually given *held*, though the strict interpretation of s. 289 and

10 C. 140 = 13 C. L. R. 358 approved in 30 B 421.

3. **Has the prosecution any right to reply where the defence puts in documentary evidence through prosecution witnesses?**—

(a) **Bombay.**—BEAMAN, J., in 11 L. R. 177 = 9 Cr. L. J. 284, dissented from the judgment of BATTY, J., as laid down in 30 B. 421, and *held* that the true principle to apply in deciding whether a reply ought to be allowed is that nothing which the accused can fairly get in to his own advantage by the legitimate employment of cross-examination while the case is in the hands of prosecution, deprives him of his right to the last word. The only practical difficulty which ever arises is this. Sometimes under the guise of cross

this evidence is all very well, but this really need it you must pay for it.

He disapproves of the test laid down in 1 B. L. R. 91 = 8 Cr. L. J. 215, that when evidence is adduced by the defence through the mouths of the prosecution witnesses, it is for the Court to decide in the particular case whether such evidence is such as to take the prosecution by surprise and to assign the right of reply accordingly.

In 30 B. 421, BATTY, J., *held*, that the section as amended was intended to give a right of reply whenever at any stage, evidence is recorded for the defence which is not part of that adduced for the prosecution. The

* Section 292 has been substituted in the place of the old section by Act XVIII of 1923

subsequent as the report proved to be true, or if and formerly by of. "And yet provided him of" 3 Hence, a division in any department of knowledge

also a mixture of meal and cut straw or hay
Good provender laboring horses would have. Tamer
2 Provisions especially dry provisions meat
food [Here]
Provision to [See PROVAND] Provisions cats

3 Hence, a striking or paradoxical assertion an
The proverb is true that old gains make heavy purses for
old gains come often great gains now and then. Bacon.

3 Hence, a striking or paradoxical assertion an

3 Hence, a region of country, a tract, a large
circuit.

2 The purveyor, steward, or treasurer of a so
religious house
n appointed by the pope to
each of the incumbents, and to
rightful patron

In a provisory manner

only, therefore, be admitted provision
for the duration

Using the provision, or such cooling fruit
As the kind, sometimes woods provisos, Milton.
To furnish; to supply — followed by with.

A, I, O, U, P, long; A, I, O, U, P, short; care, far, last, fall, what; there, yet, terms, plume, firms; alone, for, up, very, food, food;

section makes the right of reply, dependent upon the fact of evidence having been adduced. But this interpretation as is pointed by BRAMAN, J. and by Mr KNIGHT in the 1 B. L. R. 91 case would include both documentary and oral evidence and the logical effect would be to exclude a large proportion of legitimate cross-examination under pain of forfeiture of right of reply

(ii) *Calcutta*.—During the cross-examination of the witnesses for the prosecution various documents were tendered by the counsel for the defence and were admitted, but no witnesses were called for the defence. *Held* following 10 Cox 226 and *distinguishing* 31 C. 1030, that this did not entitle the prosecution to have the right of reply as the documents tendered by the defence were such as did not take the prosecution by surprise and that this was the correct test for determining whether the prosecution should have the right of reply, 10 C. W. N. 267. For other Rulings, under the previous Code, see 2 C. W. N. 201; 6 C. W. N. 303, and 8 C. W. N. 209, and also 10 C. 1024; 14 C. 243; 17 C. 930. In 43 C. 126, it was held by SANDERSON, C.J., that s. 292 must be read with s. 289 and must be construed accordingly. Reading the two sections together the right to reply which is given by s. 292 arises only if the accused or any of the accused takes advantage of the right to adduce evidence at the time and in the manner specified by the Code 212, after the case for the prosecution is concluded and the test was not whether the prosecution was taken by surprise.

(iii) *Madras and Allahabad*.—The Madras and Allahabad High Courts hold that when documentary evidence is put in by the accused during the case for the Crown and before examination of the accused the Crown has the right of reply. 11 M. 339; 14 A. 212; 16 A. 83. These cases were under the previous Code.

(i) *Bindh*.—"The correct test for deciding in these cases whether the prosecution should get the right of reply, is whether the evidence adduced by the defence was such as to take the prosecution by surprise. It is for the Court to decide in the particular case whether that evidence is such as to take the prosecution by surprise, and to assign the right of reply accordingly. The prosecution must be presumed to have had notice of all relevant facts within the knowledge of its witnesses. Such a presumption need not always arise but it is only in rare and exceptional cases as for example, when the Crown witnesses are openly and undisputedly hostile to the prosecution and have withheld material facts from the knowledge of the prosecutor, that it would be rebutted" 1 B. L. R. 91 = 8 Cr. L. J. 215.

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subsequent, as the report proves to be true, or
proves to be false

When the information ends in a guess the *esse* proves
moral.

4 To succeed [Obs]

The experiment proved not.

Encon.

5 Hence, a division in any department of knowl-
edge or speculation

Their understandings are cramped in narrow bounds so that
they never look abroad into other provinces of the intellectual
world.

Good provender laboring horses would have
2 Provisions especially dry provisions meat,
food [Rare] Cure
Provent u. [See PROVAND] Provisions cats

It is a high point of providence in a prince to cast an eye
rather upon actions than persons.

Quintus

provision 1x provision 11 provisions 12x PRO-

show
The proverb is true that light gains make heavy pains for
light gains come often great gains now and then.

Lucius

ident man a provident animal

The pious monastic animal, president
of the law

Miles

And of process and law in large
For men and beast.

Miles.

classes of men
Syn.—Masses schools
Proverbial 1x (Rare)
Am I not among and;
2 To provide with a;

With every law estate we have hewed away
kingdoms and provinces.

3 Hence, a region of country, a tract, a large
extent.

Shak

to provide, "furnish things necessary"
to, hence, to furnish, to afford.

Shak

Bring me butter, or such cooling fruit
As the head, hospitable would provide.

Miles.

4. To furnish to supply;—followed by such,

laws were devised against provisors.
Hence,

In a provisory manner
only, therefore, be admitted provision-
our H. Simons.

B, b, z, o, a, p, long; B, b, z, o, a, p, short, care, ear, last, fall, what, there, veil, firm, plume, firm; done, for, do, well, subd, subd

deed and to suit the convenience of the expert, he was examined as a prosecution witness, *held* on these facts that the defence had adduced evidence and the prosecution has the right of reply **83 P. L. R. 1911 = 12 Cr. S. J. 73**. Filing the deposition of a prosecution witness recently given by the witness on behalf of the prosecution in another connected case is not adducing evidence within the meaning of s. 292 by proving it through the prosecution witnesses, **1 S. L. R. 91 = 8 Cr. L. J. 215**.

5. If defence evidence is solely as to character, reply generally waived.—Even if evidence for the defence is only as to his character, it gives in strictness a right of reply, but the right is never even exercised. *Archbold*, p. 223. In Calcutta the practice is similar, *Henderson's Cr. Pro.*, p. 616.

6. Right of reply where one of several accused calls witnesses.—The word *reply* in this section must mean "reply generally on the whole case." It cannot be that the prosecutor is to sum up as to such of the accused as do not call evidence, and reply only on the evidence that may have been adduced by the others. Where one of several accused persons tried jointly calls witnesses, at the trial, but the other accused call no witnesses they must all follow in their defence and the prosecution has the right of reply on the whole case, **19 B. 364**. The English practice seems to be different. If there are several defendants and witnesses are called by only one or some of them there is no right of reply except against the defendants who call evidence. See *Halsbury's Laws of England*, Vol. IX, p. 369 (footnote). If one of them calls evidence which is applicable to the cases of all the prosecution has a general right of reply although the other defendants call no witnesses *R v Hayes 2 M. and Rob 155. R v Davis 17 T. L. R. 184*; but where such evidence is applicable only to the case of the prisoner calling it, and does not apply to the cases of the other defendants, the right of the prosecution to reply is confined to the case of the defendant calling evidence, *R v Trevell, 15 Cox 289. Archbold*, pp. 223-224.

7. Right of reply depends on what is done, and not on what may be said.—See *Ratanlal 938*, Note 16 under s. 257, and see Note 2 above.

293. (1) Whenever the Court thinks that the jury or assessors should view the place in which the offence charged is alleged to have been committed, or any other place in which any other transaction material to the trial is alleged to have occurred, the Court shall make an order to that effect, and the jury or assessors shall be conducted in a body, under the care of an officer of the Court to such place, which shall be shown to them by a person appointed by the Court.

(2) Such officer shall not, except with the permission of the Court, suffer any other person to speak to, or hold any communication with, any of the jury or assessors, and unless the Court otherwise directs, they shall, when the view is finished, be immediately conducted back into Court.

Notes.—1. A Judge cannot delegate his function of examining witnesses on the spot to the assessors. In cases of view by assessors of the scene of the alleged offence, it was *held* that the Judge cannot delegate his own function of examining the witnesses on the spot to the assessors, **5 W. R. 59**.

2. View of locus in quo by the jury must be during the trial and not after close of case.—The Judge may permit the jury at any time during the trial, and even after summing up to view the *locus in quo*. *Archbold* p. 224. If in a Sessions trial the Judge should think it necessary or desirable to visit the place of the alleged occurrence, he should give due notice to the parties and should proceed thither with the assessors and the parties and not after the close of the case and after the opinion of the assessors have been recorded, **1 C. L. R. 143; 17 Cr. L. J. 500**. It is illegal to take into account any observations of the locality made by a Judge without notice to the parties **9 L. B. R. 83**.

3. The trial Judge to investigate if jury held improper communication.—Where it is alleged that the jury upon the view have received evidence in the absence of the Judge and of the prisoner, it is for the Court before which the trial takes place to investigate the facts and ascertain whether the alleged irregularity has occurred. *R v Martin* **1 C. C. R. 378**.



fers slightly from the received version of king
James

Pseudomorphous crystal one which has a form that
it assumes from the original powers of crystallization.

Done

it (Gr. *psudo*, false,
imitation name assumed
r. [Written also per-

[N. Lat. *Prunella* *Pr. prunella*] pertaining to
Prussian blue

Prussic acid hydrocyanic acid, formerly so called
because obtained from prussian blue. It is a violent
poison.

Prussian's, a Prussian — applied to certain as-
tronomical tables published in the sixteenth cen-
tury founded on the principles of Copernicus's
Prussian.

Peep, v. t. [Probably contracted from *peer*, *peer* to eye
or look through.] To peer into that which is closed
to inspect closely. To attempt to discover that which
is inaccessible, — often employed with an implied
reproach.

Watch, thou and wake when others be asleep.
To pry into the secrets of the state.

Peep, n. [See *supra*.] Narrow inspection; imperi-
ous peeping.

Peep, n. [A corruption of *prize*, q. v.] A levee
contracted in America for *prize*.

Peep, v. t. [Imp. & p. p. *priced*, p. pr. & r. n. m.]
To raise or attempt to raise, with a h.
to price. [U. S.]

Peep, n. n. Looking back into closely at

[Or *peer*
w. i. i. i. i. i.]

1. A sacred song, a practical composition for
praise or word p to God

America, (b) A species of *Strychnos*, and a species
of *Solanum*.

Patience the *prize* (at last) (k), n. [See *supra*.]
pertaining to, or embodying, philanthropy. "A

Done whenever
p. done

2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, long, 8, 9, 10, 11, short, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45, 46, 47, 48, 49, 50, 51, 52, 53, 54, 55, 56, 57, 58, 59, 60, 61, 62, 63, 64, 65, 66, 67, 68, 69, 70, 71, 72, 73, 74, 75, 76, 77, 78, 79, 80, 81, 82, 83, 84, 85, 86, 87, 88, 89, 90, 91, 92, 93, 94, 95, 96, 97, 98, 99, 100

When juror or assessor may be examined.

294. If a juror or assessor is personally acquainted with any relevant fact, it is his duty to inform the Judge that such is the case, whereupon he may be sworn, examined cross-examined and re-examined in the same manner as any other witness.

Notes.—1 Analogous Law—Compare s. 413 of the N. Y. Cr. Pro. Code. That section further provides that in during retirement of the jury a juror declare a fact which could be evidenced in the case as of his own knowledge the jury must return into Court and the juror making the statement must be sworn etc.

2. Trying Judge can be elided as a witness when the trial is by jury—In the case *13 W. R. 60 = 4 B. L. R. Ap. Cr. 15*, it was held that a Judge is a competent witness and can give evidence in a case tried before himself. In the course of judgment NORMAN J. remarked as follows—No doubt it is extremely inconvenient that a Judge sitting without a jury should try a case in which he is himself the complainant and principal witness. I should have no doubt that if he has any personal or pecuniary interest in the subject of the charge he is disqualified from trying it. But if that is not the case if the Judge making the complaint has merely acted in the discharge of his duty as a public officer I think we must say that he is not incompetent to try the case.

I think it is pretty clear that a person has a right to ask to have the evidence of the Sessions Judge who is trying him taken on a point which he thinks makes in his favour.

Jury or assessors to attend at adjourned sitting.

295. If a trial is adjourned the jury or assessors shall attend at the adjourned sitting and at every subsequent sitting, until the conclusion of the trial.

Notes.—See ss. 318 and 332 for penalty for absence without leave s. 282 for effect of absence of juror and s. 283 for effect of absence of assessor.

1. Analogous Law—Under s. 415 N. Y. Cr. Pro. Code at each adjournment the jury is required to be admonished by the Court that it is their duty not to converse among themselves on any subject connected with the trial or form or express any opinion thereon, until the cause is finally submitted to them.

2. When trial should be adjourned.—See s. 344 for power to adjourn and Notes thereunder. A Sessions Judge is bound to adjourn a case in which a witness summoned for the defence is absent especially if he be a material witness and the case cannot be satisfactorily decided in his absence. *15 W. R. 34 = 6 B. L. R. Appx. LXXXVIII, 18 W. R. 20; 23 W. R. 55*. But under such circumstances the Judge is not authorized to discharge the jury together in the midst of the trial and then adjourn the case to the next Sessions, *4 Bom. L. R. 939*. Where a prisoner has been put upon his trial given in charge to the jury, and after the case has been opened some of the witnesses are found not to be present owing to some unforeseen accident it may be proper to adjourn the trial generally but where the witnesses are absent owing to some mistake, for example as to the date of trial the proper practice is to adjourn the case for a reasonable time for the prisoner to be tried by the same jury and if that cannot be done a verdict should be taken on the evidence as it stands. The jury should not be discharged merely to enable the prosecution to establish a stronger case against the prisoner. *Rex v. Lewis 22 Cox C. C. 141 (1911)*. See also *41 C. 299* where it was held that time should have been given to the counsel for the accused to cross-examine prosecution witnesses.

3. Judge not authorized to continue trial commenced before his predecessor—The Code does not empower a Sessions Judge to try a case partly on evidence not recorded by himself but by his predecessor. S. 350 applies only to Magistrates. The prisoner's consent will not give jurisdiction, *28 B. 50; 35 A. 63, 8 C. L. J. 59 = 8 Cr. L. J. 121 and see Note 10 to s. 350*.

4. Judge not competent to receive evidence after discharge of jury or assessors.—In a case tried by jury the Judge has no jurisdiction to examine witnesses after the jury has been discharged. *7 Bom. L. R. 978*. So also after discharge of assessors. *15 A. 136*.

296. The High Court may from time to time, make rules as to keeping the jury together during a trial before such Court lasting for more than one day, and subject to such rules the presiding Judge may order whether and in what

Locking up jury manner the jurors shall be kept together under the charge of an officer of the Court or whether they shall be allowed to return to their respective home.

of a nation, state, or community, the people, in-
definite

Shak. — Public line the business of keeping an inn or
house of entertainment. (Fr.)
Publican, p. 2, &c.

2 The keeper of an inn or public house, one
licensed to sell beer, spirits, or wine. Shak.
He like a swart publican he looks! Shak.
Publican's [Lat publicus Fr publicatio
Fr publicatio, "public action, the publican's
action"]

A description of these papers was not owing to our policy
but that of others.

3 That which is published or made known, es-
pecially any pamphlet or book offered for sale or to
public notice, as, a new publication, a monthly
publication.

4 Acts done in public. [Rare]
It is necessary to attend the business of the recreation, the
publications and retirements of every man. (Fr.)

Public-hearted (said of a Public-spirited
Citizen)

Public-house n. An ordinary inn or house of
entertainment.

Publicist

1. The act or process of making
of intended marriage

a. n. [L Ger pudel. Cf. Pudel.]
small quantity of dry standing water, a
plash.

2 A mixture of clay and sand, worked together
with water, until they are impervious to water.

Puddle n. [Fr. p. puddle, p. p. & n.
p. p. puddle.]
1. To make foul or muddy, to pollute with dirt
to mix dirt and water.

From the puddling furnace to be hammered
or rolled.

convert it into bars
Puddling n. 1 (Oril. Eggen.) The act of pud-
ding or impervious to water by means of clay and
sand.

He smothered Jack whom most men call
the pugilist, and on him duth all.

1. A reverberatory furnace in which
cast iron is converted into wrought iron or steel by de-
carburizing it.

Pudding n. 1. Consisting of, or resembling, pudd-
ing, muddy, foul, dirty.

Least or the puddle water beneath them. (Fr.)

private parts
Pudgy, a short and fat pudgy, as, a pudgy
man.

Puff-bag n. [Lat puerilis from puer, a child, a
boy in puerile Fr. p. & p. p. puff-bag.]
A bag.

"To every puff of
wind a slave."

2 Any thing light and filled with air, as, (a) A
dry spongy ball containing dust, a puff ball. (b)

More, that protects the mouth
In and supple same to his side.

Heedless.

S, L, D, P, long; S, L, D, P, short; care, far, last, fall, what, there, yell, firm, plique, firm, done, far, do, wolf, food, foot;

are concluded, that is after all the evidence has been taken on both sides and counsel on both sides have finished addressing the jury' After evidence for the prosecution was closed in a case of rioting where there were a large number of accused and a large number of witnesses, the Judge opining that the quickest way of getting through the case would be for the vakils and the Judge to sum up first on the case generally, and then on the case against each of the accused, one by one leaving it to the jury to say if they wished to hear the witnesses for the defence him and this proceeding were examined and held the trial was irregular, 36 M. 585.

2. Proper charge to the jury is indispensable.—Where the provisions of this section are neglected and the Judge does not sum up the evidence at all, a new trial will be ordered, 9 W. R. 51; on the ground of misdirection, 25 C. 561; 23 C. 252; 30 C. 822; 4 C. W. N. 193. The summing up contemplated by this section does not mean any statement of the evidence which a Judge may, in his caprice, think proper to make to the jury, but a "proper summing up, by which is to be understood a full and distinct statement of the evidence on both sides, with such advice as to the legal bearing of that evidence and the weight which properly attaches to the several parts of it, as a sound judicial discretion would suggest. And in so far as the Judge has not summed up properly an error in matter of law has been committed, 5 B. H. C. R. Cr. Ca. 85 at p. 93 followed in Ratanlal 720, 3 S. L. R. 102 = 11 Cr. L. J. 13. A summing up to the jury, in which the Judge gave no aid to the jury in the arrangement of the facts which were spoken to by witnesses, and himself found facts which he should have put to jury, was no summing up at all and a verdict founded thereon was set aside, 10 W. R. 7. In charging the jury, it is the duty of the Sessions Judge to call their attention to the facts and then to leave it to them to consider whether from the facts they conclude that a particular criminal act was done, and if they so conclude, then to direct them that the case comes within a particular section of the Code 4 C. W. N. 193. It is absolutely the duty of a Judge to give a narrative and history of the case and to place the facts and evidence in a clear manner before the jury so as to enable them to grasp the details, and come to a right decision, 6 Bom. L. R. 31. But it is not necessary for the Judge to go into the minutest details, 40 C. 567.

3 Judge cannot evade his duty of summing up because pleaders on both sides argued at length.—A Judge in summing up is entitled to have regard to the elaboration and skill with which the rival contentions have been placed before the jury by the advocates on both sides but he should not in doing so omit pointedly to call the attention of the jury to matters of prime importance especially if they favour the accused merely because they have been discussed by the advocate. Such an omission would amount to no direction of summing up by the Sessions Judge 27 B. 644 at p. 651. It is open to the Judge to refer the jury to the arguments of pleaders but he should not omit matters of prime importance and it is not necessary to go over all the evidence himself, 3 S. L. R. 102 = 11 Cr. L. J. 13, see remarks of JENKINS, C.J., in 19 C. W. N. 653 = 16 Cr. L. J. 561.

4. Judge must not read over the charge in a previous trial on the same facts.—Where a prisoner is tried for a crime for participation in which other prisoners were previously tried and punished before the same Sessions Judge ought to give a new charge to the jury and not read his former charge in the previous trial although the evidence in either case be the same 1564 W. R. 13

5. Language of the charge must be simple and direct.—A Judge in addressing a jury should endeavour to speak in a manner simple and direct. The charge must not be involved and the language should not be extravagant, 11 Cr. L. J. 538 (C). Intemperate language in a charge, as to the accused and witnesses deprecated, 53 C. 372.

6. Judge must not place before the jury a hypothetical defence.—It would be a most undesirable practice for Judges to put hypothetical defences not taken by the accused before the jury, and might cause serious prejudice to the accused (1 C. L. R. 62 and 1898 A. W. N. 209 referred to). Per HOLMWOOD, J. It would be a serious error on the part of a Judge to put a supposititious case before the jury; by which is meant a case founded on suppositions as to facts, and not on evidence. STEPHENS J. 'I have never had any doubt that no error of law is committed by a Judge who refrains from directing the jury as to exceptions which have neither been raised nor relied upon by the accused and have no basis in evidence on the records.' Per HOLMWOOD, J., 19 C. W. N. 653 = 16 Cr. L. J. 561. Where in a trial for murder a verdict of culpable homicide not amounting to murder could not be properly come to under any respect of the case before the Court, the Judge is not entitled upon to explain to the jury the distinction between murder and culpable homicide not amounting to murder, 8 Bar. L. T. 220 (F.B.).

7 Judge must simplify the issues fairly and properly before the Court and direct the minds of the jurors to those issues and those issues alone.—Where a trial for culpable homicide is proceeding before a jury it is not an appropriate mode of laying down the law to discourse in all branches and departments of this complicated topic of crime. To do so is calculated to confuse the jury and possibly to direct their deliberations into channels that have nothing to do with the case. [The duty of the Judge is to lay down the law in reference to the case presented to the Court and the facts of the case are not to perplex the minds of the jury with considerations that are outside the legitimate scope of the inquiry. It is the duty of the Judge to keep the jury within proper limits, and for this purpose to simplify as far as he can the issues fairly and properly before the Court and direct the minds of the jurors to those issues and those issues alone. *Per JENKINS C.J.* The reasonable construction of s. 297 is that the Judge should lay down the law only in so far as it bears on the evidence adduced in the particular case as has been said in 8 W. R. 87, all unnecessary discussion and argument should be avoided by the Judge and the summing up should be strictly confined to the evidence adduced and the mode of application of the law to such evidence." *Per MOOKERJEE J.* 19 C. W. N. 633 = 16 Cr. L. J. 561. See also 8 Bur. L. T. 220 (F.B.)

8 Judge is bound to put before the jury a case for the accused arising on the evidence whether such case is raised by or on behalf of the accused or not.—I am not prepared as a general proposition of universal applicability that a Court cannot and should not consider a case in favour of the accused which he has not raised. For such a case may properly arise on the prosecution evidence and if it did I myself should put it to the jury for their consideration whatever line might have been taken by the accused or his counsel. *Per WOODROFFE J.* I wish however to dissociate myself from the proposition that the mere fact that counsel


attention of the jury to such possible view of the case on the evidence notwithstanding that it may have escaped the counsel of the accused. *Per MOOKERJEE J.*, 19 C. W. N. 633 = 16 Cr. L. J. 561. It is the duty of the Judge to make a case for the accused on which he thinks that a verdict of not guilty may be properly returned though the case has not been suggested by or on behalf of the accused. *Per STEPHEN* *ibid.* *Line of defence adopted by counsel does not relieve Judge of his duty.* The conduct of case by counsel is not a negligible factor even in a Criminal Court though it may not necessarily conclude the accused, and that it is not with its influence is really illustrated by the judgment of the Lord Chief Justice in *R v. Bridgewater* (1905) 1 K. B. 131 at p. 135. *Per JENKINS C.J.* in 19 C. W. N. 633 = 16 Cr. L. J. 561. The fact that the pleaders for the defence thought it unnecessary to place much reliance upon the defences of the accused did not absolve the Judge from his duty of placing before the jury the evidence adduced on behalf of the accused ss. 297—299 make it imperative on the Judge in his summing up to draw their attention to the important points arising in connection with the evidence of the accused no less than that of the prosecution: 17 Cr. L. J. 19 (M). Whatever may be the line of defence adopted by counsel for a prisoner at the trial the Judge is bound to put to the jury such questions as appear to him properly to arise upon the evidence even although counsel may not himself have raised some points. At the trial of the appellant for murder his counsel relied substantially on the defence that the killing was accidental but he indicated that in the event of the jury not accepting that view he would ask them to find that the crime was manslaughter and not murder. The Judge taking the view that there was no evidence of

he had omitted to do so the Court acting under s. 5 sub-sect. (2) of the Criminal Appeal Act 1907 would enter a verdict of manslaughter which the jury might have found if they had been directed upon that point. *Rex v. Hopper* (1915) 2 K. B. 431

9 Judge must not in his charge introduce a recommendation to mercy.—A Judge ought not to introduce into his direction to the jury any question as to recommending a prisoner to mercy but he should leave that entirely to the jury 14 W. R. 46

9 A The Judge ought not to tell the jury that there was no evidence and that they should return a verdict of not guilty when the prosecution was willing to substantiate the case if further adjournment was allowed to it to bring the witnesses.—Where on a date fixed the prosecution applied for adjournment to bring

point. The power acting on the free end of the rope is then doubled, but can move the load through only half the space traversed by itself. The rope may also have



The most important and effective guard, support, and ornament of virtue is cause
3 A movable desk, from which Al-
nounced their

Cons pulley a pulley in the shape of two or more of different diameters placed side by side so that any one of which the belt may be shifted for varying the velocity. — Con

ical pulley one of a pair of pulleys in the shape of crans velocities firmly attached pulley a pulley term is the transitory

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states of the

One affected by a disease of the lungs, one who has a lung complaint. — *Apnothot*

Pulmonary c t (Zool) Having lungs or organs acting as lungs. *pulmonate*

Pulp c t (Zool) The soft part of the pulp of a fruit. — *pulp*

A moist slightly coherent mass consisting of soft undissolved animal or vegetable matter. — *pulp*

The soft, succulent part of fruit, as the pulp of an orange. — *pulp*

The soft or exterior covering of a coffee berry. — *pulp*

The material of which paper is made. — *pulp*

Pulp c t (Zool) The soft part of the pulp of a fruit. — *pulp*

Pulp c t (Zool) The soft part of the pulp of a fruit. — *pulp*

Pulp c t (Zool) The soft part of the pulp of a fruit. — *pulp*

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Pulp c t (Zool) The soft part of the pulp of a fruit. — *pulp*

Pulp c t (Zool) The soft part of the pulp of a fruit. — *pulp*

Pulp c t (Zool) The soft part of the pulp of a fruit. — *pulp*

2 Any measured or regular beat, any short, quick motion regularly repeated, as of a medium in the transmission of light, sound, etc., oscillation, vibration, pulsation. — *pulse*

Pulse c t (Zool) A car-
niferous mammal
(the *Peta concolor*)
of a brownish red

Pulse c t (Zool) A car-
niferous mammal
(the *Peta concolor*)
of a brownish red



10 11. The same as PULICE.
12 12. The same as PULICE.
13 13. The same as PULICE.
14 14. The same as PULICE.
15 15. The same as PULICE.

their witnesses and the adjournment was refused, jury was empanelled, and the Judge directed the jury to return a verdict of not guilty as there was no evidence, *held*, that under the circumstances of the case it was a misdirection for the judge to tell the jury that there was no evidence. The Judge ought to have allowed the prosecution to produce its witnesses by the grant of an adjournment. The High Court set aside the orders of acquittal and directed a retrial. 30 C. W. N. 190.

II.—JUDGE'S DUTIES WHEN DEALING WITH EVIDENCE.

10. *Duty of Judge when there is no evidence.*—Where there is no evidence against the prisoner the Judge ought to charge the jury for an acquittal, and not leave the jury to say whether the prisoner is guilty or not, 7 W. R. 39. A jury may be satisfied with a minimum of proof, and it is beyond the powers of the High Court in such a case to interfere with its verdict, but when there is nothing which can be believed amount to proof, the case should not be put to the jury at all, as a verdict of guilty cannot, under such circumstances, be sustained, 16 W. R. 19. It is not enough to say that there was some evidence. A scintilla of evidence clearly would not justify the Judge in leaving the case to the jury. There must be evidence on which they might reasonably and properly conclude the fact to be established. *Ryder v. Wombell*, (1864) 4 Ex. 32 at p. 33. This case was quoted with approval in *Metropolitan Railway Company v. Jackson*, (1877) 3 A. C. 193, where Lord Blackburn said "It is for the jury to say whether and how far the evidence is to be believed. And if the facts as to which evidence is given, are such that from them a further inference of fact may legitimately be drawn, it is for the jury to say whether that inference is to be drawn or not. But it is for the Judge to determine subject to review as a matter of law, whether, from those facts that further inference may legitimately be drawn." It is true that these remarks were made in a civil case, but they are of universal application, 19 C. W. N. 653 = 16 Cr. L. J. 561.

11. *Judge should render the jury every assistance to come to a right conclusion.*—The Code does not contemplate the reception of a verdict from the jury without their having the assistance of a summing up by the Sessions Judge, since a careful summing up may often change the hasty and superficial impressions of a jury, and the parties are entitled to this service. *Ratanlal* 283; 9 W. R. 51. It is the duty of the Judge to state to the jury, what are the principal points in the evidence, and how they bear for or against the prisoner, in short to render the jury every assistance in his power towards coming to a right conclusion, 6 W. R. 72. He should state the evidence *pro* and *con*, with a running commentary as to its agreement and disagreement with the other facts of the case. 1 W. R. 25. In charging a jury a Judge is not bound to more than lay carefully and plainly before them generally the way in which the evidence points out, at however, referred by the Police, 9 C. 453 = 11 C. L. R. 569.

12. *Summing up must not be misleading.*—Where the summing up of the most important evidence is calculated to leave a misleading impression on the minds of the jury, *e.g.* where the accused is said to be identified by four persons whereas he was only identified by two and where stolen property is treated as property in possession of accused whereas it should have been left to the jury to find that it was in the accused's possession, the conviction will be set aside, 5 M. L. T. 134 = 11 Cr. L. J. 187; 14 M. L. T. 442 = 14 Cr. L. J. 423. If a Judge thinks it necessary to put prominently before the jury that no evidence was adduced for the defence, he is bound to qualify it by pointing it out to the jury that the defence was not bound to call any evidence, that they could rely on the prosecution evidence as far as it could help them and that they were entitled to the benefit of any doubt. 15 C. W. N. 193 = 11 Cr. L. J. 557. See also 18 Cr. L. J. 717 (M).

13. *Judge ought to read over material portions of the evidence.*—Where the trial has been a prolonged one, the Sessions Judge ought to read over to the jury the important testimonies in the trial, *Ratanlal* 350. A Judge ought to point out to the jury the legal effect and bearing of a document or a portion of it relied on by the prosecution or defence, 3 W. R. 89. An objection that in delivering his charge to the jury the Sessions Judge did not read material portions of the evidence is not in itself sufficient for the reversal of the verdict of the jury. In each case it must be shown that the evidence was such as to mislead the jury, *judicial* the accused, 5 Bom. L. R. 207. 102 = 11 Cr. L. J. 13. But if a fair and proper statement of the evidence has not been placed before the jury, the High Court will set aside the conviction, 13 C. W. N. 754 = 11 Cr. L. J. 9. Where in a trial by jury before a Court of Session the Judge's summary of his charge to the jury consisted merely of these words: "It is for you

to say from the evidence you have heard whether you consider the accused guilty or not." *Held*, that the charge was wholly insufficient and the conviction and sentence were therefore set aside and a fresh trial ordered 1902 A. W. N. 201.

14. Judge may express his opinion on evidence, but must add that jury must form their own opinion.—A Sessions Judge in summing up is bound to advise a jury on questions of fact, and may tell the jury the impression which the evidence has made upon his own mind, 13 W. R. 34. But it is not a misdirection if he omits to enter into details regarding the identification of stolen property, 1 W. R. 22. In giving a warning to a jury not to disbelieve a mass of otherwise consistent evidence because in one or two minor and immaterial points, the witnesses made different statements a Judge exercises a wise discretion and affords no ground for an objection that he misdirected the jury, 1 W. R. 17. It is open to a Judge in charging the jury to express his opinion as to the effect of a certain portion of the evidence; but he should always be careful to add that it is for the jury to form their own opinion on the evidence and that they are the sole judges of fact, 10 C. 970; (1854) W. R. 5; 19 W. R. 72 = 10 B. L. R. Appx. XXXVI; 4 C. W. N. 196; 14 A. 25; 23 B. 316; 25 C. 730; 4 C. W. N. 576; 12 W. R. 80; 33 C. 531. He should not state his own view of important matters of fact so positively as to leave the jury no loophole for taking any other views, *Ratanlal* 743; 1 W. R. 25. He should not tell the jury that there was *no doubt* regarding certain facts which it was the duty of the jury to determine. A Judge is not entitled under sub-s. (2) to give his opinion as to the guilt or innocence of the prisoner, 1 W. R. 2 and 26; but he may unfavourably comment on the defence evidence as compared with that adduced by the prosecution, 2 W. R. 60.

15. Jury sole judge of facts—Judge not to present his own views of facts too positively.—The duty of a Judge charging a jury is to present the facts in their natural aspect and not to suggest far fetched explanations of points that tell in favour of or against either party, *Weir* II, 385. The Judge ought to leave the jury to decide the facts for themselves and it would be a misdirection if he explains away the fact without leaving it to the jury, 14 M. L. T. 442 = 14 Cr. L. J. 623. In truth by jury, the Judge in his charge should not state his own view of important matters of fact so positively as to leave the jury no loophole for taking any other view. This section requires the Judge to sum up the evidence for the prosecution and defence and s. 299 leaves it to the jury to decide which view of the facts is true. The duty of the Judge is simply to lay down the law authoritatively to the jury and to decide on the admissibility of the evidence, *Ratanlal* 743. It is not for the Judge to tell the jury that any explanation which the accused may offer of any fact appearing against him in evidence is incredible without any qualification that it is merely his own opinion and that the jury is at liberty to draw their own conclusions, *Weir* II, 385. Where a Sessions Judge charged the jury in a trial for dacoity that there was no force in the argument that the accused may not have foreseen and may not have intended that dacoity should have taken place, *held* that the Judge should not have taken the matter out of the hands of the jury in this way, but should have set out the evidence bearing on the question and left it to the jury to say what was the proper inference to be drawn from that evidence, 7 M. L. T. 191 = 11 Cr. L. J. 334 following *Mad. Cr. A. 592* of 1905. An expression of opinion by the Judge on the facts without telling the jury that they are at liberty to form their own opinion in regard thereto and also without cautioning them to give the accused the benefit of a reasonable doubt amounts to a misdirection, 34 C. 698. Where the Judge expressed his opinion on various questions of fact without telling the jury that his opinion was not binding on them and that they were the sole judges of fact, *held*, the charge was unsatisfactory, 35 C. 431. Even if he informs the jury that on questions of fact they are not bound by any opinion of his it may amount to a misdirection if he expresses his own opinion on the evidence in terms too dogmatic and unqualified 18 C. W. N. 150.

16. Directing jury to neglect evidence improper.—Where a Judge in the charge to the jury stated that there was a mass of oral evidence for the prosecution and another mass for the defence and then told them "It may literally be stated that the jury may neglect it all." *Held*, this was a misdirection to the jury. It is not the duty of a Judge to say that the jury may neglect any portion of the evidence. That is clearly against the provisions of the law, which says that the jury are to give their verdict upon the whole of the evidence recorded, 6 Bom. L. R. 31. It would be a material misdirection to the jury to tell them to leave out of consideration the evidence of a witness and the retracted confession of the accused, 8 M. L. T. 372 = 11 Cr. L. J. 683.

17. Judge should charge the jury that expert evidence should be approached with considerable care and caution.—An accused was charged under s. 82 (c) of the *Registration Act* with false personation in getting a document registered and the case depended on evidence as to the identity of thumb-impressions. *Held*, that the Judge should call the attention of the jury to the nature and history of the case as laid down

before the Court by the prosecution. Where a case depends on expert evidence, the Judge should call the attention of the jury to the fact that the evidence of an expert should be approached with considerable care and caution. In the present case the charge of the Judge to the jury was far from satisfactory and that certain statements in the charge—that certain exhibits being identical must be of the same person—was eminently a matter for the jury to decide upon and not for the Judge. The Judge was wrong in not drawing the attention of the jury to the actual thumb-mark on the mortgage-deed, nor was the expert asked any question about it. The conviction was therefore quashed as the prejudice to the accused was apparent and a fresh trial was ordered, 1 C. L. J. 335 = 2 Cr. L. J. 311.

18. Judge ought to point out presumptions that may be drawn from facts—effect of possession of recently stolen property.—It is a serious misdirection if the Judge fails to point out to the jury that recent possession of a murdered man's jewels is a fact from which they might presume not merely their receipt of stolen property, but also murder with which the accused was charged, 17 C. W. M. 1077 = 14 Cr. L. J. 556. It is specially important that a Judge should point out a presumption of this kind because jurors are often reluctant to act on that which is commonly known as circumstantial evidence, *ibid*.

19. Duty of Judge in respect of statements of witnesses taken under s. 164.—The Judge ought to tell the jury that the evidence of witnesses taken under s. 164 must be accepted with a great deal of caution. He ought to point out that it is not always proper for the Police-officer to get such statements recorded for the purpose of pinning the witnesses down to some statement especially at a time when they are not free from Police influence, 7 C. L. J. 246 = 7 Cr. L. J. 315.

19-A. Judge should not unduly dwell upon the evasion of arrest by accused.—In pointing out the absence of the accused the Judge should warn the jury that even if they believed he absconded, absconding is not necessarily or invariably incompatible with innocence, 18 C. W. M. 180 = 15 Cr. L. J. 157. An attempt to evade arrest should not be unduly insisted upon as evidence of guilt, *R v Hampson*, C. C. A. 11 Cr. Ap. R. 73. Where a criminal succeeded in evading arrest for some considerable period and meanwhile obtained honest employment, the jury were told that they could convict the prisoner of being an habitual criminal because he was a fugitive from justice. *Held*, that this amounted to a misdirection. *R v Brown*, C. C. A. 23 Cox C. C. 613 = 78 J. P. 79.

III.—NON-DIRECTION.

20. Non-direction is not a misdirection unless the jury have been misled.—See Note 8. A mere omission or misstatement in a summing up is not in itself a misdirection when the case has been fully heard by the jury, but there is a miscarriage of justice where the omission or misstatement is such that the jury may have probably been misled by it, *R v Wann*, 76 J. P. 269 (1913) = 23 Cox C. C. 183. As a general rule, non-direction does not amount to misdirection, and the High Court will not interfere with the verdict of a jury, because there was non-direction, unless the circumstances were such as to make the non-direction amount to a misdirection, *Ratanlal* 644; 5 W. R. 13; 7 C. 42. A non-direction is not a misdirection, unless it is on a matter of prime importance and especially if it tells in favour of the accused, 38 L. R. 102 = 11 Cr. L. J. 13. The omission of the Judge to enter into details regarding the identification of stolen property does not amount to a misdirection, 1 W. R. 22. See Note 17.

21. Where non-direction is on a point of prime importance especially in favour of the accused, it may amount to misdirection.—A non-direction amounts to a misdirection if the point is one of prime importance, generally told on a point of prime importance.

observed, that his defence may be properly and adequately presented to the jury by a person qualified to do so. Thus where a Sessions Judge omitted to point out that certain of the prisoners under trial were not originally accused and that their names were not mentioned until eighteen days afterwards, it was held that there was a misdirection and the verdict in respect to these accused was set aside, 11 C. 10. Where the Sessions Judge failed to bring to the notice of the jury, a fact of prime importance elicited in the cross-examination of the only witness who identified the accused, *viz* that she was terrified and not in her proper senses on the night of the dacoity *Held* the failure to do so amounted to a misdirection, (1912) M. W. M. 100 = 13 Cr. L. J. 271. Similarly, in a murder case, where the medical opinion was that the injuries of the deceased were not in the case of a man of ordinary health dangerous to life, *held* that the Judge should have specially called the attention of the jury to such opinion 34 C. 698; 6 C. W. M. 102. So, too the omission by the Sessions Judge in his charge to the jury to mention the fact of the original

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7. To incline, to entice, to urge

These wrinkles put us upon all kinds of

2. let me not to use the carried weapon in my own defense

8 To oblige to force, to constrain

Thank him who leads me both to this revenge. *Exeunt.*

9 To throw with the hand raised over the head
as a heavy stone {Scol} *Jackson*

To put about (boat) to change direction to starboard
To put forth (a) To shoot, bud or germinate "Take
forth" to produce a thing or things "Take forth" to
bring out

PUTREFIED *p'pr* & *ib* *n* PUTREFYING *Fr*
putrefier, *It putrefare* Lat *putrefacere* from
putrere to be rotten, and *facere*, to make See
 [TRID]

1 To render putrid to cause to decay offensively,
to cause to be decomposed to cause to rot.

2 To corrupt, to make foul

Yet I must have them: to keep them here
 They would but stink, and I strew'd the air. Sink

Meanness, silence [Obs]

1307 to
1308 to

To be a dog a mule, a lizard, an owl, a peacock, 1
would not care.

Finely powdered an oxide of tin and lead is variously known, much used in polishing glass and other hard substances.

*01147. 5 f (102 30 0 0 BUTLER, R DR. A 30 0

Â, ă, î, ô, ă, ȳ, lung; Â, ă, î, ô, ă, ȳ, short, căre, făr, lăsf, şall, what, thăre, veil, tărŭ, pique, fîrm; dône, fôr, dă, wolf, fôsf, fôsf.

witnesses named in the first information, having been abandoned by the prosecution, of two of them having given evidence for the defence and of the witnesses actually examined for the prosecution being entirely new witnesses, was deemed to be a sufficient misdirection to the jury to justify the setting aside of the conviction, **34 C. 325**. In his charge to the jury, the Judge is not justified in making comments on the first information without placing it as a whole before the jury **35 C. 531**. In summing up the case to the jury the Judge omitted to call their attention to the evidence of the witnesses for the defence. This evidence appeared to the High Court to be untrustworthy. *Held*, that the summing up is not defective on account of this omission on the part of the Judge, **7 C. 42**. But where the accused pleaded *alibi* and the Sessions Judge in the beginning of his charge to the jury referred to the plea of the accused but omitted all reference to it in the subsequent part of the charge. *Held* that this was a misdirection. The Judge ought to have told the jury that before they could convict the accused they must find that the accused were present at the occurrence, **35 C. 531**. It is for the jury to decide whether a defence of *alibi* is true or not, **16 M. L. T. 442 = 15 Cr. L. J. 623**. It is a misdirection if the Judge fails to draw the attention of the jury to the allegation of the defence that the prosecution witness had sufficient motive for concocting a false charge against the accused, (1911) **M. W. N. 190 = 12 Cr. L. J. 140**. The Judge ought to ask the jury to consider whether the delay in giving the information was sufficiently accounted for, *ibid*. When the charge to the jury placed prominently before the jury all the circumstances that went against the accused, but did not call their attention to any of those that went in their favour, and especially when it omitted to tell the jury what the defence of the accused was, *Held*, that there was misdirection sufficient to vitiate the trial, **4 C. W. N. 195; 7 C. 42; 11 C. 10**. There is misdirection, if the Judge omits to point out to the jury the case for the accused, **30 C. 822**. Three persons, who were attacked and wounded in an affray, informed the Police on the same day that the persons who had attacked them were A, B and C. Eighteen days afterwards the same complainants gave to the Magistrate inquiring into the case the names of four other persons who, they said with the three persons first accused, formed the attacking party. The seven accused were tried jointly for the offence before the Additional Recorder of Rangoon and a jury. In his charge to the jury the Additional Recorder omitted to call their attention to the fact that four out of the seven accused had not been mentioned by the prosecutors until after eighteen days had passed over. The prisoners were convicted. *Held*, that the Additional Recorder misdirected the jury, that under the circumstances the misdirection prejudiced the four persons last accused; and that the verdict must be set aside as far as they were concerned, **4 C. W. N. 195 at p. 200**. Similarly, where the accused was charged with forging a will and there was no evidence to prove that the signature on the will was not genuine, *held*, that it was the duty of the Judge to draw the attention of the jury to the point and his not having done so was a misdirection, **27 B. 625 at p. 625; 5 Bom. L.R. 599**. Also in placing a suggestion made by the Crown Prosecutor without any evidence to support it before the jury, the Judge ought to point out that there is no evidence to support the prosecution, **7 C. L. J. 246 = 7 Cr. L. J. 315**. Where a Sessions Judge, in his direction to the jury, omitted to point out the absence of evidence very material to the case of the prosecution, and where he directed the jury to attribute an undue importance to the statements or excuses made by the prisoners in the explanation of a certain document, the High Court set aside the verdict of the jury, **23 W. R. 21**. A Judge should draw the attention of the jury to the case made out for defence and the non-production by the prosecution of witnesses who were present at the time of the alleged occurrence pointing out to them that the non production of those witnesses created a presumption under s. 114 of the Evidence Act which did not help the case for prosecution, **17 Cr. L. J. 92 (C) = 32 Cr. In. Ca. 684, 25 C. W. N. 142**.

22. Omission to point out the contention of the accused that he acted in self-defence.—See **16 C. W. N. 46 = 13 Cr. L. J. 26**. Where the accused's defence that he acted in self defence was not put to the jury the conviction was quashed, *R v Hill*, (1912) **28 T. L. R. 15**.

In a charge under s. 304, I P. C., the defence was that the deceased man came to the house at night with the intention of robbery and that the accused on awaking found him coming from inside the house and inflicted wounds on him which proved fatal. The Judge in charging the jury expounded the law with regard to the right of private defence of the body, but neglected to direct the jury with regard to the right of private defence of property. *Held*, that the Judge should have charged the jury on the right of private defence of property and omission to do so was misdirection. **28 C. W. N. 585**.

23. Omission to direct the jury to give the accused the benefit of any doubt.—It is usual and most proper direction for a Judge to instruct the jury that if they entertain any reasonable doubt as to the guilt of any one of the accused, they should give him the benefit of the doubt and acquit him, and as a matter of practice this direction should always be given in every case, though the omission to give it may not in every case constitute

including

(Gr. Antiz) one of the four great na-
 ancient (before christianity) in which

Pyrophylite or Pyrophyl
 (Gr. py, from Pyr and phyl, from
 mineral usually of a white or gr
 pearly luster consisting chiefly of

[Lat. See supra]
 r. a pyx
) A pyxidion Gray Pyxidion
 f) The cavity which receives the head of
 the acetabulum.

A Y S N long A Z, I O N short care, skin, last, fall, whet, there, veil, term, plaque, firm, alone, for, sq, wq, f, foud, zout;

a misdirection of such a character as to render a conviction invalid. Where in regard to one of the accused the Judge after summing up the evidence in detail observed "there only seems to be some vague suggestion that he might have been concerned in the offence. When we scrutinise the evidence, it seems very weak and for the reasons I have pointed to jury, it seems to be wholly inconclusive." *Held*, that with regard to this accused, the omission by the Judge to give the above direction to the jury amounted to a misdirection which prejudiced the accused and he must therefore be acquitted, 1 M. L. T. R. 350. See also 15 C. W. N. 198 = 43 Cr. L. J. 557; *Weir II*, 500. Where the probabilities in favour of the prosecution outweigh the probabilities in favour of the defence, but looking to all the circumstances there remains a reasonable doubt in favour of the accused, the accused must get the benefit of the doubt, *Ratanlal 127*; 14 Bom. L. R. 710 = 33 Cr. L. J. 677.

24. Omission to point out circumstances under which confession was made and retracted.—In case of a retracted confession, the circumstances under which it was originally made and the fact of its repetition a few days later, ought to be brought to the attention of the jury. The question which should have been put to them with regard to the confessions is not whether they were corroborated by independent evidence, but whether having regard to the circumstances under which they were made and the circumstances under which they were retracted—having regard to all the circumstances connected with the confessions, whether it was more probable that the original confessions, or statements before committing Magistrate were true. The omission on the part of the Judge to place the circumstances before the jury and to put this question to them amounts to a misdirection, 21 M. 83; see 23 C. 689; *Weir II*, 510.

Omission to refer to provisions of s. 101 in charge under s. 326, I. P. C., amounts to a misdirection. 50 C. 318.

24-A. Omission to point out that a confessional statement if believed showed that the offence charged was not committed.—Where a confessional statement by the wife charged with abetment of murder alleged that she held her husband's legs while another struck him with an axe, but that she protested against the murder, and only assisted because such other person threatened to kill her also, *held* that the omission of the Judge to direct the jury that if they believed the statement, she could not having regard to s. 94, I. P. C., be convicted of abetment of murder under s. 109 was a misdirection vitiating the conviction. 52 C. 112.

IV.—ADMISSION, RELEVANCY, ETC., OF EVIDENCE.

25. Question what the jury are to receive is for the Judge, what they are to believe is for the jury.—Where a Sessions Judge allowed certain documents to go upon the record which were not proved, for the purpose of comparison of handwriting and left it to the jury to form their opinion whether the accused wrote the disputed signature. *Held*, that the irregularity was not such as to make interference of the High Court necessary. *Ratanlal 452*.

26. Judge should decide whether confession voluntary and admissible.—It is the duty of the Judge, not the jury, to decide the point whether an accused person, while making a confession was or was not in Police custody as it is a matter which it is necessary to prove in order to enable the confession to be admitted in evidence and his omission to state to the jury his finding on the point is not a misdirection and could not prejudice the accused, 31 M. 127. The question whether a confession was voluntarily made or not has to be decided by the Judge himself for the purpose of admitting it in, or excluding it from the evidence in the case. If the Judge finds it was voluntarily made and was not caused by any threat or inducement, he must admit it in evidence, once it is so admitted, it is for the jury to say whether it is true or not, 11 Bom. L. R. 332 = 10 Cr. L. J. 65. When a retracted confession of an accused is tendered in evidence at the trial of a case tried by a jury, it is the duty of the Judge to determine the question of its admissibility under this section and s. 24 of the Indian Evidence Act *Ratanlal 730*. When the Judge omitted to charge regarding the relevancy or otherwise of a confession, but said that if the confession were true it was enough to warrant the conviction and the jury convicted, it was *held* that there was material misdirection. 26 M. 33.

27. Where beating is alleged by the prisoner, Judge must make an inquiry.—On his trial before the Court of Session, the accused retracted the confessions which he had made before a first-class Magistrate and the committing Magistrate alleging that he was beaten by the Police and that the confession was the result of an offer of inducement. *Held*, that under cl (c) of this section the Judge ought to have made some inquiry into the allegation of the prisoner about torturing, which, he said, had resulted in his confessions, *Ratanlal 245*.

28. Judge must decide if a communication is privileged.—A Judge should not leave it to the jury to find whether a communication is privileged or not, but should himself decide it as a point of law, 10 W. R. 14.

[or equal] quon-
qu) resembling the
was in form and
the veins in color.
It inhabits South-
ern Africa

Quagga (See
Quagga and Quag-
ga) Of the
nature of a quag-
ga, yielding to
the feet of the
living under the
soil, as soft, wet
earth



Quagga (damiahyppus)

29 Judge must decide upon the admissibility of evidence.—It is also his duty to see that evidence which is not admissible in itself *e.g.*, statement made to a pleader, *mukhtar* or his clerk, should not be allowed to go in to the prejudice of the accused, though no objection is taken thereto by the accused **23 C. 738**; *see also* **27 B. 626**. In a trial by jury, it is the duty of the Sessions Judge to determine whether confessions retracted at the trial are admissible. If he finds them irrelevant under s 24 of the *Evidence Act*, he should so direct the jury. If there is no evidence on the record showing that they are invalid by reason of any improper inducement or threat, they should go to the jury with a direction that in absence of evidence it is not to be presumed that they are inadmissible, **Ratanlal 842**.

30. Judge must find documents admitted or proved before admitting them for comparison.—Before admitting documents under s. 73 of the *Evidence Act*, for the purpose only of comparison with a document alleged to be a forgery, it is the duty of the Judge to find whether they are admitted or proved, and the fact that the question of admissibility has been determined, should be noted by the Judge in the record of the case, **Ratanlal 491**.

31. Judge must decide on the capacity of a witness to justify.—The question of the capacity of a witness to testify is a question for the Judge himself to decide and not for the jury, although after he has decided in favour of the competency of a witness it is for the jury to determine the amount of credit to be given to the statements made by such witness, **41 C. 406 following 3 W. R. 60**.

Y.—ADMISSION OF INADMISSIBLE EVIDENCE.

32 When jury placed in possession of evidence which ought not to be admitted, there is misdirection.—Where material evidence which ought not to be admitted, is admitted and the jury are placed in possession of it, there is a misdirection in law when the Judge tells the jury that it is evidence which they can consider and on which they can, if they think proper, convict the accused, **27 B. 626**. Where evidence which the law says shall not be admitted is let in with other evidence legally admissible and where the former is of a material character, it would be mere speculative refinement to hold that the jury must have in convicting the accused relied upon the latter and neglected the former, **5 C. 768**.

33. Cases where relying on inadmissible evidence held to vitiate verdict.—

(i) *Hearsay evidence and anonymous letter*—Where a Judge in his charge to the jury admitted hearsay evidence and an anonymous letter put in by the prosecution, without showing how or by whom it was sent or that it reached the accused. *Held*, that the jury were misdirected and the accused prejudiced, **24 W. R. 77**. *See also* **18 M. L. J. 250 = 3 M. L. T. 263 = 7 Cr. L. J. 358**; *see R v. Campbell, (1915) 77 J. P. 95*; where a conviction for burglary was quashed on the ground that the trial Judge had admitted hearsay evidence which refused an *alibi* set up by the prisoner. *See also* **7 W. R. 2** and **25** as to the duty of a Judge when a witness proposes to give inadmissible evidence.

(ii) *Statements made before investigating Magistrate*—A direction by the Judge to the jury that statements made before an investigating Magistrate and not admissible under s 298 is strong evidence against the accused is clearly a serious misdirection, **31 M. 127**; **27 B. 626**; **18 M. L. J. 250 = 3 M. L. T. 263 = 7 Cr. L. J. 358**.

(iii) *Confessions to Police*—A confession made by the accused was irrelevant under s 24, *Indian Evidence Act*, being induced by a person in authority. The Judge in his charge made no reference to its relevancy but told the jury that if the confession was true, it was enough to warrant the conviction of the accused. The accused took no objection to the admission of the confession. *Held* that there was a misdirection that was material and important and the conviction was set aside, **26 M. 38**. Where the Sessions Judge told the jury generally that confessions to the Police if followed by the production of stolen property are admissible but omitted to point out that such confessions are only admissible in so far as they relate distinctly to the fact

evidence as to the guilt of one of the accused, and statements made by the accused when they were received as confessions and the jury was misdirected by being told that such statements followed up by the production of stolen property were admissible and the judge did not state

the case of each accused separately, and that a confession by one accused involving himself alone could not be received against the other accused, *held* that a new trial must be ordered, 18 M. L. J. 220 = 3 M. L. T. 263 = 7 Cr. L. J. 358. See Note 45

(v) *First information*—It is a misdirection to ask the jury to accept the statement in the first information in preference to the evidence in the case. The first information is not evidence in the case. It is tendered by the Crown for such use as the defence may be able to make of it and to test the consistency of the prosecution evidence. The most that the Judge can make of it is say, whether, although it gave a different account of the occurrence from that in the evidence, it could be reconciled with the evidence, and give the jury an opportunity of judging whether in that view the positive evidence in the case could be believed, 18 C. W. N. 198 = 11 Cr. L. J. 557. See also 34 G. 325; 35 C. 531, Note 21 above.

(v) *Previous conviction or bad character*—In charging a jury, a Sessions Judge should not tell them that the prisoners had previously been bad characters. The fact may be taken into consideration by him in passing sentence when the prisoners are convicted, 10 W. R. 39. In charging a jury upon the trial of a prisoner for being dishonestly in possession of stolen goods, the Judge directed the jury to consider the proof of previous convictions for theft as evidence from which inference might fairly be drawn as to the character of the accused. *Held* that this amounted to a misdirection, as the evidence of bad character of the accused is irrelevant and inadmissible under s. 54 of the *Evidence Act*, 5 C. 768. See also 31 M. 127, Note 2 to s. 310. See also *R v Hemmingsway*, 77 J. P. 15 (1912) and *R v Cutris*, (1912) 29 T. L. R. 512, where a conviction was quashed because evidence of a previous conviction was wrongly admitted.

(vi) *Reasons given by a Magistrate in discharging the accused and the committing order of a Judge*—The reasons given by a Magistrate in discharging the accused and the contents of the Sessions Judge's order in setting aside the conviction and directing a commitment and the opinions of the committing Magistrate should not be admitted in evidence and it is a misdirection for the Judge to lay stress on them, 11 Cr. L. J. 538 (C), it is a misdirection to lay stress on a document a statement reduced to writing under s. 167 improperly admitted in evidence, 13 Cr. L. J. 244 (Mad).

(vii) *Reference to previous cases against others implicated and the opinion of the High Court therein*—A Judge should not in charging the jury refer to a previous case against some other persons tried for the same offence, except to warn the jury not to be influenced by it. It is a misdirection to tell the jury that the High Court had come to a certain finding in the previous case and they were to consider if they had any reason to come to a different conclusion, 9 C. L. J. 380 = 10 Cr. L. J. 498.

34. *Duty of Judge when inadmissible evidence has come to the knowledge of jury*.—When in the course of a trial inadmissible evidence has come to the knowledge of the jury such as the fact that the accused has been in prison or that he has been previously convicted, the Judge should expressly tell the jury to disregard it and warn them not to let it influence their judgment. The accused was charged with altering counterfeit coin and evidence was given that a fortnight earlier he had tendered a counterfeit coin to the same person. This he showed conclusively was not true, he was in prison at the time. The Judge did not expressly warn the jury that they ought to disregard the fact that the accused had been in prison. The Appeal Court quashed the conviction, *R v Lee*, (1908) 72 J. P. 253. See also *R v Warner*, (1908) 73 J. P. 53. Where the accused has been asked an inadmissible question which the Judge has disallowed, the Appeal Court will consider in each case whether the prejudice created against the defendant by such question has been sufficiently dispelled by the Judge *R v Kurasel*, 11 Cr. App. R. 166 (1915). See Note 76.

In holding a re-trial, the Judge ought not to comment on evidence adduced at the previous trial 1 C. L. R. 62; 7 C. L. R. 193.

VI.—JUDGE'S DUTY TO DEAL WITH THE LAW.

35. *It is imperatively necessary for the Judge to expound the law to the jury*.—The jury must be told what the law is and what constitutes the offence charged and what matters must be proved to their satisfaction to constitute that offence, a total omission to lay down the law as required by s. 297 is not a mere irregularity which can be cured by s. 537, and the conviction must be set aside, 5 L. B. R. 149 = 11 Cr. L. J. 340. It is incumbent on the Judge to explain the law relating to the particular offence charged against the accused in order to enable the jury to apply the law to the special facts of the case. A mere mention of the sections of the Penal Code under which the accused were charged is insufficient, 25 C. 736; 25 C. 561. Merely to read out to the jury the sections of the Penal Code, applicable to the case is not an explanation of the law sufficient for the guidance of the jury 4 C. W. N. 193; 15 B. 369. Even when the jury has already been addressed on a question of law by the pleaders on both sides it is the duty of the Judge to lay down the law by which the jury

[illegible]

| | | | |
|-------------|--------|-------|--|
| Quell, n. | Murder | [Oss] | |
| Queller, n. | | | |

3. The sovereign of a swarm of bees or the male of the hive—called "the

one shingle-colored turn, *Chrysomela*
viridis the body fat, *corpus*
 with half dressed, *lucida* on a
 sicut or garments close to the
 e defenseless See *Chrysomela*
 [Lat. *querquedula*, from *Gr.*
 = 1 a boat, a sea fish] (*O. n. n.*)
 = 1) *Quercus alba* or *Quercus*

as hardly be more annoying than quinine, just
as fondles. *Mucosities.*
a strong complaint, as, a quinine tone of

* explaining how savings banks are a vital part
of the community, and the importance of the
savings bank in the community.

the habit of prayer

- derivative of *querere*,
- *uir* } A question,
olied.
- *in* *querere* *in* *quis*
- to make inquiry.

• **Regulatory**

Three Cambridge sophs,
Each prompt to query answer and debate, *Page*

Each prompt to query answer and debate, Page
 Quit y r t [imp & p p Q U E R I E D p. p r & i b n
 Q U E R I E D]

1 To seek by questioning to inquire into as,
 query the sum or amount query the motive or the
 fact.

2 To elicit or examine by questions Gayton
3 To doubt of to trust with incredulity

13 This word or its abbreviation (Q or Qw) is often put after a word or statement regarded as doubtful. S. 6 (CCHS)

Quel est le nom de la personne qui a écrit ce rapport ?

...the ...

1. The first group of variables includes the following:

Request, desire, solicitation

1997, 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014, 2015, 2016, 2017, 2018, 2019, 2020, 2021, 2022, 2023, 2024, 2025, 2026, 2027, 2028, 2029, 2030, 2031, 2032, 2033, 2034, 2035, 2036, 2037, 2038, 2039, 2040, 2041, 2042, 2043, 2044, 2045, 2046, 2047, 2048, 2049, 2050, 2051, 2052, 2053, 2054, 2055, 2056, 2057, 2058, 2059, 2060, 2061, 2062, 2063, 2064, 2065, 2066, 2067, 2068, 2069, 2070, 2071, 2072, 2073, 2074, 2075, 2076, 2077, 2078, 2079, 2080, 2081, 2082, 2083, 2084, 2085, 2086, 2087, 2088, 2089, 2090, 2091, 2092, 2093, 2094, 2095, 2096, 2097, 2098, 2099, 2100, 2101, 2102, 2103, 2104, 2105, 2106, 2107, 2108, 2109, 2110, 2111, 2112, 2113, 2114, 2115, 2116, 2117, 2118, 2119, 2120, 2121, 2122, 2123, 2124, 2125, 2126, 2127, 2128, 2129, 2130, 2131, 2132, 2133, 2134, 2135, 2136, 2137, 2138, 2139, 2140, 2141, 2142, 2143, 2144, 2145, 2146, 2147, 2148, 2149, 2150, 2151, 2152, 2153, 2154, 2155, 2156, 2157, 2158, 2159, 2160, 2161, 2162, 2163, 2164, 2165, 2166, 2167, 2168, 2169, 2170, 2171, 2172, 2173, 2174, 2175, 2176, 2177, 2178, 2179, 2180, 2181, 2182, 2183, 2184, 2185, 2186, 2187, 2188, 2189, 2190, 2191, 2192, 2193, 2194, 2195, 2196, 2197, 2198, 2199, 2200, 2201, 2202, 2203, 2204, 2205, 2206, 2207, 2208, 2209, 2210, 2211, 2212, 2213, 2214, 2215, 2216, 2217, 2218, 2219, 2220, 2221, 2222, 2223, 2224, 2225, 2226, 2227, 2228, 2229, 2230, 2231, 2232, 2233, 2234, 2235, 2236, 2237, 2238, 2239, 2240, 2241, 2242, 2243, 2244, 2245, 2246, 2247, 2248, 2249, 2250, 2251, 2252, 2253, 2254, 2255, 2256, 2257, 2258, 2259, 2260, 2261, 2262, 2263, 2264, 2265, 2266, 2267, 2268, 2269, 2270, 2271, 2272, 2273, 2274, 2275, 2276, 2277, 2278, 2279, 2280, 2281, 2282, 2283, 2284, 2285, 2286, 2287, 2288, 2289, 2290, 2291, 2292, 2293, 2294, 2295, 2296, 2297, 2298, 2299, 2300, 2301, 2302, 2303, 2304, 2305, 2306, 2307, 2308, 2309, 2310, 2311, 2312, 2313, 2314, 2315, 2316, 2317, 2318, 2319, 2320, 2321, 2322, 2323, 2324, 2325, 2326, 2327, 2328, 2329, 2330, 2331, 2332, 2333, 2334, 2335, 2336, 2337, 2338, 2339, 2340, 2341, 2342, 2343, 2344, 2345, 2346, 2347, 2348, 2349, 2350, 2351, 2352, 2353, 2354, 2355, 2356, 2357, 2358, 2359, 2360, 2361, 2362, 2363, 2364, 2365, 2366, 2367, 2368, 2369, 2370, 2371, 2372, 2373, 2374, 2375, 2376, 2377, 2378, 2379, 2380, 2381, 2382, 2383, 2384, 2385, 2386, 2387, 2388, 2389, 2390, 2391, 2392, 2393, 2394, 2395, 2396, 2397, 2398, 2399, 2400, 2401, 2402, 2403, 2404, 2405, 2406, 2407, 2408, 2409, 2410, 2411, 2412, 2413, 2414, 2415, 2416, 2417, 2418, 2419, 2420, 2421, 2422, 2423, 2424, 2425, 2426, 2427, 2428, 2429, 2430, 2431, 2432, 2433, 2434, 2435, 2436, 2437, 2438, 2439, 2440, 2441, 2442, 2443, 2444, 2445, 2446, 2447, 2448, 2449, 2450, 2451, 2452, 2453, 2454, 2455, 2456, 2457, 2458, 2459, 2460, 2461, 2462, 2463, 2464, 2465, 2466, 2467, 2468, 2469, 2470, 2471, 2472, 2473, 2474, 2475, 2476, 2477, 2478, 2479, 2480, 2481, 2482, 2483, 2484, 2485, 2486, 2487, 2488, 2489, 2490, 2491, 2492, 2493, 2494, 2495, 2496, 2497, 2498, 2499, 2500, 2501, 2502, 2503, 2504, 2505, 2506, 2507, 2508, 2509, 2510, 2511, 2512, 2513, 2514, 2515, 2516, 2517, 2518, 2519, 2520, 2521, 2522, 2523, 2524, 2525, 2526, 2527, 2528, 2529, 2530, 2531, 2532, 2533, 2534, 2535, 2536, 2537, 2538, 2539, 2540, 2541, 2542, 2543, 2544, 2545, 2546, 2547, 2548, 2549, 2550, 2551, 2552, 2553, 2554, 2555, 2556, 2557, 2558, 2559, 2560, 2561, 2562, 2563, 2564, 2565, 2566, 2567, 2568, 2569, 2570, 2571, 2572, 2573, 2574, 2575, 2576, 2577, 2578, 2579, 2580, 2581, 2582, 2583, 2584, 2585, 2586, 2587, 2588, 2589, 2590, 2591, 2592, 2593, 2594, 2595, 2596, 2597, 2598, 2599, 2600, 2601, 2602, 2603, 2604, 2605, 2606, 2607, 2608, 2609, 2610, 2611, 2612, 2613, 2614, 2615, 2616, 2617, 2618, 2619, 2620, 2621, 2622, 2623, 2624, 2625, 2626, 2627, 2628, 2629, 2630, 2631, 2632, 2633, 2634, 2635, 2636, 2637, 2638, 2639, 2640, 2641, 2642, 2643, 2644, 2645, 2646, 2647, 2648, 2649, 2650, 2651, 2652, 2653, 2654, 2655, 2656, 2657, 2658, 2659, 2660, 2661, 2662, 2663, 2664, 2665, 2666, 2667, 2668, 2669, 2670, 2671, 2672, 2673, 2674, 2675, 2676, 2677, 2678, 26

the 1990s, the number of people in the United States who are 65 years of age or older is projected to increase from 20 million to 30 million, and the number of people 75 years of age or older is projected to increase from 10 million to 15 million (U.S. Census Bureau, 1996).

vi. ¹ To go in search of something; to make
an inquiry

as *quester* had been unsuccessful, he appeared in the rage
 of a man who has been deceived. *Yacoub*
 O! *quester*, N! *Fr querler*, *Fr*
 as *besiding*! To search for *Herbert*

ar. *bes supra*. To search for. *Herbert*
 . 'ant, } n. [O Fr. *questant*, N Fr. *questant*,
Quintar, } It. *quistar*. *Bes supra*.] One who
 seeks, a seeker. [Obs.]

1. a. males animals fish

1. A, e, i, O, U, Y, short; care, jar, last, fall, what, there, veil, terms, pique, firm; done, son, do, wolf, told, told,

is to be guided. Omission to do so is a misdirection and the conviction is liable to be quashed. A Judge ought not merely leave with the jury a copy of the Penal Code, 16 C. 164. It is immaterial how much or how often the jury may have been addressed by the pleaders on both sides upon the law. The responsibility of laying down the law for the guidance of the jury rests entirely with the Judge and the verdict arrived at in the absence of such direction is not a valid verdict, 29 C. 379. See also 7 Bar. L. T. 30 = 13 Cr. L. J. 257; 47 Cr. L. J. 92. See Note 8.

36. Judge must not cite number of rulings and ask the jury to form their opinion on the authorities — It should appear on the face of the record that the law bearing on the charge under trial has been explained to the jury, 25 C. 651. The duty of a Judge in charging the jury is to make up his mind as to what the law is and to tell the jury what it is as succinctly and clearly as he can. If he turns out to be wrong, a higher tribunal can set him right. A large number of cases should not be cited to the jury, for such a course is calculated to confuse them and to lead to a miscarriage of justice. Further, charges of inordinate length and involved nature should not be delivered to the jury, 1 C. L. J. 139 = 2 Cr. L. J. 157. It is the duty of the Judge to give a direction upon the law to the jury so far as to make them understand the law as bearing upon the facts, and if he does not give them an explanation of the law sufficiently comprehensive to enable them to decide the particular issue, it is a misdirection. *Per FIELD, J.*, 8 C. 739 = 12 C. L. R. 233. It is a misdirection for a Judge to cite and comment on a number of rulings and tell the jury that it was for them to say whether any of those rulings are exactly on all fours with the circumstances of the case then being tried. No rulings or authorities are ever to be cited to the jury nor are they to be asked to differentiate or form an opinion whatever on any authorities. It is for the Judge and the Judge only to tell the jury what law is and before he tells them what it is he may consult as many authorities as he pleases and the authorities are no doubt binding upon him. The minds of the jury should never be confused by having a number of authorities or any authorities laid before them, 16 C. W. N. 46 = 13 Cr. L. J. 26.

36-A.—The Judge should lay down the law only in so far as it bears on the evidence adduced in the case.—See Notes 7 and 8

37. Judge must call attention of jury to different elements of the offence.—In charging a jury it is not sufficient for the Judge merely to read the definition of the offence and to leave it to them to find out whether the evidence makes out a case against the accused. It is the duty of the Judge to call the attention of the jury to the different elements constituting the offence and to deal with the evidence by which it is proposed to make the accused liable, 25 C. 711; 30 M. 44; 8 M. L. T. 82 = 11 Cr. L. J. 437. See 14 C. 164, e.g., upon a charge of murder the Judge must point out to the jury accurately the difference between murder and culpable homicide not amounting to murder, 9 W. R. 51; 15 W. R. 80; 15 W. R. 17 = 6 B. L. R. Appx. LXXXVI. The Judge should adhere to the words of the particular section of the Penal Code in charging the jury and not substitute phraseology of his own, 13 C. W. N. 754 = 11 Cr. L. J. 9. In a charge of trespass, the Judge should explain to the jury the distinction between civil and criminal trespass, 41 C. 662.

38 Discussion in Judge's charge of law points raised by defence unnecessary.—A Judge should not, in his charge to the jury, discuss points of law raised by prisoner's counsel and dispose of them. He should avoid all extraneous and unnecessary discussion and argument, and should confine himself to a mere summoning up of evidence on both sides, showing how the law applies to it, 8 W. R. 87; see also the remarks of PHEAR, J., in 19 W. R. 71 at p. 73 = 10 B. L. R. Appx. XXXVI.

39. Duty of Judge when jury are uncertain as to law on the offence committed.—If the jury after finding the accused guilty, be unable to determine what offence has been committed, a Judge should not, by handing over to them a copy of the Penal Code, leave them to decide under what section the offence fell, but should solve their doubts, if they have any, by explaining the law to them, and should state to them what offence is proved by the facts of the case, if they believed those facts, 14 C. 164. The jury should take the law from the Judge. They are not entitled to resort to a commentary on the law during their consultation, *Ratanlal* 736; 6 Bom. L. R. 258. It is the duty of the Judge when he is told that the jury do not understand the law in the matter to explain the law to them again, (1911) M. W. N. 190 = 9 M. L. T. 345 = 12 Cr. L. J. 140. Where a Sessions Judge in his charge to the jury stated "the accused are charged with offences under ss. 147, 323/159, 325/149 and 304/149, I P. C. The law bearing on the case has been placed before you more than once in the addresses delivered by the learned pleaders on either side. I need not go into detail as to the law therefore." Held there was misdirection and a retrial was ordered. It is immaterial how much or how often the jury may have been addressed by the pleaders on both sides upon the law. The responsibility of laying down the law for the guidance of the jury rests entirely with the Judge and the verdict arrived at in the absence of such direction, is not a valid verdict, 29 C. 379; 27 B. 644.

which in prudence has invariably required some corroboration sufficient to connect each of the accused with the offence committed. With this caution the Sessions Judge should have bid before the jury the evidence corroborating the statement of the accomplice **29 C. 782**. As a general rule juries ought to be advised and directed that the accused ought not to be convicted upon an accomplice's testimony unless it is confirmed not only as to the offence but as to the identity of the individual prisoner as the person or one of the persons who participated in the crime, *Wells* II 796; **12 L.J. 537 (Oudh)**; **12 O.C. 418**—**11 Cr. L.J. 71**. It would be an error in summing up if a Judge, after pointing out the danger of acting upon the uncorroborated evidence of an accomplice were to tell the jury that the evidence of the accomplice was corroborated by facts which did not amount to any corroboration at all **29 C. 782** where **5 W.R. 80** at p. 85 and **8 W.R. 19** at p. 25 are followed. See also **17 C. 642** and **2 C.W.N. 672**; **10 Cr. L.J. 567 (M)**. A Judge might misdirect a jury as to what is corroboration of the testimony of an approver **10 C. 979**. As to what amounts to legal corroboration see **11 B.H.C.R. 196**, **19 W.R. 57**; **23 W.R. 26**; **8 A. 120** at p. 137; **1 B. 475**; **14 B. 331**; **10 B. 231**, **25 C. 339** and Note to s. 337.

41 Duty of Judge when the only evidence is the uncorroborated testimony of approver—The law as to the duty of a Judge in charging a jury in respect of accomplice evidence was exhaustively dealt with in the recent case of *E. N. Nilakanti* **35 M. 247**, which was a case before a Special Bench constituted under the *Criminal Law Amendment Act* and in the appeal therefrom under the Letters Patent on a certificate of the Advocate-General *E. v. Muthukumaraswami* **35 M. 397 (F.B.)**. In this case there was no jury and the question was whether the Special Bench could act on the uncorroborated testimony of three approvers. In discussing the law on the subject the duty of a Judge in charging a jury was considered, and the majority of the Special Bench consisting of *WHITE C.J.* and *AYLING J.* (*SANKARAN NAIK, J. dissenting*) held that—

The proper direction seems to be—'Consider the evidence of the approvers always to bear in mind that it is tainted evidence scrutinise it with the utmost care accept it with the greatest caution consider it in the light of the circumstances in which it is given and in the light of all the other circumstances in the case of which evidence is legally admissible. Then if you believe it act on it even if there is no corroboration in the strict sense of the word. If you do not believe it reject it.' And they approved of the law laid down in **9 A. 528**, **1 M. 394** and **27 M. 271**. On appeal the view of the majority was approved by the majority of the Full Bench. 'It is the duty of the Judge to explain to the jury the taint and infirmity which ordinarily attach to the testimony of an accomplice and to remind them that they may presume that this evidence is unworthy of credit unless corroborated in material particulars. But it is also his duty to refer to any circumstances of fact (see illustrations to s. 114 *Indian Evidence Act*) which show that the presumption should not be drawn in the particular case or which rebut the presumption if drawn and all other circumstances tending to show its truth or falsehood if they believe it to be true they should act upon it even though there may be no corroboration of it in the strict sense of the word but that if they are not satisfied of its truth they should refuse to act upon it. *BENSON J. WALLIS J.* while approving of the law as laid down by *WHITE C.J.* and *AYLING J.* were of opinion that the trend of English authorities is that the Judge should where there is no corroboration with draw the case from the jury and direct them to acquit but such a practice would be at variance with the provisions of the *Indian Evidence Act*. As a matter of practice a Court should not accept the uncorroborated evidence of an accomplice as sufficient evidence to support a conviction but it is impossible consistently with the *Evidence Act* to hold that as a matter of law the presumption must be raised and rebutted by special circumstances or by corroboration. *MILLER J.* who approved of the view of the majority held that while Judges are bound by law to advise juries to adhere to this practice it does not follow the juries are bound as a matter of law to do so. *SUNDARA IYER J.* In approving of the majority view holds that the English practice in its uncertain state is not a safe guide to determine the law in this country and approves of the law laid down by *EDGE C.J.* **9 A. 528**. Where he says 'A Judge would advise the jury that it would be unsafe to act upon in other words believe the uncorroborated evidence of an accomplice as he would advise the jury not to act upon the evidence of any other witness whose evidence might from any cause be open to suspicion. But in either case he would tell the jury that if they believed the evidence they might legally convict the prisoner either in fact or in conclusion.

Court to raise the presumption that accomplice's evidence is unworthy of credit as against the accused persons unless it is corroborated in material particulars and the failure of the Judge to direct the jury to that effect is an error in law.

The next proposition which is also well recognized is that if there are any especial circumstances which would justify a disregard of this rule those circumstances in a trial by a jury must be clearly

set out in the direction of the Judge, and the Appellate Court is entitled to consider as a matter of law whether those circumstances are such as to justify exceptional treatment. If in the opinion of the Appellate Court, the facts in this connection are such that they in no sense negative the danger of acting upon the uncorroborated testimony of the accomplice, but if the Judge told the jury otherwise, verdict must be set aside as being due to an error in law, if the especial facts, however are such as may reasonably be considered to take the case out of the rule even though it is possible to hold a different view, the verdict cannot be interfered with by a Court of error, (1911) 1 M. W. N. 327 = 21 M. L. J. 283 = 12 Cr. L. J. 150 followed *SANKARAN NAIR, J.*, who dissented from the view of *WHITTE, C. J.* and *AYLING J.*, in the special Bench held, that "The question is (1) not whether a conviction based on the uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice is legal but whether there is a presumption that such testimony cannot be accepted without corroboration, (2) a person should not be convicted except under very special circumstances upon the uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice; (3) the special circumstances are that the grounds on which an accomplice's evidence has been held to be untrustworthy did not exist either in the case or did not exist in their full strength, that there are countervailing considerations of greater weight which diminish or entirely get rid of the weight due to such presumptions, and (4) in cases tried by a jury, a jury has to be advised by the Judge on the points above referred to'.

42. An improper direction regarding testimony of accomplice is a good ground of appeal.—If a Judge, instead of advising a jury not to convict on the mere uncorroborated evidence of an accomplice, were to advise them to convict upon such evidence or were to tell them that the uncorroborated evidence of an accomplice given under a tender of pardon was admissible, and that it was for them alone to form their opinion upon it, that a conviction founded upon such evidence would be legal and that such evidence without corroboration might be acted upon with as much safety as that of any other witness, the error in the direction would form a good ground of appeal. *Elahee Buksh's case*, B. L. R. Sep. Vol. 459 (F.B.) = 5 W. R. 80; 29 C. 782. See also the opinions of *ABDUL RAHIM, WALLIS* and *SUNDARA AIAAR, JJ.*, in 35 M. 397 (F.B.).

43. English law as to accomplice testimony.—The English law on the subject has been summarised in *SUNDARA AIAAR, J.*'s judgment in 35 M. 397. The story of the accomplice must be corroborated in some material particular, that is to say in some particular that involves the guilt of the accused. The confirmation of the accomplice must be in some fact which goes to fix the guilt on the person charged; *R. v. Wikes and Edwards* (1837) 7 C. and P. 272; 'a man who has been guilty of a crime himself will always be able to relate the facts of the case and if the confirmation be only on the truth of that history without identifying the persons, that it is really no corroboration at all, *R. v. Farler*, (1837) 8 C. and P. 108, *R. v. Everest*, (1909) 73 J. P. 269. It is the practice of the Court of Criminal Appeal to require corroboration of the evidence of an accomplice on cases when it is not necessary by statute, *R. v. Cohen*, 111 L. T. 77. As to charge to jury. It is the practice to warn the jury that they ought not to convict unless they think that the evidence of the accomplice is corroborated, *In re Munster* (1894) 2 Q. B. 415. Where there is no corroboration of the accomplice's story, the Judge should warn the jury that they ought not to act upon it. If this is not done and the Court of Criminal Appeal consider that there was no evidence of corroboration, they will quash the conviction, *R. v. Tate*, (1908) 2 K. B. 680 = 72 J. P. 391, *R. v. Beauchamp*, (1909) 73 J. P. 223. A Judge should direct a jury to acquit if the evidence of the accomplice is not corroborated in material particulars, *R. v. Everest* (1909) 73 J. P. 269; but the Appeal Court will not interfere with the conviction even if there has been no warning if the evidence of the accomplice has been sufficiently corroborated, *R. v. Warren*, (1909) 73 J. P. 359; and when it is doubtful whether the witness is or is not an accomplice, it is desirable that the Judge should indicate to the jury that the evidence of such a witness should be carefully scrutinised, *R. v. Kirkham*, (1909) 73 J. P. 408. Though in strictness if the jury believe the evidence of an accomplice they may legally convict a prisoner upon it though it stands totally uncorroborated in any material particular, whatever be the nature of the crime charged, the practice of requiring some confirmation of the accomplice's evidence has obtained so much sanction from legal authority, that "it deserves all the reverence of law, and a deviation from it in any particular case would be justly considered of questionable propriety *Taylor's Evidence* (10th edn.) s. 967, 1 *Phill. Ed.* 32, *Archbold*, p. 456, *Russell on Crimes*, 7 edn., pp. 2282-2293, *Halsbury*, vol. 12, 408.

44. Rules of accomplice testimony not applicable to Police spies.—The law and practice as to the corroboration of accomplices do not extend to the case of Police spy or agent provocateur, *R. v. Mullins* (1845) 12 J. P. 776 = 3 Cox C. C. 528; *R. v. Buckley* (1909) 73 J. P. 339; 11 Cr. L. J. 860 (C.) and see also 19 B. 361.

43. Direction in case of confessions.—It is a misdirection to tell the jury that a confession to the Police if followed by the production of stolen property is admissible, whereas he should have pointed out that such confessions are only admissible in so far as they relate to the fact thereby discovered. Evidence of such confessions should not be allowed to be given or recorded to any great extent, nor when such evidence has been properly recorded should the jury be afterwards told generally that the prisoners had confessed, *18 M. L. J.* 250 = *3 M. L. T.* 263 = *7 Cr. L. J.* 355. The Judge should point out the irrelevancy of a confession under s 24 of the Evidence Act. *Id.* 26 M. 33. It is a misdirection to treat a statement as a confession when it is consistent with innocence. *R v Joyce*, (1908) *72 J. P.* 433. It is a misdirection to tell the jury that a person to whom a confession was made was not a person in authority within the meaning of s 24 of the Evidence Act when he is one, the Judge should in such a case leave it to the jury to decide whether the confession was caused by an inducement, threat, etc., *20 C. W. N.* 612 = *23 C. L. J.* 477; *17 Bom. L. R.* 1059 = *3 Bom. Cr. C. A.* 135 = *40 B. 220*. A confession falling within the provisions of s 24 of the Evidence Act ought not to be placed before the jury without an explanation as to how they should value it having regard to the circumstances under which it was made, *20 C. W. N.* 512 = *23 C. L. J.* 477 = *17 Cr. L. J.* 138. See Note 33 (iii) above.

46. Direction in case of retracted confessions.—In the trial of a murder case a Sessions Judge in his charge to the jury treated the evidence in very general terms and described it as very poor evidence, and also told the jury that in the case of retracted confessions "The law is that you are to look for corroboration in independent evidence, and if that supplies such corroboration that you can confidently say 'the confession must be absolutely true' you can act upon them otherwise not." *Held*, that the Judge had erred in law in not summing up the evidence to the jury, and then calling their attention to the material parts of it, leaving them to form their own opinion upon it instead of treating the evidence generally and calling it very poor evidence, which evidence standing alone practically amounted to nothing, *23 B. 315*. There is no rule that a retracted confession cannot be acted upon against the maker thereof unless corroborated. The jury should be asked to consider not whether it is corroborated by independent evidence but rather having regard to the circumstances under which it was made and retracted, it is more probable that the confession is true or the statement retracting it *21 M. 83*; *8 M. L. T.* 372 = *11 Cr. L. J.* 683. See also *20 A. 133*. Where the only evidence against the accused is his retracted confession, and it is clear that it was not corroborated by independent evidence, it was *held*, that there was misdirection in not pointing out to the jury that it was unsafe to rely on the subsequently withdrawn confession unless corroborated in material respects, *Weir II*, 507 and 510. He ought to tell the jury that the retracted confession is not to be acted upon unless supported by independent reliable evidence corroborating in material particulars, *Weir II*, 509; *16 A. 78*.

47. Direction in case of confession when there are several accused.—See Notes under Heading VIII.

VIII.—JOINT TRIAL OF SEVERAL ACCUSED.

48. Evidence against each accused should be clearly and carefully placed before the jury.—In cases where several accused persons are being tried together on evidence which is not identical it is of the first importance that the evidence affecting each should be clearly and carefully placed before the jury, and that their attention should be pre-eminently drawn to the considerations by which they may properly be guided in estimating the value of the evidence as against each accused. To tell a jury generally that they have the approver's deposition and the corroborative evidence, without pointing out as regards each person what the corroborative evidence is, is to give them no guidance at all, especially in a case where the principal evidence against most of the accused is that of an approver, *29 C. 782*. See also *30 M. 44*, where the conviction was set aside and no retrial ordered. See also *R v Beauchamp*, (1909) *73 J. P.* 223, where, in a joint trial of two persons the Court held that the Judge in summing up the case to the jury had not properly distinguished between the evidence against each and set aside the conviction. Where a Judge failed to comply with the requirements of s 297 in charging the jury, and at the conclusion of the charge directed them to consider the evidence against each prisoner, without at the same time requiring them to consider the evidence in favour of each and also omitted to give them the very necessary directions that if they entertained any reasonable doubt as to the guilt of the accused, they were entitled to have the benefit of the doubt and should be acquitted. *Held*, that there was grave misdirection by the Judge to the prejudice of the prisoners, *Weir II*, 500. In charging a jury, the Judge should set out clearly the evidence as against each prisoner separately and should not place before them all the evidence against all the prisoners in a confused mass. Thus where the accused are charged both under s. 395 and 396, I. P. C., the Judge should in the first instance place before the jury the

50 50 50

evidence against the accused on the charge of dacoity, and after they have returned their verdict on the charge of dacoity, he should then set before them as assessors the evidence connected with the charge of murder in dacoity, *Wells II, 517*. See also *Wells II, 501*.

49. Jury should be warned that statement of one accused is not evidence against his co-accused.—The Judge should warn the jury to take the case of each accused separately and that a confession by one accused involving himself alone could not be used against the other accused, *18 M. L. J. 250 = 3 M. L. T. 263 = 7 Cr. L. J. 358*. See also *1 Bom. L. R. 784*. Also when statements are made by some of the accused do not amount to confessions so as to incriminate themselves though they purport to incriminate others also under trial, the Judge is bound to tell the jury that they must not consider the statements, except as against those who made them and an omission to do so would be a clear misdirection, *25 C. 711*. The omission of a Sessions Judge to tell the jury that the statement of one prisoner was not evidence against his fellow prisoner was held to be a material error and fatal to the trial, notwithstanding that the Judge dealt with the evidence against each prisoner separately, *6 R. H. C. R. Cr. Ca. 10; 5 W. R. 80*. The jury should be directed that a statement made by one prisoner implicating another and immediately denied although strictly evidence, must not be accepted as evidence of the facts contained in such statement, *R v. Curdock, (1915) C. C. A. III, L. T. 816*.

50. Jury should be cautioned not to act upon confession of co-accused corroboration.—A confession of one prisoner can be taken into consideration against another jointly tried with him, if it really amounts to a confession of guilt of the offences charged, *6 C. 279 = 7 C. L. R. 385; 25 C. 711, 6 B. H. C. R. Cr. Ca. 10*, but the Judge ought to explain the duty of the jury and tell them that they must not rely on the confession of a co-accused as evidence of the guilt of another unless it is corroborated by other evidence, *33 M. 46; 1 M. 163; 4 C. 483 (F.B.), 5 M. L. T. 355 = 9 Cr. L. J. 308; 7 M. H. C. R. Appx. XXV; 38 B. 156*. Where the only evidence against the accused was the retracted confession of a co-accused and the Judge in his charge to the jury told them that 'it was the only evidence against the accused corroborated, by the evidence of motive.' Held, that the charge was extremely defective and contained a positive misdirection as regards the amount of corroboration required to support the retracted confession. Evidence of motive can never by itself be sufficient to corroborate any statement which requires corroboration in material particulars, *15 C. L. J. 323 = 13 Cr. L. J. 283*.

51. Jury must give their verdict against each prisoner.—The jury take oath to well and truly try the case as between the Crown and the prisoner and they are not like the Judge in charge of the whole case. They have to give their verdict as against each accused severally, *16 C. W. N. 909 = 13 Cr. L. J. 715*.

IX—CHARGES IN PARTICULAR OFFENCES.

52. Forgery, ss. 474-475, I. P. C.—The accused was charged with being in possession of forged documents under ss. 474 and 475, I. P. C. In his summing up, the Sessions Judge, after stating that the documents were admitted by the defence to be forgeries, told the jury that the only issue they had to decide was whether the forged documents were in the possession of the accused and whether the nature of one, at all events, of the documents was such as to connect them with the accused, being the kind of document he would be likely to have in his house, and he alone, and that if they found this issue in the affirmative they must return a verdict of guilty. Held, that the charge to the jury was defective and misleading and insufficiently complied with the provisions of this section, *16 B. 165*. The accused were charged under s. 471, I. P. C., with having fraudulently and dishonestly used as genuine a forged document knowing or having reason to believe it to be a forged document in a suit brought against them by the vendee of their sister, the document in question being a deed of gift alleged to have been executed by their deceased father, and purporting to have been registered by the *Kazi*. It appeared that the accused were in possession of the property covered by the deed. It was proved that the endorsements of registration were forged. The Sessions Judge in his charge to the jury, omitted to deal with the fact of possession by the accused, but directed them (1) that if they considered the endorsement to registration to be forged, the onus of proving the genuineness of the document was on the accused, and (2) that if they considered the document to be forged they must then consider the accused knew it to be forged, and (3) that if they considered the document to be forged they must then consider the accused knew it to be forged. Held, that there had been a misdirection on all three points for (1) even if the endorsement of registration was forged it lay on the prosecution to prove that the document itself was forged and not on the accused to establish its genuineness (2) it was the duty of the prosecution and not of the accused to call the surviving attesting

witnesses (7) it was not sufficient to direct the jury to consider whether supposing the document to be a forgery the accused knew it was a forgery when they used it. It lay on the prosecution to prove that such use was fraudulent or dishonest in the sense in which those terms are used in the Penal Code. In order to prove that fact it lay on the prosecution to prove that the accused had no reasonable ground for asserting their title to the land in dispute. The *factum* of possession and the date of the death of the accused's father were material points for consideration on this question. If the accused had been in possession for twelve years from their father's death they would have had a good ground for asserting their title to it 8 C. L. R. 542. Where there was a material misdirection to the jury (as, e.g. stating that the *onus* was on the accused of proving a deed the subject of the charge being genuine was on the accused and calling attention to the fact that the accused had not called the attesting witnesses), *held* such a misdirection was not covered by this section. The conviction was set aside 4 C. W. N. 576. See 25 M. 33.

53. Criminal breach of trust.—It is the duty of Judge to lay down the law as required by s. 297. Where the accused was charged with criminal breach of trust and it was not explained to the jury nor were they affirmatively told what constituted criminal breach of trust nor what would amount to any one of its various ingredients and were not given the definition of dishonestly and in fact were not told what they must first find proved to constitute the offence but were only told that if they found a few facts proved the accused was guilty. *Held* the trial was bad for misdirection and the conviction was set aside 5 L. B. R. 149 = 11 Cr. L. J. 340. It is the duty of the Judge in laying down the law to explain the meaning of the term dishonestly by expressly telling the jury that the test they were to apply was whether the circumstances showed an intention to cause wrongful gain or wrongful loss and what those terms mean. Failure to do so was held to vitiate the verdict 7 Bur. L. T. 20 = 15 Cr. L. J. 257.

54. Robbery s. 393, I. P. C.—Under this section the Judge must explain to the jury all the essential elements of the offence with which the prisoner is charged. An omission to do so is not a mere irregularity curable under s. 537 but is a failure to comply with an express provision of the law and will vitiate the conviction. Thus where the Judge in summing up addressed the jury as follows:—The accused are charged with dacoity—dacoity is committed when any number of persons not less than five conjointly commit robbery—it was *held* that the Judge ought to have explained to the jury what is necessary to constitute the offence of robbery as defined in s. 390 I. P. C. and that this is a real and not merely technical defect and the conviction was therefore set aside 30 M. 44, where 29 C. 379 and 25 C. 711 are *followed*. 9 Cr. L. J. 311 (M.) 8 M. L. T. 82 = 11 Cr. L. J. 432, *Weir I. 446*.

55. Belonging to a gang of thieves s. 401, I. P. C.—[In the trial of prisoners for the offence under s. 401 viz. belonging to a gang of persons associated for the purpose of habitually committing theft the Judge should in his charge put clearly to the jury (1) the necessity of the proof of association (2) the need of proving that that association was for the purpose of habitual theft and that habit is to be proved by an aggregation of facts 8 M. H. C. R. 120.

56. Dacoity s. 397, I. P. C.—In a case of dacoity the jury must be distinctly instructed that unless they are satisfied that there were five or more persons committing robbery and that the persons present and aiding in commission of the robbery numbered five or more persons there could be no robbery. Where therefore the jury acquitted two persons out of six alleged to have committed a dacoity and the charge to the jury did not distinctly state that if they found that the robbery was committed by less than five persons the conviction should be not for dacoity but for robbery the conviction was set aside on the ground of misdirection *Weir I. 448-447*. II. 519. Where on a charge against the accused under ss. 392 and 397 I. P. C. the Sessions Judge while pointing out to the jury that there is no evidence that the accused caused the grievous hurt or used deadly weapons directed the jury that they may convict the appellants of the offence under s. 397 merely because grievous hurt was caused by some of the robbers and that some of the robbers used knives *held* that this amounted to a misdirection and following *Weir I. 450* and 23 A. 404 the conviction under s. 397 was set aside 22 M. L. J. 185 = 11 M. L. T. 20 = (1912) 2 M. W. N. 35 = 13 Cr. L. J. 42. See also 1899 A. W. N. 185, 47 A. 59 (21 A. 263 *disputed from*).

57. Murder and culpable homicide ss. 302 and 304 I. P. C.—Where the Judge in a case of culpable homicide in his charge to the jury omitted to ask the jury specifically to consider whether in causing the death the accused had the intention to cause death or such injury as was likely to cause death or the knowledge that he was likely to cause death. *Held* that this was a very material misdirection not cured by the fact that at the commencement the Judge explained the sections of the Penal Code defining murder and culpable homicide and pointed out to them the distinction between the two 35 C. 331. See also 8 C. 739, 14 C. 164,

25 C. 736; 11 Cr. L. J. 295 (G). As there are two parts of s. 304 I P C. under one of which only is a sentence of transportation for life legal a Sessions Judge in summing up a case to a jury should draw the attention of a jury to both parts of the section and ask them to say explicitly under which part they find the accused guilty. **Ratanlal 530** Where in a trial on a charge of murder, the Judge omitted to explain to the jury the distinction between murder and culpable homicide and suggested that a strong inference should be drawn against the accused from his having failed to take steps to bring the real offender to justice the misdirection was held to be grave and material. **3 L. B. R. 75 = 3 Cr. L. J. 1.** Accused were convicted before a Sessions Judge and a jury of murder and were sentenced No 1 as principal to death, and the others to transportation for life. The evidence showed that there was never any intention to kill the deceased but that there was a quarrel and the accused then proceeded to beat the deceased. Accused Nos 1 and 2 struck the deceased on the head with a *kuda* (a flat iron bar 2½ feet long with a sharp edge) and thereby fractured his skull and so caused death and did know that the blows would in all probability cause death. No 3 tried to protect the deceased from further injury and himself received a blow which No 2 had aimed at the deceased. The notes of the charge of the Sessions Judge to the jury were as follows:—

“s. 302. The murder of M—murder defined—punishment—The only question herein as to the statements made by the prisoners is, did the prisoners any or all of them inflict these injuries on the deceased. If they did they are guilty of murder. *Held* that although death was caused by accused Nos 1 and 2 with a weapon which was likely to cause death still as they did not intend to cause, or know that in all probability they would cause death they were guilty of culpable homicide only and not of murder, while accused Nos 3 and 4 were guilty of causing hurt only. That the Sessions Judge's charge to the jury was, according to the notes recorded, *very defective* and that he should have left it to the jury to decide whether the offence was one of murder or of culpable homicide, or any offence, after pointing out to them the legal definition of each offence and that infliction of injuries would not necessarily make the offence of all the accused the same, and the jury should have been asked to find as to the intention of the accused persons, and their attention should have been drawn to the provisions of ss 34, 35, 37 and 38 I P C., and they should have been told to return a verdict as to the exact guilt of each of the four accused persons. **1 Bom. L. R. 784** In a trial for murder where grave and sudden provocation causing a loss of the power of self control is suggested for the defence it is the duty of the Judge to explain the distinction between murder and culpable homicide, and the jury as judges of the facts have to decide the issue about sufficient provocation. A wife's resistance to the act of sexual intercourse or her denial of a charge of adultery is not sufficient to constitute grave provocation. **Ratanlal 766** See also **3 S. L. R. 125 = 11 Cr. L. J. 15** But in the absence of any direct evidence of grave and sudden provocation or of fact from which this exception could be legitimately inferred it would be an error on the part of a Judge to lay down the law on that subject. Where a trial for culpable homicide is proceeding before a jury it is not an appropriate mode of laying down the law to discourse on all branches and departments of this complicated topic of crime to do so is calculated to confuse the jury and possibly to direct their deliberations into channels that have nothing to do with the case. *Per JENKINS J.*, in **19 C. W. N. 633 = 16 Cr. L. J. 561** If a Judge omits to draw the attention of the jury to any matter a consideration of which might lead them to a verdict of culpable homicide not amounting to murder instead of murder, he commits an error though the defence did not suggest the existence of any such matter. **STEPHEN J. ibid** In a similar case the Full Bench of the Burma High Court (**ORROND J., dissenting**) held that as the circumstances the existence of which might bring the case under exception 4 to s. 300 I P C. could not properly be inferred from the evidence or the accused's statement the effect of that exception did not fall to be considered and the Judge did not err in not putting to the jury that it was open to them to consider the effect of that exception in that case. **8 Bar. L. T. 220 (F.B.).** See also **3 L. B. R. 123 = 17 Cr. L. J. 154** See also Notes 6—8

55. Duty of Judge where accused charged with culpable homicide—Where a jury returns a verdict

find expressly whether or not the
has been caused by a blow with a
ilily injury as would in the ordinary

course of nature cause death and it is presumed in favour of the accused that he had no knowledge that the
injury which he intended to cause was likely to cause death and the circumstances are such that an intention
merely to cause hurt dangerous to life might reasonably be inferred the jury should be directed that it is open
to them to find the accused guilty of a lesser offence viz of causing grievous hurt. An omission to do so is
a misdirection. **8 S. L. R. 116 = 13 Cr. L. J. 750** The omission to put the case of grievous hurt s. 320 (8) I P C.
was a misdirection. See also **3 L. B. R. 123 = 17 Cr. L. J. 154**.

59. Possession of stolen property, s. 411, I. P. C.—A direction to the jury that they should convict the prisoner, if they believed that he had shown the stolen property to the Police is open to exception. The mere act of knowing where the stolen property is, is not equivalent to possession, *Wells* II, 493. Where an accused is charged with an offence under s. 411, I. P. C., merely directing a jury to find whether the property was stolen and whether it was retained by the accused amounts to misdirection. The proper direction in such a case is to find—(1) whether the property was stolen, (2) whether it was dishonestly retained, and (3) whether the accused knew, or had reason to believe the same to be stolen property. Unless these three questions were found by the jury in the affirmative, the accused could not be convicted of an offence under s. 411, I. P. C., *15 B. 389 followed in 23 C. 711*. On a charge against a person of being in possession of recently stolen property, well knowing it to have been stolen, when the prosecution have proved recent possession of stolen goods, the jury should be directed that in the absence of any explanation which may reasonably be true they may find the prisoner guilty but are not bound to do so. If any explanation is given and the jury think that it may reasonably be true although they are not convinced that it is true, the prisoner is entitled to be acquitted, inasmuch as the *onus* is on the prosecution to establish the guilt of the prisoner beyond reasonable doubt. *R v Schama, (1915) C. C. A. 84; L. J. (K.B.) 396*. On a trial of an indictment for receiving stolen goods with guilty knowledge, the jury should be expressly asked to consider whether the accused's explanation of his possession of the goods soon after the theft of them is reasonable or not, *R v Hampson, (1915) 11 Cr. Ap. R. 73*. See also *R v Millington, (1915) Cr. Ap. R. 88; R v Holmes, (1915) 11 Cr. Ap. R. 130*. There is no *onus* on the accused to prove that he received the property honestly, *R v Aubrey, (1915) 11 Cr. Ap. R. 182*. See Note 64 below. See also *53 C. 229; 53 C. 157*.

60. Rape—not leaving determination of fact to jury.—On a charge of rape the Judge in his charge to the jury said: 'You will observe that this sexual intercourse was against the girl's will and without her consent, etc.' instead of saying, as he ought to have done,—'You will have to determine, upon the evidence in this case, whether the intercourse was against the girl's will, etc.' and the charge went on in the same style of stating to the jury what had been proved instead of leaving it to them to decide what in their opinion was proved. In the concluding sentence of the charge the Judge said: 'You have seen the witnesses and I have no doubt that you will return a just verdict.' *Held*, that such a charge amounted to a clear misdirection, and that the verdict was erroneous owing to such misdirection. Even the concluding sentence did not satisfy the requirements of a proper charge *25 C. 230*. See also Note 63 below.

61. Rioting—ss. 147 and 149, I. P. C.—generally common object must be stated.—The omission to state correctly to the jury what is alleged to be the common object of an unlawful assembly does not vitiate the verdict, if such omission has not prejudiced the accused, *4 C. W. N. 198*. But where persons other than those who actually did the deed are sought to be made liable by virtue of s. 149, I. P. C., the Judge ought in commenting upon the provisions of s. 149, expressly to draw the attention of the jury to the common object, although the common object of the assembly may be stated in the charge, *29 C. 379; 30 M. 44*. In *9 Bom. L. R. 153 = 5 Cr. L. J. 168*, ten persons were tried for offences under ss. 148 and 302 I. P. C. In his charge to the jury, the Sessions Judge did not place before the jury the special circumstance which in his view would have brought the offence within the definition of murder in s. 300, I. P. C. It was not put to the jury in the charge whether any of the intentions mentioned in the section were established as against any of the accused and the exceptions 1, 2 and 4 to that section were not explicitly explained to the jury. The Sessions Judge directed the jury to find that if the offence of rioting were established, all the accused were guilty of murder. *Held*, that this was a misdirection in the charge to the jury, because before any member of an unlawful assembly could be convicted of murder committed by any other member, it is essential that the murder must have been committed with an intention specified in s. 300 and not falling within any of the exceptions to that section and the act must be act committed in the prosecution of the common object. Again if the accused are charged with an offence under s. 304 or s. 325, I. P. C., they may be convicted under s. 323, though not charged under that section. But where they are charged with the offences alleged to have been committed by another person in the course of a riot, *in charged with the offences* ss. 147, 304 and 325, combined with s. 149, I. P. C., and the commission of the *riot is disclosed*, they should not be convicted under s. 323 I. P. C. in respect of their individual acts with which they are charged and which are not imputed to them in the Judge's charge to the jury, *24 C. 325*. Where the charges under ss. 147, 149/304 149/325 and 149/323 I. P. C., the Judge told the jury that if they found that a riot took place they should, under s. 149, I. P. C., find every member of the assembly guilty of causing hurt or grievous hurt but he nowhere instructed the jury what their duty was if they found that there was no unlawful assembly, but that grievous hurt or hurt was caused by any member of the assembly.

reñir { IR-ān'-nex Eñion, n The act of annexing again
ing or { IR'-ann-eñt^s, r t { I reñx reand aneñt } To annex
again

When ye reap the harvest of your land, then shall ye wholly reap the corners of thy field. *Lev. xix. 9*

2 Hence, to gather, to ob's'n to receive as a reward or as the fruit of labor or of works -- in a good or bad sense, as to reap a benefit from exertions

Why do I humble thus myself and going

Why do I humble thus myself and suing
For peace reap nothing but repulse and hate? *N. Bux.*

To clear of a crop by reaping, as, to reap a

Ball

receive the *fruit* of labor or works

persons held that the omission of the Judge to do so amounted to a serious misdirection, 34 C. 693; 29 C. 379. Fourteen accused were charged with rioting armed with deadly weapons and with murder, and causing grievous hurt during such riot. The common object alleged by the prosecution was to compel the payment of certain money by one of the persons of the opposite party. Some of the accused who admitted their presence at the scene of the occurrence stated that they had been attacked on account of an allegation being made that one of the opposite party had enticed away another's wife and that they had merely acted in self defence. The case was tried before a jury and on the close of the case for the prosecution the Sessions Judge considering, that possibly the common object alleged by the prosecution, might be considered not to have been proved amended the charge and added an alternative common object to it, viz., that the object of the assembly was to punish one of the opposite party for enticing away another's wife. There was no evidence on the record to prove the alternative common object, it being based solely on a portion of the statements of some of the accused and the Sessions Judge put it to the jury that it was an inference that could possibly be drawn from the evidence but it was for them to draw that inference or not. The jury convicted all the accused without specifying which common object they relied on and were not asked under s. 303 any questions for the purpose of ascertaining what their verdict was based on. Held, that the Judge had misdirected the jury and that the verdict of the jury leaving it uncertain what was the common object which actuated the accused was bad in law, and that the conviction must be set aside and the case re-tried, 21 C. 955 followed in 23 C. 230 and 19 B. 749, see, however 23 C. 711; 30 C. 822 at p. 830. But the omission of a Judge to state correctly the common object of an unlawful assembly, in a charge to the jury, was said, regard being had to s. 225, not to vitiate the trial if such omission had not prejudiced the accused, 22 C. 276; 4 C. W. N. 198 and 11 C. 106. See also 34 C. 698. In a trial for rioting, where only one common object was alleged in the charge, the Sessions Judge suggested to the jury that the case might not be precisely as the prosecution alleged and, at the same time, might not be what the defence endeavoured to set up, but a third alternative something between the two held, that there was no misdirection as he left it entirely open to the jury as to whether they would accept his suggestion or not and the suggestion was not inconsistent with the prosecution case, 40 C. 367. Both 20 W. R. 5 = 11 B. L. R. (F.B.) 347 and 21 C. 955 were distinguished as in these cases the charge was altered at the end of the case for the prosecution and a totally different common object was alleged. In cases of riot it is essentially necessary to mention what an unlawful assembly is. The jury might not be able to distinguish between a collection of five or more men without a common object and a collection of the same number of men with a common object, 17 Cr. L. J. 92 (C.) = 33 In. C. 884.

FUNCTIONS OF JURY.

62. Jury sole Judge of facts.—The jury must take into consideration all the facts alleged for or against the accused, and decide whether the view taken by the prosecution which leads to the conclusion of his guilt or the view which is set up on his behalf and which would make him innocent, commends itself to their judgement. *Per COLCUTT, C.J.*, 21 W. R. 72 at p. 86. Section 298 leaves it entirely to the jury to decide which view of the facts is true. The Judge should not state his own view of important matters of facts so positively as to leave the jury no loophole for taking any other view, *Ratanlal* 748. See Notes 14 and 15 above.

63. Question of consent in case of rape must be determined by the jury.—In charging a jury in a case of rape the Judge should leave the question of consent to the jury and not direct them to find that the woman's consent after a considerable struggle renders the charge of rape nugatory. 1 W. R. 21. See also 2 W. R. 230 (Clv) and Note 60 above.

64. Whether possession of stolen property is recent enough to convict is for the jury.—Where the accused was charged with dacoity and receiving stolen property, the Sessions Judge directed the jury that the finding of the dacoited article with the accused two months after the dacoity was "so short a time as to justify them in convicting the accused of the dacoity itself" and the jury returned a verdict of guilty of both charges. Held that this was a clear misdirection. Whether the possession of the stolen property was recent enough to warrant a conviction for the substantive offence was a matter entirely for the jury and should not have been put to them in the positive way which the Judge adopted. 28 M. 467. Similarly, in a trial for dacoity and receiving stolen property the charge to the jury did not leave it to them to decide whether the prisoners were guilty of one or other of the offences charged and did not contain any direction as to whether they were satisfied that the prisoners knew that the property was stolen in a dacoity nor a reference to the lapse of time between the dacoity and the finding of the property. Held that there was misdirection. *Weir* 11, 813.

Accuse 1 was in possession of stolen property for five years and he said he obtained it in a raffle. He was charged with house-breaking with intent to commit theft and theft in a building. Excepting the possession there was virtually no other evidence to connect the accused with the offence. In charging the jury the Judge's direction was: "Notwithstanding that it is nearly five years since the crime occurred you will decide whether you are satisfied with the prisoner's explanation of his possession of stolen property." *held* that the direction to the jury was so defective and misleading as to amount to a misdirection and that the verdict must be set aside and accused altogether acquitted. If the case should have been left to the jury at all they should have been told to consider whether after five years it was reasonable to require the prisoner to prove how he came by the property, or whether his explanation not being in itself improbable ought not to be accepted. *Wells II, 439. See Notes 18 and 59 above.*

65. Maturity of understanding of an infant accused must be decided by the jury.—The question whether an accused person being a child between 7 and 12 years old, has sufficient maturity of understanding to judge of the nature and consequences of his conduct is a question of fact upon which in cases tried by a jury the accused is entitled to the verdict of the jury. The omission of the Sessions Judge to refer the question to the jury is a ground for setting aside the conviction and for ordering a new trial. *Ratanlal 27.*

66. Question of identity of thumb-impression.—The question of the identity of the thumb-impressions on two or more documents for the purpose of establishing whether the thumb-impressions are of one and the same person is eminently a matter for the jury and not for the Judge, *1 C. L. J. 385 = 2 Cr. L. J. 311*. The jury may decline to rely on the evidence of an expert witness unless their own intelligence corroborates the reasons guiding the witness to his own conclusions, *9 C. W. N. 520*.

67. Duty of jury in an alternative charge for perjury.—In an alternative charge for perjury for having made two contradictory statements, the jury need not find which of the two contradictory statements is false but it is sufficient for them to find whether the allegations made in the charge are proved. *21 W. R. 72 = 13 B. L. R. 324 (F.B.). See also 16 A. 25*

68. Question of grave and sudden provocation must be laid before the jury.—In a case tried by a jury where the plea of grave and sudden provocation causing the loss of the power of self control is raised by the accused, it must be submitted to the jury and their verdict must be taken upon it. *11 C. 410*. It is the duty of the Judge in such circumstances as is clearly set forth in this section to explain the distinction between murder and culpable homicide not amounting to murder and the jury as the judges of the facts have to decide the issue as to sufficient provocation. *Ratanlal 766*. Where however grave and sudden provocation is no part of the defence case nor is any direct evidence given at the trial of such provocation or of facts from which this exception can be legitimately inferred the Judge is quite justified in excluding inquiry into the exception. In fact it would be an error on his part to lay down law as to a matter which is not legally and properly before the jury. *19 C. W. N. 633 (F.B.) = 16 Cr. L. J. 551*.

69. Jury must decide upon the weight to be given to a confession.—Where a prisoner charged with murder made a statement that he did strike the deceased with a stick, and the Sessions Judge after considering the evidence discredited the statement and all the evidence except that of the medical officer and discharged the prisoner not considering it necessary that the case should go before a jury *held* that the Judge had no right to pronounce his own judgment on the credibility of the evidence and to withdraw the consideration of the due weight to be given to the evidence from the jury whose peculiar province it is to come to a finding on the evidence after they had been duly assisted by the summing up of the Judge. *16 W. R. 20*. But the absence of any evidence to warrant a commitment is a point of law exclusively within the province of the Judge. *5 C. W. N. 90*.

70. Jury must decide upon the character or credibility of a witness.—When there is not the slightest evidence to connect the accused with the offence, or the other a Judge *held* that the Judge had no right to pronounce his own judgment on the credibility of the evidence and to withdraw the consideration of the due weight to be given to the evidence from the jury whose peculiar province it is to come to a finding on the evidence after they had been duly assisted by the summing up of the Judge. *16 W. R. 20*. But the absence of any evidence to warrant a commitment is a point of law exclusively within the province of the Judge. *5 C. W. N. 90*.

71. Jury must decide whether a previous conviction is proved or not.—*See s. 310. Where in a Session case the Judge told the jury that certain alleged prior convictions against the accused *held* (1) that it was the misdirection did not affect the conviction of the accused as the question of prior*

Instead of (2) that go be

into only after the jury returns their verdict, and (3) that though it affected the question of sentence the Court was not prepared to interfere seeing that the sentences passed were not too severe, 10 Cr. L. J. 11 (M); 21 W. R. 40.

71-A. It is for the jury to decide whether an approver has forfeited his pardon.—Under this Code there is no provision for withdrawing a pardon to an approver and the only question now is whether the pardon has been forfeited. See s. 339 and Notes thereunder. It is for the jury and not for the Judge to decide whether the pardon was forfeited. Cl. (1)(c) of s. 298 refers only to a finding on a question of fact which it is necessary to prove to make other evidence admissible. The question of forfeiting the pardon was important not for the purpose of making other evidence admissible, but for the purpose of determining whether the trial could at all continue as against the approver, 42 C. 856.

XI.—VERDICT SHOULD BE OBTAINED ONCE FOR ALL AT THE END OF THE TRIAL

72. Judge ought not to record a verdict in the middle of a trial.—At a trial before a Sessions Court the Judge after having examined five out of seven witnesses examined by the committing Magistrate and bound over to give their evidence at the trial, asked the jury whether they wished to hear any more evidence and on their stating that they did not believe the evidence and wished to stop the case, recorded a verdict of acquittal. *Held*, that the procedure of the Judge was illegal and that no final opinion as to the falsehood or insufficiency of the prosecution evidence ought to be arrived at by the Judge or by the jury until the whole of that evidence has been considered, 20 M. 445. It is not open to a Sessions Judge after hearing one witness for the prosecution to tell a jury that it would not be safe to convict and that there is no necessity to hear any further evidence to allow the jury to allow the verdict before the jury at all, 43 C. 222. See Weir 11, 499.

73. Verdict should be obtained once for all at the end of the trial and not piecemeal.—There should be but one charge to the jury both on the facts and on the points of law and a Judge acts illegally in dividing the charge into two. Where, therefore, a Judge in his direction to the jury informed them that he would alter commenting on the evidence, ask them whether they considered that the prisoner had been guilty of any crime or whether he is the unfortunate victim of a most cruel fabrication of false evidence, and that he would then explain the law and take their verdict as to what offence the prisoner has been guilty of, *Held*, the procedure adopted by the Judge was unwarranted and the conviction was accordingly set aside, Weir 11, 493. It is illegal for a Judge to take verdicts in respect of some of the accused and then to hear arguments and charge the jury and take their verdict in respect of other accused, 36 M. 585. See s. 301 as to the delivery of the verdict.

XII.—EFFECT OF MISDIRECTION.

74. See Notes under ss. 423 and 537

75. It is not in all cases of misdirection or prejudice to the accused, the High Court will set aside a verdict.—When the Court is satisfied that there has been misdirection the next question is whether the accused is prejudiced thereby. It is not in all cases of misdirection or prejudice to the accused the High Court will order a new trial. The question to be determined is not whether upon a proper summing up of the whole evidence a jury might possibly give a different verdict, but whether the legitimate effect of the evidence would require a different verdict. If the evidence is such that the High Court would have affirmed the conviction if the trial had been before the Judge and assessors, it ought not to set aside a verdict by a jury, merely because the Judge had not given the proper caution or advice to the jury as to the weight which they might properly give to the evidence. It would be improper to order a new trial if the evidence were wholly insufficient, to support any conviction against the prisoner, B. L. R. Sup. Vol. 459 = 7 W. R. 111; 11 C. 749.

76. P. A. 1, XXXI: 11 M. 1, 217.
Court *held* that ordering a re-trial is the only course open to the High Court where a verdict has been vitiated by misdirection. But this view has been *dissented from* in 23 C. 711; 19 B. 749 and 26 M. 1, and it has been *held* that the High Court could deal with the matter in any of the ways contemplated by s. 423(6). See also 17 C. 642 and 1 C. 207. If after considering the entire evidence, the Court be of opinion that it could not in any

view of the case support a conviction, it would be worse than useless to order a re-trial. *See* 5 W. R. 80 at p. 23; 26 M. J.; 30 C. 822; 29 C. 782; 7 C. 42; 4 C. W. N. 576; 14 C. W. N. 493 = 11 Cr. L. J. 98, and also the case of *Arnold v. R.*, 41 C. 1023 (P.C.) If there was no failure of justice, s. 537 (d) would cover the case, 12 A. L. J. 149 = 14 Cr. L. J. 633. *See* Notes to s. 423.

76. Effect of improper admission of evidence.—Where in a trial by jury evidence has been improperly admitted, the High Court has a power to inquire into the merits of the case under s. 167 of the *Indian Evidence Act* independently of s. 423. But the general principle is laid down in 4 C. W. N. 576 and the re-trial by jury will be ordered if the misdirection, that is the wrongful admission of evidence, has occasioned a failure of justice. If the improperly admitted evidence was so trivial that it could not have occasioned a failure of justice, the High Court will not order a re-trial, but proceed under s. 167 of the *Evidence Act*, 11 C. L. J. 301 = 14 C. W. N. 493 = 11 Cr. L. J. 96. "In England where the trial Judge has warned the jury not to act upon the objectionable evidence, the Court of Criminal Appeal under the *Criminal Appeal Act*, 1907, s. 4, may refuse to interfere, if it thinks that the jury giving heed to that warning would have returned the same verdict [*R v. Lucas*, 1 Cr. Ap. Rep. 234, *R v. Stoddart* (1909) 73 J. P. 343, *R v. Norton*, (1910) 2 K. B. 436—501, *R v. Loates*, (1910) 8 Cr. Ap. Rep. 193, *R v. Wilson*, (1911) 8 Cr. Ap. Rep. 207], or when evidence has been admitted inadvertently or erroneously, which is inadmissible but of small importance [*R v. Westcott*, 1 Cr. Ap. Rep. 243, *R v. Mullins* (1910) 5 Cr. Ap. Rep. 13] or most unlikely to have affected the verdict [*R v. Solomon*, (1909) 2 Cr. Ap. Rep. 80]. When the objectionable evidence has been left for the consideration of the jury without any warning to disregard it the Court of Appeal quashed the conviction, if it thinks that the jury may have been influenced by it even though without it there was evidence sufficient to warrant a conviction [*R v. Fisher*, (1910) 1 K. B. 140]. The rule can hardly be considered to be settled but at any rate it seems to go so far as to substitute 'highly improbable' for 'impossible' in Lord Herschell's reservation in *Makin v. Attorney General for N. S. Wales*, (1894) A. C. 57 to the effect 'where it is impossible to suppose that the evidence improperly admitted can have had any influence on the verdict of the jury,' *Ibrahim v. E.*, 13 C. W. N. 705 = 15 Cr. L. J. 326. In this case their Lordships of the House of Lords said: 'It is not possible to say that the evidence admitted was so trifling that the jury would have reached the same conclusion if it had been rejected.' *See* Notes to s. 423 for Indian cases.

(1913) where it was laid down that where evidence has been improperly submitted an appeal will not be dismissed [s. (1) of the *Criminal Appeal Act*, 1907] on the ground 'that substantial miscarriage of justice has actually occurred, unless the Court feels certain that the jury would have come to the same conclusion' if the evidence had been rejected. *See* Notes under s. 423 for Indian cases.

77. The whole of the case must be sent back.—Where an accused is tried and convicted at a trial on two connected charges and the High Court finds that the conviction on one charge was obtained by misdirection and is of opinion that the verdict of the jury on the other charge was correct, still the High Court has no jurisdiction to uphold the conviction under one charge and order a re-trial on the other charge. The whole of the case must be sent back to the jury if the verdict was obtained by misdirection, 16 C. W. N. 909 = 13 Cr. L. J. 715. *See* also 22 C. 377; 12 P. R. 1904.

78. Correctness of procedure in jury trial must be judged by the Code and not by English practice.—When the proceedings upon a trial by jury in the Mofussil are consistent with a reasonable construction of that part of the Procedure Code where such trial is provided for, the proceedings are good in the absence of any distinct ruling to the contrary, and ought not to be examined by the light of English rules of procedure, 14 W. R. 59.

300. In cases tried by jury, after the Judge has finished his charge the jury may retire to consider their verdict.

Except with the leave of the Court, no person other than a juror shall speak to, or hold any communication with, any member of such jury.

Notes.—1. Summing up essential for a valid verdict.—In a case tried by a jury, the Code does not contemplate the reception of a verdict from the jury, without their having had the assistance of a summing up by the Sessions Judge, since a careful summing up may often change the hasty and superficial impressions of a jury and the parties are entitled to this service, *Ratanlal* 288. *See* Notes 2 and 3 to ss. 297—299.

2. What papers the jury may take with them.—There is no provision in the Code as to what papers the jury may take with them. The N Y Cr Pro C. (ss 425 and 426) allows the jury to take with them any paper or article which has been received as evidence in the cause (but only upon the consent of the defendant and the counsel for the people), also the notes of the testimony or other proceedings on the trial, taken by themselves or any of them but none taken by any other person. *See also Weir II, 514*

3. No one shall hold communication.—If a juror falls ill while the jury are enclosed, a medical man may by leave of the Court, see and prescribe for him, *R v. Newton, 13 Q. B. 716—735*. If a juror, after the Judge has summed up separates himself from his colleagues, and not being under the control of the Court converses or is in a position to converse with other person, it is an irregularity which renders the whole proceedings abortive, and it is not necessary to consider whether the irregularities in fact prejudiced the prisoner. The only course open to the Court is to discharge the jury and commence the proceedings afresh. *R v. Kellersidge, (1915) 1 K. B. 467; 22 C. W. N. 740*. On the trial of a prisoner at the assizes, some time after the jury had retired to consider their verdict, the clerk of assizes went to their room and asked if they had agreed or were likely to agree. The jury then put some questions to him and he answered them and a discussion took place. Later on he visited the jury again and a further discussion took place. Eventually the jury found the prisoner guilty. *Held*, that evidence from the jurymen to prove the above facts was inadmissible, but the Court could act upon a report made by the clerk of assizes and that as it was impossible to say that but for the discussions and the advice given by him the jury would have come to a unanimous conclusion, the conviction must be quashed, *R v. Willmott, 78 J. P. 352 = 30 T. L. R. 499*. *See also Note 8 to s 301 46 C. 307*.

301. When the jury have considered their verdict the foreman shall
Delivery of verdict. inform the Judge what is their verdict, or what is the verdict of a majority

Notes.—*See s 303* for power of Judge to question jury, *s 304* for power to amend verdict and *ss 305 and 306* for acting upon verdict.

1. Each juror must form his own opinion.—The law requires a juror to exercise his own discretion and to decide on the evidence and not follow blindly the opinion of his fellows, *25 W. R. 5*. A jury cannot return a verdict on the casting of lots, *Hale v. Cole, (1725) 1 Str. 582*.

2. 'Verdict' means the collective opinion of the jury.—By verdict should be understood the collective opinion of the jury as a body, arrived at after mutual consultation, and ascertained and announced by the foreman. In cases of disagreement among the jury, the individual opinions of members are never intended to be disclosed. When several accused were charged with the offence of rioting, etc., the Judge called on each member of the jury individually to answer a series of questions of which he was furnished with a typed copy, and the individual opinion of each member of the jury on each question was recorded, *held*, that the divergence from the procedure laid down in the Code was of a serious nature and opposed to the fundamental principle of the scheme of trial by jury, *36 M. 585*.

3. Form of verdict.—The law does not prescribe any specific form in which the jury are to return their finding and they are at liberty to deliver it in any form in which they think fit, *14 W. R. 59*. In *15 B. 432 and 19 B. 735*, JARDINE, J., was of opinion that it was open to a jury under the Code to deliver 'special' verdict which the Judge is bound to accept. In *13 Cr. L. J. 586*, the Madras High Court has held that it is not open to a jury under the Code to deliver a special verdict and that they are bound to deliver a verdict of guilty or not guilty and disapproved of the Bombay cases. *See Note 7 below*

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are found by the jury, the legal inference to be derived from them being referred to the Court. *Harrison v. The People, 114 N. Y. 222*
of England Vol IX, p 371 Archbold, pp 226—232

4. Verdict where there are several accused.—A question may arise as to whether a jury has seisin of the case as a whole or whether they tried each prisoner personally and it appears clear that they take oath to try well and truly the case as between the Crown and the prisoner and they are not like the Judge in charge of the entire case as a whole. They have to give their verdict on the facts as against each man severally, and even when several prisoners are jointly tried it is open to them to convict one and acquit the others, *16 C. W. N. 909 = 13 Cr. L. J. 715*

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5. Repugnancy in verdict.—But if several are indicted for a riot and the jury acquit all but two, they must acquit the two also. And if upon an indictment for a conspiracy, the jury acquit all but one, they must acquit the one also unless it is charged in the indictment that he conspired with someone not tried upon that indictment *R v Thomson*, 16 Q. B. 832; *R v Plummer*, (1902) 2 K. B. 339. See also 14 A. L. J. 689.

The principle which underlies *R v Plummer* is this, that you cannot have contradictory results or decisions on one set of facts as only one decision can be the right one. But the repugnancy in the verdict of a jury in India is not in itself sufficient to justify the quashing of a conviction and the technicalities which are borrowed from the English Law and founded on ideas as to the sacred character of a verdict by a jury whose findings of fact are unknown, cannot be imported so as to give such a character which by the express provisions of law does not attach to jury verdicts in this country, 41 C. 350; 41 C. 754. In 41 C. 350 it was argued on the authority of *R v Plummer* that where a Judge acquitted the accused under s. 399, I P. C., and convicted them under s. 402, I P. C., the conviction was repugnant and could not stand. It was however, found on the facts that there was no repugnancy and held that such a doctrine could not be applied to the decision of a Judge trying a case with the aid of assessors. In 41 C. 754, it was argued that as the case for the prosecution in the previous trial was one of conspiracy between two youths who were then acquitted and the present accused, and that charge failed, no proceeding ought to be taken against the present accused though he was no party to the previous trial.

6. Jury must be allowed to deliver their verdict in full.—When after returning a verdict of "guilty," or "not guilty," the jury wish to state something in addition, it is wrong to stop the jury at such a stage of the proceedings. It may be the desire of the jury to add a recommendation to mercy or it may so happen that before the verdict is so recorded, the foreman of the jury may make some observations in respect of that verdict which may show the presiding Judge that the jury have not properly understood the case and that it would be the duty of the Judge not to record the verdict, but to re-charge the jury so as to lay the case properly before them. Where on a trial of certain accused on charges of robbing (ss. 147 and 148 I P. C.), in connection with certain lands, the jury after delivering a unanimous verdict of guilty, attempted to add some words to the effect 'that the lands and crop belong to the accused' and they were stopped by the Judge on the ground that the verdict was clear and nothing was left to be ascertained under s. 303, held, that the jury ought not to have been stopped, and as the words which the foreman attempted to add were very material, the accused had been prejudiced and a new trial ordered. The jury having regarded the case set up for the prosecution either as not established or as untrue, it was for them to consider and find whether the persons who were not the aggressors had or had not exceeded the right of private defence of their property, 30 C. 483.

7. Special verdict.—Is it open to a jury to deliver their opinion on the facts only without returning a verdict of guilty or not guilty?—In a trial by jury of an accused for rape the jury having retired to consider their verdict returned to the Court and announced, through their foreman, that the prisoner "did the act with consent." Thereupon the Sessions Judge required the jury to say whether the accused was guilty or not. The jury then retired

and apply the law thereto. But that the second verdict could not be sustained, as there was nothing to show that the Judge gave the jury any fresh directions or explained to them that a finding that the woman had consented was tantamount to an acquittal, 19 B. 735. Where, instead of the ordinary verdict in the form of guilty or not guilty, a special verdict stating facts found by them is returned by the jury and this special verdict is ambiguous or defective in regard to matters forming part of the offence, e.g., intention, knowledge, common design or abetment, it is the duty of the Judge to ascertain its meaning by questioning the jury under this section. In dealing with a special verdict, the Judge is confined to the facts positively stated in the verdict, and cannot of himself, supplied by intendment or implication any defect in the statement, *Ratanlal 710*; see 30 C. 495. It is open to a jury to find a special verdict, a string of facts, as in *Reg v. Dudley*, 14 Q. B. D. 273, to which the Judge applies the law. The option is theirs, not his, 20 B. 215, where (*Ratanlal 710* and 15 B. 452 referred to). *Contra.*—In a case where the accused were charged with house-breaking by night and with dacoity, the jury were asked to deliver their verdict and then the foreman said "we find that the accused were present at the dacoity, but there is no evidence they shared the common purpose of those engaged in the dacoity, or were assisting in it." The Judge informed the jury that a verdict of guilty or not guilty of the offence charged must be returned and added, "the question for you, gentlemen, is whether you think they were there in pursuance of the common purpose of those who were engaged in the dacoity and whether you think they had that purpose

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in arriving at it." After some consultation in the box by the jury, the Court said,—"I shall direct you, gentlemen, that on that finding, your verdict should be not guilty. The jury expressed a desire to return again for consultation and, after doing so, the foreman said that their finding was "guilty," as the very presence of the accused at the time was sufficient to justify a finding that they were guilty of dacoity. The Judge accepted the finding and convicted the accused. It was contended that when the foreman said that the accused were present at the dacoity but that there was no evidence of a common purpose, the Judge was bound to have recorded a verdict of not guilty and acquitted the accused, *held*, that the procedure adopted by the Judge was correct and the conviction was upheld. No doubt according to English Law it is open to the jury to deliver a special verdict *etc.*, deliver their opinion on the facts leaving it to the Judge to draw the legal inference from the facts found but the Code does not recognize any distinction between a "general" verdict and "special" verdict. The jury are bound to deliver a verdict of not guilty, or guilty, 13 Cr. L. J. 586. (M.)

8. Delivery of verdict by the foreman binds rest of the jurors—Evidence of individual jurors as to how the verdict was arrived at inadmissible.—The assent of all the jurors to a verdict pronounced by the foreman in the presence and the hearing of the rest, without their express dissent is to be conclusively presumed *Archbold*, p 227. After the verdict, however, has once been pronounced by the jury and accepted it is final as regards its meaning and effect, and no statements by the jurors, whether on affidavit or on ex —
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In this case the Court was satisfied by the evidence of by-standers that certain of the jurors had not heard the verdict announced by the foreman, the Court having declined to receive the affidavits of the jurors, and allowed a re-trial. The Court will not take notice of a letter written by a jurymen after a trial to the trial Judge, *R v Mith*, C. C. A.—11 Cr. Ap. Rep. 100. In 6 P. R. 1913 = 2 P. W. R. 1913 = 13 Cr. L. J. 815, a Full Bench of the Punjab Chief Court held that the Courts in British India were bound by s. 304 of the Code and could not disturb a verdict openly given in Court. *PER RATTIGAN, J.*—In every case, however, that I have consulted, the Judges have been agreed that affidavits by particular jurors that the verdict announced in Court by the foreman did not represent their opinions, or that they were under a misapprehension of law or of fact in not protesting forthwith against such verdict, have invariably been rejected on the ground that it would be against public policy to permit jurors, who have left the Court, and in all probability discussed the case with outsiders, to endeavor subsequently to set aside a verdict, to which, by their silence, they have impliedly given their consent. In my opinion this is a principle which in the true interests of administration of justice ought not to be departed from, save only in the exceptional cases above referred to. (See Note 3 under s. 304.) In 40 C. 693, the facts were that the jury returned a verdict of guilty on the 7th which the Judge accepted but deferred passing sentence till the 9th. On the 8th, information was given to the Judge that the jury had arrived at their verdict by casting lots and their verdict was vitiated. [*Hale v Cove*, (1725) 1 Str. 642.] The Judge sentenced the accused and examined the individual jurors and referred the matter to the High Court, *held* that the sworn statements of jurors and evidence of admissions by them, as to the mode in which their verdict was arrived at were inadmissible. But the evidence of other persons is admissible [*Owen v Warburton*, (1805) 1 B. and P. 326, 1 = 127 Eng. Rep. 439. *Strater v Graham*, (1839) 4 M. and W. 721; *Burgess v Langley*, (1843) 5 M. and G 722, 1 = 134 Eng. Rep. 750 and *Queen v Murphy*, (1869) L. R. 2 P. C. App. Cas. 535 referred to.] The evidence in the case was held insufficient to prove that the verdict was arrived at by casting lots. See also *Taylor on Evidence*, Vol 1 (10 edn), p 670, *Russell* (7 edn), p 604. If the verdict is pronounced and one of the jury is so drunk or otherwise incapable that he cannot or does not assent a conviction in such a case would, it seems, be bad. See *ex-parte Morris* (1807) 72 J. P. 5 and Note 3 to s. 300.

9. Powers of jury to return a verdict in respect of an offence not charged.—

(1) *Jury may ignore graver charges and find accused guilty of lesser one*—A jury trying an offence triable by jury has authority under s. 238, to find as an incident to such trial that certain facts only are proved in the trial which facts constitute a minor offence and return a verdict of guilty of such offence, though such minor offence be not triable by jury. Sessions Judge may thereupon record a judgment, convicting the accused of such minor offence although he is not charged with and tried for it with the aid of the jurors as assessors. *PER BHASINIAM AYYANGAR J.*, 26 M. 243. See also 3 W. R. 41; 20 B. 215; 15 C. W. N 344 and 3 C. 189, and Notes to s. 238. It is open to a jury to bring in a verdict of guilty of abetment of robbery when the charge is for dacoity only, 16 Cr. L. J. 678 (Bar.)

2 Hence to restore the wasted vigor of, to renew
in strength or health, to re-invigorate
3 To supply with new men, as an army, to fill
up or make up by enlistment
Syn — To repair, recover, regain, retrieve

Re-cru-it' (re krye') n The quality or state of be-
ing right lined
So it is with the recent accuracy or undulatory motion of
light
Re-cru-it' (re krye') n In a right line

When any word has been used to signify an idea, the old
idea will recur to the mind when the word is heard.
2 To occur at a stated interval or according to
some regular rule, as the fever will recur to night
3 To resort, to have recourse to go for help
If to avoid succession in eternal ex-istence they recur to the
"punctuating points" of the schools, if any, it very bit a help to
to a more you live idea of infinite duration
Recurring decimal See DECIMAL — Recurring series
Brown & Co
of certain
if man

Re-cru-it' (re krye') n

Re-cru-it' (re krye') n
There is a sublimity in conscious rectitude to compar-
ison in which the pressure of facts are not worth naming
Syn — See JUSTICE

In western warfare a weary wagon d'course. Synonym.
Re-cure' n. Cure, recovery (Obs)
But whom he hits without recure he dies. Fairfax
Re-cure'less, a Incapable of cure or remedy

Rectangular or
Heet an gu la

Re-cti-fi-ca-ble a [From rectify]
1 Capable of being rectified, corrected or set

Recurrent crystal (Crystallog) a crystal whose faces
being counted in some or ranges from one extremity to

RECURRING
After the re-formation of his views he was incapable of com-
promising with profounder shades of error. De Quincey
2 (Chem) The process of refining or purifying

re-ctus, from re, again
ed] Vast or curved
Derham
formity See RECUS
Cole
is p of recusatore

in the household of the
at
[See supra]

(ii) *Jury may return verdict of attempt to commit offence when principal offence is charged*—Where the accused was charged and tried for the offence of rape, *held* it was competent to the jury to bring in a verdict that the charge of rape was not proved but that the prisoner was guilty of an attempt to commit rape and it is open to the Judge to accept the verdict 13 O. C. 295 = 11 Cr. L. J. 830. See s. 237

(iii) *Jury may return verdict in the alternative*—A jury may under certain circumstances return a verdict in the alternative, *e.g.*, when it is doubtful under which of two sections or which part of the same section of the Penal Code the offence falls, or the jury might convict on a minor offence, though not specifically charged. But under all circumstances, the jury if so inclined to act, should ask for and obtain the instructions of the Judge, 5 C. 871 = 6 C. L. R. 349.

(iv) *Offence charged ss 341/523, power to find guilty of s 325, I P C*—It is not open to the jury to bring in a verdict of guilty of grievous hurt when the charge is one combined with s 149, I P C., see Note 10 to s 238

302. If the jury are not unanimous, the Judge may require them to retire for further consideration. After such a period as the Judge considers reasonable, the jury may deliver their verdict, although they are not unanimous

Procedure where jury differ

Notes.—1 **Unanimous verdict must be received unless contrary to law.**—It is only in a case where a jury are not unanimous that a Court may require them to retire for further consideration. Where the verdict is unanimous it must be received by the Judge, unless contrary to law, 5 C. 871 = 6 C. L. R. 349; 11 Cr. L. J. 557 (C.); 16 Cr. L. J. 678 (Bar.); 3 L. B. R. 75. See 1 W. R. 41, in which it was *held*, that where a jury is not unanimous the Judge is not bound to summon a new jury

1-A. **Section has no application after delivery of verdict.**—The Judge can ask the jury to retire for further consideration when he ascertains that they are not unanimous and before the delivery of their verdict, but cannot do so after the actual delivery of the verdict, 7 L. B. R. 140 = 15 Cr. L. J. 678.—Whatever may be the individual opinion of the Judge in the matter, if he goes so far as to ask the jury what was the exact majority and what was the opinion of the majority, he ought to receive that verdict without hesitation, 10 C. 140. The Judge may act under s. 302 when he has merely ascertained from the jury in what proportion they are divided and it is only when the nature of the actual finding has been disclosed that the Court is debarred from sending the jury back, 7 L. B. R. 140 = 15 Cr. L. J. 678.

2 **Judge has no power to control the verdict.**—Where a Sessions Judge refused to accept the verdict of the jury acquitting the prisoner on the first count, and finding him guilty on the second required them to find the prisoner guilty on the first count *held*, that the Judge had no power to control the verdict of the jury in this manner. Having left the several charges to jury, it must be presumed that he considered that there was evidence in support of each of those charges, and it was for the jury alone to acquit or convict the prisoner on the several charges, as they thought proper. The Judge should have recorded the first finding of the jury which is the verdict in the case and sentenced the prisoner accordingly, 7 W. R. 22.

3 **When verdict is unanimous, reason cannot be asked of jury.**—Questions by a Judge demanding the jury's reason for acquitting the accused by an unanimous verdict without any uncertain sound exceed the limits of questioning which the law contemplates, where they were not unanimous, the Judge may further direct on matters of law and require them to retire for further consideration, *Ratanlal* 736 which follows 15 B. 452 and 8 C. 739. There is nothing in the Code which empowers a Judge to question the jury as to their reasons for an unanimous verdict when there is nothing ambiguous in the verdict itself 22 M. L. J. 355 = 13 Cr. L. J. 285. See also 36 M. 585 and Note 2 to s. 303

4. **When direction for further deliberation proper.**—When in a murder case the jury returned the following verdict—'We have no doubt the prisoner killed N, we think N gave no provocation, but we do not think it murder, because the prisoner had no object in killing him,' the Calcutta High Court *held* that this was clearly not such a verdict as could have been received and the jury were properly directed by the Sessions Judge to reconsider the verdict 1 W. P. 50. When the jury are not unanimous, it is open to the Judge to require them to retire for further consideration, 1 W. P. 50. When the jury are unanimous, it is not open to the Judge to require them to retire for further consideration, 1 W. P. 50. When there are

the jury brings in, he may direct them to reconsider it. If their verdict is meaningless or inconsistent he may refuse to accept it. If, however, they insist on a general verdict of guilty or not guilty, the Judge must accept it, *R v Meany*, (1862) L. and C. 213; *Halsbury, Vol. IX, p. 373, Archbold, p. 234*

5 Where jury are not clear about the law the Judge bound to explain again.—When the jury were apparently not able to follow the summing up of the Judge as regards the law bearing on the charges, *held* it was clearly the duty of the Judge when he was told that they did not understand the law in the matter to explain to them again, 1911 M. W. N. 190. See also 6 Bom. L. R. 233 and Note 39 at p. 800

Verdict to be given on each charge.

Judge may question jury

Questions and answers to be recorded

303. (1) Unless otherwise ordered by the Court, the jury shall return a verdict on all the charges on which the accused is tried, and the Judge may ask them such questions as are necessary to ascertain what their verdict is

(2) Such questions and the answers to them shall be recorded

Notes.—1. **Questions may be put only when verdict is incomplete or ambiguous in order to ascertain what the verdict really is**—The law does not prescribe any specific form in which the jury ought to return their finding, and they are at liberty to deliver it in any form which they think fit. And if that finding is not exhaustive as to the facts in issue which go to make the charge or charges, it is competent to the Judge, and is, indeed, his duty, to put such questions to them as shall elicit a complete finding, 14 W. R. 59 = 8 B. L. R. 557. "It is only when it is necessary in order to ascertain what the verdict of the jury really is, that the Judge is justified in putting questions to the jury. Unless a necessity of this kind truly exists the questions are not justified in law. No doubt the Legislature thought that it would be very dangerous to give the Sessions Court the power of cross-examining the jury after they had delivered their final verdict with a view to show that the conclusions at which they had arrived were not logical or were inconsistent, or in order to provide materials upon which the Judge might be enabled afterwards to dispute the finality of the verdict. But in this instance it does appear from the answers which the foreman returned upon being asked to give the verdict of the jury on the first charge, that there was at the time some lurking uncertainty in the minds of the jury themselves as regards their verdict, and we think that this uncertainty in their minds made itself apparent to the Judge, and that therefore, on the whole, the questions which were put by him were rightly put within the discretion vested in him by this section." *Per PHEAR, J.*, in 21 W. R. 1. See 20 W. R. 50. Where the verdict is ambiguous, it is the duty of the Sessions Judge to ascertain what the jury meant its verdict to be and this section empowers a Judge to ask such questions as are necessary for such purpose. Thus, where in the trial of three persons, the jury returned a verdict of "not guilty" in respect of two and added that the third accused was '*Kam Doshi*' (a little or less guilty) it was *held*, that the Sessions Judge should have refused to accept such a verdict and should have required the jury to give a proper verdict by means of questions put to them, 7 C. W. N. 135. Where the jury returned a verdict of 'guilty but not voluntarily' on a trial under s. 326 and the Judge without further questioning the jury accepted the verdict as one of *guilty* and convicted the prisoner under s. 333, *held* by the Full Bench, that the verdict was in effect one of "not guilty" and the Judge was wrong without further questioning the jury in treating it as a verdict of "guilty," 12 C. W. N. 530 = 7 Cr. L. J. 362. It has been repeatedly laid down that the Judge is only entitled to question the jury as to their verdict when it is ambiguous or incomplete, 36 M. 585.

2. Where verdict clear and full, Judge bound to record without questioning—Where the verdict although perhaps erroneous is not ambiguous, it is the duty of the Judge to record it without further question, 9 C. 53 = 11 C. L. R. 169; 30 M. 469. It is the duty of the Judge simply to accept the verdict without any question,

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to
the jury after it has delivered its verdict with a view to bring on record the points on which his opinion is at variance with the jury *Ratanlal* 442; 15 B. 432; 14 B. 115 and 20 B. 215. See also 8 C. 739; 6 Bom. L. R. 258 and 361; 19 B. 733; 28 B. 412; 29 M. 91; 30 M. 469; 36 M. 585; 22 M. L. J. 355 = 13 Cr. L. J. 285; 7 L. B. R. 140 = 18 Cr. L. J. 678 and Note 1

3. Reasons for verdict cannot be asked—A Judge ought not to put any questions to any of the jury as to his reasons for the verdict he has given 20 W. R. 50; 9 C. 53 = 11 C. L. R. 169 *contra* see 1 C. L. R. 275, where PRINSEP J., held that the law did not prevent the Judge from questioning the jury as to the grounds on which they based their verdict. A Judge is not entitled to ask the jury their reasons for the verdict. He is not entitled to put questions to them to show that the conclusions at which they arrived were not logical or consistent. Though he is entitled under certain circumstances to refer the case to the High Court for decision he cannot put any question to the jury or come to a conclusion upon the case himself. Any ambiguity in the verdict is the only justification for any question by the Judge. It is true that it may be of very great assistance to a Judge to know the reasons for the verdict of the jury to make up his own mind whether it is necessary to differ from the jury or not. But the jurors would not generally be able to state their reasons very clearly 30 M. 469, followed 13 Cr. L. J. 586 (M.). The Code does not empower a Judge to question the jury as to their reasons for an unanimous verdict where there is nothing ambiguous in the verdict itself 22 M. L. J. 335 = 13 Cr. L. J. 285. It is a serious irregularity opposed to the fundamental principle and scheme of trial by jury if a Judge puts questions to each of the jurors and records their opinions 36 M. 585. A Judge ought not to treat them as assessors. See Note 1 to s. 302 and 20 W. R. 73. See however 35 C. 629, 29 M. 91 and 18 C. L. J. 522, 11 L. W. 561, 43 M. 744.

3 A Judge not to make minute inquiries to learn the nature of the majority of jury—Although this section empowers a Judge to ask the jury such questions as are necessary to ascertain what their verdict is it was never contemplated that on ascertaining that the jury are not unanimous the Judge should make minute inquiries to learn the nature of the majority and its opinion so that he should have the opportunity of accepting or refusing that opinion as a verdict according as it coincides with his own opinion or not. Whatever may be the opinion of the Judge if he goes so far as to ask the jury what the exact majority is and what the opinion of that majority is he ought to receive that verdict without hesitation 10 C. 140 = 13 C. L. R. 358.

4. Where verdict is vague or ambiguous, proper course is to question the jury and not to ask them to retire for further consideration.—In 3 L. B. R. 75 = 3 Cr. L. J. 1, the jury returned an ambiguous verdict and the Judge instead of proceeding under this section by questioning asked them to retire for further consideration. The conviction and sentence based on the second verdict was held altogether illegal. See also 2 L. L. J. 573 = 2 Cr. L. J. 357 and Note 4 to s. 302. But where the verdict is vague or uncertain in its meaning or effect, the proper course is for the Judge to ask the jury such questions as may be necessary to ascertain what their verdict really means. Thus *e.g.*, where the verdict is *guilty of culpable homicide not amounting to murder* as the punishment for that offence varies with regard to the intention or knowledge with which the act of causing death was committed the Judge should ask such questions as would enable him to ascertain the exact nature of that offence found to have been committed. If he does not do so the verdict of the jury must be taken to have found that the lesser form of the offence has been committed 6 B. L. R. Appx. LXXXVI = 12 W. R. 33, 20 B. 215. The jury when questioned for this purpose can no longer return a verdict of *guilty of murder*. If they return such a verdict the Judge must simply treat it as a verdict under the first part of s. 304 I. P. C. Ratanlal 982.

5 Jury should be asked to return verdict on each one of the heads of charge.—In a trial by jury the Sessions Judge ought to call on the jury to return a verdict on each one of the heads of charge. If the trial is for murder of two persons and the jury return a verdict of guilty the Sessions Judge ought to ascertain whether the verdict relates to the killing of one or the other or both Ratanlal 746. It is inexpedient to put a series of questions to the jury unless when called on for their verdict on different heads of charge they find themselves in difficulties which have to be resolved in that way Ratanlal 289. Where the jury convicted an accused on the second head of the charge and acquitted him on the first and the Judge required them to re-consider the verdict it was held he was bound to receive the verdict 7 W. R. 22.

6 When charges are in the alternative the jury may be asked to ascertain the exact nature of the verdict.—Where a case depends on inferences to be drawn from two or three facts neither principle nor statute forbids the Sessions Judge from asking the jury to state a plain concise finding on those facts 15 B. 452. But where the Sessions Judge in a case of rioting with deadly weapons considered that probably the common object

section any question for the purpose of ascertaining what their verdict was based upon it was held that the Judge misdirected the jury and the verdict leaving it uncertain what was the common object of the accused was bad and that the conviction must be set aside 21 C. 935.

REHASH, r t { jump & p REHASHED p pr t
rb n REHASHING } (I'll fix and hash } to hash
over a, a, a

A strip of or hide deprived of hair, and rendered
flexible, used for twisting into ropes, &c. { wash
Arid }

Meaning in the palace wood by means of it there will be
renewal

To expect to recite tell r narrate r Rere t

In
son t
By
accol

We be
recit

We be

1 to heat as in
2 To cho r up exceedingly to revive, to re

John { Obs }

If it would I comfort and r heat

All your domain n chief undertake or direction
He who like a father held his reign { ops } Reim (rin) r t

He in still r t { jump & p REINTEGRATE
p pr & to n REINTEGRATING } (I'll fix re
tact all By re-integrating } to hash again to
new

REINTEGRATE
REINTEGRATE
REINTEGRATE

REINTEGRATE

part mammal of
the deer k l of
several species,

REINTEGRATE

7. When jury finds provocation, Judge should ascertain its nature.—In a trial for murder, the first verdict returned by the jury was "guilty of murder under grave and sudden provocation." On being told by the Judge that their duty, after considering the question of provocation, was to acquit or convict of the charge of murder alone, the jury retired and brought in a verdict of "not guilty," *held*, that the first verdict was a verdict of murder, as the provocation does not reduce the offence to culpable homicide unless it destroys the power of self-control, a fact which the verdict did not find. Whether in the opinion of the jury there was, by reason of provocation destruction of the power of self-control, could have been ascertained by the Judge by questioning them under this section, 20 B. 215. Also the direction given to the jury after the first verdict to return a verdict of "guilty" or "not guilty" was clearly wrong as the case fell under s. 238 and although the charge was *one* under s. 302, I P C., the jury had a right to bring in a verdict under s. 304, I P C., if there was grave and sudden provocation, so as to deprive the prisoner of the power of self-control, 5 C. 871 = 6 C. L. R. 349; 20 C. 493. *See* also the remarks of SARGENT, C J, in 8 B. 200 and 3 C. 189.

8. Questions put and answers elicited to be recorded in exact words.—The questions put to the jury and the answers given must be recorded in exact language used and not merely their substance, 8 C. 739. *See* also 1911 M. W. N. 190 = 9 M. L. T. 345 = 12 Cr. L. J. 140

9. Effect of not noticing verdict on some of the charges.—Where an indictment contains two counts for misdemeanour to which the defendant pleads "not guilty," and the finding of the jury is guilty on the second count (without noticing the first) whereupon judgment is passed, such judgment is not affected by reason of no finding being entered on the first count, for each count is a separate indictment on which a separate judgment can be entered. *Archbold*, pp 234 and 235 where *Ratham v R*, 5 B. and 8 635 = 33 L. J. (M. C.) 197 is referred to. *See* s. 403 and *cf* 41 C. 1072.

10 When verdict is given on the major charge with which the Judge agrees, verdict on the lesser charge ought not to be taken.—Where the charges were under ss. 302, 304 and 328, I P C., and on the jury bringing in a verdict of guilty under s. 302 by a majority of 8 to 1, the Judge accepted the same, sentenced the accused and did not take the verdict of the jury on the other counts. It was contended that as the jury returned a majority verdict only on the charge under s. 302, it was incumbent on the Judge to take their verdict on the charge under s. 304. *Held*, that there was no error. If the Judge agrees with the opinion of the majority of the jury, he must give judgment in accordance with such opinion. On a verdict of murder being given it is certainly not competent to the Court to take any verdict on the lesser charge of culpable homicide. It would not only be superfluous, but impossible, 19 C. W. N. 653 = 16 Cr. L. J. 561.

304. When, by accident or mistake, a wrong verdict is delivered, the

Amending verdict. jury may, before or immediately after it is recorded, amend the verdict, and it shall stand as ultimately amended

Notes.—1. When verdict is not delivered by accident or mistake, jury not entitled to amend it.—A Judge asked a jury as to their reasons for a verdict which was unanimous and unambiguous and in consequence two of the jury were led to say that they had been misled by the notes of the foreman as to some of the evidence and that they would like to reconsider the case with the result that the jury unanimously brought a verdict exactly opposite to the first, *held* that this was not a case in which it could be said that a verdict was delivered by accident or mistake and the High Court set aside all the proceedings taken on delivery of the jury's first verdict and directed the Sessions Judge to try that case from that point in accordance with law, 22 M. L. J. 335 = 13 Cr. L. J. 285. Accused was tried by jury before a Court of Session for murder under s. 302, I P C. The jury by a majority returned a verdict of guilty under s. 304, I P C. The Sessions Judge thereupon asked the jury to consider for the purposes of the latter section whether they found that accused had intended to cause the death of the deceased. The jury retired, and on returning informed the Judge that they wished to alter their verdict as they were unanimously of opinion that accused was guilty of murder. The Judge recorded this verdict and sentenced accused to transportation for life, *held*, treating the second verdict merely as a reply to the point which the jury had been asked to reconsider, *viz*, that there was an intention to cause death (1) that the offence proved fell under the first clause of s. 304 and not under s. 302, I P C., and the sentence was altered to one of transportation for ten years, *held*, further (2) that the second verdict could not stand, as all that the Judge had wished the jury to consider was, which of the two clauses of offences under s. 304 I P C., the majority of the jury had found the accused guilty of and they had, therefore no power to reconsider the whole case, and bring in an unanimous verdict of guilty of murder, an erroneous verdict not having been delivered by accident or mistake such as will entitle them to amend it under this

But speed it to relax their sacred ties.

Stolen

Syn - Liberation freedom discharge See DEATH
 Release - A person to whom a release is given

To relieve from constipation to loosen to open, as, medicines *relax* the bowels

Syn - To slacken loose a loose rein state mild rate ease abundant water

Re
 le

loss or decay

Shall we gaze the relief of this lamp?

Shall

In some houses sweetworts will relax more than in others
 Relax - Salt of tartar placed in a cellar will bring a to relax. *Relax*

I do act of relieving or the state of being relieved, the removal of any evil or of any thing oppressive or burdensome by which a state is able to suffer comfort ease, release

section and the Judge not having asked them to reconsider their first verdict under s 1702 Ratanlal 937 See 30 C. 483

2. Section does not apply where jury deliver wrong verdict owing to a misunderstanding of law—

This section obviously contemplates cases where the verdict delivered is not in accordance with what was really intended by the jury and does not apply to a case where the jury owing to a misunderstanding of the law arrive at a wrong conclusion, but there is no accident or mistake in the delivery of the verdict. The accused were tried before a jury on a charge under s. 232 I P. C. the jury returned an unanimous verdict of *not guilty*. The Judge thereupon questioned the jury as to their reasons and the jury answered that the accused had not actually been caught in the act of coining. The Judge then explained the law under s. 232 I P. C. and asked them to reconsider their verdict. Upon this, the jury returned an unanimous verdict *guilty* and the Judge accepting the verdict, sentenced the accused *held* that this section did not apply and s 303 limited the powers of the Judge to ask questions and hence the procedure adopted was irregular. If the jury returned a verdict owing to a misapprehension of law it can be corrected only by the Judge disagreeing with the jury and referring the case to the High Court under s. 307 23 B 412, where 6 Bom. L. R. 258, 19 B 735, 21 W. R. 1 are followed.

3. The power of amendment must be exercised before or immediately after verdict is recorded.—

According to English practice the jury may before the verdict is recorded (or even promptly after the verdict is recorded *R v Parkin 1 Mood 45*) rectify their verdict and it will stand ultimately as amended. This may be done even after the defendant has been discharged out of the dock (in pursuance of a supposed verdict of acquittal) if it is done before the jury have left the box *R v Vodden 23 L. J. (M. C.) 7 = 6 Cox C. C. 226 Archbold, p. 254*. In *R v Wooller*, 18 R. R. 402 = 2 Stark 111, it was proved to the satisfaction of the Court by extrinsic evidence that affidavits of bystanders that all the jurors had not heard the announcement of the verdict by the foreman and that some of the jurors did not concur in the verdict and the Court thereupon ordered a re-trial by a different jury. On the Judge being informed by the foreman that the jury were agreed upon their verdict which was one of acquittal on both the charges and thereupon verdict was recorded and the accused was discharged from custody. From information received some days afterwards the trying Judge was led to believe that as a matter of fact, the jurors were not agreed as regards the verdict. The Judge sent for the foreman, examined him on oath and discovered that the verdict on the second count was really a verdict of the majority of jurors and was

those in *R v Wooller*. Jurisdiction in criminal cases is not to be assumed and in regard to matter for which Legislature has made express provision it certainly must not be assumed in excess of the jurisdiction so conferred 6 P. R. 1913 (F. B.) = 9 P. W. R. 13 = 13 Cr. L. J. 815. The section provides for an amendment of a wrong verdict delivered by accident or mistake but clearly contemplates that such a verdict is amended only before or immediately after it is recorded in other words before the jurors have left the Court and while they are still under the observance of the presiding Judge. And the reason for this restriction is obvious for once the jurors have left the Court they are liable to outside influences and it would be in the highest degree dangerous thereafter to accept statements to modify the verdict.

Section 304 does not apply to a second verdict after hearing further evidence.—In a jury trial all the evidence on both the sides must be considered before the case can be submitted to the jury and once a verdict has been delivered there is no power in the trial Court or in the jury to reconsider that verdict except under s. 304. The second verdict is therefore a nullity and the judgment based upon it is without jurisdiction and void verdict of jury once given is final 4 Lah. 332

Verdict in High Court when to prevail

305. (1) When in a case tried before a High Court the jury are unanimous in their opinion or when as many as six are of one opinion and the Judge agrees with them the Judge shall give judgment in accordance with such opinion

(2) When in any such case the jury are satisfied that they will not be unanimous, but six of them are of one opinion the foreman shall so inform the Judge

Discharge of jury in their cases.

(3) If the Judge disagrees with the majority he shall at once discharge the jury

effects or of evidence to have confidence, to trust, to depend, — with o or rarely with s

To in thy native innocence rely

On what thou best of nature

Shak

Gray

On some fond breast the parting soul repose

Syn. — To trust depend confidence repose

1 The act of remarking or attentively noticing notice or observation

The cause though worth the search may yet elude

On return and remark however shown

2 The express on in speech or writing of some thing remarked or noticed the mention of that

with his worthy of attention or notice hence, also, allusion as a pertinent remark

variation note comment annotation.

Hopeless are all my evils, all remedies. N. H. 11

2 Not answering as a remedy hence ineffectual powerless in spable

Forced to forego the attempt

recessed

Spencer

or comprised.

Each only remained alive, and they that were with him in

That which remains with you for you to be kept until

the month

That an older brother has power over his brother remains

to be proved.

2 To continue in a fixed place an unchanged form or condition or undiminished quantity to abide to stay to endure to last

A woman dwells at thy father's house. Gen. xxviii. 11.

Child set on earth childless remains

Syn. — To continue to stay to abide to last to endure to last

He made it to go away to be left to the conqueror now

This is the place of the conqueror now

properly a transitive verb

3 To express in words or writing as observed or noted to call attention to to bring to notice

To say or observe

I shall only

Prefix remark

To mark

Waters

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What may be remedied or cured

to our own in sickness have wrought

is for a wrong

restoration

reparation

reparation

3 Specifically that

being after the following

— as only in the plural

In weeping with her

4 Also the prelude

To say or observe

I shall only

Prefix remark

To mark

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I will remain by this year as long

He made it to go away to be left to the conqueror now

This is the place of the conqueror now

properly a transitive verb

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(4) If there are not so many as six who agree in opinion the Judge shall after the lapse of such time as he thinks reasonable discharge the jury

Notes.—1. Verdict obtained by duress—In *Pierce v Pierce*, 38 Mich 412, the jury after being out for one day sent word to the Judge that they could not agree. The Judge sent back word that he did not believe it yet and added the suggestion that they had better agree that night as he was going away and should not be back until the second day after and they might not get discharged until he returned. The verdict was returned within an hour afterwards held that it must be set aside as obtained by duress. The Court said Jury trials can never be safe unless the verdict is made as far as possible on the unbiased and free conclusion of every juror. Every attempt to drive men into an agreement which they would not have reached freely is a perversion of justice. It may be discretionary with the trial Judge to keep a jury out until he is satisfied an honest and free agreement is not to be expected. But there is no legal propriety in keeping the jury confined unreasonably after they have come to an agreement and a verdict obtained by the suggestion of such an alternative is a verdict obtained by what it would be hard to distinguish from duress. It may be that the Court is not bound to be present continually on the chance of an agreement but any unusual and prolonged delay is not to be favoured without giving an opportunity to find a sealed verdict. This error however innocently committed as we are bound to suppose it was must nevertheless in our opinion be held fatal to the verdict.

2. When jury divided in the proportion of six to three, Judge bound to ascertain verdict before discharging them—Where in a trial at the High Court Sessions the jury were divided in the proportion of six to three and the presiding Judge without ascertaining what the verdict of the majority was discharged the jury and ordered a re-trial and on the re-trial coming on before a different Judge and jury, objection was taken to the competency of the tribunal to re-try the case on the ground that the jury in the first trial were improperly discharged and it could not be said the presiding Judge at the first trial agreed or disagreed with the verdict of the majority he not having ascertained what that verdict was held the Court as composed of the Judge and jury at the first trial has legal seisin of the case and no other Court could try the case. The point had not to be decided expressly as the Advocate General entered a *Nolle prosequi* 8 C. W. N. 43. See also 2 C. W. N. 481 and 7 C. W. N. 31.

3. Recording evidence after verdict illegal—Feeling doubt as to the correctness of a jury's verdict of guilty the Sessions Judge postponed passing sentence and thereafter examined certain witnesses in the absence of the jury and the prisoner and then agreeing with the verdict convicted and sentenced the accused. Held that in a jury trial the Judge had no jurisdiction to examine witnesses after the jury had been discharged and in the absence of the accused 7 Bom. L. R. 979—3 Cr. L. J. 42.

4. It is improper for a Judge to obtain verdict prematurely and discharge the jury because he disagrees with the verdict—After the evidence for the prosecution had been given and the accused's statements read the Judge thinking the jury would not be likely to convict upon the evidence already given asked the jury if they wished to hear the defence evidence. The jury misunderstanding the question replied that they found certain accused guilty and the others not guilty and the Judge thereupon dismissed the jury and tried the case again with a fresh jury. Held that the action of the Judge in re-commencing the trial with the aid of a fresh jury was not authorized by law and that the proper course was for the Judge to have explained to the jury that they misunderstood the purport of the question and to have directed them that it was their duty to hear the defence before making up their minds that the accused was guilty. *Weir II*, 497.

306. (1) When in a case tried before the Court of Session the Judge does not think it necessary to express disagreement with the verdict of the jurors or of a majority of the jurors he shall give judgment accordingly.

(2) If the accused is acquitted the Judge shall record judgment of acquittal. If the accused is convicted the Judge shall* unless he proceeds in accordance with the provisions of section 562 pass sentence on him according to law.

Notes.—1. Upon verdict of guilty, adequate sentence must be passed—Upon a verdict of guilty it is the duty of the Judge to pass a sentence adequate to the offence of which the prisoners stand convicted. Passing a nominal sentence on account of his disagreement with the verdict would amount to usurpation of the functions of the jury—*Mad H C Pro 8th November 1866* (3 W. R. Cr. Let. 16).

2. The Sessions Judge should state whether he agrees or disagrees with the verdict of the jury 15 W

R. 48

3. Sessions Judge not competent to refer to High Court after once accepting the verdict.—Where the verdict of the jury is once accepted and the case is postponed it is not open to the Sessions Judge to reconsider his order and refer the case to the High Court under s. 307. He is bound to pass sentence. 4 C. W. N. 693.

4. On acquittal, accused to be released immediately.—If the prisoner is acquitted, no warrant or release or intimation to the jail authority is necessary. The prisoner is entitled to be discharged from custody immediately on judgment of acquittal being pronounced and if there is no further charge pending against him his further detention is illegal. It is for the jail authorities in whose custody the prisoner was until the trial was concluded to satisfy themselves of the result of the trial and no formal warrant of release need be sent by the Court to the Superintendent of jail. **5 M H C R Appx XI**

307. (1) If in any such case the Judge disagrees with the verdict of the jurors or of a majority of the jurors on all or any of the charges on which * any accused

Procedure where Sessions Judge disagrees with verdict

Procedure where Sessions Judge disagrees with verdict.

(2) Whenever the Judge submits a case under this section he shall not record judgment of acquittal or of conviction on any of the charges on which § such accused has been tried but he may either remand § such accused to custody or admit him to bail

(3) In dealing with the case so submitted the High Court may exercise any of the powers which it may exercise on an appeal and subject thereto it shall after considering the entire evidence and after giving due weight to the opinions of the Sessions Judge and the jury acquit or convict & such accused of any offence of which the jury could have convicted him upon the charge framed and placed before it, and if it convicts him may pass such sentence as might have been passed by the Court of Session.

Notes.—1. The words 'any accused person' have been substituted for the words 'the accused' and the words 'in respect of such accused person' have been added. The reasons given for this amendment are 'this amendment prescribes that when a Judge accepts the verdict of the jury in respect of some of the accused but not of others he need only refer the case of the latter to the High Court. *Statement of Objects and Reasons 1914*

The words beginning with and in such case had been one of conviction have been newly added.

We think however that a further amendment is required in s. 307 to provide for the case of a person who is also charged with a previous conviction under s 310. It seems obvious that if the Judge disagrees with the verdict of the jury and submits the case to the High Court it is desirable that the record should be complete. We propose therefore to insert at the end of s 307 (1) a provision for the trial of the further charge under section 310. *Report Sel Com 1916*

POWERS OF SESSIONS JUDGE

2. When reference may be made — When a Judge differs from the unanimous verdict of a jury given in accordance with law the only procedure open to him to follow is that laid down by this section 5 C 871 = 6 C. L. R. 349 The disagreement may be on matters of fact as well as on matters of law, 11 B. L. R. 14

(i) *When the Judge thinks that the verdict is not supported by evidence*—The discretionary power to refer cases conferred on Sessions Judges by this section should always be exercised when the Judge thinks that the verdict is not supported by the evidence. It is the only way in which the miscarriage of justice by a perverse verdict of a jury can be remedied by the High Court. It should be borne in mind that there is no appeal (10 C. 1029) on the facts, not even in cases of acquittal and the rest of his failing to refer the case is that prisoners are convicted on evidence as to the sufficiency of which he is doubtful. 13 M. 343.

* The words in inverted commas substituted for the words "the accused" by Act VIII of 1931.

† The words in inverted commas inserted by Act XVIII of 1932.

* The words "such accused" were inserted for the words "the accused" by 442.

(ii) *When the verdict is erroneous owing to misapprehension of law*—If the Judge believes that the jury has returned an erroneous verdict owing to misapprehension of law, the mistake can be corrected only by the Judge disagreeing with the jury and referring the case to the High Court under this section, 23 B. 412; 23 M. L. J. 335 = 13 Cr. L. J. 285.

(iii) *When the Judge is 'clearly of opinion' that he should refer for the ends of justice*—Where a Sessions Judge made a reference on the ground that the question involved was one of mixed law and fact, 23 B. 523, followed in 20 B. 215; 23 C. W. N. 747.

And a reference under this section should be made only when the Judge is clearly of opinion that he should do so for ends of justice, 23 G. 555. The disagreement referred to in this section must be such a complete dissent as to lead the Judge to consider it necessary for the ends of justice to submit the case to the High Court, 2 B. 523, followed in 20 B. 215; 23 C. W. N. 747.

3. Reference should be made only when the verdict of the jury is manifestly wrong and not in every case of doubt nor in every case in which a view different from that of the jury can be entertained—In a case where the evidence against the accused was mainly of a circumstantial character, the jury acquitted the accused but the Sessions Judge disagreeing with the verdict referred the case to the High Court. The High Court in rejecting the reference remarked that not in every case of doubt, nor in every case in which a view different from that of a jury can be entertained on the evidence, that a reference under this section is to be made to the High Court, but the verdict of the jury should be manifestly wrong before such reference is made. The rule in cases where evidence is circumstantial is, that the facts found should be inconsistent on a reasonable hypothesis with the innocence of the accused before a conviction is pronounced, 41 C. 621; 26 Bom. L. R. 610.

3-A. When reference ought not to be made.—(i) *After accepting verdict*—Where, after the delivery of the verdict by the jury, the Sessions Judge recorded, "I see no reason for not accepting the verdict," but subsequently on reconsideration, he referred the case to the High Court, held, that it is not open to him to reconsider his order any more than it would be for the jury to reconsider their verdict once given and recorded. The terms of s. 369 preclude him from reconsidering his judgment, which was that he accepted the verdict, 4 C. W. N. 683. When a Sessions Judge thus acts under this section without jurisdiction the High Court has no power to act and consider the merits of the case on the evidence. *Ibid* cf. 41 C. 662.

(ii) *Where on his own showing in his charge to the jury, the prosecution evidence is open to doubt*—Where on his own showing in his charge to the jury the evidence is so open to hostile criticism as to justify the jury in regarding it with suspicion the Sessions Judge does not exercise a proper discretion in referring the case under this section 7 C. W. N. 135, but see 9 C. L. J. 432. In the latter case it was, however, held that it is not improper for a Judge to refer a case to the High Court merely because there is a weak link in the evidence or the prosecution to which he drew the attention of the jury and asked them to favour and consider before returning their verdict.

(iii) *Because the High Court had upon the same evidence convicted certain other persons in another case*—Again, where a Sessions Judge not accepting a verdict of "not guilty" referred the case to the High Court, because the High Court had upon the same evidence convicted certain other persons tried in another case. Held, that that fact was no justification for referring this case to the High Court, unless the Judge himself considered the evidence against present accused reliable, independently of the result of the other trial. The reference was accordingly returned with the direction "that he must appreciate the evidence and arrive at his own conclusions and it is only if he disagrees with the verdict of the jury that a reference should be made to the High Court," 6 Bom. L. R. 599.

4. The Judge who makes the reference must be the one who held the trial and not his successor.—A reference under this section is not invalid in consequence of its having been made by an officer who had held the trial, but who at the time of the reference had ceased to be a Judge. In fact the Judge who may make a reference under this section must be one who held the trial and heard the evidence and not the officer who succeeds him as Judge, 2 C. L. J. 43 = 2 Cr. L. J. 335.

5. Points to be noted when making reference.—A Sessions Judge ought to record distinctly whether he agrees with the jury or not, 7 W. R. 6.

(i) *The Judge should ask the jury for specific findings on the particular facts on which he himself relies*—Where the jury are unanimous in their verdict of not guilty, the Judge should ask for specific findings on the particular facts on which he himself relies. This would enable the High Court to understand the particular grounds on which the jury proceeded, and it will then only be necessary to consider the propriety of

those grounds *Weir II, 335*. A bare verdict of 'not guilty' may be as consistent with a belief of great part of the evidence for the prosecution as with a total disbelief of every part of it *41 C. 621; 16 Cr. L. J. 537 (Bar)* and see Notes to s. 303 as to the power of questioning the jury.

(si) *There should be no delay*—In cases in which the Sessions Judge has disagreed with the verdict or the jury no delay should be permitted to occur in the submission of the records with the Sessions Judge's letter of reference. It is open to the Government Pleader and to the pleader for the accused to make notes of the evidence as the case proceeds *Wilkins 115*.

(iii) *Judge should state his opinion on the evidence with his reasons*—It should clearly be stated in the letter of reference what material portions of the evidence the Sessions Judge believes to be true and what his reasons are for arriving at his conclusions: he should not content himself with his remarks to the jury and merely adding vaguely the remark for these and other reasons I submit the case for the orders of the High Court. *6 Bom. L. R. 519* DAVIES, J. in *29 M. 91*, CASPERSZ J. in *36 C. 629* and PRINSEP J. *1 C. L. R. 275* are of opinion that when a Judge makes up his mind to refer case he should proceed to question the jury and record their opinions and see also *20 W. R. 73*. In *9 C. 53* and *30 M. 439*, it was held that the Judge cannot ask the jury for their reasons. Where the Judge's charge to the jury is meagre it is necessary that the Judge should state in his reference the evidence for the prosecution and the defence. He ought also to state what facts in his opinion were proved upon the evidence recorded in the case and the conclusions to which those facts lead him. The witnesses were examined before the Judge and the law contemplates that the High Court should have his opinion upon the evidence before it can deal with the case. *6 Bom. L. R. 599*. In a reference therefore where the Judge merely said that the verdict was against the weight of evidence and expressed no other opinion it was observed that it was his duty to set out on what portions of the evidence or on what fact disclosed by the evidence the accused should have been convicted *7 C. W. N. 345, 6 Pat. L. J. 264*.

(iv) *He should state what offence the accused has committed and his reasons for differing from the jury*—In his letter of reference the Sessions Judge should also state what offence the accused has in his opinion committed and on what grounds in that respect he differs from the jury. He should state with some fulness his view of the evidence and the credibility of the more important witnesses, because the High Court has to act.

173 = 7 Cr

reference under this section should not ask the High Court to consider and determine the case on matters not placed before the jury. He should recollect that in a trial held by him he is exactly in the same position as the jury in dealing with the evidence properly given before him and that he is bound to confine his attention solely to that evidence *27 C. 295*.

(vi) *Judge ought not to call upon the accused to plead to previous convictions pending a reference*—The Sessions Judge ought not to call upon the accused to plead to previous convictions pending a reference to the High Court but he might be asked to record the plea after the Court has considered the reference *30 M. 134*. See Note 3 to s. 310.

(vii) *Unfair imputations to the jury ought not to find a place in the reference*—Where a Sessions Judge disagreed with the majority verdict and observed "four of the members of the jury were Hindus and one a Mussalman. One of the accused is an educated Hindu. I cannot but think that the majority of the jury returned a deliberately perverse verdict in order to secure the acquittal of this man. Held that such an imputation is unfair to the jury, to the Sessions Judge to the accused and to the High Court. *51 C. 418*.

3 A. Judge cannot refer whole case when he disagrees with the verdict in respect of some of several accused only—Sub-sec. (2) does not intend that when the Judge is not prepared to accept the verdict of the jury in its entirety the whole case is to be referred to the High Court. It only contemplates a reference to the case of those persons in respect of whom the Judge declines to accept the verdict. When the Judge agrees with the jury in respect of any particular accused the Judge ought to convict and sentence or acquit that accused as the case may be *42 C. 789*.

3-B. Copies of all essential documents should be sent—When cases are submitted to the High Court under this section, fair copies should be made and transmitted of all essential documents in the record.—*For H. C. Cr. Cir. pp. 46 and 47*.

REFERENCE IN CASES TRIABLE WITH ASSESSORS WHEN TRIED BY JURY

a. Joint trial of offences some triable by jury and some with the aid of assessors—The proper procedure is laid down by s. 269 (3), see Notes at p. 649 under s. 746 (3) and see s. 536 and Notes thereto.—S. 269

(11) *When the verdict is erroneous owing to misapprehension of law*—If the Judge believes that the jury has returned an erroneous verdict owing to misapprehension of law, the mistake can be corrected only by the Judge disagreeing with the jury and referring the case to the High Court under this section, 28 B. 415, 21 M. L. J. 355 = 13 Cr. L. J. 285.

(12) *When the Judge is clearly of opinion that he should refer for the ends of justice*—Where a Sessions Judge made a reference on the ground that the question involved was one of importance but it was not stated that he was clearly of opinion that it was necessary for the ends of justice to submit the case to the High Court and that he disagreed with the verdict of jury, the case was sent back directing the Judge to make a proper reference should he think it necessary to do so 9 C. W. N. 66. And a reference under this section should be made only when the Judge is clearly of opinion that he should do so for ends of justice, 25 C. 555. The disagreement referred to in this section must be such a complete dissent as to lead the Judge to consider it necessary for the ends of justice to submit the case to the High Court, 2 B. 525, followed in 20 B. 215; 23 C. W. N. 747.

3. Reference should be made only when the verdict of the jury is manifestly wrong and not in every case of doubt nor in every case in which a view different from that of the jury can be entertained—In a case where the evidence against the accused was mainly of a circumstantial character, the jury acquitted the accused but the Sessions Judge disagreeing with the verdict referred the case to the High Court. The High Court in rejecting the reference remarked that not in every case of doubt nor in every case in which a view different from that of a jury can be entertained on the evidence, that a reference under this section is to be made to the High Court, but the verdict of the jury should be manifestly wrong before such reference is made. The rule in cases where evidence is circumstantial is that the facts found should be inconsistent on a reasonable hypothesis with the innocence of the accused before a conviction is pronounced 41 C. 621, 26 Bom. L. R. 610.

3-A. When reference ought not to be made.—(i) *After accepting verdict*—Where, after the delivery of the verdict by the jury, the Sessions Judge recorded, "I see no reason for not accepting the verdict, but subsequently on reconsideration, he referred the case to the High Court, held that it is not open to him to reconsider his order any more than it would be for the jury to reconsider their verdict once given and recorded. The terms of s. 369 preclude him from reconsidering his judgment, which was that he accepted the verdict, 4 C. W. N. 683. When a Sessions Judge thus acts under this section without jurisdiction the High Court has no power to act and consider the merits of the case on the evidence Ibid cf 41 C. 662.

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(iii) *Because the High Court had upon the same evidence convicted certain other persons in another case*—Again where a Sessions Judge not accepting a verdict of 'not guilty,' referred the case to the High Court, because the High Court had upon the same evidence convicted certain other persons tried in another case. Held that that fact was no justification for referring this case to the High Court, unless the Judge himself considered the evidence against present accused reliable independently of the result of the other trial. The reference was accordingly returned with the direction that he must appreciate the evidence and arrive at his own conclusions and it is only if he disagrees with the verdict of the jury that a reference should be made to the High Court, 6 Bom. L. R. 599.

4. The Judge who makes the reference must be the one who held the trial and not his successor—A reference under this section is not invalid in consequence of its having been made by an officer who had held the trial, but who at the time of the reference had ceased to be a Judge. In fact, the Judge who may make a reference under this section must be one who held the trial and heard the evidence and not the officer who succeeds him as Judge, 2 C. L. J. 48 = 2 Cr. L. J. 336.

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(i) *The Judge should ask the jury for specific findings on the particular facts on which he himself relies*—Where the jury are unanimous in their verdict of not guilty the Judge should ask for specific findings on the particular facts on which he himself relies. This would enable the High Court to understand the particular grounds on which the jury proceeded, and it will then only be necessary to consider the propriety of

those grounds, *Wells* 11, 383. A bare verdict of 'not guilty' may be as consistent with a belief of great part of the evidence for the prosecution, as with a total disbelief of every part of it, 41 C. 621; 16 Cr. L. J. 537 (*Bur*) and see Notes to s. 303 as to the power of questioning the jury.

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merely adding vaguely the remark 'for these and other reasons' I submit the case for the orders of the High Court.' 6 Bom. L. R. 519. *DAVIES, J.*, in 29 M. 91, *CASPERZ, J.*, in 36 C. 629 and *PRINSEP, J.*, 1 C. L. R. 275 are of opinion that when a Judge makes up his mind to refer case he should proceed to question the jury and record their opinions and see also 20 W. R. 73. In 9 C. 53 and 30 M. 439, it was held that the Judge cannot ask the jury for their reasons. Where the Judge's charge to the jury is meagre, it is necessary that the Judge should state in his reference the evidence for the prosecution and the defence. He ought also to state what facts in his opinion were proved upon the evidence recorded in the case and the conclusions to which those facts lead him. The witnesses were examined before the Judge and the law contemplates that the High Court should have his opinion upon the evidence before it can deal with the case. 6 Bom. L. R. 599. In a reference, therefore, where the Judge merely said that the verdict was against the weight of evidence and expressed no other opinion, it was observed that it was his duty to set out on what portions of the evidence, or on what facts disclosed by the evidence the accused should have been convicted, 7 C. W. N. 345; 6 Pat. L. J. 264.

(iv) *He should state what offence the accused has committed and his reasons for differing from the jury*—In his letter of reference the Sessions Judge should also state what offence the accused has, in his opinion, committed and on what grounds, in that respect, he differs from the jury. He should state with some fulness his view of the evidence and the credibility of the more important witnesses, because the High Court has to attach more or less weight to the opinion of the Judge who saw and heard the witnesses, 40 Bom. L. R. 173 = 7 Cr. L. J. 192. See also 3 C. 623 = 2 C. L. R. 304; 2 C. L. R. 1 and 20 W. R. 70. See Note 7.

(v) *He should not refer to matters not placed before the jury*—A Sessions Judge in making a reference under this section should not ask the High Court to consider and determine the case on matters not placed before the jury. He should recollect, that in a trial held by him, he is exactly in the same position as the jury in dealing with the evidence properly given before him, and that he is bound to confine his attention solely to that evidence, 27 C. 295.

(vi) *Judge ought not to call upon the accused to plead to previous convictions pending a reference*—The Sessions Judge ought not to call upon the accused to plead to previous convictions pending a reference to the High Court, but he might be asked to record the plea after the Court has considered the reference, 30 M. 134. See Note 3 to s. 310.

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5-A. *Judge cannot refer whole case when he disagrees with the verdict in respect of some of several accused only*.—Sub-sec. (2) does not intend that when the Judge is not prepared to accept the verdict of the jury in its entirety, the whole case is to be referred to the High Court. It only contemplates a reference to the case of those persons in respect of whom the Judge declines to accept the verdict. When the Judge agrees with the jury in respect of any particular accused, the Judge ought to convict and sentence or acquit that accused as the case may be, 42 C. 789.

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REFERENCE IN CASES TRIABLE WITH ASSESSORS WHEN TRIED BY JURY.

6. *Joint trial of offences some triable by jury and some with the aid of assessors*.—The proper procedure is laid down by s. 269 (3), see Notes at p. 649 under s. 746 (3) and see s. 536 and Notes thereto.—S. 269

(3) applies only to cases where the accused is charged with distinct offences some of which are triable by jury and some with the aid of assessors. In such cases if all the charges are tried by jury and their verdict taken, the Judge disagreeing with the verdict refers the whole case to the High Court under this section. In 8 Bom. L. R. 599 = 4 Cr. L. J. 192; 9 Bom. L. R. 1057 = 7 Cr. L. J. 236 and *Madras Referred Case 9 of 1906*, the High Court dealt with the verdict on the offences triable by a jury and returned the records to the Sessions Judge so that he might deal with the offence triable with the aid of assessors remarking that the Judge should not have joined these latter offences in the reference while in 23 B. 696 it was held following 4 C. L. R. 405, 25 C. 553 and *Ratanlal 600*, that although the procedure of the Sessions Judge was irregular, the trial by jury must be accepted as legal and the case held to be one that can be submitted under s. 307. On the reasoning adopted in 25 B. 680 (F.B.) and 33 B. 423, the latter view seems to be preferable, but see 36 M. L. J. 452 (contra).

7. Single offence triable with aid of assessors tried by jury.—An accused was tried by a jury for having delivered a counterfeit coin, s. 240, I P C., and jury returned a verdict of not guilty. The Sessions Judge disagreeing with the jury was about to refer the case under s. 307, when it was brought to his notice that the offence had not been declared triable by a jury and ought to have been tried with assessors and the Judge thereupon treating the verdict of the jury as the opinion of the assessors convicted the accused, held, that the conviction was bad, inasmuch as the case was validly tried by a jury within the meaning of s. 536 and the trial was complete when the verdict was delivered and the Judge was bound either to give judgment in accordance with it or refer the case under s. 307. 25 C. 555.

8. Where in trial of offence triable by jury, verdict of offence triable with aid of assessors is delivered.—When in a case the jury in trying a compound case incidentally (without any separate charge) find the accused guilty of a minor offence triable with the aid of assessors, it is submitted that it is competent to the Judge and he is bound if he disagrees with the verdict of the jury on the minor offence while accepting their verdict on the compound offence, to make a reference under this section. See the judgment of BHASHYAM IYENGAR, J. in 26 M. 243.

PROCEDURE AND POWERS OF HIGH COURT.

9. It is for the High Court to refer a case to the High Court.—If the Sessions Judge, after consulting the jury and after referring the case to the High Court, is of opinion that the case should be referred to the High Court, he may have to the Sessions Judge's recommendation, 19 W. R. 38.

10. Government as appellants to begin.—In a case referred to the High Court under this section, it is for the Government, the appellants, who ask for conviction, to begin and satisfy the Court that there is a case calling upon the prisoner for an answer, 20 W. R. 33.

11. Where Judge and jury agree, is High Court bound to accept their opinion?—In a reference under this section the High Court is bound to accept the opinions of the Judge and the jury where they agree, and it is not open to it to believe evidence which both have disbelieved, *Ratanlal 924*. But under the present Code, the High Court can act on its own view, 29 C. 128; 9 C. L. J. 432.

11-A. High Court cannot interfere with verdict, if Judge does not refer.—The High Court cannot interfere with the verdict of a jury when the Sessions Judge has refused to refer the case and there has been no material misdirection in the case, and no failure of justice has been caused, 4 M. L. T. 433; see also 14 M. 36, where although the Judge did not agree with the verdict he did not refer the case to the High Court as there was evidence against the accused which it was open to the jury to believe. On appeal by Government on the ground that the Sessions Judge ought to have referred the case to the High Court, held, that since there has been no misdirection by the Judge and there was some evidence to support the verdict, the High Court had no power to interfere. However absurd the verdict might be considered. See also 13 B. L. B. Appx. XIX; 13 M. 343.

12. When Judge has accepted verdict on certain charges, High Court cannot vary.—Where a Sessions Judge has approved of a verdict on certain charges and finally acquitted and discharged the prisoner as to those charges, the High Court, it was held cannot under this section, convict under those very charges. This section contemplates only cases in which without recording any order of acquittal or conviction, the Sessions Judge refers the whole case, 20 W. R. 73. The High Court has no power to interfere with the unanimous verdict of the jury with which the Judge agrees. 41 C. 662. See also 29 C. 128; 21 C. W. N. 435.

disposed to be turbulent, uneasy, as, restless subjects

Syn - I. quiet uneasy disturbed agitated sleep was agitated shallow unsettled roving wandering

Restless

line, to restrict for natural but as a part of the process

Forbear prayer before God under stop with abst. d. o. restr.

Capable of doing With restraint

Restraint n. [Obs.]

Restraint n. [Obs.]

Restraint n. One who or that which restrains

Restraint n. The act of restraining

Restraint n. [Obs.]

Restraint n. [Obs.]

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Restraint n. [Obs.]

Restraint n. [Obs.]

Restraint n. [Obs.]

Restraint n. [Obs.]

2. To come out or have an issue, to terminate, - followed by in/as this measure will result in good or in evil

3. To proceed spring, or rise, as a consequence, from facts arguments, premises combination of circumstances, conclusion thought, or endeavor

Measure and peace actually result from a holy and good will

Result

Result

Result

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13. What is meant by the 'opinion of the jury.'—By opinion of the jury in this section is meant the conclusion of the jury, *i.e.*, the verdict, and not the reasons on which that conclusion is based. If the verdict of the jury is unanimous, it coincides with their opinion. If it is a decided verdict the opinion of the minority no less than that of the majority must be considered by the Court dealing with the reference, 36 C. 629; *held per* SUBRAHMANYA Aiyar and BODDAM, JJ, in 29 M. 91 (F.B.). That in a reference under this section, although it may be expedient to have before the Court the reasons of the jury for the view taken by them, when they have been given the circumstance that no such reasons have been ascertained does not warrant the High Court to decline to go into the evidence and thus arrive at its own judgment, after giving due weight to the views taken by the Judge and the jury as to the guilt or innocence of the accused. There is nothing in sub-sec. (3) warranting the interpretation of the term 'opinion' in it to mean anything other than the respective conclusions of the Judge and jury, DAVIES, J, *held* that the Legislature in directing that the High Court should duly weigh the opinion of the jury gives an implied authority for the taking of such opinions. In 36 C. 629, CAMPBELL, J, approving of the above case *held*, that the Sessions Judge would do well before referring the case to invite the opinions of the jury when there is some inconsistency in their verdict, but that the Sessions Judge may do so not for the purpose of deciding whether a reference should be made but after arriving at his conclusion to refer the case to the High Court and after telling the jury that such is his intention. In 18 C. W. N. 615 = 18 C. L. J. 322 = 15 Cr. L. J. 31; 29 M. 91 was dissented from and it was *held* that by 'opinion of the jury' is meant the 'verdict of the jury.' The omission to ascertain from the jurors their grounds for their verdict would not vitiate a reference to the High Court.

14. High Court's power of interference with the verdict of a jury.—In 1 C. L. R. 275, GARTH, C.J. and PRINSEP, J, *dissenting* said that they would not go so far as to hold with the Ruling in 23 W. R. 25, that the verdict of the jury should not be interfered with, except when there is a gross and unmistakable miscarriage of justice. This section casts upon the High Court duty of both the Judge and the jury, 1 B. 40; and in cases referred under it, the trial remains open for the High Court till it pronounces its judgment of acquittal or conviction, 9 A. 420. See also 10 Bom. L. R. 632 and 9 C. L. J. 432. But notwithstanding this difference which clothes it with greater powers and responsibilities than the superior Courts of England, it will interfere, as far as may be, guided by the principles of English law that the verdict of the jury will not be set aside unless it be perverse and patently wrong, or may have been induced by an error of the Judge, 1 B. 40; 10 B. 497. Nor will the High Court interfere upon any mere preponderance of evidence, or unless it is satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the verdict is so distinctly against the evidence that it may be termed a perverse verdict, *Weir II*, 338, or unless it were established in the clearest possible manner that the jury were wholly miscarried in their conclusion upon the case, 20 W. R. 33; 13 B. L. R. Appx. XX; 20 W. R. 73 = 13 B. L. R. Appx. XIX; 19 W. R. 45, 21 W. R. 4 = 14 B. L. R. Appx. II; 6 C. L. R. 431 and 349; 11 C. 63; 3 C. 199, 25 W. R. 25; 2 C. L. R. 518. The High Court will form and act upon its own view of what the evidence, in its judgment proves, but in doing so it will give due weight to the opinion of the Sessions Judge no less than to the verdict of the jury, 15 C. 269, *Weir II*, 390; 15 B. 452. In such a case the High Court has to consider whether from the evidence it was so convinced that the jury ought to have convicted the accused as to take upon itself the responsibility of deciding differently from those to whom the decision was primarily entrusted by law and without an appeal in ordinary cases *Ratanlal 628*. Its power, under this section, is not limited to interference on questions of law, *i.e.*, misdirection by the Judge or misapprehension by the jury of the Judge's direction upon a point of law, 9 A. 420. The mere fact that upon a consideration of all the evidence before the Court, a Judge would have arrived at a conclusion different from that arrived at by the jury, would not justify the High Court in interfering with their unanimous verdict 2 A. L. J. 475 = 2 Cr. L. J. 357. When the High Court is asked to set aside a verdict, because it is against the weight of evidence, the question is, not whether the Judge who tried the case was or was not satisfied with the verdict or whether he would have come to the same conclusion as the jury,

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15 The Ruling in *Lyall's case* on reference—High Court must form its own opinion after considering the entire evidence and giving weight to the opinion of the Judge and jury.—A District Magistrate who held a trial under s. 47 not guilty to it was content

unless it was shown to be perverse or clearly or manifestly wrong. *Held*, that it was not necessary for the prosecution to show that opinions of the jury are perverse or clearly and manifestly wrong. Since the alteration of the language of this section by the Act of 1896 which expressed the law as it now stands, the High Court is bound to consider the entire evidence in the case and then give due weight to the opinions of the Sessions Judge and the jury and not to rely solely on the verdict of the jury, 29 C. 128; in a reference under this section, although the High Court is bound, in dealing with it, to give due weight to the opinion of the Sessions Judge and to the verdict of the jury, still it can decide for itself the question of guilt or otherwise of the accused, 11 C. W. N. 715; 15 B. 452; 9 C. L. J. 432 = 10 Cr. L. J. 57. The High Court cannot throw out a reference under this section merely because it might be argued, upon the face of the charge to the jury, that the verdict was not altogether an unreasonable one, but it must consider the entire evidence and arrive at its own judgment after giving due weight to the opinions of the Judge and jury, 36 C. 629 (29 C. 128 and 9 C. L. J. 432 followed 7 C. W. N. 135, explained 2 A. L. J. 475 = 2 Cr. L. J. 357 dissented from). See also 10 Bom. L. R. 632 = 8 Cr. L. J. 133; 10 Bom. L. R. 173 = 7 Cr. L. J. 192; 17 C. W. N. 1077 = 14 Cr. L. J. 556; 15 Cr. L. J. 513 (Bar.), 16 Cr. L. J. 440 (M.).

13-A. High Court must consider the opinions of the referring Judge as well as of the Jury.—In case of a reference under this section the High Court is to give due weight not to the opinion of the jury alone but to that of the Sessions Judge as well, 17 C. W. N. 1077 = 14 Cr. L. J. 556. 'In this country the opinion of the Judge is to be weighed by the High Court in exactly the same balance as the opinion of the jury,' 41 C. 754.

16 No analogy between powers exercised by High Court and those exercised by English Court in civil cases.—The finality of the verdict of the jury is by this section made subject to the power of the Sessions Judge who presides at the trial (when he disagrees with the verdict of the jury so completely that he considers it necessary for the ends of justice) to submit the case to the High Court, which is, in dealing with the case has to exercise any of the powers which it may exercise on an appeal. This is a most important departure from English law and practice and was undoubtedly dictated by the circumstances that the trial by jury in this country was an experiment which it was necessary to safeguard against a miscarriage of justice by allowing the case to be referred under certain circumstances to the highest judicial authority. There is, therefore, no true analogy between the discretionary powers thus conferred upon the High Court under the above section and that which the Courts of Law in England have sparingly exercised in interfering with the finding of a jury in civil action by directing a new trial on the ground of the verdict being against the evidence and the practice, therefore, of the latter Court cannot be resorted to as affording a rule in the exercise of the powers conferred on the High Court. This is I believe, the gist of Mr Justice West's remarks in 1 B. 10. However I entirely agree with Mr Justice NANABHAI, whose long experience is entitled to great weight, that it has been the uniform practice of this Court not to interfere with the verdict of a jury except, 'when it is shown to be clearly and manifestly wrong (10 B. 497), and such practice ought, in my opinion, to be followed'—*Per SARCENT, C. J.*, 15 B. 452 at p. 436. But now see 29 C. 128, in Note 15 above 46 A. 285.

17. Power of the High Court to convict the accused of offences not charged.—Where the jury acquitted the prisoners on the charges framed, but found certain facts which amounted to another offence and omitted to convict the prisoners of that offence, the High Court could convict for such minor offence, 3 C. 189. See also 5 C. 871 = 6 C. L. R. 349; 20 B. 215, 20 C. 483, 22 C. 1006. The accused were tried for charges under ss. 148, 304/149 and 326/149 I P C. The jurors acquitted them of the offence under s. 148, I P C., but found them guilty under s. 226, I P C., without the aid of s. 149 for which there was no charge. The Judge accepting the finding of the jury in respect of s. 148 but referring the verdict of the jury convicting the accused under s. 326 I P C., disagreeing with the verdict and recommending that the finding should be altered into one under s. 326/149 *Held*, that the High Court could not interfere under s. 307 as the verdict under s. 326 was practically a judgment of acquittal, inasmuch as there being no charge under that section independently there can be no verdict given upon it (see 34 C. 698 and 16 C. W. N. 1077 = 13 Cr. L. J. 502).—'On a reference under s. 307 we are bound to weigh the opinion of the Judge and the jury, and we have no power to interfere with the unanimous verdict of the jury with which the Judge agrees, and the only verdict with which the Judge disagrees is the verdict which on the face of it is illegal and void and must be set aside. We are unable to see our way to substitute anything for this offence, because we are precluded from considering the question of noting or the question of any separate act of causing hurt with which the accused were never charged.' 41 C. 882. See Notes to s. 238.

18. Non-direction.—Interference on account of.—The High Court will not interfere with the verdict of a jury because there was non-direction, unless the circumstances were such as to make the non-direction amount to a misdirection. *Ratanlal 644; 23 C. 252*

19. Appeal—High Court dealing with a reference does not act in the exercise of its original jurisdiction.—No appeal lies to High Court from its own judgment passed under this section, *Ratanlal 691*. A High Court, disposing of a reference under this section is not acting in the exercise of its original criminal jurisdiction, but only as a Court of reference in a criminal matter under cl 28 of its Charter. The hearing under this section is not in any sense an original trial **29 C. 286**

19-A. Whether s. 537 applies to a reference under s. 307.—S. 537 of the Code does not in terms apply to a reference under s. 307, but the limitation contained therein applies to such a reference. Therefore on reference under s. 307 it is not competent to the High Court to pass an order quashing proceedings for want of sanction under the old s. 175 if such want of sanction has in fact not occasioned a failure of justice **47 B 31**

20 Procedure where Judges disagree on hearing a reference—Where the Judges of the High Court hearing a case referred under this section differ in opinion the procedure laid down in s 429 should be followed and the case referred to a third Judge **2 C. L. J. 77 N**. See also **15 B. 432** and **1 C. L. R. 275**.

G—Re-trial of Accused after Discharge of Jury

308. Whenever the jury is discharged the accused shall be detained in custody or on bail (as the case may be) and shall be tried by another jury unless the Judge considers that he should not be re-tried, in which case the Judge shall make an entry to that effect on the charge and such entry shall operate as an acquittal

Re-trial of accused
after discharge of jury

Notes—1. Discharge of a jury.—The discharge may be for any of the reasons set forth in ss. 282 283

The Sessions Judge has inherent power to discharge the jury before the verdict for misconduct etc. and to empanel another s. 308 applies where a jury is discharged for misconduct **50 C 572**

2. S. 403 no bar to re-trial.—When the accused is 're-tried' under this section, he cannot be re-tried a second time on the same charge **403**. He can be re-tried on the original indictment and process may continue **403, 41 C 1072**

H—Conclusion of Trial in Cases tried with Assessors

309. (1) When in a case tried with the aid of assessors the case for the defence and the prosecutor's reply (if any) are concluded the Court may sum up the evidence for the prosecution and defence and shall then require each of the assessors to state his opinion orally, * on all the charges on which the accused has been tried and shall record such opinion * and for that purpose may ask the assessors such questions as are necessary to ascertain what their opinions are. All such questions and the answers to them shall be recorded "

Delivery of opinions
of assessors.

Judgment

(2) The Judge shall then give judgment, but in doing so shall not be bound to conform to the opinions of the assessors

(3) If the accused is convicted, the Judge shall * unless he proceeds in accordance with the provisions of section 562 pass sentence on him according to law

Note.—1. Summing up optional with Judge.—The provision as to summing up the evidence for the prosecution and defence in cases tried with assessors seems to have been suggested by the observations of NORMAN, J., in **15 W. R. 25 = 7 B. L. R. 63**. Heads of summing up need not be recorded as in the trials by jury. See also **30 C. 163**.

2. Object of summing up evidence is to assist the assessors in their conclusions.—The provision as to summing up evidence is new and its object is to enable the Sessions Judge, in long and intricate cases, to place the evidence in an intelligible form so as to assist the assessors in arriving at a reasonable conclusion and not to give the Judge an opportunity of expressing his opinion in emphatic terms on the evidence. Such a course is very likely to be embarrassing to assessors in coming to an independent opinion in the face of the very

* Words in inverted commas were added by Act XVIII of 1923

Rev'd, p f (imp & p p REVELED, or REVELLED.

1. A vicious feast, a coronal
Some men ruin the fabric of their bodies by incessant revell
Eandier

2 (Arch) See REVEAL

Who knows

1 10 follet punishment in vindication of 10 via
dicute to exact satisfaction for under a sense of
1000ry, to avenge — followed either by a wrong
received or by the person or thing wronged, as the
ol act or by the rec broad pronoun as direct ob

W 12 in two months 1 do expect return

decided opinion expressed by the Judge 9 C. 875 = 12 C. L. R. 506 He should not express his opinion upon any question of fact arising in such cases nor rely upon the views put forth by the committing Magistrate 22 C. 805. This provision should be availed of by the Judges only in cases where the facts are intricate or complicated and may therefore be expedient to explain or marshal the same Even in those cases, the Judge should not as he may do in charging a jury express any opinion upon any question of fact arising in the case BHASHAM AVANAR J., in 24 M 523 at p 536

3 Assessors not to be asked to reconsider their opinion.—When once the Judge has summed up the case to the assessors and taken their opinion he should not re-open the matter and press upon their attention a part of the accused's admission which appears damaging in order to induce them to alter their opinion. It is important that the opinion of the assessors whether good, bad or indifferent, wise or foolish should be recorded as they are expressed without any influence from the Judge, except such as may be reasonably exercised in the course of his summing up, 1886 A W N 22 Otherwise a native assessor is likely to be unduly biased by the attitude of the presiding Judge

4. When opinion of assessors may be dispensed with?—(i) When there is no evidence—It is only when there is no evidence that a Judge can withdraw a case from a jury or abstain from taking the opinion of the assessor Weir II, 391, 7 B. H. C. R. Cr. Ca 82 In the last mentioned case it was said that when a judgment of acquittal is recorded it is not necessary to record the opinion of assessors but it has since been held that the omission would be a serious irregularity 26 M 598 (ii) When the Public Prosecutor withdraws case—When the Public Prosecutor has withdrawn the case with the consent of the Court an acquittal should have been recorded without taking the opinion of the assessors. An acquittal was a matter of right whatever the opinion of the assessors might be Ratanlal 307

Where in a trial for the abetment or murder opinion of the assessors was taken and the Judge acquitted the accused accepting that opinion but convicted the accused of causing the disappearance of evidence under s. 301 I P C, held that it was imperative for the Judge to take the opinion of the assessors on the charge relating to s. 201 I P C 25 Bom L. R. 1318

5 In other cases recording the opinion of assessors imperative.—In 24 M 523 at p. 535 it was laid down dissenting from 1 A. 510 and following 10 A. 414 and 22 W. R. 34, that if a Judge should decide a case without inviting the opinion of the assessors he virtually holds the trial without the aid of the assessors and his finding of sentence cannot be regarded as one passed by a Court of competent jurisdiction Thus where in a Sessions trial the accused first pleaded *not guilty* but in the course of the examination of the accused after the completion of the prosecution evidence she pleaded *guilty* and thereupon the Judge without taking the opinion of the assessors found her guilty and sentenced her, it was held that it was the duty of the Judge to proceed with the trial as provided by this section and hear the defence and then take the opinion of the assessors 7 Bom L. R. 731. A trial is altogether bad if the assessors are not asked and are apparently not allowed to give an independent opinion in the case 40 C. 163. Again where a person was tried for offences under ss. 397 and 307 I P C. and the jury returned a verdict of *not guilty* but the Sessions Judge convicted the accused of an offence under s. 324 I P C. without reference thereto and recording such opinion as required 334. A person cannot be convicted of an offence with shows he has committed in a case tried with the aid of assessors when the opinion of the assessors has not been taken with regard to such charge Weir II, 391 Where the accused was tried at one trial for two offences one of which was a jury case and the other an assessor case and the Judge after taking the verdict of the jury on the former charge took the opinion of two of the jurors only on the latter charge and convicted the accused on both the charges the conviction on the latter charge was set aside for non-compliance with the provisions of s. 269 (3) read with this section The failure to take the opinion of all the jurors as assessors cannot be treated as a mere omission or irregularity curable under s. 337 26 M 598; 21 M. L. J. 520 = 10 M. L. R. 22 = 12 Cr. L. J. 239

the conclusion arrived at by each assessor but also the grounds of his opinion. Sessions Judges should be careful to make it intelligible and precise Oudh Cr. Dig. at p. 13.

7 Each assessor should be encouraged to state grounds of his opinion.—In 2 Bom L. R. 322, J. F. J. remarked We are led by the margin record of the assessors' opinion in this case to point out how desirable it is that assessors should be invited and encouraged by Sessions Judge to state briefly the grounds

Revert

Revert

Reproach; vilify; upbraid; calumniate.
Reproach continually, contemptuous
[Obs.]

The mind has a power in many cases to revive perception
which it has once had.
[Obs.]

of their opinion as well as the result, *see also* 2 **Bom. L. R.** 323. Assessors are appointed to aid the Judge in the trial and are to give their opinion and when that opinion differs from that formed by the Judge, he should always ascertain the grounds of the assessors' opinions, 3 **W. R.** 21. Where, in a case tried with the aid of assessors, the Sessions Judge's views differ from the opinions of the assessors and he gives judgment without conforming to their opinions it is his duty to record in his judgment the opinions of the assessors with the reasons given by them for their opinions, 43 **P. R.** 1905 = 192 **P. L. R.** 1905 = 3 **Cr. L. J.** 132. *See also* 8 **G. L. J.** 59 = 8 **Cr. L. J.** 121 and 24 **M.** 523 as to the value to be attached to the opinion of assessors. Each assessor should be called upon to state his opinion orally, 9 **C.** 875. It is irregular to take a joint opinion, 41 **P. R.** 1887. When a Judge differs from assessors, the grounds of each assessor's opinion should be distinctly recorded by him. As it is not a verdict but an opinion and not having any legal validity its weight depends solely on the reason and sense by which it is supported, 3 **W. R.** 5 and 21.

Form of record—ground of each assessor's opinion must be recorded.—When a Sessions Judge differs from the assessors or any of them, it is desirable to have a record not merely of the opinion of each assessor but

Such a record will be of use to the Court
Sessions Judge should therefore record also
assessor bases his opinion. Such grounds
should be elicited by putting specific and pointed questions to the assessors on the important and salient points on which the decision of the case really depends and writing their opinions thereon—*Madras Criminal Rules of Practice* ss 243—245. The record of the opinion of each assessor should appear at the commencement of the

opinion. While avoiding prolixity a Sessions Judge should be careful to be intelligible and precise in recording such opinions.—*Wilkins*, 116, *Pun. Cr.* Chap. XI IV, p. 239, *Oudh Cr. Dig.*, p. 13

8. Distinct opinion on each charge should be taken.—Where an accused is tried on two charges, it is necessary that the assessors should give a definite opinion whether the prisoner is guilty of either, and, if so, of which of the charges preferred against him, and that the Judge in delivering his judgment should give it with adherence to the opinions of the assessors, 22 **W. R.** 34. Where he fails to do so, the conviction is liable to be set aside and a fresh trial ordered, 15 **W. R.** 3. *See also* 10 **A.** 414 dissenting from 1 **A.** 610; 16 **B.** 414 and 26 **M.** 598. *See Note below*

9. Is a consultation between the assessors allowable?—We cannot find in the Code any provision authorizing or forbidding the Judge to allow consultation between the assessors and although we are not prepared to decide that the Judge may not in his discretion do so, we follow the opinion of BHASHIAM AVIANGAR, J., expressed in 24 **M.** 523 to the extent of holding that he is entitled to have before him each assessor's individual and independent opinion 16 **Cr. L. J.** 717 (M)

10. Questions must be put only after delivery of opinion.—S 309 gives the Judge a discretion to sum up the evidence for the benefit of the assessors if he thinks necessary, but it gives no power to question them until they have delivered their opinion orally and he has recorded such opinions. If there is anything obscure in their
allow th
interferi
A Judge should allow the assessors in the first instance to give their opinion in their own language and way and then when they had completed what they had to say, it would be open to the Judge to put to them such questions as are necessary to elucidate or supplement their opinion, 41 **C.** 350.

11. Duty of Judge to pronounce judgment.—Failure on the part of a Judge to record a judgment on a charge tried with the aid of assessors, is irregular, but having regard to s. 537 might not invalidate the trial, *Weir* II, 392. *See also* 6 **B. H. C. R. Cr. Ca.** 55; 9 **W. R.** 51 and 10 **W. R.** 7.

12. Duty of Judge in dealing with opinions of assessors.—The opinions of assessors must have no doubt regard paid to them but after all it is the Judge who has to decide the case on the facts as well as law

assessor derived from personal knowledge and unsupported by evidence on record 24 **W. R.** 28.

Rhaph'so after r d v
Rhaph
to
Lat
See
1

of any organ
action of the excretory
creas
cretec

like a fall
like a fall
like a fall



Rhe m'le (chem) The same as RHAPSODYCINE
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Rhe m'le (chem) The doctrine of Rhaph'so

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13. Reference to heads of charges to the jury is not sufficient where the jury are treated as assessors.—When an accused person is charged at the same trial with several offences of which some are and some are not triable by a jury and with respect to the heads of charges on which the Sessions Judge convicts the jury become assessors it is the duty of the Sessions Judge under s 309 to pronounce a judgment containing the particulars specified in s 367. A reference to the heads of charge to the jury is not a sufficient compliance with the requirements of the section. *Ratanlal 425*

14. Practice—Prosecuting pleader not to be employed in recording summing up.—A Sessions Judge should not utilize the services of the pleader for the prosecution for the purpose of recording his summing up to the assessors. If he is not capable of recording the substance of it himself he should employ an independent person for that purpose. *9 C. 875*

15. Practice—Record of previous conviction when to be referred.—In trials before a jury or assessors, the record should invariably show that reference to the previous conviction has not been made until the subsequent offence has been found proved against the accused. *12 C. L. R. 555*

16. Fresh evidence cannot be taken after assessors have given opinion.—When a Sessions Judge has taken the opinion of the assessors the trial is at an end except for the purpose of giving judgment and if there is a fresh case for trial for fresh evidence. *P. I. 1*

c In a trial for a common offence that the Surgeon ought to have adjourned the trial and procured the evidence of the Surgeon like that of any other witness. *1889 A. W. N. 181* Similarly where after the assessors had been discharged the Judge took some evidence to prove that a statement had been made by a person who was dead at the time of trial a retrial was ordered as the evidence was not admissible. *15 A. 136*

17. Judgment and sentence by successor of trial Judge illegal.—Where after the assessors had given their opinion the Judge left the district without recording his finding or judgment and his successor after considering the evidence recorded at the trial convicted and passed sentence on the prisoners the conviction was quashed and a retrial ordered. *21 W. R. 47, 8 C. L. J. 59 = 8 Cr. L. J. 121*

18. Recalling assessors after their discharge.—When assessors have given their opinions and they are discharged a Sessions Judge cannot recall them and amend the charge and convict the prisoner on such amended charge. *1 W. R. 40*

19. Judge cannot cancel trial after delivery of opinion by assessors, judgment must be given.—The assessors' opinions having been recorded the Judge has no option but to give his judgment in accordance with the section. He cannot cancel or set aside the trial because when writing his judgment he finds there has been a misjoinder of charges and is of opinion that the trial is illegal. s. 537 (a) does not invest the Judge with authority to cancel his own completed trial. *16 Cr. L. J. 824 (B.)*

1—Procedure in Case of Previous Conviction

*** 310.** In the case of a trial by a jury or with the aid of assessors when the accused is charged with an offence and further charged that he is by reason of a previous conviction liable to enhanced punishment or to punishment of a different kind for such subsequent offence the procedure prescribed by the foregoing provisions of this Chapter shall be modified as follows:—

(a) Such further charge shall not be read out in Court and the accused shall not be asked to plead thereto nor shall the same be referred to by the prosecution or any evidence adduced thereon unless and until

(i) he has been convicted of the subsequent offence or

(ii) the jury have delivered their verdict or the opinions of the assessors have been recorded on the charge of the subsequent offence.

Rib-grass n [p] . . .

Rib/grass v t. [u] p & p p RIBROASTED; p pr
 & ed n RIBROASTING [to beat soundly, -a bur
 lesque word.
 Rib/roast p[er]fect[ed], a Supported by ribs
 Rib/wort (w[ort]), n (of) a . . .

Rice, Ar. arroz, aru, Lat. oryza, Fr. riz, It. riso, Sp. & Pg.

Or. arroz, Ar. arroz, It. Ger. reiss, Lat. Oryza, Sw. ris, Dan. ris, D. rijst (Dut.) A plant of the genus *Oryza* and its seed. There is only one species. This plant is cultivated in all warm climates and the grain forms a large portion of the food of the inhabitants in America. It grows chiefly on low, moist land which can be overdone. It is a light and nutritious food, and very easy of digestion.

Indo-China rice still resembles water grass (*Zizania aquatica*) in appearance (it is long, slender, and such used to be food by the North American Indians. It is common in shallow water in the North-western States - called also water oat, Canada rice, etc.

Rice-bird n (Ornith) (a) A beautiful bird of the cuckoo family so named from its depressed tufts in rice fields. It is the *Ammodramus* (*Loxia*) *erythrorhynchos*, of a rich bloomy lead color, and is



Rice



This word is really in vogue -

Richly adv. In a rich manner -

To get rid of to free one's self from
 Rid/dance n 1 The act of riding or freeing, deliverance, a clearing -

(b) In the case of a trial held with the aid of assessors, the Court may, in its discretion proceed or refrain from proceeding with the trial of the accused on the charge of the previous convictions.

1. **Scope of the section.**—The whole section has been re-drafted by Act XVIII of 1923. CL (b) of the present section is entirely new under which the Court is given a discretion to proceed or not with the trial of the accused on the charge of the previous conviction in case of a trial with the aid of assessors. (See *Statements of Objects and Reasons*, 1914.) The main object of this section is to prevent the interests of the accused from being prejudiced by the production of the proof of previous conviction before jury or assessors before the accused is convicted of the subsequent offence charged.

2. **When to put in proof of previous conviction?**—Records of previous conviction should not be put in until the trial is concluded. They can only be used after conviction in determining the measure of punishment, 3 W. R. 33. In cases tried by jury, if the accused is charged with previous conviction, the judge should say "that he had heard that the accused was convicted of such and such an offence on the ground that this improper statement of the witness might have probably influenced the verdict of the jury, 1890 A. W. N. 12. Reading a charge relating to previous conviction during trial, will amount to a positive misdirection, 5 C. 763; 10 W. R. 39; and it is most essential that the procedure in jury trials in the Sessions Court should be conducted with precision, regularity and close attention to the rules laid down in this section, 1890 A. W. N. 12. In jury trials therefore the record should invariably show that reference to previous conviction had not been made until the accused was convicted of the subsequent offence, 12 C. L. R. 555. But where this rule was contravened in a clear case of theft, the High Court refused to interfere with the conviction, as the accused had not been prejudiced, 13 C. L. R. 110. See Note 33 (v) at p. 799.

3. **Procedure in respect of previous conviction in case referred to High Court.**—Section 307 and this section provide that accused is not to be asked to plead to prior convictions until he has been convicted on the charge under trial. Where a Court of Session makes a reference to the High Court under this section, there is no conviction or acquittal in the Sessions Court and it is only after conviction by the High Court that the accused can be asked to plead to previous convictions, 30 W. 134. The Sessions Judge ought not to call

gently to previous convictions, after the jury had given its verdict, but before reporting the case under this section for the orders of the High Court. In 2 Bom. L. R. 336, the High Court after convicting the accused remanded the case to the Court of Session in order that it may proceed to finish the trial by applying the procedure of s. 310 and passing sentence. The correctness of this procedure is doubtful.

4. **Nature of previous conviction to appear on the face of the record.**—Where an enhanced sentence is passed in consequence of previous conviction, the Sessions Judge or Magistrate shall state in his judgment, the date of such previous conviction and the sentence passed as well as the particular offence charged. Rule 39 (d) Code of Cr. P. and Cr. O. p. 29, amended. But the part of the charge stating the previous conviction need not show the extent of the former punishment, 4 M. H. C. R. Appx. XI.

5. **How previous conviction proved.**—See s. 511. An extract from a record of the previous conviction is not evidence of the conviction without proof of identity. Where such an extract was admitted as evidence of the conviction on the accused's denial, it was held that the procedure was more than a mere irregularity, 1890 A. W. N. 12. P. L. R. 117. See also 1890 A. W. N. 144. The accused in respect of the question which might be put to him of previous convictions, 1890 A. W. N. 233. But a Sessions Judge is not bound to put the question to the accused if he is not guilty as to previous conviction.

6. **Previous conviction outside British India cannot be taken into account.**—Berar forms no part of British India. Hence a conviction in Berar purporting to be under the Indian Penal Code is not a conviction under that Code, consequently previous convictions had in Berar cannot be considered for the purpose of effecting the punishment on the second conviction in British India under the Penal Code. But it is not improper to take such convictions into consideration in measuring the punishment which the Court is competent to award irrespective of those special provisions of law, 7 C. P. Cr. 24.

3 Bluster [Old] Burke
4 A romp a wanton a strumpet
5 A sportive track a frolic
To run the rig to play a wanton trick. -- To run the

Rope enters his ship.
Syn -- Straight direct perpendicular upright law
of right true correct just equal proper fit
suitable second g

2 (77 col) The state of being right with God,
justification. The work of Christ which is the ground
of justification.
There are two kinds of Christian right course. the one is
outward which we have by law. the other is inward
the inward of law hope and charity and other things
which are
Duty for the righteousness of Christ imputed to us, and re-
ceived by faith alone. In summary Collection.
Syn -- A praiseworthy goodness godliness eq. ly just-
ice rightfulness integrity loyalty; fidelity

Right/er (ri er) n One who is
does justice --
or by just claim as a right
In hard right/ful property right/ful judge
Syn -- Just lawful

11 Rig ger, n 1 One who rigs or dresses one whose

11 Rig ger, n 1 One who rigs or dresses one whose

11 Rig ger, n 1 One who rigs or dresses one whose

4 The outward or most finished end
piece of cloth a skirt &c

11 Rig ger, n 1 One who rigs or dresses one whose

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(b) In the case of a trial held with the aid of assessors, the Court may, in its discretion proceed or refrain from proceeding with the trial of the accused on the charge of the previous convictions.

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2. **When to put in proof of previous conviction?**—Records of previous conviction should not be put in until the trial is concluded. They can only be used after conviction in determining the measure of punishment.

on the ground that this improper statement of the witness might have probably influenced the verdict of the jury, 1890 A. W. N. 12. Reading a charge relating to previous conviction during trial, will amount to a positive misdirection, 5 C. 769; 10 W. R. 39; and it is most essential that the procedure in jury trials in the Sessions Court should be conducted with precision, regularity and close attention to the rules laid down in this section, 1890 A. W. N. 12. In jury trials therefore the record should invariably show that reference to previous conviction

3. **Procedure in respect of previous conviction in case referred to High Court.**—Section 307 and this section provide that accused is not to be asked to plead to prior convictions until he has been convicted on the charge under trial. Where a Court of Session makes a reference to the High Court under this section, there is no conviction or acquittal in the Sessions Court and it is only after conviction by the High Court that the accused can be asked to plead to previous convictions 30 W. 134. The Sessions Judge ought not to call upon the accused to plead to previous convictions pending a reference to the High Court, but he might be asked to record the plea after the High Court had considered the reference. This procedure no doubt is cumbersome and s. 310 might be so modified with advantage, as to enable the Sessions Judge to record the plea of guilty or not guilty to previous convictions, after the jury had given its verdict, but before reporting the case under this section for the orders of the High Court. In 2 Bom. L. R. 336, the High Court after convicting the accused remanded the case to the Court of Session in order that it may proceed to finish the trial by applying the procedure of s. 310 and passing sentence. The correctness of this procedure is doubtful.

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5. **How previous conviction proved.**—See s. 511. An extract from a record of the previous conviction is not evidence of the conviction without proof of identity. Where such an extract was admitted as evidence of the conviction on the accused's denial, it was held that the procedure was more than a mere irregularity, Weir II, 393, 6 B. L. R. Appx. CL1 and 1831 A. W. N. 144. The examination of the accused in respect of the previous conviction is without legal warrant or justification, the nature of the question which might be put to an accused person being clearly indicated in s. 342, 23 B. 129; 27 M. 233. But a Sessions Judge is justified under this section in passing sentence on the accused on an admission by him of previous convictions and such sentences will not be interfered with, unless the irregularity in the inquiry as to previous conviction has prejudiced the accused, 23 C. 639. See also 28 C. 49.

6. **Previous conviction outside British India cannot be taken into account.**—Berar forms no part of British India. Hence a conviction in Berar purporting to be under the Indian Penal Code is not a conviction under that Code, consequently previous convictions had in Berar cannot be considered for the purpose of effecting the punishment on the second conviction in British India under the Penal Code. But it is not improper to take such convictions into consideration in measuring the punishment which the Court is competent to award irrespective of those special provisions of law, 7 C. F. Cr. 24.

7 Previous conviction under local laws.—It has been held that a conviction under a local law like the *Frontier Crimes Regulation* does not come under the purview of s. 75 I P C. and the provisions of that section cannot be applied with reference to such a conviction. **1 Cr. L. J. 1061**

8. Applicability of this section to trials before Magistrate.—Though this section does not in terms apply to trials before Magistrates still clauses (b) and (c) indicate in general terms the preciseness with which charges relating to such convictions should be tried. **11 Bur. L. R. 33.**

Section 310 of the Code does not apply to trials before Magistrates. **50 C. 367**

311. Notwithstanding anything in the last foregoing section evidence of the previous conviction may be given at the trial for the subsequent offence if the fact of the previous conviction is relevant under the provisions of the Indian Evidence Act 1872

Note.—Relevant under the Evidence Act.—See s. 14 43 and 54 of the Evidence Act as to circumstances under which previous convictions would be relevant. See **1 C. W. N. 146**, **27 C. 139** and **4 C. W. N. 97**. As a result of the Full Bench Ruling in **14 C. 721**, s. 34 of the Evidence Act was amended by Act III of 1891 with a view to prevent a previous conviction being proved in order merely to prejudice an accused person.

J.—1st of Jurors for High Court and summoning Jurors for that Court

Number of special jurors * **312.** The High Court may prescribe the number of persons whose names shall be entered at any one time in the special jurors list

Provided that no definite number of Europeans or of Americans or of Indians shall be so prescribed

Note.—The section has been amended by the Criminal Law (Amendment) Act of 1923. * The High Court special jury list should in our opinion be revised and it should no longer be limited to 200 Europeans and 200 non Europeans. It should include all who are qualified to whatever nationality they may belong. This revision will probably increase the proportion of non Europeans in the list. *Report of the Racial Distinctions Committee*

Lists of common and special jurors. **313.** (1) The Clerk of the Crown shall before the first day of April in each year, and subject to such rules as the High Court from time to time prescribes prepare—

(a) a list of all persons liable to serve as common jurors and

(b) a list of persons liable to serve as special jurors only

(2) Regard shall be had in the preparation of the latter list to the property character and education of the persons whose names are entered therein

(3) No person shall be entitled to have his name entered in the special jurors list merely because he may have been entered in the special jurors' list for a previous year

(4) The Governor General in Council † or the Local Government* in the case of the High Court at Fort William in Bengal and, in the case of other High Courts the Local Government ‡ may exempt any salaried officer of Government from serving as a juror

Discretion of officer preparing lists (5) The Clerk of the Crown shall subject to such rules as aforesaid have full discretion to prepare the said list as seems to him to be proper and there shall be no appeal from or review of his decision

Publication of lists preliminary and revised **314.** (1) Preliminary lists of persons liable to serve as common jurors and as special jurors respectively signed by the Clerk of the Crown shall be published once in the Local Official Gazette before the fifteenth day of April next after their preparation

* s. 2 has been substituted for old s. 312 by Act XII of 1922

† For rules framed by the Allahabad High Court under this section in conjunction with s. 214 see *P. and Oudh G. R.* 1902 I 11 p. 339. For Madras High Court Rules see *St. George's Gazette* 1901 Supplement dated 7th April

‡ Words in inverted commas added by Act XXXIII of 1920.

For full details as to appointment of persons liable to serve as jurors or summoners see *St. George's Gazette* 1901 I 11 p. 347

(2) Revised lists of persons liable to serve as common jurors and special jurors respectively, signed as aforesaid shall be published once in the Local Official Gazette before the first day of May next after their preparation

(3) Copies of the said lists shall be affixed to some conspicuous part of the Court house

315. (1) Out of the persons named in the revised lists aforesaid there shall be summoned for each Sessions * in the town which is the usual place of sitting of each High Court † as many of those who are liable to serve on special or common juries respectively as the Clerk of the Crown considers necessary

(2) No person shall be so summoned more than once in six months unless the number cannot be made up without him

(3) If during the continuance of any Sessions it appears that the number of persons so summoned is not sufficient such number as may be necessary of other persons liable to serve as aforesaid shall be summoned for such Sessions

316. Whenever a High Court has given notice of its intention to hold sittings at any place outside the ‡ town which is the usual place of sitting of such High Court for the exercise of its original criminal jurisdiction the Court of Session at such place shall subject to any direction which may be given by the High Court summon a sufficient number of jurors from its own list in the manner hereinafter prescribed for summoning jurors to the Court of Session

317. (1) In addition to the persons so summoned as jurors the said Court of Session shall if it thinks needful after communication with the commanding officer cause to be summoned such number of commissioned and non-commissioned officers in Her Majesty's Army resident within ten miles of its place of sitting as the Court considers to be necessary to make up the juries for the trial of persons charged with offences before the High Court as aforesaid

(2) All officers so summoned shall be liable to serve on such juries notwithstanding anything contained in this Code but no such officer shall be summoned whom his commanding officer desires to have excused on the ground of urgent military duty or for any other special military reason

318. Any person summoned under sections 315 316 or 317 who without lawful excuse fails to attend as required by the summons or who having attended departs without having obtained the permission of the Judge or fails to attend after an adjournment of the Court after being ordered to attend shall be deemed guilty of a contempt and be liable by order of the Judge to such fine as he thinks fit and in default of payment of such fine, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding six months in the civil jail until the fine is paid

Provided that the Court may in its discretion remit any fine or imprisonment so imposed

* Words in inverted commas were substituted for the words "in each Presidency town" by Act XVIII of 1923

† Words in inverted commas were substituted for the words "at least twenty-seven of those who are liable to serve on a special jury and fifty-four of those who are liable to serve on a common jury" by Act XVIII of 1923

‡ Words in inverted commas were substituted for the words "Presidency town" by Act XVIII of 1923.

K — List of Jurors and Assessors for Court of Session and summoning Jurors and Assessors for that Court

319. All male persons between the ages of twenty-one and sixty shall except as next hereinafter mentioned be liable to serve as jurors or assessors at any trial held within the district in which they reside or if the Local Government on consideration of local circumstances has fixed any smaller area in that behalf within the area so fixed

Notes.—1 In Madras all persons who reside outside the radius of 20 miles where there is no railway communication outside 50 miles when there is railway communication and in Kistna Godavari and Malabar outside 40 miles when canal communication exists are exempt. See C O No 1734 dated 10th December 1904 *Madras Rules para 46 (g)*

2 Remuneration to be paid—Jurors and assessors should not be paid allowances of any kind except in cases in which at the request of the Sessions Judge they had to come more than five miles from the Court house to visit the scene of the offence when they may be paid actual out-of-pocket expenses. *Madras G O 1602 dated 26th October 1904 and G O No 234 dated 10th February 1910* In Punjab if the jurors and assessors residence be more than five miles from the Court each juror or assessor is entitled to his *bona fide* travelling expenses and if he is detained for more than a day he is entitled to subsistence allowance at a rate not exceeding five rupees. *Punjab Book Cir 244* In Bengal if the usual residence of the juror or assessor is more than five miles from the Court house he is entitled to a daily allowance for attendance at Court only not less than one rupee and not more than five rupees. *Cal Gazette April 1904*

320. The following persons are exempt from liability to serve as jurors or assessors namely—

- (a) officers in civil employ superior in rank to a District Magistrate
- (b) salaried Judges
- (c) Commissioners and Collectors of Revenue or Customs
- (d) Police-officers and persons engaged in the Preventive Service in the Customs Department
- (e) persons engaged in the collection of the revenue whom the Collector thinks fit to exempt on the ground of official duty
- (f) persons actually officiating as priests or ministers of their respective religions
- (g) persons in Her Majesty's Army except when by any law in force for the time being they are specially made liable to serve as jurors or assessors
- (h) surgeons and others who openly and constantly practise the medical profession
- (i) legal practitioners (as defined by the Legal Practitioners Act 1879) in actual practice
- (j) persons employed in the Post Office and Telegraph Department
- (k) persons exempted from personal appearance in Court under the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure sections 640 and 641
- (l) other persons exempted by the Local Government from liability to serve as jurors or assessors

Notes.—S. 640 of the Code of Civil Procedure relates to exemption of certain women from personal appearance in Court. S. 641 relates to exemption of certain persons by the Local Government from personal appearance in Court. Now see ss. 137 and 143 of the 1908 Code see s. 78 as to grounds of objection to persons summoned

1. Exemptions by Local Government.—For Madras see G O No. 1734 Judicial dated 10th December 1904. In Punjab military men are not exempt unless the commanding officer requires them to be excused

2 Exemption not a disqualification—Persons who are exempt from service as jurors are not incapable of serving as exemptions cannot be treated as a disqualification under s. 278

3. Persons exempted may be summoned to try Europeans.—*See s. 462*

321. (1) The Sessions Judges and the Collector of the district or such other officer as the Local Government appoints in this behalf, shall prepare and make out a list of jurors and assessors, in alphabetical order a list of persons liable to serve as jurors or assessors and qualified in the judgment of the Sessions Judge and Collector or other officer as aforesaid to serve as such, and not likely to be successfully objected to under section 78, clauses (b) to (h) both inclusive

(2) The list shall contain the name, place of abode and quality or business of every such person, and if the person is an European or an American, the list shall mention the race to which he belongs

Notes.—1 What class of persons are eligible as jurors.—In selecting persons to serve as jurors and assessors, a Sessions Judge should choose persons of an independent condition in life, men of judgment and of experience **23 W. R. 35.** Persons of high social position should not be placed on the list of assessors as native sentiment upon this point is rightly or wrongly not in favour of such nomination, **1897 A. W. N 167.** Even in a district in which there may be no Sessions Court a jury list should be prepared for use should a trial be held by the District Magistrate under s. 451

2. Qualified persons not to be arbitrarily excluded—It is not open to the Sessions Judge or Deputy Commissioner to arbitrarily exclude from the list any person who is liable and qualified to serve as a juror or assessor and who is not likely to be successfully objected to under s. 278, cl. (b) to (h), both inclusive. Special exemption from liability to serve can be granted only by the Local Government under cl. (j) of s. 320 *C P Cr Cir., Part II No 33*

3. What the list should contain in addition to particulars specified in cl. (2).—The list should also show against each person included in it the language or languages understood by him. *C P Cr Cir., Part II No 33*

4 Holding Sessions anywhere within the Sessions division may not be permitted by Assessor List.—Where the Sessions Judge of Canara asked the High Court for special permission to hold his Court at Sirsi instead of at Karwar for the September Sessions of 1886 *held*, assessors can only be chosen from the list prepared under this section which can only be revised once a year [s. 324 (6)] The Court, therefore declined to grant the permission asked for there being no assessors available for Sessions at Sirsi, **Ratanlal 304**

5 Jury list to be carefully revised.—All Collectors should exercise great care in the revision of the jurors list so as to serve the inclusion of all qualified persons of intelligence who are liable to serve and the exclusion of those who are not fit to sit as jurors *Madras G O No 474 dated 16th March 1889*

322. Copies of such list shall be stuck up in the office of the Collector or other officer as aforesaid, and in the Court houses of the District Magistrate and of the District Court and extracts therefrom in some conspicuous place in the towns or towns in or near which the persons named in the extract reside

323. To every such copy or extract shall be subjoined a notice stating that objections to list mentioned in the notice to the list will be heard and determined by the Sessions Judge or other officer as aforesaid, at the Sessions Court house

324. (1) For the hearing of such objections the Sessions Judge, Collector or other officer as aforesaid, and shall, at the revision of list mentioned in the notice, revise the list and hear persons interested in the amendment thereof and shall strike out

suitable in their judgment to serve as a juror or as an assessor, or who may establish his right to any exemption from service given by section 320 and insert the name of any person omitted from the list whom they deem qualified for such service

(2) In the event of a difference of opinion between the Sessions Judge and Collector or other officer as aforesaid the name of the proposed juror or assessor shall be omitted from the list.

(3) A copy of the revised list shall be signed by the Sessions Judge and Collector or other officer as aforesaid and sent to the Court of Session

(4) Any order of the Sessions Judge and Collector or other officer as aforesaid in preparing and revising the list shall be final

(5) Any exemption not claimed under this section shall be deemed to be waived until the list is next revised

(6) The list so prepared and revised shall be again revised once in every year

(7) The list so revised shall be deemed a new list and shall be subject to all the rules hereinbefore contained as to the list originally prepared

325. In the case of any district for which the Local Government has declared that the

Preparation of list of special jurors

trial of certain offence shall, if the Judge so direct, be by special jury, the Sessions Judge and the Collector of such district or other officer as aforesaid shall prepare in addition to the revised list hereinbefore prescribed a special list containing the names of such jurors as are borne on the revised list and are in the opinion of such Sessions Judge and Collector or other officer as aforesaid, by reason of their possessing superior qualifications in respect of property, character or education, fit persons to serve as special jurors provided always that the inclusion of the name of any person in such special list shall not involve the removal of his name from the revised list nor relieve him of his liability to serve as an ordinary juror in cases not tried by special jury

326. (1) The Sessions Judge shall ordinarily, seven days at least before the day which

District Magistrate to summon jurors and assessors.

he may from time to time fix for holding the Sessions, send a letter to the District Magistrate requesting him to summon as many persons named in the said revised list or the said special list as seem to the Sessions Judge to be needed for trials by jury and trials with the aid of assessors at the said Sessions, the number to be summoned not being less than double the number required for any such trial *† and including where any accused person is an European or an American as many Europeans or Americans as may be required for the purpose of choosing jurors or assessors for the trial

(2) The names of the persons to be summoned shall be drawn by lot in open Court excluding those who have served within six months unless the number cannot be made up without them, and the names so drawn shall be specified in the said letter

(3) † Where the accused requires and is entitled to be tried under the provisions of section 275 there shall be chosen by lot in the manner prescribed by or under section 276 from the whole number of persons returned the jurors who are to constitute the jury until a jury containing the proper number of Europeans or Europeans and Americans or of Indians as the case may be has been obtained

To be firmly fixed, to be established

AND THE HORN IS A LITTLE
of the bill are clothed with
feathers, but in rooks the
same parts are covered
with a rough, scabrous
skin, which in old birds
is white.



Rook.

Root (n) n [A. S. *roft* O. *raz* O. *Fria* L.]

branching parts called rootlets
or adventitious roots. In com-
mon usage all the parts of a
plant which grow under ground
except leaves and flowers as
the tubers of a potato the rhiz-
oma of Solomon's seal and the
like.

It is edible or esculent root,
especially of such plants as pro-
duce a single root as that of a



Root

free
free
free
free
free
free
free

free
free
free
free
free

Provided that in any case in which the proper number¹ of Europeans or Americans cannot otherwise be obtained the Court may in its discretion for the purpose of constituting the jury summon any person excluded from the list on the ground of his being exempted under section 320

(4) Where, under the provision to sub-section (3) the Court proposes to summon as a juror any person in His Majesty's Army, the provisions of section 317 shall apply in like manner as they apply for the purpose of the summoning of military jurors for a trial under section 316

Notes.—1 Form of precept to District Magistrate to summon jurors and assessors is given in Sch. V, Form No 32. The duty of issuing a precept which is imposed on the Court of Session by this section cannot legally be performed by a Subordinate Judge in temporary charge of the current duties of the Court of Sessions, Ratanlal 143

2 Object of section—Trial by jurors not summoned—The object of the provisions in this section and ss. 276—279 is to secure an impartial trial by rendering impossible any intentional selection of jurors to try a particular case and an accused person has a right to claim to be tried by a jury chosen with strict regard to all the safeguards provided therein to secure perfect impartiality. Where on the day fixed for the trial of a jury case only three jurors were present in Court and the Sessions Judge summoned the other jurors necessary, from among the residents of the town held that the facts that the jurors were summoned from among the residents of the town were specially selected and were not summoned after being chosen by lot, as the law requires from the whole of the persons liable to serve on the jury were very serious matters inasmuch as they affected the constitution of the Court and the irregularity, therefore was not cured by s 537 7 C. W. N 188 If the Judge was unable to obtain a panel in the manner provided by this section it was his duty to postpone the trial and to proceed under this section to obtain a sufficient number of jurors. See Notes to s 276 at p. 657

3. Trial with the aid of assessor not summoned—The trial held with the aid of an assessor who has not been duly summoned (it being not proved that his name was in the list of assessors and he could be summoned) is illegal and the defect cannot be cured by s. 537. The fact that the accused did not object is immaterial 130 C 337—11 Cr. L. J. 724; 1894 A. W. N 207. But it is not illegal to select as an assessor one whose name was in the list and was summoned to attend on a particular day, but who attended on another day of the same sessions, 17 Cr. L. J. 17 (A). See Notes under s. 284

327. The Court of Session may direct jurors or assessors to be summoned at other periods than the periods specified in section 326 when the number of trials before the Court renders the attendance of one set of jurors or assessors for a whole session oppressive or whenever for other reasons such direction is found to be necessary

Power to summon another set of jurors or assessors.

328. Every summons to a juror or assessor shall be in writing and shall require his attendance as a juror or assessor, as the case may be at a time and place to be therein specified

Form and contents of summons.

For Forms of summons to assessors or jurors see Sch. V Nos 32 and 33

329. When any person summoned to serve as a juror or assessor is in the service of Government or of a Railway Company, the Court to serve in which he is so summoned may excuse his attendance if it appears on the representation of the head of the office in which he is employed that he cannot serve as a juror or assessor, as the case may be, without inconvenience to the public.

When Government or Railway servant may be excused.

Court may excuse attendance of juror or assessor

Court may relieve special jurors from liability to serve again as jurors for twelve months.

330. (1) The Court of Session may, for reasonable cause excuse any juror or assessor from attendance at any particular session. C. 1

(2) The Court of Session may if it shall think fit at the conclusion of any trial by special jury, direct that the jurors who have served on such jury shall not be summoned to serve again as **period of twelve months.**

¹ Sub-section (4) has been added by Act XII of 1913

331. (1) At each Session the said Court shall cause to be made a list of the names of those who have attended as jurors and assessors at such session

(2) Such list shall be kept with the list of the jurors and assessors as revised under section 324

(3) A reference shall be made in the margin of the said revised list to each of the names which are mentioned in the list prepared under this section

332. (1) Any person summoned to attend as a juror or as an assessor who without lawful excuse fails to attend as required by the summons or who having attended departs without having obtained the permission of the Court or fails to attend after an adjournment of the Court after being ordered to attend shall be liable by order of the Court of Session to a fine not exceeding one hundred rupees

(2) Such fine shall be levied by the District Magistrate by attachment and sale of any moveable property belonging to such juror or assessor within the local limits of the jurisdiction of the Court making the order

(3) For good cause shown the Court may remit or reduce any fine so imposed

(4) In default of recovery of the fine by attachment and sale, such juror or assessor may by order of the Court of Session be imprisoned in the Civil Jail for the term of fifteen days unless such fine is paid before the end of the said term

Notes—1 Serving of summons by registered letter is illegal—The issue of a summons by registered letter is illegal and not being authorized by law conviction based upon such service is illegal and will be set aside 1 C W N 116

2 Legality of service by affixture—obligation to report change of address—Where a juror had been fined for non attendance and it was shown he was not living at the house when the summons was served by fixing the duplicate to the door of his dwelling house and that he had no knowledge of the service of the summons it was held that the law does not contemplate the imposition of an obligation on persons on the jury list to notify their change of address to the Court before leaving their usual place of residence or to make arrangement for acceptance of service of summons or for intimating to the Court their inability to attend 6 C W N 887

3 No appeal from an order imposing a fine—No appeal lies from a order fining an assessor or juror for non-attendance. But if a juror or assessor has been fined and he subsequently gives good ground such as illness for his non attendance the Judge should re-consider his order 8 W R 83

4 Gentlemen of high rank should not be put on assessors list.—A gentleman of high rank and status was summoned to attend as an assessor and he put forward a plea of sickness which was disbelieved by the Sessions Judge who fined him Rs 100 In an application for revision it was held that such persons of high position should not be placed on the list of assessors as native sentiment upon this point is rightly or wrongly not in favour of such nomination 1897 A W N 167

L—Special provisions for High Courts

333. At any stage of any trial before a High Court under this Code before the return of the verdict the Advocate-General may if he thinks fit inform the Court on behalf of His Majesty that he will not further prosecute the defendant upon the charge and thereupon all proceedings on such charge against the defendant shall be stayed and he shall be discharged of and from the same But such discharge shall not amount to an acquittal unless the presiding Judge otherwise directs

Power of Advocate-General to stay prosecution.

Notes.—1. Cases where Nolle prosequi was entered.—At the Criminal Sessions of Calcutta High Court the trial of the accused had commenced before Mr Justice R and evidence partly had been gone into when the Judge retired from the case under s. 556 as he was a shareholder of the prosecuting bank, and the case was adjourned without the jury being discharged. The Chief Justice purporting to act under cl. 13 of the Charter appointed another Judge to preside at the trial of the accused. In answer to a question by the Judge, the Standing Counsel intimated that he intended proceeding with the trial from the point where it had been left, where upon it was contended on behalf of the accused that the presiding Judge could not proceed with the trial as Mr Justice R and the jury empanelled before him had still the *sessio* of the case. The Advocate-General entered a *Nolle prosequi* and the accused was discharged, 2 C. W. N. 431. See also 8 C. W. N. 43 noted under s. 305, 7 C. W. N. 31, noted under s. 282 and see *Nirmal Kanta Roy's Case* 41 C. 1072 for other instances.

2 English practice—when a Nolle prosequi is entered—A *Nolle prosequi* to stay proceedings upon an indictment or information pending in any Court may be entered by leave of the Attorney General at the instance of either the prosecutor or the defendant at any time after the bill of indictment is found and before judgment *R v Dunn*, 1 C. and K. 730. This power of the Attorney General is not subject to any control by the Courts, but does not interfere with the right of a Judge to allow a case to be withdrawn on the application of a private prosecutor *R v Comptroller of Patents* (1899) 1 Q. B. 809–814. A *Nolle prosequi* is distinct from, and has not the same effect as offering no evidence and submitting to acquittal, *Elworthy v Bird* 2 Blag. 258. It appears to be preferable to an application to discharge the recognizances of the prosecutor and witnesses. This usual occasion of granting a *Nolle prosequi* is either where in cases of misdemeanour a civil action is depending for the same cause, *R v Foulding*, 2 Bar. 719; or where any improper and vexatious attempts are made to oppress the defendants as by repeatedly preferring defective indictments for the same supposed offence, *R v Guarchy*, 1 W. Bl. 545; or if it is clear that an indictment is not sustainable against the defendant. A *Nolle prosequi* may be entered as against one of two or more defendants who are jointly indicted to enable one such defendant to give evidence for the Crown against his co-defendants. *Archbold*, pp. 143–146, *Halsbury*, Vol. V, pp. 259–351.

Effect of a Nolle prosequi.—A *Nolle prosequi* puts an end to the prosecution but does not operate as a bar, or discharge, or an acquittal on the merits, *Goddard v Smith* 6 Mod. 261, and the party remains liable to be re-indicted. Fresh process may not, however, be awarded on the same indictment, *R v Allen*, 1 B and S. 850; *R v Mitchell*, 3 Cox 93. *Archbold*, p. 146. See Notes under s. 403. Where an accused person was discharged before the Calcutta High Court under ss. 363 and 266 I P C. and an order of discharge passed on the Advocate-General entering a *Nolle prosequi*, the accused was subsequently put up before a Deputy Magistrate who held that he could not be tried held that the Magistrate could take cognizance of the case. The order of discharge could not be set by any tribunal and it did not require to be set aside for fresh proceedings on the same charge (29 C. 728 referred to) 40 C. 91, 52 C. 590.

334. For the exercise of its original criminal jurisdiction, every High Court shall hold sittings on such days and at such convenient intervals as the Chief Justice of such Court from time to time appoints.

335. (1) The High Court shall hold its sittings as the place at which it now holds them, or at such other place (if any) as the Governor General in Council in the case of the High Court at Fort William, or the Local Government in the case of the other High Courts may direct.

(2) But it may, from time to time in the case of the High Court at Fort William with the consent of the Governor General in Council and in all other cases with the consent of the Local Government, hold sittings at such other places within the local limits of its appellate jurisdiction as the High Court appoints.

(3) Such officer as the Chief Justice directs shall give notice beforehand in the Local Official Gazette of all sittings intended to be held for the exercise of the original criminal jurisdiction of the High Court.

336. [Place of trial of European British subjects] Omitted by section 20 of Act XI of 1923

CHAPTER XXIV

GENERAL PROVISIONS AS TO INQUIRIES AND TRIALS

337. (1) 'In the case of any offence triable exclusively by the High Court or Court of Session or any offence punishable with imprisonment which may extend

Tender of pardon to accomplice

to ten years or any offence punishable under section 211 of the Indian Penal Code with imprisonment which may extend to seven years or any offence under any of the following sections of the Indian Penal Code, sections 216-A, 369, 401 435 and 477 A the District Magistrate a Presidency Magistrate, a Sub-Divisional Magistrate or any Magistrate of the first class may at any stage of the investigation or inquiry into or the trial of the offence with a view to obtaining the evidence of any person supposed to have been directly or indirectly concerned in or privy to the offence, tender a pardon to such person on condition of his making a full and true disclosure of the whole of the circumstances within his knowledge relative to the offence and to every other person concerned, whether as principal or abettor, in the commission thereof

Provided that where the offence is under inquiry or trial no Magistrate of the first class other than the District Magistrate shall exercise the power hereby conferred unless he is the Magistrate making the inquiry or holding the trial and, where the offence is under investigation, no such Magistrate shall exercise the said power unless he is a Magistrate having jurisdiction in a place where the offence might be inquired into or tried and the sanction of the District Magistrate has been obtained to the exercise thereof

(1A) Every Magistrate who tenders a pardon under sub-section (1) shall record his reasons for so doing, and shall, on application made by the accused, furnish him with a copy of such record

Provided that the accused shall pay for the same unless the Magistrate for some special reason thinks fit to furnish it free of cost

(2) Every person accepting a tender under this section shall be examined as a witness in the Court of the Magistrate taking cognizance of the offence and in the subsequent trial if any

(2A) In every case where a person has accepted a tender of pardon and has been examined under sub-section (2) the Magistrate before whom the proceedings are pending shall if he is satisfied that there are reasonable grounds for believing that the accused is guilty of an offence commit him for trial to the Court of Session or High Court, as the case may be

(3) Such person unless he is already on bail shall be detained in custody until the termination of the trial

Note.—Referring to the amendment of this section the Sel. Com. say—

After considerable discussion of the provisions of s. 337 and examination of the large body of opinion on this clause we have unanimously come to the following decisions—

(a) Instead of including all offences punishable with imprisonment for a term which may extend to seven years we have made the limit ten years and have added as special cases ss 211 216-A 369 401 435 and 477 A, of the Indian Penal Code

* S. b-sections 1 and 1 A were substituted for sub-section (1) by Act XVIII of 1923

+ ————— These were substituted for the words the case by Act XVIII of 1923

† The a-sub-section was added by Act XVIII of 1923

§ ————— These words were substituted for the words if not on bail

The words by the Court of Session or High Court as the case may be were omitted by Act XVIII of 1923

2034

(d) The Magistrate who should be allowed to tender a pardon should, in our opinion, be Magistrates of the first class who are inquiring into the offence and any District Magistrate, Presidency Magistrate, Sub-Divisional Magistrate or with the sanction of the District Magistrate, a Magistrate of the first class, having jurisdiction in that place where the offence might be inquired into or tried.

(c) The power to tender a pardon should be exercisable during an investigation as well as after a magisterial inquiry has begun.

(d) We have deleted the words "other than a Presidency Magistrate." We see no reason why Presidency Magistrates should not record their reasons for tendering a pardon.

(e) We do not agree with the Committee of 1916 that it should not be necessary to produce as a witness in the Sessions Court an accused person who has accepted a pardon.

(f) We think all cases in which there is an approver should be committed for trial, and we have deleted the provision which enabled cases to be transferred to s. 30, "Magistrates."

The charges between the old and the new section are clearly brought out in the Sel. Com. Report quoted above.

Notes—1. Scope of the section.—The procedure laid down in this section is an important exception to the general rule that the statement of an offender is not to be taken as evidence against his co-accused unless he incurs the same risk as those jointly accused with him, by inculpating himself. With a view to see that grave offences do not go unpunished, the Legislature has introduced this exception, but confined its operation to cases mentioned in the section. In rendering a pardon, the Magistrate should make an offer to the one least guilty among the several accused. See the observations of TURNER, OFFG. C., in 1 A. 664 as to the necessity of tendering pardon to an accomplice in certain cases.

2. For the History of the section, see Note (1) to s. 339.

IN RESPECT OF WHAT OFFENCES PARDON MAY BE TENDERED.

3. 'Offence triable exclusively by the Court of Session.'—The words mean an offence shown in the Schedule so triable, and an offence is none the less so because an accused person charged under s. 395, I. P. C., has a pardon granted to him under the orders of a District Judge empowered under s. 30 and is subsequently tried and convicted by the District Magistrate so empowered, 3 P. R. 1897. See also 10 C. W. N. 847 = 4 Cr. L. J. 44; 25 M. 61.

4. That other offences triable by Magistrates are jointly charged, will not invalidate a pardon when the case as a whole is a sessions case.—All that ss. 337 and 338 require is that there should be an offence that is triable exclusively by the Sessions Court, under inquiry or trial, and the fact that there may be other offences alleged or charged, which are not so triable is immaterial and will not invalidate a pardon granted in respect of the offence exclusively triable by the Sessions Court, 9 S. L. R. 43 = 16 Cr. L. J. 632. Where a Magistrate is inquiring into an offence exclusively triable by a Court of Session along with one not so triable, pardon can be granted under s. 337, 11 P. W. R. 1915 = 17 P. R. 1915 = 16 Cr. L. J. 334.

5. Under the old section pardon can only be granted in an inquiry, but under the new amendment the power to tender a pardon is exercisable during an investigation as well as after the magisterial inquiry has begun. So that the difference in the meaning of an investigation and inquiry under the Code is no longer important. The ruling in 45 B. 61, has become obsolete under the present section. See also 3 Lah. 431.

WHO MAY TENDER PARDON.

6. Tender of pardon by Magistrate of another district.—It is essential that the Magistrate tendering pardon, must be one before whom the inquiry is held. Tender of pardon by the District Magistrate of E in respect of offences regarding which inquiry was being held in the district of M before another Magistrate is illegal, consequently such tender cannot be pleaded in bar of trial, and sentence passed against the person to whom tender was so made is good, 20 A. 40. Section 529 cannot cure such excess of jurisdiction.

7. Tender of pardon by unauthorized Magistrate and its acceptance in good faith.—When a pardon has been tendered and accepted in good faith, the fact that the Magistrate had no power to tender such pardon is a defect expressly cured by s. 529 (f), 1 P. R. 1898; 20 A. 40. So also where a pardon is granted with the oral sanction of a District Magistrate, the tender of pardon though irregular is legal, 3 A. L. J. 691 = 1908 A. W. N. 259 = 8 Cr. L. J. 443. See also 10 C. 936.

8. Government not competent to tender a conditional pardon under this section.—The Local Government has no power to tender a conditional pardon to an accused person within the meaning of this and the next section, and the evidence of an accused taken under a conditional pardon so offered, is wholly inadmissible, **10 C. W. N. 847 = 4 Cr. L. J. 44; 33 C. 1353** In **9 P. R. 1906 = 4 Cr. L. J. 282**, it was *held* that an accused person whom the Local Government had promised not to prosecute in respect of an offence to which this section does not apply is a competent witness against his accomplices provided the promise not to prosecute was given and accepted before commencement of trial. An accomplice to whom the Local Government has made a promise not to prosecute and by whom the promise had been accepted after the commencement of the trial, is not a competent witness. Such a grant of pardon does not alter the position of the accomplice as an accused person or make him cease to be an accused person so as to enable him to depose on oath.

TO WHOM PARDON MAY BE TENDERED.

9. Persons supposed to have been concerned.—The word '*supposed*' in this section and the next, must be taken merely as intended to exclude the case of a man who has actually been *convicted* of the crime, and not the case of a man who, although admitted to be a party to the crime, is unconvicted, **7 A. 160 at p. 163**. A tender of pardon to a person who had already pleaded guilty but who had not been sentenced on his plea is not illegal though he may no longer be regarded as a suspected offender, *see* **25 M. 61 (P.C.)**

PROCEDURE.

10. Magistrate to explain that pardon is conditional.—The Court should, when it tenders a pardon to a person, explain to him the conditions which accompany the tender. If he refuses, the trial will proceed as if no such tender had been made. If he accepts it is the duty of the Court to examine him as a witness in the case and then, if the Court be of opinion that he had not complied with the conditions the Court may commit him or direct him to be committed for trial upon the charge in respect of which the pardon was tendered **4 B. L. R. Appx L = 12 W. R. 80**.

11. Improper condition attached to pardon—temptation to strain the truth.—Pardon was tendered to one of three persons accused of murder coupled with the condition that he should profess to have been present when the death occurred and to have personal knowledge of the circumstances under which the alleged offence occurred, *held*, such a condition could not be attached to a tender of pardon, as the only condition which the law allows is that stated in this section. The law should be so worked that the temptation to the accomplice to strain the truth should be as slight as possible, **Ratanlal 612**. *See* **12 C. L. R. 226**, as to breach of condition.

12. Sub-section (2)—Approver shall be examined as a witness in the case (old Section).—The words '*in the case*' in sub-sec. (2) include a preliminary inquiry and do not refer to the trial alone. Where, therefore, a person to whom a conditional pardon had been tendered gave false evidence at the preliminary inquiry and was therefore not called as a witness by the prosecution at the Sessions trial and subsequently the pardon having been withdrawn he was charged and stood committed, *held* that the commitment was legal as the prosecution was not bound to put him forward as a witness at the Sessions trial if they believed that he would give false evidence, **24 M. 321 which approves of 20 A. 529; 42 C. 856**. Even where the approver before the committing Magistrate first makes a full and true disclosure and subsequently resiles from his statements he need not be examined in the Sessions Court, **33 M. 514; 5 B. L. R. 174 = 13 Cr. L. J. 33; 41 P. R. 1905 = 153 P. L. R. 1905 = 3 Cr. L. J. 55 (F.B.) overruling 4 P. R. 1903; 4 U. B. R. Cr. P. 7 = 7 Cr. L. J. 245; 17 F. W. R. 160 = 1 N. 64, 2 F. 57. 1 A. 77. 4 C. 57. 1 B. L. R. 147.** *See* **Notes under s. 339** *ness in the* *from being*

examined in the Sessions Court on the ground that he may prove an untrustworthy witness.

The approver must, however, be examined as under sub-sec. (2) and then dealt with under s. 339 if necessary, after the trial of the other accused is over, **31 M. 272**.

13. Sub-section (3)—Approver to be detained in custody till termination of trial and no longer.—(a) *Approver must be discharged after trial*—In **30 B. 611, BEAMAN, J.**, was of opinion, that the approver must be discharged immediately the trial is over. It is not for the Judges of the Sessions or the High Court to exercise a discretion in the matter, and to say that they will detain him in order that the further proceedings may be taken against him. But **ANTON, J.**, was of opinion that if a Sessions Judge was of opinion that the pardon had become forfeited he may also have authority to order the pardoned accomplice to be remanded in custody until the

Syn - Regulation law receipt maxim mille
can n ord r method d rection, control govern
sway, empire
Ryle, r l [imp & p rultu p pr k
ISO l (O Er ruler riguler N Er r
regulate c

27 The canal the d...
The canal the d...

The errors of young men are the runs of business. E.
Syn - Ruin

a pra l to demolish to suby rt to destroy
relate to poverty (the
house " And
their houses " Ru

Ru'in ate r
On the others
There is a girl

Ru'in ate, a In
My brother E. is
In a man on here all over the

Ru'in ation n (L. Lat. Ruinatio See super
subversion overthrow demolition (O
colloq

Ru'in er a Ruin

n l p RUMVACED p pr
[From the noun. See su

1 Destruction Ruin

Ru'ina tity

Ru'ina tness n The state or quality of being
ruinous

Ru'ina tity n The same as Ru'ina tity

Ru'ina tity a Subject to rule, accordant or con
formable to rule Laron

II

such a place narrowly
all books in Little B. line and
ted by early ghost. See L.
A. rat. T. mapes.
who rummages
y. source L. Ger. r. aer
from the

From heat and chance
And tumult, and confusion all embroiled. R. Don.
2 Report of a fact a story well authorized
Th. a review of b m went forth throughout all Judea.

Ru'ina tial a Ruinant [Rare]

Ru'ina tity n Ruin

terminat

ruin
v imp
l r
with

proper authority has had reasonable time to decide whether further proceedings are to be taken against him. Opinion of BEAMAN, J., was followed in 11 N. L. R. 59 = 16 Cr. L. J. 417. See also 37 A. 331.

(b) *Does this sub-section imply that the approver cannot be committed along with the others?*—Every person accepting pardon under this section must be examined as a witness in the case and if not on bail, should be detained in custody until the termination of trial by the Court of Session of the other accused. Therefore nothing should be done against such person, i.e., the approver, till after the case in the Court of Session has been finished, and his trial should commence *de novo* if it be deemed necessary to take proceedings against him, 23 B. 493 approved in 24 M. 321; 31 M. 272; 14 A. 502; 4 U. B. R. 7 = 7 Cr. L. J. 245. But see Notes 8 and 9 under s. 339 and also 4 U. B. R. 7 = 7 Cr. L. J. 245.

14. *Sub-section (4) old section—Magistrates bound to state reasons for grant of pardon.* This is now included in the new sub-section (1-A).—This section requires a Magistrate who tenders a conditional pardon to record his reasons for so doing. Where, however, the facts which led up to the tender appear on the record, the omission to state reasons is, not only not an illegality but not even an irregularity which vitiates the proceedings, 5 C. L. J. 224 = 5 Cr. L. J. 142 followed in 55 C. 629. The recording of his reason is not a condition precedent to the tender of the pardon and its acceptance by the approver and the pardon cannot be set aside because the reasons are not recorded, 13 Cr. L. J. 583 (A.).

15. *Scope of sub-section (4) old section—Pardon-tendering Magistrate not competent to try the case*—i.e., as falling under a section other than that under which he originally supposed it to fall, before he tendered the pardon. Sub-section (4) refers to a stage after inquiry, while sub-sec. (1) contemplates the case as it stood before the commencement of the inquiry, viz., an offence exclusively triable by the Court of Session or the High Court. The provisions of this section must be construed strictly, and disqualification created by the last paragraph applies only to that Magistrate before whom the suspected person is brought face to face, and who attempts to induce him by promise of pardon to make a full and true disclosure. Such Magistrate to a certain extent assumes the functions of a Police-officer and identifies himself with the prosecution, and it was doubtless on that account that it was considered proper to disqualify him from trying the case. As regards the examination, there is a distinction between the examination of approver made by a pardon-tendering Magistrate and that made by another Magistrate, viz., the latter is not bound to follow the same rules as the former.

which the disclosure made by the approver shows that only a minor offence had been committed, 55 L. R. 174 = 13 Cr. L. J. 33. When a Deputy Commissioner tries a case exclusively triable by the Court of the Sessions under powers conferred by s. 30 he does so as a Magistrate and if he tenders a pardon he is precluded from trying the case, 10 C. W. N. 847 = 4 Cr. L. J. 44. But the latter part of old sub-section (4) imposing a restriction on the competency of a pardon-tendering Magistrate is omitted now.

16. *English practice—tendering pardon.*—The evidence of an accomplice is now secured by one of the following methods—(1) By special proclamation pardon is sometimes promised upon certain conditions. Accomplices within this class have a right of pardon. (2) By admitting accomplices to give evidence for the Crown, under an implied promise of pardon, on condition of their making a full and fair confession of the truth. On a strict and ample performance of this condition to the satisfaction of Judge presiding at the trial they have an equitable title to a recommendation for the King's mercy. They cannot plead this in bar to an indictment against them, nor can they avail themselves of it as a defence on their trial though it may be made the ground of a motion for postponing the trial, to give the prisoner time for an application in another quarter, and if an accomplice after being received as a witness against his companions breaks the conditions on which he is admitted, and refuses to give full and fair information he will be sent to trial to answer for his share of guilt in the transaction. *Russell on Crimes*, pp. 2283 and 2284. See also 32 M. 173 at p. 175.

ACCOMPLICES AND THEIR EVIDENCE.

17. *Who is an accomplice?*—An accomplice is one who confesses himself a criminal. No man ought to be treated as an accomplice on mere suspicion unless he confesses that he had a conscious hand in the crime or he makes admission of such facts which show that he had such a hand, 11 Bom. L. R. 1153 = 10 Cr. L. J. 530; 27 M. 371. A prosecution witness, against whom there is apart from his own statement, ground for suspicion that he was himself a participator in the very crime for which the accused are on their trial, though strictly speaking not an accomplice, stands practically on the same basis as an accomplice, 15 Cr. L. J. 410 (A.). Spies and informers, who, with a view of laying a trap for a suspected person, suggest to him the commission of an

8. Government not competent to tender a conditional pardon under this section.—The Local Government has no power to tender a conditional pardon to an accused person within the meaning of this and the next section, and the evidence of an accused taken under a conditional pardon so offered, is wholly inadmissible. *10 C. W. N. 847 = 4 Cr. L. J. 44; 33 C. 1353*. In *9 P. R. 1906 = 4 Cr. L. J. 232*, it was held that an accused person whom the Local Government had promised not to prosecute in respect of an offence to which this section does not apply is a competent witness against his accomplices provided the promise not to prosecute was given and accepted before commencement of trial. An accomplice to whom the Local Government has made a promise not to prosecute and by whom the promise had been accepted after the commencement of the trial, is not a competent witness. Such a grant of pardon does not alter the position of the accomplice as an accused person, or make him cease to be an accused person so as to enable him to depose on oath.

TO WHOM PARDON MAY BE TENDERED.

9. Persons supposed to have been concerned.—The word 'supposed' in this section and the next, must be taken merely as intended to exclude the case of a man who has actually been convicted of the crime and not the case of a man who, although admitted to be a party to the crime, is unconvicted. *7 A. 160 at p. 183*. A tender of pardon to a person who had already pleaded guilty but who had not been sentenced on his plea is not illegal though he may no longer be regarded as a suspected offender, *see 25 M. 61 (P.C.)*.

PROCEDURE.

10. Magistrate to explain that pardon is conditional.—The Court should, when it tenders a pardon to a person, explain to him the conditions which accompany the tender. If he refuses, the trial will proceed as if no such tender had been made. If he accepts it is the duty of the Court to examine him as a witness in the case and then, if the Court be of opinion that he had not complied with the conditions the Court may commit him or direct him to be committed for trial upon the charge in respect of which the pardon was tendered, *4 B. L. R. Appx. L = 12 W. R. 80*.

11. Improper condition attached to pardon—temptation to strain the truth.—Pardon was tendered to one of three persons accused of murder coupled with the condition that he should profess to have been present when the death occurred and to have personal knowledge of the circumstances under which the alleged offence occurred, *held*, such a condition could not be attached to a tender of pardon, as the only condition which the law allows is that stated in this section. The law should be so worked that the temptation to the accomplice to strain the truth should be as slight as possible, *Ratanlal 612*. *See 12 C. L. R. 226*, as to breach of condition.

12. Sub-section (2)—Approver shall be examined as a witness in the case (old Section).—The words "in the case" in sub-sec. (2) include a preliminary inquiry and do not refer to the trial alone. Where, therefore, a person to whom a conditional pardon had been tendered gave false evidence at the preliminary inquiry and was therefore not called as a witness by the prosecution at the Sessions trial and subsequently the pardon having been withdrawn he was charged and stood committed, *held*, that the commitment was legal as the prosecution was not bound to put him forward as a witness at the Sessions trial if they believed that he would give false evidence, *24 M. 321 which approves 20 A. 529; 42 C. 856*. Even where the approver before the committing Magistrate first makes a full and true disclosure and subsequently resiles from his statements he need not be examined in the Sessions Court, *33 M. 514; 5 B. L. R. 174 = 13 Cr. L. J. 33; 41 P. R. 1905 = 153 P. L. R. 1905 = 3 Cr. L. J. 85 (F.B.) overruling 4 P. R. 1903; 4 U. B. R. Cr. P. 7 = 7 Cr. L. J. 243, 17 P. W. R. 1913 = 14 Cr. L. J. 64; 23 B. 675; 11 A. 79, 42 C. 685; 11 N. L. R. 59 = 16 Cr. L. J. 417, and see Note 8 under s. 339*. But see the new amendment of sub-section (2) under which the approver must be examined as a witness in the subsequent trial and it is not left now to the discretion of the Magistrate to withhold him from being examined in the Sessions Court on the ground that he may prove an untrustworthy witness.

The approver must, however, be examined as under sub-sec. (2) and then dealt with under s. 339 if necessary, after the trial of the other accused is over, *31 M. 272*.

13. Sub-section (3)—Approver to be detained in custody till termination of trial and no longer—(a) Approver must be discharged after trial.—In *30 B. 611*, BEAMAN, J., was of opinion, that the approver must be discharged immediately the trial is over. 'It is not for the Judges of the Sessions or the High Court to exercise a discretion in the matter, and to say that they will detain him in order that the further proceedings may be taken against him.' But ANTON, J., was of opinion that if a Sessions Judge was of opinion that the pardon had become forfeited he may also have authority to order the pardoned accomplice to be remanded in custody until the

proper authority has had reasonable time to decide whether further proceedings are to be taken against him. Opinion of BEAMAN, J., was followed in 11 N. L. R. 69 = 16 Cr. L. J. 417. See also 37 A. 331.

(b) Does this sub-section imply that the approver cannot be committed along with the others?—Every person accepting pardon under this section must be examined as a witness in the case and if not on bail, should be detained in custody until the termination of trial by the Court of Session of the other accused. Therefore nothing should be done against such person, i.e., the approver, till after the case in the Court of Session has been finished, and his trial should commence *de novo* if it be deemed necessary to take proceedings against him, 23 B. 493 approved in 24 M. 321; 31 M. 272, 14 A. 502; 4 U. B. R. 7 = 7 Cr. L. J. 243. But see Notes 8 and 9 under s. 339 and also 4 U. B. R. 7 = 7 Cr. L. J. 245.

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Get some

belonging to the
dentirostral tribe,
of the order *Ex-*
serca, and family
Ascyidae. The
species are re-
markable for pos-
sessing an elevat-
ed crest of feathers
on the head,
and for the ex-
treme freshness
and delicacy of
the color of their
plumage. *Latrod.*
Rap'tion



Cock of the Rock (*H. parvirostris*)

round scales are used in bottoming
the large boats and etc.

Ran'ter *ran'ter* of run] 1 A little run or
stream a brook
2 The same as **RUNDLER** 1 A stoup of rock or
a runlet of canary

Ran'ter, *n* (from run) 1 A stoup of rock or
a runlet of canary

Ran'ter, *n* (from run) 1 A stoup of rock or
a runlet of canary

Ran'ter

to move or fly

Ran'ter
Ran'ter

Ran'ter, *n* (see **RENNER**) The same as **RENNER**
Ran'ting *n* 1 Kept for the race as a running
horse
3 Succession

Ran'ting *n* 1 The act of one who runs, the act
of passing with speed
2 That which runs or flows

Ran'ting, *n* 1 The state of
Ran'ting *n* 1 In a rushing manner, with vio-
lence and rapidity
Ran'ting *n* 1 A rush-candle, or its light
Ran'ting *n* 1 A small, ferocious light
Ran'ting *n* 1 A rushing, weak
Ran'ting *n* 1 A rushing made from a rush or from
rushes
Ran'ting *n* 1 Abounding with rushes
2 Made of rushes
3 My rushy couch is very
soft.

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offence and supply him with the means for committing it are themselves abettors of the offence and accomplices. Persons who believing that an offence is about to be committed, lie in wait till it has been committed for the purpose of apprehending the prisoner or who supply marked money for the purpose of furnishing evidence against him are not accomplices, 19 B 363. Witnesses who admit that they were cognizant of the crime that they made no attempt to prevent it, that they did not disclose its commission are not necessarily accomplices, but their evidence ought to be treated with suspicion and only relied on to the same extent as that of accomplices 24 W. R. 55; 21 C. 328, 23 C. 361, 27 C. 144 and 20 W. R. 19. Persons who assist in concealing a crime already committed *e.g.* removing and concealing the dead body of a murdered person are not accomplices in the offence of murder, 27 M. 271, but *see* 23 C. 361. A mere detective or decoy is not therefore an accomplice nor an original confederate who betrays before the crime was committed, 15 C. W. N. 1105 = 15 C. L. J. 517. Nor does it include persons who have acted with the accused with a view to aid justice by detecting crime. *R v Mullins* 3 Cox 526 followed *R v Bickley*, 2 Cr. App. R. 53 = 73 J. P. 239.

18. Every accomplice a competent witness, if not on his trial.—*See* s. 133 of the *Indian Evidence Act*, 1872. There is no law or principle which prevents a person who has been suspected and discharged for want of evidence, being afterwards admitted as a witness for the prosecution without a pardon which, if offered, he would probably have rejected, for it would have ruined him, nor is it necessary that he should have been acquitted for on the evidence against him he could not have been properly committed for trial, 7 W. R. 44. *See* also 4 L. B. R. 362 = 9 Cr. L. J. 370, where it was held that the evidence of a person discharged under s. 209 (2) is admissible whether his discharge was legal or not. Also abettors of a crime are accomplices and must be looked upon as such, if they are produced as witnesses against the principal offenders. If they are not themselves under criminal charge, their evidence is admissible. *14 P. 118; 1 A. 120* If a person has been merely accused, he is a competent witness, *14 P. 118; 1 A. 120* If a person to whom pardon was illegally tendered was admitted. *See* also 18 B. 661. Where persons accused of the same offence were being separately tried, each is a competent witness in the trial of the other, without resort being had to this section, 23 B. 213; U. B. R. (1906) Ev. 3 = 5 Cr. L. J. 300, 21 A. L. J. 42.

19. Evidence of accused illegally pardoned is not relevant.—It is not competent to a Magistrate to convert an accused person into a witness except when a pardon has been lawfully granted under this section. Evidence given by such a person who had received a pardon in the case of an offence not *exclusively* triable by the Court of Session, is not relevant, that person not having been acquitted, or discharged, or convicted, 1 B. 610 followed in 10 B. 190; 2 A. 260; 1882 A. W. N. 240; Ratanlal 461 and 224, 3 B. H. C. R. Cr. Ca. 59; 3 P. R. 1897; 10 C. 936, 6 W. R. 91; 10 C. L. R. 553, 12 P. R. 1902, 21 P. R. 1904; 9 P. R. 1906. In 25 M 61, two persons were jointly committed to the High Court on charges for offences not triable exclusively by the Court of Session or High Court, one of them pleaded guilty and his plea was recorded and the Judge purporting to act under this section, tendered him a pardon. He was then removed from the dock and examined as a witness for the prosecution in the trial against the other accused. At the end of the trial, the conditional pardon was declared forfeited and the approver was convicted and sentenced on his previous plea of 'guilty,' held (Davies J., dissenting) that though the tender of pardon was illegal, the approver was a competent witness to whom an oath could be lawfully administered, as when he gave evidence he was not in charge of the jury and no issue remained to be tried as between him and the Crown. Cf 18 C. W. N. 1213 = 15 Cr. L. J. 693. But *see* 13 C. W. N. 552 = 10 Cr. L. J. 484.

20. Effect of tender of pardon or promise of non-prosecution by Government.—A person who has accepted a pardon from Government can be examined as a witness, provided that no proceedings are being taken against him, or, if any have been taken, he has been convicted, acquitted or discharged, but then his evidence may be no better than that of an accomplice and as such will require to be corroborated. If he has been discharged he cannot be kept in 'confinement' while his evidence may be necessary in the trial against the others. He may be examined on oath like any other accomplice who is not accused in the case under trial, but great caution is necessary in admitting and using the evidence of an approver. It not only requires corroboration in material particulars for its use but its evidentiary value depends considerably upon the circumstances under which his evidence was tendered 33 C. 1353. The tender of pardon by the Local Government although of doubtful validity in law can in no way be regarded as an inducement or threat illegally held out to an accused person to disclose or withhold any matter within his knowledge 5 C. L. J. 224 = 5 Cr. L. J. 142.

21. **Difference between tender of conditional pardon and withdrawal under s. 494.**—There is a material difference between the position of an accused who has accepted a conditional pardon tendered under this section and that of one the charge against whom has been withdrawn by the Public Prosecutor under s. 494. If the withdrawal is before charge, the accused is discharged, and if after, acquitted, both the discharge and acquittal being unconditional while if the conditional pardon is forfeited he can be tried for the same offence. In 25 B. 422 it was held (WHITWORTH, J., *dissenting*) that persons discharged under s. 494 were competent witnesses for the prosecution in the very case in which they had been accused. But when the Court purporting to act under s. 494 permitted the withdrawal of the case against an accused, but omitted to record an order of discharge and the accused continued in custody, it was held his position was in no way changed from that of an accused, 33 C. 1333. In 5 C. L. J. 224 = 5 Cr. L. J. 142, however, it was held the evidence of such a person though not formally discharged was admissible. See Notes under s. 494.

22. **English practice where it is intended to obtain the evidence of an accomplice in custody and jointly charged.**—In all such cases where two persons are joined in the same indictment and it is thought desirable to separate them in their trials in order that the evidence of one may be taken against the other, in order to ensure the greatest possible amount of truthfulness on the part of the person who is giving evidence under such remarkable circumstances, it would be far better that a verdict of not guilty should be taken first, or if the plea of not guilty be withdrawn and a plea of guilty received, that sentence should be passed, in order that the mind of the witness may be free from all corrupt influences which the fear of impending punishment and the desire to obtain immunity at the expense of the prisoner might be otherwise liable to produce. *Winser v. R.*, L. R. 1 Q. B. 239, 390; *R v. Brindlay* 15 Cox 217. It is a common practice after the indictment has been found and the accused arranged to offer no evidence against the accomplice and on his acquittal to call him for the Crown. Occasionally a *Nolle prosequi* is entered against the accomplice during the trial and before verdict. If this is done the accomplice becomes a competent witness for the Crown. After the indictment has been found and the accomplice has pleaded guilty he may be called for the prosecution. *Russell on Crimes*, pp. 223-2285, *Archbold*, p. 458.

23. **Accomplice evidence.**—The general rule is that accomplice evidence must be corroborated, 17 Cr. L. J. 220 = 34 In. Ca. 332 (Par). *It there are more than one accused, there must be corroboration against each of the accused showing his connection with the offence*, 19 P. W. R. 1916, see also 2 P. W. R. 1916 = 17 Cr. L. J. 107 and 7 P. W. R. 1916 = 17 Cr. L. J. 97. The question of value to be attached to the statements of approvers must be decided upon the particular and peculiar circumstances of each case, 7 P. W. R. 1916, see also 18 Bom. L. R. 266 = 3 Bom. Cr. Ca. 171. See s. 133 and illustration (b) to s. 114 of the *Indian Evidence Act*, 1872. Though there is nothing illegal in a conviction based solely on the evidence of an accomplice, 19 W. R. 43, 1 M. 394, 27 M. 271; 8 A. 306; 9 A. 523; 14 B. 115 and 331; 5 P. R. 1902; 12 O. C. 418 = 11 Cr. L. J. 71; U. B. R. (1911) 3 Q. 96 = 13 Cr. L. J. 424, 6 S. L. R. 106 = 13 Cr. L. J. 767; 6 S. L. R. 195; 14 Cr. L. J. 179 (Burma), yet it has now become a universal rule of practice not to convict on the uncorroborated testimony of accomplices and it would be an error of law to disregard it, 27 M. 271; 10 B. 319, 9 W. R. 23; 7 Bom. L. R. 969 = 3 Cr. L. J. 33; 12 O. C. 418 = 11 Cr. L. J. 71; 9 M. L. T. 406 = 12 Cr. L. J. 240; 19 P. L. R. 1911; 9 M. L. T. 503 = 12 Cr. L. J. 170; 19 P. W. R. 1912 = 13 Cr. L. J. 182. There is an established practice, founded on the judicial experience of generations which requires corroboration by some untainted evidence and that in a material particular pointing not only to the crime but to the participation of the accused in the crime, 18 C. W. N. 550 = 15 Cr. L. J. 438, 1916 M. W. N. 363 = 15 Cr. L. J. 417. But no rule can be laid down as to the amount of corroboration necessary. It depends upon the nature of the crime, on the extent of the complicity of the accomplice and the nature of the corroborative facts. 23 C. 339; 25 B. 193; 2 Bom. L. R. 611; 33 C. 649; 27 M. 271; 7 Bom. L. R. 969 = 3 Cr. L. J. 33, 35 M. 247. Corroborative evidence must establish the existence of the crime, 1 B. 475 at p. 478 (Note), the identity of each of the accused whom the approver impeaches. 3 Bom. H. C. R. 57, 1 B. 475; 10 B. 319; 1 A. L. J. 110; 8 A. 306 and 509; 10 C. 970; 29 C. 782 and must also establish something that would bring the case home to each prisoner, 23 M. 143; 27 M. 271; 5 W. R. 18; 12 Cr. L. J. 337 (Oadh). 18 C. W. N. 550 = 15 Cr. L. J. 438. Corroboration must proceed from an independent and reliable source, 10 Bom. 319; 15 E. H. C. R. 196; 22 W. R. 43; 10 W. R. 17. Neither evidence of other accomplices, 8 A. 306; 5 W. R. 18, nor the confession of a co-accused, 11 B. H. C. R. 196; 23 W. R. 43, 12 O. C. 418 = 11 Cr. L. J. 71, nor the exact communication in detail of the several statements of the accomplice in the course of a trial, 10 C. 970 is sufficient corroboration. The previous statements of an accomplice can be regarded as corroborative, 35 M. 247, but s. 25 B. 357.

As to the duty of the Judge in dealing with accomplice testimony in jury trials see Notes on

S.

The saddle resembles the Mexican hat but has a lower heel and ears. The fur which is exceedingly valuable



Saddle (Native American)

which, according to the legend, is from the skin of a horse.

Saddle (Native American) (see) The saddle is made of horse & pack (see) & has very ears or pocket worn by a cavalry officer at the top side. Adapted for the sword belt. It is often used for the purpose of the saddle.

It is often used for the purpose of the saddle.

It is often used for the purpose of the saddle.



Saddle

It is often used for the purpose of the saddle.

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It is often used for the purpose of the saddle.

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24 Subsequent trial of accomplice for connected offences barred.—A person to whom pardon has been granted by a competent Magistrate may plead that pardon as a bar for the offence or offences under inquiry or for any other offence or which he appears to have been guilty in connection with the same matter. This plea is available in any part of British India irrespective of territorial limits, 11 A. 79. *See B. L. R. Sup. Vol. 459 = 5 W. R. 80.* A person to whom pardon is tendered and by whom it is accepted, should be examined as a witness in any case arising out of the same circumstance and should not be committed for trial for any other offence arising out of the same circumstances, unless he is found guilty of forfeiture of the pardon tendered *Weir II, 394. See Notes 11 and 13 above*

But where one *S* made a confession of his complicity in certain dacoities committed in the Etah District and also in a dacoity committed some time previously at Majhauiah. In connection with the Etah dacoities *S* was tendered pardon, *S* was subsequently tried and convicted in respect of the Majhauiah dacoity. *Held* on appeal that there was no reason why the confession made by *S* in respect of the Majhauiah dacoity should not be put in evidence against him and that apart from the fact that it was not pleaded at the trial, the pardon tendered to *S* in a totally different case was no bar to his present conviction, 46 A. 236 (11 A. 79 distinguished).

25. Value of retracted statements and confessions.—*See 11 O. C. 328 = 8 Cr. L. J. 393, 12 O. C. 418 = 11 Cr. L. J. 71; 5 P. R. 1911 = 91 P. L. R. 1911 = 12 Cr. L. J. 276; 16 C. W. N. 669 = 13 Cr. L. J. 371.* Where a retracted statement is uncorroborated by any other evidence whatsoever it is unsafe to act upon it, 16 Cr. L. J. 815 (P.), 30 P. R. 1914 = 50 P. W. R. 1914 = 15 Cr. L. J. 626; s. 288 and Notes 8, 9 and 18 thereunder. *See Notes* under Heading VIII to s. 164 at p. 373 and as to the duty of the Judge in jury trials, *see Note* 46 at p. 805 and *Note* 61 at p. 810. Evidence given before Magistrate but afterwards retracted should not be accepted in preference to the statement made to the Sessions Court unless there is something to show the truth of the first statement, 27 C. 295. *See Notes* to s. 288 and 8 B. H. C. R. Cr. Ca. 103; 21 A. 175; 22 A. 445; 15 M. 352, 22 C. 50; 7 C. L. R. 66, 13 C. L. R. 326, 14 P. R. 1894.

26 Value of statements of approver whose pardon has been forfeited —

(i) *For the offence in respect of which he was tendered a pardon —*

(a) **As against him.**—Where the pardon tendered to an approver has been forfeited on the ground that he has committed a breach of the conditions on which it was tendered, a statement made by him to the Magistrate is admissible against him under s. 339 (2) on a subsequent trial for the offence in respect of which the tender was made notwithstanding the fact that he was not examined as a witness in any Court under s. 337 (2), 41 P. R. 1905 (F.B.) *overruling* 4 P. R. 1903; 14 Bur. L. R. 306 = 7 Cr. L. J. 245. 'It is clear to us that the argument based upon the provisions of s. 24 of Act I of 1872 is not entitled to weight in the present case, *cl. (2)* of s. 339 was introduced to make it clear that a statement made by a person who accepted an offer of pardon is not governed by s. 24 of the Evidence Act and can be used in evidence against him when that pardon has been forfeited,' 1908 A. W. N. 259 = 8 Cr. L. J. 445, 11 N. L. R. 59 = 16 Cr. L. J. 417. The statement made by an approver under conditional pardon can if that pardon has been forfeited, be used against him for the offence under inquiry or trial when it was tendered or forfeited, or for any other offence connected with the same matter. But it should be proved that he was the person who made the statement, 11 C. 580, but statements made under the promise of pardon are not evidence against the person making them 8 W. R. 53, 1 A. L. J. 110, 1 P. R. 1899. There is no rule of law or practice that the self-incriminating portion of the evidence of an accomplice is unworthy or belief unless corroborated, 6 Bom. L. R. 443, 15 M. 63, but *see* 27 C. 295; 22 A. 445.

(b) **As against the other accused.**—In 7 C. L. R. 66, FIELD, J., has expressed a grave doubt whether the deposition of an approver taken before the committing Magistrate might be used as evidence against his accomplices on their trial before the Sessions Court, the condition of the pardon of the approver having been withdrawn, and so also in 13 C. L. R. 326. In 5 M. W. P. H. C. R. 217, it has, however, been *held* that the evidence is not admissible. In 22 C. 50 it was *held* that the deposition before the committing Magistrate of the approver who resiled from his statements in the Sessions trial and was then and there put in the dock and tried along with the other accused was inadmissible in evidence, because the co-accused had no opportunity to cross-examine.

PUNJAB.—The deposition of the approver at the preliminary inquiry is under s. 288, capable of being treated as evidence at the Sessions trial, if the approver is produced and examined as a witness, 14 P. R. 1894. *See also* 26 P. R. 1902; but a statement made by the approver before commitment in the absence of the accused is not admissible, 3 P. R. 1904, *see also* 9 P. R. 1906.

ALLAHABAD—The deposition of a pardoned approver before the committing Magistrate is admissible in evidence under s. 288 at the Sessions trial if he is examined as witness even though he should retract his previous statements, **21 A. 175**. But the use of such a deposition as substantial evidence of the facts therein stated is fraught with the gravest peril and could never have been the intention of the Legislature, **22 A. 443**.

MADRAS—The previous deposition is admissible under s. 288 **15 M. 352**.

(ii) *For the offence of perjury*—Section 339 (2) does not by implication forbid the use of the statements against the approver when he is tried for perjury, **5 B. L. R. 174 = 13 Cr. L. J. 33**. Such a statement may be used as the basis of a charge for perjury **1 B. 610** and **2 A. 260** refer only to the evidence of an approver illegally pardoned.

27 Approver's evidence admissible in civil case against him.—The confession and sworn evidence of an approver in a criminal trial for dacoity are admissible in evidence against him in a suit for damages brought against him by the complainant for having instigated the dacoity. The Civil Courts can act on such statements even though the Sessions Judge did not think it safe to convict the accused upon such statements, **13 C. W. N. 501**.

28 Accomplice evidence is admissible though the accomplice is not pardoned under s. 337 of the Code.—It is not necessary, in order to make an accomplice a competent witness that the procedure prescribed by s. 337 of the Code should be invariably made use of, **45 A. 226**.

338. At any time after commitment, but before judgment is passed, the Court to which

the commitment is made may, with the view of obtaining on the trial the evidence of any person supposed to have been directly or indirectly concerned in, or privy to, any such offence, tender, or order the committing Magistrate to tender, a pardon on the same condition to such person

Notes.—1. When pardon under this section may be tendered?—**7 W. R. 78 (114)** being superseded a Sessions Judge is now competent, *before trial*, to direct a Magistrate to tender pardon under this section.

The words '*after commitment*' and '*before judgment*' show that pardon under this section may be tendered not only during trial, but also before trial. But in an assessor case after the case for the prosecution was closed, the defence heard and the opinion of the assessors given, the tender of pardon was *held* to be irregular though not positively illegal, **1884 A. W. N. 147**.

will be disposed to allow him to be admitted as a witness. Where there were several persons committed as principals, and several as receivers, but no corroboration could be given as to the receivers, against whom the evidence of the accomplice was required, permission was refused to allow one of the principals to become a witness, *Russell on Crimes*, p. 2284.

committed is "not triable exclusively by the Court of Session" **10 C. 936 ; 25 M. 61 (P.C.)**. But the fact that he is charged with other offences not exclusively triable by the Court of Session is immaterial, **9 B. L. R. 43 = 16 Cr. L. J. 632**.

4 Tender of pardon to accused person who has pleaded guilty.—A Court of Session, under this section, tendered a pardon to an accused person, charged jointly with two others for the same offence, who had pleaded guilty. The tender was accepted and such person was examined as a witness against the other accused. *Held* that the tender of pardon was not improperly made, and the evidence of the approver was admissible though the evidence of the pardoned accomplice, taken with the statements of unpardoned co-prisoners is not sufficient by itself to warrant the conviction of those who never confessed **7 A. 160 followed in Ratanlal 730 ; 25 M. 61**. There is no ground for the suggestion that the words 'any person' in this section do not cover an accused person before the Sessions Judge, **9 B. L. R. 43 = 16 Cr. L. J. 632**.

5. "Supposed."—This word must be taken merely as intended to include the case of a man who has actually been convicted of the crime, and not the case of a man, ~~who~~ admitted to be a party to the crime is unconvicted, **7 A. 160 ; Ratanlal 730**. See **h**

blow by the action of the wind upon it
 him now both sail and oar

"Behooves [SAIL'-nee die, n. A large needle used in working
 Milton upon sails

knowledge of salats, one who writes the lives of
 saints [Pore]



Sail

Will he draw out
 For anger's sake he is wrothful

SE In it is use the pl rat has usually the same form
 as the singular

4 A journey or excursion upon the water a pas-
 sage by a sailing vessel

Spirit 4 like good the soul of good and evil

2 One of the blessed in heaven

When she throned upon red and from the urn
 Far separate from the holy mount

3 (Feet) One canonized by the church

SEAL n. (Seal) A monkey
 of the genus *Lutherus*. It has
 a long bushy tail and has
 obtained the name of
 seal monkey

1 The term is also applied
 to a way to denote a
 seal monkey but having a
 side tail

[Lat. See SEAL]
 - a word much used in
 story and phantasy



Seal (P. Ar. a sealus)

As it is used in passages from heaven
 When he be comes the last far the clouds
 And ends upon it a vessel of the sea

SEAL n. 1 To pass or move upon in a ship by
 the use of a seal

A thousand ships were manned to seal the sea. Deppen.

2 To fly through.

3 To do rest or manage the motion of, as a vessel

4 To do rest or manage the motion of, as a vessel

5 To do rest or manage the motion of, as a vessel

6 To do rest or manage the motion of, as a vessel

7 To do rest or manage the motion of, as a vessel

8 To do rest or manage the motion of, as a vessel

9 To do rest or manage the motion of, as a vessel

10 To do rest or manage the motion of, as a vessel

11 To do rest or manage the motion of, as a vessel

12 To do rest or manage the motion of, as a vessel

13 To do rest or manage the motion of, as a vessel

14 To do rest or manage the motion of, as a vessel

15 To do rest or manage the motion of, as a vessel

16 To do rest or manage the motion of, as a vessel

17 To do rest or manage the motion of, as a vessel

18 To do rest or manage the motion of, as a vessel

6 **Magistrate bound to obey the direction of the Sessions Judge**—The Magistrate ordered must obey the direction and tender pardon to the approver though he may be of opinion that the evidence already on record may be sufficient for conviction. He need not apply for the sanction of the District Magistrate. Under this section only a Magistrate can be so ordered and not a Police-officer, 6 W R. (Cr. Let.) 5

7 **Local Government cannot tender pardon**—A Local Government cannot tender a pardon either under this section or s 337 but it is open to the Local Government to withdraw the prosecution under s. 494 33 C. 1353, 10 C. W. N. 847 = 4 Cr. L. J. 44 and see Notes 8 and 21 to s 337 and Notes to s. 494

8 **Power of Magistrate acting under s. 30**—If a Deputy Commissioner acting under powers conferred upon him by s 30 tenders a conditional pardon in a case exclusively triable by the Court of Session he is precluded from trying the case himself 10 C. W. N. 847 = 4 Cr. L. J. 44 See Notes 15 to s 337

9 **Procedure when the pardoned approver forfeits his pardon**—See Notes 8 and 9 under s 339 and see also Note 13 under s 337

339. (1) Where a pardon has been tendered under section 337 or section 338 and the Public Prosecutor certifies that in his opinion any person who has

accepted such tender has either by wilfully concealing anything essential or by giving false evidence not complied with the condition on which the tender was made and such person may be tried for the offence in respect of which the pardon was so tendered or for any other offence of which he appears to have been guilty in connection with the same matter

† Provided that such person shall not be tried jointly with any of the other accused and that he shall be entitled to plead at such trial that he has complied with the conditions upon which such tender was made in which case it shall be for the prosecution to prove that such conditions have not been complied with

(2) The statement made by a person who has accepted a tender of pardon may be given in evidence against him § at such trial

(3) No prosecution for the offence of giving false evidence in respect of such statement shall be entertained without the sanction of the High Court

Note.—Referring to the amendment of this section the Select Committee say—

We accept clause 86 so far as it goes except that we would substitute a certificate by the Public Prosecutor for an allegation by the prosecution as the basis of the prosecution of a person who has accepted a tender of pardon. We consider however that it is desirable to lay down some procedure with regard to the plea contemplated by the proviso to sub-section (1). The Bill contains no indication as to when this plea is to be raised and what is to be the effect of it and difficulties of procedure may obviously arise with reference to sections 255 271 (2) and 272. We therefore propose a new section to be added after section 339 which lays down that when a person to whom a pardon is tendered is being tried under that section, he shall at the commencement of the proceedings be asked whether he raises the plea that he has complied with the conditions on which the pardon was granted and if he does so plead the Court shall record a finding on the point and if it finds that the conditions have been complied with shall acquit the accused. This provision we have inserted as a new clause 86 A in the Bill (s 339-A).

Notes—1. **History of the section.**—Tender of pardon was dealt with by ss. 209 and 211 of the Code of 1861 s. 211 empowered the Court of Session at the time of trial and also the Sudder Court as a Court of reference if of opinion that a person who had accepted an offer of pardon had not conformed to the conditions under which it was tendered to order his commitment. Amending Act VIII of 1860 substituted a new section 211 empowering the Magistrate before the commitment the Court of Session during trial or the High Court as a Court of reference to order the commitment. The next Code Act X of 1872 s. 349 conferred the like power and

* These words in inverted commas inserted by Act XVIII of 1923

† These words in inverted commas were substituted for the words he may be by Act XVIII of 1923

‡ The prov. (1) was added by Act XVIII of 1923

§ These words in inverted commas were substituted for the words when the pardon has been forfeited under this section by Act XVIII of 1923

tion by the action of the wind upon it. "Behooves *Sail'*-nee'dle, n. A large needle used in working knowledge of sails, one who writes the lives of him saw both end and car." *Sail'*-nee'dle, n. A large needle used in working knowledge of sails, one who writes the lives of him saw both end and car."

Sail'-nee'dle, n.

Sail'-nee'dle, n.

A large needle used in working

knowledge of sails, one who writes the lives of



Sails

Sail'-nee'dle, n. A species of falcon
who has right hand new
A sailor

Thompson

One of the blessed in heaven
Then shall thy souls unceasing, and from the injury
For aperiod, curing thy holy mind,
Unite, and hail to us in three one

One of the blessed in heaven
Then shall thy souls unceasing, and from the injury
For aperiod, curing thy holy mind,
Unite, and hail to us in three one



Sail', r. f. 1 To pass or move upon in a
motion of sails

A thousand ships were massed to and the sea.

2 To fly through.

Sublime the sail

Sail'-cloth, n. Duck or canvas used in
sails

Sail'-er, n. 1. One who sails, a sailor

Par

2 A ship or other vessel, — with qual

words descriptive of power or speed

Sail'-lug-ma'ter, n. 1. One who sails, a sailor

2 A ship or other vessel, — with qual

words descriptive of power or speed

3 A ship or other vessel, — with qual

words descriptive of power or speed

4 A ship or other vessel, — with qual

words descriptive of power or speed

5 A ship or other vessel, — with qual

words descriptive of power or speed

6 A ship or other vessel, — with qual

words descriptive of power or speed

7 A ship or other vessel, — with qual

words descriptive of power or speed

8 A ship or other vessel, — with qual

words descriptive of power or speed

contained this further provision "*the statement made by a person under pardon which has been withdrawn under this section may be put in evidence against him*"

The next Code, Act X of 1882, no longer empowered Magistrates Sessions Judges and High Courts to commit if it appeared to them that the conditions of the pardon had not been kept and enacted the section 339 with the word *withdrawn* instead of the word *forfeited* in sub-sec. (2). The Code of 1898 amended the section by substituting the word "*forfeited*" for the word "*withdrawn*", 32 M. 173; 15 M. 332.

No limitation was fixed by the section in the Code of 1898, unlike s 249 of the 1872 Code as to the time when a pardon may be withdrawn 8 C. 560 = 10 C. L. R. 369.

Now the changes introduced under the new amendment are the following —

1 Under the present section a certificate by the Public Prosecutor to the effect that the person accepting tender of pardon has in his opinion committed a breach of the condition of the tender or pardon is made the sole basis of a prosecution of the approver

2 From the above change it follows as a corollary that no formal determination as to a withdrawal or forfeiture of pardon by the trying Court is now necessary for the approver's prosecution; but the certificate of the Public Prosecutor is enough

3 In consonance with the above change it may be noted that the words "when the pardon has been forfeited under this section" have been omitted from cl (2) of the present section

4 It is now expressly provided by the proviso to cl (1) that an approver cannot be jointly tried along with any of the other accused.

1-A. **The necessity of the certificate of Public Prosecutor for the prosecution of an approver.**—Under s. 339 of the Code, the certificate of the Public Prosecutor is a condition precedent to the prosecution of an approver to whom a tender of pardon has been made but who has failed to comply with the condition of the tender 26 Bom. L. R. 1240, 5 Lah. 379

2. **Formal withdrawal or forfeiture of pardon.**—Under the present section for the reasons above noted, in Note 1, *supra*, no question can now arise as to a formal withdrawal of the tender of pardon before an approver can be prosecuted. So the cases holding that a formal withdrawal is unnecessary are of pure academic interest (See 25 B. 675; 42 C. 826, 786; 30 B. 611; 32 M. 173; 39 A. 305)

3. **What Court to decide whether pardon has been forfeited.**—Under the new amendment a formal withdrawal or forfeiture of pardon is dispensed with, the Court that tries the approver upon the certificate of the Public Prosecutor has to try the issue whether the pardon is forfeited or not on the accused raising the plea that he has complied with the conditions of the pardon. The procedure to be followed in such cases is described in the new section 339-A


4 **Approver must make full disclosure throughout—utmost good faith must be observed by both sides.**—The transaction is one of the utmost good faith and the approver commits a breach of the condition if he fails to make a full and true disclosure throughout. It is not enough for him to make such disclosure before the committing Magistrate if he withdraws it in the Sessions Court, or to make it when examined in chief, if he withdraws it in cross-examination 24 M. 321, approved in 32 M. 173. It has nowhere been laid down that if a witness first makes a full and true disclosure, he is then at liberty to contradict his statement or deny its truth without any fear of forfeiting his pardon, 33 M. 814; 11 N. L. R. 59 = 16 Cr. L. J. 417; 42 C. 636. When a pardon has been tendered and accepted, the fullest faith must be kept by both sides. No matter what degree of guilt might be admitted by the pardoned criminal he must go free provided he makes a full, fair and true disclosure of the whole of the circumstances, within his knowledge relative to the commission of the crime, 12 C. L. R. 225. Where a pardon granted under s. 337 to an approver witness, was declared forfeited by the Sessions Judge before the hearing of the whole of the evidence, without proof that the statement made by the person pardoned was inconsistent, except upon most immaterial points, with previous statement made by him, or contradicted by the evidence and before any evidence affecting his veracity had been given and where it was found by the High Court that the whole of the evidence showed that the crimes were committed in all probability exactly as he said they were, that there was absolutely no evidence that his part in the crime was either greater or less than what he had stated it to have been and that there were

tion by the action of the wind upon it
It is now both *sq* and *oar*

Behooves
Alton

Sail *nee die n* A large needle used in working
upon sails

knowledge of sailors one who writes the lives of
saints [*Par*]



Ship

1 By night 2 *h* 3 *f* 4 *f* 5 *f* 6 *f* 7 *f* 8 *f* 9 *f* 10 *f* 11 *f* 12 *f* 13 *f* 14 *f* 15 *f* 16 *f* 17 *f* 18 *f* 19 *f* 20 *f* 21 *f* 22 *f* 23 *f* 24 *f* 25 *f* 26 *f* 27 *f* 28 *f* 29 *f* 30 *f* 31 *f* 32 *f* 33 *f* 34 *f* 35 *f* 36 *f* 37 *f* 38 *f* 39 *f* 40 *f* 41 *f* 42 *f* 43 *f* 44 *f* 45 *f* 46 *f* 47 *f* 48 *f* 49 *f* 50 *f* 51 *f* 52 *f* 53 *f* 54 *f* 55 *f* 56 *f* 57 *f* 58 *f* 59 *f* 60 *f* 61 *f* 62 *f* 63 *f* 64 *f* 65 *f* 66 *f* 67 *f* 68 *f* 69 *f* 70 *f* 71 *f* 72 *f* 73 *f* 74 *f* 75 *f* 76 *f* 77 *f* 78 *f* 79 *f* 80 *f* 81 *f* 82 *f* 83 *f* 84 *f* 85 *f* 86 *f* 87 *f* 88 *f* 89 *f* 90 *f* 91 *f* 92 *f* 93 *f* 94 *f* 95 *f* 96 *f* 97 *f* 98 *f* 99 *f* 100 *f* 101 *f* 102 *f* 103 *f* 104 *f* 105 *f* 106 *f* 107 *f* 108 *f* 109 *f* 110 *f* 111 *f* 112 *f* 113 *f* 114 *f* 115 *f* 116 *f* 117 *f* 118 *f* 119 *f* 120 *f* 121 *f* 122 *f* 123 *f* 124 *f* 125 *f* 126 *f* 127 *f* 128 *f* 129 *f* 130 *f* 131 *f* 132 *f* 133 *f* 134 *f* 135 *f* 136 *f* 137 *f* 138 *f* 139 *f* 140 *f* 141 *f* 142 *f* 143 *f* 144 *f* 145 *f* 146 *f* 147 *f* 148 *f* 149 *f* 150 *f* 151 *f* 152 *f* 153 *f* 154 *f* 155 *f* 156 *f* 157 *f* 158 *f* 159 *f* 160 *f* 161 *f* 162 *f* 163 *f* 164 *f* 165 *f* 166 *f* 167 *f* 168 *f* 169 *f* 170 *f* 171 *f* 172 *f* 173 *f* 174 *f* 175 *f* 176 *f* 177 *f* 178 *f* 179 *f* 180 *f* 181 *f* 182 *f* 183 *f* 184 *f* 185 *f* 186 *f* 187 *f* 188 *f* 189 *f* 190 *f* 191 *f* 192 *f* 193 *f* 194 *f* 195 *f* 196 *f* 197 *f* 198 *f* 199 *f* 200 *f* 201 *f* 202 *f* 203 *f* 204 *f* 205 *f* 206 *f* 207 *f* 208 *f* 209 *f* 210 *f* 211 *f* 212 *f* 213 *f* 214 *f* 215 *f* 216 *f* 217 *f* 218 *f* 219 *f* 220 *f* 221 *f* 222 *f* 223 *f* 224 *f* 225 *f* 226 *f* 227 *f* 228 *f* 229 *f* 230 *f* 231 *f* 232 *f* 233 *f* 234 *f* 235 *f* 236 *f* 237 *f* 238 *f* 239 *f* 240 *f* 241 *f* 242 *f* 243 *f* 244 *f* 245 *f* 246 *f* 247 *f* 248 *f* 249 *f* 250 *f* 251 *f* 252 *f* 253 *f* 254 *f* 255 *f* 256 *f* 257 *f* 258 *f* 259 *f* 260 *f* 261 *f* 262 *f* 263 *f* 264 *f* 265 *f* 266 *f* 267 *f* 268 *f* 269 *f* 270 *f* 271 *f* 272 *f* 273 *f* 274 *f* 275 *f* 276 *f* 277 *f* 278 *f* 279 *f* 280 *f* 281 *f* 282 *f* 283 *f* 284 *f* 285 *f* 286 *f* 287 *f* 288 *f* 289 *f* 290 *f* 291 *f* 292 *f* 293 *f* 294 *f* 295 *f* 296 *f* 297 *f* 298 *f* 299 *f* 300 *f* 301 *f* 302 *f* 303 *f* 304 *f* 305 *f* 306 *f* 307 *f* 308 *f* 309 *f* 310 *f* 311 *f* 312 *f* 313 *f* 314 *f* 315 *f* 316 *f* 317 *f* 318 *f* 319 *f* 320 *f* 321 *f* 322 *f* 323 *f* 324 *f* 325 *f* 326 *f* 327 *f* 328 *f* 329 *f* 330 *f* 331 *f* 332 *f* 333 *f* 334 *f* 335 *f* 336 *f* 337 *f* 338 *f* 339 *f* 340 *f* 341 *f* 342 *f* 343 *f* 344 *f* 345 *f* 346 *f* 347 *f* 348 *f* 349 *f* 350 *f* 351 *f* 352 *f* 353 *f* 354 *f* 355 *f* 356 *f* 357 *f* 358 *f* 359 *f* 360 *f* 361 *f* 362 *f* 363 *f* 364 *f* 365 *f* 366 *f* 367 *f* 368 *f* 369 *f* 370 *f* 371 *f* 372 *f* 373 *f* 374 *f* 375 *f* 376 *f* 377 *f* 378 *f* 379 *f* 380 *f* 381 *f* 382 *f* 383 *f* 384 *f* 385 *f* 386 *f* 387 *f* 388 *f* 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the Local Government with a recommendation that the appellant should be pardoned on the ground that he had conformed to the conditions on which the original pardon was granted to him, 12 C. L. R. 226; 29 A. 11. Approver forfeits his pardon if while giving evidence against some accused he screens one, 24 P. R. 1918 (Cr. 1).

5. Mere failure of approver's evidence to convict co-accused is not sufficient to forfeit pardon.—The words "*a full and true disclosure of the whole of the circumstances within his knowledge relative to the offences directly under inquiry*" refer to the importance when a pardon is tendered, of encouraging the approver to give the fullest details so that points may be found in his evidence which may be capable of corroboration. The question of how pardon protects him and what portion of it should not protect him ought not to be treated in a narrow spirit, 11 A. 79. It is a matter of great importance, which cannot be too emphatically insisted upon, that the strictest faith should be kept with a person to whom an offer of pardon has been made and by whom it has been accepted under the Code, even though the statement made by him under the pardon tendered may reveal himself to be one of the vilest of criminals. The mere failure of his evidence to procure conviction of his alleged associates in crime is plainly insufficient in itself to justify a summary order for the withdrawal of the pardon and trial of the deponent. Where the same story is consistently adhered to in both the Courts, and only fails to procure a conviction for want of corroboration, the mere suspicion that the approver has given false evidence is plainly insufficient to justify the enforcement of the provisions of this section, and some definite evidence to show wilful concealment or the giving of false evidence should be required before the commitment of the approver for trial is considered justifiable, 15 P. R. 1895, 7 L. B. R. 1 = 14 Cr. L. J. 401. Absconding before conclusion of cross-examination does not amount to wilful concealment, 17 Cr. L. J. 391.


6. Opinion of Court directing prosecution as to non-compliance with the condition of tender is not conclusive of the fact.—A mere order by the Court before which an accomplice gives evidence that he be prosecuted for not complying with the condition of his tender does not preclude the trying Court inquiring into the question of fact involved in his plea of not guilty. The opinion of the Court directing the prosecution that the person has not complied with the condition of the tender even if relevant, cannot be conclusive especially when the order is made, as in practice may occur, without the accused having any opportunity of showing cause against the order, 6 P. R. 1889 followed in 15 P. R. 1895. The mere expression of opinion by the Sessions Judge is not enough. The approver should be given an opportunity of meeting the allegation that he has failed to make the full and true disclosure required by s. 337. The proper course is to draw up an order setting forth specifically the alleged breach and to call upon the approver to show cause why he should not be tried for the main offence as provided in s. 339. On the date fixed for the hearing unless the approver admits the alleged breach of the condition, the Magistrate or Judge should hear the evidence relied upon as establishing the breach and any rebutting evidence which the approver may offer, and should then record a definite finding as to whether there has been a breach or not. A definite finding arrived at in this manner is essential before the approver can be placed on his trial for the original offence, 7 L. B. R. 1 = 14 Cr. L. J. 401. See also 11 N. L. R. 95 = 16 Cr. L. J. 411. It should be noted that under the present section the certificate of the Public Prosecutor has been made the sole basis for the prosecution of an approver. And under s. 339-A it is provided that the trying Court must ask the approver whether he pleads that he has complied with the conditions on which the tender of pardon was made. And if the approver does so plead the Court is bound to record the plea and proceed with the trial and before judgment the Court must give a specific finding whether the approver has complied with the conditions of pardon or not. So it is clear that the opinion of the Court directing prosecution as to non-compliance with the conditions of the tender is of no value at all legally.

PROSECUTION OF APPROVER

7. Approver forfeiting his pardon during preliminary inquiry—how dealt with.—See sub-sec. (3) to s. 337 and Note 13 thereto. If it turns out that the approver has committed an offence triable by a Magistrate either exclusively by himself or concurrently with the Court of Sessions, the approver may according to circumstances be either tried by the Magistrate himself or committed to the Court of Session or High Court for trial. But if it is an offence triable exclusively by the Court of Session, s. 193 provides that there ought to be a commitment and commitment is absolutely necessary in such a case—*B. H. C. R. Rul., 17th Feb., 1899*. It is only by such commitment that the Sessions Judge or High Court has jurisdiction to hold the trial, 15 M. 352; 22 C. 50; Ratanlal 119.

(a) *Generally, nothing should be done against him until after the trial of the other accused is over*—MADRAS, BOMBAY AND BURMA. If an approver is considered to have forfeited his pardon during the preliminary investigation nothing should be done against him till after the case against the principal accused

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in the Court of Session has been finished; and his trial should commence *de novo*, if it be deemed necessary to take proceedings against him. He should be detained in custody if not on bail till the trial of the other accused in the Sessions Court is over, 23 B. 493; 4 Bom. L. R. 826, 24 M. 321; 4 U. B. R. 7 = 7 Cr. L. J. 245; 5 N. L. R. 134 = 10 Cr. L. J. 418; and it is not desirable that the Magistrate should commit the approver along with the principal accused, 31 M. 272. In 25 B. 675, however, it is stated, that it cannot be laid down as a general rule that a Magistrate who tenders a pardon to an accused has no jurisdiction to commit him before the close of the trial of other accused, since the Legislature by using a general term like 'case' in sub-sec. (2) instead of the word 'trial' must have meant to abstain from laying down any such rule. A person examined at the preliminary inquiry may well be said to be examined in the case. It is therefore impossible to lay down any rule applicable to all cases, to determine at what stage it is expedient to commit an accused who has in the opinion of the Magistrate forfeited his pardon. It should be noted that under the present section an approver can be prosecuted only upon the certificate of the Public Prosecutor and it is also provided by the new proviso to sub-sec. (1) that he shall not be tried jointly with any of the other accused against whom he has given evidence and the cases cited above are good law only in so far as they decide that as a general rule nothing should be done against him until after the trial of the other accused is over. And so in light of the new amendment the rulings, in 20 A. 529, 25 A. 24; 42 C. 856 are, it is submitted, no longer good law.

8. Approver even if he has given false evidence should be discharged. He cannot be detained in custody after trial.—See 30 B. 611, which was followed in 11 N. L. R. 59 = 16 Cr. L. J. 417, where the impropriety of the Sessions Judge having kept the approver in custody after the termination of the trial was pointed out. See also 37 C. 845.

It is for the Crown to decide whether the approver should be proceeded with for the offence.—At the termination of the trial in which a pardon is given the accomplice may be discharged by the Court. Then, if so advised, the Crown may re-arrest and proceed against him for the offence in respect of which he has been given conditional pardon, 30 B. 611 followed in 37 C. 845.

9. Duty of Court trying an approver who forfeited his pardon.—NB—It should be noted that under the present Code the procedure to be followed in cases, when the tender of pardon is forfeited by an approver, is expressly regulated by section 339-A. And the cases referred to in the following Notes 10 and 11, though prior to the enactment of s. 339-A, embody the same general principles that are laid down in that section. When put on his trial for the offence for which a pardon is granted he may plead to a competent Court his pardon in bar. And that is a plea that the Court would be bound to hear and decide upon before going further and putting him on his defence. In deciding it the Court would raise an issue whether he had or had not made a full and true disclosure of the whole facts and whether after having admittedly done that, he has at a later stage recanted, whether that recantation amounted to giving false evidence within the meaning of this section and worked a forfeiture of pardon, 30 B. 611. It is now held by all the High Courts that it is the first duty of the Court before whom an approver is put up for his trial to decide whether the pardon has been forfeited. See 32 M. 173; 30 B. 611, 42 C. 856; 34 P. R. 1902; 31 P. R. 1904; 11 N. L. R. 59 = 16 Cr. L. J. 417; 7 L. B. R. 1. The contrary view in 37 C. 845, where it was held that in such a case it was for the committing Magistrate to decide that the pardon had been forfeited and if such an opportunity was given to the accused the Court to which he is committed would not have jurisdiction to determine whether pardon was forfeited is no longer correct. The approver is entitled to plead the pardon before the Sessions Judge although he has not done so before the committing Magistrate, 37 A. 331; even when the committing Magistrate decides against the approver, it is open to the approver to raise it at the trial, 42 C. 856 where 37 C. 845 is not followed.

(a) *The forfeiture of pardon and the offence of which he is charged may be tried jointly.*—The two questions whether he has forfeited the pardon and whether he is or is not guilty of the offence of which he is charged may be heard and tried together. 42 C. 756 where 30 B. 611; 32 M. 173 and 37 C. 845 are followed. It is possible that the evidence on the two issues may overlap and in some cases be practically identical and that seems to be the only argument against trying the question of forfeiture of pardon before calling on the accused to plead to the charge of the offence and where such is the case it might be a reason for the Judge to use his discretion and order the approver to be tried separately from the other accused. *PER LETCHER, J.*, in 42 C. 856.

(b) *The Judge must ask the prisoner whether he relies on the pardon.*—Where a pardoned approver is put on his trial, it is the duty of the Sessions Judge to ask the prisoner whether he relies on the pardon granted to him and to try the issue whether the pardon has been forfeited. It is not enough that the committing

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Magistrate has found that the pardon has been forfeited, 16 Cr. L. J. 234 (M.), where 32 M. 173 is *followed*. See also 7 N. L. R. 65 = 12 Cr. L. J. 326 and 11 N. L. R. 59 = 16 Cr. L. J. 417.

(c) *Issue whether pardon has been forfeited should be tried first.*—Where a pardon has been tendered and the approver is afterwards put on trial he should be asked if he relies on the pardon and if he says 'yes' which is a plea of pardon. *This being done the con* to be placed on his trial he to an acquittal unless the prosecution proves that he has wilfully concealed material facts or has given false evidence, 1 P. R. 1893; 34 P. R. 1902. See also 7 L. B. R. 1, 19 C. W. N. 179 = 16 Cr. L. J. 120. When an approver has been committed to the Court of Session as an accused he may plead his pardon in bar at the trial, and the Judge must first try the issue of forfeiture and take the verdict of the jury thereon, and then proceed with the trial of the accused for the offences charged, 42 C. 856 where 37 C. 845 is *discussed*, 32 M. 173; 33 M. 514, 25 B. 675, 30 B. 611 and 31 P. R. 1904 are *followed*. Where, however, the Judge tried the question of forfeiture with the jury after some evidence on the general issue had been recorded. *Held* that the irregularity had not prejudiced the approver or the other accused, 42 C. 856.

(d) *The Judge must take the verdict of the jury on the issue of forfeiture and not decide it himself.*—Where this procedure was not followed and the Judge did not leave it to the jury to say whether the accused had given false evidence and thereby forfeited his pardon, but himself decided that the withdrawal of the pardon was conclusive that it had been forfeited and convicted the accused the conviction is illegal, 33 M. 514. The Judge ought to try the question of forfeiture, as a preliminary issue, on evidence limited to the point, and take the verdict of the jury on it before proceeding to try the general issue of the guilt of the accused 42 C. 856.

10. *Duty of prosecution in trial of approver who forfeited his pardon.*—(a) *Onus is on the Crown.*—In a trial of the approver after breach of the conditions on which the pardon was tendered for the offence in respect of which the pardon was so tendered, it is for the prosecution to prove that the pardon has been forfeited. The making of a full and true disclosure by the approver is not a condition precedent which the approver has to prove to establish his right to pardon according to the view taken in 11 A. 79, under the Code of 1882, but his failure to make such full and true disclosure is a condition subsequent determining or forfeiting the pardon 27 C. 137; 25 B. 675, 30 B. 611, *approved* and *followed* 32 M. 173. The *onus* of proof of forfeiture is on the Crown, 42 C. 856. It must be first proved and decided by the Court before which the approver is put on his trial that he by either wilfully concealing something essential or by giving false evidence has not complied with the conditions on which the pardon was offered, 59 P. R. 1905 = 40 P. L. R. 1906 = 3 Cr. L. J. 342, where 31 P. R. 1904, was followed and *see* Note 7.

(b) *Procedure.*—Ordinarily the proper course to follow in such a case would be to put in evidence the record of the statement made by the approver as a witness at the former trial, together if necessary with evidence as to the identity of the person making that statement. In order to form an opinion whether in the course of that statement the approver had given false evidence or had wilfully concealed anything essential it may become necessary to record evidence bearing on the question 37 A. 331.

11 *Trial of approver along with other prisoners illegal.*—*See* proviso to sub-sec (1) and Note 7, *supra*.

12 *Sanction for prosecution of pardoned persons for perjury.*—When the person to whom pardon has been legally tendered makes a statement on oath which he retracts in a subsequent judicial proceeding a proper sanction is necessary for a prosecution for giving false evidence on each branch of the alternative charge. The sanction of the High Court would be necessary in regard to the statement made under conditional pardon as well as a formal complaint of the Court before which the other statement was made (*see* section 476). Such sanction can only be granted before, not after, the commencement of the prosecution, 10 B. 190; 11 B. H. C. R. 34. A witness who is in any way induced to make a false statement in connection with a capital charge should be allowed every possible *locus penitentiae*, 11 A. L. J. 264 = 15 Cr. L. J. 76. The want of sanction is not a mere irregularity curable under s. 537, but is a fatal defect, 27 C. 137, 42 P. R. 1834.

13. *Practice.*—Application for sanction to be made in open Court.—An application to the High Court for sanction to prosecute an approver for giving false evidence should be made by motion on behalf of the Crown in open Court, 24 C. 492; 32 M. 47; 10 P. R. 1904 = 1 Cr. L. J. 793, and not by letter 1393 A. W. N. 12, 30 P. W. R. 1912 = 175 P. L. R. 1912 = 13 Cr. L. J. 431. The person moving the High Court must be in a position to place before it the tender of pardon and the evidence given in consequence of such tender and to satisfy the High Court that there is *prima facie* reason to suppose that the persons who accepted the tender of pardon

have wilfully concealed an essential thing or given false evidence. A person tried under s. 471 by a Sessions Court is prosecuted within the meaning of this section, 42 P. R. 1884.

14. Committal proceedings whether void for want of Public Prosecutor's certificate.—Where in a case the Magistrate enquired into proceedings without the Public Prosecutor's certificate required under s. 339 and the accused was committed to the Sessions and before the trial in the Sessions the necessary certificate was produced in the Sessions Court, *held*, that the irregularity in the non production of the certificate before the Magistrate was condoned by the provisions of s. 532. 3 R. 55

Procedure in trial of person under sec. 339 * "339-A. (1) The Court trying under section 339 a person who has accepted a tender of pardon shall—

(a) if the Court is a High Court or Court of Session, before the charge is read out and explained to the accused under section 271, sub-sec (1) and

(b) if the Court is the Court of a Magistrate before the evidence of the witnesses for the prosecution is taken ask the accused whether he pleads that he has complied with the conditions on which the tender of the pardon was made

(2) If the accused does so plead, the Court shall record the plea and proceed with the trial, and the jury, or the Court with the aid of the assessors, or the Magistrate, as the case may be, shall, before judgment is passed in the case, find whether or not the accused has complied with the conditions of the pardon, and, if it is found that he has so complied, the Court shall, notwithstanding anything contained in this Code, pass judgment of acquittal "

Note—The procedure laid down in ss. 339 and 339-A must be strictly adhered to and followed. In a case where the accused was not asked before the charge was read out to him whether he pleaded that he had complied with the conditions on which the tender of pardon was made, nor were the terms of s. 339-A explained to him, *held* that the trial was vitiated by non-compliance with the provisions of s. 339-A of the Code. 5 Lah. 379.

Right of person against whom proceedings are instituted to be defended and his competency to be a witness.

† "340. (1) Any person accused of an offence before a Criminal Court, or against whom proceedings are instituted under this Code in any such Court, may of right be defended by a pleader

(2) Any person against whom proceedings are instituted in any such Court under section 107, or under Chapters X, XI, XII or XXXVI, or under section 552, may offer himself as a witness in such proceedings

Notes.—Pleader.—See for definition s. 4 (r) and Notes thereto at pp 16-17

1. Analogous law—Liberal provisions of N. Y. Cr. Pro. Code.—According to s 188, when defendant is brought upon arrest, the Magistrate must immediately inform him of the charge against him and of his right to the aid of counsel in every stage of the proceeding and before any further proceedings are had. According to s. 189, the Magistrate must also allow the defendant a reasonable time to send for counsel and adjourn the examination for that purpose, and must, upon the request of the defendant, require a peace officer to take a message to such counsel in the town or city as the defendant may name. The officer must, without delay and without fee, perform that duty.

2. Accused has a right to be defended by a pleader of his choice—The defence of an accused person ought not to be shut out merely by the fact that he is represented by a *mukhtyar*, 33 C. 493. The Court has no

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trate has no power under this section to forbid a duly-qualified pleader to appear for the accused, *Ratanlal* 25. See *ibid.* 29 and 6 B. 14 and 1 M. 304 as to similar right in appeals. See also 1 B. 64 and ss. 439 (2) and 440. Notes thereto

* This sect. n was inserted by Act XVIII of 1923 s. 85

† This section was substituted for the original section by Act XVIII of 1923 s. 89

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3. Right of accused's counsel to be heard.—It is not a question of indulgence that the counsel for the accused should be heard before judgment, but one of right. It is an elementary principle of law, that no order should be made to a man's prejudice especially in a criminal case without hearing him and the very object of the Legislature in allowing parties to be represented at trials by counsel is that counsel must be heard before a final opinion is formed by the Court. If counsel had a right to be heard it is not for the Court to say before hearing them whether the omission to hear and a judgment based upon opinion formed without such hearing have or have not caused prejudice to the accused, 6 Bom. L. R. 663. And the conviction will be set aside if the accused's vakil is not heard, 5 M. L. T. 290 = 9 Cr. L. J. 305; 9 P. R. 1877; 15 P. R. 1900.

4. Magistrate should not interpose between accused and his friends but should give every opportunity for making his defence.—In a case of murder, pleaders appeared on behalf of the accused's wife before the committing Magistrate and requested him to allow them to see the accused or ascertain in their presence from him whether he required their assistance. The Magistrate asked the accused in the absence of the pleaders whether he required their assistance, and then communicated to the pleaders that the accused did not want to engage them. When the case came before the High Court for confirmation, the Chief Justice remarked:—'In conclusion I wish to draw attention to the improper conduct of the investigating Magistrate in refusing to allow the pleaders engaged by his (accused's) wife to defend this accused, to have an interview with him or to appear and sit in Court. It was the duty of the Magistrate to have afforded the accused and his friends every opportunity of making his defence, and he should not personally have interposed in any way between them,' 1 Bom. L. R. 856. Prisoners and others are to have the fullest opportunity for giving *akalatnamas* to whomsoever they please, without reference to the mode in, or the circumstances by, which they may be influenced to do so, 1 B. H. C. R. Cr. Ca. 16.

5. Access to prisoners by pleader.—Prisoners in the custody of the Police before being produced before a Magistrate are at liberty, at any time of the day, to see a pleader, due precaution being taken against escape. The access to prisoners in jails by pleaders is a matter for the officer in charge of the jail to decide—*Mad. Pol. Mnn.*, p. 95, *Note*.

6. Right of private prosecutor to a pleader.—A pleader is entitled to appear not only on behalf of the accused, but also on behalf of a private prosecutor 6 B. L. R. Appx. LXX.

7. Position of pleader appointed by the Court to defend.—The position of a pleader appointed by the Court to defend a prisoner is not the same as that of a pleader whom the accused has authorized to act for him. Any admissions that may be made by the pleader appointed by the Court are not binding on the accused 2 Bom. L. R. 871.

8. Employment of Mukhtyars.—*See* Notes to s. 4 at pp. 16 to 18. 'The terms of s. 340 do not warrant any general rule for the exclusion of *mukhtyars* in all cases, but only allow the exercise by Magistrates of a discretion in each case as it arises. The Magistrates are expected not to deprive parties of legal aid which they could frequently obtain at a moderate cost by indiscriminate exclusion of persons who are invested by law with a distinct professional status in criminal trials.' This rule is equally applicable to Sessions Judges 38 C. 433; *Hillins*, 116.

9. Discretion with Court to hear agent or not.—To refuse or to allow the appearance of a *mukhtyar* on behalf of the accused person is entirely within the discretion of the Magistrate concerned, *Ratanlal* 314; though it has been held in *Ratanlal* 4, that a prisoner is entitled to authorize any person to be his agent in any Criminal Court. A *mukhtyar* has no right to plead in a Criminal Court without the permission of the presiding Judge, 4 B. L. R. 195 = 12 Cr. L. J. 118; 6 B. 14 was held to be no longer law. The practice of admitting *mukhtyars* to defend parties is not illegal. It is discretionary with the Magistrate to hear such agents or not, 7 M. H. C. R. Appx. XXXVII. Courts are bound to exercise a discretion in each case as to permitting or not permitting the appearance of unauthorized pleaders, *Weir* II, 400. But a general order excluding any particular class from appearing as pleader is illegal. An order excluding any particular individual in any particular case on grounds stated, are apparently without grounds stated, would be within the discretion of the Magistrate and therefore legal, *Weir* II, 401. Where the High Court circular stated that as a general rule, no person not qualified as legal practitioner, should be permitted to act in any legal proceeding, except to prevent a miscarriage of justice, held, that a general rule by a Magistrate that no private vakil should appear in his Court, went beyond the terms of the circular, but that he would be acting in consonance with its terms if he stated that he was not prepared to make any general exception in favour of any particular individual, *Weir* II, 401; 33 C. 433.

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10 General dismissal of Mukhtyar is bad—A Magistrate has no power to dismiss a *mukhtyar* generally unless he be convicted of an offence involving moral turpitude or infamy. This refers to a general dismissal only and not to particular cases in which he might refuse to hear a *mukhtyar* whom he did not think qualified. 1 W R 34.

11 No Court fee for Vakalatnama—No advocate or attorney of the High Court or the authorized pleader appearing in defence of an accused person should be required to file a *vakalatnama*. 7 M H C R Appx XL. See *Court Fees Act* VII of 1870 *Schedule II Art 10* and see Note 15 below.

12 Communication to Mukhtyar is privileged—Communication made to a *mukhtyar* or his clerk is privileged. Section 126 of the *Indian Evidence Act* must be construed as applying to all persons who within the category of pleader as defined in s. 4 (r) of the Code and includes therefore *mukhtyar*. Statements made by accused persons that a false charge was going to be brought against them to a *mukhtyar* who was at the time acting for one of them as his *mukhtyar* and legal adviser and to whom the statement was made with the object that he should appear for them in Court are privileged. 23 C 736.

13. Who is an accused person?—An accused is a person over whom the Magistrate or Court is exercising jurisdiction. 18 B. 881, therefore (i) *A person ordered to give security for good behaviour is an accused person within the meaning of this section*. 23 C. 493 followed in 21 A. 107; 27 C. 656; 15 P. R. 1900, 25 A. 375 and 4 C. L. R. 452 *contra* see 27 C. 662 and 9 C. W. N. 983. And a Court is bound to hear a pleader on his behalf if he engages one. 15 P. R. 1900. (ii) *See 16 C. 781, 5 C. 535—5 C. L. R. 433* as to persons against whom maintenance proceedings are taken under s. 488. (iii) *A Civil Court making a preliminary inquiry under s. 476 is not a criminal Court and the person against whom the inquiry is made is not an accused person*. 8 A. L. J. 237 = 12 Cr. L. J. 231. (iv) *A person complained against before issue of a process has no right to be represented by a pleader*—A person complained against does not become an accused person until it has been decided to issue process against him under Chapter XVI. Section 340 does not hence entitle a person complained against to be represented by a pleader during the preliminary inquiry which may be held under s. 202 (1). If he chooses to attend the proceedings he may of course do so like any other member of the public but he has no *locus standi* as a party the purpose of the law being clearly to exclude him until sufficient ground for joining him has been made out by the complaint. 4 N. L. R. 81 = 8 Cr. L. J. 20. See 10 C. L. R. 553, 16 B. 661.

14. Duty of Pleader for accused—Where a Sessions Judge took exception to the fact that the pleader for the accused had put forward witnesses on behalf of the accused who he must have known had been tampered with and threatened to report his conduct to the High Court it was held that the remarks of the Judge were improper and that it was the duty of the pleader for the accused to call witnesses for the defence if his client insists on submitting their evidence to the Court. 3 Bom. L. R. 562.

15. Practice—Memorandum of appearance—Under Madras Dis. No. 272 of 1907 whenever a pleader representing a party in any criminal proceeding does not file in Court a *vakalat* from his client he shall be required to file a memorandum of appearance containing a declaration that he has been duly instructed to appear for the party whom he represents. Held even that is not necessary where the party is present in person along with his vakil. 5 M. L. T. 290 = 9 Cr. L. J. 303.

341. If the accused though not insane, cannot be made to understand the proceedings,

the Court may proceed with the inquiry or trial and in the case of a Court other than a High Court if such inquiry results in a commitment, or if such trial results in a conviction the proceedings shall be forwarded to the High Court with a report of the circumstances of the case and the High Court shall pass thereon such order as it thinks fit.

Notes.—1 Section not applicable to persons of unsound mind—The provisions of this section do not apply to a person who is of unsound mind. They apply to persons who are unable to understand the proceedings from deafness or dumbness, or ignorance of the language of the country or other similar cause. In such

a lunatic, the Magistrate should proceed under this section, 11 M. L. T. 24 = 13 Cr. L. J. 24.

2. Criminal responsibility of deaf mutes—To escape punishment a deaf-mute to whom sections 82 and 83 I. P. C., do not apply must like his brother who can hear and speak come within s. 84 I. P. C. in

other words if his mind is sound his inability to hear and speak will not excuse him. In *U. B. R. (1910) I. 57 = 12 Cr. L. J. 386*, it was *held* that the law does not provide for a sane deaf mute who has never been instructed being exempted from punishment and *Q. v. Bowla*, 22 W. R. 35 and 73 and 27 C 368, were followed in preference to *Dwarkanath v. Nader*, 22 W. R. 35, 34 P. R. 1885 and 37 P. R. 1889. "It seems very doubtful whether a sane deaf mute could live to the age of, say, seventeen, without learning something of his duty towards his neighbour in person and property, I think, it must be presumed that if the mind is sound there is this knowledge in the deaf mute."

3. Section not applicable where accused understands the proceedings.—Where an accused person was deaf and dumb and the Magistrate who tried and convicted the accused, thinking that the accused was unable to "understand the proceedings in the case" referred the case to the District Magistrate who was satisfied that the accused did understand what he was charged with, *held* that the District Magistrate's finding as to the capability of the accused to understand the proceedings against him, was conclusive, and this section did not apply. The High Court annulled the conviction by the Magistrate and as the accused was previously convicted of an offence under Chapter XXII I P C, ordered his committal to the Court of Session. 19 W. R. 37. See 3 Bom. L. R. 371; 22 W. R. 35 and 72, 18 Bom. L. R. 653.

4. Magistrate should try and get into communication with a deaf and dumb accused.—When a deaf and dumb person is placed on his trial, some means of communication with him should, if possible, be adopted. *Weir II, 402*. A Magistrate should try and get into communication with a deaf mute accused with the assistance of his relations, as it is impossible that a deaf mute should be able to live to maturity without being able to communicate with his relations and that if he had, his relations must have established some practicable method of inter-communication by signs or otherwise, *U. B. R. (1910) I. 57 = 12 Cr. L. J. 386*. Where a deaf and dumb prisoner was convicted of an offence, and upon the trial no attempt was made to communicate with the prisoner respecting the charge against him, the conviction was quashed. 6 M. H. C. R. Appx. VII, and see Note 8 below and 22 W. R. 35 and 72.

5. Magistrate must refer only after conviction or committal.—While the complainant and his witnesses were being examined, the accused showed that he was dumb and thereupon the Magistrate without framing a charge but expressing an opinion that the accused was guilty, referred the case under this section. The High Court, noticing that the trial was imperfect as no charge had been framed refused to treat the mere opinion expressed that the accused was guilty as tantamount to a conviction, and returned the case for disposal to the Magistrate directing him to come to a definite opinion whether the accused could be made to understand the proceedings, and if he came to that opinion, to proceed with the inquiry or trial, and if the same resulted in a conviction or commitment, to forward the proceedings under this section with a report of the circumstances of the case, *Ratanlal 679 and 836*. Before a reference to the High Court can be made under this section there should have been a committal or conviction, *Ratanlal 180*. This section requires the Judge to proceed to the end of the trial and then report the result if a conviction follows, *Weir II, 403*. It does not authorize a Magistrate to refer the case in the midst of the trial. 4 Bom. L. R. 825, *Ratanlal 836*; 25 Bom. L. R. 43.

6. Magistrate must state his views when making reference.—In submitting a case to the High Court under this section, a Presidency Magistrate should state his view of the conduct of the accused and must take some evidence regarding the previous history and habits of the accused. *Ratanlal 696*.

7. Magistrate cannot pass sentence in cases of doubt.—This section prohibits a Court from passing sentence when it is uncertain that the accused has understood the proceedings against him. *Weir II, 403, U. B. R. (1910) I. 57 = 12 Cr. L. J. 386, 11 M. L. T. 404 = 13 Cr. L. J. 248*. See also 37 P. R. 1889 below.

8. Summary trial of deaf and dumb man not advisable.—It is highly inadvisable to try a deaf mute summarily. In such a case, an attempt should be made to find out whether the accused has any friends or relatives who are accustomed to communicate with him. The Magistrate should make inquiries about his antecedents and ordinary mode of life and the manner in which he is communicated with in the ordinary affairs of life, 8 Bom. L. R. 849 = 4 Cr. L. J. 445.

9. Power of High Court to pass final orders on reference by Magistrate—nature of the orders.—*(a) On commitment.*—An accused person who had been for some time confined in a Lunatic Asylum was tried and committed to the Sessions by a Deputy Magistrate on a charge of murder. The accused was deaf and dumb and could not be made to understand the proceedings which had been taken. On the proceedings being forwarded to the High Court under this section it was *held* that the law does not contemplate that the Sessions trial should necessarily take place. That it is discretionary with the High Court on a commitment made, to order

... and much oil being
... ..

begin, as applied to the whole of the world.

1. 100
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the girl and union
Señor (sk'el hyop, n {Written like "collop"} {sc
 h. of stop}

3. *For the 1st margin* *the 1st*
the 1st *the 1st* *the 1st* *the 1st*
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9. A kind of lock for babies, or for animals.

Solution

Scallop and other (freshwater) oyster and mussel beds with a single or limited species over the whole area. This is a distinct sort of zone in distinct scaling shells in water and on a shell for the purpose called a scaling bed. The name

beds, is (U) at a depth, to not come out

Academy, is [U'f] at college, to get some work

48 100

42 31 5 1

scraping-iron, } in scraping iron
hence, a respiratory
kēāl'pet lōmā, a [Int. *scapula*

400

See "Cattle and

[illegible]

to result awkwardly, to be

1. The first of these is the *Handbook*, which is a collection of the most important facts and figures relating to the history and geography of the United States. It is a very valuable work, and is one of the best of its kind.

$\alpha_1, \alpha_2, \dots, \alpha_n$ are eigenvalues of A , then
 $\alpha_1, \alpha_2, \dots, \alpha_n$ are eigenvalues of A^T .



*It is a common pet bird and parrots. Not all of these birds are actually climbers, and there are climbing birds that do not belong to this order.

sean sō'xī nī, n (Or as a bird and food of various birds
bird and food of various birds)

Then in his mind was very much stored with materials, he used what material he had in such a way as to produce a wonderful effect.

Scantiness, n The quality or condition of being scanty, narrowness, want of amplitude *see image*

Calceolus *semita*, keep it dark & Water.
O. Fr. *exchondret*, corner, angle, from
Sto *supra* } A small patch, a
{ *Chs* } *Halt*

the Sessions trial to be held, and the High Court must consider whether any benefit would be likely to result especially to the accused by such trial. The High Court in this case having come to the conclusion that no benefit would be likely to result to the accused by his being tried by the Court of Session found that the accused was guilty of the alleged murder, but that he was by reason of unsoundness of mind not responsible for his action, and directed him to be kept in the District Jail to await the orders of Government 27 C. 368. In a proper case, the High Court might even direct the accused to be made over to the custody of his father 7 N. W. P. H. C. R. 131.

(b) *High Court may pass sentence on Magistrate's finding*—This section gives the High Court power to treat the proceedings before the Lower Court as amounting to a sufficient trial and pass sentence upon the prisoner according to the facts which seem to be established in the course and as the result of these proceedings, 22 W. R. 35 and 72, 27 C. 368, U. B. R. (1910) 1 57 = 12 Cr. L. J. 386.

(c) *On conviction High Court may discharge*—Where a person, who was deaf and dumb, was convicted the High Court, thinking that the prisoner was not a person to whom penal discipline can be properly applied set aside the conviction and directed that the prisoner be admonished and discharged 22 W. R. 35 followed 35 P. R. 1885, 4 Bom. L. R. 296.

(d) *High Court may treat the accused as a lunatic and report to Government under s. 471*—Accused, a deaf-mute was unable to understand the proceedings in Court, and was after inquiry convicted of an offence and sentenced to nine months' rigorous imprisonment by a Magistrate. Held, that in the absence of any clear and specific provisions in the Code the accused should be dealt with as a lunatic and the matter reported to Local Government under s. 471 37 P. R. 1889, followed 15 P. R. 1901.

(e) *May direct re-trial*—See 6 Bom. L. R. 849 = 4 Cr. L. J. 444.

342. (1) For the purpose of enabling the accused to explain any circumstances appearing in the evidence against him the Court may, at any stage of any inquiry or trial, without previously warning the accused put such questions to him as the Court considers necessary, and shall, for the purpose aforesaid, question him generally on the case after the witnesses for the prosecution have been examined and before he is called on for his defence.

(2) The accused shall not render himself liable to punishment by refusing to answer such questions or by giving false answers to them but the Court and the jury (if any) may draw such inference from such refusal or answers as it thinks just.

(3) The answers given by the accused may be taken into consideration in such inquiry or trial and put in evidence for or against him in any other inquiry into, or trial for, any other offence which such answers may tend to show he has committed.

(4) No oath shall be administered to the accused.

Notes.—See s. 164 for the power and mode of recording statements and confessions made during Police investigations s. 364 for the method of recording examination of accused s. 533 for curing of irregularities s. 267 as to when the examination of the accused before the committing Magistrate has to be tendered in a Sessions trial. See ss. 209 242 244 245 253 256 (2) for statements by accused persons.

1 Scope of the section.—We think that the present law gives too great a latitude to the Courts with regard to the examination of an accused person. The object of such an examination is to give the accused an opportunity of explaining any circumstances which may tend to criminate him, and thus to enable the Court, in cases where the accused is undefended to examine the witnesses in his interest. It was never intended that the Court should examine the accused with a view to elicit from him some statement which would lead to his conviction. We have, therefore limited the power of interrogating the accused by adding to the first paragraph of s. 342 the words *for the purpose of enabling the accused to explain any circumstances appearing in the evidence against him*. We think the accused should always have this opportunity of explaining and we have therefore required the Court to question him generally for that purpose before he enters on his defence.—*See Com. Rep.* on the Bill of Act V. of 1882.

The limitation of the power of the Courts in examining the accused for the purpose of enabling him to explain any evidence against him is thus accounted for by Dr STOKES "The section assumed its present form partly owing to a judgment of the High Court of Bengal and partly owing to the words of EDWARD

LIVINGSTON "An unrestricted right of interrogating is also very apt to produce insidious and catching questions. Instead of a cool and impartial attempt to extract the truth, the examination becomes a contest in which the pride and ingenuity of the Magistrate are arrayed against the caution or evasions of the accused, and every construction will be given to his answer that may fix upon him the imputation of guilt. It may be added that badgering by the Judge is apt to arouse undue sympathy for the prisoner"—*Anglo-Indian Codes, Vol II Introduction, p 20*

2. Section applies to all proceedings in Magistrate's Court.—(1) *In the stage of investigation* Justice CARNDUFF is of opinion that neither this section nor s 164 places any limitation on the extent to which the accused may be examined in the stage of investigation. "At that stage, and, indeed at any point other than that indicated in s 342 the only thing that is abhorrent is pressure or inducement, and the sole criterion by which the fitness of an examination can be judged is with reference to the question whether it was voluntary or not," 37 C. 567 at p 514

(2) *Inquiry preliminary to commitment*—Sections 209 and 210 do not curtail the powers of a Magistrate under this section. Section 342 applies to all sorts of proceedings in Magistrate's Courts whether the case is one triable by a Court of Session or otherwise. Under that section a Magistrate is empowered at any time and without any previous warning to put questions to the accused for the purpose of enabling him to explain any circumstances appearing in the evidence against him 15 Cr. L. J. 474 (Oadh). As to inquiries under s. 117, etc. see note 5 A below

3. Analogous Law.—Under N Y Cr Pro Code, s. 196, a Magistrate must inform the defendant that it is his right to make a statement in relation to the charge against him, that the statement is designed to enable him, if he sees fit, to answer the charge and explain the fact alleged against him, that he is at liberty to waive making a statement, and that he is not bound to answer questions unless he chooses to do so. The Magistrate must ask him in writing without an oath, and must ask him besides the questions of name, parentage, residence and profession only 'to give any explanation you may think proper of the circumstances appearing in the testimony against you and state the facts which you think will tend to your exculpation.'

English Law—accused may give evidence.—The accused at common law was not a competent or compellable witness at any stage of the proceedings, on the ground of the maxim *nemo tenetur scriptum prodere* and if the accused was examined on oath any conviction would be bad. The position of the accused has been changed by a series of statutory provisions culminating in the *Evidence Act, 1877* (40 and 41 Vict. c 14) and the *Criminal Evidence Act, 1898* (61 and 62 Vict. c 36) whereby it is enacted that every person charged with an offence is a competent witness for the defence at every stage of the proceedings whether charged solely or jointly. See *Archbold*, pp. 457—463. A Magistrate has no right to ask the accused any questions, except questions incidental, to the conduct of the examination, e.g., whether the accused wishes to cross-examine a witness, or to give evidence, and the statutory questions prescribed by s 18 of the *Indictable Offences Act, 1848*. Unless the accused gives evidence under the *Criminal Evidence Act*, if the Magistrate does interrogate an accused who does not so examine himself, the answer of the accused is inadmissible as evidence against him, *R v Berriman* (1854) 6 Cox C. C. 333; *R v Pettit*, (1830) 4 Cox C. C. 154; *R v Wilson* (1817) Holt (N. P. 169) *Halsbury* Vol. IX, p 397. When an accused gives evidence, he may be asked any question in cross-examination, notwithstanding that it would tend to incriminate him, *Archbold*, p. 460.

4. Court must examine and not prosecutor.—The Court conducting the trial or inquiry is alone authorized to examine the accused person, and the counsel or other person conducting the prosecution should not be allowed to take any part in the examination—*C. P. Cr. Cr., Part II, No 24*. The law allows the Court, not the complainant, to put questions to the accused and the Court should not put questions in order merely to convict the accused out of his own mouth 10 M. 121 at pp. 123—125.

EXAMINATION IMPERATIVE.

5. Court is bound to examine the accused.—The provisions of this section are not permissive, *Ratanlal* 625; but imperative, *Ratanlal* 710; 10 Bom. L. R. 201 = 7 Cr. L. J. 194; 11 Cr. L. J. 746 (Birma), U B R (1917) 2nd Qr. 18; 1 P. R. (1918) Cr. 22, 1 C. 785 (C) and the accused must be afforded an opportunity for the purpose of explaining any circumstances appearing in the evidence against him, *Ratanlal* 100 and 720. In all warrant-cases there must be an examination of the accused, s 263 (g) does not give the Magistrate any discretion whether he will examine the accused or not 41 C. 743. The term 'shall' in this section makes the duty imposed on the

regards the examination of the accused and failure to comply with them is an illegality vitiating the trial. In a warrant-case the prosecution witnesses were examined and the accused did not avail themselves of the opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses. The accused were then questioned generally in the case. For the purpose of enabling them to explain the circumstances appearing from the evidence against them and they stated they would put in a written statement. The Magistrate then framed a charge against the accused under section 411, I P C, and they pleaded not guilty and the case was adjourned. At a later date the accused cross-examined the prosecution witnesses under s. 256 of the Code and the witnesses were also re-examined. Evidence was then called for the defence and the accused were not further questioned generally on the case after the cross-examination and re-examination of the prosecution witnesses. *Held*, by the majority (VENKAT SUBBARAO, J., *dissenting*) that there was a sufficient compliance with the requirements of section 342 of the Code and the trial and conviction of the accused were legal (43 M. L. J. 402 *overruled*, 6 Pat. L. J. 644 *dissented from*). In 6 Pat. L. J. 644 it was held that under s. 342 of the Code of Criminal Procedure the Court must examine the accused after the witnesses for the prosecution had been examined. Therefore an examination of the accused after the witnesses for the prosecution have been examined in-chief but before they have been cross-examined and re-examined is not a compliance with the section. Examination in s. 342 of the Code means examination in-chief, cross-examination and re-examination. 5 Pat. L. J. 402; 6 Pat. L. J. 147 and 6 Pat. L. J. 174 *referred to*. But see 4 Lab. 61 (*contra*) 4 Pat. 433 (*contra*) following 45 M. 449 (F.B.) and disapproving 6 Pat. L. J. 644. 3 Rangoon 139 seems to follow 46 Mad. 449 and to hold that the absence of examination of the accused under s. 342 need not vitiate a trial in every case.

5-D. The section does not apply to summary trial of summons-cases.—The provisions of s. 342 of the Code requiring the Court to examine the accused generally is inapplicable to summary trials of summons-cases under Chapter XXII, as to ordinary trials of such cases, 46 M. 766 = 45 M. L. J. 230.

The mandatory provisions of s. 342 of the Code requiring the Court to question the accused generally on the case after the examination of the prosecution witnesses, do not apply to trials in summons-cases.

The use of the expression 'before the accused is called on for his defence' in s. 342 itself as well as in s. 256 relating to trials in warrant-cases and s. 289 relating to trials in Sessions cases, and the absence of such an expression in the sections relating to trials in summons-cases under Chapter XX of the Code show that the provisions of s. 342 are not intended to apply to summons-cases. 46 M. 758 = 45 M. L. J. 224.

Written statement must not take the place of examination. See Note 21. A written statement can never have the same value as answers coming directly from the accused's mouth, 19 C. W. N. 1043 = 16 Cr. L. J. 724, 46 C. 411, but see 4 Patna 438 (*contra*).

5-E. The imperative provisions of s. 342 do not apply to inquiries.—Section 342 of the Code does not apply to an inquiry under s. 117. The omission to examine the person called upon for security, at the close of the prosecution case and before he is called on to enter on his defence, is not an illegality, but an irregularity covered by s. 537, when the accused is not prejudiced by such omission (50 C. 223 *distinguished*), 50 C. 985.

6. When accused leaves case entirely to his pleader, Court may not question him.—If the accused has left his case entirely in the hands of his pleader, the fact should appear on the record and when this is the case, a Judge may not question the accused for the purpose of enabling him to explain any circumstance appearing in evidence against him. Weir II, 405.

7. Where accused is exempted from personal appearance, pleader appearing on his behalf may be examined.—When the accused has been exempted under s. 205 from personal appearance in Court, the Magistrate is not bound to enforce their personal attendance in order to examine them. The provisions of this section are complied with when the pleader for the defence is examined on behalf of his client. 6 S. L. R. 206 = 14 Cr. L. J. 272.

TIME FOR EXAMINATION.

8. When prosecution evidence discloses no criminal charge, accused not to be examined.—It is entirely within the discretion of the Magistrate himself to judge whether during the inquiry before him it is right and proper that the accused shall be examined or not, and such discretion should not be exercised when the Magistrate thinks that the evidence for the prosecution does not disclose any proper subject of criminal charge against the accused. 10 W. R. 25 = 1 B. L. R. (S. N.) 16. Where no evidence has been given implicating

the accused, the Magistrate has no right under the statute to put questions to him or to invite him to make a statement. A statement therefore made by the accused under these circumstances is not admissible in evidence against him on his subsequent trial 1915 M. W. N. 413 = 16 Cr. L. J. 623, where 27 M. 239 and *R v Berriman*, 6 Cox C. C. 388 are followed.

9. **Examination must not be made before any evidence has been recorded.**—It is illegal to examine the accused before any evidence has been recorded or to cross-examine him with regard to the part supposed to have been taken by the other prisoners, 9 M. 224; there is nothing for the accused to explain at that stage, 5 M. L. T. 216. It is not merely irregular, but contrary to the spirit of this section to take the statement of the accused three weeks prior to the commencement of the magisterial inquiry proper and before a word of evidence had been heard, 1883 A. W. N. 238. It is wrong to examine the accused prematurely at a time when no evidence to connect them with the crime with the commission of which they were charged had been recorded against them, nevertheless when their statements are actually made and are freely and voluntarily given, they cannot be rejected as inadmissible in evidence on account of this irregularity of procedure, *Ratanlal* 679.

10. **Examination must be made before defence commences.**—Before an accused person is put on his defence, he must be examined by the Court, *Ratanlal* 227.

11. **Questioning accused in middle of case to fill up gap in prosecution evidence is serious irregularity.**—Where the Court of Session put certain questions in the middle of the case to the prisoners, with a view to supply the evidence for the prosecution, *held*, that this was a most serious irregularity in the trial, 3 B. H. C. R. Cr. Ca. 51. *See*, however, 1 P. W. R. 1910; 11 Cr. L. J. 171. The object of this section is not to fill up a gap in the evidence of the prosecution, but to enable the prisoner to explain any circumstances appearing in evidence against him. It is a misdirection to ask the jury to consider a document, purporting to be proved by a statement made by the accused in his examination under this section, as evidence against the accused, 26 C. 49. To examine the accused generally on the case before the examination of the witnesses for the prosecution is completed is contrary to law and unfair to the accused 15 Cr. L. J. 438 (A.)

OBJECT AND SCOPE OF EXAMINATION.

12. **Object of examination is to enable the accused to explain circumstances against him.**—The examination of an accused person under this section is only to enable the accused to explain any circumstances appearing against him and not to supplement the case for the prosecution and to show that he is guilty, 10 M. 295; 30 A. 540. It is highly improper to subject the accused to a very embarrassing and cruel series of questions intended apparently rather to puzzle the accused than to elucidate the case, 6 Bom. L. R. 94. *See* also 10 C. 140 = 13 C. L. R. 358; 13 A. 345; 5 C. W. N. 854; 4 L. B. R. 244 = 8 Cr. L. J. 62 and Note 1. But *see* 4 N. L. R. 163, where it is laid down that s. 342 is not intended merely for the benefit of the accused. It is part of a system for leading the Court to discover the truth and it constantly happens that the accused's explanation of his failure to explain, is the most incriminating circumstance against him. The result of the examination may be beneficial, but it may equally be injurious, to him. The principle involved is that contained in the judicial maxim, *judi alteram partem*, and the section does not require that the accused should be heard only on what is *prima facie* proved against him, but on every circumstance appearing in evidence against him. Therefore in a case of previous conviction, it is not necessary that identity of the accused with the person previously convicted should be conclusively established before the accused is questioned. The moment there is some evidence of identity, accused may be asked to explain it and may be convicted on his plea of guilty to a charge of previous conviction.

13. **Accused must in his own interests give explanation of circumstances against him.**—The proof of the case against the prisoner must depend for its support not upon the absence or want of any explanation on the part of the prisoner, but upon the positive affirmative evidence of his guilt that is given by the Crown. But if there is a certain appearance made out against a party, if he is involved by the evidence in a state of considerable suspicion, he is called upon, for his own sake and his own safety, to state and to bring forward the circumstances, whatever they may be, which might reconcile such suspicious appearances with perfect innocence, (*Regina v Frost*, 4 St. Tr. N. 85 followed) 42 C. 957. In cases of circumstantial evidence, where facts are put forward on behalf of the prosecution which, unless explained, justify an inference of guilt being drawn against the accused, then it is both lawful and proper for the Court to consider the explanation of those facts which the accused puts forward in his defence. The principle is clearly recognized in the explanations to s. 114 of the *Evidence Act*, per PIGOTT, J., in 17 Cr. L. J. 23 (A.) The practice of refusing to answer

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questions in the Sessions Court and of putting in a written statement is a very pernicious practice. The refusal to answer questions may be attended with great risk to the accused, for the Court is bound to examine him, and a refusal to answer may involve an adverse inference against him, 19 C. W. N. 1043 = 16 Cr. L. J. 724. 'An innocent man cannot well injure himself by a truthful explanation, and it would be deplorable were we to hold that it was beyond the competence of the Court when dealing with a case under Act XIV of 1908 to give an accused an opportunity of explaining the circumstances appearing against him,' 16 C. R. L. J. 376 (C), 19 C. W. N. 923 = 21 C. L. J. 398. While it is not intended to empower Courts to cross-examine persons charged before them, they are nevertheless authorized to put any questions which appear necessary at any stage of inquiry or trial and particularly when all the witnesses for the prosecution have been examined, for the purpose of enabling the accused to explain any circumstances appearing in evidence against him, 5 A. 253.

14. Accused must not be cross-examined nor driven to make incriminating statements.—The discretionary power, given by law to examine a prisoner, should be used to ascertain from him how he may explain facts in evidence appearing against him, not to drive him to make self-incriminating statements, 1 M. H. C. R. 189; also 13 A. 345; 16 W. R. 21; 23 W. R. 57; 8 W. R. (F.B.) 47; 6 C. 379 = 7 C. L. R. 385; 10 M. 121; 1884 A. W. N. 106, 6 C. L. R. 431, 30 A. 540; nor for the inquisitorial purpose of making him confess his guilt or assist the prosecution by admitting facts which may go to criminate him, which is the only purpose that can be served by examining him before any evidence is recorded, 2 C. W. N. 702; 8 C. W. N. 22; 17 C. W. N. 354 = 14 Cr. L. J. 129. In 8 C. 98 at p. 102 = 6 C. L. R. 821 at p. 827. PRINSEP, J., made the following remarks on the way in which the accused had been examined —

We regret to have to notice the manner in which the examination of the accused has been conducted. In permitting a Sessions Judge to examine an accused person from time to time during a trial the law does not contemplate that he should commence a trial with a strict examination of a prisoner after the manner of the cross-examination of an adverse witness by counsel. This Court has already pointed out on more than one occasion—see particularly the case in 1 C. L. R. 436—that, by exercising the power allowed by s. 230 Act X of 1872, the Sessions Court is not to establish a Court of Inquisition, and to force a prisoner to convict himself by making some criminating admissions, after a series of searching questions, the exact effect of which he may not readily comprehend. The real object is to enable a Judge to ascertain from time to time from a prisoner, particularly if he is undefended, what explanation he may desire to offer regarding any fact stated by a witness, or after the close of the case, how he can meet what the Judge may consider to be damning evidence against him. In one of these cases now before us, we observe that the Judge was engaged during the whole of the first day in examining the accused. In like manner, in the second case he examined the accused at considerable length before the case for the prosecution was opened. Such proceedings appear to us to be an abuse of the power given under the law'. See also 1882 A. W. N. 166; 14 W. R. 16; 13 A. 345; 21 C. 642 at p. 656; 5 A. 253 and Weir II, 507. It is objectionable to direct the examination towards obtaining from the accused some explanation in regard to the matter which he had previously mentioned in his confession and has already repudiated as untrue or to endeavour to elicit information in regard to statements made by a witness, 7 C. W. N. 345. Nor can the accused be examined about a confession which is inadmissible and if he is examined about such a confession the question and the answers to them are not admissible in evidence against the accused, 4 L. B. R. 244 = 14 Bar. L. R. 233 = 8 Cr. L. J. 62. An accused person may not be asked as to what were with him in the commission of the offence to supplement the case for the prosecution, 30 A. 540; 9 M. 224. Nor does this section allow of a Magistrate questioning the accused with regard to previous statements made by him, when such statements have not been made legal evidence or brought on the record of the inquiry, 9 M. 224. No attempt ought to be made to induce the accused to incriminate himself, 17 C. W. N. 354 = 14 Cr. L. J. 129. The fact that some of the questions put are inquisitorial and in the nature of a cross-examination, need not, however, make the whole statement inadmissible, 9 C. L. J. 53. Court has no power to cross-examine accused to test the truth of his story, 18 Cr. L. J. 941; 20 A. L. J. 669; 52 C. 622.

15. Remedying gaps in the prosecution case by the statements of the accused.—In 27 M. 238 the accused was charged with defamation, but there was no evidence of the making and publication of the statement by the accused. The Magistrate remedied this defect by examining the accused under this section, *held*, that the Magistrate was clearly wrong in having tried to fill up a gap in the evidence for the prosecution and that his procedure being more than an irregularity, vitiated the conviction, *see also* 28 C. 49; 28 C. 689; 4 L. B. R. 244 = 8 Cr. L. J. 62; 36 M. 457; 1915 M. W. N. 413 = 16 Cr. L. J. 623; 28 M. L. J. 329 = 17 M. L. J. 216 = 10 Cr. L. J. 294.

A Magistrate is not entitled under s. 342 to put questions to the accused if the prosecution has not let in evidence implicating him in the offence charged and answers to questions put in contravention of the section are not admissible in evidence against the accused, 4 *Lah. 55*.

Questions as to previous conviction.—It is not competent to a Magistrate under this section, to ask the accused, before his conviction, about his previous convictions either with a view to take them into consideration for the purpose of conviction or with a view to dispense with formal evidence as to the alleged previous convictions and as to the identity of the accused in the event of conviction, 23 *B. 129*. But see 4 *M. L. R. 183*, Note 12 above. This section does not justify the Court in questioning the accused about previous convictions, 23 *C. 589*.

16. *Court not justified in examining accused to know his defence.*—The evidence referred to in this section is the evidence already given at the trial. A Court is not justified or authorized in examining an accused person for the purpose of ascertaining what witnesses he intends to call or what evidence they will give or what his defence is, 14 *A. 242*; 27 *M. 238*; 13 *A. 345*; 5 *C. W. N. 884*; 7 *C. W. N. 345*.

17. *Confession before committing Magistrate to be treated as an examination.*—A confession recorded by a Magistrate, who afterwards conducts the inquiry preliminary to committal and has jurisdiction to do so, is

is, however, the distinction between a statement under s. 164, and one under this section. In the course of a Police investigation, a Magistrate can only record under s. 164, voluntary statements made to him, but he cannot examine the accused with regard to the facts of the case, 3 *C. W. N. 864*. As to the use in a Sessions trial of examination of an accused person before committing Magistrate, see s. 287.

18. *When confession is retracted, Judge must ask accused to explain his having made the same.*—Where the only evidence against an accused person is his retracted confession, it is a grave omission on the part of the Judge not to question the accused for the purpose of enabling him to explain his having made the confession, *M. H. C. Pro. 29th April, 1886, Weir II, 507*.

PROCEDURE.

19. *Age of accused person to be placed on record.*—In every case in which a charge is framed, the accused should, at the opening of his examination, be required to state his age, and in all cases in which the age of the accused appears to the Court to be under 20 or over 50 years or to be material for any special reason the Magistrate should add a note expressing his own opinion as to the probable age of the accused—*Pun. Cr. No 8-1574 G of 1894*.

20. *The rules laid down in s. 364 apply to examination of the accused.*—Following the directions of s. 364 the Magistrate should record in full not only every question put to the accused and every answer but also the whole examination should be made conformable to what the accused declares to be the truth and the Magistrate should certify that this examination of the accused contains a full account of the statement

of the Magistrate, the Sessions Judge disallowed the questions put to the Magistrate as to the circumstances which led to the examination of the accused on the second day, but the High Court held the questions to be relevant and allowable 8 *C. W. N. 22*. See s. 533 for curing of irregularities.

21. *Written statements must not take the place of the examination.*—Though a written statement may be accepted from the accused in accordance with the universal practice in the Courts under the Calcutta High Court, they do not take the place of evidence nor of such examination of the accused as is contemplated by this section, 42 *C. 957*. This Court has recently animadverted on this practice of filing written statements, which is not provided for by the Code and enables statements to be put before the Court as statements of the accused when such statements are not, in fact drawn up by the accused themselves but by their legal advisers or friends and are entirely irresponsible, 18 *Cr. L. J. 9 (C)*. There is no provision in the Code for the making of a written statement by an accused and the obvious object of the practice in many cases is to defeat the provisions of s. 342 19 *C. W. N. 1043* = 15 *Cr. L. J. 724*. *Quare*, whether in a trial before the Court of Session, the accused may put in a written statement of the defence. Whether such a statement can or cannot

armed or furnished with scythes as a sea dog. *Neptune* and his sea-dogs. *Neptune* and his sea-dogs. *Neptune* and his sea-dogs.

1 A broad
2 Spectral
could
be still in

Neptune and his sea-dogs. *Neptune* and his sea-dogs. *Neptune* and his sea-dogs.

1 Marvel how the sea will be in the

2 The swell of the ocean or air by its surface wave below

3 A high wave or billow a surge as a sea dog

Neptune and his sea-dogs. *Neptune* and his sea-dogs. *Neptune* and his sea-dogs.

1 An oblong shield

1 An oblong shield

1 An oblong shield


1 An oblong shield

1 An oblong shield

1 An oblong shield

1 An oblong shield

1 An oblong shield
2 A large drinking cup used by the
among the Indians and Greeks



1 An oblong shield

1 An oblong shield

be legally put in and be accepted by the Court, it most certainly cannot be allowed to take the place of the examination of the accused which this section imperatively orders to be made, 1903 A. W. N. 1; 42 C. 937. The only provision made by the Code for a written statement by the accused is s 256 (2). But see 4 Pat 438 (*contra*).

22. Sub-sec. (4)—no oath to accused.—A conviction based on the deposition of the accused on solemn affirmation is bad in law, 3 M. L. T. 138 = 7 Cr. L. J. 131. Under ss 118 and 133, *Indian Evidence Act* an accomplice is a competent witness and the only limitation imposed by the general rule there stated is that involved in sub-sec. (4) to this section. If the accused and the accomplices were being tried jointly, the accomplice could not be sworn and therefore could not be a witness against his co-accused. But if they were being separately tried, this prohibition would not apply and the accomplice could be examined as a witness on oath, 1906 U. B. R. Evid. 3 = 5 Cr. L. J. 300. See also 10 C. W. N. 962; 11 C. 633; 25 C. 413, 12 M. 153; 14 B. 260; 23 B. 213. Sub-section (4) of this section applies only to persons liable to punishment. It does not apply to a person called upon to show cause against an order under s 133, who can be examined on oath and who is liable to a prosecution under s 193, 1 P. C., if he makes a false statement, 2 C. L. J. 149. See Notes 25 and 29.

23. Accused appellant is privileged.—A criminal appeal is a continuation of the criminal case, and except so far as there is a provision to the contrary, the appellant has the privilege of the accused and cannot be punished for making a false statement, 11 M. 451 at p. 453 followed in 19 A. 200.

24. Prohibition in the section not applicable to examination in another case.—The examination of the accused person referred to in this section is an examination touching the matter on which he is being tried and that the prohibition contained in the last clause applies to that examination and does not apply to an examination in another case in which the person who is being examined is not himself an accused person. If the Magistrate's view were correct, it would follow that no man while he stood charged with a criminal offence could possibly be examined as a witness in any criminal trial whatever. This was not the intention of the Legislature 20 A. 426. See also 27 C. L. J. 91.

25. When can oath be administered to co-accused?—Where an accused person called as witnesses other accused persons charged with him and awaiting a separate trial for the same offence, *held*, that he was entitled to call them as witnesses, and examine them on oath, 23 B. 213; U. B. R. (1906) Evid. 3 = 5 Cr. L. J. 300. As to examination of one of two accused in the absence of the other, see 6 B. 124; 7 C. 63 = 8 C. L. R. 352, 13 C. L. R. 275. An accused person cannot be examined as a witness because no oath or affirmation could be administered to him, till he is convicted or discharged, 1 B. 610; 2 A. 260; 10 B. 190; 12 P. R. 1902, even when accused pleads guilty there must be conviction, 19 B. 195; 23 A. 53; 5 A. 540; 30 A. 540; 13 C. W. N. 552 = 10 Cr. L. J. 484; but when the witness has never been brought before a Magistrate or released on bail with conditions to appear before a Magistrate, he can testify, 16 B. 661; see also 10 C. L. R. 553 and 1897 P. R. 38. Where the prosecution called one of the accused as a witness on the understanding that if he should tell the truth he would not be prosecuted for similar offences for which he was then awaiting trial, *held* he could be affirmed 15 Bom. L. R. 256 = 3 Bom. Cr. Ga. 171 = 17 Cr. L. J. 256. See Note 19 to s 337.

In 3 Bom. L. R. 437, P and K were put up for trial along with seven other accused on a charge of dacoity. P and K having pleaded guilty, they were at once convicted, but the passing of the sentence was postponed till the conclusion of the trial of the others, in the meantime they were examined as witnesses against the others. *Held per* CANNON, J., that they were competent witnesses, for as soon as they were convicted, their trial was concluded, though they were not sentenced. Their evidence was admissible, though their credit might be questionable inasmuch as they are likely to think that it would be to their advantage to tell a story favourable to the prosecution. *Held per* FULTON, J. that under this section no oath could be administered to them as *trial* ends with sentence and not with conviction, and therefore P and K, being still under trial could not be competent witnesses.

25-A. Co-accused in a gambling case may be examined as a witness.—Section 10 of the *Bombay Gambling Act* IV of 1887 implies that the Magistrate has power to examine as witnesses persons arrested and brought before him under s 6 (d). The section can apply to no other but persons so arrested. The whole procedure of the Gambling Act is a special procedure and overrides the general law of procedure enacted in s 342, 8 B. L. R. 309 = 16 Cr. L. J. 447 where 31 B. 438 is cited with approval.

26. Sub-section (3)—value to be attached to accused's statement.—The expression *may be taken into consideration* is not perhaps very precise or definite, but it means at all events that the statement of the accused is

is not to have the force of sworn evidence, and a conviction solely based upon it would be bad in law 1900 A. W. N. 169. See also 14 B. 331. In 3 L. B. R. 203 = 4 Cr. L. J. 471, where a person charged with giving false evidence had admitted in his examination and his defence was that he was the person who made the statement alleged to be false further evidence as to his identity was held unnecessary and the conviction in the absence of such evidence was held to be legal. The rule of evidence that what is admitted need not be proved, would apply so far as the identity of the accused with the person who made the affidavit was concerned. S 235 requires a Magistrate to take the plea of the accused immediately after the charge has been framed and when stating the plea facts are voluntarily admitted and there is no necessity for the prosecution to call evidence to prove such facts. Similarly, the admission of the defence having afforded sufficient proof of identity, the conviction was held not to be illegal merely on account of absence of evidence as to the identity of the accused with the perjuror. Statements made under this section are not made extra judicially and are not necessarily governed by the sections of the *Evidence Act* which relate to the admission of confession, 13 Cr. L. J. 474 (Oudh). See also 27 M. 233; 25 C. 49; 23 C. 689; 13 B. 339; 2 L. B. R. 53; 49 B. 878.

27. **Statements of accused made in the course of examination are privileged.**—Statements of a defamatory character made by an accused person in the course of the statement which he is invited to make must be considered absolutely privileged so as to make him not liable to be punished for an offence under s. 499, I. P. C. in respect of such statements, 36 M. 216 (F.B.). 5 M. L. T. 236 = 9 Cr. L. J. 276, distinguishing 15 M. 415, where it was held that the privilege did not extend to defamatory statements against a witness interjected during the examination of such witness by the accused who was represented by counsel. But see 40 C. 433 and 40 C. 441 (Note).

28. **Extent of immunity of accused against prosecution for false and defamatory statements.**—It is not the intention of the Legislature that an accused person shall be called upon to make a statement on oath or that he should be liable to punishment for giving false answers to questions put to him. A criminal appeal is a continuation of the criminal case and except so far as there is a provision to the contrary, the appellant has the privilege of the accused and cannot be punished for making a false statement in the memorandum of appeal, 12 M. 451, nor for a false statement in the revision petition, 9 A. 200. See also (1870) 2 N.-W. P. 128, 28 A. 331. But the protection afforded to the accused limited to statements made by the accused in answer to questions which are for the purpose of enabling the accused to explain any circumstances appearing in the evidence against him and which are put at some stage of the inquiry or trial. Where, therefore, an accused person who was under trial filed a petition voluntarily containing false allegations in a Superior Court in order to induce the Superior Court to transfer the case, held, that he was punishable under s. 182 I. P. C., and not protected by this section, 12 O. C. 308 = 10 Cr. L. J. 509; 1 B. L. R. 124 = 8 Cr. L. J. 378. So also it was held in 40 C. 433 following 14 W. R. 27; 23 C. 887; 5 C. W. N. 293 that a defamatory statement made in bad faith by an accused, against whom a trial is pending in a Criminal Court and contained in a petition to the District Magistrate for transfer of the case is not absolutely privileged but is punishable under s. 499, I. P. C., 11 L. B. R. 321; 15 C. 264, 27 C. 292; 35 C. 880; 32 C. 786; 40 C. 441; 38 M. 216 considered. See 6 Lah. 34 where 28 A. 331 is disapproved, and held that the only provision of law which confers immunity upon an accused person from criminal liability for making a false statement is that contained in sub-section (2) of section 342, but that protection is in respect of statements made by an accused in answer to questions put to him to enable the accused to explain evidence against him.

A recent ruling of the Bombay High Court is to the same effect and it is held that the statements made by an accused person under s. 342 of the Code or contained in written statement filed by him with the Court's permission, are not absolutely privileged as there is nothing in that section to give him an absolute privilege as regards defamatory statements made in the course of examination, 30 B. 162 (F.B.), (17 B. 127 and 17 B. 573 overruled) 48 C. 383 followed).

29. **Who is an 'accused'?**—This term means a person over whom the Magistrate or other Court is exercising jurisdiction. A person arrested by the Police as concerned in an offence and afterwards released without any order of discharge having been obtained from a Magistrate is not an accused within the meaning of this section, 16 B. 661; 23 C. 493. A person who has been discharged, legally or not, is not an accused 4 L. B. R. 362 = 9 Cr. L. J. 370. But a person under examination by the Court comes under this term, 23 B. 213, 28 C. 709. An accomplice to whom the Local Government has made a promise not to prosecute and by whom the promise has been accepted after the commencement of the trial, is not a competent witness. Such grant of pardon does not alter the position of the accomplice as an accused person and make him cease to be an accused person, nor could oath be administered to him, 9 P. B. 1906 = 4 Cr. L. J. 212. See contra 21 P. R. 1904, 12 P. R. 1902. See Note 20 to s. 337 as to accused illegally pardoned and see also Note 13 to s. 340.

30 Inference from refusal to answer—See ill (A) to s 114 of the *Indian Evidence Act*. The Court may presume that if a man refuses to answer a question which he is not compelled to answer by law, the answer if given would be unfavourable to him. See also 19 C. W. N 1043 = 16 Cr. L J 724

343. Except as provided in sections 337 and 338 no influence by means of any promise or threat or otherwise, shall be used to an accused person to induce him to disclose or withhold any matter within his knowledge

No influence to be used to induce disclosures

Notes.—1. With this section should be read ss 24, 28 and 29 of the *Evidence Act* (I of 1872). See Notes to s 163. It is improper to hold out any inducement to confess. 1 W. R. 24 and it is not necessary on the other hand for a Magistrate to caution a prisoner before receiving his statement. 5 M. H. C. R. Appz. 21 19 C. 775. Also where pardon is illegally tendered the evidence so obtained becomes irrelevant and inadmissible, 2 A 260 and see Note 20 to s 337. See also 1 B 610, 10 B 190 and 10 C. 936

2. Section 343 refers to the same accused person who is named and described in s 342 25 B 422 and this section does not deal with the admissibility of the evidence of a co-accused who is called for the prosecution on a promise of pardon 18 Bom L R 266 = 17 Cr L J 256 (SHAH J, *dubitante*).

344. (1) If from the absence of a witness, or any other reasonable cause it becomes necessary or advisable to postpone the commencement of or adjourn any inquiry or trial, the Court may, if it thinks fit, by order in writing, stating the reasons therefore from time to time postpone or adjourn the same on such terms as it thinks fit for such time as it considers reasonable, and may by a warrant remand the accused if in custody

Power to postpone or adjourn proceedings

Remand.

Provided that no Magistrate shall remand an accused person to custody under this section for a term exceeding fifteen days at a time

(2) Every order made under this section by a Court other than a High Court shall be in writing, signed by the presiding Judge or Magistrate

Explanation—If a sufficient evidence has been obtained to raise a suspicion that the accused may have committed an offence and it appears likely that further evidence may be obtained by a remand this is a reasonable cause for a remand

Reasonable cause for remand.

Notes.—1. Section applies only to inquiries and trials and not to Police investigations—This section relates to proceedings in inquiries and trials, and has nothing to do with Police investigations and it contemplates remand to jail and not to Police custody 23 B 32 at p 34. See also 4 Bom. L R 878, where it was held that s. 344 does not empower the Magistrate to remand an accused person in custody of the Magistrate to Police custody

2 Detention of accused under trial is not intended to be penal, but its object is to secure attendance See 36 C. 174. The seriousness of an alleged offence and some evidence of its perpetration by the accused would, however, justify detention.

3. Impropriety of undue protraction of trial—The Honourable the Chief Justice and Judges regret to observe that the trial of cases is at times unnecessarily and unduly protracted. Their Lordships therefore, desire to point out, for the guidance of all Magistrates, that it is their duty to despatch their criminal work with the least possible delay, it being essential for the proper administration of justice that it should be promptly dealt with. As far as possible criminal work should be given precedence over other work cases in which the accused are in custody being taken up for disposal in preference to those in which the accused are on bail. Magistrates should so arrange for the despatch of their criminal work that the hearing of one case should as much as possible not be allowed to interfere with the hearing of another, each one being fixed for hearing for distinct days due regard being had to their probable duration. Every effort should be made to minimise delay and hardship to the parties and witnesses. When a case is once commenced it should be heard *de die in diem* and completed with every possible despatch the whole or as much of the working day as could be spared being devoted to its hearing. Witnesses remaining over from one day should be examined at the first

sitting of the Court on the following day. The practice of taking up a case for an hour or so and then dropping it again should be avoided, and cases should be disposed of, as far as possible, in continuous sittings. Adjournments should, as a rule, be avoided, especially when the accused are likely to be prejudiced thereby, and if from any unavoidable cause an adjournment is deemed indispensable, it should be for as short a time as possible. In any case, a trial once commenced should be continued from day to day, except on Sundays and other days when the Public Treasuries are closed, and days when native usage absolutely requires the intermission of all business. Every Court should sit duly and punctually at the hour appointed for its opening unless prevented by circumstances, which should be recorded in its proceedings. When a Magistrate is on tour, every care should be taken to let the parties and witnesses know the place as well as the time for their appearance which should be fixed so as to obviate, as far as practicable, the inconvenience which must be caused to them by their being called away to long distances from their residences, and the hearing of cases should as far as possible, be completed at the appointed place without obliging them to move from camp to camp with the Magistrate" (See *Bam. Government Gazette*, 18th ... Sessions trial to be adjourned and be dealt with to grant adjournments, but such adjournments should be granted only on the strongest possible ground and for the shortest possible period, 10 A. L. J. 473 = 13 Cr. L. J. 551.

4. When criminal proceedings to be stayed pending disposal of civil litigation—Court's inherent jurisdiction.—As a general rule it is not a valid ground under this section for adjourning a prosecution, that issues similar to those arising in the Criminal Court, are concurrently the subject of determination by a Civil Court, with the possible result of conflicting decisions upon practically the same evidence, especially when the adjournment of the criminal proceedings would necessarily be very prolonged, 1903 A. W. N. 234 = 2 A. L. J. 747; but if the object of prosecuting criminal proceedings while a civil suit in relation to the same matter or a matter intimately connected therewith is pending be in reality to have a preliminary inquiry before the Magistrate into the matter of the suit and prejudice the trial of the civil suit or to coerce the accused into a compromise of the civil suit on terms to be dictated practically by the complainant, the Magistrate should, as a general rule postpone the inquiry into or the trial of the criminal case, till the disposal of the civil suit, *Weir II*, 415; 7 Bar. L. T. 73 = 15 Cr. L. J. 493. See also 1 M. H. C. R. 66, where it was held that when a Magistrate has, in the exercise of his discretion refused to proceed with a criminal charge

(P.) Parties should not be encouraged to resort to the Criminal Courts in cases in which the point at issue between them is one which can more appropriately be decided by a Civil Court, 33 P. R. 1910 = 37 P. L. R. 1911 = 12 Cr. L. J. 50; 17 Cr. L. J. 7 (Pan). See also 8 S. L. R. 20 = 15 Cr. L. J. 661; 13 C. W. N. 601 and see Notes under Heading XXIX at p. 546

ADJOURNMENT.

5. Verbal order of adjournment good.—Where the defendant appeared on a day fixed, but the Magistrate being unable to take up the case, verbally ordered him to appear on the following day, and on his omission to do so, he was convicted under s. 174, 1 P. C., held, that the conviction was good, 5 M. H. C. R. Appx. XY.

6. Reasonable ground for adjournment.—If the Court considers either on objection made by or on behalf of the accused, or of its own motion that the examination of a witness not already examined before the committing Magistrate will be a surprise to the accused, and his reasonable cause for postponement or adjournment of the trial, the Court has power to postpone an uncommenced trial or to adjourn a commenced trial, 1 P. R. 1839. A Sessions Judge should allow time to enable the accused to prepare his defence though he delayed to take copies of the evidence of the witnesses before the Magistrate, 13 C. W. N. 142. But where a Sessions trial is adjourned owing to the absence of a witness, the Sessions Judge is not competent to discharge

See also s. 205. Similarly Court must be the same event the necessity for a fresh trial (26 B. 50), for the same reason as where a Sessions Judge had vacated office before delivering judgment his successor is not competent to deliver judgment, 23 W. R. 59. An appeal pending against the conviction of the accused in a case is a good ground for adjourning the trial of the same accused in a subsequent case,

5 M. L. T. 90 = 9 Cr. L. J. 495. Where the witnesses of the accused not being in attendance, he makes application to summon them and the Magistrate refuses to comply with it, the accused is prejudiced by such omission, but when such is not the case the High Court will not interfere, **11 W. R. 19.** It is not a reasonable ground for an adjournment, that if time is granted for prosecution, by dint of inquiry some evidence might be procured against the accused. *See, however,* s. 497. Where the proceedings have been completed against an accused person, the decision of the case or his commitment to the Court of Session should not be deferred merely because the principal offenders have not been apprehended, **3 W. R. Gr. Let. 21.** A Magistrate should grant an adjournment to an accused to enable him to secure the service of a counsel for cross-examining the prosecution witnesses, **14 P. W. R. 1916 = 17 Cr. L. J. 278.** In **49 C. 182** it was held that the absence of the principal accused and the desirability of a joint trial were not sufficient grounds in the circumstances for a further postponement. The High Court directed the Magistrate to fix a date for hearing and to proceed from day to day and complete the inquiry with all possible despatch.

7 Improper refusal to adjourn.—Where a Magistrate refused to adjourn a case at the end of the day, to enable the accused to examine the witnesses who were in attendance but whose attendance was not certified in the Attendance Register of the Nazir,—the refusal being based on the ground that the witnesses must under some executive rule be treated as not in attendance—it was held that the order of Magistrate was wrong and a re-trial was directed, **7 C. W. N. 714.** *See also* **12 C. L. R. 120.** It was not an irregularity to adjourn the trial for the purpose of allowing the accused to secure the attendance of his witnesses, **16 W. R. 21.** A decision arrived at without giving the accused reasonable opportunity to secure the attendance of his witnesses, is liable to be set aside **5 M. H. C. R. Appx. XXVII; 19 M. 375.** The fact that the accused's advocate has to fulfil a longstanding engagement in a criminal case at another place is *prima facie* a reasonable cause for an adjournment, **4 Bur. L. T. 213 = 12 Cr. L. J. 474.** *See also* **1 L. B. R. 60.** On the 16th May the trial of the accused was fixed for the 26th May, and his chief pleader was informed of the latter date, but on the 17th, the date of hearing was changed to the 18th. Intimation of this change of date was given to the said pleader, but he asked to have the hearing fixed for the 23rd. Contrary, however, to his request and the wishes of the accused's other pleaders, the trial was proceeded with and the accused was convicted. *Held*, that the procedure of the Magistrate was improper and gave just cause for complaint to the accused. If there were any reasons for accelerating the date of hearing, the trial should not have been concluded and judgment pronounced without waiting until the date desired by the accused's pleader, or the date originally fixed, hearing the pleader and allowing him to recall any of the witnesses he wished, **15 P. R. 1898.** Counsel for accused in a capital case applied for permission to cross-examine a witness on the day following as he was not prepared to cross-examine them that day, but the Court refused permission. Upon this the counsel, being unable to accept the responsibility of conducting the case on behalf of the accused, did not appear and a number of witnesses were consequently not cross-examined. *Held*, that the application was a reasonable one and should have been granted as no adjournment of the case itself was asked for and the case was a fit one in which the Court should have shown an indulgence although the accused was not entitled to a postponement as a matter of right, **41 C. 299.**

7-A Improper to adjourn one of two cross-cases because one is a complaint case and the other is a Police report case.—The policy of the law is that a case should go on unless it be adjourned under the provisions of s. 544 of the Code, for reasons to be stated in the order. There is no justification for the postponement of a trial of a complaint case. There is no foundation for the view that a Police case is to have precedence because it is a Police case. To meet the ends of justice therefore both the cross-cases, the Police case and the complaint case should be tried simultaneously and contemporaneously but should be dealt wholly separately from each other, each on its own merits and upon the facts and circumstances appearing therein judgments in the two cases being pronounced if possible after both the trials are over, **28 C. W. N. 487.**

8. Where depositions before Magistrate cannot be received the Court should adjourn to summon deponents.—If in the course of a trial a Sessions Judge is of opinion that the prosecution has not laid a basis for the reception of the deposition taken before the Magistrate in the absence of the accused, he should adjourn the trial under this section and under s. 540 summon such witnesses as he may deem material, **12 C. L. R. 120.** Similarly, when the particulars of the previous conviction are to hand but the requisite copy of the certificate is not ready, remand should be asked for—*C. P. Vol. Man*, p. 207.

9 Magistrate must fix place and date of proceedings before them.—By a Government Resolution in the Judicial Department, No. 46, of the 4th January, 1888, it is ordered, that the instance of the High Court, that whenever Magistrates are able, consistently with their other duties, to fix the place as well as the date of

proceedings before them whether original or appellate they should do so in order to prevent the harassment of the accused person and others concerned—*Bom. H Cr Cr* p 39

10. Postponement of a case 'sine die'.—If for proper reasons a Magistrate has jurisdiction to adjourn a case under s. 145 *sine die* 13 C. W. N 601 = 11 Cr L J 7. A Court of Justice has inherent jurisdiction to stay proceedings in a case pending before it and s. 344 empowers a Criminal Court to adjourn an inquiry or trial for any reasonable cause such as the institution of a civil suit 4 P. W. R 1916. See Note 4

11. High Court may set aside improper order of adjournment.—Magistrates should understand that the power conferred by this section is a power which is only to be exercised in cases which come really within the terms of that section. It is not a power to be exercised arbitrarily and not according to rule. Where a Magistrate had adjourned an inquiry for a cause not contemplated by this section *viz* his being busy with executive work the High Court in the exercise of the power of superintendence conferred by s. 15 of the Charter Act set aside the order of remand 9 B. L. R. 354 = 17 W. R. 55

11 A. Trial on a holiday.—The trial on a Sunday or any other holiday would not necessarily make the proceedings invalid. It would however be irregular as contrary to the provisions of Circular No. 37 of the Criminal Circulars of the High Court (Bombay) and when the accused has been prejudiced *et* inability to engage vakils the conviction may be set aside 16 Cr L J 752 (B)

COSTS

12. Adjournment on such terms as the Court thinks fit.—The words *as it thinks fit* empower Criminal Courts to allow the costs of an adjournment 20 P. R 1904. A complainant may be directed to pay the costs of an adjournment to the accused and a witness 9 A. L. J 170 = 13 Cr L J 283, 5 L. W. 763 = 22 M. L. T. 42. An order requiring an accused to pay the costs of an adjournment is one which a Magistrate in his discretion may make under this section and the High Court would not interfere with such an order if

an order will be set aside by the High Court in revision. See also 23 A. 209 (footnote) 1902 A. W. N. 59 has been dissented from 40 M. 1130; 42 B. 254.

13. Improper to award costs against an absent accused.—Where the accused was absent at the date of hearing and he was not represented by any pleader or counsel the adjournment of the case is altogether unnecessary since the Court could not proceed with the trial or record evidence in the absence of the accused. Under such circumstances the costs of the adjournment could not be awarded against the accused person as it is entirely opposed to the spirit of conducting criminal trials to impose such terms on the accused even while granting adjournments for his benefit and it is requested 6 P. R. 1906 = 4 Cr L J 76 *dist. gushing* 20 P. R. 1904, 20 A. L. J. 280

REMAND OF THE ACCUSED

14. Old and New Codes.—It was formerly held under the Codes of 1861 and 1872 that before making out the warrant of commitment the Magistrate must ascertain the existence of a charge and that he must ascertain

25 W. R. 8. Under the present Code there is no necessity for such evidence. But no remand without a hearing can last for a longer period than 15 days 3 B. H. Cr. Ca. 31

15. Distinction between detention under s. 167 and under s. 344.—Under s. 167 a Magistrate on the mere perusal of the entries in the Police diaries relating to the case to which the accused have no access may from time to time authorize the detention of the accused in custody for a term not exceeding 15 days whole. Thereafter he can under s. 344 by a warrant remand an accused for any term not exceeding 15 days if sufficient evidence has been obtained to raise a suspicion that the accused may have an offence and it appears likely that further evidence may be obtained by such remand 36 C. 166 s. 167 at pp. 381—385

16 Remand cannot be granted in the absence of the accused—To remand is to re-commit to custody and since a first commitment requires the presence of the accused re-commitment also requires his presence *Weir II, 409.*

17 Copies of remand orders to be submitted to Sub-Divisional Magistrates.—Copies of all orders of remand together with reasons of such orders shall be transmitted by Subordinate Magistrate to Divisional or District Magistrates to whom they are subordinate within twenty-four hours from the date of the same—*M H C Pro*, 6th May 1878

18 Reasonable ground for a remand not supported by sworn testimony when sufficient.—This section must be read as a proviso to s. 208 which authorizes a Magistrate for reasonable cause to remand an accused person to jail without examining any witness. Where evidence was available but it appeared necessary to the Magistrate to defer the examination of witnesses, in order that further evidence may be produced (so that the inquiry when commenced might be continuous), held that such a reason recorded by the Magistrate justified a remand for five days and a further remand for four days. When a Magistrate defers the examination of witnesses adjourns the inquiry, and remands the prisoner, he is bound to express clearly on the record the reasonable cause from which such action became necessary or advisable, *6 M 63, 33 C 174, 11 M 98 and 20 W. R. 23 = 11 B L. R. Appx VIII at p 11.* But it ought to be understood by all Magistrates that remands to custody should not ordinarily be ordered under s. 344 without first recording some evidence, when such is already available to show that good ground exists for believing the accused person to have committed a non bailable offence. *11 N L R. 162 = 16 Cr L J 705* See Note 20 below

19 When second remand is needed by the Police direct evidence of accused being concerned in the crime must be produced—When the accused are first brought before a Magistrate and a remand is required by the prosecutor it is ordinarily sufficient to show by the evidence of a Police officer that the Police are in possession of information believed to be reliable that an offence has been committed and that the accused were concerned in its commission but when they are again brought up after a remand and a further remand is needed some direct evidence of the guilt of the accused should be required to justify the Magistrate in refusing bail and with each remand the necessity for production of evidence of guilt becomes stronger *6 M 69 followed in 11 N L R 162 = 16 Cr. L J 705*

20 Duty of Magistrate when further remand applied for—It after a remand incriminating evidence is not adduced, and if the prosecution has already had sufficient time to adduce such evidence the Court will reasonably conclude that such evidence is not forthcoming at the time. It should then under s. 497 (2) release the accused on bail whatever be the nature of the offence though the preliminary inquiry should proceed (*6 M. 63 followed*). Whether there are reasonable grounds or not must be decided judicially, that is to say there should be, some tangible evidence on the record on which, if unrebutted, the Court can conclude that the accused might be convicted. The statement by a witness that he has seen a certain act of an incriminating character done by the accused might be sufficient. But if there be no evidence whatsoever or evidence of a very flimsy character on the face of it, the inference will be, after a reasonable time has elapsed since the beginning of the inquiry that there are no reasonable grounds for supposing the accused to be guilty. The prosecution must however have a fair opportunity of adducing evidence of a really incriminating nature. In all events the first information report should indicate with sufficient exactness the character of the evidence likely to be forthcoming. The detention of an accused under trial is not intended to be penal but its object is to secure attendance. The gravity of the offence and some evidence of its perpetration by the accused will, however justify detention.—*Per MITRA J* in *36 C 174*, but see *36 C 166* See Chapter XXXIV for bail

21 When accused has made confessional statement and pointed out articles, remand for further confession is most objectionable—Where the accused has already made a confessional statement and produced an article stolen from a person who had been murdered and there was ample evidence before the Magistrate it was held that a remand of the accused in order to get from him a confessional statement was most objectionable. The practice of pressing for examination of accused persons by Magistrate immediately after they have made confessions is also objectionable *Weir II, 415*. The accused was for 15 days in the custody of the Police and at the end of that period an application was made under this section for a further period of detention in Police custody. Held that this section does not empower the Magistrate to remand an accused person in the custody of the Magistrate to Police custody for the purpose of obtaining information with regard to the offences which the accused may be alleged to have committed. *4 Bom L R. 878* See Note 3 to s. 167 at p 382.

22 Remand improper in the case of bailable offences—The terms of s. 496 have been held to be imperative and if the offence is bailable the accused ought to be admitted to bail. *8 C. W. N 779*

SENATORIAL

Senate chamber a chamber of hall in which a senate
assembles — Senate house a hall in which a senate
meets or a place of public assembly

Senator, n [1st senator] 1 senator, "p, "f,
& "s. senator "p, "f, "s. senator

1 A member of a senate

The duke and senators of Venice greet you Duke

SENATORIAL

in Quincy

Senatorial [1881]

The office or dignity of a senator

(1881)

1 To enquire of

23. Magistrate taking charge should inquire what accused persons are in detention under Court's order—Every Magistrate, on receiving or resuming charge of his office should inquire what accused persons are in detention under the orders of this Court, with a view to their being brought before him within the period allowed by law—*Bom. H C Cr Cir*, p. 18.

24. Magistrate liable in damages for unreasonable detention—A Magistrate who without reasonable cause, delays proceeding with the trial of persons, whom he keeps in jail is liable notwithstanding Act XVIII of 1850 to an action in damages if the prisoners are eventually acquitted **11 W R. 19**

*** 345. (1)** The offences punishable under the sections of the Indian Penal Code Compounding † specified in the first two columns of the table next following may be offences compounded by the persons mentioned in the third column of that table—

| OFFENCE | Sections of Indian Penal Code applicable | Person by whom offence may be compounded. |
|--|--|--|
| Uttering words etc. with deliberate intent to wound the religious feelings of any person. | 298 | The person whose religious feelings are intended to be wounded |
| Causing hurt | 323 334 | The person to whom the hurt is caused |
| Wrongfully restraining or confining any person | 341 342 | The person restrained or confined |
| Assault or use of criminal force | 352 353 358 | The person assaulted or to whom criminal force is used. |
| Unlawful compulsory labour | 374 | The person compelled to labour |
| Mischief when the only loss or damage caused is loss or damage to a private person | 426 427 | The person to whom the loss or damage is caused |
| Criminal trespass | 447 | The person in possession of the property trespassed upon. |
| House-trespass | 448 | |
| Criminal breach of contract or service | 490 491 492 | The person with whom the offender has contracted. |
| Adultery | 497 | The husband of the woman |
| Enticing or taking away or detaining with a criminal intent a married woman | 498 | |
| Defamation | 500 | The person defamed. |
| Printing or engraving matter knowing it to be defamatory | 501 | |
| Sale of printed or engraved substance containing defamatory matter knowing it to contain such matter | 502 | |
| Insult intended to provoke a breach of the peace | 504 | The person insulted. |
| Criminal intimidation except when the offence is punishable with imprisonment for seven years. | 506 | The person intimidated |
| ‡ Act caused by making a person believe that he will be an object of divine displeasure. | 508 | The person against whom the offence was committed. |

* For the sect on applicable instead of this section to a hill tribes to which *K' chin Hill Tribes Regulation I of 1895* and *Chin Hill Regulation V of 1896* have been applied see Not first one Nov 18 and 15 respectively dated 30th June—*Burma Gazette 1896 Part I p. 21*
Or Burma Code 1899 Edition pp 629-630

† This word was substituted for the word "deceit" by Act XVIII of 1911

‡ This entry was added by Act XVIII of 1922.

2 That which possesses sensibility; sensitive being [Rare]

This indirectly extends itself not to men only but even to vegetables and animals. [Rare]

Sensibility *n* 1 The condition or quality of being sensible, sensibility, capacity of perception, susceptibility 2 The acuteness of the eye [Rare] 3 Sensibility and sorrow for sin [Rare]

2 Intelligence, reasonable

Sensitively, *adv* 1 In a sensitive

ably to the senses, with perceptiveness

What remains

Does not too sensibly

2 With intelligence or good sense

Sensitively, *adv* [Rare] 1 To

sense and ferre to bear [Rare]

Sensitively, *adv* [Rare] 1 To

sense and ferre to make [Rare]

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(2) The offences punishable under the sections of the Indian Penal Code specified in the first two columns of the table next following may, with the permission of the Court before which any prosecution for such offence is pending be compounded by the persons mentioned in the third column of that table —

| OFFENCE. | Sections of Indian Penal Code applicable. | Person by whom offence may be compounded. |
|---|---|---|
| Voluntarily causing hurt by dangerous weapons or means | 324 | The person to whom hurt is caused |
| Voluntarily causing grievous hurt | 325 | Do do |
| Voluntarily causing grievous hurt on grave and sudden provocation. | 335 | Do do |
| Causing hurt by doing an act so rashly and negligently as to endanger human life or the personal safety of others | 337 | Do do |
| Causing hurt by doing an act so rashly and negligently as to endanger human life or the personal safety of others | 338 | Do do |
| Wrongfully confining a person in secret | 343 | The person confined. |
| Assault or criminal force in attempting wrongfully to confine a person. | 346 | Do |
| Dishonest misappropriation of property | 357 | The person assaulted or to whom the force was used |
| Cheating | 403 | The owner of the property misappropriated |
| Cheating a person whose interest the offender was bound by law or by legal contract to protect. | 417 | The person cheated. |
| Cheating by personation | 418 | Do |
| | 419 | Do |
| | 420 | Do |
| | 430 | The person to whom the loss or damage is caused. |
| | 431 | The person in possession of the house trespassed upon. |
| | 482 | The person to whom loss or injury is caused by such use |
| Counterfeiting a trade or property mark used by another | 483 | The person whose trade or property mark is counterfeited. |
| Knowingly selling or exposing or possessing for sale or for trade or manufacturing purpose goods marked with a counterfeit trade or property mark | 486 | The person whose trade or property mark is counterfeited. |
| Marrying again during the lifetime of a husband or wife | 494 | The husband or wife of the person so marrying |
| Uttering words or sounds or making gestures or exhibiting any object intended to insult the modesty of a woman or intruding upon the privacy of a woman | 509 | The woman whom it is intended to insult or whose privacy is intruded upon |

(3) When any offence is compounded under this section the abetment of such offence or an attempt to commit such offence (when such attempt is itself an offence) may be compounded in like manner

(4) When the person who would otherwise be competent to compound an offence under this section is dead or under legal disability to contract on his behalf

* Sub-section (2) was substituted for the original sub-section (2) by Act XXVIII of 1923 s. 9

† These words were substituted for the words "a minor" by *ibid*

Inherited by *ibid*

court (For) For

Consequence Inferred, consequential (Rare)

Septuaginta, n. A person seventy years of age, a septuagenarian

Sequitur

Septuaginta, n. Lat septem, seven. Some thing composed of seven a week (Rare) Ash
 Septuaginta, n. (See infra) (Rare) Having imper
 fert or spurious septa. Henslow
 Septuaginta, n. pl. septuaginta. Lat. an inclosure hedge, fin. c. from se
 pte to hedge in to inclose. A
 wall separating two inclosures. A par
 tition specifically (c. (For) A par
 tition that separates the cells of the
 fruit (b. (For) A partition which
 separates two cavities
 Septuaginta, n. (For) A septet See Septum (For)
 Septuaginta, n. (For) A septet See Septum (For)



(5) When the accused has been committed for trial or when he has been convicted and an appeal is pending no composition for the offence shall be allowed without the leave of the Court to which he is committed or, as the case may be before which the appeal is to be heard

* (5-A) A High Court acting in the exercise of its powers of revision under section 439 may allow any person to compound any offence which he is competent to compound under this section

(6) The composition of an offence under this section shall have the effect of an acquittal of the accused with whom the offence has been compounded

(7) No offence shall be compounded except as provided by this section

Notes.—1. Section is exhaustive as to the law on composition.—The section contains provisions with regard to (a) the persons who may compound (b) the nature of the offences that may be compounded (c) the stage of the criminal proceedings at which the composition is sought to be made (d) it also provides that in regard to some offences the mere consent of the injured person shall not suffice for composition he must obtain the permission of the Court, the Courts, being specified where permission to compound has to be obtained. Sub-section (7) must therefore be taken to mean that no offence shall be compounded except where the provisions of s. 345 are satisfied as to each of these four matters, 29 M. L. J. 521 = 18 M. L. T. 381 = 15 Cr. L. J. 758

WHO MAY COMPOUND

2. **Only person to whom hurt is caused can compound.**—The offence of hurt can be compounded only by the person to whom the hurt is caused. So where a widow who complained of hurt caused to her husband in consequence of which he died compounded the offence and the Magistrate thereupon acquitted the accused it was held the acquittal was wrong Weir II, 418, 37 A. 419 So also where hurt was caused to three persons one of whom died subsequently held that the remaining two could not lawfully compromise the offence as regards the deceased 31 A. 606 A compromise cannot be refused merely because the master of the person in whose quarrel the complainant was injured refuses to give his permission 17 O. C. 92 = 15 Cr. L. J. 567, 15 A. L. J. 467, 27 C. W. N. 168

3. **Defamation of wife.**—In 14 M. 379 at p. 331 it was laid down that where a woman had been defamed by the imputation of unchastity to her and the husband lodges a complaint being a person aggrieved within the meaning of s. 198 the wife may without the consent of the husband or against his wishes lawfully compound the offence under this section. See also the remarks of RANADE J. 25 B. 151 (F B)

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17 P. R. 189L. See sub section (4).

WHAT OFFENCES MAY BE COMPOUNDED

3. **Mischief when the only loss or damage is loss or damage to private person**—These words evidently refer to the definition of mischief contained in s. 425 I. P. C. under which the loss or damage may be caused either to the public or to any person. The distinction made is between private and public property and not between the property of a private person or a public servant. The fact that the complainant was a Village Mahar would not make his private property the property of the public but even of the Mahar community generally. Held therefore that the Magistrate was wrong in not entertaining the application of the complainant to compound the case 22 B. 839

WHO MAY PERMIT COMPOSITION

6. **Police officer cannot permit compromise.**—Police officer is not empowered to entertain an application for withdrawal of a complaint. The permitting a complainant to withdraw is a judicial act the exercise of which is vested in the Magistrate under this section and the Police have no authority to interfere in such matters Ratanlal 91.

* Sub-section (5-A) was inserted by Act XV III of 1923 s. 50

† Added by (ibid).

7 Appeal Court may permit composition.—Sub-section (5) is put in to meet 2 A. 339 and enables the Appellate Court to allow cases being compounded after conviction but pending the appeal. But without such leave there can be no composition. 11 L. W. 33

8. Is High Court competent to allow compounding of offence when exercising its revisional jurisdiction?—See Note under s. 439. Sub-section (3 A) is new and puts an end to the conflict of decisions on the point whether a High Court can allow composition in revision. So the decisions in 32 A. 153 and 37 A. 127 holding contrary opinions have lost their importance now since the above sub-section lays down distinctly that a High Court can allow composition in revision.

For the High Court's power in revision to allow an offence to be compounded see 46 A. 91 = 21 A. L. J. 838

9 It is open to parties to compound when conviction has been set aside on appeal and retrial ordered.—Where the accused is charged with a compoundable offence and is convicted and the conviction is set aside on appeal and a retrial ordered held that it was open to the accused and complainant to compound in the same manner in which a case may be compounded before conviction by the Magistrate and no sanction of the Court is necessary. 3 A. L. J. 523 = 1906 A. W. N. 200 = 4 Cr. L. J. 35.

9 A Former Magistrate from whose board case transferred to another Magistrate by the District Magistrate cannot record a composition.—Where a District Magistrate calls for papers in a case under s. 435 with a view to withdraw it from one Magistrate and refer it for trial to another the jurisdiction of a former Magistrate ceases and he cannot record a composition and acquit the accused. 27 Bom. L. R. 350

REQUISITES OF COMPOSITION.

10 Onus of proving composition lies on accused.—When an accused person alleges that an offence with which he is charged has been compounded so as to take away jurisdiction of the Criminal Courts to try it the onus is on him to show that there was a composition valid in law. 21 C. 103.

11 Is consideration for compromise necessary?—The compounding of an offence signifies that the person against whom an offence has been committed has received some gratification to act as an inducement or his desisting to abstain from prosecution.—Per *PERLINSKY J.* in 21 C. 103 at p. 112 approved in 9 P. R. 1896. But a lawful composition may be effected within the scope of this section without the passing of any consideration or gratification. All that the law requires is that there must be some arrangement between the parties settling their differences. 9 P. R. 1896, 28 L. R. 16 = 10 Cr. L. J. 228. See also 18 M. L. T. 602 = 18 Cr. L. J. 803.

12 Composition need not be effected in Court.—In cases which can be compounded without the sanction of the Magistrate (sub-sec. 1) there is no necessity for the composition to be effected in Court in the criminal trial any more than in the civil suit. If in such cases a composition out of Court is proved a Magistrate would have no jurisdiction to go on with the trial. 68 L. R. 234 = 14 Cr. L. J. 293 following 21 C. 103. Where an offence has been compounded outside the Court but subsequently at the time of hearing one of the parties resiles from the agreement it is competent to the Court to take evidence as to the tatum of agreement and give effect to it if it be found to have been entered into. Per *ABDUR RAHIM J.* 18 M. L. T. 602 = 18 Cr. L. J. 803, 23 M. L. T. 140. 41 M. 685 = 34 M. L. J. 932

12-A. Muchilka or agreement signed referring dispute to a Panchayat does not, by itself, amount to a composition.—After a charge for defamation was framed the parties signed a Muchilka referring their dispute to a Panchayat. No arbitration took place and no award was passed. Held that the mere signing of a Muchilka does not amount to a composition of the offence under s. 345 of the Code. 49 M. L. J. 544

DUTY OF COURT IN CASES OF COMPOSITION

13. Magistrate has no power to prevent composition of compoundable offences.—All offences mentioned in the second column of the table given under this section may be compounded even when cases regarding them are sent up by the Police and a Magistrate has no power to prevent this course. 10 C. 253, 1854 A. W. N. 256. The permission of the Court mentioned in sub-sec. (2) is not required in the case of such offences except under the circumstances mentioned in sub-sec. (5). 1833 A. W. N. 245, 1836 A. W. N. 167. Where after a charge of an offence compoundable without the permission of the Court was pleaded to by the accused the person mentioned in 1st column of the table in s. 345 filed a petition of composition the Magistrate altered the charge to a non-compoundable offence. Held the petition should have been at once accepted and the accused acquitted. 29 P. R. 1914 = 16 Cr. L. J. 81

14. Before allowing composition, Magistrate should decide whether compoundable offence is proved.—The accused was charged with furious driving and knocking down an old woman who died a few days

afterwards of the injuries she had received. During the inquiry before the Magistrate, a relative of the deceased came to a compromise with the accused, and the Magistrate treating the charge as that of an offence under s. 336, I P.C., allowed it to be compounded. *Held*, that as it appeared from the evidence that the death of the woman was caused by her being run over, the offence would be brought under s. 304, I P.C., or under the definition of culpable homicide, neither of which is compoundable under this section. Therefore the Magistrate should find upon the evidence whether the accused is guilty of an offence which is compoundable under this section, and that only a compoundable offence has been committed. If the offence is not compoundable under other laws are not compoundable. *See* 11 P. R. 1907 = 34 P. W. R. 1907. Where the accused were forwarded

usurped a jurisdiction not vested in him by law, as the offence disclosed was not compoundable under this section, 4 Bom. L. R. 718. *See* also 11 P. R. 1907 = 34 P. W. R. 1907, where it was held that a Magistrate had no jurisdiction to allow a non-compoundable offence to be compounded on the ground that it would probably be better for the complainant to do so, that the accused also wished for the compromise, and that it was probable that the case might in the end turn out to be a compoundable offence. Such an order is *ultra vires*. *See*, however, 29 P. R. 1914, Note 16 (b) where these cases are explained.

On withdrawal from prosecution in warrant case Magistrate cannot acquit—In a warrant case in respect of a non-compoundable offence it is not competent to the Magistrate on a private complainant offering to withdraw from the prosecution to enter an order of acquittal. 15 Bom. L. R. 81 = 2 Bom. Cr. Ca. 17 = 14 Cr. L. J. 77. In 1 B. 84 the legality of such a procedure was not considered and Ratanlal 330 which is based on that case was not followed.

15. Court must at once give effect to composition.—When the parties to an offence compoundable without permission of Court produce before the Court a writing signed by them the Court is bound to accept it and is not at liberty to call upon the parties to adduce further evidence that the case has been compounded, 16 Bom. L. R. 939 = 2 Bom. Cr. Ca. 257 = 16 Cr. L. J. 83. The resolution of the Bombay Government in the Judicial Department, No 7969, dated 4th November, 1912, can only apply to cases where the permission of the Court is needed in order that the case may be compounded. In case of offences compoundable without sanction of the Court, the composition is complete immediately the complainant puts it forward in Court. When the petition of compromise is put in the case is at an end and the Court's sole remaining duty and sole remaining function is to record a formal order of acquittal and to set the accused person at liberty, 29 P. R. 1914 (F.B.) = 16 Cr. L. J. 81. *See* also the remarks of ABDUR RAHIM, J., in 18 M. L. T. 602 = 16 Cr. L. J. 803.

(a) *Petition of compromise*—A female, presented a petition to the Magistrate thereupon satisfied himself that the case then and there ordered the petition to be filed with the record. *Held* that the complainant could not be allowed to withdraw the petition, and the Magistrate was wrong in ordering the same to be put up with the record, but should have accepted the compromise and dealt with it then and there, 3 C. W. N. 322 and 543.

(b) *Charge cannot be altered to a non-compoundable offence*—Where charge covering offences compoundable without sanction of Court has actually been drawn up and read and explained to the accused persons and been pleaded to and a petition of compromise is filed by the person mentioned in the last column in the table in s. 345, it is not open to the Court at such a stage to sit down and consider whether the charge itself is drawn was appropriate or not much less proceed to alter that charge and go on with a case which has passed wholly out of its hands. The Court must accept the petition, 29 P. R. 1914 = 16 Cr. L. J. 81 (F.B.). S. 227 has no application to such cases. The cases in 4 Bom. L. R. 718 and 11 P. R. 1907 = 6 Cr. L. J. 336 were distinguished. Where the accused was charged with an offence compoundable under this section and the parties compromised the case, *held*, that the Magistrate should have acquitted the accused and that he was wrong in having proceeded with the trial of the case and convicted the accused of an offence disclosed by the evidence. *Wells* II, 418. *See* also 1 L. B. R. 349; 4 Bom. L. R. 718.

16. Proof of composition.—The proof of the arrangement must be similar to that which the Court requires for the proof of any agreement which is in issue, and unless it appears that parties were free from influence of any kind, and were fully aware of their respective rights, it would be impossible to give effect to a so-called arrangement or composition, 21 C. 103.

17 Award of compensation illegal when acquittal results from composition.—Though the composition of an offence under this section has the effect of an acquittal, yet it is not such an acquittal as brings the case within the provisions of s. 250. Therefore where an offence under s. 323, I P C., being compounded the trying Magistrate ordered the complainant to pay out of the accused Rs 25 as compensation, his order was reversed as illegal, *Ratanlal 957; 10 Bom. L. R. 1056 = 9 Cr. L. J. 168; 19 P. R. 1888*. See *contra* 24 P. R. 833. See Note 8 under s. 250.

EFFECT OF COMPOSITION.

18 By one accused on other accused not summoned.—If in the case of a compoundable offence, the complainant intimates to the Court that he has compounded it and desires to withdraw the complaint, the order passed by the Magistrate allowing the withdrawal, is in respect to the offence and not solely in regard to the persons actually under trial at the time, and in so providing the law contemplates that all the accused persons should be under trial at the same time before a judicial officer, unless it be in some exceptional circumstances such as sickness or absconding. Where, therefore, in a complaint against several persons, one only was summoned and the case was compromised and subsequently process was ordered to issue against the others, *held* that the order was wrong as the complaint was compounded in respect of the offences committed so as to include the parties now ordered to be summoned and that further proceedings should be stayed. The moment a composition is voluntarily effected under this section, it operates as an acquittal of all the accused, irrespective of the fact whether process has issued or not, 7 C. W. N. 176. But in 41 Mad. 323, 7 C. W. N. 176 is dissented from and it is *held*, that a composition with one of several accused does not effect an acquittal of others. And in 43 B. 346; 7 C. W. N. 176, was dissented from and 41 M. 323, was followed and it was *held* that the compounding of an offence with one of many accused has not the effect of acquittal of the remaining accused persons between whom and the complainant no satisfactory settlement has been arrived at. See also 43 A. 453 and also sub-section (6) wherein the words "with whom the offence has been compounded" are newly added in consonance with 43 B. 346.

19. Complete bar to further proceedings.—(i) Sub-section (6) indicates that the composition has the same effect in a criminal trial as it would have in a civil suit. It operates as complete a bar to the prosecution as if the accused had been acquitted, 6 S. L. R. 284 = 14 Cr. L. J. 292. When a case under s. 498, I P C., was under investigation by the Police, compromise was effected and subsequently a complaint was made to a Magistrate who issued process, *held* the proceedings before the Magistrate were *ultra vires*, 22 P. L. R. 1010 = 11 Cr. L. J. 386.

(ii) *On a cognate charge*—An accused charged under s. 324, I P C., cannot, if the offence has been compounded with the permission of the Court, be again tried on the same facts on a charge under s. 323, I P C., if the composition which has the effect of an acquittal, is still in force, *Ratanlal 519; 17 C. W. N. 943 = 15 Cr. L. J. 458*. Where certain persons were accused of house-trespass causing grievous hurt and being members of an unlawful assembly but were only summoned under s. 325, I P C., and a petition to compromise the whole matter was put in and the Magistrate sanctioned the compromise so far as s. 325, was concerned, *held*, that the accused could not be tried for any of the other offences, as to the offence of house-trespass because no sanction was necessary and as to unlawful assembly because the object of the unlawful assembly could only have been to commit the two offences which had been compounded, 17 C. W. N. 943 = 15 Cr. L. J. 433.

(iii) *To a suit*—A composition can be pleaded as accord and satisfaction and would be a complete bar to a civil suit for damages 6 S. L. R. 284 = 14 Cr. L. J. 292.

20. Plea that original charge has been compounded is no answer to a charge under s. 211, I P C.—The fact that an offence, alleged to have been committed has been compounded, is no conclusive answer to a charge made against the prosecutor under s. 211 I P C. A laid a charge against M for wrongful confinement. The Police reported the case as a false one, and A not appearing to prove his complaint, the District Magistrate ordered him to be prosecuted under s. 211, I P C., and made over the case to a Deputy Magistrate. Upon the hearing of such charge, A pleaded that he had compounded the original charge laid by him against M, and that therefore the charge against him under s. 211 could not lie. The Deputy Magistrate, without hearing any evidence dismissed the case. *Held*, that the course so taken was illegal, as such plea was no conclusive answer to a charge under s. 211, 11 C. 79.

21 Comparison between withdrawal and composition—See 19 P. R. 1888; 14 M. 379; 21 C. 103 and Note 4 under s. 248.

22. Revision.—It is open to the High Court in revision to set aside the order of acquittal based on a petition of compromise if there has been material irregularity, 7 S. L. R. 200 = 15 Cr. L. J. 533.

translators of the Old Testament into the Greek language, from whom this translation is called the *Septuagint*.

5 Difficult to be endured, exact, critical, rigor
ous, as, a severe test

וְאֵלֶּיךָ יָשׁוּב׃
I will be in that day the land of Goshen in which my

{Fr sexagesimal Bee Nym} 2nd ed on, the number sixty
tons or sexagesimal the frac-
tions are some power of sixty as
— called also astronomical frac-
tion there were no others used in
Egypt. *Division* — Sexagesimal is
the method of computing by the
sexagesimals
notation of six or sixes sixfold

Joint and several note bond or other obligation one by which two or more persons signing are united and individually bound. Crab.

Several, *n* 1 Each particular or a small number, singly taken, — obsolete or very rare in the plural

[illegible]

things on to

Sincerity, n. Each particular

Sex-digital spin n (Lat sex six and digital)

23. Procedure where the injured persons refuse investigation—In non-compoundable cognizable summons-cases which affect the public interests, the Police shall ordinarily proceed irrespective of the wishes of the complainant. (2) In compoundable offences when the injured persons compound, the Police shall hold their hands. (3) In non-compoundable cognizable warrant-cases the Police shall proceed irrespective of the wishes of the complainants. (4) When the Police hold their hands, they shall make the report required by law—*Rul and Ord., Punjab*, p. 384

With respect to cases in which complainants are unwilling to prosecute the following rules shall have effect, that is, say—(a) in non cognizable cases of public importance which come to the knowledge of the Police, they shall lay information before the Magistrate having jurisdiction, and it rests with such Magistrate to take such steps as he may deem fit in any such cases which are important the Police shall confine themselves to the ordinary entry in the station diary. (b) in non-compoundable cognizable summons-cases which do not affect the public interests and which are brought forward by private complainants, the Police shall hold their hands if the complainant seeks no investigation, unless, on receipt of the report of the case, the Magistrate having jurisdiction, or the Magistrate of the district, orders investigation, or unless a clear case is made out against a known person. *Rul and Ord., N W P*

24. Analogous Law.—Under s. 663, N. Y. Cr Pro Code when a defendant is brought before a Magistrate or is held to answer, on a charge of misdemeanour, for which the person injured by the act constituting the crime has a remedy by a civil action, the crime may be compromised, as provided in the next section (*etc.* with the permission of the Court) except when it was committed (1) by or upon an officer of justice, while in the execution of the duties of his office, (2) riotously or (3) with an intent to commit felony

25. Contracts to settle or withdraw from prosecution are illegal and unenforceable.—See s. 23 of the *Contract Act*. Even if made with sanction of Court such contracts cannot be enforced. See *Windhill Local Board v Vent 45 Ch. D. 357*; in *re Campbell, 14 Q. B. D 32 Kaufman v Gerson, (1904) 1 K. B. 591 (C.A.)*. They do not affect the jurisdiction of the Court to proceed with the trial of the offence in question *re Bryant, 27 J. P. 277—289*; and even in civil proceedings, though the illegality is not pleaded the Court may intervene and dismiss the action, *Scott v Brown (1892) 2 Q. B. 724*.

26. A case may be compromised at any stage under this section before sentence is pronounced and a Magistrate cannot refuse to accept a petition of compromise filed at a time when the judgment was being written, 22 C. W. N. 744—45 C. 818

346. (1) If, in the course of an inquiry or a trial before a Magistrate in any district outside the Presidency-towns, the evidence appears to him to warrant 'a presumption that the case is one which should be tried or committed for trial by some other Magistrate in such district, he shall stay proceedings and submit the case, with a brief report explaining its nature, to any Magistrate to whom he is subordinate or to such other Magistrate having jurisdiction, as the

I proceed. of Provincial Magistrate in cases which he cannot dispose of

District Magistrate directs

(2) The Magistrate to whom the case is submitted may, if so empowered, either try the case himself, or refer it to any Magistrate, subordinate to him having jurisdiction, or commit the accused for trial

Notes.—1. When section may be resorted to.—This section might appropriately be used where the particular Magistrate is not competent to try one who is declared otherwise incompetent in a European British subject over whom he has no jurisdiction valid with

of an European British subject, provided that the section is otherwise applicable and resort to its use is in the circumstances of the case permissible. There is nothing in Chapter XXXVI or in any other provision of the Code which renders section 346 inapplicable to proceedings against European British subjects, 7 N. L. R. 93—12 Cr. L. J. 438

(b) *If the accused is an old offender*—Proof of previous conviction, against a person accused before a Magistrate is evidence which will justify such Magistrate in taking action under this section 1894 A. W. N. 200.

2. **Duty of inferior Court when aggravating circumstances become apparent during trial.**—No tribunal can properly clutch jurisdiction by intentionally ignoring facts of aggravation which make the offence really cognizable only by a higher tribunal. Where the accused has himself objected to the jurisdiction the High Court would feel itself bound to interfere, and have no discretion but to annul conviction which has been the result of the exercise of jurisdiction by a lower tribunal, *Weir II, 421*. 'It is an evasion of the law to treat an aggravated offence as an ordinary one and thus introduce a different jurisdiction or a lower scale of punishment. When evidence discloses circumstances of aggravation, e.g., such as the use of a dangerous weapon, which makes the offence one cognizable by higher Court, it becomes the duty of the trying Magistrate to use the proper procedure for sending the case to a Higher Court. *PER JARDINE J., 13 B. 502 at p. 503.*' See *Weir II, 420*, as to circumstances in which Subordinate Magistrate should refrain from exercising jurisdiction in theft cases. See 30 P. R. 1838, where a conviction by a Magistrate of a minor offence was set aside and the record was returned to him to proceed under this section or s 347 but if the interests of justice have not suffered the High Court will not interfere 24 M. 675, 2 M. L. T. 493 = 7 Cr. L. J. 215, 25 M. L. J. 434 = 14 Cr. L. J. 640

3. **Magistrate ought not to split up offences.**—Magistrates are not at liberty to pass over material parts of the evidence in cases before them and so to withdraw cases from the cognizance of proper tribunals, 5 W. R. 63; 1 C. L. R. 434; 27 C. 983. Nor can a Magistrate split up an offence into its component parts for the purpose of giving himself jurisdiction over the minor charges, 1 C. L. R. 434; 11 C. 236; 4 C. 18 = 3 C. L. R. 44; 22 M. 459, 29 C. 409

But in 24 M. 675 it was pointed out that where facts disclose an offence within the jurisdiction of the Magistrate, it would be a fallacy to say that he was not empowered by law to try the person charged for the offence which is within his jurisdiction, because the same facts disclose a more serious offence which is beyond his jurisdiction. But it was improper, it was said on the part of a Magistrate intentionally to ignore facts disclosing circumstances of aggravation which show that an offence beyond his jurisdiction, has been in fact committed as well as an offence within his jurisdiction. 'But if the Magistrate has so acted he has not acted without jurisdiction within the meaning of s 530. See also in 10 C. 85, it was held that an officer entrusted with special powers under s 34, should rarely, if ever, try a case himself when it appears from some of the evidence that the accused might have been charged with an offence beyond his jurisdiction to take cognizance of. See Note to s 260 and Notes to s. 530

..; £

4. **Magistrates having no jurisdiction to try, cannot discharge.**—A Magistrate who finds he has no jurisdiction to try a case cannot discharge the accused under s 253, but should proceed under this section *Weir II, 323*.

5. **Submission after framing charge not illegal.**—It is not irregular for a Magistrate of the second or third class, to frame a charge against an accused person in a case which he has jurisdiction to try even though at the time of framing the charge he intends if he is of opinion that the accused is guilty, to submit the proceedings to the District or Sub-divisional Magistrate under this section, 1905 U. B. R. (Cr. P. C.) 33 = 2 Cr. L. J. 464.

6. **Superior Magistrate cannot return the case.**—(a) *With direction to prepare the charge under a particular section.*—A second-class Magistrate, not being empowered to pass a sentence of whipping, which in his opinion, was appropriate, reported a case to the District Magistrate for passing sentence, *held*, that the latter should have treated the report as one made under this section and not sent back the case to the second-class Magistrate with special directions to prepare a charge under a particular section, *Ratanlal 499 and 554, 45 M. 849*

(b) *With direction to commit.*—In 4 M. 327, pending an inquiry into a case of house-breaking, the second-class Magistrate of one division was transferred to another division and the case transferred to his file by the District Magistrate. In the course of the trial, it appeared to the second-class Magistrate that the case was one of robbery and so not triable by him. He, therefore, stayed proceedings and submitted the case to the Divisional Magistrate and the latter forwarded it to the District Magistrate as he thought that he had no jurisdiction the offence having been committed outside his division. The District Magistrate ordered the case to be committed to the Sessions, if the second-class Magistrate thought there was sufficient evidence and the second-class Magistrate accordingly committed the case to the Court of Session, *held*, that the order of the District Magistrate was illegal. The submittal under this section is not a proceeding in the nature of a commitment.

7. Superior Magistrate must, if he elects to try, proceed de novo and not to act upon previously recorded evidence—consent cannot cure illegality.—In 91 P. L. R. 1905 = 2 Cr. L. J. 369, a Subordinate Magistrate having found after the completion of a trial, that the accused deserved a more severe punishment than he could inflict, sent case to the District Magistrate. The District Magistrate treating the case as sent up under this section asked the accused whether they wanted the witnesses re-called and re-heard and on their replying in the negative proceeded to judgment and convicted the accused without trying the case afresh. *Held*, that the procedure adopted by the District Magistrate was illegal. The consent of the accused cannot dispense with strict compliance with provisions of the Code and illegalities are not cured by consent. A Subordinate Magistrate referred a case to the District Magistrate under this section. The District Magistrate would have had power to try it only under this section. He instead of trying the case himself, accepted the plea put in before the Lower Court which was not actually a plea of guilty. The plea was neither made before the District Magistrate, nor was it recorded by himself. He merely contented himself with taking evidence as to previous convictions without recording any evidence as to the guilt of the accused. *Held*, that since the reference was under this section and not under s. 349, the evidence taken by the Subordinate Magistrate was not evidence in the trial before the District Magistrate and that procedure adopted by the latter Magistrate was illegal 106 P. L. R. 1905. The special provisions of s. 350 do not apply to proceedings tried under this section. The accused have the right given by law to be convicted only on evidence recorded by the District Magistrate himself and the District Magistrate is competent to convict only on such evidence and they cannot be deprived of the right even with their consent, 23 P. R. 1905 = 361 P. L. R. 1905. Where a case which has been partly heard by one officer is transferred to another officer for trial, the latter should hear all the evidence in the case before deciding it. Where a District Magistrate brought a partly heard case on to his own file, recorded the rest of the evidence and passed a decision on the whole of the evidence, it was *held* that such a proceeding was not a legal trial, 2 N. W. P. H. C. R. 468. See also 14 W. R. 3; 25 C. 863; 4 M. 327. In 1894 A. W. N. 200, the High Court refused to set aside a conviction as it was not shown that the accused was prejudiced by the evidence not being taken afresh. But see Note below.

8. But a superior Magistrate can commit without taking fresh evidence.—The Sub-Divisional Magistrate to whom a case is submitted under this section can commit it to a Court of Session without taking evidence afresh, Ratanlal 472; 12 C. W. N. 136 = 6 Cr. L. J. 429. He is bound to dispose of it in one of the ways prescribed herein, Ratanlal 556.

Procedure when after commencement of inquiry or trial, Magistrate finds case should be committed.

347. (1) If in any inquiry before a Magistrate, or in any trial before a Magistrate before signing judgment, it appears to him at any stage of the proceedings that the case is one which ought to be tried by the Court of Session or High Court, and if he is empowered to commit for trial, he shall *commit the accused under the provisions hereinbefore contained

(2) If such Magistrate is not empowered to commit for trial he shall proceed under s. 346.

Notes—1 As to how Magistrate ought to exercise their discretion in committing cases, see Notes 22 and 24 to s. 209 at pp 604—607

2 Cases which ought to be tried by the Court of Session.—The words *ought to be tried* must be read with s. 254. See Note 2 to s. 207. If a Subordinate Magistrate be empowered to make a commitment to the Court of Session and the offence be triable by the Magistrate of the District or the Court of Session, he should refer the case to the District Magistrate rather than commit to the Court of Session after holding a preliminary inquiry, since this latter procedure though strictly legal, should as much as possible be avoided, as it tends unnecessarily to occupy the more valuable time of the Sessions Judge, 2 W. R. (Cr. L.) 19. Where a Magistrate commits a case well within his power to punish and does not give any good reason for commitment, the commitment is bad. See Notes 24—28 to s. 209, at p 607. But in 42 M. 83 it has been held that the terms of s. 347 of the Code are general and give a Magistrate who is empowered to commit a discretion in committing cases for trial which is not limited by s. 254 so as to make it obligatory on him to try every case which he can adequately punish. (24 C. 429; 1 M. L. T. 81 and 11 Cr. L. J. 54 not followed. 1 M. 239 F. B. applied.) In the same case NAPIER, J., observed "I am at a loss to comprehend why the wide words of s. 347 should be curtailed by reference to s. 254 when there is a specific section, namely, s. 349 which deals with the circumstances referred to in s. 254."

3. Is this section subject to provisions of Chapter XVIII?—This section applies only to those inquiries or trials which have been started by the Magistrate with the intention of concluding them himself and then at

* The words stop further proceedings and were omitted by Act XVIII of 1923

some stage becomes satisfied that this original intention was inappropriate and thinks that the case was one which ought to be tried by a Sessions Court. If from the first he thinks that the case ought to be tried by a Sessions Court, the procedure laid down by Chapter XVIII is *prima facie* obligatory on him. The words "stop further proceedings" obviously refer to proceedings in a trial which he starts with a view to try them himself and not to shorten the proceedings before commitment under Chapter XVIII. The words "under the provisions hereinbefore contained" show that the Magistrate must make his proceedings conform to the provisions of Chapter XVIII and that before he writes and signs a committal order, the provisions of that Chapter must be carried out and he must not confirm himself to the mere passing of the order of commitment under s. 213, 8 L. B. R. 129 = 5 B. R. L. T. 539 = 13 Cr. L. J. 877 (F.B.), ROBINSON, J., *dissenting*. See also 36 M. 321 and Note at the head of Chapter XVIII at p. 593. The amendment proposed makes the point clear. "We agree entirely with the decision of the Full Bench of the Burma Chief Court that it was not intended by s. 347 to enable the Magistrate to deprive the accused of any of the right, conferred on him by Chapter XVIII, though as observed by one of the learned Judges, when an order has been made under s. 347, proceedings under Chapter XVIII need not necessarily be commenced *de novo* 13 Cr. L. J. 366 (M.). Under the old section there was a conflict of opinion as to the meaning of the words 'stop further proceedings.' Under the present amendment those words are deleted and therefore it is clear that the intention of the Legislature seems to be that the provisions of s. 347 are subject to Chapter XVIII, and this is further made clear by the wording of the section enjoining the Magistrate "to commit the accused under the provisions hereinbefore contained."

(a) *Right of accused to cross examine prosecution witnesses*—See Note 7 (2) at p. 615. The discretion to stop further proceedings does not justify a Magistrate in disregarding the directions in ss. 208–210, but only requires him to stop proceeding with the case as a trial and instead to commit the case to the Sessions. He should then follow the procedure laid down in Chapter XVIII, 5 B. R. L. T. 239 = 13 Cr. L. J. 877 (F.B.). Where however, the accused has not been prejudiced by the Magistrate not following the procedure laid down by Chapter XVIII, the commitment need not be quashed, 13 Cr. L. J. 366 (M.). The power of the Magistrate to commit the accused is not subject to the provisions of s. 209, that is to say, that no commitment could be made until all the evidence referred to in s. 208 sub-secs (1) and (2), had been taken. Such a contention altogether ignores the words "at any stage of the proceedings shall stop further proceedings," and is opposed to the clear meaning of this section which is contained in the Chapter dealing with general provisions as to inquiries and trials, and applies to all inquiries and trials, before a Magistrate, Ratanlal 975; 36 C. 45. Where, therefore the accused did not cross-examine the prosecution witnesses immediately after their examination in chief but applied to the Magistrate, after the close of the prosecution, to cross-examine them and to examine defence witnesses, *held*, that the Magistrate was justified under s. 347 in committing the case without the cross-examination of the prosecution witnesses and the examination of the witnesses for the defence, 36 C. 43 *dissenting* from 20 A. 264 and 26 A. 177. Even where the Magistrate has issued summonses to the defence witnesses and has examined some of them it is open to the Magistrate to proceed under this section without examining the other witnesses. The power to stop proceedings at any stage which s. 347 gives him is unqualified 13 Cr. L. J. 704 (M.), where 36 C. 43 is approved of. But if before the prosecution case is absolutely closed, *ex* after all the witnesses but one have been examined the accused applies to cross-examine the prosecution witnesses and examine witnesses on his behalf, the accused is entitled to do so 16 C. L. J. 45 = 13 Cr. L. J. 698. See also 51 C. 432 where 36 C. 43 is referred to and discussed and distinguished.

4. *Proceedings may be stayed and accused committed after charge*.—This section authorizes a Magistrate after a charge has been drawn up to stop further proceedings, and commit for trial 36 C. 493; only the further procedure necessary for commitment shall be taken as directed in Chapter XVIII, 2 A. 910.

5. *Committal must be before signing judgment*.—Except as provided in ss. 369, 395 and 484 no Criminal Court has power to review or alter its own judgment when it has been formally recorded or to quash its own convictions though illegal, 7 B. H. C. R. Cr. Ca. 67; 5 W. R. 61; 17 W. R. 2, 2 A. 33; 23 W. R. 49, 1 B. H. C. R. 3; 6 W. R. 70; 14 C. 42, 7 A. 672.

6. *Application of section to trials of European British subjects*.—S. 447 corresponds to this section but it does not override this section but is merely supplementary to it in that it contains directions regarding the Court to which the accused should be committed. Secs. 447 and 347 must be read together in cases in which the Magistrate thinks the accused should be committed and in cases where he does not think the accused should be committed he should adopt the procedure laid down by s. 346. See Note 1 to that section 7 M. L. R. 83 = 12 Cr. L. J. 436.

SHEAR

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is Creek.

ShYah (Shuop, §120) n A Shute see SHUTE
Shib'bo-leth, n [Heb shib'boleth an ear of corn,
or a stream, a flood]
1 A word which was made the criterion by which
to distinguish the Ephraimites from the Gileadites
The Ephraimites not being able to pronounce the
letter sh pronounced the word shibboleth see
Judges xi and xii
Without reprieve adjudged to death
For want of word pronounced shibboleth

sh'ole kw sholt
Dan sholt O H
Ger sholt H Ger
E D sholt, from
Yel & kw shyla,
Dan shyla, to cover
to defend
1 A round piece of
defensive armor car-
ried on the arm a
buckler — formerly



& O Fries, shiltz, Icel shilta, to d. to change
1 To change, to alter, as, to shift the
2 To transfer from one place or position
other as, shift the beam, sh. the tea
3 To put off or out of the way by a
dent. I shifted him away
4 To change, as clothes, as, to shift
5 To dress in fresh clothes, as, to shift
to shift himself
To shift about to turn quite round to one
or opposite point. — To shift 700 (a) To shift
as, to shift the duties of English. (b) To
to shift one's position or one's seat, and so
in convenience

SHIFT, v. i. 1 To vary from one position to
another, to change about, to move
Here the Ballerina shifted about in her
2 To change one's occupation or position
3 To change one's clothes especially the
garments
4 To satisfy one's wants by changing
5 To resort to expedients for a purpose
purpose, to contrive, to manage
Men in distress will shift to themselves, and leave
patrons to shift as well as they can
6 To practice indirect methods
All those school men though they were crowded
yet to their work all their followers to shift, that is
their duties
7 To change place, as a cargo ship to
side to the other
SHIFTS, n. (A S shift Icel shilt Ger shult
1 A turning from one thing to another as
hence an expedient tried in a case of
tried when another fails, a contrivance
I'll find a thousand shifts to get away
2 A temporary or deceitful expedient
artifice expedient to effect a bad purpose

sherp'herd g-rod (sh p-erds) n (Bot) A
sherp'herd g-staff plant of the genus D psurus,
tassel

The quality of being shift-
lence

* 348. (1) Whoever, having been convicted of an offence punishable under Chapter XII or Chapter XVII of the Indian Penal Code with imprisonment for a term of three years or upwards is again accused of any offence punishable under either of those Chapters with imprisonment for a term of three years or upwards shall if the Magistrate before whom the case is pending is satisfied that there are sufficient grounds for committing the accused be

Trial of persons previously convicted of offences against coinage stamp-law or property

committed to the Court of Session or High Court as the case may be unless the Magistrate is competent to try the case and is of opinion that he can himself pass an adequate sentence if the accused is convicted

Provided that if any Magistrate in the district has been invested with powers under section 30 the case may be transferred to him instead of being committed to the Court of Sessions

|| (2) When any person is committed to the Court of Session or High Court under sub-section (1) any other person accused jointly with him in the same inquiry or trial shall be similarly committed unless the Magistrate discharges such other person under section 209

Notes.—1 Chapter XII ss. 230—264 A refers to offences relating to coin and Government stamps, Chapter XVII ss. 378—463 refers to offences relating to property To constitute an habitual offender within the meaning of this section it is necessary that the subsequent offence charged should have been committed by the accused after the previous conviction *Ratanlal 143*. See s 221 (7) for particulars of previous conviction in a charge s. 310 for procedure in case of previous conviction in a Sessions trial and s 511 for proof of previous conviction

2. Procedure to be followed.—It is not entirely easy to deal satisfactorily with cases under s. 348. The Magistrate is bound to commit if there has been a previous conviction of one of the offence described unless he can adequately punish the accused consequently he must either as a preliminary matter or at any rate before framing a charge determine whether there has been a previous conviction having decided that point he will have to consider whether in the circumstances of the case his powers enable him to pass a sufficiently severe sentence If he thinks they do not permit, he may either commit the accused for trial or try himself, if they do not so permit but the evidence does not warrant the discharge of the accused he must frame a charge under s. 21 and commit him for trial under Chapter XVI 38 M 552.

2-A. Magistrate should not convict but frame charge and commit.—Where a Magistrate has to act under s. 348 he ought not to find the accused guilty before commitment but should merely frame charge and then commit as otherwise a conviction would bar a fresh trial before the Sessions Court under s. 403 38 M 552.

3 When accused is an old offender he need not necessarily be committed to Sessions.—4 A Magistrate convicted under ss. 457 and 380 I P C an accused whom he found to be an old offender *Held* that the Magistrate should have acted under this section and committed the accused to the High Court, *Ratanlal 704*. But now under this section as modified the Subordinate Magistrate might in his discretion either commit to the Court of Session or deal with the case himself *Weir II, 422* There is no rule of law which lays down that a person who has once before been convicted should in the absence of proof of other circumstances against him be necessarily dealt with as an habitual offender and this section cannot be understood to have any such stringent meaning 1832 A. W N 215 Although the accused was several times previously convicted of offences under Chapter XII or Chapter XVII, I P C. a second-class Magistrate passed upon him sentence of six months rigorous imprisonment and fine Rs. 200 or in default one month's rigorous imprisonment. On a reference from the District Magistrate that the trying Magistrate had no jurisdiction *Held* that looking to the discretion vested in the trying Magistrate the High Court (though agreeing with the District Magistrate) were unable to say that the second-class Magistrate had no jurisdiction and therefore they could not order a new trial *Ratanlal 70*

* This section was renumbered

† These words were inserted by Act XI III of 1925

‡ These words were substituted for the words "before whom the proceedings are pending" by *ibid.*

§ Substituted for the words "The District Magistrate" by *ibid.*

|| Sub-section (2) was added by *ibid.*

4. Magistrate cannot act under s 349 and refer the case to superior Magistrate.—A Magistrate cannot act under s 349 and refer the case to a superior Magistrate, *Weir II, 422*. Where a person is charged with an offence mentioned in the section before second-class Magistrate and the Magistrate thinks that on conviction of the accused, he cannot himself pass an adequate sentence, he has no jurisdiction to do anything but to transfer the case to a District Magistrate specially empowered under s 30, or if he is empowered to commit to Sessions, follow the procedure of Chapter XVIII for inquiry into cases triable by the Court of Session. The accused, who had been previously convicted and was liable, if again convicted, to enhanced punishment under s 75, I P C, was sent before a second-class Magistrate, charged with theft in a building. The Magistrate being of opinion that he was guilty, but that he could not pass an adequate sentence, himself, referred the case under s 349, to the Sub-Divisional Magistrate who sentenced him to two years' rigorous imprisonment and whipping. *Held*, that s 348 applied to the case and that the Magistrate was debarred from referring the case for a higher punishment under s 349, 4 L. B. R. 282. See also 17 Cr. L. J. 201 = 34 In. Ca. 313 (Bur)

5. Procedure before District Magistrate.—(a) *District Magistrate cannot act on evidence already recorded*—A Subordinate Magistrate before whom the accused was first placed for trial, took down the evidence of the witnesses for the prosecution and also examined the accused with reference to such evidence. After this, records were put in for previous conviction against the accused. Thereupon the case was transferred to the District Magistrate under the *proviso* to this section. The District Magistrate acting on the evidence already recorded, convicted the accused who called no evidence. *Held* on appeal that as the only section of the Code which empowers one Magistrate to act upon the evidence recorded by another is s. 350 and that section cannot be held to cover this case of a transfer of a trial from one Court to another, the conviction and sentence by the District Magistrate must be set aside and a new trial ordered, 1 N. L. R. 187.

(b) *District Magistrate cannot return the case*—In a case referred under this section, if the District Magistrate considers that the case should be committed to the Court of Session, he should himself commit. He should not return the case to the Subordinate Magistrate with a direction to commit, 9 M. 377; 10 B. 196.

A District Magistrate exercising powers under s 30 cannot be regarded as a Court of Session to whom cases should be committed nor can a case be sent to him under s 349, 7 C. W. N. 457.

(c) *Duty of District Magistrate when case irregularly referred*.—He cannot act under s 349. Committing to the Court of Session might be avoided, if old offenders are usually tried by first-class Magistrates only. Where a Subordinate Magistrate irregularly sends up a case falling under this section, under s 349 it is open to the District Magistrate, if he thinks that a Magistrate of the first class can pass an adequate sentence to take the case on his own file or transfer it to some other first-class Magistrate, the proceedings in either case being taken *de novo*, *Weir II, 422*.—See *Mad. H. C. Civ. Dis. No 1323, dated 16th September, 1899*.

6. Section 75, I. P. C., must be more often resorted to in the case of habitual offenders against property.—The Government of India has noticed the comparatively small extent to which the provisions of s 75, I P C, are used in the case of habitual convicts. It has been remarked that the sentence of transportation for life is peculiarly appropriate in the case of persons habitually guilty of offences against property, for whom jail life in India appears to have no terror, but who might possibly be reformed if removed from the scene of their crimes. The Judicial Commissioner, therefore, suggests a more extensive use of the power conferred by s 75, I P C.—*Oudh Cr. Dig.*, p 14. But when s 75 is to be used for enhancement of punishment the fact of the previous conviction must be stated in the charge 19 W. R. 41; 21 W. R. 40.

349.* (1) Whenever a Magistrate of the second or third class, having jurisdiction is of opinion, after hearing the evidence for the prosecution and the accused, that the accused is guilty, and that he ought to receive a punishment different in kind from, or more severe than, that which such Magistrate is empowered to inflict, or that he ought to be required to execute a bond under section 106, he may record the opinion and submit his proceedings and forward the accused to the District Magistrate or Sub-Divisional Magistrate to whom he is subordinate

† (1 A) When more accused than one are being tried together and the Magistrate considers it necessary to proceed under sub-section (1) in regard to any of such accused, he shall

In the Southern Pargannas any person convicted under this section by any Magistrate other than the Deputy Commissioner may appeal to the Deputy Commissioner and if convicted by the Deputy Commissioner may appeal to Commissioner as High Court s 4 of the Southern Pargannas Regulation of 1894.

* Section (1 A) was inserted by Act XXIII of 1924 s 92.

forward all the accused who are in his opinion guilty to the District Magistrate or Sub-Divisional Magistrate"

as he thinks fit and as is according to law

Provided that he shall not inflict a punishment more severe than he is empowered to inflict under sections 32 and 33

2. **Proceedings of Magistrates not empowered void.**—If any Magistrate not duly empowered passes a sentence under s. 349 on proceedings recorded by another Magistrate, proceeding shall be void, s. 530, cl. (f).

(i) **Second and third-class Magistrates only can refer**—A Magistrate of the first class cannot refer under this section 7 A. 414, though the District Magistrate can call for his records, 7 A. 833.

(ii) **District and Sub-Divisional Magistrates only competent to deal with proceedings**—Jurisdiction to deal with the proceedings under s. 349 is conferred upon District Magistrates and Sub-Divisional Magistrates and upon no other Magistrates, 38 B. 719.

APPLICATION OF SECTION.

3. **Improper use of the provisions of this section.**—The provisions of this section are put to an improper use when a Subordinate Magistrate takes up a case in which it is obvious from the outset that he will be unable to pass an adequate sentence if the accused is found guilty, and simply with the intention of making over the case to the District Magistrate for enhanced punishment. Such cases would more properly be taken up in the first instance by a first-class Magistrate. But when circumstances of aggravation come to light in the course of a case, a Subordinate Magistrate may properly proceed with the case (provided that, notwithstanding such circumstances, it is within his power to do so). If he is unable to do so, he should forward the case to the District Magistrate. It is his duty to do so. If he does not, he is acting in violation of the instructions, some check may be placed upon the existing tendency of Subordinate Courts to pass sentences wholly inadequate to the offences committed—*Pun Cr Cr, No 21-3620 G of 1890*

(a) **Cases under s 348 not to be dealt with under this section.**—The provisions of this section are subject to the express provisions of s 348, *Weir II, 423*, and cases falling under that section should not be dealt with under this section. *See 4 L. B. R. 232.*

(b) **Not applicable to cases tried summarily**—The procedure prescribed in s 349 is unsuited to cases tried summarily and that section does not authorize any Bench of Magistrates to refer a case for a higher punishment, 4 L. B. R. 277 = 8 Cr. L. J. 473

3-A. **Scope of sub-sec. (1) (A).*** reference to superior Magistrate under an order forwarding all the accused though only one was guilty.—Where a Magistrate of the second class came to the conclusion that only one accused was guilty and deserved more punishment but submitted the record under s. 349 and directed all the accused to present themselves in the Court of the superior Magistrate and the superior Magistrate convicted them all, *held* that as regards the other accused the order was illegal and was in contravention of s. 349 (1) (A). Under this sub-section the inferior Magistrate can only send to the superior Magistrate, those alone who are in his opinion guilty, 24 A. L. J. 80.

4. **Reference must be for one of the reasons contemplated by this section.**—A Subordinate Magistrate, having taken all the evidence for the prosecution and for the defence, sent the case to the Magistrate of the District, not on the grounds mentioned in this section, and the District Magistrate observing that none of the accused asked to have the witnesses re-heard, gave judgment upon the evidence taken by the Subordinate Magistrate. The Sessions Judge refused to interfere in revision with the District Magistrate's proceedings on the ground that they were covered by s. 350. *Held*, that this view was erroneous, that neither under s. 192 nor under this section was there any transfer to the District Magistrate by his subordinate that s. 350 was inapplicable, and that the order passed by the District Magistrate must be quashed 12 A. 66; 12 P. R. 1903; 1889 A. W. N. 130.

* Sub-section (1 A) was inserted by Act VIII of 1923 s. 93

5. Superior Magistrate cannot order Subordinate Magistrate to send up case.—If a superior Magistrate directs a Subordinate Magistrate to send up a case under this section, his order is *ultra vires*. The discretion, given by the section, is the discretion of the Subordinate Magistrate. *Weir II, 427.*

DUTIES OF REFERRING MAGISTRATE.

6. Referring Magistrate can record his opinion only and not convict.—A Magistrate of the second or third class who submits his proceedings to another Magistrate under this section, is required to record his opinion only. He cannot legally convict the accused. It is the duty of the Magistrate to whom a case is referred to pass judgment according to law, *Ratanlal 387*. The mere fact that the Sub-Magistrate who submitted the case has framed a charge is not a sufficient reason for the High Court to interfere by setting aside the charge and order the commitment of the accused to Sessions Court, *Ratanlal 948*. But it is not illegal for a second-class Magistrate, where several persons are charged before him, to convict some of the accused and forward the others under this section to a superior Magistrate, though it is desirable in such cases to forward all the accused to be dealt with by the superior Magistrates. A superior Magistrate acting under this section is not precluded from acting on the evidence recorded by the Subordinate Magistrate or from adopting his opinion, *Weir II, 428 and 429. 3 Pat. 1015.*

7. Referring Magistrate cannot refer after passing sentence.—If a Magistrate of the second or third class be of opinion that it is necessary for the accused in a case before him to be bound down under s. 106, he must refer the whole case to the proper authority for him to pass the sentence, and it is not open to such Magistrate to pass any part of the sentence himself, *33 C. 1093*. A third-class Magistrate cannot, after convicting the accused, submit his case to the District Magistrate for binding down the accused to keep the peace under s. 106 *21 C. 822*. Where, however, the third-class Magistrate convicts the accused, and on his recommendation a Sub-Divisional Magistrate binds him over under s. 106, the recommendation and the binding over are bad but the conviction is good, *11 Cr. L. J. 170 (C.)*. See also *12 C. W. N. 752; 21 P. R. 1905; 6 P. R. 1907; 7 P. R. 1909 = 10 Cr. L. J. 309; 30 M. 48 and see Notes 21 and 22 at p. 153*

7-A. Whether referring Magistrate may proceed to charge and complete the trial up to sentence.—In *2 L. B. R. 285 (F.B.) = 10 Bar. L. R. 305 = 1 Cr. L. J. 1010* it was *held* dissenting from *Ratanlal 499* that it was not illegal for a Magistrate of the second or third class to frame a charge against any accused person, in a case in which he has jurisdiction to try even though at the time of framing the charge he intends, if he is of opinion that the accused is guilty to submit the proceedings to the District or Sub-Divisional Magistrate to pass sentence, see also *17 Cr. L. J. 201 = 34 In. Ca. 313 (Bar.)*

POWERS OF MAGISTRATE REFERRED TO.

8. The whole case is opened up for him.—If a superior Magistrate, the latter is bound to form his opinion. *Appx. XLIII followed in 4 M. 233; 9 M. 377.* When the whole case is opened up for him to deal with it according to his discretion, *Ratanlal 350*. He should not confine himself to considering whether the decision of the Sub-Magistrate was plainly and manifestly opposed, to the evidence but he should find on the evidence the facts which he considers proved and in passing judgment should do so in advertence to s. 367, *Ratanlal 636*. He may act upon the evidence already recorded, *Weir II, 428*. Where a second-class Magistrate found the accused guilty, but referred the case under this section to the Sub-Divisional Magistrate and the latter sentenced the first accused, but regarding the rest he referred the case to the District Magistrate as he was of opinion that they should be committed for trial to the Sessions Court, on a reference by the District Magistrate to the High Court, it was *held* that the reference by the second-class Magistrate to the Sub-Divisional Magistrate would open up the whole case and leave the latter Magistrate free to deal with it according to his discretion and one of the powers he would have would be to order a commitment to the Court of Session, *Ratanlal 943*.

(a) "Order" means a final order.—This word, associated as it is with the words "judgment" and "sentence" means a final order, i.e., one disposing of a case so far as the Magistrate, to whom a Subordinate Magistrate submits the proceedings of the case for higher punishment, is concerned. It does not deprive that Magistrate of the exercise of his discretion as to its being a proper case for the Sessions and of the power of committing it for trial, given by this Code, *4 B. 240 (F.B.)*, *1 M. 289 (F.B.)*, see *contra 10 W. R. 50*. The order referred to in sub-sec. (2) is *eiusdem generis* with the words *judgment* and *sentence* which precede it and does not include an order returning the case to the Magistrate who submitted it, *26 A. 344*.

(b) Magistrate referred to may commit.—A Magistrate to whom a case is referred for enhancement of punishment under this section may order the commitment of the case for trial by the Sessions Court, *1 M. 289*

(F.B.), 4 B. 240 (F.B.). An accused person whose case is submitted under this section can no longer be described as *convicted* by the referring Magistrate. But now according to 9 M. 377, the Magistrate to whom the case is referred should himself commit to the Sessions. See *Weir II*, 423. *Contra* see 10 W. R. 50. He cannot return the case to the second-class Magistrate for committal to the Court of Session. The committal is liable to be quashed, if the second-class Magistrate does commit, *Ratanlal 222*, 479 and 948.

9. What the Magistrate referred to ought not to do—

(a) *Cannot transfer proceedings to another Magistrate*—The Magistrate cannot by virtue of s. 523 transfer the proceedings referred to him to another Magistrate. Even assuming that a Sub-Divisional Magistrate has the power to transfer the proceedings to another first-class Magistrate, he cannot transfer the jurisdiction conferred by the section upon him and not upon the first-class Magistrate, 33 B. 719. He has no power to send it for inquiry to another Magistrate, 4 M. 233; 6 M. H. G. R. Appx. II; 35 M. 470. The proceedings of the Magistrate to whom it is sent for inquiry would be void under s. 530 (1) 1905 U. B. R. (Cr. P. C.) 33 = 2 Cr. L. J. 464. A superior Magistrate to whom the case against an accused is submitted under this section, should not convict him of an aggravated form of the offence, without commencing the trial afresh for such aggravated offence, *Weir II*, 21 and 423.

(b) *Has no power to order re-trial*—When the proceedings of a case are submitted under this section to the Magistrate of the district he is bound to pass such judgment, sentence or order in the case as he deems proper and as is in accordance with law. He has no power to order a new trial by the Court of Session or by any other Court, unless he considers an offence has been committed which was not within the jurisdiction of the Magistrate before whom the trial is held, *Ratanlal 130*. He cannot quash the proceedings of the Subordinate Magistrate, and order re-trial by another competent Magistrate, but should report the proceedings to the High Court under s. 438, 14 P. R. 1900.

(c) *Cannot return the case*—A Magistrate to whom a case has been referred to under this section is not competent to send the case back to the referring Magistrate, *Ratanlal 479*, on the ground (a) that in his opinion the sentence which such Magistrate has power to pass would be adequate 28 A. 345, 6 C. L. R. 276 or (b) that the referring Magistrate should take the defence of an accused who had pleaded guilty in a warrant-case. If there had been any need to take the defence of the accused, the superior Magistrate ought to do it himself, 3 L. B. R. 279 = 5 Cr. L. J. 416 or (c) that the referring Magistrate should commit, 10 B. 196; 9 M. 377; *Ratanlal 222*, 479 and 998. See *contra* 14 C. 355 followed in *Referred Case No 185 of 188*, noted in 1 M. L. J. 252, where it was held that the forwarding of the accused to the District Magistrate for a severer punishment does not take away the jurisdiction of the second-class Magistrate to commit the case to the Sessions. All orders passed after a case has been so transferred are illegal, 6 C. L. R. 276; *Ratanlal 479*.

(d) *If, however, the reference is informal, the case could be returned*—A superior Magistrate can send back the proceedings to a Subordinate Magistrate when he considers the reference to be informal on account of defective inquiry, i.e., the proceeding being incomplete, it was not ripe, for reference and on making a full investigation, it is open to the Subordinate Magistrate to come to a fresh and different finding as to the guilt of the accused *Weir II*, 426.

10. *Duty of District Magistrate when he finds that conviction is by Sub-Magistrate not competent to take cognizance of the offence*—An Assistant Magistrate convicted a person under ss. 406 and 417 of the Penal Code, and deferred the case to the District Magistrate for sentence under the provisions of this section. The District Magistrate was of opinion that the offence was one properly punishable under s. 420 of the Penal Code, and one which the Assistant Magistrate had no jurisdiction to deal with and that therefore the reference under this section was *ultra vires* and illegal. On a reference to the High Court, held, that the Assistant Magistrate was not wholly without jurisdiction, as he was competent to commit the accused to the Court of Session, though not to hold a trial, and that the District Magistrate might, if he thought proper, commit the accused to the Court of Session 13 C. 303, where 1 M. 239 and 4 B. 240 are referred to and when a case is referred to a District Magistrate under this section, and he finds that the offence (s. 409 I P. C.) committed by the accused was not one within the cognizance of the second-class Magistrate he should not convict him of that offence, but should hold that the Sub-Magistrate had no jurisdiction to try the offence and should pass the order accordingly. Nor can he accept the first trial as a legal trial and on it sentence the accused on the evidence recorded by second-class Magistrate without jurisdiction, 1 Bom. L. R. 27.

11. Presence of accused necessary when passing sentence.—When the proceedings in a case tried by a Subordinate Magistrate are submitted to a District Magistrate to pass sentence upon the accused, the accused is entitled to be present at the passing of such sentence before the District Magistrate, 7 B. H. C. R. Cr. C. 31. That is why the section directs the forwarding of the accused, 14 G. 333; 7 W. R. 38.

12. Proviso controls referred Magistrate's power to inflict sentence—he cannot act under s. 30 in referred case.—When a District Magistrate acts under this section, on records being sent up by a Subordinate Magistrate he must be regarded as a Magistrate, exercising his ordinary powers, even though the same officer is vested with the enhanced powers under s. 30. Therefore a sentence of five years' imprisonment in such a case purporting to be under s. 30 would be *ultra vires* under the last clause of this section and in spite of such a sentence, the appeal will lie not to the High Court, but to the Court of Session 4 L. B. R. 53 = 6 Cr. L. J. 259. See also 12 P. R. 1903

13. Appeal lies to the Sessions Court.—An accused person dealt with by a superior Magistrate under this section is "a person convicted on a trial held by the Magistrate," etc., for the purposes of appeal to the Court of Session—*M H C Pro*, 20th May, 1867, see ss. 407, 408 and 4 L. B. R. 53.

350. (1) Whenever any Magistrate, after having heard and recorded the whole or any part of the evidence in any inquiry or a trial, ceases to exercise jurisdiction therein, and is succeeded by another Magistrate who has and who exercises such jurisdiction, the Magistrate so succeeding may act on the evidence so recorded by his predecessor or partly recorded by his predecessor and partly recorded by himself, or he may re-summon the witnesses and re commence the inquiry or trial,

Provided as follows—

(a) in any trial the accused may, when the second Magistrate commences his proceedings, demand that the witnesses or any of them be re-summoned and re heard,

(b) the High Court or, in cases tried by Magistrates subordinate to the District Magistrate, the District Magistrate may, whether there be an appeal or not, set aside any conviction passed on evidence not wholly recorded by the Magistrate before whom the conviction was held, if such Court or District Magistrate is of opinion that the accused has been materially prejudiced thereby, and may order a new inquiry or trial

(2) Nothing in this section applies to cases in which proceedings have been stayed under section 346* "or in which proceedings have been submitted to a superior Magistrate under section 349"

† (3) When a case is transferred under the provisions of this Code from one Magistrate to another, the former shall be deemed to cease to exercise jurisdiction therein, and to be succeeded by the latter within the meaning of sub-section (1)'

Note—Referring to the amendment of this section, the Sel Com say—

"Our colleague, Sir B C Mitter, pointed out that in regard to sections 246 and 350 the general principle is recognized that a Court which convicts an accused should ordinarily act only on evidence heard by itself and suggested the advisability of applying the same principle to cases coming under section 349. The official members of the Joint Committee were of opinion that a distinction could be drawn in the case of s. 349 inasmuch as under that section a Magistrate who is competent to try the offence has heard the whole of the prosecution. He finds that he had not the benefit of the provisions of section 350. A Magistrate would prefer to dispose of cases themselves, and pass what in their opinion was an inadequate sentence rather than run the risk of having the cases re-heard. The non-official members were of opinion that in those circumstances

* These words and figures were added by Act X^{III} of 1923

† Sub-section (3) was added by Act X^{III} of 1923

s. 349 might be repealed. The Committee, however, as a whole agreed that they would not be justified in making such a drastic alteration in the Code until the point had been specifically put to Local Governments and their opinions had been invited. Clause 92 has, therefore, in this respect been left unaltered.

Notes.—1. Generally judgment must be by the Judge who heard the evidence.—It is a general principle that judgment must be delivered by the Judge who has heard the evidence, 23 W. R. 59; 23 C. 194.

1-A. Section 350 gives a Magistrate jurisdiction to decide the case on the evidence recorded by his predecessor but not to deliver a judgment written by the latter, 50 C. 664.

2. Scope of the section—SIR HENRY PRINSEP thinks that the application of this section would not be limited to inquiries preliminary to commitment, but to inquiries in miscellaneous matters under Part IV, Chapters VIII, X, XI, XII, that is, cases regarding security to keep the peace or for good behaviour, public nuisances and disputes regarding immovable property likely to cause a breach of the peace, as well as preliminary inquiry under s. 476, before sending the case for inquiry or trial by the nearest Magistrate of the first class. The words "*the whole or any part of the evidence*" were added in the 1882 Code in consequence of 24 W. R. 53.

3. Section applicable to all cases of transfer of proceedings.—This section is not limited to cases in which Magistrates succeed each other in their offices but applies also to all cases withdrawn for whatever reason from one Magistrate and transferred to another. When a case under inquiry or trial is transferred under s. 528, from the file of one Magistrate to that of another, the former ceases to exercise jurisdiction in the case and is succeeded by the latter in the exercise of the jurisdiction within the meaning of this section, 35 C. 457; followed in 32 M. 218 and 16 A. L. J. 217. In 39 C. 781, it was held, following 35 C. 457 and 13 C. W. N. 420 = 9 Cr. L. J. 278 and dissenting from 12 A. 66 and 12 C. W. N. 140, that the words "ceases to exercise jurisdiction therein" refer to the inquiry or trial and not to the post. It is not necessary, therefore, that the Magistrate should have left his post. See also 13 W. R. 40, 14 W. R. 3; 19 W. R. 23; 24 W. R. 53 and 23 C. 194; 37 C. 812. The cases in 12 C. W. N. 140 = 6 Cr. L. J. 434 and 14 A. 346 were distinguished and 1889 A. W. N. 130 was not followed in 35 C. 457. PIGGOTT, J., in 35 A. 315 followed 35 C. 457 and 32 M. 218 and declined to follow the case in 1889 A. W. N. 130 and distinguished the case in 14 A. 346. See 40 A. 307 following 35 C. 457; 32 M. 218, and 39 C. 781.

3-A. Section applicable to any number of transfers.—Held, that s. 350 was not confined to two Magistrates, that the judgment of the third Magistrate was not without jurisdiction, and that conviction not illegal. 45 M. L. J. 808 = 47 M. 245.

4. Section applicable even when first Magistrate has not yet recorded evidence.—A Magistrate who succeeds another Magistrate has power under this section to try a case in which his predecessor has issued process and has granted a formal adjournment but has recorded no evidence, Ratanlal 652.

5. Section applicable to proceedings under Chapter VIII.—The provisions of this section apply to an inquiry instituted under s. 107 with a view to enforcing the giving of security to keep the peace, and in such a case, where the Magistrate, by whom a part of the evidence has been taken, is succeeded by another Magistrate, while the inquiry is pending, the person called upon to show cause why he should not give security, may insist upon the re-calling and re-examination of the witnesses whose evidence has already been taken by the former Magistrate, 4 C. L. R. 452; 23 W. R. 62; 24 W. R. 52; 43 M. 511.

6. Section applicable to proceedings under s. 145.—When, in the course of a proceeding under s. 145, one Magistrate is transferred and another comes in his place, the latter, if of competent jurisdiction, can deal with the proceeding under s. 350, 13 C. W. N. 420 = 9 Cr. L. J. 378; 37 C. 812.

7. Section applies to inquiries preliminary to commitments.—This section enables a commitment to be made by a Magistrate, who succeeds to the jurisdiction of another Magistrate, on evidence recorded by that Magistrate. In such a case the Magistrate actually making the order of commitment need not have himself recorded any of the evidence or the statement of the accused, 31 M. 40, 36 A. 315. The inference to be drawn from the proviso to this section is that, in determining whether or not to commit for trial, the Magistrate to whom the case is submitted is competent to base his determination on the evidence already recorded and the report sent with it, Ratanlal 872; 7 Lab. 70.

8. Section does not apply to cases of further inquiry directed under s. 437.—In 6 A. 367, the accused was discharged by a first-class Magistrate, and the Magistrate of the district acting under s. 437 summoned the accused, and on the evidence recorded previously by the first-class Magistrate and hearsay evidence of witness on behalf of the accused convicted the accused. The conviction was of course set aside. The further inquiry, if made by any other Magistrate, must be one *de novo*, this section having no application to such an inquiry, 7 Bar. L. R. 128.

the action of fire — *Fine sienna* sienna in its natural state, of a transparent, clayish brown color
Si en nî-ge' (SI), *a* (*Geog*) Of or pertaining to Sienna, a city of Italy.
Si en nî-ge', *nî-ge' & pl* (*Geog*) A native or inhabitant of Sienna, in the plural, the people of Sienna.

of perceiving objects by the instrumentality of the eyes

Thy sight is young and thou'st a fool! *Shal.*
 O loss of sight of thee I most complain *N'ton.*

Moses said I will now turn as do and see this great matter why the bush is not burned. *A c m. 3.*

They never saw a sight so fair *Spenser*

5 Inspection, examination, as a letter intended for the sight of only one person

6 The instrument of seeing, the eye
 In his sight his foe good judgment hit *Twelfth Night*

7 A small aperture through which objects are to be seen, and by which the direction is settled or as

mark a token, an indication, a proof hence especially, (a) A remarkable event considered by its

1. A utensil for separating the fine part of any pulverized or fine substance from the coarse, consisting of a vessel usually shallow with its bottom perforated, or made of wire, or the like, woven in meshes



Sieve

[Imp & p p sighted, p pr & ed]

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11. **Section not applicable to Benches of Magistrates.**—The provisions of this section will not cover a case where one of a Bench of Magistrates is absent during the trial, 23 C. 194; 18 M. 394; 12 C. 558; 20 C. 870. See Note 3 to s 15 at p 28. In the case of a Bench of Magistrates, if the Bench is properly constituted in the absence of a particular Magistrate, it may proceed to hold the trial without him, 21 M. 246; 2 Lah. 237. But see now section 350-A. See 41 A. 116 where it is held that it is not *ultra vires* of the Local Government, in framing rules under section 16 of the Code, to say that section 350 should apply to a Bench of Honorary Magistrates. It should be noted that 20 C. 870 and 21 M. 246, hold to the contrary, and say that such a rule is *ultra vires* as it is not justified by anything in the provisions of section 16 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.

10. **Section not applicable to Judges.**—A Sessions Judge cannot act on evidence recorded by his predecessor in office. On a change of Judge, a Sessions trial must commence *de novo*. The judgment passed by a Sessions Judge on evidence partly recorded by his predecessor is illegal and must be set aside, 8 C. L. J. 59 = 8 Cr. L. J. 121. A Sessions Judge is not competent to pronounce judgment upon evidence recorded in a trial by an Assistant Sessions Judge, 35 A. 63. A Sessions Judge is not competent to try a case partly on evidence not recorded by himself and consent on the part of the accused to such a trial cannot vest in him a jurisdiction to do so, 26 B. 50; 23 W. R. 59; 1 P. R. 1890. The power given by his section to a Magistrate does not extend to a Sessions Judge 21 W. R. 47; 3 M. 112; 7 C. P. 1; 1864 W. R. 8ap 32. A Sessions Judge hearing case in one division is not competent on transfer to another to pronounce judgment, 20 P. R. 1879.

11. **Mere change of judicial designation and local jurisdiction is not sufficient reason to commence trial *de novo*.**—Though the judicial designation of Magistrate as well as his local jurisdiction is changed, that is no reason to commence the trial *de novo* if his magisterial powers are not changed. He can proceed with the trial from the point at which he had arrived when his judicial designation and local jurisdiction were changed. To such a case the provisions of this section do not apply, 22 M. 47. But if he has ceased to exercise jurisdiction by vacating office to another Magistrate, he is not competent to resume a trial commenced by him while holding that office, 3 A. 563 (F.B.), 14 Cr. L. J. 239 (A.). A Sessions Judge is not competent to pronounce judgment in a case heard by him in one division after transfer to another division, 20 P. R. 1879.

12. **After electing to re-commence trial, Magistrate cannot dismiss complaint under s. 203.**—A Magistrate examined the complainant, and, after making investigation through Police, examined the evidence for the prosecution and the accused, framed a charge, took the defence of the accused and issued processes to the witnesses for the defence. He was then succeeded by another Magistrate, who elected to re-commence the trial under this section, and thinking that this brought the case down to the stage at which it was after the complainant's statement had been recorded and the preliminary inquiry made, he dismissed the complaint under s 263. Held, that summarily dismissing the complaint was not re-commencing the trial. The question was whether the Magistrate should have re-commenced the proceedings, or taken them up at the point to which they had been brought by his predecessor, and as he chose the former course, he was bound under this section to re-summon the witnesses and re-commence the trial, 7 C. P. Cr. 36. See also 19 W. R. 28; 14 P. R. 1903 = 175 P. L. R. 1903.

13. **After re-commencing inquiry Magistrate cannot refer to Police under s. 202.**—A Magistrate having accepted a complaint issued process upon it, and examined witnesses in support of the complaint ceased to exercise jurisdiction. Held, that his successor cannot refer the case to the Police for inquiry and report under s 202, such proceeding is contrary to the provision of this section. The inquiry referred to in this section does not include a reference to the Police, 9 M. 282.

13-A. But see 46 M. 719 which holds that in warrant-cases all proceedings before the charge is framed are only "inquiry" and not "trial" and hence if there is a change of Magistrates before a charge is framed in such cases the accused is not entitled to a fresh examination of witnesses as provided by s 350 (1) (a). (32 M. 220, 38 M. 585, and 43 M. 511 followed.)

13-B. **Re-commencement of a trial does not imply cancellation of charge already framed.**—When a charge is framed, and the trial is commenced, the charge remains in force and the only order that can be passed is one of acquittal and not of discharge. A re-commencement does not involve the cancellation of the charge or the transformation of the proceedings, from a trial back to an inquiry, 38 M. 585 (following 14 P. R. 1903 = 175 P. L. R. 1903), 17 Cr. L. J. 1 (M.). But see

S 350 which holds that for the purposes of s. 350 of the Code a trial cannot be said to commence only when a charge is framed the time expressly fixed by the proviso to the section for accused to exercise his right is when the second Magistrate commences his proceedings and not when a charge is framed.

Semble that in an inquiry by a Magistrate into a case triable by a Court of Session or High Court the accused has not the right to demand that the witnesses shall be summoned and re-heard in the event of a change of Magistrate.

14. Proviso—Magistrate bound to comply with demand of accused—Trial commences only when accused appears.—On a case being sent back by the High Court for re-trial the first order that was made by the Magistrate was dated 6th August and it was recorded before the accused had appeared in Court but in the presence of the *mukhyar* who had acted at the previous trial and who was directed to put in a list of witnesses against whom he wanted process to issue. The second order which was recorded on the 9th August was simply to the effect that warrant should issue against the witness named. On the 27th August the accused appeared before the Magistrate and made an application under this section for the re-summoning and re-hearing of the witnesses who had been examined for the prosecution at the previous trial. The Magistrate refused the application on the ground that it was made at the third hearing and that it ought to have been made when he commenced his proceedings. *Held* that the Magistrate acted in contravention of the provisions of this section in refusing the application inasmuch as the trial could not be held to have commenced before the 27th which was the first day when the accused entered appearance after remand and if the trial had not commenced it could not be said that the proceedings of the Magistrate had commenced before that day. **25 C. 863.** In **3 L. W. 496 = 1918 M. W. N. 372** it was doubted if it would be legal for a succeeding Magistrate to date, sign and pronounce a judgment written by his predecessor when the accused demands a *de novo* trial. *See* next Note **19 A. L. J. 856**.

15. Right of accused under proviso (a) is confined to trials.—A preliminary inquiry by a Magistrate into a case exclusively triable by the Court of Session is not before framing a charge a trial within the meaning of proviso (a) and where such an inquiry is transferred the accused is not of right entitled to a trial *de novo*. **32 M. 218, 14 P. R. 1903; see also 16 P. W. R. 1919 (Cr.)**

15 A. What is a de novo trial.—After the charge was framed the Magistrate was transferred the accused applied for a *de novo* trial but the Magistrate merely re-called the prosecution witnesses and gave leave to the accused to cross-examine them. *Held* that it was not a *de novo* trial. *De novo* trial means a new trial from the beginning of the case. **49 M. L. J. 423.**

16. Second Magistrate not bound to ascertain whether Accused wishes to exercise right given by proviso, cl. (a).—A Magistrate after framing charges against the accused and taking their evidence died before recording any judgment. His successor took up the case and wrote a judgment convicting the accused on all the charges framed and passed sentences proposed by his predecessor but omitted to have the accused brought before him to ascertain whether they desired to exercise the right given by proviso (a). *Held* that the irregularity not having prejudiced the accused was covered by s. 537 as the Magistrate was competent to pronounce judgment on the evidence taken by his predecessor. **6 P. R. 1884. See also 24 W. R. 12, 13 C. W. N. 550 = 10 Cr. L. J. 492.** Also a mere failure to inquire from the accused whether he desires to exercise the right reserved by proviso (a) is at most an irregularity curable by s. 537. **3 P. R. 1903.** This section confers the right on the accused person to demand and does not actually prescribe that the Magistrate shall ask the accused. **U. B. R. (1912) 151 = 14 Cr. L. J. 175 distinguishing U. B. R. (1897—1901) 1, 87.** But in **25 C. 863** it was held that s. 537 could not cure the defect in the proceedings due to the violation of the provisions of proviso (a) by a refusal to re-summon and re-hear the witnesses.

17. Where accused have been materially prejudiced conviction will be set aside.—Though the succeeding Magistrate may in the absence of objection have jurisdiction to convict on evidence partly recorded by his predecessor and partly by himself yet it is most desirable in a case of defamation that the examination and cross-examination of the complainant should be held in the presence of the Magistrate who has seized of the case and passes final orders therein. **13 C. W. N. 550.** Where a Magistrate to whose Court a case under s. 355 I. C. had been transferred at a stage when all the evidence for the prosecution had been taken and did not re-summon the witnesses for the prosecution but proceeded to act on their evidence as if it had been taken before himself it was held that the accused had been prejudiced and the conviction was set aside. **14 A. 340.** Where after the prosecution witnesses were examined and cross-examined, the case was made over to another Magistrate and a *de novo* trial commenced, in which the prosecution witnesses were not again examined but were only cross-examined by the defence without any objection, the trial was set aside on the ground of

4 (From) Not pronounced, having no sound, [*serp* bear, *Fr* *silencere*] Produces effect without sound

5 Having no effect, - "fable"

[Rare] "Causes..."

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
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n [A-Silky] (Latin)
The cater
pillar which produces
silk the larva of a white
or cream-colored moth
(*Bombyx mori*)

2. *Silk* worms feed
up on the leaves of the
mulberry, and weave a
cocoon of a K in which
they undergo the pupa
change.

3. *Silk* worm put a sub
stance prepared from the
silk worm, used in mak
ing lines for sewing. See
1. *Silk* worm put a
piece of silk worms
muscadine bee Mus
cadinine

4. *Silk* y a Frenchman says



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prejudice to the accused **12 C. W. N. 138**; where after several witnesses were examined the case was transferred to another Magistrate who convicted the accused on evidence partly recorded by the former Magistrate, no objection being raised, the conviction was set aside, **12 C. W. N. 140**. See also **1889 A. W. N. 130**, where it was held that if a case was transferred in the midst of a trial it must be tried *de novo*. As to the use of the record in the former trial, see **7 C. L. R. 193**.

Accused cannot be called upon to pay expenses of recalling witnesses—Where the accused exercises the rights conferred by cl. (a) to have the witnesses for the prosecution re-examined by the Magistrate the witnesses should be re-summoned without payment of any fees **8 Bar. L. T. 43 = 15 Cr. L. J. 857**.

18 Power of District Magistrate to set aside conviction by first-class Magistrate.—Even though appeals be from first-class Magistrates direct to the Court of Session this section specially empowers District Magistrates to set aside conviction of first-class Magistrates under the circumstances specified in proviso (b) to this section, **9 B. 100; 7 A. 853; 8 M. 18 (F.B.), 12 C. 473 (F.B.)**.

*** 350-A.** No order or judgment of a Bench of Magistrates shall be invalid by reason only of a change having occurred in the constitution of the Bench in any case in which the Bench by which such order or judgment is passed is duly constituted under sections 15 and 16, and the Magistrates constituting the same have been present on the Bench throughout the proceedings

Changes in constitution of Benches
Notes.—1 "We think, however, that the new sub-section (4) which has been introduced in the Bill to deal with the case of Benches goes somewhat too far, and we have substituted for it a new section after s. 350 which in our opinion gives effect to the law as laid down by the High Courts. Briefly, it provides that a judgment of a Bench shall be valid when the Bench is duly constituted at the time of passing the judgment and the judgment is passed by Magistrates all of whom have heard the proceedings throughout." *Sel. Com. Report*.

2 A prosecution extending over several hearings was presided over by a Bench of Honorary Magistrates (consisting of three), only one of whom was present throughout. Held that as the quorum of the Bench consisted of two, the trial was bad under s. 350-A. **7 Lah. 122**

351. (1) Any person attending a Criminal Court, although not under arrest or upon a summons, may be detained by such Court for the purpose of inquiry into or trial of any offence of which such Court can take cognizance and which, from the evidence, may appear to have been committed, and may be proceeded against as though he had been arrested or summoned.

(2) When the detention takes place in the course of an inquiry under Chapter XVIII or after a trial has been begun, the proceedings in respect of such person shall be commenced afresh, and the witnesses re-heard

Detention of offenders attending Court
Notes.—1. *Scope of this section.*—The provisions of this section would be applicable to the Court of Session, subject to the provisions of s. 193. Cf. s. 91

2. *Proceedings under this section not controlled by ss. 190, 191*—This section is self-contained and complete in itself and quite independent of the provisions of s. 190 and necessarily of s. 191 for the accused against whom action is taken under this section has full information as to the source and particulars of the materials upon which the Magistrate acts. He is thus not placed under a disability to combat the effect of the suspicious circumstances operating upon the mind of the Magistrate and influencing his judgment as in the case of a proceeding taking its rise under s. 190 (c). **5 N. L. R. 113 = 10 Cr. L. J. 303, 3 C. W. N. 270 followed 1 C. W. N. 105 dissented from**. See Note 5 to s. 190

3. *Provisions of this section do not apply when trials begun*.—A Magistrate took a person under this section without any previous notice or summons, from among the audience or attendant witnesses in open Court, and placed him in the dock to be immediately tried upon a charge which had already been commenced, to be entertained against other prisoners and on which evidence had already been given. This section applies to investigations preliminary being proceeded with, and, moreover subjects prisoner, **14 W. R. 20**. Sub-section (2) however now meets these objections

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{*tbody* } Socioer

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G Hax sundia, O H Ger sundia, zunda, N H Ger,
sunda?

2. To glimmer, to twinkle (Gle?)

The house is here before us

The car: New all are out
But you'll find the car.

But one in the parlor
Late is under father

5) How can I mark how often

2. It can't be a *normal* star above
the super and white

file in a suit, and

3 To smile in a silly, affected, or conceit
her

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Journal of Management Education 28(6)

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4. Cognizance of case against a witness.—A Magistrate taking cognizance of an offence against a witness in a case which is pending before him upon the facts disclosed by the evidence of another witness does so under s. 190 (c) and not under this section 1 G. W. N. 103 Where however a Magistrate has already taken cognizance of the offence on a complaint on a Police report and joins as a co-accused any person attending his Court who seems to him to be implicated in the case under trial he acts under this section and not under s. 190 (c), 48, L. R. 258 = 12 Cr. L. J. 399 See Note 2 above and see Note 5 at p. 468 under s. 190

352. The place in which any Criminal Court is held for the purpose of inquiring into or trying any offence shall be deemed an open Court to which the public generally may have access so far as the same can conveniently contain them.

Provided that the presiding Judge or Magistrate may, if he thinks fit order at any stage of any inquiry into or trial of any particular case that the public generally, or any particular person shall not have access to or be or remain in the room or building used by the Court

Notes.—1 **Transaction of public business at private residence of Magistrate.**—This course was condemned by the Calcutta High Court in *Surendranath Bannerji's* case reported in 10 G. W. N. 1062—*Cut Rules and Orders* p. 1 of April 1869

2 **Exclusion of any particular person or public generally.**—In 1885 A. W. N. 221 it was held that the Police-officer who investigated a case should not be admitted into the Court house at the time it is there being inquired into.

3. **Right of admission to the public.**—English Practice.—As a general rule all persons have a right to be present at the proceedings of the Court and the Court has no power to prevent her being present. Except in the above cases and in cases under the *Punishment of Incest Act* 1908 and the *Children Act* 1908. It does not appear that a Judge trying a criminal case has any power to exclude the public in general and to hear a case *in camera* *Halsbury's Laws of England Vol. 1A pp. 362-363 Archbold* p. 217 See *Scott v. Scott* (1913) A. C. 417, as to the general right of the public.

By Act 510 of the *Louisiana Code* it is enacted that in prosecutions for assault with intent to ravish rape adultery offences against decency and defamation implying a charge of such offences no person shall be present but the Magistrate Public Prosecutor accused and his counsel complainant certain officers of justice the witnesses and such persons not exceeding ten for each party as the complainant and the accused may desire to have admitted. In making a report of any such trial the reporter shall not give the details of the evidence or publish the names of the witnesses. See Notes 4-5 to s. 353 as to examination of *Pardanashin* witnesses etc.

CHAPTER XXV

OF THE MODE OF TAKING AND RECORDING EVIDENCE IN INQUIRIES AND TRIALS

353. Except as otherwise expressly provided all evidence taken under Chapters XVIII, XX, XXI XXII and XXIII shall be taken in the presence of the accused or, when his personal attendance is dispensed with in presence of his pleader

Notes.—1 **Chapter XVIII.**—Inquiry into cases triable by the Court of Session or High Court. **Chapter XX.**—Trial of summons-cases by Magistrates. **Chapter XXI.**—Trial of warrant-cases. **Chapter XXII.**—Summary trials. **Chapter XXIII.**—Trials before High Court and Courts of Session.

1 A. **When evidence may be taken in absence of accused.**—See s. 205 as to power of Magistrate to dispense with attendance of accused and see the special provisions in ss. 116 and 145 In 16 Bom. L. R. 236 = 13 Cr. L. J. 481; it was held that the High Court has the same power in a Sessions case as a Magistrate has under s. 205. See s. 423 (3) for power of Appellate Court to take evidence in absence of accused, Chap. VI. for the examination of witnesses on commission, s. 509 for evidence of a medical witness, s. 510 for the evidence of chemical examiner and s. 512 when the accused has absconded or the offender is not known.

2. **Taking evidence in the absence of accused is illegal.**—Where the witnesses are not examined in the presence of the accused the conviction is bad 2 N. W. P. H. C. R. 49 But where a *purdah* lady was

examined in a passage, screened from the direct view of the Court, and her voice could be heard perfectly and the accused made no objection, it was *held* that this was virtually a hearing of the evidence in the presence of the accused, 41 P. R. 1887.

3. Recording defence evidence in the absence of accused is illegal and the illegality cannot be cured.—One of the accused after all the evidence for the prosecution had been recorded absconded. In his absence the witnesses named by him were examined and he was convicted along with the others, *held*, that the conviction was illegal and must be set aside even if no miscarriage of justice has been occasioned. 533 clearly lays down that all evidence shall be taken in the presence of the accused and this includes both the evidence for the prosecution as well as for the defence. Such an illegality cannot be cured under s. 537, U. B. R. (1912), 4th Cr. 152 = 14 Cr. L. J. 287.

4. Pardanashin witnesses.—The deposition of the gosha females should only be taken in cases where the ends of justice cannot otherwise be attained. When requisite, the Court must be adjourned to some place where the gosha female can come and she must be examined behind a purdah in the presence of the accused. The Judge taking such precautions as he can to secure her identity, Weir II, 432. Generally a *pardanashin* woman summoned as a witness has a right to be examined on commission and to be exempted from personal appearance in Court, 4 C. 20; 12 A. 69, even though she herself is the complainant, Weir II, 639; 10 P. R. 1896; *contra* 5 A. 92 and see Notes to s. 503 and Note 2 above.

5. Pardanashin accused—where accused's presence dispensed with, evidence may be recorded in presence of accused's pleader.—A Magistrate may dispense with the presence of the accused when she is a respectable *pardanashin* woman and record the evidence in the presence of her pleader, 20 P. W. R. 1908. The High Court has power under the provisions of this section to dispense with the attendance of an accused person during his trial before it in the Sessions on the ground of his ill health, 14 Bom. L. R. 238 = 1 Bom. Cr. C. 111 = 13 Cr. L. J. 464. In 5 P. W. R. 1909 = 9 Cr. L. J. 138. It was *held* that unless and until a Magistrate has good reason to believe that there is a strong likelihood of the charge being proved, an accused, if she be really a *purdah* woman of good position, should not ordinarily be compelled to appear in person in the first instance, 43 M. 359.

6. Witnesses must be examined afresh—putting in evidence given in another trial will not satisfy the requirements of this section.—Where a Sessions Judge read over to the jury the evidence given by witnesses at a former trial of other persons for the same offence, and after the witnesses had admitted the correctness of their depositions, allowed their cross-examination, the conviction was set aside and a new trial ordered. The consent of the prisoner under trial, or of his pleader, will not cure this irregularity, for such a course cannot give the look or manner of a witness, his hesitation, his doubts, his variation of language or his precipitancy, his calmness or consideration. It is the dead body of evidence, without its spirit which is supplied when given openly and orally by the ear and eye of those who receive it, 3 B. L. R. Ap. Cr. 20 = 12 W. R. 3; 1864 W. R. 1 and 33; 1 B. L. R. O. Cr. 37. Where, however, this objectionable course was pursued at the special request of the pleaders for the accused, the High Court in revision refused to interfere in 13 W. R. 40 on the ground that there was no prejudice to the accused. It is irregular to import into a case evidence given in another case by merely reading over a deposition to a witness and asking him if it was correct, 1 Bur. S. R. 399. Where three separate charges were preferred at the same time and the prisoners were convicted on the evidence recorded in one case, without hearing their defence in the other two cases, the proceedings were quashed, 1 W. R. 36. See Note to s. 282.

Putting in evidence given in another trial will not satisfy the requirements of this section even though the consent of the accused is obtained to such a course. The principle that a prisoner can consent to nothing which is not authorized by law and a counsel cannot consent to a course which the law does not authorize. Section 537 does not apply to an infringement of a statutory requirement but only to errors, omissions and irregularities of a technical nature. 4 Lah. 376.

7. Irregularity—Evidence given at previous trial treated as examination-in-chief.—At the trial of a party of Hindus for rioting the Magistrate, instead of examining the witnesses for the prosecution, caused to be produced copies of the examination in chief of the same witnesses which had been recorded at a previous trial of a party of Muhammadans who were opposed to the Hindus in the same riot. These copies were read out to the witnesses who were then cross-examined by the prisoners, and no objection to this procedure was taken on the prisoner's behalf, and the accused were convicted. *Held*, that, although the procedure adopted by the Magistrate was irregular, the irregularity was cured by the provisions of s. 537, and of s. 167 of the Evidence Act, as it was not shown that there had been any failure of justice or that the accused had

4 Hence, to lie, rest, or bear, -- with on; as, 2
weight or burden sits heavily upon him

The horse sat on each Arecadian face. Dryden

5. To be adjusted, to fit; as, a coat sits well or ill

This new and gorgeous garment, majesty,
Sits not so easy on me as you think. Shak

[From sit +] 1 Of considerable

Syn -- State position, seat site station post
place office condition, case sight, predicament See
sitate

* The 2 are paid both of the food and loden and were only
for lodging

127 These formerly sat at the table at meals but

2 -- Disposition, likeness, largeness, greatness
sude

[W at the glass, starch, size, from a fit, stiff,
of sizzle]

any one of resembling size in being glutinous
oil
Med) The buff coat which appears on the
o of coagulated blood drawn in infusions
If right

The sitting closed in great age

8 A constant or uninterrupted
business or study for a time course
permitted

in u
to
what
N110
place
up
R

been substantially prejudiced and as the matters elicited in cross-examination were sufficient to sustain the conviction **9 A 609** To satisfy the requirements of this section it is not enough to read over the sworn statement of the complainant in the presence of the accused treating it as examination in-chief Such examination must actually take place in the presence of the accused **Ratanlal 24, 24 W R 18**

8 Practice—Evidence to be recorded legibly—Difficulty having been frequently experienced in reading the evidence of witnesses the attention of all criminal officers is called to the necessity of carefully writing such evidence in a legible manner Depositions should be written on one side of the paper only a margin of one-fourth of the sheet being left blank In the case of trials forwarded to the High Court in which from any cause the evidence has been indistinctly or illegibly recorded copies of such evidence should be submitted with the record of the case **Hilkins 116** Judges and Magistrates may use a typewriter instead of a pen but every sheet must be signed. **Bombay Gazette 1889 Part I p 1920** See also Notes 4 to 6 under s. 355

Manner of recording evidence outside Presidency towns

354. In inquiries and trials (other than summary trials) under this Code by or before a Magistrate (other than a Presidency Magistrate) or Sessions Judge the evidence of the witnesses shall be recorded in the following manner

Note.—As to special provisions for summary trial see ss. 260 261 and 355 and as to the mode of recording evidence by Presidency Magistrates see s. 362.

Record in summons cases and in trials of certain offences by first and second class Magistrates.

355. (1) In summons-cases tried before a Magistrate other than a Presidency Magistrate and in cases of the offences mentioned in sub-section (1) of section 260 clauses (b) to (m) both inclusive when tried by a Magistrate of the first or second class and in all proceedings under section 514 (if not in the course of a trial), the Magistrate shall make a memorandum of the substance of the evidence of each witness as the examination of the witness proceeds

(2) Such memorandum shall be written and signed by the Magistrate with his own hand and shall form part of the record

(3) If the Magistrate is prevented from making a memorandum as above required, he shall record the reason of his inability to do so and shall cause such memorandum to be made in writing from his dictation in open Court and shall sign the same and such memorandum shall form part of the record

Notes—S. 514 deals with the procedure on forfeiture of bonds.

1 What would be a sufficient memorandum—There is no particular form prescribed for the memorandum. But where the Judge merely recorded of four witnesses to character two give the defendant a bad character one say he knows nothing and one gives him a good character *Held* that this was not such a memorandum as was contemplated by this section **Agra Niz Ad., 20th June, 1862 p 127** Nor will the provisions of this section be complied with by a mere statement that *the witness deposes as the last* **1 B H C. R. 91, 1864 W R. 18** The Magistrate's records in summary trials however brief must show the ingredients of the offence charged **6 C. 579, 18 B 97 and 21 A 189** It is not necessary for a record of evidence to be made in summary trials even where an appeal lies but s. 264 provides that the substance must be embodied in a judgment as well as the particulars specified in that section. This section merely prescribes a briefer record in summons-cases and other cases which may be tried summarily when they are as a matter of fact tried regularly **3 L. B. R. 3 = 2 Cr. L. J. 375** Sections 263 and 355 must be read together if the Magistrate is unable at the commencement of the trial to determine whether the proper sentence to be passed should be an appealable one or not he must make a memorandum of the substance of the evidence of each witness as his examination proceeds. But if he can at this stage determine that the sentence will be in any event non-appealable he need not record the evidence. If however he actually does so the notes of the evidence form part of the record of the case and cannot be destroyed by him **43 C. 280**

* Evidence recorded by Forest Officers under the *Durma Forest Act* II of 1902, in accordance with ss. 355 356 or s. 357 of the Code are admissible in subsequent trials before Magistrates under s. 53 of that Act. Under the *Madras Forest Act* V of 1902 see s. 59 Under the *British Indian Forest Regulation* I of 1900 see s. 35 Under the *Forest Act* VII of 1978 such evidence recorded under cl. (d) of s. 71 is admissible in any subsequent trial before a Magistrate provided it is taken in the presence of the accused person

2 Mode of recording evidence in maintenance case.—Evidence taken under Chapter XXV must be taken as provided in this section **20 G 351** See s 488 (6) also s. 170 (2)

3. Trial of summons cases—In summons-cases the reading over of the recorded deposition is not prescribed by law and its omission cannot therefore *per se* be regarded as a defect fatal to a conviction **Weir II, 433** But where the evidence was illegally recorded in the form of a memorandum the conviction was set aside **Weir II, 432**

4 Substance of evidence may be recorded in English—There is no direction in the Code as to the language in which a memorandum of the substance of the evidence is to be recorded consequently if a Native Subordinate Magistrate not authorized to take down evidence in English records the memorandum of the substance of such evidence in that language there is no prohibition in law for such procedure and if it was an irregularity such irregularity would not justify the reversal of the conviction **19 M 269**

5 Record should show that depositions are taken and attested in presence of accused—It is desirable that deposition of witnesses in criminal cases should be taken and attested in the presence of the accused and that the Magistrate should add a few apt words to make it apparent that this has been done although there is no obligation to that effect imposed by the Code **10 A 174**

6 Full record of evidence when witness suspected of perjury—When during the investigation of a case coming within provisions of s. 355 it appears to the Magistrate that a witness is giving false evidence so that criminal proceedings against such witness are likely to be necessary the Magistrate shall in that case under s 358 take down the evidence of the particular witness at length in the manner prescribed in s. 356 or s 357 as the case may be.—*Oudh Cr Dig* p 22.

7 Where witness recalled, re affirmation not necessary—Where a witness is recalled, shortly after the close of his first deposition he need not to be re-affirmed **Weir II, 483.**

356.* (1) In all other trials before Courts of Session and Magistrates (other than

Record in other cases outside Presidency Magistrates) and in all inquiries under Chapters XII and XVIII the evidence of each witness shall be taken down in writing in the language of the Court by the Magistrate or Sessions Judge or in his presence and hearing under his personal direction and superintendence, and shall be signed by the Magistrate or Sessions Judge

(2) When the evidence of such witness is given in English the Magistrate or Sessions Judge may take it down in that language with his own hand and unless the accused is familiar with English or the language of the Court is English an authenticated translation of such evidence in the language of the Court shall form part of the record

(2-A) When the evidence of each witness is given in any other language not being English than the language of the Court the Magistrate or Sessions Judge may take it down in that language with his own hand or cause it to be taken down in that language in his presence and hearing and under his personal direction and superintendence and an authenticated translation of such evidence in the language of the Court or in English shall form part of the record

(3) In cases in which the evidence is not taken down in writing by the Magistrate or Sessions Judge he shall as the examination of each witness proceeds make a memorandum of the substance of what such witness deposes and such memorandum shall be written and signed by the Magistrate or Sessions Judge with his own hand and shall form part of the record

(4) If the Magistrate or Sessions Judge is prevented from making a memorandum as above required he shall record the reason of his inability to make it

* See footnote to s 355

† Sub-section (2-A) was inserted by Act XVIII of 1923 s 69

Notes.—1. Non-compliance with the provisions of this section is a material error.—The provisions of clause (1) of this section are imperative and its non-compliance cannot be condoned 42 C. 331. Sub-section (3) applies only to cases in which the evidence recorded under the first sub-section is not recorded in the Magistrate's own hand, *ibid*. Where a Magistrate omitted to record the evidence in the mode prescribed by this section held that it was a material error sufficient to set aside the proceedings, 20 W. R. 14 = 11 B. L. R. Appx. Y. In 1890 A. W. N. 184, the absence of a vernacular record of the evidence was held to be illegal. In every Sessions trial, no matter how often the case has been before the Court, the witnesses must be examined *de novo* in the same manner as if the case was entirely new and the witnesses had not been examined before 1854 W. R. 1 and 13. See Note 1 to s. 360. See 30 G. 505 as to whether the procedure applicable to inquiries under Chapter VII is that prescribed for summary trials 17 A. L. J. 1146

2. Irregularity in completing record will not avail where accused is convicted on his own plea.—Where the accused pleads guilty to the offence charged and the Court accepting the plea sentences the offender without any further record any subsequent irregularity in the mode of making up the record cannot affect the propriety of the conviction 2 C. L. R. 317

3. Record of evidence.—Care must be taken that the Judge's notes are *bona fide* what is intended i.e. notes of evidence taken from the mouths of witnesses and orders recorded at the time they are issued not abstracts made afterwards. The notes must be legible complete and properly arranged and must attest the presence of the witness at the time and mark every postponement and change of time or scene in the trial of the case so that their *bona fide* character may be apparent.—*Oudh Cr Dig* p. 21 See Notification under s. 538 as to what the language of any particular Court is.

4. Medical witness's evidence must be taken at length.—The testimony of a medical witness, especially in a case of murder, ought, when he is present, to be taken fully, and not supplemented by reading over his testimony given elsewhere and recording an answer that the earlier testimony is true Ratanlal 792.

5. Use of typewriter for writing judgment, etc.—Sessions Judges, Additional Sessions Judges and first class Magistrates may use a typewriter, instead of a pen, for the purpose of recording judgments, depositions and memoranda of evidence but every sheet of any judgment, deposition or memorandum so recorded must be signed by the Sessions Judge Additional Sessions Judge or first-class Magistrate recording it.—*Pura, 43-d Bom H. C. Cr. Cir., p. 81*

6. Record of preliminary inquiry under s. 476.—See 42 C. 240 under s. 476.

357. (1) The Local Government may direct* that in any district or part of a district or in proceedings before any Court of Session or before any Magistrate or class of Magistrates the evidence of each witness shall in the cases referred to in section 356 be taken down by the Sessions Judge or Magistrate with his own hand and in his mother tongue unless he is prevented by any sufficient reason from taking down the evidence of any witness in which case he shall record the reason of his inability to do so and shall cause the evidence to be taken down in writing from his dictation in open Court

Language of record
of evidence.

(2) The evidence so taken down shall be signed by the Sessions Judge or Magistrate and shall form part of the record

Provided that the Local Government may direct the Sessions Judge or Magistrate to take down the evidence in the English language or in the language of the Court although such language is not his mother tongue

Notes.—1. The authority conferred is local.—The authority conferred upon an officer under this force only so long as he remains in the district in which it has been conferred. A Magistrate not being empowered under this section to record a committed the accused for trial held that the Magistrate's proceeding was irregular but that there was nothing to show that the accused had been prejudiced and so the conviction was good, *Weir II, 434*, the defect being cured by s. 537

2. Special Magistrate required to conform to provisions of the Code.—Sessions Judges and Deputy Commissioners shall with all due courtesy impress upon Special Magistrates that they must comply with the

* For instance of such N. G. Section, see *Central Provinces & Gazette 1902, Part III p. 1118*

2. **Mode of recording evidence in maintenance case.**—Evidence taken under Chapter XXXVI must be taken as provided in this section, 20 C. 351. See s 488 (6) also s. 170 (2)

3. **Trial of summons-cases.**—In summons-cases, the reading over of the recorded deposition is not prescribed by law and its omission cannot therefore *per se* be regarded as a defect fatal to a conviction, *Weir II, 433*. But where the evidence was illegally recorded in the form of a memorandum, the conviction was set aside *Weir II, 432*

4. **Substance of evidence may be recorded in English.**—There is no direction in the Code as to the language in which a memorandum of the substance of the evidence is to be recorded consequently, if a Native Subordinate Magistrate, not authorized to take down evidence in English records the memorandum of the substance of such evidence in that language, there is no prohibition in law for such procedure and if it was an irregularity such irregularity would not justify the reversal of the conviction, 19 M. 269.

5. **Record should show that depositions are taken and attested in presence of accused.**—It is desirable that deposition of witnesses in criminal cases should be taken and attested in the presence of the accused and that the Magistrate should add a few apt words to make it apparent that this has been done, although there is no obligation to that effect imposed by the Code, 10 A. 174

6. **Full record of evidence when witness suspected of perjury.**—When, during the investigation of a case coming within provisions of s. 355, it appears to the Magistrate that a witness is giving false evidence so that criminal proceedings against such witness are likely to be necessary, the Magistrate shall, in that case under s 358 take down the evidence of the particular witness at length in the manner prescribed in s 356 or s 357 as the case may be.—*Oudh Cr Dig., p 22.*

7. **Where witness recalled, re-affirmation not necessary.**—Where a witness is recalled, shortly after the close of his first deposition he need not to be re-affirmed, *Weir II, 483.*

356.* (1) In all other trials before Courts of Session and Magistrates (other than Presidency Magistrates) and in all inquiries under Chapters XII and XVIII, the evidence of each witness shall be taken down in writing in the language of the Court by the Magistrate or Sessions Judge, or in his presence and

Record in other cases outside Presidency towns.

hearing under his personal direction and superintendence, and shall be signed by the Magistrate or Sessions Judge

(2) When the evidence of such witness is given in English, the Magistrate or Sessions Judge may take it down in that language with his own hand, and unless the accused is familiar with English, or the language of the Court is English, an authenticated translation of such evidence in the language of the Court shall

Evidence given in English.

form part of the record

† (2A) When the evidence of each witness is given in any other language, not being English, than the language of the Court, the Magistrate or Sessions Judge may take it down in that language with his own hand, or cause it to be taken down in that language in his presence and hearing and under his personal direction and superintendence, and an authenticated translation of such evidence in the language of the Court or in English shall form part of the record "

(3) In cases in which the evidence is not taken down in writing by the Magistrate or Sessions Judge he shall, as the examination of each witness proceeds make a memorandum of the substance of what such witness deposes, and such memorandum shall be written and signed by the Magistrate or Sessions Judge with his own hand, and shall form part of the record

Memorandum when evidence not taken down by the Magistrate or Judge himself

(4) If the Magistrate or Sessions Judge is prevented from making a memorandum as above required, he shall record the reason of his inability to make it

* See footnote to s 355

† Sub-section (2 A) was inserted by Act XVIII of 1922 s 69

Notes.—1 Non-compliance with the provisions of this section is a material error.—The provisions of clause (1) of this section are imperative and its non-compliance cannot be condoned 42 C. 381 Sub-section (3) applies only to cases in which the evidence recorded under the first sub-section is not recorded in the Magistrate's own hand *ibid*. Where a Magistrate omitted to record the evidence in the mode prescribed by this section held that it was a material error sufficient to set aside the proceedings 20 W. R. 14 = 11 B. L. R. Appx. Y In 1890 A. W. N. 164, the absence of a vernacular record of the evidence was held to be illegal In every Sessions trial no matter how often the case has been before the Court the witnesses must be examined *de novo* in the same manner as if the case was entirely new and the witnesses had not been examined before 1854 W. R. 1 and 13. See Note 1 to s. 360 See 30 C. 508 as to whether the procedure applicable to inquiries under Chapter XII is that prescribed for summary trials 17 A. L. J. 1146

2 Irregularity in completing record will not avail where accused is convicted on his own plea.—Where the accused pleads guilty to the offence charged and the Court accepting the plea sentences the offender without any further record any subsequent irregularity in the mode of making up the record cannot affect the propriety of the conviction 2 C. L. R. 317

3. Record of evidence.—Care must be taken that the Judge's notes are *bona fide* what is intended i.e. notes of evidence taken from the mouths of witnesses and orders recorded at the time they are issued not abstracts made afterwards. The notes must be legible complete and properly arranged and must attest the presence of the witness at the time and mark every postponement and change of time or scene in the trial of the case so that their *bona fide* character may be apparent.—*Oudh Cr Dig* p 21 See Notification under s. 558 as to what the language of any particular Court is

4. Medical witness's evidence must be taken at length.—The testimony of a medical witness especially in a case of murder, ought when he is present, to be taken fully, and not supplemented by reading over his testimony given elsewhere and recording an answer that the earlier testimony is true *Ratanlal* 792

5 Use of typewriter for writing judgment etc.—Sessions Judges Additional Sessions Judges and first class Magistrates may use a typewriter instead of a pen for the purpose of recording judgments depositions and memoranda of evidence but every sheet of any judgment deposition or memorandum so recorded must be signed by the Sessions Judge Additional Sessions Judge or first-class Magistrate recording it.—*Pura* 43-d *Bom H C Cr Cr* p 81

6 Record of preliminary inquiry under s. 476—See 42 C. 240 under s. 476

357. (1) The Local Government may direct that in any district or part of a district or in proceedings before any Court of Session or before any Magistrate or class of Magistrates the evidence of each witness shall in the cases referred to in section 356 be taken down by the Sessions Judge or Magistrate with

Language of record of evidence

his own hand and in his mother tongue unless he is prevented by any sufficient reason from taking down the evidence of any witness in which case he shall record the reason of his inability to do so and shall cause the evidence to be taken down in writing from his dictation in open Court


(2) The evidence so taken down shall be signed by the Sessions Judge or Magistrate and shall form part of the record

Provided that the Local Government may direct the Sessions Judge or Magistrate to take down the evidence in the English language or in the language of the Court although such language is not his mother tongue

Notes.—1. The authority conferred is local.—The authority conferred upon an officer under this section is personal to that officer and remains in force only so long as he remains in the district in which it has been conferred 5 M. H. C. R. Appx. IX. When a Magistrate not being empowered under this section to record evidence in his own hand writing did so and committed the accused for trial held that the Magistrate's proceeding was irregular but that there was nothing to show that the accused had been prejudiced and so the conviction was good *Weir* II, 434, the defect being cured by s. 537

2 Special Magistrate required to conform to provisions of the Code.—Sessions Judges and Deputy Commissioners shall with all due courtesy impress upon special Magistrates that they must comply with the

leather
This delivery cloth and tricks of some
2 Disinclination to action or labor, sluggishness,
lazinez, idleness
They change their course to pleasure, ease and sloth. Sloth-
Sloth, like rust, consumes faster than labor wears. Franklin.



Long & tall, out of shape

Slipshod

Slipshod

Slipshod, n. A very loose shoe, so worn as to

—Luna or ship bore a back or bow? For holding
especially for receiving the dregs of tea at the

Slith or Slith t. To be idle. {Obs.} Cover
Slithful or Slithful, a. Addicted to sloth,
inactive sluggish lazy, indolent, idle

Slitting-mill, n. 1 A mill where iron bars or
p. steels are slit into narrow strips as nail rods and
the like
2 A machine used by lapidaries for slicing
stones usually by means of a revolving wheel
called a slider supplied with diamond powder

Slitting-mill, n.

Slitting-mill, n.

Slitting-mill, n.

They'll shear like a turnip

Slitting-mill, n.

Slough (slif) v. (Surg.) To separate from the
main (fleshy) to come off as the matter formed over
a sore
To slip off to separate from the living parts as the
dead part of a mortification

Slitting-mill, n. A rich stone of ore displayed
in order to tempt persons to embark in mining en-
terprises

Slitting-mill, n. One
Slitting-mill, n. A slot
are said

Slitting-mill, n. A term of the word, as generally prevalent in
the Western States is shown to have been one of the

Slitting-mill, n. A depression or more so in a piece of
metal or a slit or aperture through it, for the recep-

Slitting-mill, n. Loose, disorderly, not neat, as a slovenly
dress

Slitting-mill, n. S, T, D, A, P, long, & T, I, D, A, P, short, care, far, last, fall, what, there, yet, term, plume, firm, done, far, ag, well, fad, fad,

requirements of the law in regard to recording evidence in their own hand writing. It is not necessary that they should take up case at all, but it is necessary that, if they do, they should conform to the provisions of s. 357 of the Code, viz., that they take down the evidence of witnesses with their own hands unless they be prevented by any sufficient reason from doing so, in which case they should record the reason, and cause the evidence to be taken down in writing from their dictation in open Court.—*Oudh Cr Dig*, pp 21 and 22.

3. Plea how recorded.—The language in which a plea is conveyed to the Court by the interpreter, is the language in which it should be recorded, 5 C 816

Option to Magistrate in cases under section 355

357 in the manner provided in the same section.

Mode of recording evidence under section 356 or section 357

358. In cases of the kind mentioned in section 355, the Magistrate may, if he thinks fit, take down the evidence of any witness in the manner provided in section 356, or, if within the local limits of the jurisdiction of such Magistrate the Local Government has made the order referred to in section

359. (1) Evidence taken under section 356 or section 357 shall not ordinarily be taken down in the form of question and answer, but in the form of a narrative

(2) The Magistrate or Sessions Judge may in his discretion take down, or cause to be taken down, any particular question and answer

Notes.—1. In the form of a narrative.—The ordinary and proper and convenient way of recording evidence is to take it down in the first person, exactly as spoken by the witness, 8 B. L. R. Appx. XXI = 16 W. R. 36. Though it cannot always be taken down in the exact words of witness, Judges should, as far as possible, adhere to the words actually used either in the question or in the answer. It is not a compliance with the law to record a more or less accurate paraphrase of the evidence, 11 Bur. L. R. 8.

2. Verbatim record of any particular question and answer.—This is now left to the discretion of the presiding Judge, if either side specially request him to do so. Under s. 165 of the *Evidence Act*, the Judge has also the right to ask any question at any time, but as questions by Court are frequently interpolated in the course of cross-examination, such right should be exercised with discretion. It is unfair to the accused to anticipate or break the thread of cross-examination, 11 Bur. L. R. 8.

Procedure in regard to such evidence when completed.

360. (1) As the evidence of each witness taken under section 356 or section 357 is completed, it shall be read over to him in the presence of the accused, if in attendance, or of his pleader, if he appears by pleader, and shall, if necessary, be corrected

(2) If the witness denies the correctness of any part of the evidence when the same is read over to him, the Magistrate or Sessions Judge may, instead of correcting the evidence, make a memorandum thereon of the objection made to it by the witness, and shall add such remarks as he thinks necessary

(3) If the evidence is taken down in a language different from that in which it has been given and the witness does not understand the language in which it is taken down, the evidence so taken down shall be interpreted to him in the language in which it was given or in a language which he understands

Notes.—1 See s. 512 as to when evidence may be taken in absence of accused and also see ss. 4 and 13 of the *India Criminal Law Amendment Act XIV* of 1908

2 Section is mandatory—deposition of each witness must be read over to witness in presence of accused.—Where a Sessions Judge refused to read over to the witness his deposition as it would involve a great waste of time and said ‘the section seems to me directory and not obligatory. If the witness detects a mistake he can come back and say so. This is the universal practice in Sessions Courts, my experience extending to six such Courts. *Optima est legum interpretis consuetudo*’ Held, that the custom indicated could not alter the plain words of the Act. The practice is erroneous and such a departure from the terms of the Code might lead to considerable embarrassment and place a serious impediment in the administration of justice for there are cases in which it has been held that for the purposes of a prosecution on the ground of perjury depositions to

which the procedure laid down in this section has not been applied cannot be properly used (*see* Note 3 below) 35 C. 955; 35 M 308; 12 C. W N 845 = 3 Cr. L J 116 In strictly carrying out the provisions of 360 (1) by the daily reading over in open Court of the deposition of each witness, the Court does not lay itself open to criticism though that procedure should occupy considerable time 42 C. 957 It is not sufficient compliance with the provisions of cl. (1) of this section for a Magistrate after the deposition has been recorded to hand over the record to the witness to read it to himself 42 C. 240 A conviction based upon evidence not read over in the presence of the accused is bad and will be set aside *Welfe II, 435* But the terms of the section are sufficiently complied with if the deposition of a witness is read over to him in the presence of the pleader for one out of twenty-seven accused. A deposition so read over is admissible against the witness on his trial subsequently for giving false evidence 35 C. 808; 42 C. 240

In 52 C. 159 it is now *held* that s. 360 of the Code is mandatory. The omission to read over the deposition of a witness to him in the presence of the accused if in attendance or of his pleader if he appears by a pleader is an illegality vitiating the trial and s. 537 has no application 51 C. 1 *followed*

The reading over in the presence of the accused of the deposition to a witness during the examination of another witness by the Court is not a compliance with the provisions of s. 360 and the trial is vitiated 52 C. 499

It is also *held* that under s. 360 evidence of each witness must be read over to him as soon as it is completed and before the examination of the next witness is taken up. Reading over the deposition to the witnesses examined one after another not on the completion of the evidence of each witness but during the mid-day adjournment or after the close of the day is not a compliance with the section and the trial is vitiated. 53 C. 129, 30 C. W N 644; 49 M 71 = 49 M. L. J 421

In 29 C. W N 526 It is doubted whether where the deposition is read by the witness himself and it is explained by the Sessions Judge to the accused though not in the presence of the witness it is a sufficient compliance with the section. Where a mere reading over of the evidence by the witnesses cannot convey to the accused what has been recorded as evidence given by the witnesses it is not a sufficient compliance with the section, 29 C. W N 630

Where the trial of the accused was commenced before the Assistant Sessions Judge and a large number of witnesses were examined without their depositions being read over to them. On a reference by the Sessions Judge to the High Court *held* that the commitment need not be quashed but that the case should be sent back to the Assistant Judge where the witnesses whose depositions were not read over to them in the presence of the accused would be re-called and the provision of s. 360 complied with 29 C. W N 698

Reading over the deposition of a witness in the presence of the pleader of the accused and not in his own presence although he is in attendance in Court is not a sufficient compliance with s. 360 30 C. W N 336

Patna High Court.

The Patna High Court agrees in holding that the provisions of s. 360 are mandatory their object is both to protect the witnesses and also to help the accused. But where there is nothing to show that the depositions were not in fact read over to the deponents except an omission on the part of the Magistrate to append a certificate to that effect the High Court in revision will not enquire whether the depositions were as a fact read over or not, 4 Pat. 231

In 4 Pat. 438, it is now *held* by the Patna High Court that in every case in which the legality of a trial is challenged on the ground that the provisions of s. 360 are not complied with the real test is whether there has been prejudice to the accused by reason of such omission or whether the defect is cured by s. 537

In 5 Pat. 63, *holds* that if a deposition is read out by the witness and not read over to him as required by s. 360 such a deposition was nevertheless legal evidence and admissible as such.

Rangoon High Court.

Where it was proved that the depositions had not been read over to the witnesses and further the accuracy of the record was challenged and that there was evidence also that a relevant statement made by a witness had been omitted from the record *held* that while the failure to read over the deposition to the witnesses would not of itself vitiate the trial on the facts established and under the circumstances set out above the proceedings must be quashed and a re-trial ordered 3 Rang 612

2 A The section not mandatory in proceedings under s. 107.—Section 360 does not apply to proceedings under s. 107 and it is not necessary to read over the depositions of witnesses to them in the presence of the person called upon to furnish security 52 C. 668

But as far as s 110 is concerned it is *held* that s 360 of the Criminal Procedure Code applies to inquiries under s 110 and non compliance with the provisions of that section would vitiate proceedings because by s 117 (2) the evidence in an enquiry under s 110 must be recorded as in a warrant case, *i.e.*, under s 360 52 C. 470. See also 52 C. 832.

Sec. 360, sub-sec. (1) of the Code applies to proceedings under Chapter XII of the Code, and the omission to comply with the terms of the section vitiates the final order, 52 C. 437.

But in 52 C. 721 a distinction was made between reading over the evidence to the witnesses themselves and reading over evidence in the presence of the parties or their pleaders. And it was *held*, that under s 360 of the Code the evidence of the witnesses taken in an enquiry under s 145 must be read over to them and the omission to do so vitiates the whole proceedings. *Held* also, that a party in such an enquiry is not an accused within s 360 and that the evidence of the witnesses is not required to be read over in the presence of the parties or their pleaders. (52 C. 437 overruled to this extent.)

3. Accused cannot take objection that witness did not understand language of deposition.—The section relates to the examination of witnesses and does not apply to the examination of the prisoners, 12 W. R. 44. It is intended for the protection of witnesses. The fact that, at the trial of an accused person, the evidence of the witnesses against him is recorded and read to them in a language not understood by them is no ground for setting aside a conviction based upon such evidence, where the accused person understands the language in which such evidence is recorded and read, and where the witnesses made no application to have the evidence so recorded and read interpreted to them. 7 C. L. R. 393, *contra see* 8 W. R. 63, in which failure to attach a memorandum, that the deposition of a witness was read over to him in a language which he understood was *held* to be an error in law by which the accused was materially prejudiced. See also 4 B. L. R. Appx. 1 at p. 11 = 13 W. R. 1 at p. 7 as to the question whether such an irregularity would vitiate a commitment. In 6 C. 782 where the deposition of a witness on which a charge of giving false evidence was made, had not been read over to him, he was acquitted, as it was *held* that the deposition was inadmissible in evidence.

4. Deposition not read over to witness.—Objection raised by Judge *suo moto*.—In a trial before a Sessions Judge while certain prosecution witnesses were under cross-examination, their depositions before the committing Magistrate were tendered in evidence by the accused to contradict their statements. No objection was raised by the Crown, but the Sessions Judge refused to admit the depositions made before the Magistrate on the general statement of a *mukhtyar* in Court that the practice in Magistrate's Court was not to read over depositions to witnesses and refused the application of the accused to examine the Magistrate as a witness in the trial. *Held* that the Judge was wrong in refusing to admit the depositions and even if he had refused them rightly, he should allow the prisoner to call the Magistrate for examination, 13 C. 121.

5. Failure to read over deposition to witness makes it inadmissible as evidence on charge of perjury.—It was *held* in 6 C. 762, that failure to comply with the requirements of ss 182 and 183 of Act X of 1877 in a judicial proceeding is an informality which renders the depositions of an accused inadmissible in evidence on a charge of giving false evidence based on such deposition. When the provisions of this section are not complied with the deposition is inadmissible in evidence, and no other evidence can be given to prove it or its contents (s. 91 Act of 1872). See also 28 M. 309, 12 C. W. N. 843 = 8 Cr. L. J. 116; 36 C. 935 at p. 959; 42 C. 240. But MILLER J. is of opinion that when the deposition is read over to the witness and he has admitted it to be correct and signed the same, the deposition may be used against the witness in a charge of perjury, though it may not be used against the accused against whom it is given, 8 M. L. T. 117 = 11 Cr. L. J. 482; 21 M. L. J. 411 = 9 M. L. T. 325 = 12 Cr. L. J. 44.

6. While evidence is being read over, Court not to take up another witness.—It is a very material irregularity to proceed with the evidence of the next witness, when the evidence of the previous witness is being read over to the accused, Weir II, 435, unless the accused or his pleader has had a full opportunity of knowing substantially what is recorded as the examination proceeds. 11 Bar. L. R. 8. It is a gross infraction of the provisions of this section to have the deposition of the witness read over to him by a clerk in the verandah of the Court house, though both the witness and clerk were in view of the accused and his advocate, and such a deposition cannot be admitted in evidence, U. B. R. (1912), 1 Qr. 123 = 13 Cr. L. J. 569. See 53 C. 123.

7. Deposition as recorded may be corrected.—It is no doubt, very important that a witness honestly desiring to correct an error in his evidence should not be deterred from his doing so, by the risk of a criminal charge, 10 C. 937. Before a deposition is closed, a witness should be given an opportunity of explaining and correcting any contradictions which it may contain, and the statement which the witness finally declares

to have a little more than a year old, that

Hence, to repress the action of to cover from
to suppress, as, with
suffocated as

silent air and
thick dust
baron,
clinging smut,
ring smut,

5 To suffer, to be punished

6 To smell out, to find out, to discover, to find
without {Have}

8 (Bot) Having a slippery surface void of rough-
ness, smoothness


Smoking v t To make spruce, to dress with effluvia
neatness {Gib}
That said, he swapped his beard, and stoked up for Drayton.
Smuggle v t {my} & p SMOGGLED, p pr &

Smoke-board n A board suspended over
the place to prevent the smoke from coming
into the room

Smokeless a
A contrivance for
turning a spit by
means of a fly or
wheel turned by
the current of a
rising air in a
chimney

Smokeless a
Having no smoke
knowledgeless tow
ers n

Smoker n
One who dries by
smoke
2 One who uses
tobacco by inhal-
ing its smoke from
a pipe or cigar



Smoke jack

Smooth v t To act the flatterer, to use smooth-
ment

Because I can not flatter an (look for
the to in means of smooth v t d to use and say That

Smooth-chinned, a Having a smooth chin
beardless

Smooth v t To make smooth {Obr}

Smooth v t One who smooths
smooth/ing-1 v t {turn} n In iron instrument
with a point of iron for smoothing clothes a tool

creep
1 To import or export secretly, contrary to the
law, or secretly to import or export without paying
the duties imposed by law, to run, as, to smuggle
into

Smooth v t To act the flatterer, to use smooth-
ment

Because I can not flatter an (look for
the to in means of smooth v t d to use and say That

Smooth-chinned, a Having a smooth chin
beardless

Smooth v t To make smooth {Obr}

Smooth v t One who smooths
smooth/ing-1 v t {turn} n In iron instrument
with a point of iron for smoothing clothes a tool

smooth/ing-1 v t {turn} n In iron instrument
with a point of iron for smoothing clothes a tool

3 A parasitic fungus (Irida repens) of
rallies which forms on grain, blighting it
the whole ear a blighted and converted
as is often the fact with noise
one language ribaldry, obscenity
stand upon decency a conversation that will
ough a p r and h a mother be in the room
Allison

imp & p smutted p pr & s u

than or n r k with smut to be taken with
or other dirty substance Baron

at with midday, as grain, lark n t t rish

2 To gather smut, to be converted
Mortimer

smut v t

to r k with smut to be taken with
or other dirty substance Baron

at with midday, as grain, lark n t t rish

2 To gather smut, to be converted
Mortimer

smut v t

to r k with smut to be taken with
or other dirty substance Baron

at with midday, as grain, lark n t t rish

2 To gather smut, to be converted
Mortimer

to be the true one—and that statement only—must be taken to be the statement which the witness intended to make **Ratanlal 88**. Otherwise a man who has through carelessness made an inaccurate or through partiality an exaggerated statement will be driven to stick to it and thus the object of cross-examination will be defeated **18 W R. 67**. If the Court, instead of allowing the correction to be made proceeds to make the memorandum referred to in sub-sec. (2), such memorandum must be appended to the deposition and care should be taken that the practice and the form prescribed by law are exactly adhered to **13 W R. 17**. In spite of the presumption raised by s. 114 *Illustr. (c) of the Evidence Act* in a criminal case where the prosecution must prove every step of its case it is not proper or expedient to act on a presumption that the requirements of the law have been complied with **9 A 720; 18 C. 129**

361. (1) Whenever any evidence is given in a language not understood by the accused and he is present in person it shall be interpreted to him in open Court in a language understood by him

(2) If he appears by pleader and the evidence is given in a language other than the language of the Court and not understood by the pleader, it shall be interpreted to such pleader in that language

(3) When documents are put in for the purpose of formal proof it shall be in the discretion of the Court to interpret as such thereof as appears necessary

Note.—This section relates to the oral evidence of witnesses.—As to documentary evidence although a prisoner has right to have all or any part of any document used on his trial translated or interpreted to him yet where a document like a Government Gazette or letter of the Secretary to Government is put in for the purpose of merely giving formal proof of that which is an incontestable fact as the commencement of hostilities on the frontier, it is not necessary to interpret it at length. It would be sufficient if the prisoner was made to understand what the document was and for what purpose it was used. To interpret them at length would be merely wasting time **13 W. R. 25** In **24 W R. 50**, the circumstance that the evidence of a Civil Surgeon given in English was not interpreted to the accused was held to be of small importance, where it was understood by the prisoners counsel and all necessary questions were put to the witness. See also **5 C. 826** As to when the services of an interpreter are required see **543 s 5 of the Oath Act X of 1873** and **15 W R. 61 (71)**.

362. (1) In every case * tried by a Presidency Magistrate in which an appeal lies, such Magistrate shall either take down the evidence of the witnesses with his own hand or cause it to be taken down in writing from his dictation in open Court. All evidence so taken down shall be signed by the Magistrate and shall form part of the record

(2) Evidence so taken down shall ordinarily be recorded in the form of a narrative, but the Magistrate may, in his discretion take down or cause to be taken down any particular question or answer

† (2-A) In every case referred to in sub-section (1), the Magistrate shall make a memorandum of the substance of the examination of the accused. Such memorandum shall be signed by the Magistrate with his own hand and shall form part of the record

(3) Sentences ‡ unless they are sentences of imprisonment ordered to run concurrently passed under section 35 on the same occasion shall for the purposes of this section, be considered as one sentence

§ (4) In cases other than those specified in sub-sec. (1) it shall not be necessary for a Presidency Magistrate to record the evidence or frame a charge

* Words in inverted commas were substituted for the words in which a Presidency Magistrate imposes a fine exceeding two hundred rupees or imprisonment for a term exceeding six months by Act XVIII of 1923

† This sub-section was inserted by 15 d

‡ These words were added by 16 d

§ Sub-section (4) was added by Act XVIII of 1923

2 To speak roughly, to talk in rude, murmuring
 terms
 Is to malicious and generally to scold the little papers of
 a pen, from which they in words stand and examples
 Dryden

To reprehend See SNEAP.

A door latch {Scol}

A latch string

To draw in with the breath through
 the nose

2 To perceive as by sniffing; to sniff, to scent

To sniff, to snuff to smell

To now appears that they were at a snuff up and laugh and
 after their old quarrels

A moment Had Puffell
 H. Russell

Snatch v t {sup & p p snatched (snail
 pr & th n snatching) {O & Prov Eng
 Her WACK n}

me to heaven

Snatch v t To snatch snatch and catch
 Snatch v t To attempt to seize something
 deny to catch

Snatch v t To snatch snatch and catch
 Snatch v t To attempt to seize something
 deny to catch

Snatch v t To snatch snatch and catch
 Snatch v t To attempt to seize something
 deny to catch

Snatch v t To snatch snatch and catch
 Snatch v t To attempt to seize something
 deny to catch

Snatch v t To snatch snatch and catch
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Snatch v t To snatch snatch and catch
 Snatch v t To attempt to seize something
 deny to catch

Snatch v t To snatch snatch and catch
 Snatch v t To attempt to seize something
 deny to catch



Snivel (colic) n [A B anything snivel (L snivel
 and snivel) Hence from the nose snivel.
 Snivel, v t [sup & p p snivelled or sniv-
 elled p. pr & th n snivelling, or snivelling.]

snivel

snivel, v t, v p, snivel, snivel

Note—Referring to the amendment of this section, the Select Committee say—

'We are inclined to agree with those critics who point out that the re-draft proposed by sub-clause (v) in sub-sec. (1) of s. 382 does not get rid of the difficulty that a Magistrate has to make up his mind as to the sentence he will impose before he begins trying the case. We do not see how this difficulty can be got rid of but we think that the amendment proposed has the advantage of bringing the language of this section into conformity with the language of ss. 263 and 264, and we would, therefore, retain this sub-clause

In order to meet difficulties that have arisen, we have introduced a sub-section laying down that Presidency Magistrates in cases subject to appeal, shall make a memorandum of the substance of the examination of the accused, and we have introduced a new clause making a consequential amendment in sub-sec. (4) of s. 364.

The non-official members who constituted a majority in the Committee, expressed their dissatisfaction with the distinctions drawn in the Code between Presidency Magistrates and other Magistrates and in particular with regard to this clause would have liked to see Presidency Magistrates required, in warrant-cases at all events to keep as full a record as any other Magistrate. But the Committee as a whole held that there was some force in the contention put forward by numerous High Court Judges that no change should be made in the Code affecting to any extent the special powers of Presidency Magistrates until a much fuller inquiry had been made into the question of their status, powers and procedure. We desire to take this opportunity of placing on record our hope that it may be possible to appoint a small Committee to undertake this investigation.'

Notes—1. Section 35 deals with a sentence in cases of conviction of several offences at one trial. See s. 370 as to the particulars of a judgment of a Presidency Magistrate and s. 441 which empowers Presidency Magistrates to supplement the reasons for their orders, when records are called for by the High Court under s. 430. From the wording of this section it would appear to be necessary either that the Magistrate shall make up his mind as to the sentence to be passed or likely from the nature of the case before him to be passed, before the case is gone into or that having determined to pass such sentence he shall recall and re-examine the witnesses and record their evidence.

2 Scope of the section—The provisions of Chapter XXII (Summary Trials) do not apply to trials before Presidency Magistrates. A warrant-case must be tried by a Presidency Magistrate in the manner provided by Chapter XXI, subject only to the special provisions of this section as to the method of taking down the evidence, **Ratanlal 839**. A Presidency Magistrate is bound to record evidence only in cases coming under this section, i.e., in cases where he passes appealable sentences (s. 411). He is not bound to record evidence in any summons-case or warrant case or cases in which inquiries have to be made as in summonses or warrant-cases, except where he may impose an appealable sentence. Thus in an inquiry for taking security for good behaviour (s. 110) a Presidency Magistrate is not bound to record the evidence of witnesses, though it is desirable that he should keep some record of the statements made by witnesses, or that his judgment should indicate what those statements are, so that the High Court as a Court of Revision may judge of the propriety or legality of the order passed by him **33 C. 1038**, where **16 C. 799** is referred to. But see next Note.

2-A. Record of evidence when sentence of imprisonment over six months is imposed under the Reformatory Act—The Presidency Magistrate is bound under s. 382 to record evidence of witnesses in a case where he imposes imprisonment exceeding six months for detaining the accused in a reformatory, **26 Bom. L. R. 1232 (10 Bom. L. R. 201 referred to)**.

3. Section not applicable to cases referred under s. 110.—This section does not apply to cases under s. 110 where it has become necessary to make a reference to the Appellate Court under s. 123 (2) **33 C. 1038** does not refer to cases of this nature. It refers to cases which are held to be not applicable and in which no reference has to be made. Therefore the Presidency Magistrate in cases where he makes a reference is not absolved from the duty of recording evidence, but it is not necessary that he should provide the High Court with the same materials as in a case from a Mofussil Magistrate, **13 C. W. N. 318 = 10 Cr. L. J. 122** and see also **30 A. 334**.

4. Record of evidence in non-appealable cases not necessary (under the new section).—There is no obligation in law requiring a Presidency Magistrate to record evidence in cases other than those dealt with in this section. In non-appealable cases it is left to the discretion of the Magistrate to do so or not, and the High Court could not interfere with the exercise of such discretion **31 C. 933**, but see **10 Bom. L. R. 201 = 7 Cr. L. J. 184**, where it is laid down that the Code does not mean that a Presidency Magistrate can act arbitrarily and record nothing by way of evidence in cases in which he is not bound to take down evidence in the manner prescribed in the section. In such cases the section merely gives him a discretion to take down the evidence or not.

and the discretion should be exercised judicially in a reasonable spirit, and not arbitrarily. There may be no necessity to record any evidence in 'morning cases.' But where a respectable person is charged with an offence reflecting on his character and serious allegations are levelled against him, there ought to be some record of evidence to enable him in case of conviction to go to the High Court. Now it is made quite clear by sub-section (4) that in non-appealable cases a Presidency Magistrate need not record the evidence or frame a charge.

Even in a summary case a Magistrate is bound to record a summary of the accused's examination and any statement in the course of that examination.

5 Parties are entitled to copies of notes of deposition.—Where a Presidency Magistrate refused to furnish copies of the notes of deposition to a party the High Court under s 45 of the *Specific Relief Act* ordered the records to be brought to the High Court and kept with the Registrar and allowed liberty to the party to take copies **15 C. W. N. 770**

363. When a Sessions Judge or Magistrate has recorded the evidence of a witness he shall also record such remarks (if any) as he thinks material respecting the demeanour of such witness, whilst under examination

Remarks respecting
demeanour of witness

Notes.—1. Until whole evidence is taken, it is unsafe to pronounce upon credibility of witnesses.—Although a Judge may note the demeanour of a witness, it is generally unsafe to pronounce an opinion on the credibility of a witness until the whole of the evidence has been taken, **Weir II, 433**

2. Value of Judge's remarks.—The object of this section is to give to the Appellate Court some aid in estimating the value of evidence recorded by another Court. In a case of noting a witness in his deposition before a Magistrate omitted to mention the names of some of the accused. The Magistrate recorded on the deposition of the witness that, at the time it was being taken, he was in such a weak state, that the Magistrate was unable to proceed with his examination and had only asked him two questions when the excessive weakness of the witness obliged him to stop. The attestation of the Magistrate, it was held, is *prima facie* proof of that fact and may be laid before a jury, **12 W. R. 51**. Where a Sessions Judge of experience has, in the most emphatic manner stated that the demeanour of the eye-witnesses was evasive that they inspired him with no confidence and that no man could be convicted on their testimony, the Appellate Court before accept

be rejected, before the Court should interfere **27 P. W. B. 1914 = 125 P. L. R. 1914 = 15 Cr. L. J. 203**. See also **6 P. R. 1898, 22 In. Ca. 987 (Pun.)**.

364. (1) Whenever the accused is examined by any Magistrate, or by any Court other than a High Court established by Royal Charter*† the whole of such examination including every question put to him and every answer given by him, shall be recorded in full, in the language in which he is examined, or, if that is not practicable, in the language of the Court or in English and such record shall be shown or read to him, or, if he does not understand the language in which it is written, shall be interpreted to him in a language which he understands, and he shall be at liberty to explain or add to his answers

Examination of ac
cused how recorded.

(2) When the whole is made conformable to what he declares is the truth, the record shall be signed by the accused and the Magistrate or Judge of such Court, and such Magistrate or Judge shall certify under his own hand that the examination was taken in his presence and hearing, and that the record contains a full and true account of the statement made by the accused

(3) In cases in which the examination of the accused is not recorded by the Magistrate or Judge himself, he shall be bound, ‡ as the examination proceeds, to make a memorandum thereof in the language of the Court or in English, if he is sufficiently acquainted with the latter language,

* The words or the Chief Court of the Punjab were repealed by Act XVIII of 1878

† The words or the Chief Court of Lower Burma were repealed by Act XI of 1923

‡ The words unless he is a Presidency Magistrate were omitted by Act XXXVII of 1923

and such memorandum shall be written and signed by the Magistrate or Judge with his own hand, and shall be annexed to the record. If the Magistrate or Judge is unable to make a memorandum as above required, he shall record the reason of such inability

(4) Nothing in the section shall be deemed to apply to the examination of an accused person under s 263 * "or in the course of a trial held by a Presidency Magistrate"

Notes—See s 164 for the mode of recording confessions and statements in the course of investigation, s 209 for examination of accused before committal, s 255 for recording the plea of guilty in a warrant-case, s 271 for recording the plea of guilty in a Sessions trial, s 287 as to when the examination of an accused has to be tendered in a Sessions trial, s 342 for power to examine the accused, and s 533 for the effect of non-compliance with provisions of s 164 or this section

APPLICATION OF SECTION.

1. **Scope of this section.**—This section and s. 164 should be read with s 533 This section applies only to inquiries and trials It does not govern *investigations*, otherwise s. 164 would be superfluous 10 B. H. C. 2 186 The rules laid down in this section as to the mode of recording statements are, however, applicable alike to confessions taken before inquiry or trial under s 164 and to the examination of the accused under s 342 153 A. W. N. 253. Before criminating a man upon his own statement under examination, it is necessary to see that such statement was deliberately made and recorded, that after being recorded it has been shown or read to the accused and the examination has been attested by the signature of the Magistrate following a certificate to be given under his own hand, 7 W. R. 49. But this section does not limit the generality of s. 21 of the *Indian Evidence Act* and a confession is none the less admissible because in some instances, and to some extent, statements were made in response to questions but there was no pressure or inducement, 37 C. 467.

2. **Section inapplicable to statement of person not in position of accused**—Where during an inquiry under s. 202, the Magistrate recorded a statement made by a person against whom the complaint was filed, *held*, that the statement cannot be regarded as having been recorded under this section and s. 164, the statement having been made when the deponent was not in the position of an accused person, 32 C. 1083. A deposition on solemn affirmation recorded by a Magistrate is admissible if he was not an accused person when the statement was recorded, 222 P. L. R. 1918 = 18 Cr. L. J. 257.

3. **Confessions duly recorded by Magistrate in Native States admissible.**—A confession made to a Magistrate in a Native State is admissible in a trial in British India, if it is duly recorded as required by the Code But it is not entitled to the same weight as a confession recorded by a British Magistrate, 2 P. R. 1909 = 9 Cr. L. J. 297; 8 P. R. 1907; 12 A. 595 and see Note 17 at p 365

4. **Magistrate does not become interested by omitting to record statement.**—Where a Magistrate before whom an accused person is brought omits to record the statements made to him by the accused, he does not thereby make himself a witness and so become disqualified from trying the case, 24 C. 499.

5. **Examination of accused is for explaining evidence against him.**—The examination of an accused person under this section is subject to the purpose referred to in s. 342, viz, "to enable him to explain any circumstances appearing against him," and not to supplement the case for the prosecution against him to show that he is guilty *Per KERNAN, J.*, 10 M. 293; 1 M. H. C. R. 199, 6 C. 96; 15 A. 242; 15 A. 345; 15 C. L. J. 322 = 13 Cr. L. J. 283. See Notes 12, 13 and 15 to s. 342. The procedure laid down in this section applies to the examination contemplated by s 342, 4 Bom. L. R. 481; 1 Bar. L. R. 320. Statement of accused in answer to questions put by Court under s. 384 cannot be used against a co accused to convict him on the strength of it. The expression "proving a confession" is inapplicable to the procedure where a Judge asks questions and the accused gives explanations under a special section provided for the purpose 43 A. 323 (23 M. 131 *dissented from*).

6. **Whenever the accused is examined by any Magistrate, &c., either before the commencement of the inquiry resulting in the commitment of the accused or during that inquiry when the accused is questioned under ss 209 and 342, 21 B. 493 at p. 498; but not before the case reaches the stage at which the examination of the accused is authorized, 2 C. W. N. 702.**

7. **Magistrate should refrain from assuming guilt of prisoner when examining him.**—A Magistrate when examining the prisoner and asking him whether he pleads guilty or not should refrain from assuming that

* These words in _____ were substituted by Act XXXVII of 1923 for the words "or section 263 sub section (1 A)" inserted by Act XVIII of 1923

the prisoner is guilty of the crime with which he is charged. The proper mode is to tell the prisoner that he is charged with a certain offence and ask him if he has any explanation to give of the charge, and whether he wishes to make any statement, *Wells* 11, 433. The form of the questions is immaterial, even though it assumes the prisoner's guilt, *2 B. H. C. R. 397*. Nor is it necessary for the Magistrate to state in the body of the examination, that the statement comprised *every question* put to the accused and *every answer* given by him and that he had had liberty to add to or explain his answers. Attestation at the foot of the examination is sufficient, *7 B. L. R. Appx. LXII*.

8. Examination and certificate need not be in Magistrate's hand.—There is nothing in the Code which necessitates a Magistrate to take down the examination of the accused in his own hand. It is enough that he appends a certificate that the examination is in conformity to this section, *20 W. R. 80*; *1 B. 219*; *1900 A. W. N. 203*; *21 B. 495*. Even the certificate need not be written by the Magistrate or Judge himself. It is sufficient if he signs it, *8 W. R. 55*. But the memorandum mentioned in sub-sec. (3) must be written and signed with his own hand.

BOTH QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS TO BE RECORDED.

9. Every question put and every answer given to be recorded in full.—This is of very great importance, for a statement made in answer to a question put, may have a different meaning if considered without such question. The questions put should not be of the nature of a cross-examination, nor should they be put with the object of getting the accused to incriminate himself or others under trial with him, *6 C. L. R. 431*; *1 M. H. C. R. 199*; *13 A. 345*. Ordinarily, every question and every answer must be recorded *verbatim*, no matter whether relevant or irrelevant, *15 W. R. (Cr. Let.) 3*; *2 B. H. C. R. 395* and *398*.

10. Confession in narrative form admissible unless accused prejudiced.—The confession of an accused person was recorded in a simple narrative form instead of in the shape of question and answer as required by this section. There was nothing in the character of the confession, or in the circumstances of the case, to lead to the inference that the accused had been prejudiced, by the error, *held*, that the error did not affect the admissibility of the statement in evidence, *8 C. 616*; also *Ibid. 618 (footnote) (F.B.) = 1 C. L. R. 1 followed in 14 C. 533*. There the Magistrate omitted to record in the vernacular the questions put to the prisoner. They were of such a nature that it was perfectly immaterial to the sense and meaning of the prisoner's statement whether they were recorded or not. It was *held*, that the prisoner was not prejudiced in any way by the omission. The mere absence of questions in a prisoner's statement does not make it inadmissible, *12 C. L. R. 120*. See also *5 A. 253*; *1892 A. W. N. 60*.

LANGUAGE OF RECORD.

11. Object of recording statement of accused in his language.—“The law requires that ordinarily such a statement, *i.e.*, the examination of the accused, should be recorded in the language of the person making it, the object being to represent the very words and expressions used so as to ensure accuracy and prevent misrepresentation or misconstruction of what was said. If such a record is not practicable, the law directs that the statement shall be recorded in the language of the Court or in English, if, however, as in this case a second translation be made, and the statement be recorded as so understood, the accuracy which the law contemplates is made more remote,” *21 C. 642* at p. 660, *13 A. 345*. If an interpreter is employed, the examination should be recorded in the language in which it is communicated to the Court by the interpreter, *5 C. 826*.

12. Statement taken down in language other than that in which it was made.—When answers are made by an accused person in one language and written down in another, the provisions of this section would not be complied with unless it is shown that it was impracticable to write them in the language in which they were spoken. If the answers were not taken down in accordance with the provisions of this section, it is doubtful whether the defect could be cured by s. 533, *15 C. 595 (F.B.)*, *10 O. C. 112 = 6 Cr. L. J. 94*. Where a *Bhil* accused, having been examined by a Magistrate in the *Marathi* language and the accused's answers having been given in *Marathi* with a large sprinkling of *Bhil* terms the Magistrate recorded the accused's statement in English, *held*, that the procedure was irregular, and that the statement should have been recorded in *Marathi*, *Ratanlal* 533. See s. 533 and *21 B. 495*, *10 O. C. 112 = 6 Cr. L. J. 94*; but see *contra* *17 C. 852*.

13. Where impracticable, statement need not be recorded in accused's own language.—The confession of an accused person made in Bengali, the language in which accused was examined, was recorded in English. The committing Magistrate, in his evidence in Court, said that he could not write Bengali well, and that there was no *Mohurrir* with him at the time when the confession was recorded. *Held distinguishing* *17 C. 862*

The solemnity and gravity of the Spaniards shows itself in the solemnity of their language

4 Hence, affected gravity or seriousness
Lateness & a cover for a veil

5 Awe or reverence inspired by outward
stances appearance calculated to inspire
even feelings, as, the solemnity of West
Abbey

From darkness to promise me! Miron
2 To endeavor to obtain, to seek, as, to solicit
an office, to solicit a favor
I saw my crime but bludge at the new
Repeat old phrase as a divine new
3 To awake or excite to action, to summon, to
invite

My brother knows with study to have
The vow that he hath made that I would fear
Not on my desert.

5 To disturb to disquiet — a Latinism rare y
need

Have any ill advised thine ears? Chapman.

But anxious thou art not thy weak breast. Dryden.

Syn — To beseech ask request crave supplicate,
entreat beg implore importune See 1252 B

2 To dignify or honor by ceremonies, hence to
celebrate to make famous

Their choice nobility and Sway
Rise from all parts to side on are this feast. M. Ben.

A "habermus" may be in one word a solemn must be of
note solemn

2 Hence, any useless absurdity or impro-
pety

Solemnity, n. {Of solemnity} One who commits

So.
So.
So.
So.

In a solemn manner, with

Solemnity

female who sold his or pet

1 A solemn ceremony performed

2 A ceremony adapted to impress
solemnity of the last day

3 Usually a solemn seriousness

4 S, T, G, F, long S, T, D, G

the provisions of this section were sufficiently complied with, 22 C. 817. See also 21 B. 495 at p 500; 15 C. 539 and 1891 A. W. N. 55; 1892 A. W. N. 60. Where a confession given in Hindustani was taken before a Sub-Divisional Magistrate, and was recorded by the Court officer in Bengali, that being the language of the Court and where it appeared that the Magistrate himself was a Muhammadan, and it was contended that he must be taken to have been able to record the confession in the language in which it was given, there being no evidence to the contrary, *held*, in the absence of such evidence, the Court should presume that the proceedings of the Sub-Divisional Magistrate were conducted in accordance with law, and that in the absence of anything to show that it was practicable for the officers of his Court to record the statement in *Urdu*, it could fairly be held that the Sub-Divisional Magistrate found that it was impracticable, and adopted the alternative allowed by law of having the confession recorded in the Court language. In this case the confession was received, but the record of the Magistrate was treated as a mere memorandum, 18 C. 549, where 17 C. 862 is doubted. See also 21 B. 495. There a Presidency Magistrate examined the accused under ss. 209 and 342. The accused was examined in *Murathi*, but the questions and answers were recorded in English. The Magistrate deposed at the trial that it was the invariable practice in his Court to take down depositions in English and that he could not himself have accurately recorded the prisoner's statement in *Murathi*. In 10 O. C. 112 = 6 Cr. L. J. 94 an English record was held inadmissible in the absence of proof that it was impracticable to record the statements in the language they were made and no presumption under s. 80 of the *Indian Evidence Act* could be made in favour of such a record. See also 23 B. 221, where 17 C. 862 is dissented and 21 B. 495 is followed.

Burden of proof as to impracticability.—In 17 C. 862 it was *held* that it would be for the prosecution to establish the impracticability. See also 15 C. 585. In 18 C. 594 it was, however, *held* that in the absence of any evidence the regularity of proceedings must be presumed.

14. English record held good, when accused not prejudiced.—A Magistrate fully conversant with *Urdu* and English languages, and able to write fluently in both, took down a confession in English. The Magistrate was subsequently examined and testified that the English record was in his hand writing, and that was the confession actually made by the accused, and was recorded in English because he was in the habit of doing all his civil and criminal work in English (not that it was impracticable as the section contemplates). There was no vernacular record of confession. The Magistrate swore that the confession was taken down sentence by sentence, and was interpreted by himself to the accused who admitted its correctness. *Held*, that the defects in the manner of recording confessions had not injured the accused in his defence on the merits, and could therefore, be cured by s. 533 7 P. R. 1899.

15. Where the English and Vernacular records differ, the latter to be relied on.—Where an accused, a *Manipuri*, was examined before a Magistrate through an interpreter who obtained his answer in *Manipuri* and they were written in that language, and the interpreter translated them into *Bengali* and they were recorded by the Magistrate in English and the statement in English and that in *Manipuri* were found to differ, *held* that the statement recorded in *Manipuri* must be taken to be the record in the case. Had the *Manipuri* statement not been made, the Magistrate by recording statement in English would not have complied with the spirit and intention of this section, though the record in English might not have necessarily been inadmissible in evidence, 21 C. 642.

RECORD MUST BE SIGNED.

16. Direction as to accused's signature.—The direction that "the accused person shall sign etc." in para 4, s. 346, Act X of 1872, was held not to be satisfied by the following supscription —

"Signature of A B (the accused), the hand writing of C D"

Where the conviction of a person was substantially based upon a confession thus subscribed, the High Court reversed it and *held*, that the Sessions Judge was bound to prevent such a confession being admitted in evidence, 11 B. H. C. R. 44. A confession not signed by the accused is inadmissible in evidence until the defect is cured in manner provided by s. 533, 1883 A. W. N. 243.

17. Accused's signature should be taken in Magistrate's presence.—To take the signature of the accused in an adjoining room before a clerk and not in the immediate presence of a Magistrate is not a proper compliance with s. 364. The signature of the accused should be taken in the immediate presence and under the control of the Magistrate himself, *Ratanlal* 687.

18. Mark of accused unable to sign is sufficient.—When an accused person cannot sign his name, his mark is sufficient for the requirement of this section, that the statement must be signed by the accused, *Weir II, 437*. See *the General Clauses Act* X of 1897, s. 3 (52).

19. Refusal by accused to sign record—An accused who refuses to sign a statement made at his trial in answer to questions put by the Court does not commit an offence punishable under s 180 I P C., 4 B. 15. The procedure indicated by sub-sec. (2) involves the Magistrate offering the record for the accused's signature, but it does not empower the Magistrate to require his signature. It is only when a person refuses to sign a statement which a public servant is legally empowered to require him to sign that he renders himself liable to punishment, 3 L. B. R. 199 = 4 Cr. L. J. 205. But see 15 A. L. J. 291, wherein 41 B. 15 is distinguished and not followed.

20. When thumb-impresion not sufficient signature.—A thumb-impresion in the case of a person who can write, is not a signature within the meaning of s. 3 (52) of *the General Clauses Act* under which a mark is to be considered a signature only in the case of a person unable to write his name. *Held* therefore, the thumb-mark of a person who can write, attached to a confession, did not satisfy the requirements of s. 164, 32 C. 550. See also 23 B. 221.

21. Proof of accused's mark or signature.—If the signature or mark of the accused is not taken to his confession ostensibly recorded under this section, the Magistrate who took down the confession may be examined as to the circumstances under which the confession was recorded, 1896 A. W. N. 161.

22. Effect of absence of accused's signature—Where a record of confession does not bear the mark or signature of an accused it is inadmissible in evidence. But parol evidence of the confession may be given and the confession when proved is evidence against the accused under s 533 23 B 221

23. When objection as to absence of accused's signature is waived—Where the signature of the accused was not taken by the committing Magistrate, and no objection was raised before the Sessions Court by his pleader on the ground of the irregularity of the Magistrate and of his being prejudiced thereby, *held* that under all the circumstances, the accused was not prejudiced, and that there was no sufficient ground for reversing the judgment. 11 B. H. C. R. 237.

24. Attestation unnecessary when confession is made in the Court.—The attestation required by this section is unnecessary when a confession is made in the Court to the officer trying the case at the time of trial, 3 C. 756. A distinction is thus drawn between the examination of the accused and the admission of his guilt.

CERTIFICATE OF MEMORANDUM.

25. No particular form for certificate.—This section unlike s 164 does not prescribe any particular form of certificate. Where the certificate and attestation are wanting to a statement, the Appellate Court is not competent to direct the same to be supplied and then to receive the statement as evidence. But their absence is not necessarily fatal 7 B. H. C. R. 50 at p 53. Where, however, no attempt is made to conform to the provisions of this section or of s. 164 read with this section, which are imperative, s. 533 will not render a confession admissible. 9 M. 224 at p 240, 2 C. W. N. 702

EFFECT OF NON-COMPLIANCE WITH FORMALITIES

26. Omission to certify confession is not an error unless the accused is prejudiced.—Omission to certify the confession in the manner provided in this section or to record the whole of the questions put to the accused when the accused has not been prejudiced by the omission, is not such a material error as will justify the High Court in setting aside the conviction *Weir II, 436*. Confession does not become inadmissible because the memorandum is not written in the exact form prescribed. 3 A. 338.

27. By what evidence defect in certificate or memorandum can be cured?—A defect in the memorandum or certificate to be attached to the examination of the accused person by a Magistrate cannot be cured by the examination of a witness to prove the hand-writing of the Magistrate. The proper course is to examine either the Magistrate or some other person who was present when the statement was made. 8 C. P. Cr. 6; 22 M. 15; 23 B. 221; 2 P. R. 1909 = 9 Cr. L. J. 297. It would also be necessary to show that no inducement had been held out to the accused by threat or promise or otherwise, 1 B. 219. In 3 C. W. N. 387 the High Court, in a case where the examination was not signed by the Magistrate who recorded it, directed the Sessions Judge before whom the case had been tried to examine the Magistrate and take the evidence that the accused had duly

3 At one time or other hereafter

Syn Sometimes it really is a compound noun and at times it is used before it — at some time

Sometimes, a. Having been formerly, former
Our sometime sister, now our queen. *Shak*

4 The want of the gall is shown here but the

Solution of continuity the separation of connection or of connected substances or parts — applied in surgery to a fracture incision and the like. As in the past not only a wound or solution of continuity is worse than a corrupt humor so in the spiritual. *Bacon*

Soluble a. [*Fr soluble* *Fr solutus*, *Sp & It solutio* from *Lat solvere solutum*] Tending to dissolve, loosening, latinate

Solvability, n. [*Fr solvabilite*] Ability to pay all just debts

Solve a. [*Fr solvere* from *Lat solvere*, to dissolve pay *Cf Solvite*]

1 Capable of being solved, resolved or explained

Some to the shores do fly
Some to the woods
You all rise now scolders from slat,
But must your wit and to eat example w us

Syn —To explain, resolve, unfold, clear up, to solve

Solvent a. [*Lat solvens p. pr. of solvere* *It*

made the statement recorded. Again where the statements made to a Magistrate on two successive days and duly recorded by him under this section were objected to on the ground that the certificate required by this section appeared only on the first pages of the record of his examination, while the record of his examination on the first day alone extended over two pages and that of the second day was entirely written on the second page, *held*, that the defect was cured by the evidence of the recording Magistrate who had been examined as witness at the trial, 8 C. W. N. 22. See also 222 P. L. R. 1918 = 18 Cr. L. J. 257.

28. **Non-compliance with letter of law may result in diminishing value of confession.**—Magistrates should in all cases be careful to observe all the provisions of ss. 164 and 364, for although various defects can be cured, the value of the confessions may sometimes be very much diminished by non-compliance with the strict letter of the law. *Per* ROBERTSON, J., 7 P. R. 1899.

29-A. It is now *held* by the Calcutta High Court that omission to comply with requirements of s 364 may vitiate a trial. The provisions of s 364 are mandatory. Where the examination of the accused during the trial in the Sessions Court was not recorded, conviction and sentences were set aside and the case was directed to be heard according to law. 29 C. W. N. 939; 52 C. 446; 52 C. 403.

In a Lahore case it was *held* that the omission to record his reasons under s. 256 did not render the trial illegal as s. 256 was not mandatory. Further *held* that the recording of statements of two accused persons collectively, instead of separately, is an illegality which vitiates the proceedings. 8 Lah. 554.

29. **Statement inadmissible if formally not observed.**—Where the examination of the accused is not recorded in conformity to the directions of this section, and when there is no certificate referred to in sub-sec. (2) attached to it, *held* that the Judge rightly rejected it, and did not allow it to go to the assessors or act on it himself, 12 W. R. 44. The law requires attestation by the signature of the Magistrate and is not satisfied by the affixing of an unreadable initial to what purports to be the statement of the accused, 13 W. R. 63; 7 W. R. 49. But a certificate which contains the words, 'taken by me,' but in which the Magistrate omitted to record that the prisoner's statement was taken in his hearing, was treated as substantially a compliance with this section, 3 C. 958 = 6 C. L. R. 333.

30. **Is oral evidence admissible to supplement informal record?**—Under the Code of 1872 the Bombay High Court *held* that oral evidence is admissible and no certificate is necessary. 4. 219; 10 Bom. Jur. 10; 24 W. R. 29.

R. 29 sent the case back for the examination of the Magistrate to remedy the defect. See also 3 A. 338 and 11 Bom. R. C. R. 237. Now under the terms of s. 533, oral evidence that the accused duly made the statement recorded may be given and it provides that notwithstanding anything contained in s. 91 of the Evidence Act such statement shall be admitted if the error has not injured the accused as to his defence on the merits, and s. 533 applies to all cases, in which the directions of the law have not been fully complied with, 23 B. 221; 15 C. 549. But s. 533 does not apply where no record whatever has been made of such a confession and therefore a confession cannot be proved merely by oral evidence, 35 A. 260. In 37 C. 467 it was laid down that ss. 164, 244 and 364 of the Code are not exhaustive and do not limit the generality of s. 21 of the Evidence Act as to relevancy of admissions. See Notes to s. 533 and Note 7 to s. 164 at p. 363.

31. **Confession to Magistrate must be recorded to be admissible.**—The confession by an accused person made to a Magistrate holding an inquiry a matter required by law to be reduced to the form of a document within the meaning of s. 91 of the Evidence Act, and no evidence can be given to the terms of such a confession except the record, if any, made under s. 364. S. 533 deals only with errors in the record and does not apply where no record whatever has been made of such a confession, 35 A. 260.

365. Every High Court established by Royal Charter, *†‡§ shall, from time to time, by general rules, prescribe the manner in which evidence shall be taken in cases coming before the Court, || "and the evidence shall be taken down in accordance with such rule."

Record of evidence in High Court.

* The words "the Chief Court of the Punjab" were repealed by Act XVIII of 1918

† The word "and" was omitted by the Lower Burma Courts Act VI of 1909

‡ The words "and the Chief Court of Lower Burma" were repealed by Act XI of 1923.

§ The word "shall" was substituted for "may" by Act XI III of 1923

|| These words in "and the Judges of such Court shall take down the evidence or the substance thereof in accordance with the rules (if any) so prescribed by this"

CHAPTER XXVI

OF THE JUDGMENT

Note.—Appellate judgment must conform to rules contained in Chapter XXVI. Appellate Courts continually overlook that s 424 prescribes that rules in Chapter XXVI shall apply to judgments of Appellate Courts, 37 C. 194; 14 C. W N 23. The rules contained in this Chapter shall apply, so far as may be practicable to the judgment of any Appellate Court other than a High Court. See s 424

366. (1) The judgment in every trial in any Criminal Court of original jurisdiction shall be pronounced, or the substance of such judgment shall be explained—

Mode of delivering judgment

(a) in open Court either immediately after the termination of the trial or at some subsequent time of which notice shall be given to the parties or their pleaders, and

(b) in the language of the Court, or in some other language which the accused or his pleader understands

Provided that the whole judgment shall be read out by the presiding Judge, if he is requested so to do either by the prosecution or the defence

(2) The accused shall, if in custody, be brought up, or, if not in custody, be required by the Court to attend, to hear judgment delivered, except where his personal attendance during the trial has been dispensed with and the sentence is one of fine only, or he is acquitted, in either of which cases it may be delivered in the presence of his pleader

(3) No judgment delivered by any Criminal Court shall be deemed to be invalid by reason only of the absence of any party or his pleader on the day or from the place notified for the delivery thereof, or of any omission to serve or defect in serving, on the parties or their pleaders, or any of them, the notice of such day and place

(4) Nothing in this section shall be construed to limit in any way the extent of the provisions of section 537

367. (1) Every such judgment shall, except as otherwise expressly provided by this Code be written by the presiding officer of the Court * ' or from the dictation of such presiding officer ' in the language of the Court, or in English, and shall contain the point or points for determination, the decision thereon and the reasons for the decision, and shall be dated and signed by the presiding officer in open Court at the time of pronouncing it † " and where it is not written by the presiding officer with his own hand, every page of such judgment shall be signed by him '

Language of judgment

Contents of judgment

(2) It shall specify the offence (if any) of which, and the section of the Indian Penal Code or other law under which the accused is convicted and the punishment to which he is sentenced

(3) When the conviction is under the Indian Penal Code, and it is doubtful under which of two sections, or under which of two parts of the same section, of that Code the offence falls, the Court shall distinctly express the same, and pass judgment in the alternative

Judgment in alternative

(4) If it be a judgment of acquittal, it shall state the offence of which the accused is acquitted and direct that he be set at liberty

* These words in ——— were inserted by Act XVI of 1937

† These words in ——— " were added by *ibid*

3 Dull or stupid with intemperance

Syn.—Dull, stupid, senseless, foolish, imbecile.

Exsufflag. by ...

For consider into what degree of sottisness and confirmed ignorance men may sink themselves.

without signification, empty noise, noise

else

and not the sound that must be the prin-

cipal

[O Erg souven, Fr sonner, O Fr

r, l, & Ep soner, N. suonare, Lat.

sounded out the word of the Lord. I then t &

to signify, to mean, to import. JDB

to rest, profound, undisturbed, as,

sound sleep

I in case of a more mentioned in the law it translated "sound unconsciousness" but in the Hebrew it sounds "restlessness of night or any real sleep" JDB

I in damara (Law) to have the sound of images. This is at Jol an action brought not very of a year as it is as a replevin doct, &c, as a rule as trespass, &c.

I To cause to make a noise, to play sound a trumpet or a horn.

For and is sometimes used in the same sense as

four
fourth

He is the soul of bounty

4 Energy courage spirit fervor ardor or any other noble manifestation of the heart (moral nature)

That he wants reason, he must needs confess

But will a and to give our sense surceis

Yow

(5) If the accused is convicted for an offence punishable with death, and the Court sentences him to any punishment other than death, the Court shall, in its judgment, state the reason why sentence of death was not passed.

Provided that, in trials by jury, the Court need not write a judgment, but the Court of Sessions shall record the heads of the charge to the jury

* (6) For the purposes of this section, an order under sections 118 or 123, sub-sec (3) shall be deemed to be a judgment

Note.—Referring to the amendment of this section, the Sel. Com. say—

"We do not see any necessity to limit the privilege of dictating judgments in the manner provided by the Bill and we have, therefore, re-drafted this clause. We think it desirable to lay down that orders under ss. 118 and 123 (3) should be deemed to be judgments for the purposes of the section."

APPLICATION OF SECTIONS.

1. **Section apply only to judgments of conviction or acquittal on a trial.**—The term *judgment* is nowhere defined in the Code. In the words of TREVELIAN J in 21 C. 121 at p 127 it means the expression of the opinion of the Judge or Magistrate arrived at after due consideration of the evidence and of the arguments. But the terms of s 367 show that the word as used in this Chapter means a judgment of conviction or of acquittal, and not an order of discharge or the dismissal of a complaint, 29 C. 532; 29 C. 726; 29 M. 126 (F.B.), 31 M. 543. *Quare* Whether the final order of acquittal on a petition of composition is a 'judgment' under this section. 29 P. R. 1914 = 16 Cr. L. J. 81 (F.B.) A judgment is not a judgment 5 N. L. R. 76 = 9 C. 1861 Code was held not to apply to

gation of offences, *Rastalal 61*. It has been said that at common law in strictness a conviction consists of verdict, judgment and sentence. See *Archbold* p 244

2. **Sections do not apply to inquiries** *e.g.*, Chap. XII.—Having regard to the language of s. 366 which deals with 'the judgment in every trial' and the reference in ss 366 and 367 to *the accused* and to *acquittal and conviction* it may be questioned whether this section applies to orders made in *inquiries* (*e.g.*, under Chap. VIII or XII) as distinguished from *trials* 27 M. 510; 37 C. 91. But now under the new sub-section (6) orders under sections 110 and 123 shall be deemed to be judgments. And also see 49 C. 187.

3. **Sections do not apply to sanction proceedings**—In 6 Bom. L. R. 897, it was held this section does not apply to sanction proceedings under s 195 and that it relates only to judgments in trials, *i.e.*, such judgments as are referred to in s 366. It may be held that this section does not apply to proceedings under s. 476 which are substituted for the old sanction proceedings under section 195

4. **Sections do not apply to cases of discharge and dismissal of complaint.**—Discharge and dismissal orders are specially provided for in ss 253, 207 and 203. The Legislature does not render the writing of reasons necessary when an accused person is discharged under s 253, after the whole of the prosecution evidence had been heard. But it is desirable that the Magistrate should record his reasons for discharge though it is not compulsory, 9 Bom. L. R. 250 = 5 Cr. L. J. 235. See 29 C. 726 as to whether an order of discharge amounts to a judgment within the meaning of this section, and the observations of WHITE, C.J., in 29 M. 126 (F.B.) and also 1 N. L. R. 18. In 31 M. 543 it was held that an order of discharge is not a judgment. In 29 P. R. 1914 it was doubted whether an order made on a composition was a judgment.

5. **Sections apply to appellate judgments.**—See s. 424 and 37 C. 194 noted at the head of this Chapter and Notes 29—33 below

6. **Sections do not apply when appeal summarily dismissed.**—See s 421 and Note 29 below. A dismissal of an appeal or an application for default of appearance of party is not a judgment, 5 N. L. R. 76 = 9 Cr. L. J. 533, 10 C. L. J. 80 = 10 Cr. L. J. 237.

II.—DELIVERY OF JUDGMENT.

7. **Judgments to be delivered in open Court.**—Every judgment must be delivered in open Court, 21 C. 121. The judge after writing his judgment, judgment is not to be considered

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as a judgment, but merely as an opinion, 13 W. R. (Civ.) 209; 11 A. L. J. 743 = 14 Cr. L. J. 562. But where a Magistrate conducted and closed the trial in the established Court house, but could not by reasons of illness pronounce judgment, which he did at his private residence, *held*, that the proceedings being exceptional, need not be quashed as illegal, as no prejudice to the accused was made out, 1 Agra H. C. R. 17. Similarly, in 1 Bom. L. R. 117, where the Magistrate had died after passing sentence, but had left no written judgment, the High Court declined to set aside the sentence on the ground that the Magistrate was transferred after he had pronounced sentence. *See also* 1 P. & F. 404; 11 A. L. J. 743.

7-A. When judgment should not be dated and signed.—Section 367 requires the dating and signing of the judgment to be in open Court at the time of its pronouncement, 3 L. W. 476 = (1916) M. W. N. 372.

8. Judgment should not be delivered in the absence of accused.—Accused was charged with abetment of cheating in assisting another person to obtain Rs 5 from complainant. He absconded after all the evidence had been taken, was convicted and sentenced in his absence. But the Magistrate re-pronounced judgment on his being re-arrested and brought before him. *Held*, that judgment should not be pronounced in the absence of the accused, Ratanlal 325. But s 366 (2) contemplates the absence of accused up to the stage of judgment or even after that stage when the judgment is one of acquittal or of fine only, 6 B. L. R. 206 = 14 Cr. L. J. 272. In England, if the Court is satisfied that the prisoner is too ill or infirm to be brought up, the judgment may be pronounced in his absence, R v Constable, 7 D and B 669. *Archbold* p 240.

9. No Court has inherent power to adjourn passing of sentence for indefinite period.—Judgment in criminal cases should be delivered without undue delay, as delay is not only unjust to the accused as it prevents them from appealing at once, but it is opposed to the principles of law, 5 C. P. 24. Where on conviction, under s. 379, I P. C., the Judge directed the accused to furnish security for six months and then to come up for receiving sentence and the Judge justified his procedure on the ground that he was only adjourning the proceedings by not passing a sentence but instead calling on the accused to furnish security, *held* that no Court has inherent power to adjourn the passing of sentence in this way for an indefinite period and the Judge did not exercise his discretion reasonably. The order cannot be treated as one of adjournment because the Judge has as a matter directed a security to be given which is a sentence, 14 Bom. L. R. 144 = 1 Bom. C. C. 85 = 13 Cr. L. J. 288.

10. Judgment must be written and delivered before sentence is pronounced.—Judgment must always be written and delivered before sentence is pronounced. It is illegal to pass a sentence at the termination of a trial and to postpone the writing of the judgment to a future occasion. All cases must continue to be shown on the pending file until judgment and sentence are written and delivered, *Pun. Civ.* p 239.

11. Legality of conviction where judgment written after sentence.—In 14 A. 242 it was *held* that inasmuch as a sentence in the case of conviction and the direction to set the accused at liberty in the case of acquittal can only follow on the decision and cannot precede it and inasmuch as the decision must be contained in the written judgment which is read out in open Court, and in such judgment only, it must necessarily follow that where there is no written judgment when the sentence is passed the sentence is illegal. But now the rigour of this rule is somewhat relaxed as sub-sec. (4) indicates that the want of a complete judgment in writing can be cured by s. 537, 23 C. 502. In 1892 A. W. N. 157, where judgment had not been delivered until several days after the order of acquittal had been passed and the accused had been discharged from custody, the order of acquittal was set aside and re-trial ordered, on appeal by Government. The Madras High Court, following the Allahabad Rulings, set aside a conviction and ordered re-trial, where a Sessions Judge had his judgment ready only some days after pronouncing sentence of conviction, holding that the procedure adopted was in violation of the provisions of ss 366, 367, 27 M. 237, where 14 A. 242 is approved. *See also* Madras Case Ref. Trial I of 1909 noted in 19 M. L. J. (S.N.) at p 9. A Magistrate passed sentence on the accused without delivering his judgment in open Court, the judgment (one in the course of being written during the hearing of the case) being in fact not then completed. The case went on appeal to the Sessions Judge, who dealing fully with the evidence taken before the Magistrate, confirmed the conviction and sentence. *Held, per* PRINSEP and TREVELYAN, JJ, that the judgment of the Magistrate was not in accordance with the law as laid down in this section, but *held by* PRINSEP and O'KINEALY, JJ (TREVELYAN, J, *dissenting*), that the irregularity was contemplated by s. 537 and not having occasioned failure of justice, re-trial was not necessary, *per* TREVELYAN, J, the case was more than one of mere irregularity within the meaning of s. 537. The judgment having been irregularly arrived at and pronounced, there was no judgment in accordance with law, and therefore no fair trial to which every accused person is entitled, the case ought therefore to be re-tried. Judgment means the expression of the opinion of the Judge or Magistrate arrived at after due consideration of the evidence and of the arguments, 21 C. 121. *See also* 20 C. 353. It is a material

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irregularity to pass a sentence before recording a judgment, but unless it has occasioned failure of justice the conviction need not be quashed, 5 B. L. R. 131 = 12 Cr. L. J. 610. Whether a judgment delivered after sentence passed is an illegality or a mere irregularity must depend on the circumstances of each case, 13 Bom. L. R. 435 = 12 Cr. L. J. 457. In this case the High Court refused to interfere with the judgment of the Presidency Magistrate as the accused had not been prejudiced. Where a Magistrate died immediately after pronouncing sentence, but before writing judgment, High Court declined to interfere in the matter, holding that it was for the accused either to have moved the High Court or to have exercised their right of appeal, 1 Bom. L. R. 117. In 1 Bom. L. R. 160, under similar circumstances, there was a petition of the accused, so the High Court reversed the conviction and ordered re-trial. See 45 M. 913 = 43 M. L. J. 369 (F.B.)

12. Conviction not bad where Magistrate died without writing judgment.—A Subordinate Magistrate died after passing sentence but before recording judgment. The sentences were entered on the back of the depositions and the accused were committed to custody under warrant addressed to the jailor. *Held*, on reference to quash the proceedings, that a conviction on a trial regularly held will not be set aside merely because the Magistrate had been unavoidably prevented from recording a judgment in accordance with the requirements of s. 367. In such circumstances, the right of appeal is not taken away by the absence of a complete judgment, *Weir II*, 438. See Note 7.

13. Delivery of sentence and subsequent destruction of judgment does not render conviction illegal.—S. 366 only imposes the condition that the judgment should be pronounced in open Court and imposes a few other conditions but such conditions do not include the condition that the record should not have been lost or that if only a portion of the judgment (that relating to conviction and sentence only) is pronounced the conviction is illegal. In *Weir II*, 711, omission to read a portion of the judgment was *held* to be a mere irregularity covered by s. 537. So also omission to pronounce the judgment before convicting and sentencing is cured by s. 537, though it might be different if no judgment had been written, 38 M. 498.

14. Delivery of judgment must not be delegated.—The duty of dating and signing the judgment and of delivering the same should not be delegated by the presiding officer to any other. In a case in which the Sessions Judge after holding trial in a district within his Sessions division, went back to his headquarters in another district and sent his judgment in the case to the Magistrate of the district in which the trial had taken place, to be delivered by the latter and the latter delivered it accordingly, it was *held* that the trial had never been legally complete and must be set aside, 1889 A. W. N. 181. But in 18 M. L. J. 197 = 7 Cr. L. J. 439 it was *held* that a judgment written by a Magistrate, but dated, signed and pronounced by his successor, was good.

III.—LANGUAGE AND CONTENTS OF JUDGMENT.

15. Judgment must be written by the Court.—The judgment must be written by the Court itself. It will not do if the judgment is written by a clerk and signed by the Court, *Ratanlal* 545. See, however, ss. 265 and 370. In other cases, it will not do if the judgment is written by a clerk and signed by the Judge, 11 A. 242. The judgment must be in the hand writing of the presiding officer, but where it was actually dictated and when reduced to writing signed by the Magistrate, the procedure was *held* to be a mere irregularity curable by s. 537, 4 C. L. J. 411.

16. Judgment to be in language of the Court or in English.—Under this section, the judgment of a Criminal Court, should be written in the language of the Court or in English. Where an Honorary Magistrate had written his judgment in *Urdu*, the script used being *Persian*. *Held*, this was irregular and that the judgment should have been in *Hindi* (language of the Court) or in English, and the script should have been in the former case *Kash* (as directed by the Local Government) and *Roman* in the latter. The irregularity was, however, cured by s. 537, 4 C. L. J. 232 = 4 Cr. L. J. 162.

17. Judgment must be written before passing of sentence.—See Note 11 above.

18. Judgment must be temperate and sober.—Comment on conduct of parties and witnesses should not go beyond what is really necessary.—"A judgment is a privileged document and it is well to remind judicial officers that the immunity which they enjoy in writing judgments carries with it the duty of circumspection. Any temptation to pillory or pour ridicule on strangers should be restrained and comments on the conduct of witnesses and parties should not go beyond what is really necessary for the elucidation of the case. A humorous judgment is not necessarily a bad one. But if it is a good judgment its value does not depend on the value of its humour. It is better to disregard the humorous aspect altogether, even if the reproach of dulness was incurred in consequence." 4 Bur. L. T. 473 = 12 Cr. L. J. 464. In this case it was *held* there was no sufficient

reason to order anything to be expunged. It cannot be too strongly insisted on, that temperate and sober language should be used in judgments. It must not be forgotten that strangers attacked in judgments are not able to defend themselves. A judgment should confine itself to a consideration of the issues before the Court together with fair and legitimate comment on any errors or irregularities that may be disclosed in the course of the trial, 5 *Bur. L. T.* 20 = 13 *Cr. L. J.* 259. In this case several parts of the judgment were directed to be expunged. For the purposes of judgment in a Sessions trial, the testimony or conduct of Police-officers concerned may be scrutinised and commented on in the same degree as those of other material witnesses and no further, 25 *W. R.* 65. Remarks to the effect that the prisoner was a person of wealth and influence, and had prevented truth from appearing, ought not, unless established in evidence, to find a place in a judgment, 8 *W. R.* 13.

19. Contents of judgment.—Care shall be taken that the decisions of judicial officers are written on a uniform, concise and complete plan, neither too prolix, nor omitting all reference to the facts, as is sometimes the case. Reference should first be concisely made to the main facts and proofs on which the decision is founded, secondly, the deduction and reasons should follow, and then in due course will come, thirdly, the sentence or decision. When reference is made in a judgment to witnesses or accused persons, Judges shall not content themselves with merely mentioning their numbers on the list, but shall also mention their names. The name of the person referred to shall always be distinctly stated, *Oudh Cr Dig.*, p 22. Judgments are sometimes faulty, in that they hardly refer to the evidence at all, and contain little more than an expression of the Magistrate's convictions as to the guilt of the accused. Others, again, are rambling, inconsistent and arbitrary. Magistrates import into their judgments their personal knowledge of character and behaviour, and refer to matters not found in the record in explanation of the probable motives or causes which may have led to an offence. A judgment should be clear, systematic and straightforward. It should state the facts of the case, establishing each fact by reference to the particular evidence by which it is supported, and it should give sufficiently and plainly the reasons which justify the finding, *C P Cr Cir.*, Part II, No 27, 14 *C. W. N.* 23. Attention is drawn to s 367 which lays down what every judgment of a Criminal Court must contain, and in particular to the necessity of stating clearly the points for determination in each case, *Bom H C Cr Cir.*, p 38.

20. Judgment should contain enough particulars to enable Appellate Court to decide whether it will interfere.—A judgment should state sufficient particulars to enable a Court of Appeal to know what facts are found and how, *Ratanlal* 833. Where the judgment of an Appellate Court is in the nature of a stereotyped one, which might answer for any case, it is not in accordance with this section and s 424. But where a judgment though not a long and elaborate one affords a clear indication that the Court duly considered the evidence, it is a good judgment, 1 *C. W. N.* 169, and see Note below.

21. Particulars to be given in every judgment.—(i) *Names of accused to be set out*—At the head of every written judgment and of the record of the heads of the charge to the jury, the names of all the accused persons shall always be set out, together with the numbers by which they may respectively be referred to by the Court in the course of the judgment or charge to the jury, *Bom H C Cr Cir.*, p 39.

The following tabular form should be annexed to judgment, *Madras G O No 918, dated 16th June, 1910*—

| Serial Number | Description of accused. | | | | | | Date of | | | | | Explanation of delay |
|---------------|-------------------------|----------------|--------|-------------|------------|------|-------------|------------|--------------|------------------------|----------------|----------------------|
| | Name. | Father's name. | Caste. | Occupation. | Residence. | Age. | Occurrence. | Complaint. | Apprehension | Commencement of trial. | Close of trial | |
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(ii) *Offences must be clearly specified*—The offence of which the accused is convicted must be specified in the judgment with the same precision as in the charge 5 L B R 21; 33 C. 718. When an offender is convicted of two or more offences and it is competent to the Court to award more than one sentence the Court shall in its judgment declare in respect of which offence or offences any sentences awarded is imposed *Mad G O No 1448 Judicial dated 26th October 1909*

(iii) *Finding on all charges to be given*—A Sessions Judge should record findings whether of conviction or on all the charges under which prisoners are committed for trial 13 W R. 50

(iv) *Judgments should be signed and not stamped*—Judicial officers shall in all cases take care to sign their names distinctly and legibly *Wilkins 119*. When the law prescribes that a proceeding should be signed by a judicial officer it ordinarily intends that the signature should be made with a pen and not with a stamp. There are obvious reasons why judicial documents should be authenticated in such a manner that their authenticity may admit of proof 6 M 396, and the signature by a Magistrate to the judgment must be appended at the time of pronouncing it in open Court *Ratanlal 429*. In the case of all the documents which are required by law to be signed the impression of a stamp bearing the officer's name is insufficient and illegal *Wilkins 119*

(v) *Indication of power should be apparent beneath the signatures of Magistrates*—Magistrates should indicate in their judgments beneath their signatures the extent of their magisterial powers with which they have been invested. Omission to do so frequently impedes the exercise of the powers of revision possessed by the High Court *M H C Memo 27th July 1871*. In every sentence or order made by a Criminal Court the jurisdiction of the Judge or Magistrate making it should distinctly appear on the face of the record *Wilkins 112*

(vi) *List of witnesses and material objects must be appended*—There shall be appended to every judgment a list of the witnesses examined by the prosecution and for the defence and by the Court also a list of exhibits and material objects *R 39 Madras Rules of Practice*

(vii) *In trials with assessors*—The record of opinions of the assessors should be appended to the judgment. It should also be noted of what caste or castes the assessors were. See Rules 245 and 250 of the *Madras Rules of Practice*. Where the Sessions Judge convicted the accused but gave no reason for differing from the opinion of the assessors it was held to be an irregularity which did not vitiate his finding 6 B H C R. Cr Ca. 53. But where an Appellate Court merely rejected an appeal without specifying the points for determination its decision thereon and the reasons therefor the appeal was ordered to be reheard 6 P R 1376

(viii) *Judgment must specify punishment*—Under this section this sentence is a part of the judgment and when an accused person is convicted it is incumbent upon the Court to pass a formal sentence of but a single day's imprisonment (or any other punishment) in order to make the record legally complete unless it seems fit to act under s. 562 1833 A W N 210. It is illegal to antedate a sentence. It is imprisonment for as many days as he is imprisoned after conviction and release him at once *Ratanlal 892*

22. *Judgment in particular offences*—(i) *Mischief*—In every case of mischief (s. 425 I P C), a question of legal title involved is a point for determination. It is the duty of the Criminal Court to determine whether the offender in such a case was not acting in the exercise of a *bona fide* claim of right 2 A 101 at p. 103

(ii) *Unlawful assembly*—It is the duty of the Court to determine where several alternative common objects of an unlawful assembly are alleged in the charge to determine whether the charge is sustainable and if so which of the common objects is made out 35 C. 718, 36 C. 158. On a charge under s. 143 I P C. the judgment should contain as one of the points for determination on a statement as to existence of the elements constituting the unlawful assembly 37 C. 194

(iii) *Theft*—The judgment on a charge under s. 379 I P C should contain as one of the points for determination the question as to the dishonest intention and a finding on it especially when a *bona fide* claim of right is set up 37 C. 194

23. *Duty of the Court of limited jurisdiction to state in conviction its legal justification*—Every conviction by a Court of limited jurisdiction ought to contain a statement of its legal justification within itself. Therefore where the accused was convicted under s. 47 of Bom. Act V of 1878 (*Abkari*) for being in possession of more than one gallon of country liquor without a permit from the Collector and sentenced to pay a fine of Rs. 10 the conviction was reversed as being insufficient on its face and no other authority being cited in support of it *Ratanlal 310*

24. Judgment must be self-contained and cannot be supported by subsequent explanation.—A Magistrate cannot supplement his judgment by his explanation to the superior Court. If there are no material findings in the judgment, the defect cannot be cured by the Magistrate's explanation, 7 C. L. J. 238 = 7 Cr. L. J. 312.

25. Personal knowledge of Magistrate may be stated in judgment.—It is not improper for a Magistrate to state in his judgment as an additional ground for believing certain evidence that it is in accord with what he had himself personally seen or heard *M H C Pro*, 6th September, 1883. But where the judgment in a criminal trial is based partly upon evidence and opinions formed in another criminal case the conviction was set aside on the ground of prejudice to the accused 11 C. W. N. 151.

26. Reasons for not passing capital sentences to be stated, when accused convicted of offences so punishable.—Sub-sec. (5) of s. 367 must be complied with, 8 M. L. T. 81 = 11 Cr. L. J. 481. Judges must not shirk from doing their duty and they are bound to pass the death sentence in a case of murder when they believe the evidence, 7 W. R. 33. The fact that the accused is a woman is no ground for not passing the death sentence 1885 A. W. N. 134. Even where the accused is a pregnant woman, capital sentence should be passed, but the execution of the sentence shall be deferred till after delivery, 15 W. R. 55. Where a Judge passes on conviction for murder, the alternative sentence of transportation for life, he should set forth his reasons for not passing the capital sentence, 1864 W. R. 27. The circumstance that the body of the murdered man has not been found should not influence the Court in passing the death sentences, 3 A. 333; 1882 A. W. N. 160. But see 11 W. R. 20. Where, however, the condition of the accused rendered it likely that if he were hanged, decapitation would ensue, the sentence of death was commuted to transportation for life, 2 C. L. R. 215. In 16 M. L. T. 535 = (1915) M. W. N. 34, the fact that the evidence was all circumstantial and the age of the accused were taken into consideration.

27. Benefit of doubt as to propriety of death-sentence to be given to accused.—Where a Judge is in doubt whether a sentence of death or a sentence other than death should be passed in a capital case, the doubt like all other doubts should result in favour of the accused. It is quite erroneous and illegal, that feeling reasonable doubt as to whether death alone can be the proper penalty, the Judge should yet pass a sentence of death, leaving the responsibility to the High Court of commuting it, if necessary. There is no authority in law for holding that a Sessions Judge has any right to devolve his responsibility in respect of sentence in a capital case on a higher tribunal, 3 L. B. R. 111 = 3 Cr. L. J. 23, where 1 L. B. R. 216 is *dissented from*. It is highly improper for a Sessions Judge to pass sentence of death and, at the same time in his reference to the High Court, recommend the prisoner for mercy, *M H C Pro*, 24th April, 1866.

28. Judgment in the alternative.—The provision in sub-sec. (3) applies only where the facts are established but there is a doubt as to the application of the law to the proved facts and not where the doubt in the mind of the Judge is whether there was sufficient proof that the accused had committed one of two offences, e.g., murder of the deceased or merely caused evidence of the murder to disappear, 11 P. R. 1913. See Note 6 to s. 236, 11 P. R. 1887; 7 N.-W. P. H. C. R. 137 and 21 C. 955 *referred to*. The power to pass judgment in the alternative should not be resorted to until both the committing officer and the Sessions Judge are satisfied that no reliable evidence is procurable in support of one or other of the charges, and such a finding cannot be based in a case of giving false evidence upon the statements which are not absolutely contradictory, the one or the other, nor when in one of them the accused gives only hearsay evidence. Every presumption in favour of the possible reconciliation of the statement must be made, 12 W. R. 11. As the section allows a judgment to be given in the alternative, where it is doubtful under which of two sections or of two parts of same section, an offence falls, and alternative finding that a trespass was committed with one or other of two intents, either of which would make it criminal trespass as defined in s. 441, I P C., is sufficient if there is evidence to support the finding, 5 P. R. 1886. So where the judgment did not state in express terms that the Court was in doubt as to the question under which of two sections the offence fell as required by this section, *held*, that this was at most an irregularity and did not vitiate the judgment, *Weir II*, 450.

IV.—JUDGMENT ON APPEAL.

29. Section inapplicable when appeal summarily rejected under s. 421.—Though in rejecting an appeal under s. 421, the Appellate Court is not bound to write a judgment, 20 B. 540; 21 C. 92, 23 M. 534; 35 A. 496, it is advisable to give reason for dismissing the appeal, in view of the order being challenged by an application for revision, 17 A. 241 (F.B.), 35 A. 496; 13 N. L. R. 169. See Notes 10 and 11 to s. 369.

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1: spiraculo

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9. *External aperture* The external aperture of the tra-

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single woman
as a wife, or addition to

1. *Chlorophyll a* and *Chlorophyll b* contents were determined by spectrophotometry using the method of Lichtenthaler and Whistler (1987). The total chlorophyll content was determined by the method of Arar and Cook (1980). The carotenoid content was determined by the method of Lichtenthaler and Whistler (1987). The total phenolic content was determined by the method of Singleton and Rossi (1965). The total flavonoid content was determined by the method of Zhishen et al. (1999). The total protein content was determined by the method of Lowry et al. (1951). The total lipid content was determined by the method of Folch et al. (1957). The total carbohydrate content was determined by the method of Dubois and Gilles (1950). The total ash content was determined by the method of AOAC (1990). The total acid content was determined by the method of AOAC (1990). The total alkaline content was determined by the method of AOAC (1990). The total nitrogen content was determined by the method of Kjeldahl (1950). The total phosphorus content was determined by the method of Molybdenum blue (1950). The total potassium content was determined by the method of Flame photometry (1950). The total calcium content was determined by the method of Atomic absorption spectrophotometry (1950). The total magnesium content was determined by the method of Atomic absorption spectrophotometry (1950). The total iron content was determined by the method of Atomic absorption spectrophotometry (1950). The total zinc content was determined by the method of Atomic absorption spectrophotometry (1950). The total copper content was determined by the method of Atomic absorption spectrophotometry (1950). The total manganese content was determined by the method of Atomic absorption spectrophotometry (1950). The total selenium content was determined by the method of Atomic absorption spectrophotometry (1950). The total iodine content was determined by the method of Atomic absorption spectrophotometry (1950). The total bromine content was determined by the method of Atomic absorption spectrophotometry (1950). The total fluorine content was determined by the method of Atomic absorption spectrophotometry (1950). The total chlorine content was determined by the method of Atomic absorption spectrophotometry (1950). The total sulfur content was determined by the method of Atomic absorption spectrophotometry (1950). The total carbon content was determined by the method of Atomic absorption spectrophotometry (1950). The total oxygen content was determined by the method of Atomic absorption spectrophotometry (1950). The total hydrogen content was determined by the method of Atomic absorption spectrophotometry (1950). The total nitrogen content was determined by the method of Atomic absorption spectrophotometry (1950). The total phosphorus content was determined by the method of Atomic absorption spectrophotometry (1950). The total potassium content was determined by the method of Atomic absorption spectrophotometry (1950). The total calcium content was determined by the method of Atomic absorption spectrophotometry (1950). The total magnesium content was determined by the method of Atomic absorption spectrophotometry (1950). The total iron content was determined by the method of Atomic absorption spectrophotometry (1950). The total zinc content was determined by the method of Atomic absorption spectrophotometry (1950). The total copper content was determined by the method of Atomic absorption spectrophotometry (1950). The total manganese content was determined by the method of Atomic absorption spectrophotometry (1950). The total selenium content was determined by the method of Atomic absorption spectrophotometry (1950). The total iodine content was determined by the method of Atomic absorption spectrophotometry (1950). The total bromine content was determined by the method of Atomic absorption spectrophotometry (1950). The total fluorine content was determined by the method of Atomic absorption spectrophotometry (1950). The total chlorine content was determined by the method of Atomic absorption spectrophotometry (1950). The total sulfur content was determined by the method of Atomic absorption spectrophotometry (1950). The total carbon content was determined by the method of Atomic absorption spectrophotometry (1950). The total oxygen content was determined by the method of Atomic absorption spectrophotometry (1950). The total hydrogen content was determined by the method of Atomic absorption spectrophotometry (1950).

A legend of fiery form belied the gods
 as white on red sand, the boy said

2. A lot of that is set up or
out to be a lot of that

1) Paradise is a step a
 way from body with the

1. No special jurisdiction
 allowed. U. 110.

3. I stalked birds of stone

of off r, lant

1. To shoot up pyramidically; to shoot
 the (Obs) Genslow

1 sprout | To sprout a grain in malting
living a spire

as of a church the upper extremity of a
/ 196 /

(90) a [Fr] a [rɛʒim] fr Lat spiritus regis
e t l u r] (f form) One of an ex m

1. [O. Ex. *exposit* *exposit* 2. Ex. *exposit*]

Lat. spiratus from spirare, to breathe, to

set in motion by breathing breath hence,
 we life itself. All of us must do

the wind air with season moderate.

...breathing. An agonistic — all of its

$\{C_1, C_2\}$

done, for, dg, wqll, foqd, foel;

30. Unless every appellate judgment conforms to provisions of s. 367 it is not legal.—See s. 421 and Notes thereto. No judgment of a Court other than a High Court which purports to dispose of an appeal under s. 423 is a legal judgment unless it contains at least (1) the point or points for determination raised by the memorandum of appeal, (2) the decisions thereon and (3) the reasons for the decisions. The Legislature appears to regard two rules as cardinal points in ensuring public confidence in the tribunals of justice, namely (1) that the Judges should understand and the parties before them should have the assurance that they do understand what questions are submitted for their decision and (2) that the Judges should lay open to criticism the reasons which impel them to their conclusions. A judgment as the following "I have considered the evidence in this case and I agree with the Magistrate in his conclusions and in the reasons given for them, and in my opinion the sentence which he passed was a proper sentence," is not a proper judgment. The fallacy in 19 A. 506 lies in the assumption that, in a criminal appeal, the matter before the Appellate Court is precisely and only, the matter which was before the first Court. This is obviously not the case. The first Court had to try the accused for the offence charged, and both parties are entitled to a judgment which shows *on the face of it* that the 'case' of both parties has been judicially considered and weighed one against the other prior to arrival at a decision. The Appellate Court has to try, not the accused, but the appeal. In every appeal, at least two points are raised which can only be raised for decision in the Appellate Court, namely (1) is any objection raised in the memorandum of appeal a valid objection and if not, (2) is there any ground apparent on the record for interference in appeal. The judgment abovementioned does not comply with the law and ought not to be accepted as valid merely because Judges can be trusted to act honourably. The judgment of EDGE, C.J., in 19 A. 506 dissented from, 8 N. L. R. 84 = 13 Cr. L. J. 559. See 10 A. L. J. 435 = 13 Cr. L. J. 859; (1913) U. B. R. 2nd Ge 169 = 14 Cr. L. J. 570, 37 C. 194. Having regard, however, to the provisions of s. 537, it does not follow that because the form of judgment does not exactly comply with all the requirements of this section, it is not a valid judgment and the conviction must be set aside. It is sufficient if the Judge in appeal has appreciated the points which the prosecution had to establish and expressed opinion thereon, 20 C. 353 and 19 A. 506 (F.B.). In 35 C. 158, a conviction for rioting was not set aside even though there was no express finding as to the common object, as the common object was set out in the charge and there was no question about it and the accused was not prejudiced, 22 C. 276 and 33 C. 295 distinguished. See 33 C. 384 for a slight difference in the common object charged and found, 24 A. L. J. R. 318.

Effect of s. 537—S. 537 (a) deals with omission or irregularity in a judgment and it cannot be invoked in a case of the absence of any judgment. Where the only order made was—the appeal is dismissed under s. 423, Cr. P. C., held the order could not be sustained, 17 Bom. L. R. 1085 = 16 Cr. L. J. 832. The provisions of s. 367 are mandatory. See 8 N. L. R. 84 = 13 Cr. L. J. 559.

31. Case of several accused—Appellate judgment must be independent and not supplementary to judgment of first Court.—An Appellate judgment must be quite independent and stand by itself. It ought not to be read in connection with or as supplementary to the judgment of the Court of First Instance. The judgment of an Appellate Court dealing with the case of several accused in a joint trial must show on the face of it that the case of each accused has been taken into consideration and should state reasons as far as may be necessary to show that the Appellate Court has devoted judicial attention to the case of each accused. 35 C. 133; 37 C. 91; 16 Cr. L. J. 496 (M).

32. Instances of informal and defective appellate judgments—Where an additional Sessions Judge after admitting an appeal without dismissing it under s. 421, disposed of it in these terms—"No one appears to argue the appeal. I have read the record myself and think the conviction is right, appeal dismissed" it was held this order did not comply with the provisions of this section and that the Appellate Court ought to have written a judgment, even if no one appeared for the accused, 11 C. W. N. 133. Even if the counsel for the appellant does not refer to the defence evidence it is the duty of the Appellate Court to look into that evidence and after dealing with it come to its own decision, 40 C. 376, and see Note 11 under s. 369. The Appellate Court in finally deciding the appeal should record its reasons for confirming, reversing or modifying the sentences or orders of Lower Courts, 5 M. H. C. R. Appx XII. Although, as a general rule, it is not incumbent on an Appellate Court to record its reasons in full when confirming a decision, yet in the circumstances of a case, anything peculiar should be noted, 8 B. H. C. R. Cr. Ca. 101; and where no facts were stated and no reasons given in the judgment for the conclusion arrived at on appeal, by a Sessions Judge, the appeal was ordered to be re-heard, 7 C. W. N. 30, 9 C. W. N. 23. Similarly, where a Sessions Judge, after hearing an appeal gave the following judgment "It is urged that the evidence is quite untrustworthy, and that the decision should be reversed. The depositions have been gone through and commented on at considerable

length. The Court finds no ground for interference. The application is dismissed," it was *held* that this was not a sufficient compliance with this section and s 424 of the Code, and, that the case should be re-tried, 11 C. 444 *followed* in 13 C. 110. Similarly, when the judgment contained inconsistent findings of fact and it was not possible to decide which set of findings was correct without going through the whole evidence the appeal was directed to be re-heard, 13 Cr. L. J. 895 (C). Again when on appeal the Sessions Judge gave the following judgment "After reading the evidence and hearing the learned counsel for the appellant and the learned Government pleader, I am convinced that the Deputy Magistrate has decided the case rightly. The appeal is dismissed." *Held*, that the judgment was not in accordance with the law with the meaning of this section and s. 424, 23 C. 420. But a Magistrate is not bound to give his opinion as to the character of the evidence in prolix detail, much less the Judge in confirming the sentence passed by the Magistrate, 1884 W. R. Sup. Vol. Cr. 6; 19 A. 506; 20 C. 353. The judgment of an Appellate Court must comply with the provisions of s 367. If it does not consider the evidence of the defence nor even allude to it, it is defective 7 M. L. T. 182 = 11 Cr. L. J. 331; 18 C. W. N. 167; 12 M. L. T. 335 = (1912) M. W. N. 881 = 13 Cr. L. J. 712. So an Appellate judgment which merely stated "I have heard the arguments and have perused the records. The conviction is in my opinion thoroughly justifiable on the evidence on record" is defective, 13 C. W. N. 192. See also 18 P. R. 1897; 1886 A. W. N. 289; 22 C. 241; 15 B. 11; 31 P. R. 1884; 8 A. 514; 17 Bom. L. R. 1085 = 16 Cr. L. J. 882 and see Notes under s 424.

33. Even order of acquittal may be set aside if judgment defective.—In 5 C. L. J. 452 = 5 Cr. L. J. 349, it was *held* that the High Court should not interfere with an order of acquittal, unless there has been a miscarriage of justice. Where, however, an appellate judgment of acquittal, was so meagre that it was impossible to form an opinion as to the merits of the case or to say whether there has been a miscarriage of justice or not, the High Court on the application of the complainant set aside the order of acquittal, directing appeal to be re-heard. See also 7 C. W. N. 30, 13 Cr. L. J. 48 and see next Note.

33-A. Appellate Court not to remand for insufficiency of original judgment.—The orders of High Courts directing re-hearing for insufficiency of judgments being passed mostly in revision, it is not to be supposed that an Appellate Court is competent to remand a case, because the Court of the First Instance has not recorded a proper judgment. Its duty is to decide the case under appeal on its merits, 32 C. 1069. But it would be for those who contend that a judgment is not a proper judgment, so as to have in fact occasioned a failure of justice (s 537) to show that there were points raised for the determination of the Appellate Court on which no decision was given or reasons stated. The fact that the objection was set out in the petition of appeal does not show that it was necessarily taken in the course of argument before the Appellate Court, nor is it the duty of the Appellate Court to do more than consider the arguments actually raised at the hearing of an appeal, 21 C. 131 at p. 125. See, however, Notes 30 and 33.

Y.—RECORD OF CHARGE TO THE JURY.

(See s. 297 and Notes under Heading I thereto) .

34. Charge to the jury need not be written before being delivered.—It is not necessary that the direction to the jury should be reduced to writing before delivery, but it is essential that the "heads of the charge" placed upon the record should represent with absolute accuracy the substance of the charge, and be such as to enable the High Court, in the event of an appeal, to see distinctly whether the case was fairly and properly placed before the jury, *Wilkins*, 116, 34 C. 698; 36 C. 281.

35. Charge must be written out as soon as possible after the delivery of the charge.—In a case the verdict was delivered on the 29th May, and the sentence was passed on the 5th June, but the charge to the jury was not written out until the 29th June. On appeal the High Court remarked though there was nothing in the section as to when the charge must be written as in the case of a judgment, it was very unsatisfactory that the charge was not written out until nearly three weeks after the sentence. "We are strongly of opinion that in these cases such charges ought to be written out as soon as possible after the charge to the jury has been actually delivered, and when the facts of the case are fresh in the mind of the Judge," 36 C. 281.

36. Reference to heads of charge not sufficient when jury become assessors.—When an accused person is charged at the same trial with several offences some of which are, and some are not, triable by jury, and with respect to the heads of charge on which the Sessions Judge convicts the jury become assessors, it is the duty of the Judge to pronounce a judgment containing the particulars specified in s 367. A reference to the heads of the charge to the jury is not a sufficient compliance with the requirements of the section, *Ratanlal* 426.

37. What "the heads of the charge to the jury" should contain?—These words must be construed reasonably, and must be held to include such statement on the part of the Sessions Judge as will enable the Appellate Court to decide whether the evidence has been properly laid before the jury, or whether there has been any misdirection in the charge, 23 W. R. 32, and must represent with absolute accuracy the substance of the charge, 36 C. 231 referring to *Circular Orders of the Cal H C Ch I, Ord 59*. Although a Judge is not bound to record a judgment yet he should give sufficient indication in his record of the heads of the charge that he has complied with the law so as to enable the Appellate Court to determine whether or not he has acted in accordance with this section, 25 C. 736. In a trial by jury before a Sessions Judge, the record made by the Judge of the heads of his charge to the jury under the provisions of this section should include such a statement as will enable an Appellate Court to decide whether the evidence was properly laid before the jury, or whether there has been any misdirection in the charge 1903 A. W. N. 232; 39 A. 343, 4 Pat. 626 following 3 Pat. L J 613 and 1 Pat L J. 317. See 30 C. W. N. 693.

VI.—EXPUNGING REMARKS FROM JUDGMENT.

38. Judge himself may expunge remarks.—It is open to a Judge to reconsider and expunge damaging observations regarding a witness in a criminal case who had at the trial no chance of defending himself. This does not amount to the reviewing of a criminal judgment as there is no question of re-considering the guilt of the accused, 2 P. W. R. 1910 = 11 Cr. L. J. 176.

39. Power of High Court to expunge improper remarks from judgment of Subordinate Court.—G S and G C were prosecuted under ss 181 and 189, 1 P C, for making a false statement on oath, the alleged false statement being that G C was 21 years old and eldest son of his father. The Magistrate discharging the accused recorded his opinion that both the accused had deliberately perjured themselves. Only one witness was examined for the prosecution who gave no evidence tending to show whether the statement was false or true. The accused asserted the truth of their statement, but no evidence was adduced for the defence also, *Att. Gen. v. CLARKE C J and CHATTERJEE, J*, that under the circumstances, it was obviously most improper for the Magistrate to express any opinion that the accused had deliberately perjured themselves and the words "I am of opinion that both the accused have deliberately perjured themselves" were ordered to be expunged from the judgment *Punjab Gazette, 23rd November, 1901*. See also 22 P. W. R. 1908 = 197 P. L. R. 1903 = 3 Cr. L. J. 463. An application to expunge several paragraphs from the appellate judgment in the *Kodur case* was made to the Madras High Court by the Public Prosecutor, but the Court merely enhanced the sentence expressing its disapproval of the views of the Sessions Judge, *M H C Cr Rev Case 530 of 1907*. In 3 Bar L. T. 20 = 13 Cr. L. J. 259, the High Court directed several parts of the judgment to be expunged. See also 4 Bar. L. T. 173 = 12 Cr. L. J. 465. In 15 Cr. L. J. 420 (Oudh) the High Court directed the expunging from judgment of the Lower Court remarks against the accused's counsel to the effect that a suggestion was a daring attempt to mislead the Court.

VII.—MISCELLANEOUS.

40. Particulars to be endorsed on the copy of judgment.—In order to aid the Appellate Courts in determining whether appeals are time-barred by limitation, every Criminal Court subordinate to High Court shall cause to be endorsed the following particular on every copy of a judgment, order, or charge to a jury furnished under the provisions of s. 371 or s. 548, Cr. Pro. Code.—(1) The date on which the copy was applied for, (2) the date on which it was ready for delivery and (3) the date on which it was delivered. To prevent unauthorized alterations being made, the date should be written in letters in distinct hand writing and each endorsement should be signed by some responsible officer of the Court on the date to which it refers *Bom H C Cr Cir.*, p 72, *Wilkins, 138*.

41. Copies of conviction and sentences of persons in the Military Department.—When any person serving under the Government of Bombay in the Military Department is convicted in a Criminal Court, such Court shall inform the officer commanding the regiment or corps to which the convict belongs, *Bom H C Cr Cir.*, p 38, see also *Pun. Cir.*, p 324, *Wilkins, 139*.

42. Copies of convictions and sentences of military pensioners.—When a military pensioner is convicted and sentenced to imprisonment in a Criminal Court, the facts of the case should be reported, without delay to the Pension Paymaster of the Circle to which the pensioner belongs, *Bom H C Cr Cir.*, p 39 see also *Pun. Cir.* p 325.

blow a sponge for absorbing the nutriment of

sponge
Spongy plain - See PLAIN
Spongy n [See SPONGE]
Spongy sound See SPONGY

for the wind as well as any other



can 'sponhill
 for & around it

Spongy
 * Spongy boys, where nature has the play
 The wind will play with the spongy boys

Spongy (M.I.), a disease which is caused by
 single and scattered cases in a section from an ep-
 idemic and endemic, which affects many persons at the
 same time

In a sporting manner, in sport,

* you put, you do it, I suppose but more likely

Tending to, or provocative of, sport,

Yes, playful

to drive thee from the sport a court

will, (firm, plaque, firm, down, for, up, weight, food, food,

43. Immediate discharge of prisoner on acquittal.—A prisoner entitled to be discharged from custody immediately on the judgment of acquittal being pronounced, when there is no other charge pending against him, and his further detention is illegal, 5 M. H. C. R. Appx. II.

44. Distribution of copies of judgment of Court of Sessions.—Under the Madras Rules, every Court of Session must print all its Sessions judgments and distribute copies to the District Divisional and Commuting Magistrates, the Inspector-General of Police, the Superintendent of Police, High Court, accused person, Local Police, Prosecutor and to the Superintendent of Jail, Chemical Examiner and Inspector-General of Registration where they are concerned.

45. European soldiers not to be sentenced to rigorous imprisonment for petty offences.—‘The Lieutenant Governor would be obliged if the Judges of the Chief Court would point out to Magistrates that a sentence of rigorous imprisonment or hard labour, when passed upon a soldier in Her Majesty’s Service, involves his discharge under military regulations, and that consequently, though unintentionally, they may in passing such a sentence give a far higher punishment than they in any way intended. This point, the Lieutenant-Governor thinks, should be borne in mind by Magistrates when trying soldiers for petty offences’—*Extract from letter No 3665, dated 30th October, 1876 from Secretary to Government, Punjab, to Registrar, Chief Court, Punjab*

Why should not the above rule be extended to all Government servants like Village Munsiffs, Kurnams, Policemen, etc.?

368. (1) When any person is sentenced to death, the sentence shall direct that he be hanged by the neck till he is dead

Sentence of death
Sentence of transportation. (2) No sentence of transportation shall specify the place to which the person sentenced is to be transported

Notes.—1. Form of warrant of execution of sentence of death.—See Sch. V, Form No 35

2. No sentence of transportation shall specify the place, etc.—Under the *Prisoners Act* III of 1900, s 32, printed in Appendix in cases in which the sentence passed is one of transportation for life, the judgment must be preserved until a report is received of the convict’s death or release—*M H C Letter, 14th January, 1892.*

369. * “Save as otherwise provided by this Code or by any other law for the time being in force or, in the case of a High Court established by Royal Charter, by the Letters Patent of such High Court, no Court” when it has signed its judgment, shall alter or review the same, except to correct a clerical error.

Court not to alter judgment

Note—Referring to the amendment of this section, the Select Committee say—

“The proposal to repeal the words ‘other than a High Court’ was intended to remove the possibility of reading s. 369 as if it gave High Courts unlimited powers of altering or reviewing their judgments. But there are cases other than those referred to in ss. 395 and 484 in which a review of judgment is possible. We would refer to s 434 and also to clause 26 of the Letters Patent of the Presidency High Courts. The Indian Legislature has power to amend the Letters Patent of the High Courts, and the amendment introduced by clause 27 might be interpreted as an intention to amend the Letters Patent in this respect. We have, therefore, re-drafted the amendment so as to provide that no Court shall alter or review its judgment save as provided by or under any law for the time being in force or, in the case of a High Court, in its Letters Patent.”

Notes—1. Undelivered judgment is inoperative and may be changed.—A Bench of Magistrates after writing a judgment convicting and sentencing the accused but before delivering the same changed their mind and referred the case under s. 349. On its being contended that they could not refer after having written out the judgment, *held*, as the judgment though signed was never pronounced, it was inoperative as a judgment and must be merely taken as an expression of opinion, 11 A. L. J. 743 = 14 Cr. L. J. 562.

2. Section must be read subject to s. 437.—Where the District Magistrate who had discharged the accused under s. 259, owing to the absence of the complainant, revised the case on an application by the complainant and made over the inquiry to another Magistrate. *Held*, on the reference of the Sessions Judge

* The words in inverted commas were substituted for the words ‘no Court other than a High Court’ by Act XVIII of 1921,

that this section was no bar to the District Magistrate making further inquiry into a case dismissed by himself 28 C. 102. But when a Magistrate has already dealt with a case in revision and decided that there was no cause for interference he cannot subsequently under s. 437 direct further inquiry. Such an order would be one reviewing the earlier order and he is prohibited by s. 369, 5 Bar. L. T. 37 = 13 Cr. L. J. 301. See Notes to s. 437.

3. Section applicable to final order in miscellaneous proceedings.—(i) *Sanction*.—See Notes under Heading XXI at pp 543-544. A Magistrate cannot grant a sanction having once refused it, 10 M. L. T. 333 = (1911) 2 M. W. N. 431 = 12 Cr. L. J. 555; 40 C. 423.

(ii) *Orders under Chap. XXI*.—See Notes under Heading XVII at pp 303-306. A Magistrate having once passed an order under s. 146 cannot cancel the order and pass an order under s. 147 in lieu thereof, 16 O. C. 192 = 14 Cr. L. J. 605; 35 C. 350 followed.

(iii) *Order directing delivery of property*.—The same considerations which prevent Subordinate Courts from altering their judgments on review, hold good in respect of final orders passed by them and which are of the nature of a judgment and this rule was in 22 B. 949 at p. 959 applied to an order refusing to send to a foreign State, property seized in execution of a search warrant, which was reviewed by the Magistrate and was drawn. But see 23 C. 652 at p. 660 (F.B.) and 29 C. 726 (F.B.).

(iv) The section applies equally to final orders under s. 488, 21 C. W. N. 344.

4. Where judgment has been signed it cannot be altered.—After signing and pronouncing judgment in open Court a Magistrate on the same day enhanced imprisonment by one day at the request of the accused in order to make his order appealable. Held, that although the Magistrate acted with the best of motives, yet nevertheless the alteration of the sentence was illegal 1933 A. W. N. 16. No Magistrate can add to or alter the proceedings or judgment in any case after they are signed and published. It is especially irregular when made in the absence of the accused and without notice to him, 10 C. W. N. 1062 = 4 C. L. J. 415 = 4 Cr. L. J. 210, 12 Bom. L. R. 521 = 11 Cr. L. J. 456. See also 12 Cr. L. J. 473 (Bar.)

5. Sessions Judge not competent to alter judgment, once signed.—A Sessions Judge has no power to alter or set aside a conviction and sentence once made and signed by him, 23 W. R. 49, 23 B. 50. On the 27th August 1895 a Sessions Judge sentenced the accused to three years rigorous imprisonment. On the 29th *id.* he directed that the sentence should run from the 26th June, as the prisoner was on that day convicted and sentenced by the Magistrate and thereafter in appeal conviction and sentence being set aside, retrial resulted in his committal to the Sessions, where he was convicted and sentenced as above. Held, that under s. 367 the sentence is part of the judgment, and the express words of this section forbid the Sessions Judge to alter it. The altering order dated the 29th August was a nullity, Ratanlal 804. Where a Judge added a note to his judgment throwing doubts on the conclusion at which he had arrived on the evidence, STUART, C.J., describes the proceedings as most unwarrantable, 2 A. 33. But in 3 M. 49, where a Sessions Judge on appeal annulled the conviction by a Magistrate, but omitted at the time to order a retrial, it was held that he was not precluded from passing such an order subsequently. A judge may also expunge improper remarks from his judgment 2 P. W. R. 1910 = 11 Cr. L. J. 478, as there is no question of reconsidering the guilt of the accused.

6. Even when judgment has been obtained by fraud or trick, Court cannot alter judgment.—The accused obtained his acquittal under s. 247 by preventing the complainant from appearing when the case was called on by wrongfully arresting and detaining him on a false charge, though the order was obtained by fraud on the Court, the Code does not permit the Court which made the order to vacate it on proof of fraud. There is no provision resembling Order IX, r. 4 of the *Civil Procedure Code* by which a case can be restored to file by the Court which dismissed it, 38 M. 1023. The only course is to move the Local Government to file an appeal.

7. Judgment final, even though based on erroneous view as to limitations.—A Sessions Judge, after receiving a criminal appeal recorded a written order of rejection on the ground that it was barred by limitation but on a later representation by the prisoner, admitted the appeal and at the hearing acquitted him. Held that the order of acquittal was made without jurisdiction the previous order rejecting the appeal being final and not open to review by the Sessions Judge, 19 B. 732. See Note 9 below.

8. Not open to Judge to differ from jury, after accepting verdict.—After accepting the verdict of the jury it is no longer open to the Sessions Judge to change his mind and refer the case to the High Court under s. 307. The only course open to him is to refer the case to the Local Government, 4 C. W. N. 633.

Spur-clad, n (to) An energetic suit

[From spur] To shoot

Squab'ble a Thick, fit heavy Harvey
Squab'ble (akwbb bl), r f jump & p p squar
bled, p pr & r b n squabbling } Allied to L.

9. Proper course when mistake made—(i) Magistrates—A judgment cannot be reviewed. The proper course is to apply to the High Court under s. 433 (*Mad H C Pro*, 13th November, 1873), through the Sessions Judge, 1 Bar. B. R. 334. Where a Magistrate erroneously dismisses an appeal as out of time, he cannot subsequently re-admit it on his file on the discovery of his mistake; but the case must be referred to the High Court for revision, 6 Bom. L. R. 360. On finding that he has passed an illegal sentence, a Magistrate may, if the prisoner is suffering prejudice, direct the jailor to suspend the execution and merely keep the prisoner in detention, which should in no case be allowed to exceed the term of imprisonment awarded while the case is referred to the High Court, *Ratanlal* 137. (ii) *Sessions Judge*—Where a Sessions Judge discovers he has made a mistake, he cannot himself alter the sentence but must refer the case to the High Court, 23 W. R. 49; 22 B. 949—958. See also Note 8.

10. Does section apply to orders of dismissal and discharge?—(s) Cases under s. 203—See Notes 27 to 30 at pp. 586-597. See Note 1 to s. 366. An order of dismissal under s. 203 is not a judgment within the meaning of this section. *Per* WHITE, C. J., in 29 M. 126 (F.B.) But in 4 C. W. N. 26 it was held, that where a Presidency Magistrate orders the dismissal of a case, it is not open to him to revise his proceedings. It has been held, that an order of a Magistrate dismissing a case for default of appearance of the complainant is not a judgment, but when after examining the complainant or after taking certain evidence, however incomplete such evidence may be, the Magistrate exercises his judgment upon the merits of the complaint, and makes an order of discharge, it is a judgment which under this section cannot be reviewed or altered by himself.—*Per* GHOSE, J., in his dissenting judgment, 23 C. 652 (F.B.) at p. 654—666.

(ii) *Cases under s. 253*—See Note 18 at p. 718. An order of discharge under s. 253 (1) is not a judgment, as it is not a final order in a trial terminating either in the conviction or acquittal of the accused, 31 M. 543, 9 Bom. L. R. 250. Order of discharge passed by a Magistrate under s. 253 when the complainant withdrew from the complaint is not a judgment, 29 C. 726 (F.B.).

(iii) *Cases under s. 259*—See Note 10 at p. 732, 28 C. 652 (F.B.).

(iv) *Dismissal of an appeal*—An order dismissing an appeal for non-appearance of an appellant is not a judgment, 5 N. L. R. 76 = 9 Cr. L. J. 553, 10 C. L. J. 80 = 10 Cr. L. J. 287.

10-A. An order for costs under s. 143 (3) subsequent to the final order under s. 145.—Under s. 148 (3) of the Code a Magistrate who makes an order under s. 145, without any direction as to costs, has power to order the same subsequently, and such latter order is not an alteration or review of his judgment in the original case within the meaning of s. 369 of the Code, 47 C. 974.

10-B. An order under s. 204 is not a judgment within the meaning of s. 369.—On a complaint being made, the Magistrate ordered issue of process under s. 204. Subsequently on that date a cross-complaint being made the Magistrate rescinded the order and sent both the cases to a Subordinate Magistrate for local inquiry and report. Held that the order passed by the Magistrate under s. 204 was not a judgment under s. 369 of the Code. There is nothing in the Code which forbids a Magistrate to reconsider an order of this kind on sufficient grounds, 27 C. W. N. 651.

11. Dismissal of appeal for non-appearance of pleader may be set aside.—In 7 M. H. C. R. Appx. XXIX it was held, a District Magistrate could re-hear an appeal rejected for non-appearance of appellant's pleader when sufficient cause was shown for such non-appearance. See also 5 N. L. R. 76 = 9 Cr. L. J. 553. But this view has not been accepted in Bombay, where even a summary dismissal under s. 421 was held not open to review, 4 B. 101; 19 B. 732. Anyhow an Appellate Criminal Court cannot dismiss an appeal for mere default of appearance. It is bound to go into the case, even if the accused is not present in person or by pleader, 5 N. L. R. 76 = 9 Cr. L. J. 553.

But in 46 M. 332 it is held, that it is the duty of the Court to go into the matter and to dispose of an appeal on the merits. When a criminal appeal or revision petition is dismissed for default of appearance, there is no decision on the merits and no proper disposal of the case and therefore the Court may re-hear it. In such a case the order of dismissal for default of appearance is no judgment at all. The order is tantamount to an adjournment of the case till some one appears and moves the Court to hear him. (*Per* Ranga Rao, (1912) 23 M. L. J. 371 doubled.)

11-A. Where an accused was charged under s. 379, I P. C., and also under ss. 75 and 379, I P. C., and at the trial the Sessions Judge tried the accused on the first charge alone and convicted and sentenced him and then inquired into the second charge, viz., as to previous convictions and then sentenced on that charge, held, the subsequent proceedings were not valid as they amounted to a review which is not allowed by this section, 20 Bom. L. R. 87 = 42 B. 202.

ing on trees

Squid

Squid

Squid, n. The body of squid is covered with
adhered squarish [Obe]

Stab, to thrust

Stab, to thrust

I. In the night a person
wounded with a sharp pointed weapon, as
the stab of an assassin
in injury & death in the dark, a sly scheme
as given to character

Stabber [Lat] A celebrated Lat
beginning with these words set to music
it is a French composition and performed in the
service of the Roman Catholic

stabber n. One who stabs a private murderer
stab n. A small marine sp. to make holes
in the ground

stabbing n. By stabbing, with intent to
act maliciously

stab n. [Lat stabular] a room for
to make firm or stable from Lat stab n. I
to Fr establishment O by establishing

Squid n. The cuttle-fish, - often used as bait

Squid line a fishing line the hook of which is baited
with a squid

Squid n. [Fr] The cuttle-fish, - often used as bait

Squid n. [Fr] The cuttle-fish, - often used as bait

contortions
2 To climb, by em
bracing and clinging
with the arms and feet
free without

Stabber
[okwir rel,
vri] (nydop,
O Fr equi

Stabber
[okwir rel,
vri] (nydop,
O Fr equi



American Fox Squirrel

Stable n. Fr stable, Fr stable, estate, by estate, n.
stable n.

Stable n. Fr stable, Fr stable, estate, by estate, n.
stable n.

Stable n. Fr stable, Fr stable, estate, by estate, n.
stable n.

A, B, C, D, E, F, G, H, I, J, K, L, M, N, O, P, Q, R, S, T, U, V, W, X, Y, Z, a, b, c, d, e, f, g, h, i, j, k, l, m, n, o, p, q, r, s, t, u, v, w, x, y, z, A, B, C, D, E, F, G, H, I, J, K, L, M, N, O, P, Q, R, S, T, U, V, W, X, Y, Z, a, b, c, d, e, f, g, h, i, j, k, l, m, n, o, p, q, r, s, t, u, v, w, x, y, z

POWER OF HIGH COURT TO ALTER ITS JUDGMENT.

(See Note 7 to s. 439.)

12. High Court has no power to alter or review its judgment.—As soon as the judgment is pronounced and signed by the Judge, the High Court is *functus officio*, 14 C. 42; 7 A. 672; 24 A. L. J. 61 = 17 Cr. L. J. 57, 1 P. R. 1909 = 9 Cr. L. J. 306; 4 P. R. 1909 = 9 Cr. L. J. 378. See, however, s. 434, s. 63. There is no inherent power to revise a judgment once pronounced.—*Per SUBRAHMANYA AYYER, J.*, in 29 M. 126 (F.B.) 23 M. L. J. 371 = 12 M. L. T. 350 = 13 Cr. L. J. 710. The words 'other than a High Court' do not give to a Division Bench of the High Court power to review its judgment in a criminal appeal. The words are to be accounted for by the power of review given to the High Court under s. 434, on points specially reserved by the Judge presiding at the High Court Sessions, Ratanlal 791; 1 P. R. 1909 = 9 Cr. L. J. 306; 46 C. 67. It should be noted that s. 369 as amended makes it clear that even the High Court have no unlimited powers of altering or reviewing their judgment save as provided by their Letters Patent.

13. Judgment or order not complete until signed and sealed.—A judgment of the Allahabad High Court was held not complete until it was sealed in accordance with Rule 83 of Rules of 1898, and that up to that time it may be altered by the Judge or Judges concerned therewith, without any formal procedure by way of review of judgment, 21 A. 171 followed in 27 A. 92, where it was held, that the High Court is not precluded from entering an application for revision merely because an appeal petition from the same conviction has been previously dismissed on the ground that no appeal lay, coupled with the remark to the effect that there appeared no ground for taking up the case in revision. These two rulings were recently followed in 14 A. L. J. 61 = 17 Cr. L. J. 47. An application to rehear must be disposed of by the Judge who originally heard the case. See also 10 C. L. J. 80 = 10 Cr. L. J. 207. If an application for revision is made before the judgment is signed, 33 C. 828. If the judgment is copied and signed and sealed and communicated to the Court below, the application was ordered to be refused, 7 C. W. N. 7.

14. Dismissal of revision application for non-appearance of pleader.—The High Court has no power under this section to review an order dismissing an application for revision made by an accused person and the only remedy is by an appeal to the prerogative of the Crown as exercised by the Local Government, 7 A. 171 followed in 10 B. 176, see also 14 C. 42 and 1 P. R. 1909 = 9 Cr. L. J. 306. Even if the application for revision is dismissed for default, the High Court cannot rehear, 23 M. L. J. 371 = 12 M. L. T. 350 = 13 Cr. L. J. 710. But see 46 M. 332 in which 23 M. L. J. 371 is doubted. See above Note 11. The High Court can set aside its own order dismissing a revision application for non-appearance of pleader, 10 C. L. J. 80 = 10 Cr. L. J. 287, but not if it has been disposed of on the merits. Similarly, when the High Court has passed an order in revision under s. 439, it has no power to review its own order, (1905) U. B. R. (Cr. Pr. Code) 35 = 2 Cr. L. J. 485. It would not do so on the ground of the discovery of fresh evidence for the prosecution, since the Police ought to have produced the evidence (as to previous conviction) at the trial, Ratanlal 458. High Court has no power to review an order passed by it rejecting an appeal, 46 C. 60, 47 M. 428 = 146 M. L. J. 456.

15. Judgment of single Judge or Division Bench of High Court cannot be interfered with by himself or by Division or Full Bench.—The powers of a single Judge in a matter with which he has jurisdiction to deal are the powers of the Court and cannot in any way be controlled by a Bench or Full Bench of the Court. As no appeal lies so no revision lies. Both procedures imply subordination or inferiority which does not exist, 1 P. R. 1909 = 9 Cr. L. J. 306; 4 P. R. 1909 = 9 Cr. L. J. 378; 8 P. R. 1909 = 10 Cr. L. J. 314. See also 8 C. 61, 14 C. 42 (F.B.), 10 B. 176 (F.B.), 7 A. 672 and 27 A. 92. But see Note 11 above.

16. Remedy for erroneous order.—Remedy against an erroneous order of High Court in its appellate jurisdiction is to petition the Local Government—the authority with whom rest the discretion either of executing the law or of commuting the sentence Ratanlal 791; B. L. R. Sup. Vol. 438 (F.B.) = 6 W. R. 61, 14 A. L. J. 61 = 17 Cr. L. J. 47. In *Referred Trial No 40* of 1903, WHITE, C. J. and MOORE, J., after confirming the sentence of death on the accused, entertained serious doubts as to the propriety of the conviction. Their Lordships holding that they had no power to review their judgment, reported the case to the Local Government with a strong recommendation for a free pardon under s. 401.

LOSS OF JUDGMENT.

17. In case of loss of judgment and records after conviction, Court may restore by memory.—There seems to be no provision of law which empowers the High Court to quash the conviction and sentence because some of the material records of the Sessions trial have been lost. There is no

provision of law which enacts that, unless all the records of a case are in the Court house at the time of convicting and sentencing, the conviction and sentence are void and should be quashed or that the trial has been held without jurisdiction or the sentence was passed without jurisdiction. Where a judgment has been lost, it is open to the Judge to re-write from memory the substance of it, *see* 8 C. L. J. 52. A Court has inherent power in case of loss or destruction of a judicial record to restore such record *see* 11 C. L. J. 243; 38 M. 498.

Presidency Magistrate's judgment.

370. Instead of recording a judgment in manner hereinbefore provided a Presidency Magistrate shall record the following particulars —

- (a) the serial number of the case,
- (b) the date of the commission of the offence,
- (c) the name of complainant (if any),
- (d) the name of the accused person and (except in the case of an European British subject) his parentage and residence,
- (e) the offence complained of or proved,
- (f) the plea of the accused and his examination (if any),
- (g) the final order,
- (h) the date of such order, and
- (i) in all cases in which the Magistrate inflicts imprisonment or fine exceeding two hundred rupees, or both, a brief statement of the reasons for the conviction.

Notes.—*See* s. 263 for summary trials, s. 362 as to record of evidence by a Presidency Magistrate and s. 441 for power to supplement his decision and s. 537 as to irregularities in judgment etc.

1. In petty cases reasons for conviction need not be stated.—Imprisonment in default of payment of fine is not a sentence of imprisonment within the meaning of cl. (i) of this section. The meaning of that clause is that where the offence found is sufficiently grave to involve a fine of Rs. 200 or imprisonment as the substantive sentence, the Magistrate is bound to record his reasons for the conviction so as to enable the party to bring the matter up to the High Court, but in petty cases, which can be met by a fine of a few rupees the decision of the Magistrate may be recorded shortly, 14 C. 174.

2 Effect of not giving reasons.—Where reasons are stated they should be stated in such a manner that the High Court on revision may judge whether there were sufficient materials before the Magistrate to support the conviction 13 C. 272. If reasons are not clearly stated in an appealable case, the conviction is liable to be quashed in spite of s. 537. But the law does not demand a full and complete statement of reasons 31 C. 983.

3. In non-appealable cases reasons for conviction should generally be stated.—If a case is not appealable to High Court, a Presidency Magistrate should state his reasons for conviction so that the High Court may judge as to whether there were sufficient materials before the Magistrate to support the conviction. Where the notes of evidence taken by a Presidency Magistrate show materials upon which the prisoner could legally be convicted and the Magistrate records reasons for the conviction under clause (i), the conviction was set aside by the High Court on revision 13 C. 272. In 8 C. W. N. 997, it was further held that the reasons for conviction should show the previous convictions in order to justify the punishment imposed *see, however*

4 When sentence of imprisonment is passed, reasons for conviction to be stated.—When a Magistrate passes a sentence of imprisonment, he is bound to give a brief statement of the reasons for the conviction. It is not sufficient for him to say that he is of opinion that the accused is guilty for that may necessarily be implied to be his opinion from the fact that he has sentenced the accused to imprisonment. He contemplates something further as the reason for the conviction 27 C. 481. In 17 B. L. 200, the High Court set aside the judgment of a Presidency Magistrate which was set aside on revision. The Magistrate had said that the accused was guilty of the offence. I believe the evidence of the complainant and the witnesses was not sufficient to satisfy the provisions of this section, which required the Magistrate to give reasons for the conviction.

5. Section does not apply to cases under Workmen's Breach of Contract Act.—The provisions of this section do not apply to cases under Act XIII of 1859, where no offence is committed and where there is no accused, 72 C. 131; 4 C. W. N. 253; 20 M. 235 at p. 238; 18 E. 268; 11 A. 262 and 4 M. 234.

371. (1) On the application of the accused a copy of the judgment, or, when he so desires, a translation in his own language, if practicable, or in the language of the Court, shall be given to him without delay. Such copy shall, in any case other than a summons case be given free of cost

(2) In trials by jury in a Court of Session, a copy of the heads of the charge to the jury shall, on the application of the accused, be given to him without delay and free of cost

(3) When the accused is sentenced to death by a Sessions Judge, such Judge shall further inform him of the period within which, if he wishes to appeal, his appeal should be preferred

Notes—1. **Limitation**—An appeal against a sentence of death must be filed within seven days from the date of the sentence—*Act XV of 1877, Sch. II Art 150 and Art 180, Sch. II of Act IX of 1908.*

2. **Remission of Court-fee on copy of judgment**—In the exercise of powers conferred by s 35 of the Court fees Act (No VII of 1870) the Governor-General in Council is pleased to remit the Court fee on a copy or translation of judgment in a case other than a summons-case and a copy of the heads of the Judge's charge to the jury when the copy or the translation is given under this section, also on a copy or translation of a judgment in a summons-case when the accused is in jail.—*Notification, Government of India, No 4680, dated 10th September, 1889 (Gazette of India 1889, Part I, p. 506)*

3. **Appeal not to be rejected for copy of judgment not being stamped.**—Where an Appellate Court rejected an appeal from a conviction under s 323 I P C, because the copy of judgment of the Lower Court was not stamped, the High Court reversed the order of the Lower Appellate Court under the above notification *Ratanlal 355*

4. **Who are entitled to obtain copies**—All prosecutors whose charges are dismissed, are affected by the order of discharge, and are therefore entitled to obtain copies of the order made by, and of the depositions taken before, the Magistrate, 8 C. 166 = 10 C. L. R. 190. An advocate against whom remarks have been made by a Court in a judgment imputing to him misconduct should have furnished to him on application a copy of the judgment containing those remarks in order to enable him to explain his conduct, 6 Bom. L. R. 540. See also s 548

372. The original judgment shall be filed with the record of proceedings, and, where the original is recorded in a different language from that of the Court, and the accused so requires, a translation thereof into the language of the Court shall be added to such record.

373. In cases tried by the Court of Session, the Court shall forward a copy of its finding and sentence (if any) to the District Magistrate within the local limits of whose jurisdiction the trial was held

Judgment when to be translated.

Court of Session to send copy of finding and sentence to District Magistrate.

Sentence of death to be submitted by Court of Session.

CHAPTER XXVII.

OF THE SUBMISSION OF SENTENCES FOR CONFIRMATION

374. When the Court of Session passes sentence of death, the proceedings shall be submitted to the High Court and the sentence shall not be executed unless it is confirmed by the High Court

Notes.—See s 31

1. **For Form of warrant of commitment under sentence of death, see No 34, Sch. V.**

2 Description of weapons, etc., produced in Court should be on record in certain cases.—When death or grievous hurt has been caused by a blow from a stick or other weapon the weight and dimensions of the weapon should be stated in the Sessions Court proceedings with such particularity as may enable the High Court (which has no opportunity of seeing it) to form an opinion as to the character of the weapon and the intention with which it was probably used. The mere entry of a stick or a stone in the list of property produced before the Sessions Court does not enable the High Court to judge whether the stick or stone was a deadly or a comparatively harmless weapon.—*Bom. H. C. Cr. Cir.* p 90. In all cases referred to the Chief Court for confirmation of sentence of death and in all cases where death or serious bodily injuries are found to have been caused by an accused person a full and accurate description of all weapons produced in Court in connection with the trial should form part of the record transmitted. Such description should in the case of cutting instruments of all kinds include mention of the condition of the edge and in the case of all weapons, not being firearms their dimensions and weight.—*Pun. Cr.* p 238. When any article or articles are produced in evidence before a Criminal Court a description of such article shall be entered under the Court's signature on the flysheet of the record. This description should always include dimensions and weights when dimensions and weights are material either as regards the article itself (as in excise and weight and measure cases) or as regards the use that was made of it (as in murder and hurt cases). Each article should be distinguished by a letter or number and when reference is made to it in the course of the evidence the letter or number shall be quoted.—*C. P. Cr. Cir.*, Part V, No 11.

3. Practice—High Court must be satisfied on facts as well as law—*Bombay*—In cases sent up to the High Court for confirmation of sentence of death it is the practice of the Court to be satisfied on the facts as well as the law of the case that the conviction is right before it proceeds to confirm the sentence. *Ratanlal 710*. In the Bombay High Court when a prisoner has been sentenced to death even though the conviction was with the unanimous verdict of a jury, the whole case referred is before the High Court on matters of fact as well as on matters of law, *17 Bom. L. R. 1072 = 3 Bom. Cr. Ca. 145 = 16 Cr. L. J. 818*. The correctness of the procedure was doubted.

Calcutta.—When the case is referred to the High Court under s. 374, the Court is bound under this section to go into the facts of the case, although the conviction was by the verdict of a jury, *19 W. R. 57*. But this rule will not be followed in hearing the appeal of a co-accused not sentenced to death along with reference under s. 374, in the case of a person sentenced to death. *2 C. W. N. 49*. Thus a person sentenced only to transportation for life may be in a worse position as regards invoking the Appellate Court than one sentenced to death, *11 B. L. R. 14*. See also *20 W. R. 19*. Where there is a case of clear failure of justice to a person sentenced to transportation for life in a trial by jury the High Court can only bring his case to the notice of the Local Government to be dealt with under s. 401, *30 C. W. N. 166*.

375. (1) If when such proceedings are submitted the High Court thinks that a further inquiry should be made into or additional evidence taken upon any point bearing upon the guilt or innocence of the convicted person it may make such inquiry or take such evidence itself or direct it to be made or taken by the Court of Session.

Power to direct further inquiry to be made or additional evidence to be taken.

(2) Such inquiry shall not be made nor shall such evidence be taken in the presence of jurors or assessors and unless the High Court otherwise directs the presence of the convicted person may be dispensed with when the same is made or taken.

(3) When the inquiry and the evidence (if any) are not made and taken by the High Court the result of such inquiry and the evidence shall be certified to such Court.

Note.—This section is an exception to s. 333.

1 High Court's power to take additional evidence.—Under this section and s. 428 the High Court when recording the further evidence could dispense with the presence of the accused especially where the additional evidence was recorded by itself, as in the *Ranga Reddi Murder Case*, *24 M. 523*. See *Criminal Appeal 52 of 1906, Allahabad High Court*. Under the powers conferred by this section, the Bombay High Court in *25 B. 188* admitted a confession rejected by the Sessions Judge. In *16 P. W. R. 1911 = 12 Cr. L. J. 412*, the High Court admitted further evidence in an appeal from a conviction of murder and inspected the building where the offence was alleged to have been committed.

Power of High Court to confirm sentence or order of Court of Session.

376. In any case submitted under section 374 whether tried with or without a jury, the High Court—

(a) may confirm the sentence, or pass any other sentence warranted by law or

(b) may annul the conviction, and convict the accused of any offence of which the Court of Session might have convicted him, or order a new trial on the same or on an amended charge, or

(c) may acquit the accused person.

Provided that no order of confirmation shall be made under this section until the period allowed for preferring an appeal has expired, or, if an appeal is presented within such period, until the appeal is disposed of.

Note.—1. Power of High Court to annul conviction and direct fresh trial.—On a case sent up under section 374 for confirmation of the sentence of death, the High Court in 8 C. W. N. 123 ordered a new trial in the evidence was inconclusive and further evidence was necessary. See also 13 C. W. N. 116 = 21 C. L. J. 413 = 13 Cr. L. J. 421, where the High Court directed the retrial of the accused, who was undersentenced in the Court of Session on the same charge after arrangement being made for his defence.

2. Power of High Court on acquittal of murder, to convict accused of minor offence though so finding on the minor charge.—In a case where the appellant was tried for murder and concealment of murder in 202 and 201 L. P. C., and was convicted of murder, but no finding was given on the minor charge, the Court on appeal acquitted the accused of the charge of murder, but held that it was competent for it to convict the appellant on the minor charge, although no finding was recorded, provided there was evidence on record to support it, 2 P. R. 1313 = 22 P. L. R. 1913 = 22 P. W. R. 1913 = 14 Cr. L. J. 272.

Confirmation of new sentence to be signed by two judges.

377. In every case so submitted, the confirmation of the sentence, or any new sentence or order passed by the High Court, shall, when such Court consists of two or more Judges, be made, passed and signed by a least two of them.

378. When any such case is heard before a Bench of Judges and such Judges are equally divided in opinion the case, with their opinions thereon, shall be laid before another Judge and such Judge after such hearing as he thinks fit, shall deliver his opinion and the judgment or order shall follow such opinion.

Procedure in case of difference of opinion.

Note.—Judge to whom case is referred may decide according to his own opinion.—In a case referred to a third Judge, it is the duty of that Judge to express and act upon the opinion at which he has himself definitely arrived, and not necessarily to hold that the opinion or the one in favour of an acquittal should prevail, 1337 A. W. N. 123 dissenting from the judgment of MAHMOOD J., in 1845 A. W. N. 275 who was of opinion that the principle ought to be that wherever one Judge was for acquittal the accused must have the benefit of the same and be acquitted. See also s. 429. In 17 C. W. N. 1213 = 14 Cr. L. J. 612. CARNOCKY J., to whom the case was referred, there being a difference of opinion between the Judges who first heard the appeal, upheld the conviction for murder but did not pass the capital sentence for the reason that the accused had the capital sentence hung over their heads for six months owing to the delay in the High Court.

379. In cases submitted by the Court of Session to the High Court for the confirmation of a sentence of death the proper officer of the High Court shall without delay, after the order of confirmation or other order, has been made by the High Court, send a copy of the order, under the seal of the High Court and attested with his official signature to the Court of Session.

Procedure in cases submitted to High Court for confirmation

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^a $\chi^2 = 1.0$, $df = 1$, $p = .32$.
^b $\chi^2 = 1.0$, $df = 1$, $p = .32$.

1996, 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014, 2015, 2016, 2017, 2018, 2019, 2020, 2021, 2022, 2023, 2024, 2025, 2026, 2027, 2028, 2029, 2030, 2031, 2032, 2033, 2034, 2035, 2036, 2037, 2038, 2039, 2040, 2041, 2042, 2043, 2044, 2045, 2046, 2047, 2048, 2049, 2050, 2051, 2052, 2053, 2054, 2055, 2056, 2057, 2058, 2059, 2060, 2061, 2062, 2063, 2064, 2065, 2066, 2067, 2068, 2069, 2070, 2071, 2072, 2073, 2074, 2075, 2076, 2077, 2078, 2079, 2080, 2081, 2082, 2083, 2084, 2085, 2086, 2087, 2088, 2089, 2090, 2091, 2092, 2093, 2094, 2095, 2096, 2097, 2098, 2099, 2100, 2101, 2102, 2103, 2104, 2105, 2106, 2107, 2108, 2109, 2110, 2111, 2112, 2113, 2114, 2115, 2116, 2117, 2118, 2119, 2120, 2121, 2122, 2123, 2124, 2125, 2126, 2127, 2128, 2129, 2130, 2131, 2132, 2133, 2134, 2135, 2136, 2137, 2138, 2139, 2140, 2141, 2142, 2143, 2144, 2145, 2146, 2147, 2148, 2149, 2150, 2151, 2152, 2153, 2154, 2155, 2156, 2157, 2158, 2159, 2160, 2161, 2162, 2163, 2164, 2165, 2166, 2167, 2168, 2169, 2170, 2171, 2172, 2173, 2174, 2175, 2176, 2177, 2178, 2179, 2180, 2181, 2182, 2183, 2184, 2185, 2186, 2187, 2188, 2189, 2190, 2191, 2192, 2193, 2194, 2195, 2196, 2197, 2198, 2199, 2200, 2201, 2202, 2203, 2204, 2205, 2206, 2207, 2208, 2209, 2210, 2211, 2212, 2213, 2214, 2215, 2216, 2217, 2218, 2219, 2220, 2221, 2222, 2223, 2224, 2225, 2226, 2227, 2228, 2229, 2230, 2231, 2232, 2233, 2234, 2235, 2236, 2237, 2238, 2239, 2240, 2241, 2242, 2243, 2244, 2245, 2246, 2247, 2248, 2249, 2250, 2251, 2252, 2253, 2254, 2255, 2256, 2257, 2258, 2259, 2260, 2261, 2262, 2263, 2264, 2265, 2266, 2267, 2268, 2269, 2270, 2271, 2272, 2273, 2274, 2275, 2276, 2277, 2278, 2279, 2280, 2281, 2282, 2283, 2284, 2285, 2286, 2287, 2288, 2289, 2290, 2291, 2292, 2293, 2294, 2295, 2296, 2297, 2298, 2299, 2300, 2301, 2302, 2303, 2304, 2305, 2306, 2307, 2308, 2309, 2310, 2311, 2312, 2313, 2314, 2315, 2316, 2317, 2318, 2319, 2320, 2321, 2322, 2323, 2324, 2325, 2326, 2327, 2328, 2329, 2330, 2331, 2332, 2333, 2334, 2335, 2336, 2337, 2338, 2339, 2340, 2341, 2342, 2343, 2344, 2345, 2346, 2347, 2348, 2349, 2350, 2351, 2352, 2353, 2354, 2355, 2356, 2357, 2358, 2359, 2360, 2361, 2362, 2363, 2364, 2365, 2366, 2367, 2368, 2369, 2370, 2371, 2372, 2373, 2374, 2375, 2376, 2377, 2378, 2379, 2380, 2381, 2382, 2383, 2384, 2385, 2386, 2387, 2388, 2389, 2390, 2391, 2392, 2393, 2394, 2395, 2396, 2397, 2398, 2399, 2400, 2401, 2402, 2403, 2404, 2405, 2406, 2407, 2408, 2409, 2410, 2411, 2412, 2413, 2414, 2415, 2416, 2417, 2418, 2419, 2420, 2421, 2422, 2423, 2424, 2425, 2426, 2427, 2428, 2429, 2430, 2431, 2432, 2433, 2434, 2435, 2436, 2437, 2438, 2439, 2440, 2441, 2442, 2443, 2444, 2445, 2446, 2447, 2448, 2449, 2450, 2451, 2452, 2453, 2454, 2455, 2456, 2457, 2458, 2459, 2460, 2461, 2462, 2463, 2464, 2465, 2466, 2467, 2468, 2469, 2470, 2471, 2472, 2473, 2474, 2475, 2476, 2477, 2478, 2479, 2480, 2481, 2482, 2483, 2484, 2485, 2486, 2487, 2488, 2489, 2490, 2491, 2492, 2493, 2494, 2495, 2496, 2497, 2498, 2499, 2500, 2501, 2502, 2503, 2504, 2505, 2506, 2507, 2508, 2509, 2510, 2511, 2512, 2513, 2514, 2515, 2516, 2517, 2518, 2519, 2520, 2521, 2522, 2523, 2524, 2525, 2526, 2527, 2528, 2529, 2530, 2531, 2532, 2533, 2534, 2535, 2536, 2537, 2538, 2539, 2540, 2541, 2542, 2543, 2544, 2545, 2546, 2547, 2548, 2549, 2550, 2551, 2552, 2553, 2554, 2555, 2556, 2557, 2558, 2559, 2560, 2561, 2562, 2563, 2564, 2565, 2566, 2567, 2568, 2569, 2570, 2571, 2572, 2573, 2574, 2575, 2576, 2577, 2578, 2579, 2580, 2581, 2582, 2583, 2584, 2585, 2586, 2587, 2588, 2589, 2590, 2591, 2592, 2593, 2594, 2595, 2596, 2597, 2598, 2599, 2600, 2601, 2602, 2603, 2604, 2605, 2606, 2607, 2608, 2609, 2610, 2611, 2612, 2613, 2614, 2615, 2616, 2617, 2618, 2619, 2620, 2621, 2622, 2623, 2624, 2625, 2626, 2627, 2628, 2629, 2630, 2631, 2632, 2633, 2634, 2635, 2636, 2637, 2638, 2639, 2640, 2641, 2642, 2643, 2644, 2645, 2646, 2647, 2648, 2649, 2650, 2651, 2652, 2653, 2654, 2655, 2656, 2657, 2658, 2659, 2660, 2661, 2662, 2663, 2664, 2665, 2666, 2667, 2668, 2669, 2670, 2671, 2672, 2673, 2674, 2675, 2676, 2677, 26

1. *Chlorophyll a* and *Chlorophyll b* were determined by the method of Arar and Collins (1971) using a Shimadzu 1010 UV-Visible Spectrophotometer.

1. *Chlorophyll a* and *Chlorophyll b* were determined by the method of Lichtenthaler and Whistler (1973). The total chlorophyll content was determined by the method of Arar and Cook (1980). The carotenoid content was determined by the method of Lichtenthaler and Whistler (1973). The total carotenoid content was determined by the method of Arar and Cook (1980). The total protein content was determined by the method of Lowry et al. (1951). The total lipid content was determined by the method of Bligh and Dyer (1959). The total carbohydrate content was determined by the method of Dubois and Gilles (1950). The total nucleic acid content was determined by the method of Burton (1956). The total ash content was determined by the method of AOAC (1990). The total moisture content was determined by the method of AOAC (1990). The total dry matter content was determined by the method of AOAC (1990). The total organic acid content was determined by the method of AOAC (1990). The total alkaloid content was determined by the method of AOAC (1990). The total saponin content was determined by the method of AOAC (1990). The total tannin content was determined by the method of AOAC (1990). The total flavonoid content was determined by the method of AOAC (1990). The total phenol content was determined by the method of AOAC (1990). The total terpenoid content was determined by the method of AOAC (1990). The total steroid content was determined by the method of AOAC (1990). The total glycoside content was determined by the method of AOAC (1990). The total alkaloid content was determined by the method of AOAC (1990). The total saponin content was determined by the method of AOAC (1990). The total tannin content was determined by the method of AOAC (1990). The total flavonoid content was determined by the method of AOAC (1990). The total phenol content was determined by the method of AOAC (1990). The total terpenoid content was determined by the method of AOAC (1990). The total steroid content was determined by the method of AOAC (1990). The total glycoside content was determined by the method of AOAC (1990).

1. *Journal of the American Medical Association*, 1990; 263: 1025-1026.

1. *Chlorophyll a* and *Chlorophyll b* were determined by the method of Arar and Collins (1971) using a Shimadzu 1010 spectrophotometer. The concentration of chlorophyll was expressed in $\mu\text{g mL}^{-1}$.

1. *Journal of the American Medical Association*, 1997; 277: 1033-1037.

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Śāstrī nīti-bhōṣaṇ *n* A record of laws or legislative acts

1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014, 2015, 2016, 2017, 2018, 2019, 2020, 2021, 2022, 2023, 2024, 2025, 2026, 2027, 2028, 2029, 2030, 2031, 2032, 2033, 2034, 2035, 2036, 2037, 2038, 2039, 2040, 2041, 2042, 2043, 2044, 2045, 2046, 2047, 2048, 2049, 2050, 2051, 2052, 2053, 2054, 2055, 2056, 2057, 2058, 2059, 2060, 2061, 2062, 2063, 2064, 2065, 2066, 2067, 2068, 2069, 2070, 2071, 2072, 2073, 2074, 2075, 2076, 2077, 2078, 2079, 2080, 2081, 2082, 2083, 2084, 2085, 2086, 2087, 2088, 2089, 2090, 2091, 2092, 2093, 2094, 2095, 2096, 2097, 2098, 2099, 2100, 2101, 2102, 2103, 2104, 2105, 2106, 2107, 2108, 2109, 2110, 2111, 2112, 2113, 2114, 2115, 2116, 2117, 2118, 2119, 2120, 2121, 2122, 2123, 2124, 2125, 2126, 2127, 2128, 2129, 2130, 2131, 2132, 2133, 2134, 2135, 2136, 2137, 2138, 2139, 2140, 2141, 2142, 2143, 2144, 2145, 2146, 2147, 2148, 2149, 2150, 2151, 2152, 2153, 2154, 2155, 2156, 2157, 2158, 2159, 2160, 2161, 2162, 2163, 2164, 2165, 2166, 2167, 2168, 2169, 2170, 2171, 2172, 2173, 2174, 2175, 2176, 2177, 2178, 2179, 2180, 2181, 2182, 2183, 2184, 2185, 2186, 2187, 2188, 2189, 2190, 2191, 2192, 2193, 2194, 2195, 2196, 2197, 2198, 2199, 2200, 2201, 2202, 2203, 2204, 2205, 2206, 2207, 2208, 2209, 2210, 2211, 2212, 2213, 2214, 2215, 2216, 2217, 2218, 2219, 2220, 2221, 2222, 2223, 2224, 2225, 2226, 2227, 2228, 2229, 2230, 2231, 2232, 2233, 2234, 2235, 2236, 2237, 2238, 2239, 2240, 2241, 2242, 2243, 2244, 2245, 2246, 2247, 2248, 2249, 2250, 2251, 2252, 2253, 2254, 2255, 2256, 2257, 2258, 2259, 2260, 2261, 2262, 2263, 2264, 2265, 2266, 2267, 2268, 2269, 2270, 2271, 2272, 2273, 2274, 2275, 2276, 2277, 2278, 2279, 2280, 2281, 2282, 2283, 2284, 2285, 2286, 2287, 2288, 2289, 2290, 2291, 2292, 2293, 2294, 2295, 2296, 2297, 2298, 2299, 2300, 2301, 2302, 2303, 2304, 2305, 2306, 2307, 2308, 2309, 2310, 2311, 2312, 2313, 2314, 2315, 2316, 2317, 2318, 2319, 2320, 2321, 2322, 2323, 2324, 2325, 2326, 2327, 2328, 2329, 2330, 2331, 2332, 2333, 2334, 2335, 2336, 2337, 2338, 2339, 2340, 2341, 2342, 2343, 2344, 2345, 2346, 2347, 2348, 2349, 2350, 2351, 2352, 2353, 2354, 2355, 2356, 2357, 2358, 2359, 2360, 2361, 2362, 2363, 2364, 2365, 2366, 2367, 2368, 2369, 2370, 2371, 2372, 2373, 2374, 2375, 2376, 2377, 2378, 2379, 2380, 2381, 2382, 2383, 2384, 2385, 2386, 2387, 2388, 2389, 2390, 2391, 2392, 2393, 2394, 2395, 2396, 2397, 2398, 2399, 2400, 2401, 2402, 2403, 2404, 2405, 2406, 2407, 2408, 2409, 2410, 2411, 2412, 2413, 2414, 2415, 2416, 2417, 2418, 2419, 2420, 2421, 2422, 2423, 2424, 2425, 2426, 2427, 2428, 2429, 2430, 2431, 2432, 2433, 2434, 2435, 2436, 2437, 2438, 2439, 2440, 2441, 2442, 2443, 2444, 2445, 2446, 2447, 2448, 2449, 2450, 2451, 2452, 2453, 2454, 2455, 2456, 2457, 2458, 2459, 2460, 2461, 2462, 2463, 2464, 2465, 2466, 2467, 2468, 2469, 2470, 2471, 2472, 2473, 2474, 2475, 2476, 2477, 2478, 2479, 2480, 2481, 2482, 2483, 2484, 2485, 2486, 2487, 2488, 2489, 2490, 2491, 2492, 2493, 2494, 2495, 2496, 2497, 2498, 2499, 2500, 2501, 2502, 2503, 2504, 2505, 2506, 2507, 2508, 2509, 2510, 2511, 2512, 2513, 2514, 2515, 2516, 2517, 2518, 2519, 2520, 2521, 2522, 2523, 2524, 2525, 2526, 2527, 2528, 2529, 2530, 2531, 2532, 2533, 2534, 2535, 2536, 2537, 2538, 2539, 2540, 2541, 2542, 2543, 2544, 2545, 2546, 2547, 2548, 2549, 2550, 2551, 2552, 2553, 2554, 2555, 2556, 2557, 2558, 2559, 2560, 2561, 2562, 2563, 2564, 2565, 2566, 2567, 2568, 2569, 2570, 2571, 2572, 2573, 2574, 2575, 2576, 2577, 2578, 2579, 2580, 2581, 2582, 2583, 2584, 2585, 2586, 2587, 2588, 2589, 2590, 2591, 2592, 2593, 2594, 2595, 2596, 2597, 2598, 2599, 2600, 2601, 2602, 2603, 2604, 2605, 2606, 2607, 2608, 2609, 2610, 2611, 2612, 2613, 2614, 2615, 2616, 2617, 2618, 2619, 2620, 2621, 2622, 2623, 2624, 2625, 2626, 2627, 2628, 2629, 2630, 2631, 2632, 2633, 2634, 2635, 2636, 2637, 2638, 2639, 2640, 2641, 2642, 2643, 2644, 2645, 2646, 2647, 2648, 2649, 2650, 2651, 2652, 2653, 2654, 2655, 2656, 2657, 2658, 2659, 2660, 2661, 2662, 2663, 2664, 2665, 2666, 2667, 2668, 2669, 2670, 2671, 2672, 2673, 2674, 2675, 2676, 2677, 2678, 2679, 26

1. *Chlorophyll a* (Chl *a*)

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1. *Chlorophyll a* and *Chlorophyll b* were determined by the method of Arar and Collins (1971) using a Shimadzu 1601 UV-Visible Spectrophotometer.

$\frac{1}{2} \times \frac{1}{2} = \frac{1}{4}$

1. The first group of people who are likely to be affected by the proposed changes are those who are currently employed in the public sector. This group includes a wide range of individuals, from those who are employed in the public sector to those who are employed in the private sector. The proposed changes are likely to have a significant impact on the public sector, as it is the largest employer in the economy. The public sector is likely to be affected in a number of ways, including a reduction in the number of employees, a reduction in the number of hours worked, and a reduction in the number of jobs available. The public sector is also likely to be affected in a number of other ways, including a reduction in the number of jobs available, a reduction in the number of hours worked, and a reduction in the number of jobs available.

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|--------------|-----------|-----------------|---------------|---------------|-------|
| ξ | η | ν | s_1 | s_2 | μ |
| $H_{F1} = 1$ | $m_F = 1$ | 1.5 m | 1 f | 1 f | 1 |

380. Where proceedings are submitted to a Magistrate of the first class or a Sub-Divisional Magistrate as provided by section 562 such Magistrate may thereupon pass such sentence or make such order as he might have passed or made if the case had originally been heard by him, and if he thinks further inquiry or additional evidence on any point to be necessary, he may make such inquiry or take such evidence himself or direct such inquiry or

evidence to be made or taken

Notes.—1 This section is new. The Select Committee in their report say: "We have omitted this clause in the Bill as introduced for reasons already given under s. 31 *ante*. We have substituted a clause providing the procedure to be followed when a Magistrate not empowered under clause 562 is of opinion that a first offender should be dealt with under this section."

2. Superior Magistrate cannot refer the case back.—A second-class Magistrate found the accused guilty of an offence under s. 375 I.P.C. and he sent the record and the accused to the District Magistrate under s. 562. The District Magistrate sent the case back to the second-class Magistrate pointing out that s. 562 was inapplicable. *Held* the District Magistrate's order was illegal inasmuch as s. 380 of the Code enacts that such Magistrate may pass such sentence or order as he might have passed or made if the case had originally been heard by him and he could not have sent the case to the second-class Magistrate for the purpose of sentence if he had originally heard it. 4 L.B.R. 130 = 7 Cr. L.J. 419, 1 L.B.R. 124 referred to

3. What order superior Magistrate may make.—*Query*—Whether a Magistrate to whom a case is submitted under s. 562 proviso can pass under this section any order other than a sentence or an order for release on the probation? 4 L.B.R. 277 = 8 Cr. L.J. 475

4. Superior Magistrate may even acquit.—In 1915 U.B.R. 1st Qr. 55 = 16 Cr. L.J. 535 it was *held* that the Magistrate to whom the proceedings were submitted under s. 562 was not prevented from acquitting the accused under the powers vested in him by this section if on a perusal of the evidence he comes to the conclusion that the conviction ought not to stand. 4 L.B.R. 277 = 8 Cr. L.J. 475 referred to

5. Appeal lies against conviction to Sessions Court.—A conviction under this section must for purposes of appeal be considered to be passed by a first-class Magistrate and appealable within the meaning of s. 409 and not a conviction within the meaning of s. 407. 17 Bom. L.R. 895 = 16 Cr. L.J. 738

CHAPTER XXVIII

OF EXECUTION

381. When a sentence of death passed by a Court of Session is submitted to the High Court for confirmation such Court of Session shall, on receiving the order of confirmation or other order of the High Court thereon cause such order to be carried into effect by issuing a warrant or taking such other steps as may be necessary

Execution of order passed under s. 376

Notes.—1 For Form of warrant of execution on a sentence of death see Sch. V No. 35 and on commutation No. 36

2. Order of High Court to be communicated to Superintendent of Jail.—Sessions Judges are directed to make arrangements for communicating every order of confirmation reversal or commutation of sentence of death to the Superintendent of jail wherein the prisoner is confined within 24 hours of receipt of the order in the Sessions Court. *Madras Rules of Practice* s. 249

3. Reference to Government in cases of infanticide.—In all cases where women are convicted for the murder of their infant-children a reference should be made through the High Court to the Government with an expression of his opinion by the Sessions Judge as to the propriety or otherwise of reducing the *Madras G.O. No. 404 dated 13th February 1881*

Postponement of capital sentence on pregnant women

382. If a woman sentenced to death is found to be pregnant, the High Court shall order the execution of the sentence to be postponed, and may, if it thinks fit, commute the sentence to transportation for life

Notes—1. For Form of warrant after a commutation of sentence, see Sch. V, No. 36.

2. It is only the High Court that can postpone execution.—The High Court is the only tribunal in which the law vests the power of postponing the execution of a sentence of death (passed and) confirmed on a woman found to be pregnant, *Weir II, 441*. Such a case, the Sessions Judge is competent only to direct the postponement of the execution of the sentence, until further orders of the High Court. The High Court is now under such circumstances empowered to commute the sentence to one of transportation for life, if it thinks fit and this is an instance of a case contemplated by s. 369 in which the High Court after signing or passing judgment, may alter or review the same

3. English Practice.—This is an instance of a 'Reprieve' or 'Respite'. In England when a woman is convicted and sentenced to death, the Clerk of the Crown after sentence is to ask whether the woman has anything to say in stay of execution of the sentence. If she then alleges or the Court then or later has reason to suppose that she is pregnant, a jury of twelve matrons should be empanelled sworn to try whether or not she is quick with child. If the jury require the assistance of a medical man, a medical man is requested by the Court to retire and examine the prisoner and is then examined as a witness. If the jury find that the prisoner is quick with child, the Court stays execution of the capital sentence until the prisoner is delivered of a child, or it is no longer possible that she should be so delivered. See *Hatsbury*, Vol IX, p 375, *Archbold* p 242. It is for the prisoner to plead pregnancy and unless she so pleads the right to a jury of matrons is said not to be absolute, *R. v Hunt, 2 Cox 261*.

Execution of sentences of transportation or imprisonment in other cases

383. Where the accused is sentenced to transportation or imprisonment in cases other than those provided for by section 381, the Court passing the sentence shall forthwith forward a warrant to the jail in which he is, or is to be confined, and, unless the accused is already confined in such jail, shall forward him to such jail, with the warrant.

Notes.—1. Sentence of transportation on woman, if not appealed against, to be referred to Government.—Under the orders of Government, the Chief Court has directed that in every case in which a sentence of transportation for life is passed on a woman for the murder of her infant-child, and the sentence is not appealed against, the file of the case shall, after the expiration of the period allowed for appeal, be forwarded to the Chief Court for submission to Government with a view to the consideration of the question whether any commutation or reduction of the sentence to be allowed. *Pun Cr*, Chapter XLIV, p 402

2. Warrant of Imprisonment.—Schedule V, Form 29 gives the form of a warrant of commitment on a sentence of imprisonment passed by a Magistrate. The signature of a Magistrate should not be affixed by a stamp, 6 M. 396

3. Sentence of Imprisonment commences when it is passed.—A sentence of imprisonment ought to commence from the time that the sentence is passed, unless there is some lawful reason for ordering it to commence at some future period, 3 B. L. R. Ap Cr. 50 = 12 W. R. 47. A sentence once passed might be postponed by Legislative enactment (s. 397) or by judicial order warranted by law (ss 35 and 426). When a Magistrate after sentencing two persons to separate terms of imprisonment, admitted them to bail in order that they might have the means of appealing, it was held that admission to bail did not make the sentence one to appeal, upheld future time and consequently illegal, 7 C. L. R. 393, 12 W. R. 47.

379. Sentence of imprisonment cannot be antedated.—A sentence of imprisonment for period up is illegal, but sentence of imprisonment until the rising of the Court is good and fulfils the law, 9 P. W. R. 1907 = 5 Cr. L. J. 217; 4 L. B. R. 152 = 7 Cr.

Procedure in cases submitted to High Court for confirmation

High Court to commit prisoner to jail outside the territory, in a case referred under s. 307 the High Court is not to exercise its ordinary original jurisdiction to the warrant within the territorial limits of

the High Court is required to send the accused to the jail in which he would be confined by the Court submitting the case, subject to any rules under s. 511 ss. 7, 8 and 9 of the *Prisoners Act* III of 1900 do not apply to such a case 29 C. 235 (F.B.)

6. Illegal to order confinement in 'Police Lock up'—In the absence of a notification by Local Government declaring a Police Lock up as a place where person sentenced to imprisonment may be confined it is illegal for a Magistrate to direct the prisoner to suffer imprisonment in such a place, 7 L B R 62 = 15 Cr. L. J. 10

7. Period of imprisonment how to be calculated—In calculating sentence of imprisonment the day upon which the sentence is passed and the day of release ought both to be included and considered as days of imprisonment, for example a man sentenced on the 1st January to one month's imprisonment should be released on the 31st January, not on the 1st February *Madris G O No 2411 dated 22nd November, 1891* In calculating their (soldiers') sentences of imprisonment the rule laid down in para. 776 (*Queen's Regulations*) is that the day on which the sentence is signed and the day of release shall both be included * * * This rule is founded on the principle of English Law which omits to take notice of fractions of days and considers a year completed on the last day of the year A soldier who is sentenced to imprisonment for one year on the 1st January is entitled to be released on the 31st December and if detained on the following day he is illegally in custody This method of reckoning sentence is further enjoined in the *Bengal Military Regulations* s. 43 para 27 *Oudh Cr Dig*, p 23

8. Endorsement of previous conviction on back of warrant.—Every Criminal Court when it passes a sentence of imprisonment or transportation shall endorse on the back of the warrant, with which under s. 383 it forwards the convict to jail the following particulars—(a) age of the convict (b) caste of the convict (c) place or residence of the convict (d) plea of the convict and (e) opinion of the assessors (where the trial is conducted with the aid of assessors).

If at the trial any previous conviction has been established the following particulars shall also be given—(a) name of the offence of which the convict was previously convicted (b) sentence passed upon him (c) date of such sentence and (d) name designation of the trying authority

The above particulars shall be written in the same language in which the warrant itself is written.—*Pom. H C Cr Cir* p 38

9. Warrant of execution—directions as to—See *C P Cr Cir* Part II No 33

384. Every warrant for the execution of a sentence of imprisonment shall be directed to the officer in charge of the jail, or other place in which the prisoner is or is to be confined

Notes.—1. Separate warrant for each prisoner—A separate warrant should be issued in case of each prisoner and a definite period of imprisonment should be stated. Thus an order directing a person to be imprisoned 'until he gives security' is bad 8 C. 644

2. Confinement in jail other than that stated in warrant unlawful—In 11 C. 527, it appeared that a Sheriff's officer delivered over to the officer in charge of the Alipore Jail a judgment-debtor who had been duly committed to the Presidency Jail. It was held that the imprisonment was unlawful. See also 29 C. 236 (F.B.).

385. When the prisoner is to be confined in a jail, the warrant shall be lodged with the jailor

*** 386. (1)** Whenever an offender has been sentenced to pay a fine, the Court passing Warrant for levy of the sentence may take action for the recovery of the fine in either or both fine. of the following ways that is to say it may—

(a) issue a warrant for the levy of the amount by attachment and sale of any moveable property belonging to the offender,

(ii) *Compensation under s. 250*—When compensation is ordered to be paid under s. 250 the proper procedure is to recover the fine in the first instance under this section and s. 387, and if not recovered, then alone can the Magistrate order imprisonment, 3 L. B. R. 32; 25 Q. 164 and 251; 26 M. 127. See Notes 31 and 32 under s. 250 at p. 710

(iii) *Compensation under s. 545, q v*

(iv) *Excess charge and railway fare is not fine*—The excess charge and fare mentioned in s. 113 of Act IX of 1890 (*Indian Railway*) is not a fine though it may be recovered as such, and no imprisonment in default can be inflicted, 20 M. 393. See Note 11 to s. 33 at p. 55

(v) *Court and process fees*—A Magistrate can recover the costs of the Court fee paid upon the complaint and the process-fees from the accused, but he has no authority to order imprisonment in default, 1 Bar. S. R. 593.

3. *Fine must be levied by the same Court with as little delay as possible.*—See *C P Cr Cir, Part II, No 38. Secs 389* The successor in office of a Judge or Magistrate may levy a fine imposed by his predecessor, 9 W. R. 50. But the Court that levies the fine must be the same as the Court which imposed it. There should be no delay in the levy of a fine directly on passing a sentence, which includes a fine leviable by distress, whether that be the only punishment or not, it is quite lawful for the Magistrate to issue his warrant for the levy of the fine by distress and sale of the goods of the offender, i.e., imprisonment and distress may be simultaneously ordered, the law nowhere providing that fines may be levied by means of imprisonment, 22 C. 139; 8 B. L. R. Appx. XLVII at p. 49; see 3 W. R. 61. The levy of the fine should not be deferred until the result of any appeal the convict may prefer, be known; nor can the Appellate Court order a Lower Court to abstain from issuing such a warrant, 2 W. R. (Cr. Let.) 13.

4. *Is it legal to pass sentence of fine against several accused collectively and individually?*—A sentence of fine must be specific as to each person fined. It is not legal to pass a sentence of fine on the prisoners individually and collectively, 5 M. H. C. R. Appx. V. When, however, the payment of a fine or fee is ordered to be made jointly by several persons convicted together, it may be recovered from all or anyone of them, and if payment made by one is nullified by the reversal of the order as to him, the liability of all and each of the others revives, as what was done subject to appeal was but provisional or subject to a condition subsequent, Ratanlal 90.

5. *Fine may be levied at any time within six years*—Fine may be levied at any time within six years after the passing of the sentence or during the term of imprisonment if it exceeds six years, and the death of the offender does not discharge any of his property from liability which would, after his death, be legally liable for his debts—i.e., s. 70, 1 P. C., Ratanlal 207. The attention of Sessions Judges and Magistrates is called to the fact that proceedings are seldom taken to recover fines after the imprisonment in default has expired. If, at any time, subsequent to the return of the original warrant and within a period of six years from the passing of the sentence, the fine, or any part of it, remains unpaid, and the Court, from information gained, has reason to think that there is any moveable property belonging to the offender, it should issue a fresh warrant for the attachment and sale of that property within a special period, returnable within a certain time—*Bom H C Cr Cir*, p. 53, also *Wilkins*, 118

6. *Liability to fine does not cease when imprisonment is undergone in default.*—An offender who has undergone the full term of imprisonment to which he was sentenced in default of the payment of fine, is still liable to have the amount levied by distress and sale of any moveable property belonging to him, which may be found within the jurisdiction of the Court passing the sentence, whether the officer who inflicted the fine issued any special direction on the subject or not, 3 W. R. 61. The imprisonment which the Court is authorized to impose in default of payment is intended as a punishment for non payment, not as a satisfaction and discharge of the amount due. Ratanlal 91. But see the new amendment made by the insertion of the proviso under which no warrant can be issued without special reasons when the accused has undergone the full term of imprisonment in default of payment of fine.

7. *Court should exercise its discretion whether fine should be recovered even after imprisonment.*—The law is merely permissive and not imperative. When efforts have been made to realize a fine by distress and sale, and when the offender has undergone the imprisonment awarded in default of payment of fine, the Court should exercise its discretion, according to the circumstances of each particular case, as to whether, after the release of the prisoner, any further steps should be taken towards the realization of the fine within the pe

allowed by law. If there is reason to believe that the offender was able to pay and would not, preferring to undergo imprisonment, the law should be strictly enforced, but if it appears that the fine was not paid for want of means or that its realization would be ruinous to the offender or his family, it is not desirable that further steps should be taken.—*Pun. Cir.*, Chap. LI, p. 264. But see preliminary Note above.

DISTRESS AND SALE.

8. Formalities to be observed in attachment and sale.—Formalities will be observed in attachment, sale and adjudicating upon objections similar to those in force in the execution of civil decrees, with this difference that the process issues on the criminal side.—*Pun. Cir.*, Chapter LI, p. 268. But see s. 533. Thus the officer attaching moveables must have the warrant at the time of attachment, otherwise the attachment is illegal. 27 A. 258.

9. Signature on warrant should not be affixed by means of stamps.—This practice besides being illegal, is objectionable on other grounds, and is strictly prohibited. No officer of a jail would be justified in receiving or detaining a prisoner on a warrant so signed.—*Pun. Cir.*, p. 263, also 6 M. 396. The impression of a stamp bearing the officer's name is insufficient and illegal, *Wilkins* 125.

10. What property may not be sold.—See Note 9 at p. 127.

(i) *Agricultural implements*—Although agricultural implements are not exempt from distress and sale in realization of a fine the measure is one which should be resorted to with discretion, otherwise it may entail undue hardship in cases which do not require such severity.—*Pun. Cir.*, Chapter LI, p. 269.

(ii) *Joint family property*—This language denotes things which may be taken by distress and then sold so as by mere act of sale to pass the property in them, not mere rights and interests or shares in joint moveables, such as that of an undivided Hindu family, *Weir II, 442*, 20 C. 478. See also 28 P. L. R. 1915 = 16 Cr. L. J. 166. In *Weir II, 443* it was held that an attachment of moveable property belonging to an *Ahyasantana* family (of which complainant and accused were members) in execution of the warrant for the levy of the amount of compensation ordered under s. 250 to be paid by the complainant to the accused, was illegal. But a Full Bench of the Madras High Court has, however recently held that the interests of an absconder in the joint family of which he is a member can be attached under s. 88. The mode of levying pecuniary penalties should be strictly confined to the provisions of the law that gives the jurisdiction. In 27 Bom. L. R. 1363 the question whether a share of joint Hindu family estate can be attached and sold by a Magistrate came before the High Court and it was held *per FAWCETT, J.*, that under s. 488 (3) read with s. 386 (1) (a) a Magistrate can attach and sell property even if such property consists of a share in a joint Hindu family estate. See *Mud. Pol. Min. Vol. I, p. 115*. See 31 M. L. J. 84 (F.B.), 31 M. L. J. 120.

(iii) *Growing crops* are not moveable property for the purpose of this section. *Weir II, 444*.

(iv) *Property in a foreign State*—There is no authority in the Code to attach the property of the offender in a foreign State, as the Code is only applicable to British India, *Weir II, 444*. ✓

(v) Where money was deposited by a person as surety for his brother's appearance in a criminal trial and the latter being convicted in the case, and sentenced to a fine, the money was seized in realization of the fine, on the ground that the depositor and his brother were members of a joint Hindu family, but there was nothing to show that the money deposited was not the depositor's own. Held, that the deposit could not be seized in levy of the fine. 19 A. L. J. 887.

CLAIMS OF THIRD PARTIES.

10-A. Under the new amendment by sub-section (2).—The Local Government under the amended sub-section (2) is authorized to frame rules regarding the execution of warrants and the determination of claims preferred by third parties on an attachment of property in execution of a warrant of fine. Under the old law, upon a claim preferred by a third party, the Magistrate could not try any such claim because the section did not provide for such contingency.

Under the old Code.—It was held that the principles applicable to attachments under s. 88 apply equally to attachments under this section, 28 P. L. R. 1915 = 16 Cr. L. J. 166; what may be said with regard to s. 88 would equally apply to s. 386, 20 M. 88.

11. Is a Magistrate bound to inquire and decide claims?—The Code does not contain any provision for the trial of claims which may be preferred to property distrained under s. 386, 28 P. L. R. 1915 = 16 Cr. L. J. 166. In cases of dispute the Magistrate should stay the sale of the property seized to give the

claimant time to establish his right, 22 M. 89. The Magistrate is nowhere required by law to try any claim that may be preferred to the ownership of any property distrained, 22 G. 935. A Magistrate is bound to inquire judicially into and decide a claim to property attached under his orders in attempting to recover a fine. A claimant must be given an opportunity of showing *bona fide* interest in such property before it was attached, 1 Bur. & R. 332. But see 10-A above.

A Magistrate, who has issued a distress warrant under this section, is not required by law to try any claim which may be preferred to the ownership of the property distrained, 22 G. 935. A was sentenced to pay a fine. Proceedings were taken under this section to realise the fine inflicted on A and certain moveable property supposed to belong to him was sold for Rs. 5. The property thus sold really belonged to B, A's father, who thereupon sued the Secretary of State praying for restoration of the said property, or its value Rs. 10. *Held, per BLAIR, J.*, that the order of the Magistrate for the sale of particular chattels made under the circumstances was not a judicial proceeding and was not the proper subject of criminal revision, that the remedy of an aggrieved third party was by suit, not against Magistrate or Government, but against the person in whose possession the goods were found. *Per ATKIN, J.*, that a claimant may proceed against the purchaser, but this does not prevent his proceeding against the Crown if he prefers to do so, 1898 A. W. N. 173.

12. Claims and objections how disposed of.—See Notes 17 to 21 at p. 128.—When an objector comes forward, he should be warned of the penalties contained in s. 207, I P C, against a fraudulent claim to property to prevent its seizure in satisfaction of fine. After this warning, the objection should be inquired into and disposed of either by admitting the claim or referring to civil action if his claim seems *prima facie* groundless.—*Fun. Cir.*, p. 269. If any claim is made to the attached property, the Magistrate before ordering its sale should allow the claimant an opportunity of establishing his title in a Court having jurisdiction to determine civil rights, *Weir II*, 445.

13. Postponement of sale of attached property when necessary.—When claim is made to property attached under this section, the Court should direct the postponement of the sale of property seized for such time as in its opinion would be sufficient to give the claimant time to establish his right to the property, unless by the reason of the nature of the property an immediate sale would be for the benefit of the owner, in which case the proceeds should be held over. *Ratanlal 976*, where 22 G. 935 and 20 M. 89 are followed.

14. Claims to be decided by Magistracy and not by Police.—A warrant issued under this section for the levy of a fine should ordinarily be directed to a Police-officer and the authority issuing it should set a time for the sale and for the return of the warrant. If no one claims the property, the Police have the power of selling it within the time specified in the warrant, without any previous reference to the Magistrate, if a claimant comes forward then the ownership of the property distrained must be determined by the Magistrate and not by the Police, *Wilkins* 118.

15. Revision.—If the Magistrate errs the remedy is by civil suit and not by application to the High Court in revision, 20 M. 89; 23 P. L. R. 1915 = 16 Cr. L. J. 166. But see 9 P. R. 1908 = 29 P. W. R. 1908 = 8 Cr. L. J. 260. Where it was held that the High Court has jurisdiction under s. 439 to revise the orders of a Magistrate. See Note 20 at p. 128.

MISCELLANEOUS.

16. Information to jailor about recovery of fine.—As soon as a fine or any part of it is recovered information should immediately be given to the jailor of the same. The responsibility is with the Court.—*Bom. H. C. Cr. Cir.*, p. 54. The responsibility for intimating to the jail authorities, the fact of the payment rests entirely with the Court, such information should invariably be acknowledged by the jail authorities and the acknowledgment should be filed by the Court for future reference. *Madras Rules of Practice*, p. 177.

17. Refund of fine to be made without application.—In cases where an Appellate Court has ordered a fine indicated by a Court of First Instance to be refunded, the Appellate Court should forthwith certify its order to the Court of First Instance, and the Court of First Instance should, on receipt of the Appellate Court's order for such refund of the fine, immediately prepare a payment order, if the fine has been levied, and deliver it to the payee, whether he applies for it or not. The Court of First Instance should at the same time ascertain from the payee at what treasury or sub-treasury he desires the refund to be made and at once direct the officer in charge of such treasury or sub-treasury to make the refund and inform the Appellate Court of having done so. The officer in charge of the treasury or sub-treasury should, on presentation of the payment order and without requiring the applicant to furnish an official copy of the Appellate Court's order or judgment or any other document besides his bare application, make the refund upon demand of the applicant.

soon as he has furnished satisfactory proof of his identity. In such cases a written application from the person entitled to the repayment of the fine is not required and should an applicant for refund present at any time such a written application it should be accepted on plain paper without any Court fee (*vide Government Gazette for 1896 Part I pp 427 and 428*)—*Bom H C Cr Cr*. Whenever an Appellate Court other than the High Court reduces or reverses a sentence of fine, it shall if the fine has been levied grant to the appellant an order of refund. When the order of refund is presented to the Court of First Instance it shall forthwith prepare the necessary order and deliver it to the payee without requiring any formal application therefor. *Madras Rules of Practice p 65*

18 Liability of judicial officers for judicial act done illegally within the limits of their jurisdiction.—

A judicial officer, who in the discharge of his judicial duties issues a warrant which he has authority to issue though the particular form or manner in which he issues it is contrary to law acts within and not without the limits of his jurisdiction. That word means authority or power to act in a matter and not authority or power to do an act in a particular manner or form. *See 2 M I A 293 and cf 39 C 953 (P C)*. Where a Magistrate of the first class having sentenced an accused person to three years rigorous imprisonment and Rs. 500 fine under ss 379 and 411 of the Penal Code and having issued a warrant purporting to act under this section for the levy of the fine by distress and sale of cattle belonging to the accused sold such cattle before the date fixed for the sale and in contravention of Form 37 Sch V and s. 554 of the Code and Form D in Chap V of his judicial duty within his was immaterial that he did not in he did and that the fact that

he acted with gross and culpable irregularity did not deprive him of the protection afforded by Act XVIII of 1880, 12 A 115 "

378. * A warrant issued under s 386 sub-section (1) clause (a) by any Court "

Effect of such warrant.

may be executed within the local limits of the jurisdiction of such Court and it shall authorize the † 'attachment and sale of any such property without such limits when endorsed by the District Magistrate or Chief Presidency

Magistrate within the local limits of whose jurisdiction such property is found

Suspension of execution of sentence of imprisonment.

‡ 388. (1) When an offender has been sentenced to fine only and to imprisonment in default of payment of the fine and the fine is not paid forthwith, the Court may—

(a) order that the fine shall be payable either in full on or before a date not more than thirty days from the date of the order, or in two or three instalments of which the first shall be payable on or before a date not more than thirty days from the date of the order and the other or others at an interval or at intervals as the case may be of not more than thirty days and

(b) suspend the execution of the sentence of imprisonment and release the offender on the execution by the offender of a bond, with or without sureties as the Court thinks fit conditioned for his appearance before the Court on the date or dates on or before which payment of the fine or the instalments thereof as the case may be is to be made and if the amount of the fine or of any instalment, as the case may be, is not realised on or before the latest date on which it is payable under the order, the Court may direct the sentence of imprisonment to be carried into execution at once.

(2) The provisions of sub-section (1) shall be applicable also in any case in which an order for the payment of money has been made on non recovery of which imprisonment may be awarded and the money is not paid forthwith and if the person against whom the order has been made, on being required to enter into a bond such as is referred to in that sub-section fails to do so the Court may at once pass sentence of imprisonment

* The words and figures in the inverted commas were substituted for the words such warrant by Act XVIII of 1915

† The word was substituted for the word distress by 1915

‡ The word was substituted by Act XXVII of 1922

Notes.—1 The words 'and the Court issues a warrant under s. 386¹ and the words "day appointed for in return of such warrant' of the old section have been omitted by the present amendment, 1923. So it is clear that section 388 does not contemplate the issue of a warrant under s. 388 and therefore a Magistrate is entitled to proceed under s. 388 without the issue of a warrant. The effect of this change would be to overrule 26 M 127 which held that the issue of a warrant under s. 386 was a condition precedent to the carrying out of the sentence of imprisonment.

2. This section inapplicable if no alternative sentence of imprisonment.—Where a Magistrate sentences an offender to a fine and fails to pass a sentence of imprisonment in default of payment of fine, he has under this section no power to bind him over in his own recognizance to appear. *Weir II, 443*

3. Issue of distress warrant a condition precedent to suspension of sentence.—The accused was sentenced to pay a fine and in default to three months imprisonment. The Magistrate allowed her some days to pay the fine and released her on her giving security. *Held* the procedure was illegal unless at the same time a distress warrant for the levy of the fine was issued. The suspension of the sentence was not lawful in this case. **4 L. B. R. 151 = 7 Cr. L. J. 452**. See Note 1 and the present amendment enabling a Magistrate to proceed under section 388 without the issue of a warrant, so now such a distress warrant would be perfectly legal and valid.

Who may issue warrant

389. Every warrant for the execution of any sentence may be issued either by the Judge or Magistrate who passed the sentence, or by his successor in office.

Note.—Change of incumbent does not change the Court.—The successor in the office of a Judge may levy a fine imposed by his predecessor. The power is restricted to the Court which sentences the offender, but the word Court is not restricted to the particular individual who held the office. **9 W. R. 50**

Execution of sentence of whipping only

390. When the accused is sentenced to whipping only, the sentence shall * subject to the provisions of section 391 be executed at such place and time as the Court may direct.

Notes.—1 Whipping not to be inflicted in public.—The punishment of whipping is never to be inflicted in public or in front of the Court house but always within some walled enclosure, and in the presence or a Magistrate or the Superintendent of a jail and when practicable, of a medical officer.—*Pun. Act, p. 277*. Judicial floggings shall be inflicted in private either at a jail or in an enclosure near the Court house and if possible in the presence of a medical officer. *Madras Rules of Practice s. 80*. See also Note 16 to s. 32.

2. Execution of sole sentence of whipping not to be deferred.—This section authorizes a Court passing a sentence of whipping only to fix the place and time for its execution but it does not contemplate a postponement of the execution of the sentence to a future day. It must take place at once. *Ratanlal 90a, 26 M 465*. It is illegal to state in the warrant that execution of the sentence of whipping shall take place at some future day, such as the date of the expiry of the sentence of imprisonment. **6 M. H. C. R. Appx. XXXVIII.** Where execution, has been so deferred the sentence was cancelled as inoperative, **20 W. R. 72**. See Notes 2 and 3 to s. 391.

391. (1) When the accused—

Execution of sentence of whipping in addition to imprisonment.

† "(a) is sentenced to whipping only and furnishes bail to the satisfaction of the Court for his appearance at such time and place as the Court may direct, or

(b) is sentenced to whipping in addition to imprisonment, the whipping shall not be inflicted until fifteen days from the date of the sentence, is made within that time, until the sentence is confirmed by the Appellate Court, but shall be inflicted as soon as practicable after the expiry of the fifteen days, or, as soon as practicable after the receipt of the order of the Appellate Court.

(2) The whipping shall be inflicted in the presence of the Judge or Magistrate unless the Judge or Magistrate orders it to be inflicted in his own presence.

* These words and figures were inserted by Act XII of 1923

† These words were substituted for the words "is sentenced to whipping only and furnishes bail to the satisfaction of the Court for his appearance at such time and place as the Court may direct, or"

(3) No accused person shall be sentenced to whipping in addition to imprisonment when the term of imprisonment to which he is sentenced is less than three months.

Note—Under the new clause (a)—A sentence of whipping can be postponed though in addition to whipping no sentence of imprisonment is passed. The old section contemplated cases of whipping in addition to which a sentence of imprisonment was also passed. So under the old section a sentence of whipping alone could not be postponed.

Notes—1. "Sentence"—whipping when to be carried out.—The word 'sentence' in this section means the total punishment inflicted at one trial. Therefore when an accused is convicted at one trial of two offences and sentenced to a separate term of imprisonment for each, and also to whipping for the second and the sentences are directed to be consecutive, *held*, that the sentence of whipping ought not to be delayed until the expiry of the first sentence, but shall be carried into effect according to the provisions of this section, *Ratanlal 303*

2 No provision for postponement of execution of sole sentence of whipping when convicted by a second-class Magistrate.—The refusal of a second class Magistrate to postpone a sole sentence of whipping only, pending an intended appeal, is quite proper, as that is the only order he could legally pass. The Code makes no provision whereby a second class Magistrate, imposing a sentence of whipping only, can suspend its execution nor does it provide for the detention of a person so sentenced to allow of his appealing nor for his refusal to undergo the whipping if the sentence is confirmed on appeal. It is only when whipping is added to imprisonment in an appealable case that the whipping may and ought to be postponed under this section, *26 M. 465* at p. 466. But now a second-class Magistrate cannot pass a sentence of whipping. *See s. 32* as amended by Act IV of 1909. *See Note to the section and also CL (a) to sub-section (1)*

3. Postponement of whipping illegal.—In a case where a person was sentenced on three separate convictions, first, to a term of imprisonment, second, to certain number of lashes to be inflicted at the expiry of the term of the imprisonment, and third, to a term of imprisonment to take effect after the sentence of whipping was carried out, *held* that the postponement of whipping after the first term of imprisonment had expired is illegal *6 M. H. C. R. Appx. XXXVIII, 7 M. H. C. R. Appx. XXIX; Ratanlal 300*. *See also 4 Bom. L. R. 929*. Similarly, in *4 Bom. L. R. 436* it was *held* that where the accused was convicted of two offences for one of which he is sentenced to imprisonment and for the other to whipping, the postponement of the sentence of whipping is illegal, (1) that no appeal lay against the conviction and (2) the whipping ought not to be postponed, merely because the accused appeals against the sentence of imprisonment. The immediate execution of a sentence of whipping is not illegal in a case in which in the same trial, whipping is imposed for one distinct offence and imprisonment for another, *Weir II, 446*. *See also Note 2 to s. 390*. *See Note to the section and also CL (a) to sub-section (1)*

4. When sentence becomes inoperative, it should be cancelled.—Where a Deputy Magistrate ordered that the prisoner should be brought before him at the expiration of his imprisonment, and that the sentence of whipping should then be carried out, the High Court cancelled the sentence of whipping as having become inoperative and incapable of being carried out by lapse of time, *20 W. R. 72*. The words "as soon as practicable" in sub-sec. (1) renders this ruling practically absolute. But where an accused person was ordered to receive thirty stripes on the day of his release from prison, the High Court set aside the order as altogether illegal and improper, *1881 A. W. N. 135*.

5. When does sentence of whipping become inoperative?—A sentence of whippings delayed beyond the period prescribed by the Act, cannot legally be carried into effect, *Weir II, 446, e.g.*, where a second-class Magistrate passes a sentence of four months' rigorous imprisonment and whipping and the order of the Appellate Court is not received within the four months, the prisoner must be released at the expiration of the sentence of imprisonment and the sentence of whipping will become inoperative, for the law provides no means for obtaining the attendance of the prisoner so sentenced. Sub-section (3) which is new is put in to render such cases rare.

6. Prisoner not freed from liability to whipping through breach of duty, etc., of officer.—The punishment of whipping is to be inflicted immediately on the expiration of the time set forth in the section. But if through accident or neglect, or wilful breach of duty, the direction as to whipping is not obeyed, the prisoner is not thereby, in any way, freed from his liability. The sentence still subsisting must be executed, *Ratanlal 136*

7. When whipping is illegal—When the term of imprisonment to which the accused is sentenced is less than three months, the infliction of the punishment of whipping is illegal. 2 Bom. L. R. 56 and under s. 439 (5), the High Court has power to set aside such illegal sentence of whipping, otherwise than at the instance of the party who could have appealed, Weir II, 417. Sub-section (3) of this section controls s. 3 of the *Whipping Act*, 4 Bom. L. R. 438.

8. Double sentence of whipping illegal—Accused was convicted under ss. 454 and 380, I. P. C., and sentenced to two years rigorous imprisonment and fifteen stripes for each of the offences, *held*, reducing the sentence, that it was doubtful whether the double sentence of whipping was legal under this section, *Ratanlal* 955.

392. (1) In the case of a person of or over sixteen years of age whipping shall be

Mode of inflicting punishment.

inflicted with a light rattan not less than half-an-inch in diameter, in such mode and on such part of the person, as the Local Government directs, and, in the case of a person under sixteen years of age, it shall be inflicted in such mode, and on such part of the person and with such instrument, as the Local Government directs.

Limit of number of stripes.

(2) In no case shall such punishment exceed thirty stripes and in the case of a person under sixteen years of age, it shall not exceed fifteen stripes.

Notes.—Amendment.—The words in brackets in sub-sec. (2) have been added by the *Whipping Act IV* of 1909.

1. On which part of the person whipping shall be inflicted—(1) In the case of a person of, or over, sixteen years of age—

Bombay—The punishment of whipping shall, when inflicted in private (*i.e.*, within precincts of prison) be inflicted on the bare buttocks, when inflicted in public (*i.e.*, without precincts of prison) across the bare shoulders.—*Bom. G. R.* No 608 of 1897.

Central Provinces.—The rattan shall be applied to the bare posterior, the offender being tied to triangle and a leather apron fastened round his waist.—*Notification* No 20, dated 4th January, 1899, *C. P. Gazette*.

Madras—The punishment of whipping shall be inflicted on the posteriors, and that care is to be taken that the person undergoing punishment is tied to a triangle or that his mobility be otherwise secured, in order to preclude the possibility of the rattan falling on any other part of the body.—*Fort St. George Gazette*, dated 1st January, 1893, *Gazette*, 1898, Part I, p. 1248. A thin cloth soaked in antiseptic should be spread over prisoner's buttocks.

Burma—The punishment of whipping shall be inflicted on the breech.—*Notification* No 203, dated May, 1891, *Burma Gazette*, 1891, Part I, p. 201.

Assam—See *Assam Gazette*, 1899, Part II, p. 384.

(2) In the case of a person under sixteen years of age—

Bombay—The punishment of whipping shall be inflicted in private with a light rattan across the bare buttocks.—*Bom. G. R.* No 6222, dated the 16th September, 1893.

The United Provinces of Agra and Oudh—The whipping shall be inflicted on the buttocks with a light rattan half-an-inch in diameter.—*G. O.* No 1290, dated 12th May, 1893.

Central Provinces—The whipping shall be inflicted on the bare posterior or in the case of a boy under the age of twelve on the hands, at the discretion of the Magistrate. The instrument shall be a rattan lighter than that used for adults, and while the whipping is being administered the prisoner shall be held but not tied on a triangle or in any other convenient way, as the Magistrate or officer present may think fit.—*C. P. Gazette Notification* No 20, dated 4th January, 1899.

Madras—A still lighter cane shall be employed.—*Madras Rules of Practice*, s. 180.

Punjab—The punishment of whipping shall be inflicted on the buttocks in the way of school discipline with a rattan not more than half-an-inch in diameter.—*Notification* No 677, dated 16th May, 1899.—*Punjab Gazette*, 1899, Part I, p. 314.

Burma—The punishment of whipping shall be inflicted with a light rattan the breech in the way of school discipline.—*Burma Gazette Notification* No. 193, dated 1st July, 1898, P.

2. Only one sentence of whipping permissible—Under the provisions of this and the next section not more than one sentence of whipping and that not exceeding thirty stripes should be awarded at one time 1906 U. B. R. (Cr. P. C.) 47 = 4 Cr. L. J. 231, where 1892—96 U. B. R. 1 and 41; 1897—1901 U. B. R. 1 and 247, 9 W. R. 81, 14 W. R. 7 and P. J. L. B. 582 are referred to

Not to be executed
by instalments.
Exemptions

393 No sentence of whipping shall be executed by instalments and none of the following persons shall be punishable with whipping, namely—

(a) females,

(b) males sentenced to death, or to transportation or to penal servitude, or to imprisonment for more than five years,

(c) males whom the Court considers to be more than forty five years of age

Notes—1 Sentence of whipping cannot be enhanced—An accused person was convicted under s 382 I. P. C. and sentenced to whipping. The whipping was inflicted and an application was made for an enhancement of the sentence on the ground that it was inadequate, held that the sentence was legal and could not be enhanced, as no sentence of whipping can be executed by instalments, *Ratanlal 537*.

2 Sentence of whipping may subsequently be incompatible—A sentence of whipping passed on a person who is already under sentence of death or transportation, or penal servitude or imprisonment for more than five years is illegal. Even if the sentence of whipping precedes instead of follows the other sentence, the passing of the latter sentence renders the inflicting of the punishment of whipping illegal, *1 M 56*.

Whipping not to be
inflicted if offender
not in fit state of
health

394. (1) The punishment of whipping shall not be inflicted unless a medical officer, if present certifies, or, if there is not a medical officer present, unless it appears to the Magistrate or officer present, that the offender is in a fit state of health to undergo such punishment

(2) If, during the execution of a sentence of whipping, a medical officer certifies, or it appears to the Magistrate or officer present, that the offender is not in a fit state of health to undergo the remainder of the sentence the whipping shall be finally stopped

Stop of execution.

Note—Medical officer cannot certify for part of sentence before commencement—A sentence of whipping is wholly prevented from being executed when a medical officer certifies under this section that the offender is not in a fit state of health to undergo the punishment. It is partially prevented from being executed if, during the execution of the sentence the medical officer certifies that the offender is not in a fit state of health. But there is no provision of law authorizing a medical officer to give a certificate before the commencement of whipping, that the accused is fit to receive only a portion of the sentence and such a certificate cannot be held as one granted under this section. The Magistrate is not in such a case empowered by s 393a to sentence the offender to imprisonment in lieu of so much of the sentence as was not executed *[31 M. 84]*.

395. (1) In any case in which, under section 394, a sentence of whipping is, wholly or partially, prevented from being executed, the offender shall be kept in custody till the Court which passed the sentence can revise it, and the said Court may, at its discretion, either remit such sentence, or sentence the offender in lieu of whipping, or in lieu of so much of the sentence of whipping as was not executed, to imprisonment for any term not exceeding twelve months* "or to a fine not exceeding five hundred rupees" which may be in addition to any other punishment to which he may have been sentenced for the same offence.

Procedure if punishment cannot be inflicted under section 394

(2) Nothing in this section shall be deemed to authorize any Court to inflict imprisonment for a term* or a fine of an amount exceeding that to which the accused is liable by law, or that which the said Court is competent to inflict

* These words were inserted by Act XVIII of 1923.

Notes.—1 Under the old law no Court could inflict fine in lieu of whipping where the sentence of whipping could not be carried out. But now under the present section as amended the Court has power to revise its sentence of whipping by inflicting a fine. So under the new amendment 11 A 303 and Weir II, 449 have become obsolete.

2. Section deals with substantive sentence of imprisonment.—The word *imprisonment* in this section means a substantive sentence of imprisonment and not imprisonment for default in payment of a fine 11 A 303.

3 "The Court which passed the sentence"—When a sentence of imprisonment and whipping passed by a District Magistrate is confirmed on appeal by the Sessions Judge the power of the former to revise the sentence of whipping is not affected by such confirmation for the only Court which can act when a sentence of whipping cannot be carried out under the circumstances referred to in s. 394 is the Court which passed the original sentence 10 P R. 1839. But the words "the Court that passed the sentence" do not mean the same officer who inflicted the sentence of whipping originally where therefore a first-class Magistrate who passed the sentence of whipping was transferred. It was *held* that the District Magistrate who had jurisdiction over the whole district was competent to commute the sentence of whipping to one of imprisonment 33 P R 1901 = 20 P L R. 1902

4. Limit of imprisonment awardable in lieu of whipping—Imprisonment for a term exceeding that which the Court is competent to inflict cannot be awarded. Therefore where a Magistrate has passed substantive sentence of imprisonment on the accused to the full extent of his powers he cannot sentence him to a further term in lieu of whipping. If he finds him unfit to undergo that sentence 21 A 25 *followed* 11 P R. 1901 and so also if the aggregate of the substantive sentence of imprisonment and the imprisonment in lieu of whipping exceed the maximum term imposable by the Magistrate Weir II, 449; 11 P R 1901. SIR HENRY KINSERP que-ries the correctness of these rulings.

5 Solitary confinement in lieu of whipping—Solitary confinement may be awarded in lieu of whipping when that sentence cannot be carried out 14 P R. 1899

6 Imprisonment in lieu of whipping cannot be awarded where medical certificate invalid—See Note under s. 394

396. (1) When sentence is passed under this Code on an escaped convict such sentence if of death fine or whipping shall subject to the provisions hereinbefore contained take effect immediately and if of imprisonment, penal servitude or transportation shall take effect according to the following rules that is to say —

Execution of sentence on escaped convicts

(2) If the new sentence is severer in its kind than the sentence which such convict was undergoing when he escaped the new sentence shall take effect immediately

(3) When the new sentence is not severer in its kind than the sentence the convict was undergoing when he escaped the new sentence shall take effect after he has suffered imprisonment penal servitude or transportation as the case may be, for a further period equal to that which at the time of his escape remained unexpired of his former sentence

Explanation—For the purposes of this section—

(a) a sentence of transportation or penal servitude shall be deemed severer than a sentence of imprisonment

(b) a sentence of imprisonment with solitary confinement shall be deemed severer than a sentence of the same description of imprisonment without solitary confinement and

(c) a sentence of rigorous imprisonment shall be deemed severer than a sentence of simple imprisonment with or without solitary confinement.

Notes — 1 Succession of sentences.—A life-convict under sentence of transportation for murder cannot on conviction for attempting to escape from lawful custody be ordered to undergo sentence of rigorous imprisonment for that offence prior to the expiry of the sentence of transportation regard being had to the provisions of this section. Ratanlal 965

2 Sub sections (2) and (3) to be strictly complied with—The punishment under s. 224 1 P C being in addition to the original sentence the Courts when passing sentence must comply with the provisions of sub-sections (2) and (3) of this section, Weir I, 203 204

1. To walk with long steps

to step in the middle of the skinner's shoulder
to guard and stride along the R. side

Dreken

2. To straddle.

I mean to stride your sword.

Strak

Stride, v. i. To pass over at a step.

See also stride

Stridone

Strident, a. [Lat. strident, p. pr. of stridere, to make a grating or creaking noise. See infra.]
Characterized by harshness, grating. "A strident voice."

Strid'ous a. [Lat. from stridere to make any harsh, grating or creaking sound, it. stridore, strido, sp. Eg. & Fr. estridor, Fr. stridor.] A harsh shrill, or creaking noise.

Strid'ous loud, a. [Lat. stridulus. It. stridulo. See supra.] Making a small, harsh sound or a creaking.

Strife, n. [O Fr. strife. See Strive.]
1. Exertion or contention for superiority, contest of emulation either by intellectual or physical efforts. "Doting about questions and strifes of words."

2 Tim vi 4

2. Contention in battle, contest, struggle for victory, quarrel or war.

Strife, n. [O Fr. strife. See Strive.]
Lives in these houses better than the
These words that granted to us.

Artificial strife

Strak

Strife'ful a. Contentious.

Stroke, n. [O Fr. stroke. p. pr. of stricken. See infra.]
(STROKE, obj.), p. pr. & v. n. STRIKING. STRUCK
is more commonly used in the p. pr. than stricken.
[A. S. strican. stricken, O Fr. ca. strica. D. stricken.
Icel. strika, Sw. strika. Dan. stryge, N. D. Ger.
streich.]

1. To touch or hit with some force either with the hand or an instrument, to give a blow to either with the hand or any instrument or missile.

He. vi 10

2. To smite or strike along the world.

Tennyson

3. To punish, to afflict, to smite.

To punish the just is not good, nor to strike princes for equity.

Ezek. vi

O D Mrs. Jhr. Dun & Sw. striz 2, 1 of stringy,

1. A small rope like or cord or a slender strip of leather or other like substance, used for lashing, lacing or tying things.

2. A ribbon.

Round Combs have their teeth with the mystic string. 1 Tim.

3. A thread on which any thing is strung, and hence a line of things, as, a string of shells or beads.

4. A strip of leather, or the like, by which the covers of a book are held together.

5. A string of things, as, a string of shells or beads.

6. A string of things, as, a string of shells or beads.

7. A string of things, as, a string of shells or beads.

8. A string of things, as, a string of shells or beads.

9. A string of things, as, a string of shells or beads.

10. (Ship-building) The highest rim in a ship's ceiling or in the hull.

11. A string of things, as, a string of shells or beads.

12. A string of things, as, a string of shells or beads.

13. A string of things, as, a string of shells or beads.

14. A string of things, as, a string of shells or beads.

15. A string of things, as, a string of shells or beads.

16. A string of things, as, a string of shells or beads.

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21. A string of things, as, a string of shells or beads.

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30. A string of things, as, a string of shells or beads.

31. A string of things, as, a string of shells or beads.

32. A string of things, as, a string of shells or beads.

33. A string of things, as, a string of shells or beads.

34. A string of things, as, a string of shells or beads.

35. A string of things, as, a string of shells or beads.

36. A string of things, as, a string of shells or beads.

3 Sentence under this Code—The word sentence here applies also to an order of imprisonment passed under s 123 Ratanlal 774 But see Notes 1 and 2 to s 397

4 Rule for the arrest of escaped convicts from Port Blair—The Police having arrested a person upon the charge of having escaped will apply to the Magistrate before whom the accused has been brought for an adjournment to enable them to ascertain whether a warrant has been received from *Port Blair* for his recapture. Inquiry must be made at the Home Department of the Government of India, if no warrant has been received by the Police of the Province in which the convict has been arrested. And in all cases of escape by a life-convict the Superintendent of *Port Blair* or other Magistrate having jurisdiction as soon as the fact of escape is known should issue a warrant charging him with having committed an offence under s 224 I P C. to the Chief of the Police of the Province or Administration in which the convict is known or is likely to be found and he should also forward a warrant forthwith to this department. If the warrant is forthcoming, the Magistrate by whom the case is being inquired into will decide whether there is any reason why the accused should not be removed in custody under ss 85 and 86 of the Criminal Procedure Code to the Magistrate at the *Andamans* who issued the warrant.—*Order of Government of India Home Department, 18th May, 1874*

397. When a person already undergoing a sentence of imprisonment, penal servitude or

Sentence on offender already sentenced for another offence transportation is sentenced to imprisonment penal servitude or transportation such imprisonment penal servitude or transportation shall commence at the expiration* of the imprisonment, penal servitude or transportation to which he has been previously sentenced† “unless the Court directs that the subsequent sentence shall run concurrently with such previous sentence.”

Provided that if he is undergoing a sentence of imprisonment, and the sentence on such subsequent conviction is one of transportation the Court may, in its discretion, direct that the latter sentence shall commence immediately, or at the expiration of the imprisonment to which he has been previously sentenced

‡ Provided further, that where a person who has been sentenced to imprisonment by an order under sec 123 in default of furnishing security is whilst undergoing such sentence sentenced to imprisonment for an offence committed prior to the making of such order, the latter sentence shall commence immediately

Referring to the amendment of this section the Select Committee say—

We agree with those critics who point out that the drafting of this clause will not have the effect which the Committee of 1916 contemplated. The result of the amendments introduced will ordinarily be that imprisonment for a subsequent offence will not be concurrent with detention under s 123. The Bill in fact appears to alter the law as laid down by the High Courts which is that when a person is in jail in default of giving security a sentence of imprisonment for subsequent offence passed subsequently must take effect at once. We think that it is not correct to say that the law should be that in cases where an offence has been committed prior to the order under s 123 but the conviction takes place subsequently the sentences should ordinarily run concurrently but where the offence is committed after the order under s 123 has been passed e.g. cases of escape from custody or jail or of offences committed in jail then we think that the imprisonment for the subsequent offence should ordinarily not be concurrent otherwise the prisoner might in some cases receive no further punishment for his subsequent offence. We have therefore re-drafted this clause on these lines

Preliminary Notes.—I Rulings under the old section held that where a person undergoing rigorous imprisonment in default of giving security for good behaviour was convicted of an offence and punished subsequently with rigorous imprisonment the sentence for the substantive offence must commence at once and cannot be postponed to take effect after the expiration of the sentence which the prisoner was undergoing in default of giving security for good behaviour. But under the second proviso which is newly added it is clear that a distinction is made as to an offence for which a person undergoing imprisonment in default of security is subsequently convicted and punished as to whether such offence was committed before or after the order under section 123 was made. And now under the new proviso if the offence was committed before the order under section 123 was made the

* In the case of a youthful offender however no sentence runs concurrently with s 123 of the *Detention of Persons in Custody Act XVIII of 1893*
 † In 1908 sentence these words were inserted by Act XVII of 1903
 The proviso was added by Act XXVIII of 1903

imprisonment under the subsequent conviction would commence immediately, but if the offence was committed after the order under section 123, *ex.*, as in *Weir II*, 452, the subsequent imprisonment would not commence immediately but will be postponed after the period of imprisonment under section 123 is undergone. So cases following *Weir II*, 452, have become obsolete.

II. Detention under the order of a Civil Court is not a sentence of imprisonment, etc., referred to in s. 397.—Where an accused person was ordered to suffer imprisonment in default of compensation under s. 250 while he was already under detention under the order of a Civil Court, *held* that a Magistrate cannot order under s. 347 that the sentence of imprisonment shall take effect at the expiry of the term of detention in the Civil Jail as detention under the order of a Civil Court is not a sentence of imprisonment, penal servitude or transportation within the meaning of s. 397, 3 *Rang* 93.

Note.—1. Sentence for substantive offence must be first carried out before imprisonment in default of security for good behaviour.—*See* Note 72 at p. 200. Imprisonment in default of giving security for good behaviour cannot be considered a sentence of imprisonment within the meaning of this section. Sentence of imprisonment implies the punishment awarded on conviction of an offence, 14 P. R. 1895. *See* also 27 M. 523, where it was *held*, that an imprisonment which a person is undergoing in consequence of default in complying with an order under s. 123 to give security, is not within the terms of this section. So where a person so imprisoned was convicted and sentenced to imprisonment for an assault on a jail-warden, execution of that sentence could not be deferred until the termination of the imprisonment under s. 123, *Weir II*, 452; 1914 M. W. N. 500 = 15 Cr. L. J. 137; 3 B. L. R. 114 = 11 Cr. L. J. 15. Where a person undergoing rigorous imprisonment in fault or giving security for good behaviour was convicted of an offence under s. 224 I P. C., and sentenced to rigorous imprisonment for two months, *held* that the sentence for a substantive offence must commence at once and cannot be postponed to take effect after the expiration of the sentence which the prisoner was undergoing. *Ratanlal 970*; 5 Bom. L. R. 26 followed in 6 Bom. L. R. 1095 and 31 M. 515; 34 B. 326; 37 B. 178; 3 B. L. R. 114 = 11 Cr. L. J. 15; 7 B. L. R. 203 = 15 Cr. L. J. 892; 8 N. L. R. 20 = 13 Cr. L. J. 189; 17 Cr. L. J. 450 *contra* 30 A. 334 (P.B.) where it was held that a substantive sentence of imprisonment passed on a person who has been committed to prison under s. 123 (1) for failing to give security must commence after the first sentence. *See* Preliminary note above and the second proviso which is newly added.

2. Concurrent sentences.—Section 35 provides for sentences being concurrent if they are passed at one trial. The passing of concurrent sentences otherwise than at one trial is opposed to the provisions of this section. 15 C. P. 57. As to previous law, *see* 20 A. 1 and Notes under Heading IV at p. 63.

3. Only sentences passed at one and same trial can be made to run concurrently.—*See* Notes under Heading IV at p. 65. A Court has no power to direct that a sentence passed at a trial against an accused person do run concurrently with a sentence passed against him in a previous trial and supersede it, *Weir II*, 453. *See* also *Ratanlal 552*; 4 Bom. L. R. 676; 2 Bom. L. R. III. *Ratanlal 18*; 11 A. L. J. 283 = 14 Cr. L. J. 240, 14 Cr. L. J. 385 (Bur.), 4 L. B. R. 147 = 7 Cr. L. J. 445; 11 M. L. T. 213 = 1912 M. W. N. 396 = 13 Cr. L. J. 466; 20 P. L. R. 1912 = 13 P. W. R. 1912 = 13 Cr. L. J. 3. In 13 Bom. L. R. 200 = 12 Cr. L. J. 241, however, it was *held* that inasmuch as the trials took place on the same day and one after the other, it was for all practical purposes one trial and the sentences could be made to run concurrently. Accused was convicted at two trials held on the same day, of two distinct offences under ss. 75 and 379, I P. C., and was sentenced on each to seven years' transportation the sentences to be concurrent. *Held*, there is no provision in the Code which enables any Court to pass concurrent sentences, 12 P. R. 1894. Nor has the Court power to direct that a sentence of transportation should take effect concurrently with a sentence of rigorous imprisonment that the accused was then undergoing. 2 B. L. R. 23 = 10 Cr. L. J. 236. In 15 Cr. L. J. 68, it was held that a sentence of transportation and a sentence of rigorous imprisonment passed at one trial can be made to run concurrently, and *see* Notes under Heading I at pp. 57-6.

4. Sentence usually to take effect when it is passed.—This section provides for an exception to the general rule that sentences commence to run from the time of their being passed, 3 B. L. R. 107. The direction that a sentence in one case is to run from the date of the expiration of the sentence in the warrant, *Weir II*, 451. Sentences of imprisonment imposed upon the same person at different trials on the same day take effect by the terms of this section one after the other in the order in which they are passed, and a Magistrate need not therefore give any direction in his judgment in respect of the same.

5. Procedure in consecutive sentences.—When a convict is imprisoned and a sentence of substantive sentence of imprisonment and imprisonment in default of payment is passed, the first warrant should be completely executed, and then a second warrant given to the second warrant, *Ratanlal 132*. *See* now s. 398 (2).

insensable senescent was tinged by
heavy, sluggish, — said of persons
on whom little or no stored power
takes the place of God's. *St. John*

With such verities
at a cup of molasses he stood. *Thomson*
from or evincing stupidly formed
or gentles dull, heavy, — said of

1' Great dimness on or suspension of sensibility,
suppression of sense or feeling numbness, as the
st. part of a limb.
2' I teller and insensibility moral stupidity

One thing more stumbles me in the new form of
hypothesis.

stun'bling-b"
that which is

as the way I mean it to be
run so much as to go heavy *Hard iron*
hardened runner advances in the present path of
line resistance that he took the first step
characterized by strength or force, strong,
not as a sturdy lion
stood in the woods beneath the sturdy oak
stout strong as a sturdy oak
of a delicate constitution he stands rather weak
St. John

6 Sentences taking effect in succession—It is only sentences mentioned in para (1) of this section that can be pronounced to take effect in succession **Ratanlal 300** But it is competent to a Magistrate in British India to pass a sentence of imprisonment for an offence committed in India which should take effect after the expiration of the sentence which the accused is undergoing in foreign territory **20 M 444**

7 Sentence to take effect on expiration i.e., whether by reversal or completion—See Note 39 at p 63 When a person was convicted in two distinct trials by two different tribunals and on appeal the conviction in one of the cases was set aside it was *held* that the imprisonment undergone should be reckoned as imprisonment under the sentence in the conviction which was not reversed **Weir II, 450** A person was sentenced to two years' imprisonment by a Magistrate of the first class on 6th February 1879 A month afterwards he was sentenced to three years' imprisonment by the Court of Session which directed the sentence to take effect on the expiration of the sentence passed by the Magistrate On appeal the conviction and sentence passed by the Magistrate were reversed *Held* that the sentence by the Sessions Court must be deemed to have commenced from the time it was ordered to commence viz from the expiration of the sentence by the Magistrate whether by reversal or completion of the punishment **Ratanlal 139 and 523** When a prisoner has been committed to jail under two separate warrants the sentence in the one to take effect from the expiry of the sentence in the other the date of such second sentence shall in the event of the first sentence being remitted on appeal be presumed to take effect from the date on which he was committed to jail under the first or original sentence **Wilkins 120**

8 Order under this section is no part of judgment—An order made by a Court under this section is not a part of its judgment and may therefore be made after the judgment has been signed **Ratanlal 391** Where therefore in ignorance that the person under trial before him was already under sentence in jail a Magistrate convicted and sentenced him dating the warrant irrespective of the previous sentence it was *held* the Magistrate was competent to alter the date of the warrant as the alteration referred only to the time at which the sentence should commence and not to the sentence itself **3 W R, (Cr Let.) 16**

398. (1) Nothing in sections 396 or 397 shall be held to excuse any person from any part of the punishment to which he is liable upon his former or subsequent conviction

Saving as to sections 396 and 397

(2) When an award of imprisonment in default of payment of a fine is annexed to a substantive sentence of imprisonment or to a sentence of transportation or penal servitude for an offence punishable with imprisonment and the person undergoing the sentence is after its execution to undergo a further substantive sentence or further substantive sentences of imprisonment transportation or penal servitude effect shall not be given to the award of imprisonment in default of payment of the fine until the person has undergone the further sentence or sentences

399. (1) When any person under the age of fifteen years is sentenced by any Criminal Court to imprisonment for any offence the Court may direct that such person instead of being imprisoned in a criminal jail shall be confined in any Reformatory established by the Local Government as a fit place for confinement in which there are means of suitable discipline and training in some branch of useful industry or which is kept by a person willing to obey such rules as the Local Government prescribes with regard to the discipline and training of persons confined therein

Confinement of youthful offenders in Reformatories.

(2) All persons confined under this section shall be subject to the rules so presented

(3) This section shall not apply to any place in which the Reformatory Schools Act 1897, is for the time being in force

Notes.—1 Section applies only to Coorg.—Sec. 399 is in force only in Coorg see ss. 1 (3) and 3 of the *Reformatory Schools Act VIII* of 1897, printed in Appendix IV and s 3 (1). It will cease to be in force in that Province also on the extension to it of that Act see s. 3 of that Act.

2 Order of detention in a Reformatory is not a sentence within the meaning of s 428—A previous Judge cannot under s. 428 prevent carrying out of the order of detention as such an order is not a sentence **16 Cr L J 134 (M).** See Note 5 at p. XXXIX of the Appendix

3. Sentence of imprisonment is indispensable.—Where there is no preliminary sentence of imprisonment an order under s. 399 cannot be passed 34 P. R. 1910

4. Confinement for short period in Reformatory is not good — Sentence cannot be enhanced by the passing Court.—A Magistrate finding a juvenile offender guilty of theft in a building sentenced him to three months' rigorous imprisonment, and ordered that in place of this sentence the offender should be confined in a Reformatory for 14 months. *Held* that the Magistrate having once passed a sentence of imprisonment for a particular term cannot direct that the offender shall be confined in a Reformatory for a longer term Ratanlal 109

5. Period of detention must be fixed.—A sentence ordering a person to be detained in a Reformatory School until he attains the age of 18 years is not legal. The period of detention must be for a fixed period 24 M 13; 15 Bom. L. R. 308—2 Bom. Cr. Ca. 57—14 Cr. L. J. 238

6. Sentence on juvenile offenders must be irrespective of the establishment of Reformatories.—A Judge or Magistrate is not at liberty in estimating the proper sentence to consider the fact that there is no Reformatory. The fact that the provisions of law as to Reformatories have not been carried out should not prevent the Judge or Magistrate from passing an adequate sentence Weir II, 433.

7. Only first-class Magistrates can send juvenile offenders to a Reformatory.—The Reformatory Schools Act (V. of 1876) was extended to the Madras Presidency by a notification in the Official Gazette in 1887. It provided only for male juvenile offenders being sent to Reformatory Schools by Magistrates of the first class and s. 399 of the 1882 Code so far as it authorized a Magistrate not of the first class to direct that a male juvenile offender be sent to a Reformatory, was thereby repealed. *Held* therefore when a second-class Magistrate directed a boy to be sent to a Reformatory under section 399 of the 1882 Code that the order was illegal 12 M 91; 23 C. 333; 21 M 430. See now Act VIII of 1897 Reformatory Schools Act s. 9 which provides for such a contingency. Under this section any Criminal Court may also direct that a female juvenile offender be sent to a Reformatory when one is established Weir I, 875.

8. On release, juvenile offenders to be made over to their friends.—All juvenile offenders who have been detained in a Reformatory may be made over on release by the Superintendent of the Jail to the District Superintendent of Police and shall be escorted to their homes by the Police and made over to the charge of their friends in the presence of the *lambardar* or headman of the village. The report of the Police-officer who actually made over charge will be forwarded to the District Superintendent of Police of the district from which the released offender was despatched. The latter will then return the warrant of release to the Superintendent of the Jail concerned. Before despatching such juvenile offenders the District Superintendent of Police will personally satisfy himself that a sufficient subsistence allowance has been supplied by the jail authorities.—Reg. and Ord., N. W. P. p. 288

9. Rules under Reformatory Schools Act.—See Appendix IV where the Act is set forth with annotations and rules. Sub-sec. (3) is new and follows 25 C. 333 and Ratanlal 855, 915 and 929

400. When a sentence has been fully executed the officer executing it shall return the warrant to the Court from which it issued with an endorsement under his hand certifying the manner in which the sentence has been executed

Return of warrant on execution of sentence

Note—Shall return the warrant.—If the sentence be one of both imprisonment and whipping a certificate of the execution of the whipping should be endorsed on the warrant at the time of inflicting that punishment, but the warrant should not be returned but detained (except when the prisoner dies) until the sentence of imprisonment has been undergone *Higgins* 190

CHAPTER XXIX

* OF SUSPENSIONS, REMISSIONS AND COMMUTATIONS OF SENTENCES J

401. (1) When any person has been sentenced to punishment for an offence, the Governor General in Council or the Local Government may at any time with out conditions or upon any conditions which the person sentenced accepts suspend the execution of his sentence or remit the whole or any part of the punishment to which he has been sentenced

Power to suspend or remit sentences

1 f) Capable of being sublimated; capable of being raised by heat into vapor, and again condensed by cold.
Sublimable ness n The quality of being sublimable.

What of you?
 Extreme
 and to pr
 in subordi
 Uncon
 To supply,
 Hiver
 stratio G
 s suminis
 of furnish
 H often
 suba utere
 Submit
 (obs or
 Spencer
 ale
 missio Ty
 c, romine
 evul ting in

Submissive daughter! Is a mere French word.
 We English wags are not what it means. Shot
 2 The state of being submissive; acknowledging
 ment of inferiority or dependence; humble or sup
 pliant behavior; meekness; resignation
 In all submission and humility
 York dash present to more to your highness Shot
 3 Acknowledgment of a fault, confession of
 error
 Be not as extreme in submission as in offense Shot

Also see 1315
Syn—Grand, exalted, lofty, noble, majestic. See
 1315

Syn—
Sub mūn'tai, e [Lat. prefix sub under and tēs
 I am the chin] (Jant) Situation under the chin

2 To put or place under. [Obs. & rare.]
 Of the submised sacrifice with ruthless steel he cut. Chaps. 2

(2) Whenever an application is made to the Governor General in Council or the Local Government for the suspension or remission of a sentence, the Governor General in Council or the Local Government as the case may be, may require the presiding Judge of the Court before or by which the conviction was had or confirmed to state his opinion as to whether the application should be granted or refused together with his reasons for such opinion * " and also to forward with the statement of such opinion a certified copy of the record of the trial or of such record thereof as exists

(3) If any condition on which a sentence has been suspended or remitted is, in the opinion of the Governor General in Council or of the Local Government, as the case may be, not fulfilled, the Governor General in Council or the Local Government may cancel the suspension or remission and thereupon the person in whose favour the sentence has been suspended or remitted may if at large be arrested by any Police-officer without warrant and remanded to undergo the unexpired portion of the sentence

(4) The condition on which a sentence is suspended or remitted under this section may be one to be fulfilled by the person in whose favour the sentence is suspended or remitted or one independent of his will

† "(4-A) The provisions of the above sub-sections shall also apply to any order passed by a Criminal Court under any section of this Code or of any other law, which restricts the liberty of any person or imposes any liability upon him or his property "

(5) Nothing herein contained shall be deemed to interfere with the right of ‡ " His Majesty or of the Governor General when such right is delegated to him " to grant pardons reprieves, respites or remissions of punishment

§ " (5-A) Where a conditional pardon is granted by His Majesty or, in virtue of any powers delegated to him, by the Governor General, any condition thereby imposed, of whatever nature, shall be deemed to have been imposed by a sentence of a competent Court under this Code and shall be enforceable accordingly

(6) The Governor General in Council and the Local Government may, by general rules or special orders give directions as to the suspension of sentences and the conditions on which petitions should be presented and dealt with

Note — The new clause (4 A) is intended to make it clear that the power to remit sentences conferred by section 401 can be exercised in the case of orders of a penal nature e.g., orders under s. 565 of the Code. The object of the new clause (5 A) is to enable any condition on which a pardon has been granted by His Majesty or by the Governor-General when such power has been delegated to him to be enforced in the same way as a sentence of a Court. *Statements of Objects and Reasons*

In section (4 A) the word " Law " has been used instead of the more common word " Act " to make it clear that this section applies to the case of persons sentenced by tribunals constituted by Regulations and Ordinances. Report Joint Committee 1922.

Notes.—1 When any person has been sentenced —The special authority conferred by this section relates to persons sentenced to punishment and does not touch cases under s. 337, in which an approver satisfies the conditions precedent, upon which the pardon was tendered, 11 A 79 at p 89.

2 **Conflicting Court to state its opinion.**— A Sessions Judge, required to state his opinion under this section must forward his reply through the High Court whether the requisition for the opinion has been received through the High Court or not — *M H C Cr No 3204, dated 15th November, 1895*

* The word " Law " is used in the Code to include Ordinances and Regulations.
 † This clause is inserted in the Code by Act No. 10 of 1922.
 ‡ *ibid.*

ad. Fr. *subsequent* Pr. *subsequente* Sp. *subsecuente* Syn. — Trübe — Ständig Thübe A *subody* is | Sub-stän'tial a (Fr. *subst*) Ital. Pr. Sp. & Pg. *sub*, Lat. *sub*

Sub stän'tial ness n The state or quality of being substantial, firmness, strength power of holding or lasting, as, the *substantialness* of a wall or column

3. Procedure where Court is of opinion that Local Government should act under this section.—When any Court shall be of opinion that there are grounds for recommending the Local Government to exercise the powers vested in it by ss. 401 and 402 of suspending, remitting or commuting the punishment to which any accused person has been sentenced the recommendation shall be submitted with the proceedings in the case though the Court of the Judicial Commissioner *se* High Court—*C P Cr Cir Part II No. 40*. See also 23 G. 604 followed in 16 P. W. R. 1909 = 11 Cr. L. J. 105; *REFERRED TRIAL No 40 of 1905 Madras 7 A 672; 10 B 176*

See the *Madras Police Manual* Vol. I pp. 319-320 as to form of conditions to be assented to by a prisoner when released on medical grounds. See also s. 21 of the *Prisoners Act* III of 1900 printed in Appendix A.

4. Together with his reasons for such opinion.—In cases of murder the Judge may record any extenuating circumstances rendering it expedient that there should be a mitigation of the sentence required by law and submit the same to Government and the Government may under this section act in such manner as it seems proper, 1884 W. R. 27

5. Object of sub-sec (6).—Sub-sec (6) is new it will enable the different Government to make rules for respite in emergent cases so that execution of a sentence—especially one of death—may be suspended until the orders of Government shall have been received on a petition made to it under this section by a convicted person. It will be useful also in cases where the Local Government had refused to interfere and an application is afterwards made to the Governor General in Council.

* 402. (1) The Governor General in Council or the Local Government may without the consent of the person sentenced commute any one of the following sentences for any other mentioned after it —

Death transportation penal servitude rigorous imprisonment for a term not exceeding that to which he might have been sentenced simple imprisonment for a like term fine

{ (2) Nothing in this section shall affect the provisions of sections 54 or 55 of the Indian Penal Code.

CHAPTER XXX

OF PREVIOUS ACQUITTALS OR CONVICTIONS

403. (1) A person who has been tried by a Court of competent jurisdiction for an offence and convicted or acquitted of such offence shall while such conviction or acquittal remains in force not be liable to be tried again for the same offence, nor on the same facts for any other offence for which a different charge from the one made against him might have been made under section 236 or for which he might have been convicted under section 237

Person once convicted or acquitted not to be tried for same offence.

(2) A person acquitted or convicted of any offence may be afterwards tried for any distinct offence for which a separate charge might have been made against him on the former trial under section 235 sub-sec (1)

(3) A person convicted of any offence constituted by any act causing consequences which together with such act constituted a different offence from that of which he was convicted, may be afterwards tried for such last mentioned offence if the consequences had not happened or were not known to the Court to have happened at the time when he was convicted

* This section was renumbered by Act XVI of 1923

† Sub-section (2) was added by 15 d

(4) A person acquitted or convicted of any offence constituted by any acts may, notwithstanding such acquittal or conviction, be subsequently charged with and tried for, any other offence constituted by the same acts which he may have committed if the Court by which he was first tried was not competent to try the offence with which he is subsequently charged

(5) Nothing in this section shall affect the provisions of s 26 of the General Clauses Act, 1857, or of s 188 of this Code

Explanation—The dismissal of a complaint, the stopping of proceedings under section 249 the discharge of the accused or any entry made upon a charge under section 273, is not an acquittal for the purposes of this section

Illustrations

(a) *A* is tried upon a charge of theft as a servant and acquitted. He cannot afterwards, while the acquittal remains in force, be charged with theft as a servant, or, upon the same facts, with theft simply, or with criminal breach of trust

(b) *A* is tried upon a charge of murder and acquitted. There is no charge of robbery, but it appears from the facts that *A* committed robbery at the time when the murder was committed, he may afterwards be charged with and tried for robbery

(c) *A* is tried for causing grievous hurt and convicted. The person injured afterwards dies. *A* may be tried again for culpable homicide

(d) *A* is charged before the Court of Session and convicted of the culpable homicide of *B*. *A* may not afterwards be tried on the same facts for the murder of *B*

(e) *A* is charged by a Magistrate of the first class with, and convicted by him of, voluntarily causing hurt to *B*. *A* may not afterwards be tried for voluntarily causing grievous hurt to *B* on the same facts, unless the case comes within paragraph 3 of the section

(f) *A* is charged by a Magistrate of the second class with, and convicted by him of, theft of property from the person of *B*. *A* may be subsequently charged with, and tried for, robbery on the same facts

(g) *A*, *B* and *C* are charged by a Magistrate of the first class with, and convicted by him of, robbing *D*. *A*, *B* and *C* may afterwards be charged with, and tried for, dacoity on the same facts

I.—PRELIMINARY.

Notes.—1. *Explanation of terms*—*Tried*—See 32 M. 220 at pp. 225 and 234; 34 M. 253; 9 N. L. R. 42 = 14 Cr. L. J. 230; 15 C. 608; Notes 1 to 3 at pp. 12, 13, Note 5 under s 251 and Notes 18–20 below. Chapters XXI, XXII and XXIII deal with trials in summons, warrant and sessions cases respectively

Offence—For definition, see s 4 (a) at p. 15 and Notes thereunder

Conviction—"Undoubtedly 'conviction' is *verbum equivocum* it is used sometimes to denote the verdict of the jury, and at other times in its strict legal sense, to denote the judgment of the Court."—*Per* TINDAL, C. J., in *Bergess v Beaufeur*, 8 Scott N. R. 194 cited in 29 M. 126 (F. B.). For judgment of conviction, see ss 243, 245, 245, 238, 301, 305, 306, 307, 309, 423, 480 and 485

Sentence—"does not in all cases follow a conviction," see s 502

Acquittal—"The word 'acquittal' is an equivocal expression, in common parlance a party is said to be acquitted by the verdict of the jury finding him not guilty." But it is only the formal judgment of the Court that in legal intendment satisfies the word "acquittal."—*Per* TINDAL, C. J., noted above (cf ss. 301, 305 and 306).

BOUVIER in his "Law Dictionary" explains 'acquittal' as "the absolution of a party accused on a trial before a traverse jury" and also as "the absolution of a party charged with a crime or misdemeanour," SCHRAMANIA IYER, J., is of opinion that the word 'acquittal' is used in the Code in a sense different from what is ordinarily attached to it as a term of English Law. Under that Law a plea of *autrefois acquit* is technically available only where there is an acquittal after verdict or sentence. But the Code has introduced a modification in several instances (see Note 26) 29 M. 126 (F. B.). For acquittals, see ss. 245, 247 and 248 in summons-cases, s. 258 in warrant cases, ss. 305, 306, 308 and 309 in Sessions trials, and see also ss. 240, 249, 333, 345, 427, 470, 480 and 493

2. Acquittal must be accepted as completely establishing innocence of accused on all facts charged.—"It is a very dangerous principle to regard a verdict of 'not guilty' as not fully establishing the innocence of the person to whom it relates," *R v Pennier*, (1932) 2 K B 339 followed in 33 C 859. When once an accused has been acquitted of an offence his innocence must be presumed. A verdict of acquittal is immune from challenge, 37 B 838. A complaint which is based on part of the facts which were the foundation of previous proceedings cannot be entertained. Where a false complaint was made to the Police on the 5th and repeated at the Police inquiry on the 11th who therefore took proceedings under s. 211, I P C., which resulted in an acquittal, a fresh proceeding under s. 182 I P C., in respect of the false complaint of the 5th cannot be entertained 35 W 303. The prisoner was charged originally with an offence under s. 493, I P C., of having enticed away a married woman from her husband and was finally acquitted on appeal by the District Magistrate who found the whole case was a deliberate fabrication. The prisoner was next charged under s. 353, I P C., of having kidnapped two infants of A, who were with her when she left the husband's house, and the prisoner was convicted and the conviction upheld by the Sessions Judge, who held that the prisoner was the person who induced A to leave her husband's house along with the infants and convicted the prisoner, held that so long as the acquittal under s. 493 remained in force the Judge was bound to take it as proved that the accused did not so take or entice away A. Though the acquittal is no bar to the trial the finding was perverse and contrary to every recognised principle of law and the Judge had no right to arrogate to himself the right to adjudicate upon the finding of the District Magistrate in the previous case 65 P. L. R. 1911 = 12 Cr. L. J. 86.

Properly of ordering further inquiry into offences some of which formed component parts of an offence of which the accused was acquitted—Where an accused was charged with being a member of an unlawful assembly with the common object of assaulting the complainant and that he so assaulted the complainant and was acquitted under s. 147, I P C. after trial but notwithstanding the order of acquittal, the District Magistrate directed further inquiry into an offence under s. 323 I P C. held that the matter cannot be re-opened until the order of acquittal shall have been set aside and further, no order within the terms of s. 437 having been passed regarding the offence under s. 312 I P C. the District Magistrate had no jurisdiction to order further inquiry with regard to that offence, 5 C. W. N. 72.

3. Burden of proof is on accused.—The burden of proving *autrefois acquit* or *autrefois convict* when such a plea is set up by a party, is on him 1899 A. W. N. 8. The onus of proving the plea is on the accused, he may prove it by producing a certificate copy of the record or proceedings or the alleged conviction or acquittal and showing by such copy or other evidence if necessary, that he has been convicted or acquitted of the offence on which he has been arraigned, or that he might have on his former trial been convicted of the offence on which he has been arraigned or that his previous conviction or acquittal is by statute a bar to subsequent proceedings for the same cause *Halsbury's Laws of England Vol. IX* p. 356.

4. Procedure—pleading—Section 403 has nothing to do with pleading being in terms a limitation on the jurisdiction of the Court, and is not to be construed with reference to the English Law of criminal pleading 41 C. 1072. Under English Law the accused cannot plead double that is a defendant having pleaded not guilty to an indictment is not entitled whilst that plea is standing to have a plea of *autrefois acquit* put on the record. The verdict of the jury must be taken at once on the special plea and then the general issue must be pleaded to by the defendant. See 41 C. 1072.

(i) **Method of proof**—See s. 511. When the second trial is in the same Court the Judge is entitled to refer to his own notes see remarks of STEPHEN, J. in 41 C. 1072.

(ii) **When plea may be set up**—Unlike English procedure, a defence under this section may be set up at any time before verdict, 41 C. 1072.

(iii) **Judge or jury to decide the plea**—In England the jury are sworn *instanter* to try the issue whether there has been a previous acquittal or conviction on the same facts. The counsel or the prisoner opens his case in support of the plea and calls his witnesses, the counsel from the Crown afterwards addresses the jury and calls witnesses and the counsel for the prisoner replies. See *R v Sheen* 2 C and P 636. *Russell on Crimes*, pp. 1993–1996, *Archbold* pp. 179–180.

Wherever the offences charged in the two indictments are capable of being identified as the same offence it is a question of fact whether the offences are the same and the identity must be proved, but where a plea of *autrefois acquit* upon its face shows that the offences are legally distinct and incapable of identification, the Court may determine the question as a matter of law, 7 W. R. 15 citing *R v Vandercomb*, 1 Leach, 712. In

1 To follow up to prosecute, to sue after, to endeavor to win

2 To sue by means of many a gentle hit

And said and sought in all the new case door

3 (Law) 1 To seek just or right for by legal process 2 To settle a case in law against, to bring an action on, not to prosecute, to lobby

4 To proceed with an action and follow it up to its proper termination to go on by legal process

5 (Sailing) 1 To clean the back — said of a hawk

6 (Yacht) To leave high and dry on shore, to lose a ship

7 To sue a case (Law) to petition and take a case to court for and claim as to a case in the city

8 To sue out a warrant for a crime

9 To sue by 1 To seek by legal action to make application to petition to entreat to plead to do

By address 1 To convey notice to one

For charges and return he sent to you

Case came to home to sue for the double honor of a triumph and the triumph up

9 To prosecute to make legal action to sue in law, as to a case for damages

3 (Law) To be left high and dry on the shore as a ship

Uniformly or evenly distributed for

Advent, even amount See ADVANT

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41 C. 1072, STEPHEN, J. A.I., that under the circumstances arising in that case, the question whether the accused who was acquitted of the offence of murder, could be tried for the offence of culpable homicide is a question of law to be decided by the Judge and not by the jury. See ss 310 and 311 for procedure in cases of previous conviction.

5. Effect of loss of records of previous trial.—See s 369 and 38 M. 498 where SADASIVA AYYAR, J., held that it was open to the Judge to re write the judgment by memory and the Court had an inherent jurisdiction to replace the records. But where in an appeal before the High Court from a conviction and sentence for murder, it appeared that the entire record of the proceeding of the trial has been lost and that no trace of it could be discovered the High Court directed that the conviction and sentence and all other proceedings in the case be set aside and a new trial of the accused held by the Sessions Judge, on the counsel for the accused, assuring the High Court that no legal plea in bar of a new trial could be put forward by or for his client, 1889 A. W. N. 55.

6. S. 26 of the General Clauses Act deals with the same acts constituting offences under two or more enactments.—'Where an act or omission constitutes an offence under two or more enactments the offender shall be liable to be prosecuted and punished under either or any of those enactments, but shall not be liable to be punished twice for the same offence.' This is almost identical with s 43 of the *Interpretation Act*, 1889 (52 and 53 Vic., c 63), which does not more than extend to statutory offences the common law rule as laid down in *R v Miles*, 24 Q B D. 423, *Archbold*, p 177. The editors observe that the enactment would have been clearer if for the word 'offence' at the end had been substituted the words 'act or omission'.

II.—SCOPE OF SECTION.

7. Section applies to second trial and not to powers of Court of Appeal and Revision.—Under s. 403 it is the duty of the Court before the plea of *autrefois acquit* is taken in bar, to decide on evidence, and not merely by hearing the parties and looking into the papers of the previous trial. Where the petitioner charged the opposite party with cheating and criminal breach of trust, and the accused took the plea of *autrefois acquit* and the Magistrate on hearing both the parties and looking into the papers of the previous trial discharged the accused. Held, that whether the facts in the present case were the same as those in the previous case has to be determined after hearing the evidence and ascertaining what the facts are in this case and what were the facts found in the previous case. 23 C. W. N. 599 following 23 C. W. N. 543. This section refers only to a second trial and bars it, if it comes within its terms. It does not affect the powers of a Court of Appeal or Revision in the same proceedings, as those proceedings are only a continuation of the same trial, 23 C. 975 at p 977. An appeal is not a second trial, but a continuation of the trial in the Lower Court and s. 403 has therefore no application, 37 M. 199. Thus an Appellate Court can, under s. 424, convict on a charge on which the accused had been acquitted by the Court of First Instance, or order a new trial on the same charge. See also 22 C. 377; 27 C. 172, 40 C. 163 and Note 62 to s. 423 and Note 49 to s. 439.

8. Section does not apply to re trial of accused under s. 303 after discharge of jury.—The accused who was charged with several charges and had pleaded not guilty, was acquitted on two of the charges and the jury disagreeing on the other charges were discharged and the accused when put up for trial before a fresh jury pleaded *autrefois acquit*. STEPHEN, J. held, that for the purposes of s. 403, the accused was not being tried again. 'He is being tried on the original indictment and I consider that he is being tried on his first plea of not guilty.' The duty of the Court is to continue the trial of the accused before another jury, and the process may continue till a verdict is passed on all the counts without the accused being tried again under s. 403. I am aware that s. 308 refers to the accused being re-tried, but this does not affect the construction of s. 403, 41 C. 1072.

B-A. Does acquittal on some of several charges bar re-trial after disagreement of jury on the other charges?—N was committed and tried before a jury on a charge containing five counts. The fourth count charged him with the murder of A T under s. 302, I P C, and the fifth count charged him with culpable homicide of A T under s. 304, I P C. The accused pleaded not guilty and the jury unanimously acquitted the accused of the fourth count and differed as to the fifth count. The jury was then discharged and the accused was put up for trial on the fifth count among others. It was urged in defence that as the accused had been acquitted of the charge of the murder of A T, he could not be tried again for committing culpable homicide of A T. Held, that s. 403 protects him only against a trial for murder and any other offence for which a different charge from the one made against him 'might have been made.' But the offence of culpable homicide for which he was to be tried again was the same charge that was made against him and on the terms of this section the defence must fail. 'If he had been charged with murder alone, no doubt a verdict of not

guilty would protect him from another trial for culpable homicide, and should he be acquitted of culpable homicide he will be protected from a trial for any offence involving hurt but where a charge was made, the case falls outside the provisions of the law dealing with cases where it might have been made." 41 C. 1072. STEPHEN, J., *held*, that even according to the law of England in such a case the acquittal for murder is no bar to the re-trial for culpable homicide and the authority of *R v Grimwood*, 60 J. P. 609 cited at p 235 of *Archbold* was doubted.

9. Does section bar second application for maintenance under Chapter XXXVI?—A dismissal of a previous application for maintenance does not constitute a legal bar to an order granting a maintenance on a subsequent application. *Res judicata* does not bar any proceedings by general principle, but only by a special enactment, is confined in s. 13 of the Civil Procedure Code, and s. 403 of the Criminal Procedure Code, but where . . . application on the . . . ing the previous d . . . and void, regardless of the merits 6 L. B. R. 337 = 9 Cr. L. J. 21, *dissenting from* 5 A. 226 and see Note 14 under Heading II to s. 488

10. Does section apply to security proceedings under Chapter VIII?—S. 403 applies only when the proceedings could end in an acquittal or discharge. In 33 M. 85 and 27 C. 682 it is explained that the expression 'discharge' in s. 119 means merely 'discharged from custody' and is not used in the technical sense of 'discharged' as opposed to acquittal from an offence as used in s. 283. See Notes 131 and 132 at p 213. Even though a Magistrate enters an acquittal in security proceedings it is unmeaning and does not bar further proceedings on the previous facts, 36 M. 315. "We are not to be understood as countenancing the idea that it would be right to vex a party repeatedly with proceedings under those sections on the same facts as formed the foundation for previous proceedings whom those facts were found insufficient to justify an order for security. See also 14 Cr. L. J. 189 (C.) and 15 Cr. L. J. 69 (A). But see 35 B. 401, and Notes 21 and 22 to s. 457

11. Section does not apply to proceedings under the Workman's Breach of Contract Act.—This section does not bar a second prosecution under Act XIII of 1859, when the complainant withdrew the first case before the Magistrate made any order. It is the non-compliance with the Magistrate's order that constitutes the offence, a wrong order or acquittal on the withdrawal it does not bar prosecution. In 21 C. 262 it was *held*, that where a person was convicted and imprisoned it is a bar to my subsequent conviction on the same contract for not returning to service. See Notes 5 and 6 at p 147 of the Appendix, 24 M. 660.

12. Does section bar subsequent prosecution of persons jointly implicated with accused who was acquitted?—There is no provision of law which renders the subsequent prosecution of persons jointly concerned in the commission of an offence illegal, where on a previous trial others concerned in the offence have been tried and acquitted, but the principle of the section was in 7 C. W. N. 493 applied to such persons and it was held that until that order of acquittal declaring the facts on which the prosecution proceeded were false, was set aside on the appeal of Government, the Magistrate was not competent to take proceedings against others for the same offence. Where, however, on a complaint charging a number of persons with offences under ss. 148, 326 and 302, I P C., only three were sent up for trial and acquitted on the ground that the prosecution story was not a true one, and subsequently others implicated in the complaint were placed on trial and it was objected on the authority of 7 C. W. N. 493 that they could not be prosecuted until the previous judgment declaring the case untrue was set aside, *held*, there was no bar, 37 C. 680. 7 C. W. N. 493 was a peculiar case. There five persons were indicted for various offences, which included the offence of unlawful assembly that there should be five persons. Three out of the five were placed on trial and acquitted, the other two who were alleged with the other two to make up the five were put for trial which the other three had already been acquitted and the High Court *held*, that such prosecution ought not to proceed. It did not lay down any general rule. In 10 C. W. N. 1031 = 4 Cr. L. J. 173, where on a charge of theft against A, B and C under s. 380, I P C., A and B were placed on their trial and acquitted by a competent Magistrate and subsequently on the discovery of some stolen property in the house of C, C was put on his trial for an offence under s. 411, I P C., it was *held, dissenting from* 4 C. W. N. 346 and 7 C. W. N. 493, that the previous acquittal of A and B was not a bar to the subsequent trial of C, as there were certain additional facts before the Court ascertained subsequent to the acquittal, which supported the charge under s. 411, I P C. See also in 41 C. 754 where in a previous trial two persons were acquitted by the jury of the offence of conspiring with a third person who was not a party to that trial, it was *held*, that such an acquittal was no bar to fresh proceedings being taken against the third party. See also 36 A. 163.

13. Rule equally applies where first trial is against accused jointly with others and subsequent charge is against him alone.—The rule is equally applicable, though the first indictment is against the defendant jointly with others, and the second against him alone. *R v Dann*, 1 Mood. 424.

14. Plea in the nature of, or analogous to, "*autrefois acquit*."—The reason for the plea *autrefois acquit* is that an accused person should not in respect of any offence, be in jeopardy of prosecution more than once. Though, technically, such a plea cannot be relied upon where there has been no trial resulting in an actual acquittal, it would be impossible to contend that the great principle with reference to which the law allows the said plea should be inapplicable to cases where the prosecution failed before it reached that stage without any fault on the part of the accused. It is justice that a person prosecuted on a former occasion upon evidence sufficiently strong to warrant his being put upon his trial and being called upon for his defence and his evidence, should not be vexed again in the matter when the trial terminates in his favour, it must, *a fortiori*, be so, when evidence on which his prosecution was initiated was so weak as not to justify the trial and the accused discharged and saved from the necessity of entering upon the vindication of his innocence. BISHOP in his "*Commentaries on the Law of Criminal Procedure*," after pointing out that according to the better doctrine a person is in legal jeopardy when the jury is empanelled and ready to try him on a valid indictment and there is no latent or patent obstacle in the judicial path to prevent the cause from proceeding to the end, observes "then, if contrary to his rights and without his consent, the cause is suffered to break off before a verdict of acquittal or conviction is reached, there cannot technically be a plea of *autrefois acquit* or *autrefois convict* by reason of this jeopardy, yet the prisoner is entitled in some way to rely upon it afterwards for his protection." The same jurist lays down that a plea analogous to the plea of *autrefois acquit* setting out the special facts which show the jeopardy may be brought forward as the proper method of taking the objection and calls it the defence of former jeopardy.—*PER SUBRAMANIAM IYER*, J, in his dissenting judgment in 23 M. 125 (F.B.) But in 31 M 543 it is stated that the Code is exhaustive on the subject of *autrefois acquit* and it is not permissible to add to its provisions.

15. "Section bars second trial and no judgment can be passed in respect of second complaint."—Where a prosecution is barred on account of a previous trial s. 402 directs that the accused "*shall not be liable to be tried*." An order of acquittal on a subsequent complaint is therefore, improper, as no such order can be passed without a trial, 5 L B. R. 12 = 9 Cr. L. J. 378. The section bars any trial and therefore no order regarding the disposal of property can be made under s. 517 on a second complaint after a previous acquittal, as an order under s. 517 could only be made "when an inquiry or trial in a Criminal Court is concluded," 4 L B. R. 229 = 7 Cr. L. J. 490.

16. Liability of accused to be tried after acquittal, for using false evidence in his defence.—Where an accused person obtained an acquittal, and in the course of his defence which he knew to be false, *held* (LINDSAY, J., dissenting), that he was liable to be tried under s. 196, Indian Penal Code, for using such evidence. *PER LINDSAY, J.*—The second trial, viz, that under s. 196, I P C., was in effect a trial of the accused for the offence of which he had been already acquitted 35 P. R. 1870.

III.—GENERAL RULE OF AUTREFOIS ACQUIT OR CONVICT.

17. A person shall not be in jeopardy in respect of any offence more than once.—It is an established rule of the common law that a man may not be put twice in peril for the same offence, 2 Hawk C. 35. The principle on which the right to plead "*autrefois acquit*" or "*autrefois convict*," is founded is that a man should not be put twice in jeopardy for the same matter, and it does not rest on any doctrine of estoppel. See *Archbold*, p. 176. At common law a man who has once been tried and acquitted of a crime may not be tried again for the same offence if he was "in jeopardy," on the first trial. He was so, in jeopardy, if (1) the Court was competent to try him for the offence, (2) the trial was upon a good indictment on which a valid judgment of conviction could be entered, and (3) the acquittal was on the merits, i.e., by verdict on the trial or in summary cases by dismissal on the merits, followed by a judgment or order of acquittal. *Russell on Crimes*, p. 1932.

The general rule of the common law forbids a man to be *punished* twice for the same offence. This is now read as meaning for the same acts and omissions, irrespective of the exact terms of this indictment, and as meaning, that the evidence to obtain a legal conviction on the first charge was *in substance* the same as that necessary to sustain the second charge, *see R v King*, (1897) 1 Q. B. 246—248.

MUST HAVE BEEN TRIED.

18. There must have been a 'trial' for the application of the rule.—Under English Law unless acquittal was on the merits, *i.e.*, by verdict on the trial, or in summary cases by dismissal on the merits followed by a judgment of acquittal, it does not operate as a bar. See judgment of SUDRAMANIAM IYER, J., in 29 M. 126. Where a jury sworn and charged with a prisoner is discharged without giving a verdict, such a discharge does not bar a fresh indictment. *Hinson v R*, L. R. 2 Q. B. 259, 390 and *R v Lewis*, 78 L. J. (K B) 722. Where the Judge disagreeing with the divided verdict of the jury discharges them and orders the re-trial of the accused under s. 308, this section has no application, 41 C. 1072. Under the Code trial in the literal sense of the word does not seem to be necessary. Throughout the Code clear directions are given as to when an order of acquittal or discharge should be entered. To set up the plea dealt with by this section, there must have been a previous trial in which some final order has been passed, *i.e.*, of conviction or acquittal. The explanation to this section makes the point clear. So when, after an investigation, the Police reported that theft (a cognizable offence) had not been established, and the Magistrate passed an order striking off the offence, it was held that such order could not affect the subsequent trial of another non-cognizable offence regarding which no proceedings had been taken. The Magistrate could not take cognizance of that offence on a Police report, but only on a complaint and he had not done so, 5 B. 403.

19. When may a person be said to be "tried"?—See Note 1 above. A process must have issued to the accused for his appearance, 38 W. 315. In a summons-case when the accused appears and answers to the charge, he is said to be "tried," although the case is dismissed owing to non-appearance of the complainant. In such a case the accused cannot be tried again upon the same facts for the same offence at the complaint of another person, *Weir* 11, 437. Even though the accused also was absent in spite of having been served with a process and the case is dismissed under s. 247 the accused is entitled to the full benefit of s. 403, 34 M. 253 following 4 C. W. N. 346; 7 C. W. N. 711 and 493. See Notes 17—21 at pp 699-700. If the trial has otherwise been regularly conducted, even though no formal charge has been framed therein, the order of acquittal would still be a bar to further proceedings, 3 A. 129; 40 M. 9786.

20. Judgment of acquittal without adducing any evidence would still operate as bar—(i) Under s. 247 on the non-appearance of the complainant in a summons-case the accused has to be acquitted, for the effect of such an acquittal, see Notes 17—20 thereto at p 609 and 34 M. 253. (ii) Under s. 248, a Magistrate may permit the withdrawal of a summons-case and acquit the accused. (iii) See s. 333 where the Judge of a High Court can enter a judgment of acquittal on a *Nolle prosequi* by the Advocate-General. (iv) Under s. 345, a compromise has the effect of an acquittal, *Ratanlal* 519; 29 P. R. 1914=16 Cr. L. J. 81. (v) Under s. 494, an acquittal follows where a Public Prosecutor withdraws from the prosecution after the charge has been framed or there is no charge required, 9 N. L. R. 26=14 Cr. L. J. 135; 12 M. 35. (vi) See also s. 240 where the withdrawal of remaining charges on conviction on one of several charges has the effect of an acquittal 19 W. R. 55.

An acquittal under s. 247, equally with an acquittal after trial on the merits acts as a bar to further proceedings by virtue of s. 403 43 A. 58.

BY COURT OF COMPETENT JURISDICTION

(See Notes 39—41)

21. 'Council of Elders' is a Court of competent jurisdiction.—For the purposes of this section, the Council of Elders established under *Punjab Frontier Regulation* (IV of 1887) is a Court of competent jurisdiction, and a person convicted by such council cannot be ordered to be committed on the same facts on which he was convicted, 30 P. R. 1883.

22. Order of incompetent Court of no avail under this section.—The principle is that the accused must have been in jeopardy at the previous trial, where, therefore, owing to the incompetency of the Court he was not lawfully liable to suffer judgment in the previous proceeding, the section does not apply. See *Russell on Crimes*, p 1983. Where a former trial is set aside on the ground of want of jurisdiction and illegality, it is no bar to the second trial. For, when the High Court quashed the whole of the original proceedings as being all together without jurisdiction and therefore illegal, their result cannot be pleaded as *autrefois acquit*, it being necessary to that plea that the first Court should have had competent jurisdiction to try the offence, 2 W. R. 10. A Magistrate cannot convict or acquit a prisoner whom he has no jurisdiction to try. Such an order is of no avail under this section, 6 W. R. 13. Where a prisoner is released by the Court of Session on the ground that the proceedings had in his case were illegal and irregular, this section is no bar to his being subsequently tried and convicted of the same offence, 13 W. R. 42. See also 29 C. 412 at p. 414, where it

was held that if the trial is void *ab-initio* for want of jurisdiction in the Magistrate, it cannot be called a trial, and that a discharge by the Appellate Court, without an order for trial by the proper Court, does not bar fresh proceedings being taken in the proper Court. Where an offence is tried by a Court without jurisdiction, *ie.*, a Court of not competent jurisdiction, the trial is void under s 530, and the offender, if acquitted, is liable to be re-tried under this section. It is not necessary for the High Court to reverse the acquittal, before the re-trial can be had, 8 B. 307. A Court which has no jurisdiction to try has no jurisdiction to acquit the accused, it can only discharge, 7 P. R. 1910 = 7 P. W. R. 1910. 19 A. L. J. 813.

Effect of absence of complaint.—See Note 41

23. Is want of sanction under s. 195 condition of the competency of a Court?—Want of sanction under s. 195 is only a condition precedent for the institution of a proceeding before a tribunal, it is not a condition of the competency of the tribunal, 35 M. 393. But in 37 A. 107 it was held following 22 B. 711 that where the law requires a previous sanction to be given before a charge can be entertained by a Court, that Court is not a Court of competent jurisdiction until the sanction has been maintained. See also Note 41. S 403 does not bar the re-trial of the accused after sanction on the same facts in respect of which he was acquitted for an offence which required no sanction, 37 A. 107. See Note 20 under s 195, see also 40 B. 97 and 3 M. 43. But it should be noted that the necessity of a sanction is done away with under the present Code as amended.

24. Does personal disqualification under s. 556 affect competency of Court?—If a person put on his trial for an offence produces an order of acquittal, passed by a Court which on the face of it is a Court of competent jurisdiction, in that it had both territorial jurisdiction and jurisdiction under the second Schedule of the Code in respect of the offence charged, the Court before which such order of acquittal is produced is not entitled to impeach the competency of the Court which passed the order, on the ground that the presiding officer of that Court may perhaps have laboured under the disqualification prescribed by s. 556 of the Code. Until the order of acquittal has been set aside and a new trial ordered by some competent Court, the person acquitted is entitled to plead it under s 403 in connection with any further proceeding that may be taken against him, 8 A. L. J. 1129 = 12 Cr. L. J. 575. The accused were tried and acquitted by two Justices of the Peace. One of them was under statute (*Coal Mines Act*) disqualified to have acted as a Justice without the consent of parties for the offence of which the accused were acquitted. This fact was not known to the prosecutor at the time. Held on an application to quash the commitment, that the principle *nemo debet bis vexari* applied, *R v Simpson* (1914) 1 K. B. 66.

25. Acquittal by foreign Court may operate as bar.—An acquittal by a Court of competent jurisdiction outside England has been held to be a bar to an indictment for the same offence before any tribunal in England. It does not matter whether the Court is one in the King's Dominions or of a foreign country. *Russell on Crimes* p. 1984 citing *R v Hutchinson*, (1878) 3 Keb. 785, *R v Roche*, (1775) 1 Leach 135.

MUST HAVE BEEN CONVICTED OR ACQUITTED

26. "to be acquitted" means "to be discharged" and not "to be acquitted by a Court of competent jurisdiction". 35; 40 M. 976. Where the prisoner have pleaded to a formal charge the Magistrate is bound to convict or acquit and his order only dismissing the case, will amount to an acquittal, 5 C. L. R. 359; 29 P. R. 1914; 33 M. 595.

(i) *Wrong order of acquittal.*—If a Magistrate tries a warrant-case as a summons-case and acquits the accused, it must be regarded as an order of discharge only and cannot operate as a bar, 1898 A. W. N. at p. 260. See also 24 M. 660 where a wrong order of acquittal was entered on the withdrawal of a case under the *Workman's Breach of Contract Act*. See Note 11 above.

(ii) *Acquittal before issue of process*—Where the Police laid a preliminary charge-sheet before a Magistrate and before process was issued the Police applied to withdraw which was permitted. The Magistrate endorsed on the charge-sheet that the accused were acquitted, second charge sheet was subsequently laid by the Police, held, that the order passed by the Magistrate on the first charge-sheet was no bar to proceedings on the second charge-sheet. "It appears to be clear that neither an order of discharge nor of acquittal could properly be made in a case when the accused has not been directed to appear at all. The provisions regulating trials and inquiries all contemplate the appearance of the accused as essential for the commencement of the proceedings." See ss. 242, 252, 268 (1) and 271. The order of acquittal on the first proceedings was unmeaning and could not be availed of. 36 M. 815. 17 A. L. J. 867.

[*Supersensitivity*, *n* [*See infra*] the act of

(iii) *Order for release not amounting to acquittal*.—Where the nature of the charge was explained to the accused, but no formal charge in writing was drawn up against him as required by s. 254; *held*, that the order for release (s. 249) did not amount to an acquittal under s. 258, 4 B. L. R. 4p. Cr. 1. But an order for the release of the accused as "*Nirdoshi*" has been held by the Calcutta High Court to operate as an acquittal. Where a complaint was made of extortion under s. 384, I P. C., and the Magistrate allowed the dispute to be referred to arbitration and discharged the accused, but the arbitration having fallen through, the Magistrate allowed the complaint to be revived. The High Court held the discharge to be improper, but refused to interfere with the order revising the prosecution, 1 C. W. N. 49; 35 M. 315; 17 O. C. 18.

JUDGMENT MUST BE IN FORCE.

27. *Bar only so long as such conviction or acquittal remains in force, i.e., so long as such judgment or order has not been set aside by a Court of Appeal or Revision.* When so set aside, the result will be that the proceedings on the trial will be annulled, and this will not prevent the prisoner being again put on his trial 7 W. R. 2. If the order of acquittal is set aside by a Court of Appeal or Revision, the proceedings on the trial will be annulled and there is no prohibition against the prisoner being again put on his trial, 7 W. R. 3. Where the Appellate Court reverses the verdict of a jury and orders a re-trial, unless it has limited the scope of the re-trial such re-trial must be taken to be one upon all the charges originally framed, 22 C. 377; 40 C. 693. A judgment reversed by a Court of error is the same as no judgment, and in that case, therefore, the plea of *autrefois acquit* is not available, *Drury*, (1849) 3 C. and K. 193.

28. *So long as previous order is in force, irregularity of proceedings is of no consequence.*—It is not necessary that the judgment of acquittal should be, in fact, correct and proper, for, while unreversed, it will support a plea of *autrefois acquit* in bar of a second trial. Thus a judgment for the defendant, though consequent on a misdirection or erroneously given on a special verdict, or on an insufficient indictment, so long as it stands unreversed, is a bar to a new indictment. *Russell on Crimes*, p. 1983. If the offence is the same, the former conviction or acquittal is a bar to the second trial, whether the second Court considers that the former conviction or acquittal was warranted by the evidence given in the first trial or not, 7 W. R. 15. Even if the judgment of acquittal was passed under a misapprehension of the law it would still operate as a bar. When a Sessions Judge considering that two charges under ss. 302 and 201, I P. C., could not be combined, separated the charges and tried the accused on a charge of murder only and acquitted her, it was *held* that the accused could not be tried again for the offence under s. 201, I P. C., as the two charges might have been combined in the former trial and though he clearly intended that the accused should thereafter be tried on a charge under s. 201, 4 B. L. R. 174 = 11 Cr. L. J. 731. See also 9 N. L. R. 28 = 14 Cr. L. J. 135, where the accused was acquitted of a charge, under s. 203, I P. C., on a withdrawal of the case under a misapprehension and it was *held* he could not be tried again under s. 177, I P. C., on the same facts. Even if the acquittal had been obtained by a trick on the part of the accused, the acquittal would operate as a bar. See 38 M. 1028. See 35 P. R. 1870. The Court before which an order of acquittal is produced is not entitled to impeach the competency of the Court which passed the order, on the ground that the presiding officer was disqualified under s. 558, 8 A. L. J. 1129. See Note 24 and Note 19.

IDENTITY OF OFFENCE

29. *Offence must be the same—Immaterial difference do not affect identity of offence.*—When it is the same offence, the identity of the offence is the same, and therefore, immaterial circumstance, for it the precise accuracy of which is not material, the prosecutor could change the rights of the defendant and subject him to a second trial for what in reality is the same offence. Thus if a prisoner be indicted for murder alleged to have been committed on a certain day and acquitted and afterwards be charged with killing the same person on a different day, he may plead the former acquittal in bar notwithstanding this difference, for the day stated in the indictment on the former trial was not material. If a prisoner should be charged with murdering *A* and should plead a former acquittal, and prove that he had been acquitted upon a charge of murdering *B*, evidence would be admissible to prove that the two charges related to the same person and to the same killing. But if the offences are different identity of evidence is no bar. Therefore where, the prisoner was charged with forging the document *A*, but evidence was given in respect of both the documents *A* and *B* indiscriminately, and the accused acquitted, *held*, that such acquittal was no bar to his being tried again for forging the document *B* for a conviction and acquittal both fall under the same category in this section. It would be no answer on a trial for one, to say that the prisoner had been acquitted on another on a trial at which evidence was given respecting both, and which, if believed, would have proved the prisoner guilty of both, 7 W. R. 15. It was *held* in *Weir* 1, 789, that an illegal and

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inoperative conviction under s. 21 of the *Forest Act*, will not bar a prosecution under the Penal Code for such other offence as the accused may be proved to have committed. Where a charge of kidnapping from lawful guardianship under s. 366, I P C., is in general terms and does not state from whose guardianship the kidnapping took place, an acquittal on such a charge of the offence of kidnapping from the lawful guardianship of a particular person may be pleaded in bar of a trial on a charge of kidnapping from the guardianship of another person, 23 M. 284. Where it was the duty of the prosecution to put before the Court true evidence respecting the measurement of the timber which the accused cut in excess of his license, the failure to do this at the first trial does not entitle the Crown to prosecute the offender again in respect of the same timber, on the ground that the measurement stated at the first trial was incorrect and below the quantity actually cut, 3 L. B. R. 253 = 5 Cr. L. J. 412.

30. Test for finding whether the offences are same.—The true test by which the question whether such a plea is a sufficient bar in any particular case may be tried is whether the evidence necessary to support the second indictment would have been sufficient to procure a legal conviction upon the first. *R v Clark*, 1 B. and B. 473; *Archbold*, p. 177. A trial is said to be upon the same facts if the evidence in the first case would have supported a conviction for the offence charged in the second case, *Q v Bird*, 2 Den. C. C. 94 and 1 Bom. L. R. 15 cited 5 S. L. R. 12 = 16 Cr. L. J. 224. Except for the purpose of ascertaining whether the offence which formed the subject of the first trial is the same as that which forms the subject of the second charge, the Court before which the second trial is held has nothing to do with the evidence given on the former trial. If the offence is not the same, the former conviction or acquittal is no bar to the trial upon the second charge, notwithstanding the evidence given in the two cases is the same, and the Court, whether the same as that which tried the prisoner for the first offence or a different Court, is bound to apply its own judgment to the evidence before it. Two distinct offences cannot be converted into one such offence by reason of any evidence which the prosecutor may think fit to adduce upon the trial for one of them, 7 W. R. 15.

31. The rule prohibits second trial not merely for same offence, but also upon same facts, for any other offence.—Where a person has been tried and convicted or acquitted of an offence arising out of a particular set of facts, he cannot while such conviction or acquittal remains in force be again tried in respect of any offence based on the same facts, unless the case can be brought under one or the other specific exception to the rule provided by the section, 9 N. L. R. 26 = 14 Cr. L. J. 135. The two offences may not be the same, but this finding by itself is not sufficient for disposing of the applicability of s. 403. A bar under that section operates not only where a person has been tried for an offence and convicted or acquitted of it, and is sought to be tried again for the same offence but also when he is sought to be tried on the same facts for any other offence for which a different charge from the one made against him might have been made under s. 236 or for which he might have been convicted under s. 237. Where on the same facts a person has been tried and acquitted on charge under s. 182, I P C., he cannot be tried again on a charge under s. 211, I P C., after obtaining a fresh sanction, 36 M. 308. It has long been fully established that acquittal on an indictment is a bar to a subsequent indictment for any offence of which the accused could have been lawfully convicted on the first indictment whether the offence was or was not specifically stated in the first indictment and whether the proper evidence was or was not adduced at the first trial. Under the present practice, the substance rather than the form of charges in the two indictments is considered, *R v Sheen*, 2 C. and P. 634. See *Russell on Crimes*, pp. 1984-85.

32. Where on same facts a charge 'might have been framed' under s. 236 and is not so framed, subsequent trial for that charge will not lie.—See Notes 3 and 6 under s. 236 at pp. 671-672. The protection afforded by this section extends only to other and different offences of which the accused could be charged if they were supported by the same facts and fell within the category of offences mentioned in ss. 236 or 237, 1 Bom. L. R. 15. The joinder of charges of murder (s. 302, I P C.) and of causing evidence of the murder to disappear (s. 201, I P C.), on the alternative is legal. Where the Sessions Judge considering that the two charges could not be combined, separated the charge and tried the accused on a charge of murder only and acquitted her. He next tried her for an offence under s. 201 and convicted her, held that the conviction was bad. Though he clearly intended that the accused should thereafter be tried on a charge under s. 201, I P C., such subsequent trial is absolutely prohibited by s. 403, for as the two charges might have been combined in the former trial she cannot be tried again on the same facts 4 S. L. R. 174 = 11 Cr. L. J. 373. In 5 S. L. R. 16 = 12 Cr. L. J. 224, PRATT, C. J., was of opinion that this case was wrongly decided. The offences are distinct offences committed in the same series of acts and fall under s. 233 (1) and sub-sec. (2) of s. 403. 45 C. 727; 26 Bom. L. R. 440.

(i) *Acquittal under s. 203 bars trial under s. 177, I P C., on same facts.*—U was killed by a shot from the gun of Z. The Police Patel, though aware of this fact, falsely reported that U died of fever. The Patel was prosecuted for an offence under s. 203 I P C. on the ground that he gave false information regarding an offence

which he knew to have been committed. After a charge was framed against him, the shooting of *U* by *Z* was found to be accidental. Thereupon the prosecution of the Police prtel under s. 203, I P. C., was withdrawn, and he was acquitted under s. 494, *held* that the Police-officer could not afterwards be tried again for an offence under s. 177, I P. C., on the basis of the same false report, 9 M. L. R. 28 = 14 Cr. L. J. 135.

(ii) *Acquittal under s. 352 operates as bar to trial under s. 323, I P. C.*—A person tried and acquitted on a charge of using criminal force under s. 352 cannot be tried in respect of the same criminal matter on a charge of hurt, 16 W. R. 3 = 7 B. L. R. Appx. XXV; see 32 P. R. 1884.

(iii) *Acquittal under s. 201 bar to trial under s. 176, I P. C.*—Similarly, a person who has been tried for offences under ss. 201 and 202, I P. C., and acquitted by the Sessions Court, cannot be tried again for an offence under s. 176 I P. C., based on the same facts by an inferior Criminal Court, as the case of such a person comes not within sub-sec. (1), but within sub-sec. (2) of s. 235. The charge under s. 176, I P. C., might have been framed at the former trial on the very same facts and the Sessions Court which tried him under s. 202, I P. C., was also competent to try him under s. 176, I P. C., 10 C. W. N. 518 = 3 Cr. L. J. 339.

(iv) *Person convicted of secreting letter cannot on same evidence be again convicted of making away with that letter*—Where a prisoner was convicted and sentenced under s. 5 of Act XVII of 1854 (now s. 62 of Act VI of 1893) upon a charge of fraudulently secreting a postal letter, and on appeal such conviction and sentence were confirmed, *held*, that he could not subsequently be convicted under the same section of having fraudulently made away with the same letter upon the same occasion, both acts being connected and substantially a part of one criminal transaction, 1 M. H. C. R. 83.

(v) *Acquittal under s. 411 is bar to trial under s. 414, I P. C.*—So also, where a person had been convicted under s. 411, I P. C., in respect of certain property stolen on a particular occasion from a particular person, he could not, subsequently, be tried for an offence under s. 414, I P. C., in respect of other property stolen on the same occasion from the same person, 28 A. 313 where 15 A. 317 is referred to 27 C. W. N. 654; 3 Pat. 503.

(vi) *Theft and mischief*—*E* was charged with theft and mischief in respect of certain branches cut from a tree claimed by complainant and was acquitted on the charge of mischief on the ground that, as against the complainant *E* had title to the property. The District Magistrate ordered further inquiry under s. 437. *Held*, that a trial on the charge of theft was barred under this section, as the offences were not distinct and the facts were common to both offences and had been found in favour of the accused, 8 M. 296. Similarly, an accused person who was charged with theft of an animal was held not liable to be separately charged with and convicted of mischief for the subsequent killing of it, Weir I, 497.

(vii) *Acquittal in summons case for one of several offences alleged operates as bar to trial of the other offences*—Where a Magistrate issued processes against and summoned the accused persons for one of several offences alleged against them and acquitted them of the offence for which they were summoned, *held*, that no fresh process could in view of the provisions of s. 403 (1) be issued against them in respect of all the offences alleged against them on the previous occasion including the one for which they were summoned and acquitted, 2 C. L. J. 622 = 3 Cr. L. J. 115, distinguishing 15 C. 608 and 29 C. 725. See also Note 17 to s. 247.

(viii) *Trial and acquittal under special law may be pleaded in bar*—All offences against the *Abkari Law* (Bombay Act V of 1878) being cognizable by a Magistrate of the second class (s. 3 cl. 5 and s. 56) a person tried for any such offence by any such Magistrate, and acquitted, is not liable by reason of this section to be tried again for the same offence unless the acquittal has been set aside by the High Court on appeal by the Government. The jurisdiction conferred by the Code does not affect any special jurisdiction or power conferred by any law in force at the time when the Code came into force, 10 B. 181.

(ix) *Composition of offence under s. 324 I P. C., may be pleaded in bar on charge under s. 324, I P. C.*—An accused person charged under s. 324, I P. C., cannot, if the offence has been compounded with the permission of the Court, be again tried on the same fact on the charge under s. 223 I P. C., if the composition which has the effect of an acquittal is still in force Ratanlal 519.

(x) *Acquittal under s. 211 may bar trial under s. 182 I P. C.*—Where the accused made a complaint to the Police that certain articles had been stolen from his house and the Police made an enquiry when the accused repeated his complaint and said that he suspected *C* and it was found that no theft took place and the complaint was false. *C* laid a charge against the accused under s. 211, I P. C., sanction for a complaint of an offence under s. 182 I P. C. having been refused, the accused was convicted but the High Court set it aside stating that the offence was one under s. 182, I P. C., and not under s. 211. *C* then obtained sanction and instituted a complaint for an offence under s. 182 I P. C., and it was contended that the previous acquittal was

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Sar'loin *n* *Obs* *Farmer*.



no bar as the offences were not the same, *held*, that the previous acquittal under s 211, I P C, operated as a bar on the same facts because a charge under s 182, I P C, might have been framed under s. 236 and the case came under sub-sec. (1) and not sub-sec. (2) of s 403, 36 M. 303. In 20 P. R. 1910 = 11 Cr. L. J. 420, however, it was *held* that acquittal of the accused under s 182, I P C, was no bar to the trial for an offence under s. 211, I P C, as a person could not be charged in the alternative under s. 236 of offences under ss 182 and 211, I P C, and the offences are essentially distinct. *See* 32 C. 180 and 31 B 204 and also 8 S. L. R. 179 = 16 Cr. L. J. 104

(xi) *Acquittal under s 302, I P C, may bar trial under s 304 I P C*—*See* 22 C. 377—383.

(xii) *Acquittal on charge under s 193 bars trial on charges under ss 465, 471, 120-B, I P C*—Petitioners were tried under s. 193 and upon a careful and exhaustive consideration of the whole evidence acquitted. They were again put on trial under ss. 465, 471 and 120—B, I P C. *Held* that inasmuch as the facts on which the complainant founded the present case were inseparable from those upon which the previous case was proceeded with, the proceedings should be quashed, 30 C. W. N. 384

32-A.—Effect of the amendment of s 238 by the insertion of sub-sec. (2) (A) and its removal from s. 237.—Where in an appeal to the Sessions Judge, the Sessions Judge altered the conviction to one under ss 385 and 508, I P C, holding that ss 420 and 507, I P C, were not applicable to the facts, *held* in revision that the accused's offence did not fall under ss. 507 or 508 or 385 or 420, I P C, but amounted to an attempt to cheat under ss. 420 and 511, I P C, read together, that by virtue of the new amendment of s. 238 of the Code cl. (2) (A) the accused were liable to be convicted under those sections, though he has been charged only under s 420, and that as the Sessions Judge had not acquitted the accused of the offence of attempting to cheat, s 439 (4) of the Code was no bar to the accused being convicted in revision of the offence of attempting to cheat under ss. 420 and 511, I P C, read together, 43 M. 774 = 43 M. L. J. 190.

EXCEPTION I.—DISTINCT OFFENCES UNDER SUB-SECTION (2).

33. Section does not bar trial for distinct offence for which separate charge might have been made under s. 235 (1).—*See* illustration (b) to s. 235 and Notes thereto at pp. 657—669. The limitation of this exception to sub-sec. (1) of s 235 necessarily involves the exclusion of cases falling under the other sub-sections of s 235, where the several offences are separable for the purposes of charging, but not distinct for the purposes of punishment. But the Legislature even here recognises a special case should be provided for, and therefore sub-sec. (3) of s 403 makes an exception in respect of a case which eventually falls under sub-sec. (3) of s 235, 9 N. L. R. 26 = 14 Cr. L. J. 135, 10 C. W. N. 518 = 3 Cr. L. J. 385. If the crimes were so distinct that the evidence necessary to prove one will not prove the other it cannot properly be said that they were so far the same that the acquittal of one is a bar to a prosecution for the other. *Archbold*, p 171

(i) *Acquittal of charge under s 324, I P C, does not bar trial under s 365, I P C*—Where certain persons trespassed into a house [and after beating the inmates, carried off a woman, it was *held* that their conviction under s. 452 was no bar to their being tried under s. 365 I P C, 1906 A. W. N. 32 = 3 A. L. J. 2 = 3 Cr. L. J. 93.

(ii) *So also ss 395 and 400 I P C*—The acquittal of accused on a charge under s. 400 I P C, cannot operate under this section as a bar to his being prosecuted again on a charge under s. 395, I P C, for committing one of the atrocities in respect of which evidence was given in the previous trial under s. 400, 1 Bom. L. R. 15.

(iii) *Being in possession of excisable articles and putting false trade-marks*—The trial and conviction of the accused for being in possession of excisable articles without a license under s 61 of the *Bengal Excise Act* (V II of 1868) is no bar under this section to his trial upon the same facts under ss. 486 and 487, I P C, and ss. 6 and 7 of the *Merchandise Marks Act* of 1889, *ie*, for putting false trade marks upon cases containing excisable articles and making use of false trade-marks for his own trade, 23 C. 174. *See*, however, s. 26 *Genl Cl. Act* X of 1897 and 22 C. 377.

(iv) *Conviction under s 325 no bar to trial under s 365 I P C*—When the accused attacked the complainant's house, inflicted a beating on him and his two sons and carried away a woman and on the first trial they were convicted for the attack on his house and for beating him and his sons, and at the second trial the accused were charged under s 365, I P C, for the abduction of A, *held*, that the case fell under s. 235 (1) and the previous conviction was no bar under s. 403 (ii) 3 A. L. J. 2 = 1906 A. W. N. 32 = 3 Cr. L. J. 93.

(v) *Acquittal under s 182 I P C no bar to trial under s 500 I P C*—Where the accused who had in a petition to a Tahsildar under the Court of Wards falsely made certain allegations against an Inspector of

Use of as any part of the earth's surface, whether

any change, affection, or influence, as, a body susceptible of color or of alteration

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The colour of an eternal day

2 Capable of impression. Impassible tender,
The children are more susceptible than adults

to cease for a time from operation or
per of the habitus corpus
to intermit daily, intermit, stay,

To cease from operation or action
to stop payment, or be unable to
of the garments as a commercial

1 One who or that which, and
worn for holding up pantaloons

in The act of suspending or the
suspend, especially for a short

Surveyor (sur v'ur) n. 1 An overseer, one
placed to superintend others

You were the duke's surveyor. Final

Surveyor (sur v'ur) n. 1 An overseer, one
placed to superintend others

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3 To hold to be uncertain, to doubt, to mistrust,
to be uncertain, to be of a nerve

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of operations as and only, it is a suspension of arms
as for burying the dead making proposals for
surrender or for peace, &c



Suspension bridge.

Suspension of arms (susp) a act of truce or cessation
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as for burying the dead making proposals for
surrender or for peace, &c

Suspension of arms (susp) a act of truce or cessation
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Suspension of arms (susp) a act of truce or cessation
of operations as and only, it is a suspension of arms
as for burying the dead making proposals for
surrender or for peace, &c

Police was tried under s. 182, I P C., but was acquitted on the ground that the person to whom the application was made was not a public servant, and a subsequent prosecution by the Inspector under s. 500, I P C., was objected to, *held* the previous acquittal was no bar, 37 C. 604, where 10 C. W. N. 518 is distinguished. 43 C. 383.

(vi) *Section 467 or 109, I P C., and s. 82 of the Registration Act, 1908.*—Acquittal in respect of the offence of aiding and abetting the forgery of a document presented for registration does not bar the trial for an offence under s. 82 (a) of the Registration Act in respect of the same document, 37 A. 107. But see 1 Rang 299 where it is *held* that if an accused is already tried and acquitted for offences of forgery and abetment thereof, their re-trial for a separate offence under the Registration Act, s. 82, was barred under s. 403 as no sanction is necessary for a prosecution under s. 82, I. R., Act and as the accused might have been charged and tried for an offence under s. 82 Registration Act.

(vii) *Acquittal of abetment of forgery, s. 467/109, I P C., does not bar trial for offence of using as genuine the forged document, s. 471, I P C.*—The series of acts beginning with the forgery and ending with the use of the forged document in a Civil Court must be regarded as so connected together as to form one transaction, so that under s. 235 (1) it would have been competent to try the accused for both the offences at the same trial, the case therefore fell under sub-sec. (2) of s. 403 and was not governed by sub-sec. (1), 40 B. 97; 30 C. W. N. 432.

(viii) *Conviction under s. 243, I P C., no bar to trial under s. 240, I P C.*—C gave 50 counterfeit coins to P to pass for him. Subsequently C was convicted under s. 243, I P C., for being in possession of other counterfeit coins. He was again tried jointly with P in respect of the 50 coins under s. 240, I P C., and convicted. On appeal it was contended that C could not be tried for an offence under s. 240, I P C., after the previous conviction under s. 243, I P C., *held*, that the delivery of the 50 coins by C to P with a view to its being changed was a distinct offence from that for which C was previously convicted and that the second conviction of C was good, 31 C. 1007.

(ix) *Offences under ss. 302/34, I P C.—Effect of acquittal under ss. 302/34, I P C. on re-trial under ss. 302/109 and 302/114, I P C.*—Where the Judge directed an acquittal under ss. 302/34, I P C., on legal grounds, the verdict of that jury to that effect has not determined any question of fact and the acquittal has no effect on the trial of charges under ss. 302/109 and 302/114, I P C., 41 C. 1072.

(x) *An acquittal under s. 342, I P C. no bar to trial under s. 147, I P C.*—Several Police constables were convicted of rioting. Two of them were previously tried and acquitted on charge of wrongful confinement for having taken into custody some persons in the course of such rioting. *Held*, that the second trial was not vitiated by contravention of the rule embodied in s. 403 sub-sec. (1) of the Cr. Pro. Code (*R v Barron*, 1914 2 K. B. 570 followed, 2 C. L. J. 622 distinguished 43 C. 78.)

(xi) *A conviction under s. 379, I P C., no bar to a trial again under s. 9 of the Opium Act (I of 1878).*—An accused previously convicted of theft under s. 379 in respect of some opium can be tried again for an offence of illicit possession of the same opium under s. 9 of the Opium Act 24 A. L. J. 559.

34. *Acquittal in respect of some of several sums misappropriated whether bar to trial in respect of others?*—The accused was tried for and acquitted of criminal breach of trust in respect of Rs. 12 misappropriated between July 1907-08. He was subsequently tried and convicted in respect of another sum of Rs. 19 misappropriated during the same period. On appeal the Sessions Judge being of opinion that when the prosecution had made its election and s. 222 (2) and proviso, by choosing some out of the different amounts misappropriated during the period they were estopped by s. 403 from instituting any further prosecution in respect of any fresh items covering the same period, and set aside the conviction, *held* the previous acquittal was no bar. Sections 234, etc., do not bar the separate trial of the accused for each separate offence. See the case noted above under ss. 233 and 235, 12 Bom. L. R. 226 = 11 Cr. L. J. 337. Where, however, a charge has been framed under s. 222 (2) in respect of a gross sum of money misappropriated during a certain period and a conviction obtained, the accused cannot be tried again in respect of another gross sum of money misappropriated during the same period. The charge in the previous case should be taken to include all the items misappropriated by the accused in the course of the same transaction during that period. That ought to be the interpretation of s. 222 because otherwise it seems difficult to conceive that the Legislature should have intended that under s. 222 the prosecution should be at liberty to prosecute for a gross sum misappropriated during a particular period consisting of certain items more than three in number and obtain a conviction for the same, and then choose another gross sum consisting of different items alleged to have been misappropriated during the same period and have a separate trial for the second group of items. What the Legislature apparently intended was that where there is to be a trial for misappropriation of a gross sum 'there should be only one trial for such an offence during the period covered by the defalcation,' 17 Cr. L. J. 30 (M), 27 C. W. N. 578.

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Acquittal on trial for criminal breach of trust of a sum between certain dates does not bar a subsequent trial for criminal breach of trust committed on an intermediate date, of a separate sum not included in the amount forming the subject of the first trial. 50 C. 632 (*following* 12 Bom. L. R. 226)

35. Similarity of offences does not render them identical.—

(i) *Forgery of several documents*—See Note 12 at p 628 When a person was first tried in respect of three out of six documents alleged to be forged under such circumstances which constituted the forgery of all six documents one and the same transaction, and acquitted in respect of those three documents; *held*, that there was nothing in this section which could prevent his being tried again in respect of the other documents, but that in the circumstances of the case, it was inexpedient to take proceedings in respect of the remaining three documents, 1905 A. W. N. 238 = 2 A. L. J. 673 = 2 Cr. L. J. 790. See 7 W. R. 18.

(ii) *Threatening three witnesses at same time*—Each person brought a separate case, *held* separate sentences were legal, 9 W. R. 30.

(iii) *Stealing of several articles at the same time*—It has happened that a man acquitted of stealing a horse has yet been arraigned and convicted for stealing the saddle, though both were done at the same time *Hale's Pleas of the Crown* cited in 7 W. R. 13. The tendency now is to extend the rule for the same acts and omissions irrespective of the exact terms of the indictment See 28 A. 313.

(iv) *Possession of stolen property*—Accused was found to be in possession of property stolen from two different persons on different occasions He was separately tried and sentenced on each charge, *held*, that there was nothing in the fact that the goods were stolen at different times, to constitute by itself proof that they were received at different times, or under such circumstances as to show that more than one offence was committed in receiving them Conviction on the second trial was set aside, 15 C. 511; 15 A. 317; 27 C. W. N. 554.

EXCEPTION II.—SCOPE OF SUB-SEC (3).

36 The new facts must constitute different offence—See illustration (3) and 36 A. 4.—It is not enough to defeat the plea of *autrefois acquit* to show that the second indictment charges circumstances of aggravation not included in the first, or serious consequences of the offence which have occurred since the first indictment, unless the new facts or circumstances are such as to indicate a different kind of offence of which there could be no conviction for the first trial. A man who has been acquitted on an indictment for manslaughter cannot be indicted for the same death of murder *Russell on Crimes*, pp 1985–87. There is no authority for holding that when a man has been convicted of committing an act constituting an offence, and further evidence subsequently comes to light which shows that his act constituted a graver offence than that of which he was convicted, he may merely on that ground alone be put upon his trial for the graver offence. Clauses 2, 3, 4 and 5 lay down under what circumstances alone a previous conviction is not a bar to a subsequent trial for the same matter, *held*, therefore, a person convicted under s. 31 of the *Rangoon Police Act* 1899, for being in possession of an article supposed to be stolen cannot be again tried later for an offence under s. 457, I P C., merely on the ground that the owner of the article is traced and some further evidence is available, 8 Bur. L. T. 129, 16 Cr. L. J. 267.

37. The new facts must have happened after or not known to the Court at the first trial.—Where *A* causes hurt to *B*, and as a consequence of the injury so inflicted, *B* dies and *A* is tried and convicted of the hurt. If death took place before the trial and the fact was known to the Court which convicted *A* of hurt, then *A* could not again be tried for the homicide under this sub-sec. (3) though he might be under sub-sec. (4), 9 N. L. R. 26 = 14 Cr. L. J. 135. A summary conviction for common assault may be a bar to an indictment for wounding with intent to murder, *R v Stanton*, (1851) 5 Cox 344, *R v Elrington*, 1 B. and s. 688, *R v Miles*, 21 Q. B. D. 423. In 1901 the accused was prosecuted by the Bombay Municipality under s. 476 of the *City Municipal Act* II of 1899 for proceeding to erect certain balconies contrary to the Act. He was acquitted. Subsequently in 1902, the accused was called upon under ss 308 and 309 of that Act to remove the balconies which had been in existence at the time of the previous prosecution, and on the accused's failure to comply with the notice, he was again prosecuted, *held*, that the former acquittal did not preclude the Magistrate from trying the present charge, as the second offence could not have been committed until the notice to remove was served on the accused and this notice to remove was not served on the accused until the year following that in which he was acquitted of the previous charge, 4 Bom. L. R. 575. See also 9 Cr. L. J. 878 (Birma) where an acquittal of the offence of disobedience of an order under s. 92 (2) of the *Burma Municipal Act* III of 1898 was *held* no bar to the trial for the disobedience of an order under s. 92 (3). See 3 P. R. 1901 and 36 A. 4, where a man was first tried for hurt and later, the injured person dying, *held* the previous trial was no bar to a fresh trial for culpable homicide.

EXCEPTION III.—SCOPE OF SUB-SEC. (4).

33. 'Was not competent to try' means 'had no jurisdiction to try.'—It is only when the Court which first tried the accused had no jurisdiction to try the offence with which the accused is subsequently charged, that this sub-sec. (4) prevents the operation of the general rule enacted in sub-sec. (1). See 24 M. 681 and illustrations (f) and (g). The clause refers to the character and status of the tribunal when it refers to the competency to try the offence, 36 M. 303. Upon a charge of dacoity the Magistrate, having split up the charge, convicted the accused of rioting, using criminal force and misappropriating the property of a deceased person.

Sessions Court was no bar to further proceedings by virtue of sub-sec. (4), 7 M. 557. So, where an accused person appears to have committed culpable homicide, his conviction by a Magistrate for a minor offence does not prevent his trial for murder, etc., Ratanlal 337. In 5 Bom. L. R. 125 the accused was charged with an offence under s. 304, I P C., but the trying Magistrate convicted and sentenced him under s. 323 I P C., being of opinion that the evidence was not sufficient for commitment. The District Magistrate, however, taking a different view, ordered a commitment, and it was held, that the order was not bad as the previous conviction under s. 323, I P C., was no bar to a trial under s. 304 which the Magistrate was not competent to try. This case was followed in 7 P. R. 1912 = 39 P. W. R. 1912; 243 P. L. R. 1912 = 13 Cr. L. J. 742, where the accused were acquitted of offences under ss. 323, 326 and 143, I P C., and were subsequently tried and convicted under s. 302, I P C. See 18 Cr. L. J. 643; 43 M. L. J. 490.

39. That offence is triable by jury does not affect competency of Court.—A Sessions Judge with the aid of assessors tried and acquitted the accused of the offence of abetment of murder with dacoity, ss. 396 and 109, I P C. Subsequently on the same facts, the accused was charged with an offence under s. 412, I P C., and tried by the Sessions Judge and a jury and convicted. The conviction was sought to be sustained under this sub-section inasmuch as the Court which tried the accused on the first occasion. Sessions Judge aided by assessors, was not competent to try the offence under s. 412 which was triable by a jury; held, setting aside the conviction that the words "not competent to try" means "had not jurisdiction to try." But the Court by which he was first tried, i.e., the Court of Sessions, was competent as a Court of Session to try the offence under s. 412, I P C., 24 M. 681. See 7 M. 557.

40. Want of complaint under s. 199 renders Court incompetent.—The accused was tried under ss. 366, 368, 376, I P C., and acquitted. On complaint by the husband, the accused was tried and convicted on the same facts under s. 493, I P C., held, that the conviction was not bad by virtue of s. 403 as the earlier Court was incompetent to try the accused under s. 493 in the absence of a complaint by the husband, 17 Bom. L. R. 678 = 3 Bom. Cr. Cn. 91 = 16 Cr. L. J. 657. A intimating to the District Magistrate that he had authorized his brother B to institute a complaint against C for enticing away A's wife (s. 498, I P C.) and the charge was heard and evidence for both sides recorded, but the Magistrate discovering that B had no authority purported to acquit C. On the husband A instituting a fresh complaint, it was held that the so-called acquittal was no bar to the trial, as the Magistrate's finding amounted to this, that there was no complaint before him of which he could take cognizance, 31 A. 317. See Note 10 at p. 566.

41. Effect of absence of sanction on competency of Court.—(i) Sanction under s. 195 only a condition precedent for institution of proceeding before tribunal, it is not a condition of the competency of the tribunal.—The clause refers to the character and status of the tribunal when it refers to competency to try the offence. See illustrations (f) and (g). Where, therefore, a person was acquitted of an offence under s. 211, I P C., and no charge under s. 182, I P C., was framed for want of sanction though it could have been jointly tried in the first trial held, that the acquittal was a bar to a trial under s. 182, I P C., 33 M. 308.

(ii) Contra.—Want of sanction renders Court incompetent.—A complaint was made to a Magistrate of offences under ss. 182 and 500, I P C. When accused appeared, the Magistrate passed the following order—"As there is no sanction, prosecution withdraws the charge. Accused is discharged." Sanction having been obtained, a fresh complaint was lodged against the accused for the same offences. The Magistrate ordered that the proceedings be stopped as they could not be taken by reason of the provisions of this section. Held, that as the accused had not been acquitted by a Court of absence of sanction the Court could not take cognizance of that offence. And as the offence under s. 500 is not a bailable offence, the only legal order that the Magistrate could have passed was one of discharge under s. 253, 33 M. 308. An accused, was placed upon trial for

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(ii) *Threatening three witnesses at same time* — Each person brought a separate case *held* separate sentences were legal 9 W. R. 30

(iii) *Stealing of several articles at the same time* — It has happened that a man acquitted of stealing a horse has yet been arraigned and convicted for stealing the saddle though both were done at the same time *Hale's Pleas of the Crown* cited in 7 W. R. 15. The tendency now is to extend the rule for the same acts and omissions irrespective of the exact terms of the indictment. See 23 A. 313.

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EXCEPTION II — SCOPE OF SUB-SEC (3).

36 The new facts must constitute different offence. — See illustration (3) and 36 A. 4. — It is not enough to defeat the plea of *autrefois acquit* to show that the second indictment charges circumstances of aggravation not included in the first, or serious consequences of the offence which have occurred since the first indictment unless the new facts or circumstances are such as to indicate a different kind of offence of which there could be no conviction for the first trial. A man who has been acquitted on an indictment for manslaughter cannot be indicted for the same death of murder. *Russell on Crimes*, pp. 1985–87. There is no authority for holding that when a man has been convicted or committing an act constituting an offence, and further evidence subsequently comes to light which shows that his act constituted a graver offence than that of which he was convicted, he may merely on that ground alone be put upon his trial for the graver offence. Clauses 2 3 4 and 5 lay down under what circumstances alone a previous conviction is not a bar to a subsequent trial for the same matter, *held* therefore, a person convicted under s. 31 of the *Rangoon Police Act* 1899 for being in possession of an article supposed to be stolen cannot be again tried later for an offence under s. 457, I P. C., merely on the ground that the owner of the article is traced and some further evidence is available. 8 Bar. L. T. 129, 16 Cr. L. J. 267.

37 The new facts must have happened after or not known to the Court at the first trial. — Where *A* causes hurt to *B*, and as a consequence of the injury so inflicted, *B* dies and *A* is tried and convicted of the hurt. If death took place before the trial and the fact was known to the Court which convicted *A* of hurt then *A* could not again be tried for the homicide under this sub-sec. (3) though he might be under sub-sec. (4). 9 N. L. R. 26 = 14 Cr. L. J. 135. A summary conviction for common assault may be a bar to an indictment for wounding with intent to murder *R v Stanton*, (1851) 5 Cox 344, *R v Elrington*, 1 B. and s. 693, *R v Miles*, 23 Q. B. D. 423. In 1901 the accused was prosecuted by the Bombay Municipality under s. 476 of the *City Municipal Act* II of 1888 for proceeding to erect certain balconies contrary to the Act. He was acquitted. Subsequently in 1902 the accused was called upon under ss. 308 and 309 of that Act to remove the balconies which had been in existence at the time of the previous prosecution and on the accused's failure to comply with the notice he was again prosecuted, *held*, that the former acquittal did not preclude the Magistrate from trying the present charge, as the second offence could not have been committed until the notice to remove was served on the accused and this notice to remove was not served on the accused until the year following that in which he was acquitted of the previous charge, 4 Bom. L. R. 575. See also 9 Cr. L. J. 578 (Barnes) where an acquittal of the offence of disobedience of an order under s. 92 (2) of the *Burma Municipal Act* III of 1898 was *held* no bar to the trial for the disobedience of an order under s. 92 (3). See 3 P. R. 1901 and 36 A. 4, where a man was first tried for hurt and later, the injured person dying, *held* the previous trial was no bar to a fresh trial for culpable homicide.

EXCEPTION III.—SCOPE OF SUB-SEC. (4).

33. 'Was not competent to try' means 'had no jurisdiction to try.'—It is only when the Court which first tried the accused had no jurisdiction to try the offence with which the accused is subsequently charged, that this sub-sec. (4) prevents the operation of the general rule enacted in sub-sec. (1). See 24 M. 681 and illustrations (f) and (g). The clause refers to the character and status of the tribunal when it refers to the competency to try the offence, 36 M. 303. Upon a charge of dacoity the Magistrate, having split up the charge, convicted the accused of rioting, using criminal force and misappropriating the property of a deceased person. On appeal, the Sessions Court reversed the conviction, holding that the offence, if any, was dacoity, but that the facts alleged being incredible, there was no need to order a committal. The complainant thereupon lodged a fresh complaint of dacoity based on the same facts before another Magistrate. *Held*, that the judgment of the Sessions Court was no bar to further proceedings by virtue of sub-sec. (4), 7 M. 537. So, where an accused person appears to have committed culpable homicide, his conviction by a Magistrate for a minor offence does not prevent his trial for murder, etc., Ratanlal 337. In 5 Bom. L. R. 123 the accused was charged with an offence under s. 304, I P C., but the trying Magistrate convicted and sentenced him under s. 323 I P C., being of opinion that the evidence was not sufficient for commitment. The District Magistrate, however, taking a different view, ordered a commitment and it was *held*, that the order was not bad as the previous conviction under s. 322, I P C., was no bar to a trial under s. 304 which the Magistrate was not competent to try. This case was followed in 7 P. R. 1912 = 39 P. W. R. 1912; 243 P. L. R. 1912 = 13 Cr. L. J. 742, where the accused were acquitted of offences under ss. 323, 326 and 148, I P C., and were subsequently tried and convicted under s. 302, I P C. See 18 Cr. L. J. 643; 43 M. L. J. 490.

39. That offence is triable by jury does not affect competency of Court.—A Sessions Judge with the aid of assessors tried and acquitted the accused of the offence of abetment of murder with dacoity, ss 396 and 109, I P C. Subsequently on the same facts the accused was charged with an offence under s. 412 I P C., and tried by the Sessions Judge and a jury and convicted. The conviction was sought to be sustained under this subsection inasmuch as the Court which tried the accused on the first occasion Sessions Judge aided by assessors, was not competent to try the offence under s. 412 which was triable by a jury, *held* setting aside the conviction that the words "not competent to try" means "had not jurisdiction to try" But the Court by which he was first tried, *i.e.*, the Court of Sessions was competent as a Court of Session to try the offence under s. 412, I P C., 24 M. 681. See 7 M. 537.

40. Want of complaint under s. 199 renders Court incompetent.—The accused was tried under ss 366, 368, 376, I P C., and acquitted. On complaint by the husband, the accused was tried and convicted on the same facts under s. 498, I P C., *held*, that the conviction was not bad by virtue of s. 403 as the earlier Court was incompetent to try the accused under s. 498 in the absence of a complaint by the husband, 17 Bom. L. R. 678 = 3 Bom. Cr. Ca. 91 = 16 Cr. L. J. 657. A intimed to the District Magistrate that he had authorized his brother B to institute a complaint against C for enticing away A's wife (s. 498, I P C.) and the charge was heard and evidence for both sides recorded, but the Magistrate discovering that B had no authority purported to acquit C. On the husband A instituting a fresh complaint, it was *held* that the so-called acquittal was no bar to the trial, as the Magistrate's finding amounted to this, that there was no complaint before him of which he could take cognizance, 31 A. 317. See Note 10 at p 666.

41. Effect of absence of sanction on competency of Court.—(1) Sanction under s. 195 only a condition precedent for institution of proceeding before tribunal, it is not a condition of the competency of the tribunal.—The clause refers to the character and status of the tribunal when it refers to competency to try the offence. See illustrations (f) and (g). Where, therefore a person was acquitted of an offence under s. 211, I P C., and no charge under s. 182, I P C., was framed for want of sanction though it could have been jointly tried in the first trial *held*, that the acquittal was a bar to a trial under s. 182, I P C., 35 M. 303.

(2) Contra.—Want of sanction renders Court incompetent.—A complaint was made to a Magistrate of offences under ss. 182 and 500, I P C. When accused appeared, the Magistrate passed the following order—“As there is no sanction, prosecution withdraws the charge. Accused is discharged.” Sanction having been obtained a fresh complaint was lodged against the accused for the same offences. The Magistrate ordered that the proceedings be stopped as they could not be taken by reason of the provisions of this section. *Held*, that as the accused had not been acquitted by a Court of competent jurisdiction, the order was illegal. As owing to absence of sanction the Court could not take cognizance of the offence under s. 182, it could not acquit him of that offence. And as the offence under s. 500 is not a summons-case, the only legal order that the Magistrate could have passed was one of discharge under s. 253, 22 B. 711, 3 M. 48. An accused was placed upon trial for

aiding and abetting the cheating of a Sub-Registrar in respect of a forged document presented for registration and was acquitted the Registrar thereupon gave sanction for his trial for an offence under s 82 (a) of the Registration Act. *Held* that the former trial was no bar as the first Court was not competent by want of sanction to try the offence with which the accused was subsequently charged, 37 A. 107. So also in 40 B 97 it was *held* following 22 B 711 that want of sanction under s. 193 rendered the Court incompetent. Where a person has been acquitted of the abetment of the forgery of a document he may after sanction obtained under s 195 be put upon his trial for using the same forged document as genuine, as the first Court was not competent to try the offence subsequently charged for want of sanction. *See* also 37 A. 283. But it should be noted that under the present Code as amended the necessity of sanction is done away with and a complaint under section 476 is a condition precedent to the institution of a prosecution under s. 195.

41-A.—Where the prosecution of the accused for an offence under s. 21 of the *Bengal Food Adulteration Act* fell through for want of valid sanction and the accused was acquitted under s 245, *held* that the previous acquittal of the accused did not operate as a bar to his subsequent trial after sanction being obtained in writing of the Municipal Commissioner for such prosecution. Because the previous prosecution was incompetent as there was no sanction and there could have been no trial of the accused within the meanings of s. 403. 30 C. W. N. 332.

SCOPE OF EXPLANATION

42. **Purpose of explanation.**—SUBRAMANYA AYYAR, J., in his dissenting judgment in 29 M. 126 (F.B.) is of opinion that this explanation does not bar resort to a plea analogous to *autrefois acquit* (*see* Note 14 above) in cases where such plea ought to be allowed on grounds of justice, and the words '*is not an acquittal for the purposes of this section*' was not merely equivalent to 'in no way bar a fresh prosecution for the same offence'.

43. **Dismissal of complaint.**—Where a Magistrate dismisses a complaint under s. 203 it is competent for him without any order for further enquiry by a superior tribunal, either to entertain a fresh complaint or to re-hear and act upon the complaint already on record. *See* 24 C. 286; 23 C. 993; 29 M. 126 (F.B.), 36 A. 53 following 1893 A. W. N. 86 and *see* Note 27 to s. 203. Where, however the order of the Magistrate dismissing the complaint has been upheld by the Sessions Judge, it is not open to the Magistrate to entertain a fresh complaint. The complainant's remedy is to move the High Court by way of revision 68 P. L. R. 1902 distinguished 11 P. W. R. 1910 = 11 Cr. L. J. 347.

44. **Withdrawal having the effect of acquittal.**—Where a conviction has been had on one or more of several charges the withdrawal of the remaining charges under s 248 has the effect of an acquittal on such charges unless the conviction be set aside 19 W. R. 55, and *see* Note 28 for other instances.

45. **Stopping of proceedings under s 249.**—An order under s. 249 is specifically excluded by the explanation from being an acquittal and fresh proceedings are not barred, 9 P. R. 1913 = 8 P. W. R. 1913 = 13 Cr. L. J. 860. A Magistrate trying an accused person upon charges under ss. 193 and 204 I P C., convicted him under the former section and with regard to the latter observed that the facts appeared to him to constitute an offence under another section and he therefore directed the file to be laid before the District Magistrate with a view to having such offence enquired into. On appeal the conviction under s. 193 I P C. was set aside and *subsequently* *held* that I P C. and a stay of the trial of such charge under s 249 and the subsequent trial was not barred by this section 1899 A. W. N. 8.

46. **Discharge and its effect.**—(i) An accused person may in an inquiry preliminary to commitment, be discharged by the Magistrate under s. 209 before a charge is framed or under s. 213 after the framing of the charge. In 4 Bom. L. R. 779 at p. 785 it was *held* that an order of improper discharge under s. 209 need not be set aside before an order of committal of the accused person improperly discharged can be made. (ii) In a warrant case an accused person may be discharged under s. 253 before a charge is framed and under s. 259 when the complainant is absent and the offence is compoundable. It is now *held* by all the High Courts that the Magistrate is competent to re-hear a case when the accused is discharged. *See* 1 C. W. N. 49, 28 C. 211, 28 C. 632 (F.B.) where 4 C. W. N. 28 and 46 are *dissented from* 29 C. 726 (F.B.) 29 M. 126 (F.B.) 36 A. 53, 1 B. 64 and *see* Notes 18 and 20 to s. 253 and Notes 7 and 8 to s. 259. (iii) In a Sessions trial before the High Court the accused may be discharged by the Advocate-General entering a *nolle prosequi*. *See* s. 333. An order of discharge on a *nolle prosequi* is no bar to fresh proceedings 15 C. W. N. 983 = 13 Cr. L. J. 488. (iv) In cases of contempt of Court when the offender submits an apology the

Court may discharge him. See s. 484 (v) When a Public Prosecutor withdraws from the prosecution before a charge is framed the accused shall be discharged, s. 494 (vi) The word 'discharge' in s. 119 is used in the sense of "permission to depart". Its meaning in that section is non-technical as no 'charge' need be drawn up, 33 M. 83. See Notes 19, 26 and also 10 Bar. L. R. 1 = 2 L. B. R. 37, where all the authorities are reviewed. No order under ss. 435 and 437 is necessary, to enable proceedings to be taken afresh after an order of discharge, 8 W. R. 61; 9 Ibid. 15; 14 Ibid. 63; 18 Ibid. 39; 20 Ibid. 46 and 47; 23 Ibid. 31; 1 C. 282; 2 C. 402; 4 C. 16 and 647; 10 C. 268; 1 B. 64; 2 B. 634; 10 Bar. L. R. 1; 4 M. H. C. R. Appx. VIII; 4 N.-W. P. H. C. R. 23; 23 C. 211; 29 C. 726; 23 M. 310; 29 A. 7; 32 M. 220; 17 O. C. 273 = 15 Cr. L. J. 833 and Notes to s. 437.

PART VII.

OF APPEAL, REFERENCE AND REVISION.

CHAPTER XXXI.

OF APPEALS.

404. No appeal shall lie from any judgment or order of a Criminal Court except as provided for by this Code or by any other law for the time being in force.

Unless otherwise provided, no appeal to lie

Notes.—Limitation for presentation of appeal.—*Appeal under this Code to any Court other than a High Court.*—An appeal must be preferred within thirty days from the date of the sentence or order appealed from. *The Limitation Act IX of 1908, Sch. I, Art. 154*

Appeal to High Court from a sentence of death passed by a Court of Session.—Appeal must be preferred within seven days from the date of the sentence.—*Ibid.*, Art. 150

Appeal to High Court from an order of acquittal.—Appeal must be preferred within six months from the date of the order appealed from.—*Ibid.*, Art. 157

Appeal to High Court in other cases, within sixty days from the date of the sentence, or order appealed from.—*Ibid.*, Art. 155, 2 C. 436.

2. Extension of period of limitation.—If the period of limitation prescribed for any appeal, etc., expires on the day when the Court is closed, the appeal may be preferred on the day that the Court re-opens. Section 49, *Act IX of 1908*. But any appeal may be admitted after the period of limitation prescribed therefore when the appellant satisfies the Court that he had sufficient cause for not referring the appeal within such period.—*Ibid.*, s. 5, formerly s. 5 of *Act XV of 1877, 1891 A. W. N. 10.*

Sufficient cause.—These words ought to receive a liberal construction so as to advance substantial justice when no negligence, nor inaction, nor want of *bona fides* is imputable to the appellant. Delay in the filing of an appeal ought not to be excused unless there are special circumstances, e.g., a misleading by the other side, a mistake in the office itself or some sudden accident, 9 Bom. L. R. 893 = 6 Cr. L. J. 221, following 13 M. 269. See 16 Cr. L. J. 300 (P). In the case of a convict in jail, the presentation of the petition of appeal to the officer in charge of the jail, is for the purpose of the *Limitation Act*, equivalent to presentation to the Court, 9 M. 238; 29 P. R. 1890. In 2 A. 386, SPARKIE, J., treated an appeal presented long after the period of limitation, as a petition for revision and decided it on the merits as an appeal. Where one of several accused appealed and was acquitted, held, that his acquittal was a sufficient cause for admitting the appeals of others, 7 P. R. 1871.

3. Mode of computation of the period of limitation.—(i) In computing the period of limitation prescribed for any appeal, etc., the day from which that period is to be reckoned shall be excluded. (ii) In computing the period of limitation prescribed for an appeal the day on which the judgment complained of was pronounced and the time requisite for obtaining a copy of the sentence or order ordered appealed from shall be excluded.—S. 12, *Act IX of 1908*

"*The time requisite for obtaining copy, etc.*"—The words imply that the appellant is not to lose his right of appeal by reason of the neglect of the officials who issue copies, or who are required to give notice when such copies are ready, 12 A. 105. They (the words) do not mean requisite by reason of the carelessness or negligence of the applicant, they mean the time occupied by the officer who has got to provide the copy, in making the copy delivered, but the d had notice that

whole the

3 A meeting convention or council as a *synod*
of gods

Parent of gods and men, propitious Jove!
And you bright mind of wise powers above
On this my suit your gracious aid bestow *Daphne*
3 (Athena) A council not less of two or more
of the heavenly bodies [are]

To the blank moon
Direct the stars prescribed, in the ether live
Their planetary host and aspects
In east and west and time and opportune
I'll not be silly, and when to go
In good season, *Mon.*

Computation of time when appellant is in jail.—The time taken in forwarding an application by a prisoner for a copy of the judgment and in transmitting the same from the Court to the jail must be excluded, 9 M. 258; 5 P. R. 1888; 10 C. 642.

5. *Petition of appeal how presented.*—See Note 7 to s. 419

5. *When appeals require stamps each must be presented separately.*—Except where the petition requires a stamp, it is not material whether the appeals of several convicted persons in the same case are made jointly in one petition or separately. Where a stamp is required, the petitions must be separate and separately numbered, and be accompanied by separate copies of judgment or of orders appealed against.—*Bom H. C. Cr. Cir.*, p. 42, *Weir II*, 467. Where certain appellants, undergoing a sentence of imprisonment had presented an appeal accompanied by an unstamped copy of a judgment, *held*, that other persons sentenced in the same trial, but who were not undergoing imprisonment, in presenting an appeal against the same judgment, were not entitled to take advantage of the unstamped copy of the judgment put in by the appellants who were in jail, but must present along with their appeal, a stamped copy of the judgment appealed against. For remission of Court fees on copies of judgment, etc., see Note 2 to s. 371.

6. *No appeal from Magistrate exercising special jurisdiction outside British India.*—(1) The District Magistrate of Simla was specially deputed by the Punjab Government to try certain Native Indian Subjects of His Majesty for offences committed in a Native State outside British India. The trial took place and sentences were passed outside British India. *Held*, the Chief Court had no jurisdiction to hear appeals against the sentences, 14 P. R. 1910 = 20 P. W. R. 1910 = 11 Cr. L. J. 390.

(ii) *Mourbhaj and Tributary Mahals*—No appeal lies from conviction of Superintendent of Tributary Mahals when exercising jurisdiction over offences committed in Mourbhaj a place not within British India. See 9 C. 238; 16 C. 667; 8 C. 985 and 7 C. 523.

7. *Jurisdiction of the Appellate Court to dispose of pending appeal is not affected by locality of offence ceasing to be British India.*—An offence was committed at a place in British India and on conviction by the Magistrate an appeal was filed to the Sessions Judge. Pending the disposal of the Appeal the place where the offence was committed was constituted an Independent State. The Sessions Judge returned the memorandum of appeal to the appellants for presentation to the proper Court in the Native State on the ground that he had no jurisdiction to hear the appeal. *Held*, the Sessions Judge was in error. The offence was committed in British India, the appeal was presented to the proper Court the appellants were then confined in a jail in British India, and the mere fact that the particular locality has ceased to be British India before the appeal has been determined does not oust the jurisdiction of the Judge, 38 A. 378. See also 34 A. 118.

8. *This Chapter does not exhaust all appeals.*—See ss. 250 (3) 486, 515, 524, etc. In addition to the matters appealable under this chapter, it should be noted, that an order under ss. 517 or 518 or 519 regarding the disposal of property before a Criminal Court, may be considered by a Court of Appeal, solely with reference to such order, although no appeal might have been presented in the case in which such order was passed, 9 M. 448, for, it may often happen that the question of the propriety of such an order may in no way concern the convicted person, 3 C. 379 = 1 C. L. R. 339. Such an order may be passed when the accused is acquitted or discharged and application should be made to the Court of Appeal, before an application for revision can properly be made to the High Court, 2 A. 276. See also 29 C. 724 *overruling* 25 C. 630.

9. *Appeals under other Acts.*—(i) *Cattle Trespass Act*—A complaint under s. 20 of the *Cattle Trespass Act* is now included in the term "offence," see s. 4, cl. (o), therefore a person, against whom an order is made under s. 22 of Act I of 1871, is "a person convicted on a trial," and an appeal lies from an order of a second class Magistrate awarding compensation for illegal seizure of cattle 29 M. 517. The Rulings in 10 B. 230; 11 M. 359; 15 C. 712 and 19 M. 238 are now superseded. See *Weir I*, 712. See Note 9 at p. lxxvi, Appx vi.

(ii) *Bengal Excise Act*—Section 84 of the *Bengal Excise Act V* of 1909 which excludes the application of s. 191, Cr. P. C., provides ample indication that this Code is applicable to trials before a Magistrate, subject to specified restrictions 41 C. 694.

(iii) *Frontier Crimes Regulation III* of 1901—See 19 P. R. 1910.

(iv) *Workman's Breach of Contract Act*, 1859—See Notes 25 and 26 at p. lxxxix of the Appendix.

10. *Appeals under the Letters Patent.*—See Notes under s. 15 of the *Letters Patent* at p. iv of the Appendix and Note 176 at p. 275, Note 221 at p. 476.

11. *Appeals to the Privy Council.*—See Notes to s. 41 of the *Letters Patent* at p. iv of the Appendix as to the conditions and circumstances under which appeals might be allowed to the Privy Council, 32 C. 1. Before granting the certificate that the case is a fit subject for appeal to the Privy Council, the High Court must be

satisfied that there is reasonable ground for thinking that grave and substantial injustice may have been done by reason of some departure from the principles of natural justice, 23 B. 221 at p. 233. An order under cl 10 of the Letters Patent dealing with professional misconduct is not a matter of criminal jurisdiction within the meaning of the Letters Patent. *In Louis Ea* (1904) 1 P. R. 1909 = 9 Cr. L. J. 306. The powers of an Appellate Court, when exceptional grounds exist as where the conviction is not in any degree supported by the evidence, 8 B. 197; 14 B. 331; 22 C. 993. The proper course for a person to follow when he finds that his petition of appeal has been rejected on the ground that no appeal lay from the order, is to file a petition of revision, 1898 A. W. N. 147, see also 9 C. 513 = 12 C. L. R. 500 and 2 A. 53.

In Louis Ea (1904) 1 P. R. 1909 = 9 Cr. L. J. 306. The powers of an Appellate Court, when exceptional grounds exist as where the conviction is not in any degree supported by the evidence, 8 B. 197; 14 B. 331; 22 C. 993. The proper course for a person to follow when he finds that his petition of appeal has been rejected on the ground that no appeal lay from the order, is to file a petition of revision, 1898 A. W. N. 147, see also 9 C. 513 = 12 C. L. R. 500 and 2 A. 53.

12. **In revision|High Court may exercise all powers of Appellate Court.**—In a case in which the law allows no appeal, the High Court as a Court of Revision may exercise under s. 439, the powers of an Appellate Court, when exceptional grounds exist as where the conviction is not in any degree supported by the evidence, 8 B. 197; 14 B. 331; 22 C. 993. The proper course for a person to follow when he finds that his petition of appeal has been rejected on the ground that no appeal lay from the order, is to file a petition of revision, 1898 A. W. N. 147, see also 9 C. 513 = 12 C. L. R. 500 and 2 A. 53.

13. **No appeals from High Court to High Court—from single Judge to Division or Full Bench.**—The powers of a single Judge in a matter which he has jurisdiction to deal with are the powers of the Court and cannot in any way be controlled by a Bench or Full Bench of the Court. As no appeal lies, no revision lies. Both procedures imply subordination which does not exist, 1 P. R. 1909 = 9 Cr. L. J. 306.

14. **Disqualification for hearing appeals.**—No Judge or Magistrate shall hear an appeal from any judgment or order passed or made by himself. See s. 556 and Notes thereunder, where a District Magistrate as executive head of the District is actively concerned in the institution of proceedings against a person under Chap. VIII, he is debarred from hearing an appeal under s. 406 without the permission of the Sessions Judge under s. 556, 1 B. L. R. 98 = 8 Cr. L. J. 356; 23 C. 323 referred to. A Magistrate who takes cognizance of a case under s. 190 (1) (c) cannot hear an appeal in the case, 12 C. W. N. 439 = 7 Cr. L. J. 224. He must follow the procedure laid down in s. 192. But mere directing the issue of a summons does not make the Magistrate incompetent to hear the appeal, 36 C. 869. See Note 8 at p. 427.

15. **Proceedings of Magistrates not empowered to hear appeals, void.**—If any Magistrate, not being empowered by law decides an appeal, his proceedings shall be void, s. 530 (r).

16. **Proceeding of Judges not empowered to hear appeals, void.**—In *Criminal Reference No 130 of 1906* (Allahabad High Court), a Sessions Judge erroneously entertained an appeal from the conviction of a second-class Magistrate and acquitted the appellant. *Held*, the order of the Sessions Judge disposing of the appeal was *ultra vires*. See also *Ratanlal 17*, where it was *held* that an accused person acquitted and discharged by a Sessions Judge on hearing an appeal which he was not entitled by law to hear, may be re-arrested even after the expiration of the period to which he was originally sentenced and made to undergo the remaining portion of the sentence. But in 4 L. B. R. 49 = 6 Cr. L. J. 287, it was *held* that an appellate judgment of a Sessions Judge not competent to hear the appeal, is not to be treated as a nullity till it is set aside.

17. **Appeal is a continuation of the case and accused cannot be put on oath.**—A criminal appeal is a continuation of the criminal case, and except so far as there is a provision to the contrary, the appellant has the privilege of the accused, and cannot be punished for making a false verification or statement 12 M. 451. See Note 3 to s. 423.

405. Any person whose application under section 89 for the delivery of property or the proceeds of the sale thereof has been rejected by any Court, may appeal to the Court to which appeals ordinarily lie from the sentences of the former Court.

Note.—Appeals 'ordinarily lie,' i.e., in the majority of cases, 11 B. 433. See 26 M. 636 (F.B.) and see Notes under Heading XXII at pp 470-473.

***406.** "Any person who has been ordered under section 118 to give security for keeping the peace or for good behaviour may appeal against such order—

(a) if made by a Presidency Magistrate, to the High Court,

T.

T the twentieth letter of the English alphabet, is] *brilliant* A secretary or notary under the Roman

a smooth, flat surface, an inscription; a draw or sometimes, a painting

The opposite walls are painted by Rubens which with the other of the infant taking leave of Don Felix is a most incomparable table

St. Anthony has a table that hangs up to him from a good peasant.

4. Hence, in a great variety of applications a condensed statement which may be comprehended by the eye in a single view, a methodical or systematic synopsis, the presentation of many items or partic-

Jons, sq 1371.

10 (*Canes*) (a) The board on which bailant

11 (*Clare Manus*) A flat, circular sheet of crown glass

(b) if made by any other Magistrate, to the Court of Session

Provided that the Local Government may, by notification in the Local Official Gazette direct that in any district specified in the notification appeals from such orders made by a Magistrate other than the District Magistrate or a Presidency Magistrate shall lie to the District Magistrate and not to the Court of Session

Provided, further, that nothing in this section shall apply to persons the proceedings against whom are laid before a Sessions Judge in accordance with the provisions of sub-sec. (2) or sub-sec. (3-A) of s 123'

Notes.—1. See ss. 124 and 125 for powers of District Magistrates in security matters distinct from powers on appeal. And see Note 14 to ss 404 and 556 as to disqualification of District Magistrates to hear appeals.

2 **Change.**—Considerable change has been effected by the new amendment of this section. Under the old law an appeal was allowed to the District Magistrate against the orders under s. 118 in cases of security for good behaviour passed by Magistrates other than the District or Presidency Magistrates. Under the new Amendment all orders under s 118 whether to give security for keeping the peace or for good behaviour are made appealable and an appeal ordinarily lies to the Court of Sessions against an order of any Magistrate except the Presidency Magistrate in which latter case the appeal lies to the High Court.

Under the proviso the Local Government is authorized to direct by notification that in any particular district appeals from such orders made by a Magistrate other than a District or a Presidency Magistrate shall lie to the District Magistrate and not to the Court of Sessions

So the following cases viz 27 A. 623 = 11 Bom L. R. 740; 25 C. W. N 393 have owing to the new changes in the section become obsolete

3. Under s. 406 an Appellate Court is competent to order a re trial. Where the applicants were bound over by a Magistrate to keep the peace and on appeal the Sessions Judge directed that the Magistrate's order be reversed and that proceedings subsequent to the stage of the issue or notice under s. 107 be cancelled and that the Magistrate should proceed from the stage of the issue of the notice held that the order of the Sessions Judge was an incidental order which he was authorized to make 24 A. L. J 556

Appeal from order refusing to accept or rejecting a surety

406-A. Any person aggrieved by an order refusing to accept or rejecting a surety under section 122 may appeal against such order —

(a) If made by a Presidency Magistrate to the High Court

(b) If made by the District Magistrate to the Court of Session or

(c) If made by a Magistrate other than the District Magistrate to the District Magistrate

Appeal from sentence of Magistrate of the second or third class

407. (1) Any person convicted on a trial held by any Magistrate of the second or third class or any person sentenced under section 349† or in respect of whom an order has been made or a sentence has been passed under section 380 by a Sub-divisional Magistrate of the second class may appeal to the District Magistrate

(2) The District Magistrate may direct that any appeal under this section or any class of such appeals shall be heard by any Magistrate of the first class subordinate to him and empowered by the Local Government to hear such

Transfer of appeals to first-class Magistrate.

appeals and thereupon such appeal or class of appeals may be presented to such Subordinate Magistrate or if already presented to the District Magistrate may be transferred to such Subordinate Magistrate. The District Magistrate may withdraw from such Magistrate any appeal or class of appeals so presented or transferred

Taciturnly, *adverb* In a taciturn manner, silent

In house of gutting *Con*

- 1 That which is attached, a suffix, *adjective*
pendix { *Old* }
Some ticks had been made to money bills in King Charles's
2 A small short, sharp pointed nail, usually have
{ *adjective* }

In a taciturn manner, *adverb*

{ *adjective* } One
hence, a manufacturer, an adroit

Tag { *verb* }
Tagging { *verb* }
1 To slip & p p TAGGED, p pr. & t
TAGGING
2 To fit with a point or points
3 To learn to make long-sighted thread lace. *Adm*
4 To fit, as one thing to another, to append:
5 To contain
6 To every sentence with some five or six words. *Adm*

Tag { *verb* }
1 (Sticks Laid) A contract by which one man
thing is set or let, for hire, & lease, as a truck of
land
2 To tag, *adverb*
(*From Eng*)

Tagged { *verb* }
1 The same as TAG, *adverb*
2 One who or that which appends
3 To tag, *adverb*
4 To tag, *adverb*

Tag { *verb* }
1 To tag, *adverb*
2 To tag, *adverb*
3 To tag, *adverb*
4 To tag, *adverb*
5 To tag, *adverb*
6 To tag, *adverb*
7 To tag, *adverb*
8 To tag, *adverb*
9 To tag, *adverb*
10 To tag, *adverb*

Tag { *verb* }
1 To tag, *adverb*
2 To tag, *adverb*
3 To tag, *adverb*
4 To tag, *adverb*
5 To tag, *adverb*
6 To tag, *adverb*
7 To tag, *adverb*
8 To tag, *adverb*
9 To tag, *adverb*
10 To tag, *adverb*

Tag { *verb* }
1 To tag, *adverb*
2 To tag, *adverb*
3 To tag, *adverb*
4 To tag, *adverb*
5 To tag, *adverb*
6 To tag, *adverb*
7 To tag, *adverb*
8 To tag, *adverb*
9 To tag, *adverb*
10 To tag, *adverb*



Tadpole.

McClintock

Agent of (Infection)

1 To tag, *adverb*
2 To tag, *adverb*
3 To tag, *adverb*
4 To tag, *adverb*
5 To tag, *adverb*
6 To tag, *adverb*
7 To tag, *adverb*
8 To tag, *adverb*
9 To tag, *adverb*
10 To tag, *adverb*

Tail { *verb* }
1 To tag, *adverb*
2 To tag, *adverb*
3 To tag, *adverb*
4 To tag, *adverb*
5 To tag, *adverb*
6 To tag, *adverb*
7 To tag, *adverb*
8 To tag, *adverb*
9 To tag, *adverb*
10 To tag, *adverb*

1 To tag, *adverb*
2 To tag, *adverb*
3 To tag, *adverb*
4 To tag, *adverb*
5 To tag, *adverb*
6 To tag, *adverb*
7 To tag, *adverb*
8 To tag, *adverb*
9 To tag, *adverb*
10 To tag, *adverb*

Referring to the enactment of this section, the Select Committee say—

"We note that there has been considerable criticism on this clause which provides for an appeal against an order refusing to accept a surety. But we think that if no appeal is provided most cases are bound to be taken up in revisions and we would retain the clause. We have made a slight amendment consequential on our proposals regarding s. 122.

We do not agree that all appeals under ss. 406 and 406-A should lie to the Sessions Judge, Sayid Raza Ali dissents from this view."

Notes.—1. S. 349 relates to procedure when a Magistrate cannot pass a sentence sufficiently severe

2. **Section as amended.**—The words 'may be presented' were substituted for the words 'shall be presented.' The District Magistrate is still competent to hear appeals filed in his Court even when he has taken action under sub-sec. (2).

3. **Appeal from second-class Magistrate invested with first-class powers during trial.**—Where a trial was held by a Magistrate holding second-class powers, the fact that he was appointed a Magistrate of the first class before the conclusion of the trial was held to make no difference, with reference to the question of appeal, which, therefore, was held to lie to the District Magistrate, 4 L. B. R. 239 = 8 Cr. L. J. 43.

4. **Appeal against conviction by Bench of Magistrates.**—An appeal lies under this section from a conviction by a Bench of Magistrates invested with second or third-class powers *see* s. 15 (2) § M. 36. But not from a Bench invested with first-class powers, 9 C. 96 = 11 C. L. R. 423.

5. **Validity of wholesale delegation by District Magistrate.**—Where a District Magistrate directed an Assistant Collector under him to perform "the routine work of the Collector's office, including the Criminal Appellate and Revisional work," and it was contended that the order was invalid being a wholesale delegation of appellate and revisional power not contemplated by sub-sec. (2) of this section *held* that as regards revisional powers, it was *ultra vires*, as the section does not refer to work of that kind, but as regards appellate powers the order was valid whether it included all the appeals of the district or the appeals which in the ordinary course of procedure came to the District Magistrate's office, 2 Bom. L. R. 836.

6. **District Magistrate has powers to withdraw part-heard appeals.**—A District Magistrate has jurisdiction to withdraw a part heard appeal to his own file from the file of a Sub-Divisional Magistrate. When such Sub-Divisional Magistrate had issued summons for the examination of certain witnesses as Court witnesses, it is not incumbent on the District Magistrate on the withdrawal of the case to his own file to examine those witnesses, 31 M. 777, where 23 M. 314 and L. R. 29 I. A. 198 are referred to. The Court to which an appeal is transferred for disposal, and on which the responsibility for correct disposal rests, is not bound by any opinion as to the necessity for further evidence formed by the Court from which the appeal was transferred.

7. **Order as to disposal of property under s. 520 can be passed in an appeal under s. 407.**—A Sub-Divisional Magistrate hearing an appeal under s. 407 (2) has power to pass orders under s. 520 regarding the disposal of property, 46 M. 182.

*** 408.** Any person convicted on a trial held by an Assistant Sessions Judge, a District Magistrate or other Magistrate of the first class or any person sentenced under section 349† "or in respect of whom an order has been made or a sentence has been passed under s. 380" by a Magistrate of the first class may appeal to the Court of Sessions

Provided as follows —

(a) † * * * *

(b) When in any case an Assistant Sessions Judge or a Magistrate specially empowered under section 30 passes any sentence of imprisonment for term exceeding four years, or any sentence of transportation, the appeal "of all or any of the accused convicted at such trial" shall lie to the High Court,

* As to appeals from sentences of District Magistrates Upper Burma in cases other than those affecting European British subject *see* the Upper Criminal Burma Justice Regulation of V of 1892, Sch. as. X and XVII as to similar appeals in British Baluchistan, *see* s. 13 of the British Baluchistan Criminal Justice Regulation of VIII of 1896. As to appeals from decisions under the Punjab Frontier Crimes Regulation of II of 1891 *see* Chapter III of that Regulation.

† The words in inverted commas were inserted by Act XVII of 1923.

‡ Cl. (a) of the proviso was omitted by Act XII of 1924.

(c) When any person is convicted by a Magistrate of an offence under section 124-A of the Indian Penal Code, the appeal * "of all or any of the accused convicted of such trial" shall lie to the High Court

Notes.—1. Scope of section—Section 403 lays down the general rule and s. 413 is an exception. Section 415 is explanatory and apparently was entered in the Code to remove all possible doubts which might arise in the cases mentioned therein, 33 A. 510.

Appeal to Sessions Court when accused has pleaded guilty—The mere fact that the appellant pleaded guilty before the trying Magistrate is not by itself a sufficient reason for a Sessions Judge to reject his appeal. An appeal to the Court of Session lies on fact as well as on law, and it should be disposed of in a legal manner, Ratanlal 954 and 877. These decisions were under the old Code, but now see s. 412 which limits the right of appeal even to Sessions Court.

2. Joint trials—How far s. 413 limits appeals.—When more persons than one are convicted at one trial by a Magistrate of the first class and an appealable sentence is passed on anyone of them, s. 413 does not take away from the other convicts, their right of appeals conferred by s. 403, even though the sentence passed on anyone of such persons may not be an appealable one under s. 413 if they had been tried singly, 4 L. B. R. 334 = 9 Cr. L. J. 356 (F.B.), 15 O. C. 338 = 14 Cr. L. J. 170; 30 P. R. 1915 = 17 Cr. L. J. 27. See also 14 A. L. J. 518. *Contra* MADRAS and BOMBAY, see Note 1 to sec. 413

3. Jurisdiction of Sessions Court how determined, where district has two Sessions divisions and Magistrate has jurisdiction throughout the district.—Under s. 435, the Sessions Judge may call for and examine the records of any inferior Criminal Court "*situate*" within the local limits of his jurisdiction. The word "*situate*" means fixed or located, and when applied to a Court, it must be taken to refer to the place where the Court ordinarily sits. In the absence of any indication to the contrary in the Code, the principle thus laid down in regard to the analogous powers of revision under s. 435 should be followed in the case of appeals also. Thus, where a Magistrate against whose decision appeals are preferred, has his head-quarters, within the limits of one or two Sessions Divisions in the district (Malabar) though he is authorized to try offences throughout the whole district, including cases arising within the other Sessions Division, appeals lie to the Sessions Court within whose jurisdiction the head-quarters of the Magistrate are situate, irrespective of the place where it was committed, 30 M. 136. This case is distinguished in 23 M. L. J. 670. See next Note.

4. Appeal from Magistrate in Agency Tracts does not lie to Sessions Judge but to Agent.—The Magistrates of the Agency District are not as such in any way subordinate to the Sessions' Court of a Non-Agency Sessions Division, nor does the facts that the same person is a first class Sub-Divisional Magistrate in both districts, make him subordinate to the Sessions Court in regard to the Magistrate's jurisdiction in the Agency District. See Note 5 at p. 29. An offence was committed within the limits of the Ganjam Agency Tracts. The case was transferred by the Agent to the first-class Magistrate, Gumsur, who had local criminal jurisdiction over certain Agency as well as certain Non-Agency Tracts. The Sessions Judge of the Non-Agency Sessions Division set aside the conviction. *Held*, that the proper form of appeal was the Agent and not the Sessions Judge as the Magistrate tried the cause as an Agency Magistrate, 23 M. L. J. 670 = 12 M. L. T. 601 = 13 Cr. L. J. 850 where 30 M. 136 distinguished

5. "Convicted on a trial"—*Conviction without a sentence under s. 562.*—This would include the case of a person released under s. 562, 24 P. R. 1903 = 1 Cr. L. J. 1093; followed in 10 Bar. L. R. 321 = 1 Cr. L. J. 543 and 5 L. B. R. 129 = 11 Cr. L. J. 152. Just as a sentence passed by a first-class Magistrate under s. 349 is appealable to the Sessions Court, so a sentence by a first class Magistrate under s. 380 must, also be held appealable to the Sessions Court, 17 Bom. L. R. 895 = 3 Bom. Cr. Ca. 107 = 16 Cr. L. J. 733. See also 29 C. W. N. 151.

6. Order under s. 123 is no sentence.—No appeal lies to the High Court from an order passed by a District Magistrate under s. 123 and on reference by the Magistrate confirmed by the Sessions Judge, as such an order is not a sentence, 9 C. 878, 15 P. R. 1900. See Notes 135–137 at p. 214

7. Proviso (b)—appeal lies to High Court in case where anyone of the accused jointly tried is sentenced to imprisonment for more than four years, etc.—Under proviso (b) when any sentence of over four years' imprisonment is passed by an Assistant Sessions Judge in any case the appeal lies to the High Court. The language of the proviso requires that an appeal by any person convicted in a case in which an Assistant

* The words in inverted commas were inserted by Act XVIII of 1923

Sessions Judge has passed a sentence of imprisonment of four years or upwards, on anyone of the accused, whether he be appellant or any other person tried with him in the same case, shall be only to the High Court and the Sessions Judge has no jurisdiction to hear an appeal from the persons sentenced to less than four years in the same case, 17 M. L. J. 243 = 5 Cr. L. J. 436; 13 A. L. J. 272 = 16 Cr. L. J. 333. The appeal lies to the High Court even though the accused against whom the sentence of imprisonment exceeding four years was passed has not appealed, 37 A. 471. Similarly, when a Sessions Judge has confirmed the sentences passed by an Assistant Sessions Judge on some of the preferred by any one of the prisoners in the Court irrespective of the length of the sentence

8 Sentences in a case must be aggregated for purposes of appeal.—See s. 35 (3) at p. 59 12 P. R. 1900; 161 P. L. R. 1911 = 12 Cr. L. J. 236 Where the accused was convicted by a District Magistrate under s. 124 A, I P. C., and sentenced to two years rigorous imprisonment, and also under s. 153 A, and sentenced to one year's rigorous imprisonment, held having regard to s. 35 (3) that the aggregate sentence of three years should be considered as one sentence for the purposes of appeal and taking into consideration proviso (c) it is a reasonable inference that the appeal against the single sentence of three years under both the sections should lie to the High Court 38 C. 214. In this case the accused filed one appeal in the High Court against the conviction under s. 124 A, and one appeal against the sentence under s. 153 A to the Sessions Court, but the latter appeal was called up by the High Court and the two were heard together See also 5 P. R. 1916 = 17 Cr. L. J. 299 See now cl (3) to section 35

9 Can concurrent sentence be added together for purposes of appeal?—See Note 36 When the sentences are to run concurrently each being four years or less the appeal lies to Sessions Judge, 17 Cr. L. J. 265.

10. Appeal lies to Sessions Court from District Magistrate vested with powers under s. 30 acting under s. 349—Appeal lies to Sessions Court even where a District Magistrate vested with powers under s. 30 sentences accused to five years imprisonment in a case sent up under s. 349 The sentence is *ultra vires* and having regard to the last clause of s. 349 appeals from conviction in all cases sent up for enhanced sentence under s. 349, will lie to the Court of Session 4 L. B. R. 53 = 6 Cr. L. J. 299. See Note 13 to s. 349 In 5 P. R. 1916, it was held that no appeal lies against the sentence of a first-class Magistrate exercising enhanced powers under s. 30 to the Court of the Session but such an appeal lies to the High Court, and see 2 R. 386.

11. An order awarding compensation and repayment of fines, etc. under s. 22 of the *Cattle Trespass Act, 1871*, is appealable under s. 408 of the Code. The compensation so awarded is not a fine and consequently the restrictive provisions of s. 413 of the Code do not apply 45 B. 58

Appeals to Court of Sessions how heard. 409. An appeal to the Court of Session or Sessions Judge shall be heard by the Sessions Judge or by an Additional Sessions Judge

* "Provided that an Additional Sessions Judge shall hear only such appeals as the Local Government may, by general or special order, direct or as the Sessions Judge of the division may make over to him "

Notes.—1 Competency of Assistant Sessions Judges to hear appeals—The word 'case' in s. 193 (2) does not include appeals therefore that clause does not confer on the Sessions Judge any power to transfer appeals to the Assistant Sessions Judge 37 A. 286 where 9 B. 164 and 2 A. L. J. 576 are referred to and 7 A. 661 not followed.

2 Competency of Additional Sessions Judge to hear application under s. 195 (6).—Under s. 409 read with s. 9 an Additional Sessions Judge is competent to hear and determine applications under s. 195 (6) transferred to him by the Sessions Judge A Magistrate is subordinate to the Additional Sessions Judge under s. 195 (7) 14 Cr. L. J. 193 (C) See Note 182 at p. 536

Appeal from sentence of Court of Session 410. Any person convicted on a trial held by a Sessions Judge, or an Additional Sessions Judge may appeal to the High Court

Notes.—1. May appeal—This section gives *right* of appeal, as distinguished from an indulgence to be heard or not to be heard, 1891 A. W. N. 48.

the sake of its shade

[Tameless, or Incapable of being tamed] wild, [Tameless]

See also

She had a tongue with a long

flat

1. JOURNAL

2. Agallochum, or sloes wood See AGALLO

CHUM

4. Hence, to drive in or down by frequent gentle strokes, as to tamp mud so as to make a smooth place

1. A. A. was in drum especially a shallow drum with only one



1. A. A. was in drum especially a shallow drum with only one

Artificial or logarithmic tangent

Syn - Gentle mild weak See CENTRE

Time r [sup & p p TAMED p, p' & ed n.] T

2 This section does not give right of appeal from appellate judgment merely because fresh evidence is taken on appeal—See Note 13 to s 423

3. High Court to which appeals by European British subjects lie.—Where an accused is dealt with as an European British subject and convicted by the Sessions Court the appeal lies to the High Court as defined in s 4 (1) *vide* p 20. The High Court in reference to proceedings against European British subjects in Oudh is the High Court of Judicature for the North Western Provinces and not the Court of the Judicial Commissioner of Oudh 13 O G. 335 = 11 Cr L J. 723.

4 Appeal to High Court in a case of insult under s. 223, I P. C.—See s. 486. An appeal lies to the High Court against an order of the Sessions Court imposing a fine upon a witness under s. 223, I P. C., for intentional insult offered to the Sessions Judge, 4 M H. C. R. 143

5 Special exclusion of appeal to High Court.—In 27 C 653, it was held that having regard to s. 1 of Act XXII of 1860 *Chittagong Act* no appeal lies to the Calcutta High Court from a conviction for any offence committed within the *Chittagong Hill Tract*

Appeal from sentence of Presidency Magistrate
Act IV of 1877 s 167

411. Any person convicted on a trial held by a Presidency Magistrate may appeal to the High Court, if the Magistrate has sentenced him to imprisonment for a term exceeding six months or to fine exceeding two hundred rupees

Notes — 1 Principle of combination does not apply to sentences of Presidency Magistrate.—No appeal lies from a sentence of six months rigorous imprisonment and a fine of Rs. 200 or a further period of three months simple imprisonment passed by a Presidency Magistrate, that is to say that a combination of punishment does not give a right of appeal under this section though it does so under ss. 413 and 414 (see s 415), 2 M 30, 16 C 799, 20 B 143, 10 Cr L J 235 (B). The words 'to imprisonment etc two hundred rupees' are confined in their meaning to substantive sentences and cannot be extended to include an award of imprisonment in default of payment of fine the operation of which is contingent on the fine not being paid. The ruling in 6 C 575 = 8 C. L. R. 250 to the effect that where for two offences the accused were sentenced to three and six months imprisonment respectively, no appeal lay under this section is no longer law having regard to the provisions of s 30 (3) relating to aggregate sentences

2. Concurrent sentences cannot be added together for purposes of appeal.—See Note 30

3 No appeal from order of discharge—There is no appeal against an order of discharge made by a Presidency Magistrate but the High Court has under s 423 embodied in s 459 power to set aside the order of discharge passed by a Presidency Magistrate 36 C 994 See Notes under ss. 423 and 437

412. Notwithstanding anything hereinbefore contained, where an accused person has pleaded guilty and has been convicted by a Court of Session or any Presidency Magistrate or Magistrate of the first class on such plea, there shall be no appeal except as to the extent or legality of the sentence

No appeal in certain cases when accused pleads guilty

Where a person has been convicted by a Court (s 167 Act IV of 1877) on the plea that he is a previous convict though the Magistrate has sentenced him to imprisonment for a term exceeding six months or to a fine exceeding Rs. 200 5 B 85 See Note 2 to s 408 Similarly where a charge has been framed against an accused person under s. 221 (7) Cr P. C., and such person has pleaded guilty to the charge that he is a previous convict the Appellate Court under s 412 is precluded from opening the question whether the accused is a previous convict 4 N L R. 163 = 9 Cr L J 56

2 Plea of guilty is a waiver of the right to appeal.—The plea of guilty is regarded as a waiver of the right to appeal except as to the severity or legality of the sentence 5 B 85, 20 P W R 1917 (Cr) Hence where an appeal is allowed in a case in which the accused person has pleaded guilty the Court should satisfy itself that such plea was properly made after the nature of the offence was explained and understood by the person under trial so as to amount to a confession of guilt and this is conclusive evidence against him 22 B. 789

3. Scope of the section.—The inclusion in this section of the Magistrate of the first class practically overrules 22 B. 759 and Ratanlal 954. See Note 1 to s. 422.

4. Conviction based on admissions obtained improperly illegal.—See 13 A. 343; 2 G. W. N. 702; 27 M. 238 and Notes 12—15 to s. 342.

413. Notwithstanding anything hereinbefore contained, there shall be no appeal by a convicted person, in cases in which a Court of Session* passes a sentence of imprisonment not exceeding one month only or † "in which a Court of Session or District Magistrate or other Magistrate of the first class passes a sentence" of fine not exceeding fifty rupees only ‡

Explanation—There is no appeal from a sentence of imprisonment passed by such Court or Magistrate in default of payment of fine when no substantive sentence of imprisonment has also been passed

Note.—Under the new amended section right of appeal is given in all cases of sentences of imprisonment passed by a District Magistrate or Magistrate of the first class even though the period of imprisonment be one month or less. Under the old law in such cases an appeal lay only when the sentence passed exceeded one month. It should be noted that a sentence of whipping is appealable under the new amended section.

"We consider that outside the Presidency towns in the case of all persons, both European and Indian, there should be an appeal against any sentence of imprisonment passed by a Magistrate. This involves a substantial modification in the general law of the kind and will, to certain extent, increase the work of the Sessions Court. Nevertheless we are of opinion on general grounds that apart from the particular case of European British subject, that an appeal should lie against any sentence. It is to be noted that short sentences of imprisonment should where possible be avoided and the number of sentences of one month and under passed by District Magistrates and first-class Magistrates should not as far as we can judge, be very large. In the case of a sentence passed in a trial by a Court of Session we would allow no appeal in respect of a sentence of one month or under" *Report of the Racial Distinctions Committee*

1. Is right of appeal in a 'case' in which two or more are convicted, regulated by sentence passed on each or anyone of the sentences?—Where several prisoners were tried together, and some of them were sentenced to a fine of Rs. 50 only while others were more severely punished, *held*, that the existence of the latter fact does not give jurisdiction to an Appellate Court to take cognizance of appeal as regards the sentence of fine of Rs. 50, 7 B. H. C. R. Cr. Ca. 33; 5 B. H. C. R. Cr. Ca. 24; 7 M. H. C. R. App. Y; 9 M. L. T. 322 = 12 Cr. L. J. 63; 39 A. 293; 10 S. L. R. 156; 16 M. L. T. 33 = 15 Cr. L. J. 371 where it was *held*, that 17 M. L. J. 243 = 5 Cr. L. J. 496 which was decided on the interpretation of s. 408 (b) throws no light on the construction of s. 413. *Contra*—In 4 L. B. R. 354 = 9 Cr. L. J. 356 (F.B.) the above ruling was dissented from and it was held that the word "case" in this section includes a trial at which two or more persons are convicted, and the grammatical meaning of the section is that there shall be no appeal in a case in which no sentence exceeding any of those described in the section is passed on any of the persons convicted and therefore where more persons are convicted at one trial, and an appealable sentence is passed on anyone of them this section does not take away from the others convicted, their right of appeal under s. 408. This case was followed in 15 O. C. 386 = 14 Cr. L. J. 170 and in 30 P. R. 1915 = 17 Cr. L. J. 27. S. 143 applies only to cases in which the only sentence passed is imprisonment of one month or less or fine of Rs. 50 or less or whipping. In 14 A. L. J. 518 = 33 A. 395 and 23 P. W. R. 1916, it was held that each one convicted in a trial in which an appealable sentence is passed is entitled to appeal even if the sentence against him is not appealable. But in 40 M. 591 it is held that s. 413 of the Code prohibits an appeal by a person against whom a non-appealable sentence has been passed even though appealable sentences have been passed against others jointly tried with him. It was further held that though for convenience a joint trial of several accused persons under certain circumstances might be allowed, on conviction each accused must be deemed to have been convicted in a separate case of his own for the purposes of s. 413 of the Code. 38 A. 395 = 14 A. L. J. 518 not followed. It should be noted that in 15 A. L. J. 136 the ruling in 14 A. L. J. 518 is dissented from and 40 M. 591 is followed. But the doubt and conflict is set at rest now by the addition of the new section 415-A. And the Legislature does not seem to follow, 40 M. 591. S. 415-A adopts the view expressed in 38 A. 395.

* The words "or the District Magistrate or other Magistrate of the first class" were omitted by Act XII of 1923

† Words in inverted commas were inserted by *ibid*

‡ The words "or of whipping only" were omitted by *ibid*

2 Order to pay costs of Court-fees is not an order of fine.—An order under s. 31 of the *Court-fees Act* to pay to the complainant the cost of the Court fees is no part of the sentence so as to make it a sentence of fine within the terms of this section, therefore an order sentencing the accused to 14 days' imprisonment and to pay the costs of Court fees is not appealable, 20 C. 687; *Wells* 1, 724 = 15 M. 423; 31 M. 547.

3. Compensation awarded under s. 22, Cattle Trespass Act, is not fine.—An order awarding compensation and repayment of fine, etc., under s. 22 of the *Cattle Trespass Act* 1871, is appealable under s. 408 of the Code. The compensation so awarded is not a fine and consequently the restrictive provisions of s. 413 of the Code do not apply, 46 B. 58.

4 Aggregation of separate sentences in one trial.—See Note 9 to s. 408 and s. 35 (3). Where a person is charged with two separate sentences in one trial, the amount of the whole punishment must be regarded as one sentence for the purpose of determining whether an appeal lies, 3 C. L. R. 511; 1 B. 223.

Right of appeal is not taken away merely because Magistrate makes addition to sentence to make it appealable.—A Magistrate passed a non appealable sentence at first and shortly afterwards at the request of the accused added to the sentence passed so as to make it appealable, on appeal the Sessions Judge struck out the added sentence which being done, he declined to go into the merits of the case on the ground that the original sentence passed was not open to appeal, *held* that from this section it is clear, that where a Magistrate passed a sentence exceeding one month, an appeal lies whether that sentence was passed legally or illegally. The Sessions Judge being once seized of the appeal, the whole appeal becomes open to his Court and the Sessions Judge is bound to hear the appeal on the merits also, 35 B. 418; 13 Bom. L. R. 503 = 12 Cr. L. J. 402. Cf Note 1 to s. 422.

6. Further restriction on appeals in Upper Burma.—In *Upper Burma* except the Shan States, the *Upper Burma Criminal Justice Regulation V* of 1892, Sch. XI, provides that an appeal shall not lie in any case in which a District Magistrate or Court of Session passes a sentence for a term not exceeding six months or of fine not exceeding Rs. 500 or of whipping or of all or any of these punishments combined. But this does not affect the right of European British subjects under the Code. See Sch. XVII.

414. Notwithstanding anything hereinbefore contained, there shall be no appeal by a convicted person in any case tried summarily in which a Magistrate empowered to act under section 260 passes a sentence * of fine not exceeding two hundred rupees only.†

Notes—1. Under the new amended section even in the case of summary convictions all sentences of imprisonment or of whipping are now made appealable. Under the old law only European British subjects enjoyed this privilege of appeal.

2 An appeal lies over an order under 562.—An appeal will lie to the Sessions Judge from an order of a Magistrate under s. 562 of the Code passed in summary trial, 45 A. 823.

415. An appeal may be brought against any sentence referred to in sections 413 or 414 by which any two or more of the punishments therein mentioned are combined, but no sentence which would not otherwise be liable to appeal, shall be appealable merely on the ground that the person convicted is ordered to find security to keep the peace.

Explanation.—A sentence of imprisonment in default of payment of fine is not a sentence by which two or more punishments are combined within the meaning of this section.

Notes—1. Section does not restrict power of appeal when security for good behaviour is ordered under Rangoon Police Act.—Where two persons were jointly tried at a summary trial under s. 30 of the *Rangoon Police Act*, under s. 31, for good behaviour, and was further ordered to find security for good behaviour under the *Rangoon Police Act*, s. 31 A, since (i) s. 415 has no reference to security for good behaviour (ii) there is no corresponding provision in the *Rangoon Police Act* restricting the right of appeal, 4 L. B. R. 399 = 9 Cr. L. J. 368.

* The words "of imprisonment not exceeding three months" only were omitted by Act XII of 1923.

† The words "or of whipping only" were omitted by this Act.

2 That accused was not sent to jail does not take away right of appeal—The accused was sentenced to one day's rigorous imprisonment and sentenced to a fine of Rs. 50 by a Magistrate. The Sessions Judge on appeal held that as the accused were in fact neither sent to jail nor actually imprisoned there was no conviction as contemplated by s 415. *Held* the Judge was wrong and an appeal by **33 A 510**

*** 415-A.** Notwithstanding anything contained in this Chapter when more persons than one are convicted in one trial, and an appealable judgment or order has been passed in respect of any of such persons all or any of the persons convicted at such trial shall have a right of appeal

Note—It has been pointed out that even with the amendment proposed there will be still anomalies in that the cases of persons who will have a right to appeal under s 415 and who do not appeal will not be covered. We think however that the Legislature has gone as far as it can in giving a right of appeal in the cases referred to. And if injustice results the powers of remission can always be exercised under s 401. *Report Set Com 1922.*

By the addition of this section the conflict in law is once for all set at rest. The legislature does not follow the ruling in **40 M 591**. The ruling in **38 A 395** is adopted by the present section. See Note 1 to s 413 (*supra*)

416. (Omitted by Act XII of 1923)

Appeal on behalf of Government in case of acquittal.

417. The Local Government may direct the Public Prosecutor to present an appeal to the High Court from an original or appellate order of acquittal passed by any Court other than a High Court

Notes.—See s. 423 (1) (a) for powers of Appellate Court in acquittals and s 427 for powers of arrest pending appeal.

1 Limitation—Appeal must be preferred within six months. See Note 1 to s 404. But it is highly desirable the appeal should be preferred as expeditiously as possible. **5 A 253** at p 255 and **2 C 436 (F B)**. Section 5 of the *Limitation Act* however allows the High Court to admit for sufficient cause shown an appeal against an acquittal after the prescribed period of limitation. But where there has been unexplained delay in taking the necessary steps to present the appeal the discretion allowed by that section will not be exercised. **Weir I, 791, II, 462**. See Note 2 to s 404.

2 What amounts to "an order of acquittal"—*The acquittal need not be an absolute acquittal*. On a trial by a jury of a person on a charge of murder the jury found the accused not guilty of the offence of murder but convicted him under s. 304 f f C. The Sessions Judge declined to submit the case to the High Court although he disagreed with the verdict. Against this decision Government appealed. *Held* that the appeal was duly made and that the judgment passed by the Court of Sessions following the verdict of a jury acquitting the prisoner of murder is a judgment of acquittal within the meaning of this section **2 C 273**. The words *an order of acquittal* include also all judgments of an Appellate Court by which a conviction is set aside. **24 W R 31**

3. Right to appeal restricted to Local Government.—The High Court has no authority to entertain an appeal against an acquittal except upon an appeal by Local Government. **19 W R 55, 6 C L R. 245, 14 M 363, 1 A 139**. This is the construction most favourable to liberty of the subject and it is not likely that the power should have been given to reverse an acquittal without a right on the part of the accused to be heard by the High Court. **3 R 150, but see 2 A 443**

4 Only Public Prosecutor may present appeal under this section—See s. 4 (f) for definition of Public Prosecutor and s 492 for his appointment. A private complainant cannot seek to set aside the acquittal involved and an appeal is sought to be preferred and full compliance with its provision is directed to present an appeal does not involve his appointment as Public Prosecutor. An appeal presented by the Legal Remembrancer of Bengal at the instance of the Government of Behar and Orissa was held not properly presented. **41 C 425**. *Contra* **46 C 544**.

5 No Court except High Court can entertain appeal against acquittal—A District Magistrate entertained an appeal from an order of acquittal by a Subordinate Magistrate under s. 247 and reversed it and directed

a re-hearing on the ground that the complainant and his *vakil* had appeared at the Court shortly after the case has been dismissed by the Subordinate Magistrate. *Held*, that the order of the District Magistrate was illegal, as cl. (1) (a) of this section applies only to a High Court, 7 M. 213 24 C. 523. The High Court has the same power under cl. 28 of the *Letters Patent* of 1865, 26 C. 745. A difference of opinion was expressed in 27 C. 122 as to the authority under which such powers are exercised by the High Court.

Neither Sessions Judge nor District Magistrate can set aside acquittal and direct further inquiry.—A Sessions Judge has no power to order further inquiry under s. 423(1)(a), when the accused is acquitted by a Magistrate. Such power can only be exercised by the High Court in revision under s. 439, 20 C. 633 followed in 23 M. 225. A Sessions Judge has no such power even if the case be, according to his judgment, exclusively triable by the Sessions Court, 2 C. W. N. 256. See *contra* 24 M. 135 (F.B.), nor has a District Magistrate, 7 M. 213. See Note 17 to s. 437.

7. Restrictions on right of appeal.—(i) *No appeal on questions of fact in jury trials.*—See ss. 418 and 423 (2). No appeal at the distance of the Local Government lies from an order of acquittal in a case which has been tried by a jury when the questions involved are purely questions of fact, 10 C. 1029; for under this Code the Local Government have the same right of appeal against an acquittal, as a person convicted has of appealing against his conviction and sentence, and there is no distinction between the mode of procedure and the principles upon which both classes of appeals are to be decided, 17 C. 495. See 9 A. 420; 11 C. L. R. 23; 23 C. 347 and Notes to s. 423.

(ii) *No appeal because additional evidence has been discovered after acquittal.*—The accused was tried under s. 304, I P. C. He was acquitted of that charge, but convicted under s. 504, I P. C. The Local Government appealed against the acquittal, the main ground of appeal being one that went entirely beyond the record. It was to the effect that the evidence of the Civil Surgeon one of the witnesses, was incorrect as to facts and affidavits were filed in support of this ground. *Held*, that the affidavits could not be accepted for the reason that, although under the provisions of s. 428, an Appellate Court is competent to admit additional evidence, yet the necessity for taking such additional evidence must be apparent from something on the record and cannot be derived from external information, and in an appeal from an acquittal, the fact that fresh evidence against the accused has been discovered subsequent to the acquittal, is not a sufficient reason for setting aside the acquittal or ordering a new trial 3 L. B. R. 114, where U. B. R. (1902-03), p. 9 is referred to. In 33 M. 1028, MILLER, J., doubted whether the High Court can in revision or appeal set aside an acquittal because fresh evidence is available which would not be produced at the trial or because the complainant shows sufficient reasons for his absence. See Note 2 to s. 428.

(iii) *Refusal to add new charges is no ground for appeal.*—It is not open to the Government under this section to appeal to the High Court on an interlocutory order, e.g., on the ground of the Sessions Judge's refusal to add new charges, 16 B. 414.

(iv) *No appeal where case is withdrawn by Public Prosecutor under s. 494.*—There is no appeal against an acquittal or a withdrawal by the Public Prosecutor in the Sessions Court acting under s. 494, 18 M. L. J. (Sh. N.) 57.

(v) *Appeal ought not to be preferred to obtain abstract opinions.*—In 14 P. R. 1909 = 11 Cr. L. J. 65 and 26 P. W. R. 1913 = 14 Cr. L. J. 523 it was said that the object of s. 417 is not to obtain the opinion of the High Court on abstract points which do not arise in the case. See also 10 P. R. 1911 = 12 Cr. L. J. 365 (F.B.).

8. Principles which should guide Local Government in directing appeals from orders of acquittal.—The Local Government will not direct an appeal (1) where the case is trifling in itself and the acquittal involves no erroneous principle of law, the correction of which is of public importance, (2) where, however, serious or otherwise important the case, the legal guilt of the accused is fairly questionable or the evidence admits of any reasonable doubt, and the Court has considered and weighed it with impartiality, intelligence and care, (3) merely on account of the production of the fresh evidence after the acquittal, (4) when there is no distinct probability that appeal will result in an order or re trial at the least, *Pun. Rul. and Ord.*, p. 377, *Pun. Cir.*, Chapter LXXVIII (A). Appeal by Government should be made only in cases of some importance, 15 P. R. 1893; 10 P. R. 1911 = 12 Cr. L. J. 364 (F.B.), 22 C. 164, or where there has been a miscarriage of justice of a very grave nature 26 M. 1, 10 P. R. 1897, 4 A. 143, 9 A. 528 (F.B.).

Court's power to convict on appreciation of evidence.—The Code makes no distinction between an appeal from an acquittal and an appeal from a conviction. In an appeal from an acquittal if the Court thinks the Lower Court has taken an erroneous view of the evidence it has no jurisdiction to refuse to convict, 26 Bom. L. R. 113.

It is viewed by the eye glass —
 from telescope. See **TELESCOPE**.
 A telescope in which the image is
 formed by a concave specul-
 or mirror instead of an eye
 glass — **Reflecting telescope**.
 A telescope in which the image is
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The discretion to appeal is not subject to control of any Court—The power of appeal is one that should be sparingly exercised by Government. But the discretion to exercise that right of appeal appertains to Government and is not subject to the control of the Court, 9 B. L. R. 17 = 16 Cr. L. J. 604. The Legislature has allowed by this section an appeal by the Local Government in the widest terms and without any limitation whatever, 2 C. 273, *per* SPENCER, J., in 35 M. 1028. It has to be noted that 2 C. 273 was decided under the Code of 1872.

9. Procedure and principles guiding the High Court in deciding appeals against acquittals.—See Notes under Headings V and XI to s. 423

10. High Court does not ordinarily interfere with acquittals in exercise of the powers of revision.—See Notes under Heading VIII to s. 439

11. Complainant cannot move High Court under s. 15; Charter Act—The only course to be pursued where it is sought to set aside the order of discharge made by a Presidency Magistrate is that laid down in s. 168, Act IV of 1877, and as by that section there is no appeal allowed to a complainant, who is a private individual, it is not open to him by invoking the aid of the High Court under s. 15 of the *Charter Act* to obtain under the Court's extraordinary powers that which he might obtain had he a right of appeal, 7 C. 447, but now see 36 C. 994. See 3 C 573; 1 A. 139, as to when the High Court is likely to interfere, if at all under s. 439, at the instance of a private complainant, 6 A. 434; 188 P. R. 1833.

12. On admission of appeal Appellate Court may order arrest of accused.—See s. 427 The admission of an appeal under this section has the effect of revising the proceedings against an accused person who has been acquitted, and the Appellate Court can order the arrest of such person, pending the appeal, 2 A. 340 (F.B.), 1 C. 281. Where the accused so arrested is convicted, the sentence will run, not from the date of arrest, but only from the actual date of the committal of the accused to jail 6 C. L. R. 349

Government must apply for arrest of accused—In capital cases, where the Local Government appeals under this section, from an order of acquittal, it is, generally speaking, undesirable that the prisoner's fate should be discussed while he remains at large, and the Government should, in such cases, apply for the arrest of the accused under s. 427. *Per* EDGE, C J., 9 A. 528. See 1 C. 231, 2 A. 340 and 386.

13. Procedure when Magistrate in the United Provinces opines that appeal should be filed.—When ever the Magistrate of the District is of opinion that an appeal should be filed from an order of acquittal, he will prepare a brief narrative of the facts of the case and a statement of the reasons why he considers an appeal advisable, and will forward them with the original record to the Commissioner. That officer will forward the case to Government (with whom the ultimate decision rests) whatever may be his opinion as to its worth. Magistrates are held responsible for addressing Government on good and sufficient grounds only, and should be careful to refrain from urging an appeal solely because the judgment which it is sought to set aside happens not to be in harmony with that of the Lower Court.—*Reg. and Rul., N W P* s 10 para. 33, p 223

14. In exceptional cases Government to be allowed access to original documents.—When Government desires to make an appeal under s. 417, it is ordinarily sufficient that the Public Prosecutor or other officer appointed by Government should have an opportunity of taking copies of the record. But in exceptional cases, in which Government may consider it essential to see any original documents, such documents may be given into the possession of the officer appointed by Government to receive them under such precautions for securing their safe keeping and return as the Court may deem necessary.—*Bom. H C Cr. Cir.*, p 64

15. Procedure when Police desire to appeal against acquittals.—If it is considered advisable to appeal against an order of acquittal in a case where a Police-officer prosecutes in his capacity of general prosecutor on behalf of or at the instance of his own department, the proposal to appeal should be submitted to Government through the Inspector General of Police or his Deputy, in other cases, through the head of the department concerned.—*Pun. Rul. and Ord.*, Chapter XXIV, p 377. When Superintendents of Police wish for an appeal on behalf of Government against judgment of acquittal, they should report on the subject, without loss of time, to the District or Sub-Divisional Magistrate after judgment is passed.—*Bom. Pol. Mun.*, p 88.

Appeal on what matters admissible.

*418. (1) An appeal may lie on a matter of fact as well as a matter of law, except where the trial was by jury, in which case the appeal shall lie on a matter of law only.

*“(2) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-sec. (1) or in s. 423, sub-sec. (2), when, in the case of a trial by jury, any person is sentenced to death, any other person convicted in the same trial with the person so sentenced may appeal on a matter of fact as well as a matter of law.”

Explanation.—The alleged severity of a sentence shall, for the purposes of this section, be deemed to be a matter of law

Note.—Sub-sec. (2) is newly added to remove an anomaly: “this clause provides that when in the case of trial by jury one person is sentenced to death and another to a lower punishment, the second accused may appeal on a matter of fact as well as on a matter of law. This is intended to remove the anomaly under the existing law that a High Court acting under s. 374 could consider the facts of the case as regards the former accused, but on an appeal of the second accused could only intervene on a point of law” (*Statement of Objects and Reasons*)

Notes.—1. Where case triable with assessors is tried by jury, appeal lies on matters of law only.—The word “where the trial was by jury” mean where the trial in fact was by jury and not where the trial should have been, as a matter of law, by jury. Where the accused is tried and convicted by a jury for an offence which is triable by the Judge with the aid of assessors, it was held by the Full Bench that no appeal lay on a matter of fact, 23 B. 680 (where 24 W. R. 30, 3 C. 765; 4 C. L. R. 405; 23 C. 555; Ratanlal 600 and 861; 23 B. 696 are referred to). In the rulings reported in 26 M. 243 and footnote thereto, the accused was tried by a jury for an offence under s. 397, I P C (jury case), but the jury returning a verdict of *not guilty* on that charge, found him guilty of the minor offence under s. 325, I P C. (assessor case). *Held per BENSON, J.*, that the conviction was not by a jury, but the Judge ought to have treated the finding of the jury as the opinion of the assessors, and therefore following 3 C. 765, an appeal lay on the facts. *PER BHANISIMAN AIR VAGAR, J.*, ‘the trial was in fact by a jury and that under s. 238 (1), the jury had authority to find as an incident to the trial of an offence triable by jury, that certain facts only are proved in the trial which constitute a minor offence and return a verdict guilty of such offence, though such offence be not triable by a jury and therefore, according to the rulings in 4 C. L. R. 405 and 23 C. 555, an appeal will lie from such judgment only on a point of law’ See also Note 6 to s. 307

2. Powers of Appeal Court in cases tried by jury.—In cases tried by jury an appeal under this section lies on matters of law only and the Appeal Court has no power to try the accused on matters of fact. Where the Appeal Court goes into the facts in such a case, it would be substituting the decision of the Judges of that Court for the verdict of the jury who have had the opportunity of seeing the demeanour of the witnesses and weighing the evidence with the assistance which this affords, whereas the Judge of the Appeal Court can only arrive at a decision on the perusal of the evidence, 21 C. 955, *dissented from* in 23 C. 711. This section gives finality to the verdict of a jury, when there has been no error of law nor misdirection and when the Judge has concurred with the verdict of the majority, Ratanlal 790. All that this section says is, that in a case of an acquittal by a jury, an appeal shall lie, *i.e.*, shall be heard and supported on a matter of law only, an erroneous verdict on a matter of fact will not support such an appeal. But the section does not prohibit the Court in a case where an appeal lies on a question of law, from deciding questions of fact which other sections require the Court to decide in order to decide the case, *e.g.*, ss. 423, 537, 26 M. 1. See Note 75 to s. 299, Notes 14 and 15, Notes 37, 100 and 101 to s. 423

3. In deciding on admissibility of rejected evidence High Court may review whole case.—On point of law as to the admissibility of rejected evidence, the High Court has power to review the whole case and determine whether the admission of the rejected evidence, would have affected the result of the trial, 2 B. 61; 1 C. 207; 23 W. R. 36; 6 C. 247 = 7 C. L. R. 74; 10 B. H. C. R. 497; 9 B. H. C. R. 358; 19 B. 749, *contra see* 21 C. 955.

4. Every petition of appeal in cases tried by jury, should state distinctly in what respect the law has been contravened.—It is not for the Court to hunt through the record, and find out any illegality that may arise, 1 W. R. 21. Thus, a conviction based on no evidence, is bad in law, 15 W. R. 46; 16 W. R. 19; misdirection to the jury is a matter of law, 25 C. 230 so also omission or error in considering or stating material evidence, 7 C. 283 = 8 C. L. R. 449; 27 B. 626. Thus a non direction on a point of prime importance telling in favour of an accused, is a point of law 27 B. 644; 3 B. L. R. 102 = 11 Cr. L. J. 13. Also where material evidence which ought

not to be admitted is admitted and the jury are placed in possession of it, there is an error of law in the trial, **27 B. 616** at p. 632; where a witness who is not an accomplice is treated as an accomplice, **26 M. 1**. Misjoinder of charge is an incurable defect in law, **25 M. 61 (P. C.)**.

5. Effect of section 307.—The clear provisions of s. 307 are not in any way curtailed or cut down by this section and it is open to the High Court to go into the facts in a case referred under s. 307, **9 A. 420**. The fact that the record is before the Court under s. 374 in regard to some of the accused jointly tried and that there fore the Court has to go into the facts in regard to those accused, cannot affect the case of an accused who has been sentenced in the same trial to any sentence other than death and the appeal of such an accused must be confined to matters of law in accordance with ss. 418 and 423 (2), (**19 W. R. 57 approved**), **2 C. W. N. 49**. But see Note 5 A below

5-A. Effect of the newly added sub-sec. (2) to the present section.—By the addition of sub-sec (2), it will be observed that the anomaly existing in the law as pointed by **2 C. W. N. 49** is finally removed, and now under this clause in a trial by jury if one person is sentenced to death and another is sentenced to a lower punishment, the second accused may appeal on a matter of fact as well as on a matter of law. This is intended to remove the anomaly that under ss. 374 and 376 the Court can go into questions of fact in a capital case while in the case of a person who is jointly tried and sentenced to a lower punishment, the Court cannot go into questions of fact if it happens to be jury case. In view of the amendment, **2 C. W. N. 49** has become obsolete

6. Appeal by Government on questions of fact.—See Notes 6—8 to s. 417

419. Every appeal shall be made in the form of a petition in writing presented by the

Petition of appeal appellant or his pleader, and every such petition shall (unless the Court to which it is presented otherwise directs) be accompanied by a copy of the judgment or order appealed against, and, in cases tried by a jury, a copy of the heads of the charge recorded under section 367.

Notes.—1. Scope of section.—This section prescribes the form of the petition of appeal which alone gives jurisdiction to the Appellate Court, in the same way as a complaint gives jurisdiction to the Court of First Instance. This section applies even while the accused is in jail, s. 420 dealing only with the mode of presentation, **1891 A. W. N. 48**. For form of appeal petition, see *Wilkins*, 236 and also Note 6 to s. 420

2. Several convicts may appeal together when stamp is not required, i.e., when appellants are in custody.—See Note 5 to s. 404

3. Grounds of appeal should be distinct.—In cases tried by a Judge, every petition of appeal should state distinctly in what respect the law has been contravened, **1 W. R. 21**.

4. One counsel should not file one appeal for two accused having conflicting interests.—*H and L* were accused of murder. Each of them made a confession partially exonerating himself, and attributing the principal offence to the other. Both were convicted and appealed by one and the same counsel. *Held*, that a single counsel could not with propriety file one appeal on behalf of and represent both the accused, **13 P. R. 1890**.

5. Appeal petition containing scandalous allegations may be returned.—A petition containing scandalous allegations against the Magistrate, need not be entertained, but may be returned for representation after expunging the offensive portions of it, **15 B. 488**.

6. Appeal petition need not be verified.—A criminal appeal being the continuation of a criminal trial, the appellant has all the privileges of an accused and cannot be punished for making a false statement in his appeal petition, **12 M. 451**.

7. 'Presented.'—What is a proper presentation?—As regards presentation no special method is enjoined in the Code and therefore, the question is one of administrative convenience alone. So long as there is an actual presentation to an officer of the Court, such as a Bench Clerk, or to one of the Judges, there is a valid presentation, **29 M. L. J. 101 = 18 M. L. T. 95 = 16 Cr. L. J. 593**. In this case the appeal was directly presented to a Bench of a High Court by the Public Prosecutor. No petition of appeal, on behalf of a person convicted by a Criminal Court, shall be admitted by a Criminal Court unless it is either submitted through the

district or jail authorities or is presented by the convicted person himself or by some person authorized by power of attorney to present it on behalf of the convicted person. Petitions of appeal received by post other than through jail or district authorities shall if possible be returned bearing *Pin Cir* p 283. See also 1 M 304

(i) *Depositing in a box intended for deposit of papers is not a proper presentation*—Depositing a petition of appeal in a box kept for the convenience of parties (in the compound of a Court house) and intended for the deposit of papers for the Court is not a presentation within the meaning of this section, 19 M 354

(ii) *Nor sending by post*—Nor is transmitting an appeal by post a proper presentation under this section *Ratanlal* 454. Though s 190 (c) seems to render it legal for a Magistrate to take cognizance of a complaint reported by post the practice of accepting appeal petitions transmitted by post otherwise than as provided in the next section is prohibited the transmission of an appeal by post not being a sufficient compliance with this section *Welle II*, 467; also 15 M 137; 19 M 354; *Pin Cir* p 283

(iii) *Presentation of appeal by pleader's clerk or other person*.—Presentation of petition of appeal by the clerk of the appellant's pleader is equivalent to a presentation by the pleader himself when it is signed by him and he is duly authorized 20 M 87, *Welle II*, 469 and 470, 6 B 14. But a petition of appeal is not duly presented when having been signed by a pleader it is handed in by a person who is not his clerk and over whose conduct and actions he has no control 21 M 114. But where a petition of appeal on behalf of three accused persons was signed under a Vakalat by their pleader and presented by another pleader who held a Vakalat only from the first accused it was held that the appeal on behalf of the other two should be treated as properly presented *Welle II*, 470

(iv) *Legality of presentation of appeal by person authorized by appellant*.—A petition of appeal in a criminal case may be presented to the Appellate Court by any person authorized by the appellant to present it 1 M 304; 6 B 14, *Ratanlal* 29. But having regard to the definition of the word "pleader" s 4 cl. (r) the words "appointed with the permission of the Court" are very material to this Ruling but the fullest opportunity must be given to persons to execute powers of attorney to whomsoever they please and without reference to the mode or circumstances under which they might be influenced to do so 1 B H C. R. Cr. Ca. 16

(v) *Unauthorized petitions of appeal presented by relatives etc. of prisoners cannot be recognized*.—When a prisoner is in jail his petition of appeal if not forwarded by the officer in charge of the jail under s. 420 can be presented under this section only by his pleader whose appointment must be in writing signed by the prisoner whose signature must be attested by the Superintendent of the Jail. If this attestation should be wanting the document should be sent to the Superintendent of the Jail for verification. Unauthorized petitions of appeal presented on behalf of prisoners in jail by the relatives of friends cannot legally be recognized.—*C P Cr Cir* Part II No 44

8 **Appeal may be entertained without copy of judgment**—The Appellate Court has a discretion to receive an appeal unaccompanied by a copy of the judgment or order appealed against. Where injustice might result from a strict compliance with law a proper discretion should be exercised but in such cases before hearing the appeal the Court should have before it the judgment or order appealed against which it can obtain by sending for the record. In 5 Bom L R. 703, three accused persons preferred a joint appeal with which one copy of the judgment appealed against was filed. On the District Magistrate insisting on their putting in separate copies of the judgment they tendered stamp requisite for copies. The District Magistrate however refused to dispense with separate copies and when such copies were ultimately produced rejected the appeals as out of time. Held that the District Magistrate would have exercised a sounder discretion if he had in virtue of this section dispensed with separate copies of the judgment appealed against. See Circular Order Bombay edition 1907 s 75 for procedure when copies of judgment are not available the records having been sent to High Court under s 438

9 **Section complied with if copy in accused's language is produced**—To comply with the requirements of this section which enacts that every petition of appeal shall be accompanied by a copy of the judgment or order appealed against a copy furnished to the prisoner in his own language under s 371 (1) is sufficient *Ratanlal* 82. In cases tried by jury the charge to the jury is under s 371 (2) equivalent to the judgment 13 W R. 60

420. If the appellant is in jail, he may present his petition of appeal

Procedure when and the copies accompanying the same to the officer in charge of the jail, appellant in jail who shall thereupon forward such petition and copies to the proper Appellate Court

Notes.—1. Limitation—Presentation of appeal to jailer.—See Note 1 to s. 404

2. Every facility for making appeal should be allowed to prisoners.—Every facility, such as pen, paper and ink, and even a writer, should be allowed to prisoners to enable them to prepare their petition of appeal, 13 W. R. 69; 1 B. H. C. R. Cr. Ca. 16. See also s. 60 (9), the *Prisons Act* IX of 1894, printed in Appendix XI

3. Appeal not to be summarily rejected until after seven days of its receipt.—Prisoners appealing from jail should be clearly made to understand that their appeals are liable to summary rejection, and that if they wished to be heard by pleader, an appearance must be put in within a limited time. No appeal forwarded from jail under s. 420 should be summarily rejected until seven days have elapsed after its receipt by the Appellate Court. In forwarding such an appeal the officer in charge of the jail shall invariably certify that the appellant has been informed that if he intends to appoint a pleader, an appearance must be put in within seven days from the date on which his petition may reach the Appellate Court. If the appellant or his pleader appear within seven days, the Appellate Court is not obliged to wait for full seven days. *Madras G O No 1448, dated 26th October, 1909*

4. Practice—Appeal to High Court—Petitions of appeal against the sentences or orders of Sessions Judges, presented to officers in charge of jails, shall be forwarded by officers direct to the Registrar of the High Court of Judicature, intimation of the fact being at once given in each instance to the Judge whose sentence or order is appealed against. (*Wilkins 121*) If the petition of appeal be not accompanied by a copy of the Sessions Judge's judgment or charge to the jury the Sessions Judge shall at once forward to the High Court a certified copy of the record in the case—*Bom H C Cr Cir*, p 46. On receipt from the Superintendent of the Jail of a petition of appeal, together with a copy of the judgment or order appealed against, the Deputy Commissioner will forward the papers to the proper appellate authority along with the magisterial records of the case. If the appeal lies to the Judicial Commissioner's Court from a judgment or order of the Court of Session, then the Deputy Commissioner will forward the papers (as above) through the Court of Session, where the appropriate records of that Court will be added and the whole will then be passed on, *C P Cr Cir*, Part II, No 44

5. Power to dispose of appeals in absence of appellant—See 13 A. 171 (F.B) and Note 8 to s. 422 and Note 4 to s. 421

6. Jail appeal might be argued by counsel.—There is nothing in the provision of this section to indicate that it was intended to deprive appellants in jail of the opportunity of being heard on their appeal, *Weir 11, 472*.

7. Appeal dismissed for default may be re-admitted—See Note 18 to s. 421

421. (1) On receiving the petition and copy under section 419 or 420, the Appellate Court shall peruse the same, and, if it considers that there is no sufficient ground for interfering, it may dismiss the appeal summarily

Summary dismissal of appeal. Provided that no appeal presented under section 419 shall be dismissed unless the appellant or his pleader has had a reasonable opportunity of being heard in support of the same

(2) Before dismissing an appeal under this section, the Court may call for the record of the case, but shall not be bound to do so

Notes.—1. Pleader, see s. 4 (r) at p. 16. As to right of *mukhtyars* see Note 8 to s. 340 at p. 866

2. Alteration in language of section.—It should be noted that the words 'dismiss' and 'dismissing' are substituted in sub-secs. (1) and (2) respectively, for the words, 'reject' and 'rejecting' in the same section of the old Code. Whether this change is made simply to bring the language of the sub-sections in harmony with that of the proviso where the word 'dismissed' is used or whether it implies an obligation on the Court to send for the record and hear the appellant or his pleader when the appeal is sent from the jail under s. 420, cannot be determined. See also 32 C. 178.

3. Difference between dismissals of appeal under this section and dismissal under s 423.—An order summarily dismissing an appeal under the provisions of this section does not amount to a judgment within the meaning of s. 424. A judgment under s. 424 implies a trial. The essential difference between rejection of appeal under this section and its dismissal under s. 423 is that in the latter case the appeal is disposed of after a trial but in the former the Court refuses to try it at all. **6 C P Cr 24**. Besides dismissal and rejection, the petition of appeal may also be withdrawn. **5 C L R 372**. See **6 C L R 427**. See also Note 14 below.

4 Dismissal of appeal merely for absence of appellant is not proper.—An appeal should not be dismissed merely because the appellant did not appear to support the petition but the Appellate Court should consider whether there was sufficient ground for interfering which would imply judicial consideration on the merits. **Ratanlal 593, 21 P R 1896, 5 N L R 76 = 9 Cr. L J 553, 12 C W N 243, 12 Cr L J 431**. Where the appellant was represented by a pleader and the Sessions Judge not knowing the fact disposed of the appeal in Chambers the High Court set aside the order of the Appellate Court and directed the appeal to be reheard. **Ratanlal 914**. Such a miscarriage of justice would not have occurred if the Sessions Judge had followed the usual practice of having the appellant's name called out.

5 Appellate Court may send for appellant.—If an Appellate Court thinks it necessary for the purpose of disposing of an appeal to have the prisoner before it the Court has the same power to direct that the prisoner be brought before it as a Court of First Instance has when in pursuance of the direction of the Appellate Court it takes further evidence in the presence of a prisoner. **Weir II, 473, 13 A 171 at p 179, MAHMOOD J dissenting contra see Ratanlal 22** and Note 6 under s. 423.

6 Appellant should be allowed reasonable opportunity of being heard before summary rejection of appeal.—Before rejecting an appeal under this section the Court is bound to give reasonable opportunity to the appellant or his pleader whether the appellant be in jail or not. Where an appellant is confined in jail situated at the same station as the Appellate Court there is nothing to prevent an appellant from applying to be heard in person and in all cases a person so situated may apply that he shall be heard by a pleader, **Weir II, 472**. A Magistrate having rejected an appeal under this section without giving appellant an opportunity of being heard his order rejecting the appeal was set aside and he was directed to rehear the appeal petition following the procedure laid down in this section. **Ratanlal 703**. But where a District Magistrate heard the appellant's pleader in support of the appeal and then sent for the records of the case but disposed of the case without hearing the appellant's pleader a second time held that the Magistrate was within his right. **2 S. L R 39 = 10 Cr. L J 204**.

7 Appellant's pleader should be heard.—Where a convict sent up an appeal from jail to the Court of Session and also presented a petition of appeal through a pleader held the Sessions Judge was not competent to dismiss the jail appeal summarily but should have heard the appellant's pleader. **1906 A W N 303 = 3 A L J 693 = 4 Cr L J 373, where 17 A 241 (F B) is followed**. In **Ratanlal 914**, the appellant was represented by a pleader but the Sessions Judge not knowing the fact disposed of the appeal in Chambers. The High Court set aside the order of the Appellate Court and directed the appeal to be reheard. Where a District Magistrate called on the pleader who presented a criminal appeal to argue it at once and on the pleader praying for a short adjournment to enable him to acquaint himself with the evidence in the case

had not been given a reasonable opportunity for being heard. If the appeal is not admitted at once and the Court desires to hear the appellant before admitting it under this section he should be given the same notice as is given to the Crown. *See* the practice in the mofussil is to admit appeals which are supported by pleaders without any hearing except on a question of bail the only cases which are dealt with under section 421 of the Code being jail appeals. **36 C 385, see also 10 Cr L J 491 (M) 7 Bom L R 89 = 2 Cr L J 58**. See also **29 M 236** where it was held that on presentation (while in camp) to a Court by the party in person of a memorandum of appeal signed by a pleader it is not competent to the Court to reject the appeal summarily.

when the appeal is presented by an
= **18 Cr L J 538**. The principle
appeal under s. 195 (6). **43 M 383, 47**

The Pná, n The same as THERE.
The'ine, n (Fr theine from N. Lat thea) Foo
gure is (Chem) A bitter principle.

Thín'a dāy, n At that time then
days

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as a nipple on a
to breathe)
(Foot) One of a
family of crustaceans
resembling the land
crab which live in
the earth near the
shore.



Theiphas

Thém pron i object
five case of they
[is dat pl them
acc pl thó] Those
persons or things those See Titt y

Give to them that sell, and buy for yourselves. Mat xxv
Then shall the King say unto them on his right hand, Come ye blessed of my Father

Thém, n (Fr theme, Sp. Tg. & It tema) Py &
Lat thema, Gr téma from téma, to set plus
1 A subject or topic on which a person writes or
speaks

When a soldier was the theme my name
Was not far off.

Stok

2 A short dissertation composed by a student
usually upon some assigned topic

3 (Germ) A radical work

See the 1st & 2nd meanings from G
and Hebrew, a mixing from exposure to the
3 A mixture of the worship of different
of Jehoyah and idols

The 1st & 2nd

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by the time that. — Till then until that time
But that or now, I trust by then this following agreement
hall been well read will be left for one of the 1st of
Antioch.

N. then who knew

N. then

Then is often used elliptically like an adverb
of the then existing as then in this situation. It was
often we then in former times of then but this use is
now obsolete

Then conj In that case

pul lan'thro pism, n Love to both God
and man
The o phi lán'thro pism

7-A Dismissal of jail appeal when the accused also appears through a Mukhtyar.—Where a Sessions Judge, in ignorance of the fact that an appeal in the same case had been filed by a mukhtyar, dismissed a criminal appeal submitted from jail, it was *held*, that though the Sessions Judge could not review his own order, the High Court could set it aside in revision, and it was so done. **43 A. 208.**

8. Hearing includes right of reply.—The section lays down that the appellant or his pleader should have a reasonable opportunity of being heard in support of the appeal and this must be taken to include the possible right of reply if necessary, for it is obvious that if the Crown in its reply raises any points or disputes in the opinion of the learned Judge, the points which were raised in the opening by the appellants or their pleaders will have reasonable opportunity of supporting their case unless they are allowed to reply (*C. Rev. No. 874 of 1906 followed*), **33 C. 307.**

9. Desirable that Judge goes through record.—The powers conferred by this section should be exercised sparingly and with great caution, and reasons however concise, should be given for rejecting an appeal, **8 A. 516, 9 C. W. N. 229.** Where the appellant is content to leave the question of admission or rejection of appeal to be determined by the Sessions Judge on the papers the Judge is bound to peruse them and the appellant is not bound to appear a second time, either by counsel or in person. **Ratanlal 739.** 'Although a Judge acts within his powers in rejecting an appeal without sending for record I think such a course is ordinarily very inconvenient and should not be adopted'—*Per STRAIGHT, J.* **1893 A. W. N. 145.** Where there are in the memorandum of appeal allegations of withholding witnesses, or refusal to grant warrants and summonses to witnesses and of disregard of certain evidence filed in the case, it cannot be said that there are no sufficient grounds for interfering, **Ratanlal 916.** Similarly, where the grounds of appeal disclose reasons for discrediting the witnesses for the prosecution, the Appellate Court ought to call for the records, **29 M. 238.**

10. Time for hearing appeal must be fixed in each case and notice given.—A general notice posted in a Sessions Court house that appeals will be heard for admission only on the first Court-day after the date of presentation of the appeal is not a compliance with the requirements of this section. A time is by law required to be fixed in each case. **5 M. 11.** If the appeal is not admitted at once, notice must be given, **36 C. 385.**

Notice of appeal must be posted two days before the day fixed for hearing.—In the case of an appeal presented under s. 419 there shall be posted up in the Appellate Court, in place accessible to the public notice of the day appointed for considering the petition of appeal in order to afford the appellant or his pleader a reasonable opportunity of being heard in support of the same. Such notice shall be posted two days at least before the day so appointed unless the appellant or his pleader consents to a shorter notice or to dispense with a notice. *Bom. H. C. Cr. Cir.*, p. 42

11. Disposing of appeal before day fixed for hearing is material error.—The disposal of an appeal before the day fixed for the adjourned hearing is a material error of procedure. *Weir II, 475,* and the High Court in revision will set aside the order and order the Appellate Court to re-hear the appeal. **7 P. R. 1891.** The fact that the pleader of the accused is present in Court, when an order is made admitting an appeal does not relieve the Court from the necessity of giving notice to the appellant of the day fixed for the hearing of the appeal, **10 C. L. R. 57.**

12. When notice to appellants in jail may be dispensed with?—The practice of sending notices to persons who have transmitted criminal appeals from jail may be discontinued when the Appellate Court considers, after perusal of the petition of appeal and judgment, that there is not sufficient ground for interfering, and resolves to reject the appeal summarily.—*M. H. C. Pro.*, 11th and 27th Nov., 1884, Nos. 3327 and 3465

13. Principles which should govern consideration of appeals.—See Notes to s. 423 under Heading IV

14. Right of counsel to refer to certified copies of evidence at the hearing.—At the hearing of an appeal under this section, counsel for the appellant is entitled to refer to certified copies of the evidence. Where the Judge declined to allow this to be done and dismissed the appeal, the dismissal was set aside, **11 O. C. 360 = 9 Cr. L. J. 55.**

15. Form of judgment—whether reasons to be given?—'Summarily' means 'in an informal manner and without delay of formal proceedings'—This would seem to show that a Judge is entitled to reject an appeal without any formality at all, therefore without the formality of either a recorded judgment or reasons of any description. **21 C. 92; 20 B. 540; 9 C. W. N. 623, Weir II, 473; 1906 U. B. R. 49 = 4 Cr. L. J. 384; 29 C. 726.** Though every order passed in the exercise of judicial discretion should show the ground on which it is so passed, **6 C. P. 34;** yet the order under this section need not comply with all the requirements of s. 367, **25 M. 584;** or give any

specific reasons for dismissal. It must be taken that if the Appellate Court dismisses summarily, it considers that there are no sufficient grounds for interfering, 9 C. W. N. 823 = 32 Cr. L. J. 344. Though it is not required by law that a Sessions Judge should write a regular judgment when exercising the powers of summary dismissal, it is very important that such discretion should be exercised upon sound and reasonable lines. But it would be advisable for Appellate Courts to state shortly in their order the reason or reasons which influence them in coming to the conclusion that there is no sufficient ground for interfering, in view of the possibility of such order being challenged by an application in revision, 17 A. 241, *cf.*, the appeal is time-barred, it is manifestly groundless, or that no appeal lies. It is, however, advisable to give reasons for rejecting the appeal, 36 A. 496; 8 A. 514, 3 A. L. J. 693 = 1905 A. W. N. 303; 2 Pat. L. J. 695. See also 32 C. 178, where it was held, that the Court disposing of an appeal should either expressly state it has dealt with it under this section or the judgment must notice, though but concisely, what objections were urged on appeal and how they were disposed of. Even in a judgment under s. 421 the judgment should show that the Judge has considered such points as whether the witnesses are or are not accomplices and such points as are particularly challenged by the appellant 39 C. 307. It should also show whether the appeal is rejected on perusal of the petition of appeal and the copy of the judgment of the Lower Court or after calling for the record of the case.—C P Cr. Cr., Part II, No. 24. See Note 29 at p. 930.

16. Effect of admission of connected appeal on summary power.—Where a Sessions Judge admitted the appeal of one of two accused and summarily dismissed under this section the appeal of the other, *held*, that the fact the Judge admitted the appeal of a co-accused, does not affect the power vested in him by this section to dismiss the appeal of the other accused against the same judgment, 5 C. W. N. 332.

17. Powers of Bench of High Court to admit appeal.—Under Rule 1 (1) (f) of the Madras Appellate Side Rules of Practice, applications for the admission of appeals from the judgment of any Criminal Court are ordinarily to be made before a single Judge. But this does not in terms and is not intended to deprive, a *Divisional Court*, constituted for the disposal of criminal business, of the right to exercise its powers in special cases, in which convenience and the acquaintance which the Judges composing the Benches may have rendered their intervention advisable. The fact that a Court constituted by a single Judge was sitting as an admission Court does not determine the competency of the Bench to admit appeals presented to it, 29 M. L. J. 101 = 18 M. L. T. 93 = 15 Cr. L. J. 593.

18. Is order of summary rejection final?—No review.—An order under this section by the Appellate

And therefore an order rejecting an appeal under it is final and being an order "on appeal," is not open to review, 19 B. 732. It has also been *held* that no appeal lies under s. 15 of the *Letters Patent* against the judgment of a single Judge of the High Court dismissing criminal appeal under this section, as it is a judgment in a criminal trial, 13 M. L. J. (Notes) 65, Weir I, 783 (A). See Note 3 to s. 430.

Appeal dismissed for default of appearance may be re heard.—Where an appeal is dismissed for default and it is proved to the satisfaction of the Appellate Court that an adequate excuse has been made for the pleader's non-appearance, the Appellate Court may re hear the appeal, on its merits, 7 M. H. C. R. Appx. XXIX. Such an order is not a judgment and s. 369 offers no obstacle to the restoration of the appeal, 5 N. L. R. 78 = 9 Cr. L. J. 553, 10 C. L. G. 80 = 10 Cr. L. J. 287. See s. 369 and Note 11 at p. 813 and Note 7 to s. 439.

19. After rejecting appeal, sentence cannot be altered.—A Magistrate cannot after rejecting an appeal under this section diminish the sentence. He should either report the case to the High Court, or should hear the appeal as directed by s. 423, Ratanlal 304. An Appellate Court has no power to alter the conviction, when it dismisses an appeal under this section, Weir II, 475; Ratanlal 384. Nor to enhance the sentence, Ratanlal 74. If an Appellate Court proceeds to alter the sentence, it must give the notice prescribed by s. 422, Ratanlal 384. An Appellate Court cannot summarily set aside the sentence passed by the Court of First Instance, without giving notice of hearing to the respondent and calling for and perusing the records of the case as required by ss. 422 and 423 Weir II, 474.

20. Dismissal for bar by limitation not under this section.—An appeal presented after the expiry of the period of limitation, may be rejected without having resort to this section, if no sufficient reason is assigned to excuse the delay in presentation, Ratanlal 90.

21. Revision.—For a case where the Sessions Judge dismissed an appeal summarily, but the High Court finding on revision that the evidence was insufficient for the conviction and instead of remanding the appeal for re-hearing on the merits set aside the conviction and acquitted the accused, *see* 10 C. W. N. 448 = 3 Cr. L. J. 335. Though the practice usually is to send the case back to the Lower Appellate Court and ask for a judgment from that Court after a regular hearing, the High Court has a discretion to go into the case on its own account and, if necessary, even to consider questions of fact as if in first appeal, 13 O. C. 309 = 11 Cr. L. J. 531.

422. If the Appellate Court does not dismiss the appeal summarily, it shall cause notice to be given to the appellant or his pleader, and to such officer as the Local Government may appoint in this behalf, of the time and place at which such appeal will be heard, and shall, on the application of such officer, furnish him with a copy of the grounds of appeal, and, in cases of appeals under section 417, the Appellate Court shall cause a like notice to be given to the accused.

Notes.—1. **Appeal cannot be admitted for limited purpose.**—If the Appellate Court does not dismiss the appeal summarily, the Appellate Court must hear the whole appeal, consequently all the grounds taken in the petition of appeal are open for consideration at the final hearing and the appellant cannot be restricted to any selected ground out of those specified in his petition. A restrictive order for admission is clearly not contemplated by s. 422 and must be deemed *ultra vires*, 41 C. 406. *Cf.* 14 C. L. J. 416 = 15 C. W. N. 921. Except where it uses express language in ss. 412 and 418, the Code does not provide for the admission of an appeal for the limited purpose of reversing only a part of the sentence. Generally if an appeal is admitted, the appellant has a right to have the whole merits dealt with by the Judge in solemn form *Ratanlal* 826. A Sessions Judge being once seized of the appeal, the whole appeal becomes open to his Court and he is bound to hear the appeals on the merits only 35 B 418, Note 7 to s. 413. 4 Patna 254.

2. Notice is obligatory.—(i) **To Appellant.**—Notice to the appellant of the time and place of hearing is obligatory under this section when notice of the appeal by the accused has gone to the prosecutor, *Weir II*, 475 (ii) **To Officer appointed by Government.**—In an appeal before a Joint Magistrate, notice ought to be served on the District Magistrate. If the Magistrate hears the appeal without the notice being served, the procedure is irregular, 1915 M. W. N. 510 = 16 Cr. L. J. 600. But the omission to serve notice is an irregularity and if the parties have not been prejudiced, the High Court will not interfere in revision. But in 24 Bom. L. R. 1150, the High Court did interfere as the objection was raised by the District Magistrate to the proceedings of the Appellate Court and in 23 Bom. L. R. 151 the High Court declined to interfere in revision at the instance of the complainant where the District Magistrate did not raise any objection to the procedure in the Appellate Court in acquitting the accused without notice to him.

Order for hearing made in presence of appellant's pleader does not relieve the Court from giving notice.—The fact, that the pleader of the accused is present in Court when an order is made admitting an appeal, does not relieve the Court from the necessity of giving notice to the appellant of the day fixed for the hearing of the appeal. In criminal cases the procedure laid down in the law must be strictly followed, 10 C. L. R. 57; 7 P. R. 1833. These cases were under the Code of 1872. The addition of the word "pleader" in this section is new. It seems that the mere presence of the pleader of the accused is not enough unless his attention is specially directed to the notice when it is given verbally.

3. Notice of change of place of hearing must be given.—When a Court issues notice to the agent of the accused, it ought not to hear the appeal at a different place without giving notice of the same to such agent, 7 P. R. 1891. Where notice is issued to an appellant in a criminal case to appear at headquarters on the date fixed, and when on that date, the Magistrate moves out into camp, it is not competent for him to dismiss the case for default of appearance even though there may be a general order made by him to the effect that parties ought to go to him in camp still less is such an order justifiable, when it is not even shown that the appellant was not even present in headquarters on the date in question, or that any order to follow the officer into camp was ever communicated to him. The proper course in such cases, is to fix a fresh date and issue fresh notice, 11 P. R. 1905 = 117 P. L. R. 1905 = 2 Cr. L. J. 66 which follows 21 P. R. 1895. *See also* 5 N. L. R. 76 = 9 Cr. L. J. 553.

4. Particulars in notice.—(i) **Notice should show whether appeal is to be heard under s. 423.**—In every case in which a day is fixed for the hearing of an appeal, the order fixing the date should distinctly state whether

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[illegible][illegible][illegible]

or not the hearing is to be under s 423 This information not being given it becomes very difficult to distinguish between appeals rejected under s 421 and appeals confirmed after hearing under s 423—*Pun. Cir.*, Chap LXXVIII p 289

(ii) *Notice must specify time of hearing, i.e., the particular date*—In 1891 A. W. N 46, a Magistrate of the district directed that an appeal to him would be heard in January, no particular date being specified. The appeal was heard and dismissed on the 6th January. The appellant had not received any information as to when his appeal was to be heard and only arrived in the Magistrate's Court to learn that the appeal had just been dismissed and could not be re-heard. SPANKIE, J., observed that the appellant should have been informed as to the date on which his appeal would be heard. The Magistrate was directed to take up the appeal fix a date for its hearing and determine it on the date so fixed. See also 5 M. 11

5 *On whom notice must be served*—(i) *Notice of appeal may be left at the address given by accused*—Notice of the hearing of an appeal was not given to an appellant as he could not be found at the address given by him and appeal was heard and decided in his absence. *held* that the Appellate Court might have been justified in doing what it did if the notice or a copy of it had been left at the address given or there had been anything to show that the appellant could by any diligence of his have got knowledge of the notice and as this was not done the appeal should be re-heard, *Ratanlal* 889

(ii) *Notice of hearing to appellant in jail*—If the Appellate Court decides to proceed under s 421 it is not legally bound to give notice to the appellant nor is it generally necessary to do so. When the Court means to proceed under s 422 the law requires that notice shall be issued to the appellant and the intimation given by the officer of the jail when forwarding the appeal petition is not sufficient for this purpose. See Rules 264 265 of the *Madras Criminal Rules of Practice*

(iii) *Notice to Railway authorities in cases of appeal by their servants*—In all appeals from sentences passed on railway servants notice should be given of the time and place of hearing the appeal to the Head of the Railway Administration concerned as well as to the District Magistrate—*Pun. Cir.* No 17 of 1894 C P Cr Cir Part II No 45 *Oudh Cr Dig.*, p 27

(iv) *To such officer as the Local Government may appoint*—(a) *Madras*—In case of appeals to the Sessions Court and the High Court the *Public Prosecutor* is the officer entitled to notice (*Fort St. George Gazette* 1887 Pt I p 30) but the *District Magistrate* is the proper person to direct whether there should be a formal appearance in support of a conviction (G O No 653 Judicial 24th March 1887). In cases of convictions for Railway offences the *Agents* of the Companies are the officers entitled to notice (G O No 1807 Judicial 7th September 1891). In appeals from convictions in cognizable cases the *Assistant Superintendent of Police* in the Nilgiri District and the *Prosecuting Inspectors of Police* in other districts are entitled to notice (G O No 1614 Judl 7th August 1895). In Forest cases the *District Forest Officers* are entitled to notice (G O No 433 Judl 2nd March 1896).

(b) *Bombay*—District Magistrates are to receive notice (*Gazette* 1883 Pt I p 182). See *Bom Bk Cir.* p 42, and for form of notice, see *ibid.*, pp 117 and 118

(c) *Bengal*—In Bengal also the District Magistrate is the officer to receive notice 7 C. W. N 80. See *Gazette* 1883 Pt I p 1200. In the Calcutta High Court, the *Legal Remembrancer* is the Public Prosecutor (*Calcutta Gazette* 30th June 1886 p 783).

(d) *In the Punjab*—Notices are to be sent to the District Magistrate (*Punjab Gazette* 1883 Pt I, p 13). See also *Pun. Cir.* Vol. II p 274

(e) *In the Central Provinces and Oudh* to the District Magistrate (*Central Province Gazette* 1883 Pt II p 101) *Oudh Cr Dig.* p 27

6 *Appearance of mukhtyar for appellant*—An appellant in a criminal case has a right to appear and to be heard by a *mukhtyar* 6 B 14. This decision must be taken subject to s 4 cl (r) and see Note to s 340

7 *Appeal cannot be dismissed for default*—On receiving an appeal if the Appellate Courts proceeds under this section it can only dismiss the appeal on the merits and not on account of the absence of the appellant's pleader 21 P. R. 1895, 11 P. R. 1905, 39 C 385, vote 3 to 2 421

8 *Power to dispose of appeal in the absence of appellant*—Where an appeal is admitted and the Appellate Court has sent for the record and perused the same, it is competent for that Court to dispose of the appeal though the Appellant is not present and is not represented by a pleader. The only limitation on the power

of the Appellate Court is that, before disposing of the appeal, it must peruse the records, and, if the appellant is present or represented by a pleader, the appellant in person or the pleader must be heard, 13 A. 171 (F.B.), MAHMOOD J., *dissenting*

9 Complainant cannot as of right be heard in appeal—See Note 9 to s. 423

10 Notice on appeal by complainant against order under s 250—Where on the appeal of a complainant, an order under s 250 was reversed without notice either to the accused or to the Public Prosecutor, held, on revision, setting aside the appellate order, that though there be no express provision directing that notice should be given to the accused in such a case yet on the principle, *audi alteram partem*, the accused should be given notice of the appeal so as to afford him an opportunity of supporting the order passed in his favour. Also according to the letter of the law, notice should also be given to the officer, if any, appointed by the Local Government and referred to in Note 5 above. The safer course in such an appeal therefore unless it be summarily rejected, is to give notice to both the accused and the officer referred to 29 M. 187. See Note 34 at p 710

*** 423. (1)** The Appellate Court shall then send for the record of the case, if such record is not already in Court. After perusing such record, and hearing the appellant or his pleader if he appears and the Public Prosecutor, if he appears, and in case of an appeal under section 417, the Court may if it considers that there is no sufficient ground for interfering, dismiss the appeal or may—

(a) in an appeal from an order of acquittal, reverse such order and direct that further inquiry be made, or that the accused be re-tried or committed for trial as the case may be, or find him guilty and pass sentence on him according to law

(b) in an appeal from a conviction, (1) reverse the finding and sentence and acquit or discharge the accused, or order him to be re-tried by a Court of competent jurisdiction subordinate to such Appellate Court or committed for trial, or (2) alter the finding maintaining the sentence, or with or without altering the finding reduce the sentence or (3) with or without such reduction and with or without altering the finding alter the nature of the sentence but subject to the provisions of section 106 subsec (3) not so as to enhance the same

(c) in an appeal from any other order, alter or reverse such order,

(d) make any amendment or any consequential or incidental order that may be just or proper

(2) Nothing herein contained shall authorize this Court to alter or reverse the verdict of a jury unless it is of opinion that such verdict is erroneous, owing to a misdirection by the Judge, or to a misunderstanding on the part of the jury of the law as laid down by him

Notes.—1. Changes in the section—Sub-sec. (d) is necessary to give effect to the amendment of s. 106—**Statement of Objects and Reasons** Sub-sec. (2) corresponds with clause (d) of s. 423 of the 1882 Code

2 Analogous law.—See the provisions of the (*Criminal Appeal Act 1907* *Edw VII, C.23*) ss 4 and 5 for the powers of the Appellate Court in England. *Archbold* pp 303—315. Compare s 543 of N.Y. Cr. Pro. Code which is as follows—Upon hearing the appeal Appellate Court may, in cases where an erroneous judgment has been entered upon a lawful verdict or finding of fact correct the judgment to conform to the judgment or finding, in all other cases they must either reverse or affirm the judgment appealed from, and in cases of reversal may, if necessary or proper, order a new trial

* As to enhancement of punishment by Appellate Court in Upper Burma, see pt in cases affecting European British subjects see Reg V of 1892 ss. 11 and 17. For a similar provision in the S. and P. Regs. and in the S. and P. Regs. see the *Southern Provinces and Berar Reg. V of 1891* s. 4 (VI) and the *British Burmah Co. Reg. VIII of 1894* s. 413, respectively

ANALYSIS OF NOTES.

- I Nature of appellate jurisdiction, Notes 3—4
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- VI Appeals from convictions—
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- VII Alteration of finding—
 - (A) Maintaining sentence—sub-sec. (1) (b) (2), Notes 61—66
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- XI Limitation on Appellate Court's power to interfere with verdict of jury—sub-sec. (2) Notes 94—104

I—NATURE OF CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION.

3 Power of Appellate Court is measured by power of Original Court.—(i) *Appellate Court cannot pass sentence beyond original Court's power*—Sec. 32 contains no word which makes it applicable to any Court, of Appeal or Revision nor is there any restricting proviso to be found in sec. 423 or any other section dealing with appellate jurisdiction such as sub-sec. (3) of s. 439. Nevertheless it is a rule underlying the whole fabric of appellate jurisdiction that the power of an Appellate Court is measured by the power of the Court from whose judgment or order the appeal before it has been made. This is equally so in the civil and criminal branches of the law of procedure. It is a fundamental principle that every Court of Appeal exists, for the purpose where necessary of doing or causing to be done, that which each Court subordinate to its appellate jurisdiction should have but has not done, or caused to be done and nothing further. Therefore the jurisdiction in appeal is necessarily limited in each case to the same extent as the jurisdiction from which that particular case comes. It is a proposition which cannot be disputed that all powers conferred upon an Appellate Court as such, must be interpreted as subject to the general rule above stated. All jurisdiction starts with the first Court and remains a constant factor throughout all subsequent stages of the suit or proceeding governed by it. Therefore where a District Magistrate in an appeal from a sentence of four months imprisonment altered the sentence to one of a fine of Rs. 300 only, held that the Appellate Court cannot, on appeal pass a sentence which the original Magistrate was not competent to pass and the sentence was reduced to a fine of Rs. 200, 7 N. L. R. 109 = 12 Cr. L. J. 444. See also 39 G. 157 and 1030, 12 M. 431.

(ii) *Appellate Court cannot alter finding to an offence which Original Court is incompetent to try*—See Note 64 (ii).

(iii) *But Appellate Court cannot pass order which Original Court only can pass*—See Notes 84, 85 and 88.

4 Court of Appeal is not mere Court of Error—A Court of Reference or Appeal under this Code is not a mere Court of Error, but the Court as a Court of Appeal Reference or Revision is enjoined by s. 537 and s. 167 of the *Indian Evidence Act* not to reverse or alter the finding or sentence passed by a Court of competent jurisdiction on account of any error, omission irregularity, improper admission or rejection of evidence, unless in its judgment, such error omission or irregularity has in fact occasioned a failure of justice or unless independently of evidence objected to and admitted there was not sufficient evidence to justify, or that if the rejected evidence had been received it ought to have varied the decision.—*Per BHASHYAM AIVANGAR, J.*, in 24 M. 523 at p. 551.

II.—PROCEDURE IN HEARING AND DISPOSING OF APPEALS.

5. Appellate Court may suspend sentence pending appeal and release on bail—See s. 426

6 Can appellant be sent for from jail?—There is no provision of law which specifically authorizes a Sessions Judge to cause an appellant under a sentence of imprisonment to be brought before a Sessions Court

18 Rules as to execution of orders of Courts of Appeal, Reference or Revision.—When a sentence on a prisoner is reversed or modified on appeal by a Court other than the High Court, a fresh warrant will be issued by the Appellate Court to the officer in charge of the jail, and its order will be communicated to the Lower Court for record. Provide that when the Appellate Court order the re-trial or committal for trial of a prisoner under this section, it shall communicate its order to the Court whose decision has been reversed and that Court shall thereupon make such orders as are conformable to the judgment or order of the Appellate Court. In all cases in which a sentence or order is modified or reversed, whether in appeal or revision, a separate warrant should be issued as regards each prisoner whose sentence has been so modified or reversed.—*Rom H C Cr Cir*, para 81

III—GENERAL POWERS AND DUTIES OF APPELLATE COURT.

19 Judge personally interested in prosecution should not hear the appeal.—The words 'try any case' in s 556 are wide enough to include the hearing of an appeal, 23 C. 44; (1899) A. W. N. 74. Where, therefore, a Magistrate in his executive capacity after personally satisfying himself that a person is guilty directed a prosecution he ought not to hear the appeal, 9 N. L. R. 81 = 14 Cr. L. J. 335. See Note 14 at p. 482.

20 Appellate Court has no power to remand case directing trial Court to pass proper sentence.—Where the District Magistrate convicted the petitioner under ss. 411, 380 and 420 I. P. C., and sentenced him to six months imprisonment and a fine of Rs 100 under s. 411, I. P. C., no separate sentences being passed under the other sections and the Sessions Judge on appeal, set aside the convictions under ss. 411 and 420 and also the sentence under s. 411 and remanded the case to the District Magistrate 'for passing such sentence, if any, as he may consider fit under s. 380, I. P. C.' *Held*, setting aside the order of the Sessions Judge and the sentences passed by the District Magistrate, that the Sessions Judge had no power to remand a case for the Lower Court to pass a proper sentence. He was directed to dispose of the appeal by himself passing a proper sentence, 11 C. W. N. 254.

21 Appellate Court cannot send case back for proper judgment to be written.—An Appellate Court cannot, where the judgment of the Court below is defective, send the case back to the Magistrate to re-hear the parties and write out a proper judgment. It is the duty of the Judge on appeal to go into the whole facts fully and dispose of the case, 32 C. 1069. Where the record is such that the Appellate Court cannot form its own opinion on the evidence the conviction cannot be maintained. 4 L. B. R. 340 = 9 Cr. L. J. 25.

22 Appellate Court cannot set aside conviction merely because locality of offence was not within jurisdiction of trying Court.—Appellate Court ought not to set aside a conviction because the offence had been committed beyond the local limits of the Magistrate's jurisdiction. The Appellate Court ought not to overlook the provisions of s 531, 33 C. 766, and see Note 7 to s. 404.

23 Appellate Court cannot make reference to High Court.—It is clearly the intention of the Law that Sec. 423 does not sit in the appeal, pending before the Judge himself. See Note 6 to s 438. Where a Sessions Judge sitting on appeal is of opinion that the accused should be acquitted, he ought not to refer the case to the High Court. It is his duty to allow the appeal and acquit the accused, 13 A. L. J. 477 = 16 Cr. L. J. 433.

24 Can Appellate Court consider point not taken in grounds of appeal?—In a trial for *cheating* in which the prisoner was acquitted, the High Court, on appeal by Government, *held* that the accused might have been convicted for attempt and abetment of the offence and ordered a re-trial, although in the petition of appeal this objection had not been taken, for, it was *held* that the accused had not been unfairly prejudiced and had not asked for time on the ground of surprise, 12 B. H. C. R. 1. *Contra*, see 19 B. 51 at p. 63; 63 P. L. R. 1911 = 12 Cr. L. J. 78. The High Court, on appeal, set aside the acquittal.

convict that person of an offence entirely different from that charged against him and not even suggested in the grounds of appeal (19 B. 51 *followed*), 63 P. L. R. 1911 = 12 Cr. L. J. 73. The Bombay High Court has, however, allowed a new objection to be taken in appeal, holding that the accused had not been unfairly prejudiced on the ground of surprise. 12 B. H. C. R. 1.

3 Absolute or unmeasured duration

1 Time of duration

NRton

11 (1/2000) Lenses {Hart}
12 (1/12) Measure of sounds measure, time
ne, common or triple time

Some few lines are units & others are not. Draw & FI

Adorned with velvet it forms *gaster* and *sol* in
all; top class of antimony & iron, and sand
about in *trianema* &c. an 1 unit with top
different proportions if *forus* *brone* 800-mole
of m-metals. T shall coated with quicksilver,
a reflector & surface of glass mirrors

In plates of iron covered with tin
ner {Cont}
(See & p) *trivale* p pr & to w riv
To cover w th tin or tinned iron or to over
tin foil

gu n {The
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one of a family
also gallina
ride peculiar
to America
st tinamou is
from tinches
a deep olive
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and Brazil
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25. Appellate Court should not refer to evidence not forming part of record—An Appellate Court will be in error if it refers to documents and evidence which did not form part of the record of the proceedings before the Magistrate, 6 C. L. J. 251 = 6 Cr. L. J. 337; 8 M. L. T. 81 = 11 Cr. L. J. 221. The Appellate Court may take fresh evidence under s. 424 after recording its reasons.

26. Appellate Court may make local inspection.—Where an inspection of the scene of the crime is material either to the case for the prosecution or that of the defence, it is desirable that the Appellate Court should also inspect the spot, 16 P. W. R. 1911 = 12 Cr. L. J. 412. He should place on record any information which he may receive during such inspection if he intends to rely on the same. See 1896 A. W. N. 73.

27. In case of joint appeals, Appellate Court must devote judicial attention to case of each accused—The judgment of an Appellate Court, dealing with the case of several accused who were convicted in a joint trial, must show on the face of it that the case of each accused has been taken into consideration and should state reasons, as far as may be necessary, to show that the Appellate Court has devoted judicial attention to the case of each accused. An appellate judgment should be quite independent and stand by itself. It ought not to be read in connection with or as supplementary to the judgment of the Court of First Instance, 35 C. 138, 16 Cr. L. J. 496 (M). It has been a practice with all the High Courts to set aside a conviction where there are in the judgment whether Original or Appellate, no sufficient materials to support it. The first duty of a Court of appeal is to find whether the conviction had by the Lower Court against each of the accused person is sustainable. A general agreement with the Lower Court cannot be sufficient to uphold the conviction of each particular individual as each of them is entitled to a finding on the fact that he did or did not take part in the alleged offence and when there is no such finding the appeal must be re-heard, 12 Cr. L. J. 43 (C.). Especially in cases of rioting the evidence against each accused must be discussed, 2 Mad. L. W. 958 = 16 Cr. L. J. 735.

IV.—WHAT ARE SUFFICIENT GROUNDS FOR INTERFERENCE.

28. That judgment was obtained by fraud or concealment of material fact is a ground of appeal—An appeal from a conviction could be entertained if based on the concealment of a material fact from the Court which conducts the trial. Equally so an appeal from acquittal may be entertained where the acquittal was obtained by the fraud of the accused, e.g., by preventing the complainant from attending the Court in a summons-case, 38 M. 1028. See also 1891 A. W. N. 120 and Note 36.

29. Failure of appellant's counsel to refer to evidence does not relieve Judge of his duties.—Because no reference was made to the defence evidence by the counsel who appeared for the appellant and the defence evidence was practically ignored the Appellate Court did not think it necessary to consider and deal with the evidence adduced by the defence. Held that it was the duty of the Appellate Court to look into that evidence and after dealing with it come to a decision. The appeal was directed to be re-heard. 40 C. 376.

A—APPEALS AGAINST CONVICTIONS.

30. Rule in trying criminal appeal is to consider whether conviction is right.—A convicted person when appealing is not in the same position before the Appellate Court as he is before the Court trying him, he must satisfy the Appellate Court that there is sufficient ground for interfering with the order of conviction, 5 A. 386. But this view has not been followed. No doubt an Appellate Court is bound to presume the decision of the Court of original jurisdiction to be correct until the contrary is shown and it is equally beyond all doubt that an Appellate Court is bound to give every reasonable weight to the conclusion which the Original Court has arrived at upon a question depending upon evidence. But the Appellate Court is also bound precisely in the same way as the Court of First Instance to test the evidence extrinsically as well as intrinsically. The Appellate Court is bound to inquire as thoroughly as the Court of First Instance whether the probabilities arising from all the surrounding circumstances of the case are such as to justify a reasonable mind in coming to the conclusion that the evidence is worthy of credit, 17 W. R. 59; 18 C. W. N. 1215 = 15 Cr. L. J. 686.

(i) *Is the appellant bound to satisfy Court as in civil appeal that trial Judge was wrong?*—The sound rule to apply in trying a criminal appeal where questions of facts are in issue, is to consider whether the conviction is right, and in this respect a criminal appeal differs from a civil one. In the latter case the Court must be convinced before reversing a finding of fact by a Lower Court that the finding is wrong. Per WHITE, J., 11 C. L. R. 2. If the Judge of the Appellate Court has any doubt that the conviction is a right one, whatever the Original Court has done, the Judge of the Appellate Court should discharge the accused. In this respect the duty of the Appellate Court in criminal cases is not similar to that in civil cases. In the latter case the Court must be

satisfied before setting aside an order of the Lower Court that the order is wrong, 23 C. 357. If the evidence which came before him, whatever its shape, was not sufficient to reasonably satisfy him, that the prisoners had been rightly convicted he ought to have acquitted them, 20 W. R. 13 = 11 B. L. R. 33.

(ii) *Appellate Court should consider facts of case independently and give benefit of doubt to prisoner*—It is the duty of a Court of Appeal to exercise an independent judgment in reviewing the evidence, 1890 A. W. N. 148. It is the duty of an Appellate Court in every case to examine the evidence for itself and to give an accused person the benefit of a reasonable doubt which it may entertain after such examination. Doubtless, it ought not lightly to disturb the conclusions of the Court of First Instance, and should give due weight to the fact that the witnesses received credit from the Court of which their evidence was given, but in every case, it is the duty of an Appellate Court to arrive at an independent opinion. It is improper for an Appellate Court to record in its judgment grave imputations on the motives of an officer whose decision is under appeal, when such imputations on the motives of an officer whose decision is under appeal, when such imputations have no other foundation than suspicion, Welr II, 535. Though in criminal cases an Appellate Court should be guided in its estimation of the evidence of a witness by the remarks recorded by the first Court under s. 463, as to the demeanour of that witness, such Appellate Court is bound independently to consider the facts of the case, and the prisoner is entitled to the benefit of reasonable doubt in the Appellate, no less than in the first Court. Where therefore, the Sessions Judge admitted that he was 'perplexed by the difficulties and incongruities of the case,' but upheld the conviction on the ground that an Appellate Court should interfere with the finding of the first Court unless clearly convinced that it was erroneous, *held*, that the judgment of the Sessions Judge must be set aside and the appeal heard *de novo* 6 P. R. 1893 where 5 A. 336 was not followed, 5 P. R. 1976, Note 3 to s. 424.

31. *Appellate Court cannot decline to interfere because the matter is a trifle, but must proceed according to law*.—A first-class Magistrate convicted the accused under s. 480 and sentenced him to a fine of one pice. In appeal the Sessions Judge declined to interfere, observing that the matter was merely a trifle. It did not appear whether the Sessions Judge referred to the act of the accused or to the punishment as being merely a trifle. *Held* that the Sessions Judge had not heard the appeal as he was bound by law to do and come to a finding as to whether the conviction was legal or illegal therefore his order must be reversed and the appeal must be re-heard, *Ratanlal 978*

B—APPEALS AGAINST ACQUITTALS

32. *In both appeals benefit of doubt must be given to accused*.—Only one broad rule can be laid down with regard to the consideration of evidence in all criminal cases and that is that the innocence of the accused person must be presumed, 20 C. W. N. 128 = 17 Cr. L. J. 9. In an appeal against acquittal, the benefit of doubt is against the appellant, whereas in appeal against conviction the benefit is in favour of the appellant, 15 P. R. 1909 = 11 Cr. L. J. 66.

33. *Is no difference to be observed in dealing with appeals from acquittal and conviction?*—

(i) *No special rules for dealing with evidence in appeal from acquittal*—Only one broad rule can be laid down with regard to the consideration of evidence in all criminal cases, and that is that the innocence of the accused person must be presumed, and the burden lies upon the prosecution of completely rebutting that presumption. If after the consideration of the whole evidence any doubt is felt by the Court as to the guilt of any accused person he is entitled to the benefit of that doubt, and the verdict must be in his favour, of course due weight must be given to the decision of the Court below and the reasons advanced for that decision. Apart from this, however, an appeal from an acquittal must be considered in precisely the same manner as all other cases are considered and it must be determined whether the evidence is such as to warrant a conviction of the accused 20 C. W. N. 128 = 17 Cr. L. J. 9. In the appeal from acquittal if the High Court thinks the Lower Court has taken an erroneous view of the evidence, it has no jurisdiction to refuse to convict. The Code makes no distinction between an appeal from a conviction and an appeal from an acquittal, 9 S. L. R. 17 = 16 Cr. L. J. 604, where it was held that the view taken in 17 C. 435 and 19 B. 51 was the correct one. There is nothing in the language of s. 417 to limit appeals against acquittals to cases in which Courts have, owing to some error of law or misappreciation of evidence, come to a wrong decision on the evidence before them. There is no distinction in the Code between the right of appeal in an acquittal and the right of appeal against a conviction both being governed by the same rules and being subject to the same limitations 17 C. 435; 7 P. R. 1904 = 1 Cr. L. J. 781, 33 M. 1023. There is no distinction in the Code between the right of appeal against an acquittal and a right of appeal against conviction. In both these cases the appellant has to satisfy

the Court that there does exist some good and strong ground apparent upon the record for interfering with the deliberate determination by a Judge who has had all the evidence before him and has arrived at the determination with that great advantage in his favour, 20 A. 459; 36 A. 163, *Weir* II, 462; 17 C. 435. Sound principles of criminal jurisprudence require that the indications of error in the judgment of acquittal ought to be clearer and more palpable and the evidence more cogent and convincing in order to justify its being set aside than would be necessary in the case of conviction, 7 P. R. 1914 = 97 P. L. R. 1904 = 1 Cr. L. J. 781. It is immaterial that the Appeal Court might have arrived at a different conclusion. The indications of mistake must be obvious or the evidence too strong to be rejected before the Appeal Court should interfere, 123 P. L. R. 1914 = 15 Cr. L. J. 203. See also 7 P. W. R. 1916 = 47 Cr. L. J. 97; 27 P. W. R. 1914 = 123 P. L. R. 1913 = 15 Cr. L. J. 203 and 47 Cr. L. J. 194 (Pan)

Contra—High Court will not usually interfere unless the Original Court has grossly blundered through perversity or incompetence—Unless the judgment of the Court below was wrong and perverse or without jurisdiction and based on obvious errors in procedure, the High Court should uphold the decision or the Magistrate though wrong, because it would be based at the most on a doubtful weighing of facts and not on any irregularity or negligence or other matter going to the jurisdiction or the regularity of the trial, 18 C. W. N. 666 = 15 Cr. L. J. 160. The High Court will not interfere in appeal from an acquittal unless the judgment of the Court was clearly wrong and the judgment either perverse or based on obvious errors of procedure, 30 M. 44; 16 Cr. L. J. 529 (M). It is not because a Judge or a Magistrate has taken a view of a case in which that of Government does not coincide, and has acquitted the accused persons, that an appeal from his decision must necessarily prevail, or that this Court should be called upon to disturb the ordinary course of justice by putting in force the arbitrary powers conferred on it by this section. The doing so should be limited to those instances in which the Lower Court has so obstinately blundered and gone wrong as to produce a result mischievous at once to the administration of justice and the interest of the public, 4 A. 143, followed in 9 A. 528 (F.B.) 1852 A. W. N. 64 and 16 A. 212, where it was held that when the judgment appealed from is based upon the facts and the conclusions of the Court are such as may be reasonably arrived at upon the facts found, an appeal on behalf of Government should not be entertained. See also 16 C. 310; 11 P. R. 1903 and 14 P. L. R. 1909 = 11 Cr. L. J. 65 and 26 P. W. R. 1913 = 14 Cr. L. J. 525. The Ruling in 4 A. 143 was dissented from by the Chief Court of Punjab. They said "Section 417 appeals to us to place the Local Government in no better or worse position in appealing from an acquittal than a convicted person in appealing from a conviction, and, it appears to us, legislating rather than interpreting the law, to weight a Government appeal with the necessity of showing that the Court below, 'obstinately' blundered or 'has so gone wrong as to produce result mischievous at once to the administration of justice and the interests of the public, unless every illegal acquittal be held to fulfil the latter description, while the former requirement would make the provisions of this section a dead letter in almost every conceivable case,' 29 P. R. 1895. (See, however, 7 P. R. 1904) Technically speaking, no doubt, the learned Judges are right, but appeal against an acquittal is an extraordinary remedy not recognized by any civilized country, introduced in this country for the first time by the Code of 1872 (see 14 W. R. 29) like many others of similar kind, viz., enhancement of punishment (by Court of appeal now partially abolished), differential treatment of European British subjects from the rest of the population, the rule for calling out and employing the military in aid of the civil power, etc. (See Dr WHITLEY STOKES remarks in the Note at the head of Chapter IX.)

(ii) In an appeal from an acquittal the High Court is a Court of Appeal on matters of fact as well as of law and must decide questions of fact from the whole of the evidence on record, 9 C. L. J. 378 = 10 Cr. L. J. 499.

34. High Court will not interfere with order of acquittal unless case is of sufficient consequence.—See Notes 4 to 12 to s. 417. The powers conferred by cl. (1) (a) of this section are exceptional and the High Court will not exercise its discretion by setting aside an order of acquittal unless it be satisfied that the case is of sufficient consequence. The accused were charged under s. 24 of the *Sea Customs Act* VI of 1863, and convicted upon appeal the Sessions Judge quashed the conviction on the ground that the offence of importation of salt did not fall under that section, but under s. 194. On appeal by Government the High Court said that in strictness of law, the Sessions Judge was right in saying that the offence was not made out, still they were inclined to think that, instead of acquitting the prisoners, he (the Judge) might properly have come to the conclusion that they had not really been prejudiced in their defence, and have allowed the conviction to stand for the offence of which they were manifestly guilty. On such a matter of discretion it would be a strong thing to re-establish the conviction even if so doing would be legal, 7 M. H. C. R. 339. In a similar case, the Bombay High Court ordered re-trial, 12 B. H. C. R. 1.

Y.—APPEALS TO HIGH COURT FROM ACQUITTALS—SUB-SEC. (1) (a).

35. Power of High Court to direct further inquiry.—High Court can direct Presidency Magistrates to make further inquiry in cases of acquittal, 7 C. W. N. 521 and in cases of discharge, 36 C. 994. Direction as to further inquiry can be made by the High Court under this section, only in the case of an appeal from an order of acquittal but not in the case of an order of dismissal or discharge, 27 C. 125 *dissenting from* 26 C. 748. See Note 44 under Heading VI to s. 439.

36. Where acquittal order resulted from fraud, re-trial is proper.—Where a Court of Session had been deceived, e.g., by alteration in a document, and fraudulently led to pronounce an order of acquittal, the High Court reversed such order and directed a new trial—*M H C Pro*, 24th April 1883; whereon an erroneous view of the law, the Sessions Judge on appeal acquitted the accused, the High Court, on the appeal to Government, set aside this order, and as the appeal had not been heard on the merits, ordered the re-hearing of the appeal by the Sessions Judge. 24 W. R. 41. See Note 28.

37. Powers of High Court in appeals against acquittal in jury trial limited to points of law.—See s. 418 and Notes thereto. The appeal in such cases will be limited to a point of law, 10 C. 1029. But where a real misdirection as to a material part of the charge is established, it was held the High Court was bound to consider the evidence in the case in order to determine if the misdirection has *in fact* occasioned a failure of justice [s. 537 (d)] and if the verdict is erroneous [sub-sec. (2)], it may then convict or acquit the accused according to the view it takes of the evidence, or may if it thinks fit, order a re-trial [sub-sec. (1) (a)], 5 W. R. 80 (F.B.) = B. L. R. Sup. Vol. 459. The High Court is not bound in all cases to order a re-trial, except where it thinks that a different verdict is possible on any view of the evidence, 26 M. 1, where 21 C. 323 and 955 and 25 C. 230 are commented on and L. R. 1894, A. C. 57 distinguished and 14 B. 115 approved. In a case of misdirection the High Court can consider the evidence and if after so doing, it forms the opinion that the evidence cannot in any proper view of the case, support a conviction it will not alter or reverse the acquittal. The introduction of the words "*in fact*" in s. 537 (d), is to emphasize the duty of the Court to go into the merits, before interfering in consequence of a misdirection.—*PER BENSON J.* in 26 M. 1.

38. Powers of High Court in other trials.—The High Court in appeals under s. 417 is a Court of Appeal on the facts as well as law and it is the duty of the High Court to consider whether as a matter of fact there is or is not sufficient evidence on the record, 9 C. L. J. 378 = 10 Cr. L. J. 499.

39. Reverse or alter.—'Reverse' means to set aside, to make null. To 'alter' means to substitute a finding of 'guilty' for 'not guilty' or vice-versa.—*PER BENSON, J.*, in 26 M. 1 at p. 15.

40. Procedure where original trial illegal.—On an appeal under s. 417 from the order of acquittal of the Sessions Judge, passed an appeal from a conviction by a Magistrate, the High Court held that the original trial was illegal as it contravened the provisions of s. 233. *PER BATTY, J.* 'though it was open to the High Court under sub-sec. (1) (a) to reverse the order of acquittal and to order that the accused be re-tried, such an order was not necessary or possible in the present case. There had been no legal trial and therefore there had been no legal acquittal and hence no valid appeal from an acquittal. The High Court had therefore no acquittal to reverse, and the question whether, the accused should be tried legally, was a question not for judicial decision, but for the Government' 29 B. 449 at p. 467.

VI.—APPEALS FROM CONVICTIONS.

(A) RE-TRIALS—SUB-SEC. (1) (b) (1)

41. Power to allow objections, not distinctly raised in the grounds of appeal.—See Note 24.

42. Appellate Court bound to see what possible object could be served by fresh trial.—Where all the evidence, on which a conviction for any offence could be sustained had been put before the Court of First Instance, the Appellate Court should before quashing a conviction and directing a new trial, come to a certain conclusion as to the offence which the accused is shown by the evidence to have committed, and should consider whether, if the evidence showed that the accused should have been convicted of another offence than that charged, he would be prejudiced by amending the conviction. Before ordering a re-trial, the Appellate Court is bound to see what possible object could be served by a fresh trial, *WELF II*, 430. Where a rule nisi was issued to show cause why the conviction should not be set aside and a re-trial ordered, and it appeared that the accused had already suffered the whole imprisonment, less one day, the Court in setting aside the conviction did not direct a re-trial, 3 C. W. N. 332.

to roast, toast, from *Lai* *torrens*, to parch, {
roast.]

1. Lren?
kind of fo
into milk
And put fat

st. One who toddl

ny are invited to drink -- so called from the toasts
formerly put into liquor, which were considered a
great delicacy

After such bloody toil we bid good night. That
Toil a sometimes used in the formation of self-
the city compass, as, toil strung, toil strung, toil
sore and the like
Syn -- Labor drudgery work exerting compulsion
employment task travail, ~ Toil, Labor, drudgery
Laborer's strenuous exertion

as the ancient Romans con-
sisting of a single broad
piece of cloth and wrapped
around the body. It is called

1. Lren?
kind of fo
into milk
And put fat



43. Re-trial should not be ordered when there is no irregularity or defect.—Where the evidence recorded by the Magistrate was as full as the law required it to be, and where there was no irregularity of procedure or defect in the inquiry which made it necessary that the case should be re-tried, the Sessions Judge had no authority to order the re-trial of the accused on appeal. He should have considered, on the evidence given before the Magistrate, whether the conviction should be sustained, or whether it ought to be altered, or whether the accused was entitled to an acquittal, *Ratanlal 530*.

44. Re-trial should not be ordered to enable prosecution to fill up gaps in the evidence.—A re-trial should not be ordered where the charges fail not because they were deficient in form, but because the evidence adduced is not enough to support the charges, *17 C. W. N. 479 = 14 Cr. L. J. 219; 23 M. L. J. 379*. A re-trial should not be ordered where the evidence is untrustworthy and discrepant, *20 P. W. R. 1909 = 11 Cr. L. J. 131*. A re-trial should not be ordered for the sole object of enabling the prosecution to reconcile discrepancies and fill up deficiency in their evidence pointed out by the appellant, *3 Bur. L. T. 9 = 11 Cr. L. J. 634*. A re-trial should not be ordered where the prosecution of its own negligence failed to produce evidence which it was bound to. *PER SUNDARA AIVAR, J.*, in *38 M. 457*. But if the prosecution was ready to adduce evidence, *e.g.*, the publication of a libel and the Magistrate intervened and held that it was unnecessary as it had already been proved by the production of the newspaper, *held* that the case was one in which a re-trial may properly be ordered, *36 M. 457*. An Appellate Court should not order a re-trial on the sole ground that some additional witnesses ought to have been examined for the prosecution, especially when the prosecution was conducted by a pleader and it was not shown that he had exercised an improper discretion in not calling the witnesses, *31 C. 710*. *See 33 M. 1023*, where it was *held* that an acquittal may be set aside on appeal when it has been obtained by fraud or trick of the accused. *See also 17 Cr. L. J. 193 (M.)*

45. Proper order when Magistrate has refused to take defence evidence.—Where the Magistrate had refused to take the defence for the accused, the proper order for the Sessions Judge to pass in appeal under this section is to set aside the conviction and sentence passed on the accused and direct the Magistrate to re-commence the proceedings against the accused from the stage when his evidence was refused. *28 P. R. 1884*. An Appellate Court should not set aside a conviction on the ground that all the witnesses cited for the defence were not examined. The proper course in such a case is to have the evidence taken of the other witnesses before disposing of the appeal, *Weir II, 431; 16 A. L. J. 325*.

46. When re-trial may be ordered.—*Re-trial may be ordered when trial was illegal, irregular or defective*. Power not confined to cases where trial was held by Court having no jurisdiction.—A re-trial may be ordered where the trial is held to be illegal on the ground of misjoinder of charges. A re-trial would also be proper where evidence has been improperly rejected or where the accused was rightly acquitted of one offence, the Appellate Court comes to the conclusion that he ought to have been tried for another. Appellate Court should come to the conclusion that the trial was not properly held for one reason or other. *36 M. 457*. In *27 C. 172*, it was *held*, that the power of an Appellate Court to order a new trial conferred on it by sub-sec. (1), cl. (b) is not confined to the case where the conviction and sentence is set aside for want of jurisdiction in the Court that tried the case. A re-trial may properly be ordered where the original trial is void for want of jurisdiction or for misjoinder, or where the enquiry has been obviously superficial and material witnesses have not been examined, *3 Bur. L. T. 9 = 11 Cr. L. J. 634*. But it is not in every case of error, that the High Court will direct a re-trial. In *7 W. R. 3*, where the appellants had been wrongly convicted, as *abettors*, instead of as *principals*, the High Court declined to interfere. So, too, in *3 B. H. C. R. 42*, where the accused was wrongly convicted of cheating by personation, when he should have been convicted of giving false information.

(i) *When charge is defective and has misled accused*.—Apart from the general power conferred by cl. (b) of this section, a Session Judge is empowered by s. 232 to direct a re-trial to be had upon a charge, framed in whatever manner he thinks fit, on the ground that the accused has been misled in his defence by the absence of a charge or a defect in the charge. Thus, where certain owners of land were convicted under s. 154 or s. 155, I P C., for acts or omissions on the part of their agents and the charges framed by the Magistrate against them, referred only to the knowledge and belief and acts and omissions of the accused themselves, the Sessions Judge on appeal *held* that by reason of the omission to insert the words "or their agents or managers" in the charge, the accused had been seriously prejudiced in their defence and directed a re-trial upon charges as amended. It was contended that the words "*order him to be re-tried by a Court of competent jurisdiction*" in cl. (1) (b) were borrowed from s. 284 of the 1872 Code and they indicated that the Appellate Court had no power to order a re-trial except in cases where the previous trial was held by a Court having no jurisdiction. But it was decided that the power to order re-trial was not so limited, *7 C. W. N. 301*, which follows *15 A. 203, 23 C. 975*.

27 C. 172 and 23 C. 104 In the last quoted ruling, PRINSEP and HANDLEY, JJ, doubted whether an Appellate Court had, apart from s 232 a general power under this section to order a re-trial.

(ii) *Where trial bad for misjoinder of parties*—An Appellate Court in discharging the accused on the ground of misjoinder of parties, has power to add to that order a direction that the accused should be re-tried. The Court is not bound to remain silent and leave further proceedings to the discretion of the Magistrate. A fresh trial can be had because the accused have not been acquitted. When the evidence before the Appellate Court is mixed up, it is not bound to see whether there was evidence on which a re-trial could properly take place, 23 C 104; 9 N. L. R. 42 = 14 Cr. L. J. 230.

(iii) *Where proceedings have been irregular and the irregularity has prejudiced the accused*—S and four others were prosecuted for an offence under the *Indian Forest Act*. All but S admitted their guilt, but were nevertheless kept as accused persons during the trial, their statements being used against S. All were convicted and S appealed. The Appellate Court being of opinion (*inter alia*) that S must have been seriously prejudiced by the irregular procedure followed in that the other accused, who pleaded guilty, were kept in the dock instead of being examined as witnesses, when S would have had an opportunity of cross-examining them, set aside the conviction and directed that S should be re-tried. Against this order S applied in revision, alleging that in the circumstances he should have been discharged. *Held*, that the order of the Appellate Court was proper one. Ratanlal 933. A second-class Magistrate having jurisdiction convicted the accused upon evidence which was not given in their presence and the Sub-Divisional Magistrate on appeal, ordered that the accused should be re-tried and the District Magistrate, doubting whether the Sub-Divisional Magistrate had power under this section to pass such an order, referred the case to the High Court. *Held*, that the order of the Appellate Court was perfectly legal. Weir II, 431; 23 C. 63. When a Sessions Court consider that the proceedings have been irregular and the irregularity has prejudiced the accused, he is competent to order a re-trial of the accused without referring the case to the High Court, 1883 A. W. N. 99.

(iv) *Is order for re-trial proper where conviction is for minor offence by competent Magistrate?*—*Held*, that the Appellate Court that the convicting Magistrate was not competent to punish the accused adequately, 16 P. R. 1895. *Quere* Why not report the case then to the High Court for enhancement of sentence? Compare 15 A. 205, 16 B 580, 23 C. 350; 17 C. P. L. R. 97. Again where the accused had been convicted of a minor offence and appeals from the conviction, the Sessions Judge can act under cl. (1) (b) of this section set aside the conviction, and order a re-trial for the graver offence, even though the prosecution, at the previous trial, had adduced all the available evidence, 11 C. W. N. 100. Where, however, a second-class Magistrate convicted the accused under s 182 I P C., though he found that the facts constituted also an offence under s 211, I P C., which was triable by a first-class Magistrate and on appeal, the Sub-Divisional Magistrate, though he considered the accused guilty under s 182 I P C., acquitted him on the ground that he should have been tried by a first class Magistrate for the graver offence under s. 211, I P C. *Held*, that the procedure of the Sub-Divisional Magistrate acquitting the accused was wrong. Weir II, 432. This ruling was followed in 2 M. L. T. R. 495, where it was laid down that the conviction for the minor offence is not to be set aside, especially where the interests of public justice may not require a fresh trial for the graver offence.

47. Is it necessary to order re-trial where original trial void for want of jurisdiction?—Where a Magistrate tried and convicted an accused for an offence triable exclusively by a Court of Session and on appeal, the conviction was set aside and the accused discharged. *Held*, that the Appellate Court could not order a re-trial as the proceedings of the Magistrate were void and could not in any sense be regarded as a trial. There was nothing to prevent fresh proceedings being taken, 29 C 412, 12 C. W. N. 248. Where on appeal the conviction is set aside, the Appellate Court is not bound to hold the trial, but may order a re-trial without such order, to hold an inquiry and commit, 29 C. 412.

43 Order of re-trial may be made subsequent to annulling conviction.—When a Sessions Judge on appeal annuls the conviction of a Magistrate for want of jurisdiction and omits to order a re-trial at the time under cl. (1) (b) of this section, he is not precluded by s. 369 from passing such an order subsequently, 3 M. 48; 23 C. 350.

43-A. Reversal of conviction by the Appellate Court on a preliminary ground is not an acquittal, the question of re-trial may be left to the Crown.—The reversal of the conviction and sentence by the Appellate

outh A
 great stout
 servant girl
 with cheeks
 as red as her
 top knots "

W Scott

2 (Ichth)

A species of

flat dish of the

genus *Rhombus* (*R. punctatus*)

Top'-lin tern

Top'-light,

Top'-less a

Top-knot (*Rhombus*)

n (See it) A lantern or light in

the top of a vessel

Having no

They light the signal torch

Torch'-be'-saw

Toph n [Lat. *tophus* *topus* tufa or tuff See

Torch and terra] A kind of sandstone.

To ph'a'eous a [Lat. *tophaceus* *tophaceus*

rough, stony

Top'-häm per, n

Court on the ground of non-compliance with the provisions of s 360, leaving the question of re-trial to the District Magistrate is not an order of acquittal of the accused. The order of the Appellate Court leaving the question of re-trial to the discretion of the Crown authorities is legal, and the District Magistrate has power to direct the same. 53 C. 192.

49. **Jury trials.—Power of High Court.**—See Notes 37 and 101 and s. 417

50. **Appellate Court can order re-trial by particular Subordinate Court.**—When an Appellate Court reverses a conviction and sentence under this section, it can order re-trial of the appellant by a competent Subordinate Court, and there is nothing in the section which prevents the specification by the Appellate Court of a particular Subordinate Court, *Ratanlal* 367.

51. **Is Appellate Court itself competent to re-try or must re-trial be by Subordinate Court?**—An Appellate Court cannot, while reversing the conviction recorded against and the sentence passed upon the accused by Subordinate Magistrate, direct that the case should be tried by itself. Such a direction is plainly illegal and the re-trial under this section, if ordered, must be by a Court of competent jurisdiction subordinate to the Appellate Court, *Ratanlal* 932. See 4 C. W. N. 576, where MACLEAN, C. J., expressed a doubt whether the High Court could itself re-try. But in 30 M. 225, it was held, following *Weir II*, 431, that where a conviction by a second class Magistrate is appealed against, the Appellate Magistrate may himself proceed to try the offender, although the offence is one within the ordinary jurisdiction of the Subordinate Magistrate, the Appellate Magistrate need not necessarily refer it to another competent Magistrate. The words "*order him to be tried by a Court subordinate to such Appellate Court*" are not words of limitation and do not exclude the Appellate Court from itself trying the offender, if the offence is one within the ordinary jurisdiction of the Appellate Magistrate, but if the Appellate Court happens to be the Court of Session except in cases in which it is expressly empowered to take cognizance of an offence as a Court of Original jurisdiction, it has no power itself to hold the re-trial, unless a valid commitment has been made by a Magistrate duly empowered in that behalf, 4907 A. W. N. 178 = 6 Cr. L. J. 7, where 22 G. 50 is referred to and see s. 193

52. **High Court may direct re-hearing of appeal by Lower Appellate Court.**—See Note 12 to s 424. In 43 P. W. R. 1912 = 7 P. L. R. 1913 = 13 Cr. L. J. 737 following 13 B. 566, it was held that the High Court has power under this section to order re-trial of an appeal by a Sessions Court. Where a Sessions Judge, as an Appellate Court reversed a conviction erroneously on a technical point and acquitted the accused, the High Court set aside his order, on appeal by Government, and directed the Sessions Court to hear the appeal on the merits, 24 W. R. 41

53. **Re-trial may be directed on fresh charge framed on recorded evidence.**—When an Appellate Court orders under sub-sec. (1)(b) that a convicted person be retried, it may, in a suitable case, direct at the same time that the new proceedings should commence with the framing of a proper charge on the evidence already on record, 8 N. L. R. 42 = 14 Cr. L. J. 230, 25 C. 863 explained

54. **Where no express limitation stated, order of re-trial applies to all charges framed by Original Court.**—Where an accused person is charged with and tried for various offences arising out of a single act or series of acts, it being doubtful which of those offences the act or acts constitute and where he has been acquitted by the verdict of a jury of some or such offences and convicted of others and appeals against such conviction, and where the Appellate Court reverses the verdict of the jury and orders a re-trial without any express limitation as to the charges upon which such trial is to be held, such re-trial must be taken to be upon all the charges as originally framed, and the acquittal by the jury on the previous trial upon some of such charges is no bar to the accused being tried on them again, as, having regard to the provisions of this section, s. 403 in that respect cannot apply to such cases, 22 C. 377. When a conviction is set aside and a re-trial is ordered the whole case is re-opened and the accused must be tried again on all the charges originally framed 13 Cr. L. J. 497 (C). The High Court has no jurisdiction in ordering a re-trial to uphold the conviction under one sentence and to order him to be re-tried under another, 15 C. W. N. 909 = 13 Cr. L. J. 715.

55. **Evidence cannot be restricted when re-trial ordered.**—Where an Appellate Court passes an order of remand under this section it cannot restrict the evidence to be taken to that mentioned in its order, but, it should refer the case to be retried in view of the instructions contained in its order. In such a case it is open to the accused person to adduce such additional evidence as he may desire, 3 C. L. J. 303 = 3 Cr. L. J. 304. See s. 423.

B—COMMITTAL FOR TRIAL.—SUB-SEC. (1) (b) (1)

56. **Where Appellate Court orders committal, no preliminary inquiry needed.**—Where a Sessions Judge on appeal acting under sub-sec. (1) (b) annulled conviction and directed the committal of the accused, it

remarkable
fortification
size of its
bill The
feet of tou
cans like those of
parrots, are formed
for grasping *H. Cyc*
2 (*Astron*) A
small modern con
stellation of the
southern hemi
sphere *Station*
Touela (*Uch*), v t
imp & p n Toula (*Uch*)



1 to sit on the nest and touched the top of the *scripter*
2 How she intent *Intend* with his eyes *Intend*
2 To pete, for by the *pete* *pete*

SYN — Whole entire complete Integral See
Whole
Total n The whole, the whole sum or amount
as these sums added make the grand total of five
millions

7 to meddle or interfere with; as I have not
touched the books
8 To affect the senses or the sensibility of, to
move, to melt, to soften

Hath touched — What of sense

to strike, as an instrument of music, to
play on

was held that there was no need of preliminary inquiry by the committing Magistrate before commitment, **Weir II. 479**. Where a Magistrate tries a case which is exclusively triable by the Court of Session and convicts and sentences the accused and such conviction and sentence are subsequently annulled by the Court of Session, but not the proceedings held at such trial, the Magistrate may commit the accused to the Court of Session on the record as it stands, *ie*, on the evidence given before him at the previous trial without taking evidence *de novo*, **2 A. 910**. Thus, where a Subordinate Magistrate convicted the accused under ss 323 and 379, I P C., and on appeal, the Sub-Divisional Magistrate having come to the conclusion, that the facts constituted robbery and that the Sub-Magistrate had no jurisdiction to try the case, submitted the records to the District Magistrate for orders. *Held*, that the proper course was to follow the course laid down in sub-sec. (1)(b)(1) of this section and that if there was no Court of competent jurisdiction subordinate to the Appellate Court to try the offence of robbery, it was competent to the Appellate Court to direct the committal of the case to the Court of Session, **Weir II, 484**.

57. Appellate Court can order commitment in cases not exclusively triable by Court of Session.—It is competent to a Session Judge acting as a Court of Appeal, having reversed the finding and sentence to order the commitment of the appellant to the Sessions for trial. There is nothing in this section to limit his power to do any of the acts which he as an Appellate Court is empowered to do by cl (1)(b), **15 A. 205** where **8 A. 14** and **1895 A. W. N. 288** were dissented from, **27 C. 172**; **16 P. R. 1895**; **16 B. 530**; **23 C. 330**. Such commitment is quite different from an enhancement of sentence, though as a result of trial at the Sessions, the appellant gets a heavier sentence. The power of ordering a new trial merely for the purpose of enhancing punishment is a power that ought to be very sparingly exercised, **13 A. L. J. 477** = **16 Cr. L. J. 433**.

58. Commitment may be ordered when sentence required by law for the offence has not been and could not be passed by the Magistrate.—If a Magistrate ignores circumstances of aggravation, which show that an offence beyond his jurisdiction was in fact committed and tries and convicts on the same facts within his jurisdiction, his proceedings are not void. When the Magistrate convicts of an offence which he is competent to try, the Sessions Judge is not competent on appeal, to set aside the conviction and sentence and direct the accused to be committed for an offence triable exclusively by the Court of Session on the ground the proceedings are void under s. 530. He should not direct the commitment to be made in such a case, unless he is of opinion that the accused had been prejudiced or that the sentence is inadequate, **24 M. 675**.

59. Appeal Court cannot commit to itself.—The Sessions Judge has no power to commit the accused to his own Court **1907 A. W. N. 173**. See Note 51

60. Commitment may be made only after reversing conviction.—Appeal Court except High Court cannot set aside acquittal.—In a case where the accused were charged under ss. 143, 147, 323 and 379, I P C., the second class Magistrate acquitted them of theft and convicted them on the other charges. On appeal by the accused, the Deputy Magistrate holding that the offence of theft had been committed and that it amounted in essence, *Held*, that the words 'reverse the finding and on which the conviction is based and do not empower other than a High Court) to reverse or set aside his decision ignores the powers conferred by cl.(b)(2) and was dissented from in **34 M. 556** and **35 M. 243**. So also where the petitioners were tried for offences under ss 143 and 325 read with s. 149, I P C., and acquitted of those offences, but convicted under s. 323, I P C., and an appeal from conviction, the District Magistrate acquitted the accused of the offence under s. 323, I P C., and ordered re trial, and on the Subordinate Magistrate proceeding to try the petitioner under s. 147, etc., *held*, that the re-trial, cannot proceed, as the petitioners have been acquitted under ss. 147 and 325 read with s. 149 by the offences. Then cannot be re-tried

VII.—ALTERATION OF FINDING.

A—MAINTAINING THE SENTENCE

61. Appellate Court may alter finding of acquittal into one of conviction.—When an act or a series of acts is of such a nature that it is doubtful which of several offences the facts which can be proved will constitute, an appeal from a conviction for anyone of such offences the facts which can be proved will constitute an appeal from a conviction for anyone of such offences must lay the whole case open to the interference of the Appellate Court, notwithstanding any order of acquittal in regard to any other of the offences, **22 C. 371**.

In an appeal from conviction, the Appellate Court can under this section alter the finding of the Lower Court and find the appellant guilty of an offence of which he was acquitted by that Court, provisions of s 403 notwithstanding, 3 C. 975 followed in 27 C. 172. The charge against the accused was under ss. 148 and 325, 1 P. C. The Magistrate acquitted the accused under s 148, but convicted under s 325, 1 P. C. The accused then appealed to the Sessions Judge who was of opinion that the accused should have been convicted under s. 147, but thought he could not interfere with the acquittal, *held following* 23 W. 975 that it was open to the Sessions Judge under sub-sec. (b) (2) to alter the finding maintaining the sentence and there is nothing to restrict the finding which may be altered to a finding of conviction (25 M. 478 not followed) 34 M. 545, 8 A. L. J. 1239 = 12 Cr. L. J. 572; 35 M. 243; 37 M. 119; U. B. R. (1911) 4 Qr. 100 = 13 Cr. L. J. 437, 12 P. R. 1904; 34 A. 115. There is only one restriction on the powers of a Court of Appeal. It cannot enhance the sentence under appeal 23 C. 975; 15 A. 205, 22 C. 377; 23 C. 975 holds in general terms that under s 423, in an appeal from conviction the Appellate Court can alter the finding of acquittal into one of conviction. The reason given is that there is no reason to limit the meaning of the words 'alter the finding' in s 423 (b) (2) only to a finding of conviction. Therefore as long as the sentence is maintained without enhancement a Court of Appeal can convert a finding of acquittal into one of conviction under s. 423 (b) (2).

In 26 M. 478 it was held that under s 423 a Deputy Magistrate has no power to reverse an order of acquittal. The words 'reverse the finding and sentence' in clause 1 (b) of that section mean reverse a finding upon which a conviction is based and do not empower the appellate tribunal (or at any rate an appellate tribunal other than a High Court) to reverse or set aside an acquittal. In this case 23 C. 975 was explained.

And in 35 M. 243 it is held that in cases not falling under ss 237 and 238 of the Code the Appellate Court cannot convict a person of an offence with which he was not charged in the first Court. But where he has been charged and the first Court has recorded a finding of acquittal on that charge there is no reason for holding that the Appellate Court can alter the finding provided the sentence is not enhanced.

In 27 C. W. N. 555 where the trial Court convicted the accused under s 143, 1 P. C., but acquitted them of the offence under s 379 1 P. C., and the Appellate Court while upholding the conviction under s 143, 1 P. C., and the sentence set aside the acquittal under s 379, *held*, that the Appellate Court had no jurisdiction to set aside the acquittal of the petitioner when he upheld the conviction under s 143, 1 P. C. It was not a case of altering the conviction which was within his powers under s. 423 of the Code.

62. On appeal High Court may alter finding and enhance sentence.—The effect of reading ss. 423 and 439 together is that the High Court when hearing an appeal against a conviction may under cl. (b) of s. 423 alter the finding and then as a Court of Revision may under s 439 enhance the sentence so as to make it appropriate to the altered finding. S 439 (4) does not limit the powers of a Court of Appeal 37 M. 119. It is only the High Court that is given this power. In this case the High Court on appeal altered the finding from s 304 to s. 302 1 P. C. and enhanced the sentence. *See* 1 Rang 436. But *See* 27 Bom. L. R. 355 = 49 Bom. 450.

63. When Appellate Court may alter charge or finding and convict accused for offence which his acts properly constitute?—(s) *When accused has met the new charge and is not prejudiced by alteration*—If the prosecution establishes certain acts constituting an offence and the Court misapplies the law by charging and convicting an accused person for an offence other than that for which he should have been properly charged, and if, notwithstanding such error, the accused has by his defence endeavoured to meet the acquisition of the commission of these acts, then the Appellate Court may alter the charge or finding and convict him for an offence which those acts properly constitute, provided the accused be not prejudiced by the alteration. In the finding. Such an error is one of form rather than of substance, and the alteration by an Appellate Court of the charge or finding would not necessitate a re-trial expressly on a charge of the offence, 26 C. 683. The exercise of this discretion must be regulated largely by a consideration of what was the nature of the evidence in respect of the charge upon which a person was convicted and whether the evidence reasonably supports the particular charge to which the former charge is to be altered, and whether the accused person will in any way be prejudiced or injured by the alteration of the charge (s 474 to s. 193, 1 P. C.), 1890 A. W. N. 86. The Appellate Court must look to the offence as charged and determine whether it is proved or not. It has nothing to do with the form the offence may take owing to subsequent events. A conviction for an offence for which the accused was tried, will not prevent his conviction, if guilty, of another distinct offence subsequently committed, 9 W. R. 65. Where the evidence showed that there were six robbers, but three were acquitted, the conviction of the rest under s 391, 1 P. C., was on appeal altered into one for robbery, s. 392, 1 P. C., 7 M. L. T. 340 = 1910 M. W. N. 52 = 11 Cr. L. J. 249. In (1912) M. W. N. 1110 = 15 Cr. L. J. 239, a conviction under s. 353, 1 P. C., altered into one under s. 183, 1 P. C. *See also* 17 Cr. L. J. 354 (M.).

(ii) *Alteration of conviction from composite offence to element of such offence*—The accused was convicted by a Subordinate Magistrate of house-breaking by night under s 457, I P C. In appeal the conviction was altered to one under s 414, I P C. On reference that the order was illegal, no charge of theft having been preferred in the first Court, *held*, that s. 457 applies to a composite offence, and that the conviction of the accused on any element of such offence was legal under s 238, under sub-sec. (1)(b)(2) the Appellate Court can record a new finding and sentence, *Ratanlal* 293.

(iii) *Appellate Court may alter finding in order to legalise sentence*—Accused, an old offender, was sentenced to 18 months' rigorous imprisonment and 20 lashes for house-breaking by night with intent to commit theft. *Held*, that the previous convictions being only for theft, the double sentence was quite illegal as a sentence under s 457, I P C, but on the facts, it was open to the Sessions Judge as an Appellate Court to alter the conviction and to convict the accused of both house-breaking by night and theft in a house, and the double sentence would then be legal as a sentence for theft, 3 L B. R. 112 = 3 Cr. L. J. 343.

(iv) *Appellate Court may alter finding to an offence for which sanction or complaint may be necessary*—In 23 A. 534 it was *held* that under this section, an Appellate Court altering the finding but maintaining the sentence is not bound in respect of such altered finding by such conditions as previous sanction or complaint by the person aggrieved as would be binding on the Original Court before it can take cognizance of the offence, and that the alteration of the conviction from s. 182, I P C, to one under s 500, I P C, was within the powers of the Appellate Court, even though there was no complaint by some person aggrieved. As both offences arise out of the same facts such altered conviction will be upheld, unless the accused were prejudiced by such alteration by way of the shifting of the onus, etc. The correctness of this view may be open to doubt, if an appeal be held to be a continuation of the original trial, but looking to the view of the Legislature as laid down in s 532 the decision may be upheld as a want of sanction does not affect the competency of the Court. See 23 C. 975 at p 977. See Note 254 at p 548

64. *Limitations on power to alter finding*—(i) *Offence must be one for which accused was charged or might have been charged at trial*—When the accused had been convicted of murder, and on appeal had been acquitted of that offence the High Court refused to order a trial for dishonestly receiving stolen property, as the accused was never charged with that offence, and it was not one cognate to the offence of murder, or one which was connected with it so as to form the same transaction, 20 A. 107. The finding which an Appellate Court may alter under sub-sec. (b) may relate either to an offence with which the accused was separately charged in the Lower Court or to one of which he might be convicted without a distinct charge, 21 M. L. J. 805 = 10 M. L. T. 66 = (1911) 2 M. W. N. 106 = 12 Cr. L. J. 269. Where the Court of Session had tried, convicted and sentenced an accused person under s. 409 I P C, and the High Court was of opinion that the conviction was not sustainable under that section the Court refused to alter the finding to a conviction for some other offence (bribery) for which the accused had not been charged or tried, 8 A. 120. Alteration of finding will be proper only where both findings are equally consistent with the charge upon which the appellant had been tried. See 1887 A. W. N. 130. A totally new case ought not to be sprung upon the accused without proper notice to him of the new charge he has to meet, 16 Cr. L. J. 599 (A.), 4 Lah. 373

(ii) *Conviction of offence which Original Court was incompetent to try*—An Appellate Court is not competent to alter the finding of a Magistrate so as to convict an accused person of an offence which the Original Court is not competent to try, 7 A. 414 (F B). In 3 L. B. R. 232 = 4 Cr. L. J. 490, the question was whether the alteration by the Sessions Judge of a finding under s 397, I P C, into one under s. 392 was sustainable and it was *held following* 27 C. 660 and *dissenting from* 25 A. 534 that the alteration would be good only if the accused is not thereby convicted of a more serious offence, the general rule being that on appeal or revision, an accused person cannot be convicted of an offence of which he could not have been convicted by the Court which tried him.

(iii) *Power to alter finding is subject to provisions of ss 233 and 239*—The power conferred on Appellate Courts by this section is not to be understood as overriding the provisions of s 733. Thus when the petitioner and four others were tried jointly under s 454 I P C, and the petitioner was convicted of the abetment of the offence but the Appellate Court converted the conviction into one under ss 411 and 414, I P C, *held*, that the altered conviction could not be maintained, as the petitioner could not be tried under ss 411 and 414, I P C, jointly with four others who were being tried for an offence under s 454, I P C, and the fact that the petitioner was convicted for the offence of

(iv) *Conviction for offence cannot be altered into conviction for abetment of that offence*—Though under this section the Appellate Court has power to alter a finding, that power cannot be used arbitrarily but only in accordance with other provisions of this Code which are to be found in ss 237 238. When a person has been charged with a certain offence and has been convicted of that offence, the Appellate Court cannot on finding that the conviction is not sustainable, convict the accused of abetment of that offence, 11 Bom. H. C. R. 240 followed, 33 M. 264; 13 Cr. L. J. 203 (M.), 13 Cr. L. J. 223 (M.), 15 Cr. L. J. 694 (M.). See, however, Note 2 under s. 237 at p. 674. See also 42 C. 1094 = 19 C. W. N. 1239. See 26 Bom. L. R. 323, but see 3 Rang. 11 (contra).

(v) *Conviction ought not to be altered into one for a more serious offence*—As a general principle it would be improper and unfair to an accused person that on his appeal he should be convicted of a more serious offence to which he had never pleaded on his trial, especially if the offence, which the Appellate Court might consider to be established was not cognate to the offence of which he had been tried and convicted, if there were circumstances of aggravation of an offence to which the accused had not pleaded, 26 C. 63; 3 C. W. N. 367; 6 C. L. R. 427. For exceptions to this rule, see ss 236 237 and 238. It is not competent to an Appellate Court to find a prisoner on appeal guilty of a graver offence than that with which he was charged at his trial, unless an opportunity is afforded to the accused of defending himself against the charge so altered (e.g., from ss 143 to s 147, 1 P. C.), 6 C. L. R. 427. In 4 B. H. C. R. Cr. Ca 16 the accused was convicted of cheating. Though the facts found constituted criminal breach of trust, the conviction and sentence were maintained. See 7 W. R. 3.

63 *Alterations which have been held to be illegal*—(i) *Alteration of ss 211 and 109 to s 193, 1 P. C.*—In proceedings taken in a charge of abetment of an offence punishable under s. 211, 1 P. C., it would be improper to convict the accused of intentionally giving false evidence (s. 193) as the two offences are entirely of a different character, and in making a defence on a charge of the first named offence the accused could not be regarded as pleading to a charge of intentionally giving false evidence in regard to some particular statement 3 C. W. N. 367.

(i) *Alteration of the charge illegal when the nature of the case is changed*—A charge cannot be so altered by an Appellate Court as to make it necessary for an accused to meet an absolutely different case from that with which he is charged in the Court of the committing Magistrate. 23 A. L. J. R. 924.

(ii) *Alteration of s 376 to s. 366, 1 P. C.*—The alteration of the finding must be of an offence charged or of some cognate offence and not of an offence which should have formed the subject of a new and separate charge. Thus, where on appeal, the conviction under s. 376 1 P. C., was altered into one under s. 366, 1 P. C., the alteration was held to be improper, as the latter charge involved different elements and different questions of fact from the former, 8 Bom. L. R. 120; 3 Rang. 63.

(iii) *Alteration of s. 379 to s 143 1 P. C.*—The appellate judgment altering a conviction under s. 379, 1 P. C., into one under s. 143, 1 P. C., was set aside on the ground that the latter was an offence with which the accused was never charged and regarding which he had never been called upon to enter upon his defence and moreover it was an offence of an entirely different character from theft for which alone the accused had been tried, 27 C. 560.

(iv) *Alteration of s 323 to s 143*—The accused were convicted of an offence under s. 323, 1 P. C.

(v) *Charge under s 443, 1 P. C., ought not to be added*—An addition by the Appellate Court to charges under ss. 451 and 426, 1 P. C., of a charge under s. 143, 1 P. C., is not permissible. The addition of this section would have the effect of enforcing a constructive responsibility for individual acts of all persons who were members at the time of the assembly, whereas it would be necessary to prove the guilt of each of the persons charged for his individual acts if the charges were only under ss. 451 and 426, 1 P. C., 16 Cr. L. J. 737 (M.).

(vi) *Alteration of s 143 to s 823, 1 P. C.*—Where a Magistrate convicted the accused on the only charge of rioting, and on appeal, the Sessions Judge acquitted them of rioting but convicted them of house-trespass and hurt. Held on revision that these latter offences were distinct and separate offences which should have formed the subject of separate charges, and as the accused were prejudiced by the omission of the charges the conviction could not be sustained, 30 C. 233. In 33 C. 233 and 15 C. W. N. 1276 = 15 Cr. L. J. 704 it was held that a conviction under s. 147 could not be altered into one under s. 323, 1 P. C. See also Ratanlal 353; 30 C. W. N. 523.

(vii) *Alteration of ss 447 and 357 to s. 379, 1 P. C.*—In 7 M. L. T. 202 = 11 Cr. L. J. 340, it was held that where an Appellate Court altered the conviction under ss. 447 and 357, 1 P. C., into one under s. 379, 1 P. C., the

1 To tread and r foot esp ally to tread upon with pride cont mpt, trample or scorn

He here to your pen, a bold row e foot in a noble stride treaded it. *See* *trample*

2 To tread down to prostrate by tread ng as to trample grass

3 To tread with pride contempt and insult

Trample r 4 1 To tread in cont mpt — with on or upon

Disgrace trample d on Plato's pride w th pride of his own

2 To tread with force and rapid

Trample n 3 To tread of treading under foot with violence [Rare]

Trample r 4 One who tramples, one who treads down

Tram pouse' r 5 [to TRAMP Tramp] To walk with labor or tramp [Loc] [C]

Tram-wad n 6 Road prepared for the use of trains or wagons by form ng the wh smooth beams of wood blocks of stone, iron

7 The word said by some to be deris n in all Afric a term ex nely con cted w the colonies in America

8 The act of trampling or treading

9 The act of trampling or treading

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2 (A n of an Ilos) Transcending or going beyond the bounds of human knowledge — applied to speculation about what lies beyond the reach of the human intellect

Transcendent n That which surpasses or is supereminent that wld h is very exal cont, say thing superior

Transcendent n 1 (Fr transcendent Ep transcendent) That which is transcendent

2 Supereminent surpassing others, as transcendental being or qualities

3 (Annoy trans) 4 If or pertaining to that which can be determined i pr in regard to the fundamental principles of a human knowledge

What is transcendental Therefore transcendentalism is a philosophy but it does not transcend all human knowledge, or become transcendent

Transcendent n 5 (Fr transcendent) That which is transcendent

6 (Annoy trans) 7 If or pertaining to that which can be determined i pr in regard to the fundamental principles of a human knowledge

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Transcendent n 8 (Fr transcendent) That which is transcendent

9 (Annoy trans) 10 If or pertaining to that which can be determined i pr in regard to the fundamental principles of a human knowledge

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Transcendent n 11 (Fr transcendent) That which is transcendent

12 (Annoy trans) 13 If or pertaining to that which can be determined i pr in regard to the fundamental principles of a human knowledge

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Transcendent n 14 (Fr transcendent) That which is transcendent

15 (Annoy trans) 16 If or pertaining to that which can be determined i pr in regard to the fundamental principles of a human knowledge

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Transcendent n 17 (Fr transcendent) That which is transcendent

18 (Annoy trans) 19 If or pertaining to that which can be determined i pr in regard to the fundamental principles of a human knowledge

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Transcendent n 20 (Fr transcendent) That which is transcendent

21 (Annoy trans) 22 If or pertaining to that which can be determined i pr in regard to the fundamental principles of a human knowledge

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Transcendent n 23 (Fr transcendent) That which is transcendent

24 (Annoy trans) 25 If or pertaining to that which can be determined i pr in regard to the fundamental principles of a human knowledge

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Transcendent n 26 (Fr transcendent) That which is transcendent

27 (Annoy trans) 28 If or pertaining to that which can be determined i pr in regard to the fundamental principles of a human knowledge

What is transcendental Therefore transcendentalism is a philosophy but it does not transcend all human knowledge, or become transcendent

Transcendent n 29 (Fr transcendent) That which is transcendent

30 (Annoy trans) 31 If or pertaining to that which can be determined i pr in regard to the fundamental principles of a human knowledge

What is transcendental Therefore transcendentalism is a philosophy but it does not transcend all human knowledge, or become transcendent

Transcendent n 32 (Fr transcendent) That which is transcendent

33 (Annoy trans) 34 If or pertaining to that which can be determined i pr in regard to the fundamental principles of a human knowledge

What is transcendental Therefore transcendentalism is a philosophy but it does not transcend all human knowledge, or become transcendent

Transcendent n 35 (Fr transcendent) That which is transcendent

36 (Annoy trans) 37 If or pertaining to that which can be determined i pr in regard to the fundamental principles of a human knowledge

What is transcendental Therefore transcendentalism is a philosophy but it does not transcend all human knowledge, or become transcendent

Transcendent n 38 (Fr transcendent) That which is transcendent

39 (Annoy trans) 40 If or pertaining to that which can be determined i pr in regard to the fundamental principles of a human knowledge

What is transcendental Therefore transcendentalism is a philosophy but it does not transcend all human knowledge, or become transcendent

Transcendent n 41 (Fr transcendent) That which is transcendent

42 (Annoy trans) 43 If or pertaining to that which can be determined i pr in regard to the fundamental principles of a human knowledge

What is transcendental Therefore transcendentalism is a philosophy but it does not transcend all human knowledge, or become transcendent

Transcendent n 44 (Fr transcendent) That which is transcendent

45 (Annoy trans) 46 If or pertaining to that which can be determined i pr in regard to the fundamental principles of a human knowledge

What is transcendental Therefore transcendentalism is a philosophy but it does not transcend all human knowledge, or become transcendent

conviction was wrong as the accused had no opportunity of answering the charge of theft, 27 C. 660 and 36 C. 238 referred to

(viii) *Alteration of s 406 to s 417, I P C*—An accused charged under s 406, I P C, was convicted under s 417, I P C, without any charge framed against him of having committed any other offences. On appeal the Sessions Judge held that the Magistrate was irregular in convicting of offences under s 417, but he found the evidence recorded disclosed that the appellant had committed offences under s 406, I P C, and he accordingly altered the finding without giving however any opportunity to the accused of showing cause against being convicted by him of offences of which he had been acquitted by the Magistrate. Held, that the Sessions Court's order must be set aside and the appeal must be reheard, 3 L. B. R. 233 = 5 Cr. L. J. 420.

(ix) *Different common object for an unlawful assembly*—It is not competent to an Appellate Court while disbelieving the common object of an unlawful assembly, to find out a different common object regarding which the accused were never called upon to plead nor tried, and then to affirm the conviction, 33 C. 295 which follows 27 C. 990; 11 C. W. N. 158, and see s. 215

(x) *Conviction under s 411, alteration to s 379 or s 412*—Where the accused was convicted of the offence of dishonestly receiving stolen property, and the Appellate Court altered the conviction to one under either s 379 or s 411 I P C, held, that the alternative conviction in appeal was illegal, the accused not having been charged with theft and having had no opportunity of meeting such a charge, Ratanlal 365.

66. *Power of High Court on revision*.—Under s 439, the High Court in its revision jurisdiction may exercise all the powers given to it as a Court of Appeal by this section. See Notes to s 439

B—REDUCTION OF SENTENCE

67. *Where conviction is partly annulled sentence ought to be reduced*—Where a second-class Magistrate convicted the accused under ss 147 and 379, I P C, but passed only a single sentence for both the offences and the Appellate Court while acquitting the accused of the offence under s 379, maintained the sentence in its entirety and also passed an order under s 106. Held, that the Appellate Court having acquitted the accused of one of the offences some reduction of the sentence must be made, unless the Court thinks that the sentence ought not to be reduced, in which case, it should refer the matter to the High Court for enhancement of the sentence, 30 M. 43, where Welr II, 487 (a), 24 C. 316 and 22 B. 760 are followed, 3 M. L. T. 312 = 7 Cr. L. J. 361, 12 Cr. L. J. 454. In 7 M. L. T. 81 = 11 Cr. L. J. 243 it was, however, held that sentence need not be reduced when the conviction for one of two offences charged is set aside by Appellate Court if the inference can be drawn that the Magistrate did not intend to pass any sentence for the offence set aside. Also an Appellate Court is not competent to make an order under s 106 unless the conviction was in the first instance by a Court of the description specified in the first paragraph of that section. See also 29 M. 190; 21 C. 322 and Note 69

68. *When combined sentence is passed on conviction of two separate offences, Appellate Court cannot allot part of it to any particular offence*.—When a Magistrate on conviction of an accused person of two offences (for which separate sentences ought to have been passed) passed a single sentence, combining imprisonment and fine, held, that the Appellate Court on reversing the conviction for one offence was not justified in treating the sentence of fine as the punishment for the one offence and the sentence of imprisonment as the punishment for the other (no such distinction having been made by the trying Magistrate) and retaining the full sentence of imprisonment, Ratanlal 409.

VIII.—ALTERATION OF NATURE OF SENTENCE SO AS NOT TO ENHANCE SAME.

69. *Where conviction on one of several charges is reversed, sentence must also be set aside*.—See Note 87. Where an accused is convicted and sentenced by the Lower Court on two separate charges, an Appellate Court has no power in appeal to retain intact the whole sentence when it reverses the conviction on one of the charges, in such a retention has virtually the effect of an enhancement of sentence, 22 B. 760; 45 P. R. 1837, 24 C. 316. It is not competent for a District Magistrate to enhance a sentence on appeal, which would be the case, if he maintains the whole sentence while annulling the conviction under one of several sections under which the Court of First Instance has convicted the accused, Ratanlal 618; Welr II, 487 (a). See also 10 M. L. T. 118 = (1911) 2 M. W. N. 97 = 12 Cr. L. J. 454 and 3 M. L. T. 312 = 7 Cr. L. J. 361, where 30 M. 43 is followed. Thus, where a Magistrate had sentenced the accused separately for the two offences he found to be committed, the second offence being under s 221, I P C, and the Sessions Judge on appeal, when reversing the conviction under s 221, allowed both sentences passed by the Magistrate to stand as an aggregate sentence for the convictions substituted in his own Court for the other conviction pronounced by the Magistrate, Held,

Transgressive ly. a. In a transgressive man

Trans-Agrees **Delta**

| | | |
|------------------|--------------|-----------|
| TRANS-Shape, r f | To transform | See TRANS |
| SHAPE {Pure} | | |
| TRANS | | |

[illegible]

Transiency (tranz'ien-see) *n* The quality of being transient.

| Trial | Control | MCI | AD |
|-------|---------|-----|----|
| 1 | 95 | 85 | 75 |
| 2 | 95 | 85 | 75 |
| 3 | 95 | 80 | 70 |
| 4 | 95 | 78 | 68 |
| 5 | 95 | 75 | 65 |

Transient effect (Paral): a representation of onset

1997, 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014, 2015, 2016, 2017, 2018, 2019, 2020, 2021, 2022, 2023, 2024, 2025, 2026, 2027, 2028, 2029, 2030, 2031, 2032, 2033, 2034, 2035, 2036, 2037, 2038, 2039, 2040, 2041, 2042, 2043, 2044, 2045, 2046, 2047, 2048, 2049, 2050, 2051, 2052, 2053, 2054, 2055, 2056, 2057, 2058, 2059, 2060, 2061, 2062, 2063, 2064, 2065, 2066, 2067, 2068, 2069, 2070, 2071, 2072, 2073, 2074, 2075, 2076, 2077, 2078, 2079, 2080, 2081, 2082, 2083, 2084, 2085, 2086, 2087, 2088, 2089, 2090, 2091, 2092, 2093, 2094, 2095, 2096, 2097, 2098, 2099, 2100, 2101, 2102, 2103, 2104, 2105, 2106, 2107, 2108, 2109, 2110, 2111, 2112, 2113, 2114, 2115, 2116, 2117, 2118, 2119, 2120, 2121, 2122, 2123, 2124, 2125, 2126, 2127, 2128, 2129, 2130, 2131, 2132, 2133, 2134, 2135, 2136, 2137, 2138, 2139, 2140, 2141, 2142, 2143, 2144, 2145, 2146, 2147, 2148, 2149, 2150, 2151, 2152, 2153, 2154, 2155, 2156, 2157, 2158, 2159, 2160, 2161, 2162, 2163, 2164, 2165, 2166, 2167, 2168, 2169, 2170, 2171, 2172, 2173, 2174, 2175, 2176, 2177, 2178, 2179, 2180, 2181, 2182, 2183, 2184, 2185, 2186, 2187, 2188, 2189, 2190, 2191, 2192, 2193, 2194, 2195, 2196, 2197, 2198, 2199, 2200, 2201, 2202, 2203, 2204, 2205, 2206, 2207, 2208, 2209, 2210, 2211, 2212, 2213, 2214, 2215, 2216, 2217, 2218, 2219, 2220, 2221, 2222, 2223, 2224, 2225, 2226, 2227, 2228, 2229, 2230, 2231, 2232, 2233, 2234, 2235, 2236, 2237, 2238, 2239, 2240, 2241, 2242, 2243, 2244, 2245, 2246, 2247, 2248, 2249, 2250, 2251, 2252, 2253, 2254, 2255, 2256, 2257, 2258, 2259, 2260, 2261, 2262, 2263, 2264, 2265, 2266, 2267, 2268, 2269, 2270, 2271, 2272, 2273, 2274, 2275, 2276, 2277, 2278, 2279, 2280, 2281, 2282, 2283, 2284, 2285, 2286, 2287, 2288, 2289, 2290, 2291, 2292, 2293, 2294, 2295, 2296, 2297, 2298, 2299, 2300, 2301, 2302, 2303, 2304, 2305, 2306, 2307, 2308, 2309, 2310, 2311, 2312, 2313, 2314, 2315, 2316, 2317, 2318, 2319, 2320, 2321, 2322, 2323, 2324, 2325, 2326, 2327, 2328, 2329, 2330, 2331, 2332, 2333, 2334, 2335, 2336, 2337, 2338, 2339, 2340, 2341, 2342, 2343, 2344, 2345, 2346, 2347, 2348, 2349, 2350, 2351, 2352, 2353, 2354, 2355, 2356, 2357, 2358, 2359, 2360, 2361, 2362, 2363, 2364, 2365, 2366, 2367, 2368, 2369, 2370, 2371, 2372, 2373, 2374, 2375, 2376, 2377, 2378, 2379, 2380, 2381, 2382, 2383, 2384, 2385, 2386, 2387, 2388, 2389, 2390, 2391, 2392, 2393, 2394, 2395, 2396, 2397, 2398, 2399, 2400, 2401, 2402, 2403, 2404, 2405, 2406, 2407, 2408, 2409, 2410, 2411, 2412, 2413, 2414, 2415, 2416, 2417, 2418, 2419, 2420, 2421, 2422, 2423, 2424, 2425, 2426, 2427, 2428, 2429, 2430, 2431, 2432, 2433, 2434, 2435, 2436, 2437, 2438, 2439, 2440, 2441, 2442, 2443, 2444, 2445, 2446, 2447, 2448, 2449, 2450, 2451, 2452, 2453, 2454, 2455, 2456, 2457, 2458, 2459, 2460, 2461, 2462, 2463, 2464, 2465, 2466, 2467, 2468, 2469, 2470, 2471, 2472, 2473, 2474, 2475, 2476, 2477, 2478, 2479, 2480, 2481, 2482, 2483, 2484, 2485, 2486, 2487, 2488, 2489, 2490, 2491, 2492, 2493, 2494, 2495, 2496, 2497, 2498, 2499, 2500, 2501, 2502, 2503, 2504, 2505, 2506, 2507, 2508, 2509, 2510, 2511, 2512, 2513, 2514, 2515, 2516, 2517, 2518, 2519, 2520, 2521, 2522, 2523, 2524, 2525, 2526, 2527, 2528, 2529, 2530, 2531, 2532, 2533, 2534, 2535, 2536, 2537, 2538, 2539, 2540, 2541, 2542, 2543, 2544, 2545, 2546, 2547, 2548, 2549, 2550, 2551, 2552, 2553, 2554, 2555, 2556, 2557, 2558, 2559, 2560, 2561, 2562, 2563, 2564, 2565, 2566, 2567, 2568, 2569, 2570, 2571, 2572, 2573, 2574, 2575, 2576, 2577, 2578, 2579, 2580, 2581, 2582, 2583, 2584, 2585, 2586, 2587, 2588, 2589, 2590, 2591, 2592, 2593, 2594, 2595, 2596, 2597, 2598, 2599, 2600, 2601, 2602, 2603, 2604, 2605, 2606, 2607, 2608, 2609, 2610, 2611, 2612, 2613, 2614, 2615, 2616, 2617, 2618, 2619, 2620, 2621, 2622, 2623, 2624, 2625, 2626, 2627, 2628, 2629, 2630, 2631, 2632, 2633, 2634, 2635, 2636, 2637, 2638, 2639, 2640, 2641, 2642, 2643, 2644, 2645, 2646, 2647, 2648, 2649, 2650, 2651, 2652, 2653, 2654, 2655, 2656, 2657, 2658, 2659, 2660, 2661, 2662, 2663, 2664, 2665, 2666, 2667, 2668, 2669, 2670, 2671, 2672, 2673, 2674, 2675, 2676, 2677, 2678, 26

* I am so long / A transient guest
 A vapor few hours will disperse Page
 Of transient things who soon decay
 Age must be herehest at the latest day Poem
 O fleet joys
 Of Paradise dear bought w lazing woe!

Transiently (shent) a li [see supra]
transient manner in passage for a short
not with continuance

Transmittance of the film was measured with a Shimadzu UV-160U ultraviolet-visible spectrophotometer. The thickness of the film was measured with a digital micrometer.

1. *Journal of the American Medical Association*, 1990; 263: 1001-1005.

$\frac{1}{2}$ $\frac{1}{2}$

observing the time of trans-
it of a heavenly body over
the meridian of a place

Prime vertical transit instrument a transit instrument placed with its horizontal axis in the plane of the meridian and used for observing the transit of bodies over the prime vertical.

Trans'ition (tran'sh'zh' un, 100) (Synop, § 130) *n* [*Fr* *transition*, *Sp* *transición*, *It* *transizione*, *Ir* & *Lat* *transitiō* (see *trans*)]

* I Passage from one place or state to another, change, as the transition of the weather from hot to cold.

The spots are of the same color
immediate transition from white

2 (Mus) A. passing down
another



Surveyor & or Engineer's
Transit Instrument.

2 Hence also, to cause to lose sense or recollection, to entrance {Obs and rare }

And the good gentleman
 Fell to the bottom
 Jammed his joints together,
 And was confounded *J. Fletcher*

5 To render into another language, to express the

1. *Chlorophyll a* (Chl *a*)

this was virtually an enhancement of the sentence on altering the finding, and therefore in contravention of sub-sec. (1) (b) (3), 45 P. R. 1887. Where the offences are distinct, and require separate charges and separate sentences, then, no doubt, the reversal of one of the two or more convictions must carry with it the sentence appended to it, or in case of an erroneous combined sentence, might necessitate a fresh trial. But where only one offence has been committed, and the Magistrate erroneously splits it into two and passes either two sentences or a combined sentence, the joining up of the erroneous split—whether in conviction or in sentence—and the maintaining of the original sentence cannot be regarded as beyond the powers of the Appellate Court under this section, 3 N. L. R. 67 = 6 Cr. L. J. 43, where 24 C. 316; and 317 (Note), 22 B. 760, 45 P. R. 1887; 26 G. 863 and 8 C. P. L. R. (Cr.) 23 are referred to.

70. Appellate Court cannot on appeal pass sentence which original Magistrate was not competent to pass.—See 7 N. L. R. 109 = 12 Cr. L. J. 444, Note 3 at p. 1004

71. If conviction is confirmed, some sentence, though nominal, must be passed.—When an Appellate Court confirms a conviction, but reverses the sentence, it should, if it disapproves of the sentence, pass some other sentence, even though a nominal one. *Ratanlal 543*. But see s. 401 (5) s. 562, Note 89 and 1884 W. R. 27.

72. Is whipping more severe than imprisonment?—We have no data from which the comparative severity of the two sentences of whipping and rigorous imprisonment can be determined, and it is impossible to say how many lashes would be equivalent to a sentence of rigorous imprisonment for a specified period, 6 B. L. R. Appx. XCV = 15 W. R. 7. Thus when the first Court in addition to a sentence of imprisonment passed a sentence of whipping which was contrary to law, and the Appellate Court in setting aside the sentence of whipping, substituted for it a sentence of an additional term of imprisonment, the additional term of imprisonment was cancelled as illegal. Conversely where the Appellate Court reduced the sentence of imprisonment but awarded whipping, it was held the latter sentence was illegal as it virtually amounted to enhancement of sentence. See also *Ratanlal 131* and *Weir II, 487*.

73. Reduction of imprisonment with fresh imposition of fine, whether an enhancement of sentence.—Alteration of a sentence of four months' rigorous imprisonment to one of three months' rigorous imprisonment, and a fine of Rs. 10 or, in default a further term of six weeks' rigorous imprisonment, is practically an enhancement of the sentence, because if fine were not paid, the sentence to be undergone would be four months and two weeks' rigorous imprisonment. Such a sentence, was in excess of the powers of the Appellate Court, having regard to this section, 17 A. 67, 23 A. 497. When an Appellate Court alters a conviction under s. 323, 1 P. C., punishable with imprisonment or fine into one under s. 335 punishable with imprisonment and fine and sentences accordingly, it practically enhances the sentence. The point was considered at length by a Full Bench of the Madras High Court in 30 M. 103, and it was held, the mere fact that a fine was imposed by the Appellate Court would not in law be an enhancement of sentence, if the aggregate period of imprisonment which the accused would have to undergo is to any extent less than the period of the original sentence. But where such an alteration of the sentence, has the effect of rendering it in the circumstances of the case excessive and inappropriate, the interference in revision of a superior Court may be called for. See also 23 B. 439 and 27 C. 175. In *Criminal Revision Case 35 of 1906*, the Madras High Court held that where the sentence of the first Court is imprisonment and fine, if the Appellate Court resolves to set aside the sentence of imprisonment, it cannot impose a fine in lieu of that imprisonment, as this would be virtually an enhancement of the sentence, *Weir II, 487* is virtually overruled by the above Full Bench Ruling. An alteration of sentence by the Appellate Court from simple imprisonment for one month to a sentence of simple imprisonment for three weeks and a fine of Rs. 50 and further an imprisonment of one week in default of payment is an enhancement of sentence and is consequently illegal, 3 N. L. R. 90 = 6 Cr. L. J. 100, where 27 C. 175 and 23 A. 497 are followed and 23 B. 439 dissented from.

(1) Modification of three months' rigorous imprisonment into two months and fine of Rs. 30 is not an enhancement.—A prisoner was sentenced to three months' rigorous imprisonment for cheating. On appeal the sentence was modified into one of two months' rigorous imprisonment and Rs. 30 fine. On reference it was held, that though the sentence would be an altered one, it would not be called an enhancement of the sentence, 1 M. L. J. 194 (Note). In 7 P. R. 1915 = 16 Cr. L. J. 603 an alteration of a sentence of three months' rigorous imprisonment to one month's rigorous imprisonment and a fine of Rs. 100 or in default one month's rigorous imprisonment was not considered to be an enhancement because the fine was paid and the appellant did not wish to have the original sentence restored.

(11) *Reduction of imprisonment with increase of fine*—*PICOTT, J.*, in 26 A. 483 though he declined to interfere with the sentence in that case, stated that he was inclined to prefer the ruling in 27 C. 175 to the rulings in 23 B. 439 and 30 M. 103 and *held* that no general rule can be laid down to determine what is or what is not an enhancement of sentence, when only a portion of the sentence is altered to a punishment of lesser degree of severity. In this case a sentence of one month's imprisonment and Rs 5 fine was altered by the Appellate Court to three days imprisonment and Rs 100 fine, but the total imprisonment including the imprisonment in default of fine was less.

74. *Fine considered to be less severe than imprisonment.*—Altering a sentence of fine into one of imprisonment is an enhancement of the sentence within the meaning of cl. (1) (b) (3) and a Sessions Judge in appeal has no power to alter a sentence in this way, 18 B. 751; 18 A. 301. S. 402 follows human sentiment and commonsense in regarding the substitution of fine for imprisonment as a merciful commutation of punishment, 7 N. L. R. 109 = 12 Cr. L. J. 444. But altering a sentence of nine months rigorous imprisonment and a fine of Rs 1,000, or in default of its payment rigorous imprisonment for three months, is not an enhancement of sentence. A sentence of fine is always considered lighter than a sentence of imprisonment. A sentence therefore of fine of Rs 1,000, would not be so severe as a sentence of three months' rigorous imprisonment, and the substitution of the former for the latter would not be an enhancement. The sentence of three months' rigorous imprisonment in default of payment of fine did not make the whole sentence of imprisonment larger than it was before, 23 B. 439, where 17 A. 67 is distinguished.

Quare—But if the accused were unable to pay the fine, and had therefore to suffer imprisonment still his liability to pay the fine would remain and it could be realised from his estate, would not the sentence be then an enhancement? 27 C. 175 seems to leave it for the determination of the Court of Revision, whether the substitution of a heavy fine for imprisonment is or is not an enhancement of sentence. In 5 P. W. R. 1916, alteration of a sentence of one week's imprisonment only to Rs. 50 fine or one week's imprisonment was held to be an enhancement as the accused had already undergone several days imprisonment.

75. *Adding imprisonment to sentence of fine is enhancement of sentence.*—When an Appellate Court alters the conviction of an offence (hurt) punishable with imprisonment or fine into one (grievous hurt) punishable with imprisonment and fine and to make the sentence legal, passes a nominal sentence of one day's imprisonment (in addition to the fine already imposed), it practically enhances the sentence. In such a case the proper course is to let the conviction for the former offence stand or to refer the case to the High Court, *Weir II, 486*. The correctness of this seems open to doubt because the enhancement of a sentence presupposes that the sentence was a legal sentence.

76. *Transferring sentence.*—Where an accused is charged with two separate offences and distinct sentences are passed for each of them, an Appellate Court cannot transfer the sentence given for the offence of which the accused was acquitted to the other offence, conviction regarding which was upheld. The effect of such transference of sentence is to enhance the punishment which such Appellate Court has no power to do under sub-sec. (1), cl. (b) (3) of this section 24 C. 316 following *ibid* 317 (Note). See *Ratanlal 618*; 3 M. L. T. 312 = 7 Cr. L. J. 361. But where a Magistrate finds an accused person guilty of acts which in law constitute a single offence, but by erroneously splitting them convicts him of two distinct offences and passes either two distinct sentences or one combined sentence, the Appellate Court if it concurs in the finding, is competent to alter the two convictions to the proper one for the single offence committed while maintaining the aggregate of two sentences or the whole of the combined sentence inflicted by the Magistrate. Such an alteration is one of form only and does not involve an enhancement of sentence in violation of this section, 3 M. L. R. 67 = 6 Cr. L. J. 43. Under the sub-sec. (1) (b) (3) the only restriction on the power of an Appellate Court in an appeal from a conviction, is that it cannot enhance the sentence. On an appeal from a conviction of two accused under ss 323 and 325 I P C., respectively, the Appellate Court, finding that the accused were guilty of rioting and grievous hurt, convicted both of them under ss 147 and 325, I P C., taken with s. 149. *Held* that the alteration of the finding was in no way prohibited by this section.

77. *Order as to payment of costs, whether an enhancement?*—On conviction of the accused, a Magistrate passed an order to the effect that out of the fine Rs 2 should be paid to the complainant for his expenses. On appeal the Appellate Court confirmed the conviction, and directed the accused to pay a further sum to complainant. *Held*, that the order was illegal as it was virtually an enhancement of the sentence, 22 M. 153, 5 M. H. Cr. Appx. XXVIII. But these rulings have been overruled in 29 M. 188 where it was *held following* 20 C. 687 that an order passed by an Appellate Court directing an accused person to pay the costs of

the complainant under s 31 of the *Court fees Act*, correcting omission of the Court below to order such payment, does not amount to an enhancement of such sentence, the order under the *Court fees Act* forming no part of the penalty or sentence passed in the case. Such an order is perfectly legal under sub-sec. (1) (d), see 26 M. 421, where on the acquittal of one of two accused ordered to pay court and process fees to the complainant in equal proportions, the other was directed to pay the whole of the costs by the Appellate Court, such an order was upheld as legal. See also 47 M. 914.

78. **Requiring security to keep the peace is not enhancement**—The power of the Appellate Court to order the accused to furnish security to keep the peace is new, 16 C. 779, 21 P. R. 1884 and 23 P. R. 1888; but does not amount to an enhancement of the sentence, 21 P. R. 1905.

79. **Inadequacy of sentence should be reported to High Court for revision.**—Though Appellate Court are no longer able to enhance sentences themselves, the power of Sessions Judges and District Magistrates to refer inadequate sentences to the Chief Court for enhancement has not been altered. When a sentence comes before a Subordinate Court on appeal which is manifestly inadequate, the Judge should, if a Sessions Judge or District Magistrate, report the case for revision, and if a Subordinate Magistrate, bring the case to the notice of the District Magistrate, with a view to its being reported. *Pun Cr*, Chap LXVIII, p 289. The High Court may, in revision, enhance a sentence so as to alter its nature, 6 A. 622 (F.B.), 11 C 530.

IX.—ALTERATION OF SENTENCE ON PRISONER WHO HAS NOT APPEALED

80. **Appellate Court not competent to alter sentence of prisoner who has not appealed.**—An Appellate Court (other than the High Court) has no authority to alter the sentence of a prisoner who has not appealed and whose sentence is not appealable 8 M. H. C. R. App. VII, nor to reverse it. The proper course is to report the case to the High Court Ratanlal 358. Where of two persons jointly tried one is convicted and the other acquitted and the convicted appeals the Appellate Court in dealing with the appeal has no jurisdiction to pass any order which would affect the order of acquittal of the other accused 8 A. L. J. 1129 = 12 Cr. L. J. 575.

81. **Only High Court may alter sentence of prisoner not appealing**—Where on an appeal by one of several accused, the High Court disbelieves the entire evidence for the prosecution and sets aside the conviction of the appellant, it has jurisdiction to set aside the convictions of the other accused who have not appealed, s 439 (5) does not affect such jurisdiction, 5 C. W. N. 330; 14 P. W. R. 1909 = 11 Cr. L. J. 99; 4 Bur. L. T. 87 = 12 Cr. L. J. 250. In 1893 A. W. N. 51 three persons were jointly tried and convicted on the same evidence for an offence. Two of them appealed and were acquitted. The third did not appeal, but it appeared that it was by mistake that his name had been omitted from the Memorandum of Appeal and that reasons for the acquittal of the others applied also to him. Held that under the circumstances, it was competent to the High Court, to acquit or order the release of the third accused on a reference made to it by the Appellate Court.

X.—POWER TO MAKE ANY AMENDMENT OR CONSEQUENTIAL OR INCIDENTAL ORDER.—Sub-sec. (1) (d).

82. **What is a consequential or incidental order?**—Section 423 (1) which defines the powers of an Appellate Court in disposing of an appeal, begins by setting forth those powers in precise terms, and concludes with clause (d), which enables it to 'make any consequential or incidental order that may be just or proper'. Now, in a Criminal Court, this phrase cannot be construed so liberally as to embrace any and every ancillary order which is capable of being described as "consequential or incidental". Otherwise an Appellate Court, affirming, for instance a conviction of kidnapping a woman, might add and enforce, a direction that the offender should pay her by way of maintenance, a monthly allowance. This can hardly be it would seem, there fore that "consequential or incidental" orders within the purview of the provision, must fall under one or other of two heads.

'First, there are orders which follow as a matter of course being the necessary complements to the main order passed, without which the latter would be incomplete or ineffective. Such are directions as to the refund of fines realised from acquitted appellants, or, on the reversal of acquittals, as to the restoration of compensation paid under s. 250, and for these no separate authority is needed.

'Secondly there are orders which, though ancillary in character, require more than the support of a Criminal Court's inherent jurisdiction, and could not be passed without express authority'

If this be so, then the clause can be relied upon only if it be sufficient to extend to an Appellate Court, to be exercised by it, *mutatis mutandis* the special power given to an original Magisterial Court alone by s. 250. But it falls short of this, and, so far as appears, it never occurred to the learned Judges who decided,

3 Bom L. R. 811 that it could be appealed to in this connection. It does not like s. 2 of the *Supreme Court of Judicature (Jurisdiction) Act, 1834* (37 and 53 Vict., clause 18), or O. XLI, R. 33 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 invest an Appellate Court with authority "to make any order which ought to have been given or made" by the Court below, nor does it like s. 107 of the latter, confer upon Appellate Courts "the same powers" as Courts of original jurisdiction. It does not amplify the powers of Appellate Courts, but what it does is to modify the exhaustive character which, without it, s. 423 (1) would apparently have, and so to prevent any conflict between its special provisions and the general provisions of, e.g., s. 517 or s. 522, 39 C. 157. See also 39 C. 1050.

83. *Order under s. 106—Appellate Court competent to require security for keeping the peace*—Clause (3) of s. 106 giving power to Appellate Courts to demand security is new and 16 C. 779 is now superseded. The Bombay, Allahabad, Madras and Oudh Courts hold that this power may be exercised whether the original Court was competent or not to pass such an order, 33 B. 33, 33 A. 43; 37 M. 153 (F.B.), 16 O. C. 231 = 14 Cr. L. J. 592, but the Calcutta and Punjab Courts, in 21 C. 622; 35 C. 434; 21 P. R. 1903; 7 P. R. 1909 = 10 Cr. L. J. 309 (5 P. R. 1907 = 6 Cr. L. J. 275 approved) have held that in conviction by second and third-class Magistrates the Appellate Court cannot require security. See Notes 24 to 26 at pp. 133-154.

May cancel order under s. 106—An order in appeal, setting aside an order requiring security to keep the peace made by the first Court under s. 106 is an incidental order, and therefore an Appellate Court can pass such an order even when upholding the conviction, 30 C. 101. See Note 27 to s. 106. See also 6 C. W. N. 422 and 424.

84. *Cannot order compensation under s. 250*—An Appellate Court is not empowered to grant compensation under s. 250. In view of the express terms, "*the Magistrate by whom the case is heard*" in that section, subsec. (1) (d) of this section cannot be taken to confer such power, 23 A. 623; 39 C. 157 (F.B.). See Notes under s. 250.

85. *Power to allow parties to compound*—See s. 345 and Notes thereto. When an Appellate Court alters the sentence to one of those mentioned in s. 345, it may allow the parties to compound, 13 O. C. 181 = 11 Cr. L. J. 436. See also 3 O. C. 314. The power to sanction to compound is given by s. 345 (5). *Quære whether* subsec. (d) of s. 423 covers such powers, see 11 A. L. J. 13 = 14 Cr. L. J. 46 where 32 A. 153 is doubted. In 29 M. L. J. 521 = 16 Cr. L. J. 750 it was held that an order allowing composition of an offence is not an incidental order and 32 A. 153 was dissented from.

86. *Order committing accused to Lunatic Asylum, s. 47 (1), is an incidental order*—An order under s. 47 (1) is clearly an order which the acquitting Court, whether original or appellate, not only has power to make but is bound to make, under s. 423 (d), 16 Cr. L. J. 670 (Bar).

87. *Power to order restoration of property, ss. 517-520*—See s. 520 which specially deals with powers of Appeal Court. Orders under ss. 517 or 522 are consequential or incidental orders within the meaning of subsec. (1) (d), 6 C. W. N. 424. Any order passed under s. 517 may be amended under cl. (d) by an Appellate Court, 13 C. W. N. 959 = 15 Cr. L. J. 184. Even where the accused while preferring an appeal against their conviction omit to appeal against the order under s. 522 owing to want of notice the Appellate Court may make any order for the consequential relief, 14 Cr. L. J. 172 (C.). The order directing restoration of property which was found to have belonged to the complainant, but the restoration of which was not ordered by the Court of first instance, is therefore a proper order for the Appellate Court to make. It may also cancel or modify an order passed by the Lower Court under s. 517, and even extend such an order to property which it did not previously include, 1905 A. W. N. 256 = 3 A. L. J. 770 = 4 Cr. L. J. 370. In this case the Appellate Court extended the order of restoration made by the first Court to property which it did not previously include.

88. *Order restoring possession of immovable property, s. 522*—(i) *Appellate Court may amend orders made by first Court under s. 522*—In 29 C. 724 it was held that the Appellate Court in dealing with an appeal has power to interfere with an order made by the first Court under s. 522 and 23 C. 630 was declared obsolete. See also 19 C. W. N. 990 = 16 Cr. L. J. 607. In a case in which the accused had been convicted under ss. 352 and 448, L. P. C., the prosecutor had obtained an order under s. 522, from the convicting Magistrate, restoring possession of the property, the subject matter of the offence under s. 448, L. P. C. The accused having been acquitted on appeal, applied for restitution and the Appellate Magistrate referred the case to the High Court. On a preliminary objection that the High Court had no power to order restoration of property, held, reading together subsec. (1) (d) and s. 522, the High Court had power to order restitution, 27 A. 415 followed in 36 C. 43, where it was held that the High Court can revise an order made under s. 522, see also 7 O. C. 23 = 1 Cr. L. J. 697.

[illegible]

(ii) *Appeal Court cannot for first time make such order*—In 39 C. 1050 referring to 39 C. 157 (F.B.), it was, however, *held* that where the first Court did not pass an order under s. 522, it was not open to the Appellate Court for the first time to pass an order under s. 522. It is clear that the confirming of a conviction on appeal where the Magistrate had not thought it necessary to act under s. 522 cannot make such an order a consequential relief or an order ancillary in character for which no separate authority is needed. Separate authority under s. 522 is distinctly needed before any Criminal Court could have such extraordinary powers as are given thereby. It is one certainly not inherent in the ordinary Courts of criminal jurisdiction and it certainly could not be exercised by any person other than the Court which convicts the accused.

89 *May suspend sentence and give appellant benefit of s. 562*—Under sub-sec. (1) (d), in an appeal from a conviction, the Appellate Court is competent to suspend the sentence passed by the Court of First Instance and in lieu thereof make an order under s. 562 provided it is satisfied on taking evidence or otherwise that the case is covered by that section, 24 A. 306; 29 M. 567. See also 2 Bom. L. R. 817.

90 *Power to order removal of cause of obstruction*—In 5 C. W. N. 432 it was *held* that on a conviction for wrongful restraint, an order for removal of the cause of obstruction could properly be made, and under sub-sec. (1) (d), the Appellate Court ought not to make an amendment by way of setting aside the order as that would make the entire proceeding injurious and absurd. But this Ruling was *overruled* in 31 C. 691 (F.B.) where it was *held* that the powers of an Appellate Court to make such an order, would depend on the power conferred by law on the original Court, and this is limited to matters regarding which a Court is expressly empowered to make an order. So on a conviction for wrongful restraint by erecting a hut or other means of obstruction an order cannot be issued for the removal of the obstruction.

91 *Cannot order confiscation under the Indian Forests Act*—An order of confiscation under s. 54 of the *Indian Forests Act* VII of 1878 is not incidental on a conviction under that Act. It is regarded as a punishment in addition to the sentence passed. Hence an Appellate Court is not competent to make such an order of confiscation, 27 C. 430, 4 A. 417.

92 *Cannot set aside order for payment of costs*—An Appellate Court is not competent to set aside the order of the trying Magistrate under s. 31 of the *Court-fees Act* as the order directing the accused to repay to the complainant the fee on the complaint is not a part of the sentence, 31 M. 547, 29 M. 583 *followed*.

93 *No power to direct expunging of portion of Lower Court's judgment*—An Appellate Court has no power to issue orders to a Lower Court to expunge any portion of a judgment of another Court which comes before it on appeal, Weir II, 534. But see 2 C. W. N. 256. See Note 39 to s. 367. But in 44 A. 401 the case in 2 C. W. N. 256, was distinguished and it was *held* that where certain witnesses against whom certain remarks were made by the trial Magistrate preferred an application to the High Court for expunction of these remarks and that the High Court had no power to expunge from judgments of Lower Court remarks reflecting unfavourably upon the credibility or the character of witnesses, in cases in which the effective orders of the Courts are not before the High Court either in appeal or in revision. But see now s. 561 A (newly added) and the Select Committee Report thereon. See section 439, Note 67 (c).

93-A *Power to order judgment to be returned for being signed by one of the members of the Bench who had omitted to sign*—A District Magistrate, on an appeal from the decision of a Bench of Honorary Magistrates found that although the case had apparently been heard by a Bench of two Magistrates, the judgment was signed by only one member of the Bench and accordingly returned the judgment to be signed by the other Magistrate who had heard the case, *held* that this procedure was in no way opposed to s. 423 of the Code. 41 A. 217.

93-B *Order to accused to repay Court-fees to complainant under sec. 31 of the Court-fees Act is no enhancement*—An order passed by the Appellate Court directing the accused under section 31 of the *Court-fees Act* to repay to the complainant the Court fee paid on the complaint does not amount to an enhancement of sentence, but is only an incidental order which an Appellate Court can make under section 423 (d), 47 M. 914.

XI.—LIMITATION ON APPELLATE COURT'S POWER TO INTERFERE WITH VERDICT OF JURY.—Sub-sec. (2).

94 *Power of High Court to interfere with verdict of jury under s. 207 are wider than powers conferred by s. 423*—See s. 207 and Notes thereunder. Under s. 207 the High Court is authorized to go into facts, 31 C. 935 at p. 957.

Trim n 1 Dress' gear, ornaments "Facing; Of, or pertaining to, the Trinity, or to the doctrine } 2 To take a brief or sudden journey to make
him just pass under the window in his woodland } of the Trinity.

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1 A brief journey, or a voyage, an excursion or
jaunt

Took a trip to London on the death of a queen. For

inkets coil

neck, or

Soul's

1 Trimly so, v 10 trim secretly or underhand to

1 single word of use in giving to

1 sock of sheep, or a small flock of them

n Eng 1 Hallowell

a boat, [Obr] 1 Bruce

under, a hard or back } 18.04 }

The same as TRIPETALOID

3 Bom L. R. 841 that it could be appealed to in this connection. It does not like s 2 of the *Supreme Court of Judicature (Jurisdiction) Act, 1894* (57 and 58 Vict., clause 16), or O XLII, R 33 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 invest an Appellate Court with authority "to make any order which ought to have been given or made" by the Court below, nor does it like s 107 of the latter, confer upon Appellate Courts "the same powers" as Courts of original jurisdiction. It does not amplify the powers of Appellate Courts, but what it does is to modify the exhaustive character which, without it s 423 (1) would apparently have, and so to prevent any conflict between its special provisions and the general provisions of, e.g., s 517 or s 522, 39 C. 157. See also 39 C. 1050.

83. **Order under s. 106.**—*Appellate Court competent to require security for keeping the peace*—Clause (3) of s 106 giving power to Appellate Courts to demand security is new and 16 C. 779 is now superseded. The Bombay, Allahabad, Madras and Oudh Courts hold that this power may be exercised whether the original Court was competent or not to pass such an order, 33 B. 33; 33 A. 43; 37 M. 153 (F.B.), 16 O. C. 281 = 14 Cr. L. J. 592, but the Calcutta and Punjab Courts, in 21 C. 622; 35 C. 434; 21 P. R. 1908; 7 P. R. 1909 = 10 Cr. L. J. 309 (6 P. R. 1907 = 6 Cr. L. J. 275 approved) have held that in conviction by second and third-class Magistrates the Appellate Court cannot require security. See Notes 24 to 26 at pp 153-154

May cancel order under s. 106—An order in appeal, setting aside an order requiring security to keep the peace made by the first Court under s. 106 is an incidental order, and therefore an Appellate Court can pass such an order even when upholding the conviction, 30 C. 101. See Note 27 to s 106. See also 6 C. W. N. 422 and 424.

84. **Cannot order compensation under s. 250.**—An Appellate Court is not empowered to grant compensation under s 250. In view of the express terms, "*the Magistrate by whom the case is heard*" in that section, sub-sec (1) (d) of this section cannot be taken to confer such power, 28 A. 623; 39 C. 157 (F.B.). See Notes under s 250

85. **Power to allow parties to compound.**—See s 345 and Notes thereto. When an Appellate Court alters the sentence to one of those mentioned in s 345, it may allow the parties to compound, 13 O. C. 161 = 11 Cr. L. J. 496. See also 3 O. C. 314. The power to sanction to compound is given by s 345 (5). *Quære* whether sub-sec. (d) of s 423 covers such powers, see 11 A. L. J. 13 = 14 Cr. L. J. 46 where 32 A. 153 is doubted. In 29 M. L. J. 521 = 16 Cr. L. J. 750 it was held that an order allowing composition of an offence is not an incidental order and 32 A. 153 was dissented from.

86. **Order committing accused to Lunatic Asylum, s 47 (1), is an incidental order.**—An order under s 47 (1) is clearly an order which the acquitting Court, whether original or appellate, not only has power to make but is bound to make, under s 423 (d), 16 Cr. L. J. 670 (Bur.)

87. **Power to order restoration of property, ss. 517-520.**—See s 520 which specially deals with powers of Appeal Court. Orders under ss 517 or 522 are consequential or incidental orders within the meaning of sub-sec. (1) (d) 6 C. W. N. 424. Any order passed under s. 517 may be amended under cl (d) by an Appellate Court, 18 C. W. N. 959 = 15 Cr. L. J. 184. Even where the accused while preferring an appeal against their conviction omit to appeal against the order under s 522 owing to want of notice the Appellate Court may make any order for the consequential relief, 14 Cr. L. J. 172 (C.). The order directing restoration of property which was found to have belonged to the complainant, but the restoration of which was not ordered by the Court of first instance, is therefore a proper order for the Appellate Court to make. It may also cancel or modify an order passed by the Lower Court under s 517, and even extend such an order to property which it did not previously include, 1906 A. W. N. 256 = 3 A. L. J. 770 = 4 Cr. L. J. 370. In this case the Appellate Court extended the order of restoration made by the first Court to property which it did not previously include.

See also 19 C. W. N. 990 = 16 Cr. L. J. 607. In a case in which the accused had been convicted under ss 352 and 448, I P. C., the prosecutor had obtained an order under s 522, from the convicting Magistrate, restoring possession of the property, the subject matter of the offence under s 448, I P. C. The accused having been acquitted on appeal, applied for restitution and the Appellate Magistrate referred the case to the High Court. On a preliminary objection that the High Court had no power to order restoration of property, held, reading together sub-sec. (1) (d) and s 522, the High Court had power to order restitution, 27 A. 415 followed in 36 C. 44, where it was held that the High Court can revise an order made under s 522, see also 7 O. C. 28 = 1 Cr. L. J. 697.

(ii) *Appellate Court cannot for first time make such order*—In 39 C. 1050 referring to 39 C. 157 (F.B.), it was however, *held* that where the first Court did not pass an order under s 522 it was not open to the Appellate Court for the first time to pass an order under s. 522. It is clear that the confirming of a conviction on appeal where the Magistrate had not thought it necessary to act under s 522 cannot make such an order a consequential relief or an order ancillary in character for which no separate authority is needed. Separate authority under s. 522 is distinctly needed before any Criminal Court could have such extraordinary powers as are given thereby. It is one certainly not inherent in the ordinary Courts of criminal jurisdiction and it certainly could not be exercised by any person other than the Court which convicts the accused.

89 *May suspend sentence and give appellant benefit of s 562*—Under sub-sec. (1) (d) in an appeal from a conviction the Appellate Court is competent to suspend the sentence passed by the Court of First Instance and in lieu thereof make an order under s 562 provided it is satisfied on taking evidence or otherwise that the case is covered by that section 24 A 306, 29 M 567. See also 2 Bom L R 817.

90 *Power to order removal of cause of obstruction*—In 5 C. W. N. 432 it was *held* that on a conviction for wrongful restraint an order for removal of the cause of obstruction could properly be made and under sub-sec. (1)(d), the Appellate Court ought not to make an amendment by way of setting aside the order as that would make the entire proceeding infructuous and absurd. But this Ruling was *overruled* in 31 C. 691 (F.B.) where it was *held* that the powers of an Appellate Court to make such an order, would depend on the power conferred by law on the original Court and this is limited to matters regarding which a Court is expressly empowered to make an order. So on a conviction for wrongful restraint by erecting a hut or other means of obstruction an order cannot be issued for the removal of the obstruction.

91 *Cannot order confiscation under the Indian Forests Act*—An order of confiscation under s. 54 of the Indian Forests Act VII of 1878 is not *incidental* on a conviction under that Act it is regarded as a punishment in addition to the sentence passed. Hence an Appellate Court is not competent to make such an order of confiscation 27 C. 450, 4 A 417.

92. *Cannot set aside order for payment of costs*—An Appellate Court is not competent to set aside the order of the trying Magistrate under s 31 of the *Court fees Act* as the order directing the accused to repay to the complainant the fee on the complaint is not a part of the sentence 31 M 547, 29 M 158 *followed*.

93. *No power to direct expunging of portion of Lower Court's judgment*—An Appellate Court has no power to issue orders to a Lower Court to expunge any portion of a judgment of another Court which comes before it on appeal, *Welle II, 534*. But see 2 C. W. N. 256. See Note 39 to s 367. But in 44 A 401 the case in 2 C. W. N. 256, was distinguished and it was *held* that where certain witnesses against whom certain remarks were made by the trial Magistrate preferred an application to the High Court for expunction of these remarks and that the High Court had no power to expunge from judgments of Lower Court remarks reflecting unfavourably upon the credibility or the character of witnesses in cases in which the effective orders of the Courts are not before the High Court either in appeal or in revision. But see now s. 561 A (newly added) and the Select Committee Report thereon. See section 439 Note 67 (c).

93-A *Power to order judgment to be returned for being signed by one of the members of the Bench who had omitted to sign*—A District Magistrate on an appeal from the decision of a Bench of Honorary Magistrates found that, although the case had apparently been heard by a Bench of two Magistrates the judgment was signed by only one member of the Bench and accordingly returned the judgment to be signed by the other Magistrate who had heard the case *held* that this procedure was in no way opposed to s. 423 of the Code 41 A 217.

93 B. *Order to accused to repay Court fees to complainant under sec. 31 of the Court fees Act is no enhancement*—An order passed by the Appellate Court directing the accused under section 31 of the *Court fees Act* to repay to the complainant the Court fee paid on the complaint does not amount to an enhancement of sentence but is only an incidental order which an Appellate Court can make under section 423 (d), 47 M 914.

XI—LIMITATION ON APPELLATE COURT'S POWER TO INTERFERE WITH VERDICT OF JURY—Sub sec (2)

94. *Power of High Court to interfere with verdict of jury under s. 307 are wider than powers conferred by s. 423*—See s 307 and Notes thereunder. Under s. 307 the High Court is *not* bound by facts 21 C. 953 at p. 957.

95. To enable High Court to interfere with verdict of jury, there must be misdirection or some error in law.—*See* 3 W. R. 13. The High Court is not authorized, by s 423 to alter or reverse the verdict of the jury unless it is of opinion that that verdict is erroneous owing to a misdirection by the Judge or to a misunderstanding on the part of the jury of the law as laid down by the Judge, 32 M. 179; 4 M. L. T. 433 = 9 Cr. L. J. 93. If it comes to that opinion, then it has the power to reverse the verdict, but that power ought not to be lightly exercised. It is manifestly the intention of the Legislature that the power of interference conferred on the High Court should be exercised on occasions, 10 Bom. L. R. 565 = 8 Cr. L. J. 35. *See* Notes 3 and 5 to s 518 at p 863

96. Meaning of 'misdirection'.—Technically 'misdirection' means 'an error of law made by a Judge in charging the jury' (WHARTON) or 'an error of a Judge in charging the jury on a matter of law' (MOZLEY and WHITELEY). In England where procedure is not the subject of statute, a mere omission in a summing up would not be termed an error of law. But, in India, where a Judge is bound by statute law to sum up the evidence for the prosecution and defence, any omission, however slight, is at least an irregularity and may not unfairly be termed an error of law inasmuch as there has been a failure to conform with the law. Hence, in India 'misdirection' is an appropriate term to apply to an omission in a summing up. But to treat every failure to conform to the Procedure Code as a matter of law would lead to absurdity and the test laid down therefore is "whether or not the omission was in the opinion of the Court of such importance as to have led to an erroneous verdict by the jury. 3 S. L. R. 102 = 11 Cr. L. J. 13; 5 B. H. C. R. 85 followed. *See* also 17 Cr. L. J. 353 (Patna) as to the duty of those who allege misdirection

97. Non-misdirection to direct jury to reconsider their verdict when they were confused.—*See* s 302 and Note 2 to s 301. A Judge is not wrong in directing a jury to reconsider their verdict when it appears that they were confused and failed to understand the remarks of the Judge. Also, the act of a Judge in giving a jury who are not intelligent men in a complicated case, a paper in which the different counts against each prisoner and the witnesses whose testimony bore upon each count are noted, is not objectionable, *Weir* 11, 514.

98. Allowing jury to pronounce verdict before calling on accused to enter on his defence is in effect a misdirection.—To allow the jury to pronounce their verdict before the accused is called upon to enter on his defence is in effect a misdirection though the Judge omits to charge the jury at all. In such a case sub-sec. (2) does not stand in the way of the Appellate Court's interfering with the verdict of the jury, 23 C. 252. Where a Judge required a jury to give a finding on one of two questions of fact constituting the proof in the case, before he concluded his charge with reference to the other question of fact *Held*, that the course adopted by the Judge was irregular if not illegal, and was calculated to embarrass the jury in arriving at a proper verdict as to the character of the offence, if any, proved, *Weir* 11, 499. *See* Notes 72 and 73 at p 706

99. Misunderstanding of expressions used by Judge in his charge to jury.—Mere misunderstanding on the part of the bystanders in Court or Counsel engaged in a case of expressions used by a Judge in charging a jury (where it appears that the expressions used by the Judge were such as ought to have been understood by any reasonable man having regard to what was proved in the case, and what was said to the jury afterwards) will not constitute misdirection, 10 C. 1079. Where the Judge charged a jury for the acquittal of one of several accused on the ground that the witnesses had deposed falsely as against him. *Held*, that he ought to have also made it clear to them that if they disbelieved the witnesses, on whose testimony the case hinged, in regard to anyone of the accused that was a circumstance to be carefully weighed by them in estimating the credibility of the testimony as it affected the other accused, and that his omission to do so and directing the jury in language capable of being understood in a contrary sense, amounted to a misdirection, *Weir* 11, 501.

100. 'V. = 1/2 is erroneous' means that verdict is rendered bad by reason of misdirection or

that the verdict has been vitiated and rendered bad or defective by reason of misdirection of the law. The effect of the clause is evidently to prevent the Appellate Court from reversing the verdict of a jury on account of any misdirection by the Judge or any misunderstanding on the part of the jury of the law as laid down by him unless such misdirection or misunderstanding of the law is on points material to the verdict, so that the verdict can be said to be tainted with error in the process by which it has been arrived at. It throws upon the Appellate Court the duty no doubt, of ascertaining whether the process or method which the Judge directed the jury to follow, as to the acceptance or discarding of evidence or as to the view taken of the law, was erroneous on any material point, but not certainly the duty of determining for itself whether the verdict, as

a conclusion of fact, was right or wrong. To hold otherwise would be tantamount to holding that an appeal would lie upon the facts from the verdict of a jury in the face of the provisions of s 418, and that the Legislature intended to give the High Court the same powers in respect to an appeal from the verdict of a jury as it has in respect of a judgment by the Sessions Judge in a trial with assessors. *PER BEVERLEY and BANERJEE, JJ*, 21 C. 955 at p 977.

101. Power of High Court in jury trials.—(1) *When verdict of jury is set aside for defective summing up, High Court not bound to direct retrial*, but may go into the evidence and decide the matter finally itself. See Note 75 under s 299, and Notes 14 and 15 to s 307. "It would defeat and not promote justice, if a verdict were set aside and a new trial granted for a defective summing up with reference to the weight of evidence in a case in which the High Court would, upon evidence given in a trial, have affirmed a conviction if instead of a trial by jury, the trial had been before a Judge and assessors. It appears to us that the question to be considered is not whether upon a proper summing up of the whole evidence, a jury might possibly have given a different verdict, but whether the legitimate effect of the evidence would require a different verdict. If the Court is of opinion that the evidence would not, on any proper view of the case, support a conviction, it would be worse than useless to send back a case for a new trial, in order that a jury may have the opportunity of convicting on such evidence upon a proper summing up." 5 W. R. 80 at p. 80 = B. L. R. Sup. Vol. 459 (F B) followed in 29 C. 782, 12 C. W. N. 80. See also 9 W. R. 51; 15 W. R. 17. When the verdict of a jury is reversed on the ground of its being erroneous owing to misdirection, the power of the Courts is not limited to directing a new trial, but they can deal with the case in any of the ways provided in this section, and therefore the Court may, in an appeal from a conviction under cl. (1)(b) of this section, either reverse the finding or sentence and acquit or discharge the accused or order him to be re-tried, etc., sub-sec. (2) restricts the grounds on which the verdict of the jury can be reversed or altered, but once the verdict is out of the way, there is no restriction on the powers of the Court to deal with the case of which it has complete *seisin* in any of the manner provided in that section. Nowhere does the Code lay down that when the verdict of the jury is set aside, the Court must necessarily direct a new trial. The principle laid down in *Makin v The Attorney-General of New South Wales*, L. R. (1894) A. C. 57 is of considerable importance, but it seems the policy of law in this country is different and that the Legislature has, with a distinct purpose, vested the Appellate Court with large powers, 25 C. 711 where 21 C. 955 is *disputed from*. See 26 M. 1; 26 M. 33; 30 M. 44; 9 B. H. C. R. 358; 6 B. H. C. R. Cr. Ca. 47; 5 B. H. C. R. Cr. Ca. 85; 2 B. 61, 5 B. 63; 6 B. 34; 19 B. 749; 6 C. 247; 22 C. 276; 14 C. W. N. 493 = 11 Cr. L. J. 96, 1 C. 207; 17 C. W. N. 42; 29 C. 782; 34 C. 698.

Contra—Accused in trial by jury is entitled to verdict of jury on questions of facts—Where a verdict vitiated owing to misdirection by the Judge, the Appeal Court has no option but to set aside the verdict and direct a retrial. Were the Appellate Court to go into the facts in such a case, it would be substituting the decision of the Judge of that Court for the verdict of the jury, who have the opportunity of seeing the demeanour of the witnesses and weighing the evidence with the assistance which this affords, whereas the Judges of the Appeal Court can only arrive at a decision on the perusal of the evidence, 21 C. 935. In a case of misdirection, *viz*, that the Judge had wrongly put the *onus* on the accused, the High Court was asked to deal with the case itself and not send it for retrial when MACLEAN, C.J., referring to *Makin v Attorney-General for New South Wales*, (1894) L. R. Ap. Cas. 57 held as follows—"I am very doubtful whether we have under s. 423, power to re-try the case ourselves, but if we have, this is not a case in which we ought to exercise it. I entertain personally a strong opinion that when a case has been tried before a jury and the conviction has been set aside on the ground of misdirection, the accused is entitled to have his case re-tried before a jury and that as a matter of procedure and in justice to the accused this course should be adopted," 4 C. W. N. 576. Where there was a misponder of charges and the charge to the jury was defective in so far as the heads of the charge did not set out the facts of the case, what the evidence was, or what the

evidence on record

Court cannot go into

sec. (2) and s. 537 do

a verdict is actually

erroneous on the facts, 25 C. 330. See also 16 C. 184; 25 C. 561. Where there was evidence tending to show that the object of the offender may have been in the first instance revenge, and the charge of the Judge to the jury failed to show that the Judge guided the jury to the necessity of discriminating between the offences committed by the several prisoners, in
 anance of a common object or that he
 the verdict was set aside and
 determining whether all acted in pursu-
 law applicable to the facts before them,

1. *Journal of the American Medical Association*, 1997; 278: 1039-1044.

(11) *When charge bad for misjoinder*—Where a person is convicted by a jury on an indictment which is in contravention of the provisions of s. 234 and therefore illegal the conviction must be set aside. It cannot be amended by arranging afterwards what might or might not have been properly submitted to the jury. The effect of the multitude of charges before the jury cannot be averted by dissecting the verdict afterwards and appropriating the findings of guilty only to such parts of the written accusations as ought to have been submitted to the jury. It would in the first place leave to the Court the functions of the jury and the accused would never have been really tried at all upon the charge afterwards arranged by the Court 25 M 61 (P.C.).

(12) *Procedure when jury improperly discharged in midst of trial*—In a Sessions trial after the evidence of the prosecution witnesses had been given and the statements of the prisoners read, the Judge thinking that the jury would not be likely to convict upon the evidence that had been given asked the jury if they wished the case to go further and desired to hear the defence of the prisoners. The jury misunderstanding the reason of the question replied that they found certain prisoners 'guilty' and the others 'not guilty'. The Judge thereupon dismissed the jury and tried the case again with a fresh jury and convicted some of the accused. Held that the action of the Judge in recommencing the trial with the aid of a fresh jury was not authorized by law and that the whole of the proceedings of the second trial were *ultra vires* and must be set aside. W 11, 12.

have heard whatever the prisoner has to urge before them in his defence.

(13) In an appeal from an acquittal the High Court is a Court of Appeal on matters of fact, as well as of law and must decide questions of fact from the whole of the evidence on record 9 C. L. J. 378 = 10 Cr. L. J. 499

102. *High Court may direct re-trial by different jury*—It is competent to the High Court in setting aside the verdict of a jury on the ground of misdirection to order a re-trial before a new jury. Thus where a Judge in his direction to the jury informed them that the he would after commenting on the evidence ask them whether they considered that the prisoner had been guilty of any crime or whether he is the unfortunate victim of a most cruel fabrication of false evidence and that he would then explain the law and take their verdict as to what offence the prisoner had been guilty of. Held that the procedure adopted by the Judge was unwarranted and that there should be but one charge both on the facts and on the law and that the Judge acted illegally in dividing the charge into two parts. Welf II, 493.

103. *When inadmissible evidence has been admitted High Court may direct re-trial or deal with case itself*—In case of wrongful admission the Appellate Court has apart from s. 418 power under s. 167 of the *Evidence Act* to inquire into the merits of the case. Reading sub-sec. (2) of this section and s. 418 together it is clear that before the High Court can interfere with a verdict on the ground that some evidence has been wrongly admitted it must be satisfied (1) the verdict was erroneous (2) that this erroneousness was caused either by the Judge's misdirection to the jury as to that evidence or by a misunderstanding on their part of the law as to what was laid down by the Judge and this has in fact occasioned a failure of justice. Where material evidence which ought not to be admitted is admitted and the jury are placed in possession of it there is an error in law in the trial within the meaning of s. 418 and there is a misdirection in law when the Judge tells the jury that it is evidence which they can consider and on which they can if they think proper convict the accused. The fact that after putting the jury in possession of the inadmissible evidence the Judge in his charge points out circumstances which would justify the jury in disbelieving the wrongly admitted evidence, does not make the misdirection any the less a misdirection since the presumption is that the jury are well aware that it is for them to appreciate the evidence and they are at liberty to take or not the Judge's view of it. Where evidence which the law says shall not be admitted is let in with other evidence which is legally admissible and where the former is of a material character it would be mere speculative refinement to hold that the jury must have in convicting the accused relied upon the latter and rejected the former 27 B 626 at p. 632. If in a case tried by jury the Court finds that inadmissible evidence has been received but that after setting it aside there is other evidence on record on which the jury may find a verdict of guilty, but which evidence does not seem to the High Court to be conclusive as to the guilt the High Court may reverse the conviction and sentence and order a new trial 10 B H C R 497. In such a case it is impossible to know the exact amount of weight which the jury attached to the particular evidence in question. In so far as that evidence was wrongly admitted and treated in the Judge's charge the verdict of the jury is invalidated and the Appellate Court cannot any longer accept it as conclusive decision on the facts. It is competent to the High

Court in such a case to consider whether after excluding the evidence wrongly admitted, the rest of the evidence is sufficient to sustain the verdict and to determine the appeal, 27 B. 626 at p. 636. See Note 16 at p. 707 to s. 299, also 27 B. 644; 31 M. 127; 26 C. 49, and Notes under Heading V to s. 299 at pp. 693-694. If the High Court considers that the improperly admitted evidence was so trivial that it could not have occasioned a failure of justice, it should not order a re-trial but should make the inquiry contemplated by s. 167 of the Indian Evidence Act, 14 C. W. N. 493 = 11 C. L. J. 301 = 11 Cr. L. J. 96; 15 Cr. L. J. 43 (G).

In a case of misreception of evidence it is the duty of the Judge to tell the jury to totally disregard it. The charge to the jury must contain a special warning against the taking into consideration by the jury of such wrongfully admitted evidence. And if such evidence cannot be wiped off it is the duty of the Judge to discharge the jury and begin the case *de novo*. 28 Bom. L. R. 281.

104 Verdict means 'entire verdict.'—In cases where an accused person is tried for various offences arising out of a single act or series of acts as contemplated by s. 236, the word verdict in sub-sec. (2) of this section means the entire verdict, and is not limited to the verdict upon a particular charge upon which an accused person may have been convicted and appealed against, 22 C. 377; 12 P. R. 1904. Thus, where the appellants were convicted by the jury of grievous hurt and acquitted of murder, it was held that on re-trial, they could properly be tried for murder, 16 C. W. N. 909 = 13 Cr. L. J. 715 and Note 77 at p. 707.

424. The rules contained in Chapter XXVI as to the judgment of a Criminal Court of original jurisdiction shall apply, so far as may be practicable, to the judgment of any Appellate Court other than a High Court.

Provided that, unless the Appellate Court otherwise directs, the accused shall not be brought up, or required to attend, to hear judgment delivered.

Notes —1. See s. 367 and Notes thereunder at pp. 802-810.

2. Judgment when appeals dismissed must comply with this section and s. 367.—In dismissing an appeal under s. 423, a Judge must comply with the provisions of this section and s. 367, 1 Bom. L. R. 225; 1 Rang. 301; but when an appeal is dismissed under s. 421 summarily no reasons are necessary. See Note 15 to s. 421 at page 868 as such an order of dismissal does not amount to a judgment. Cf. 29 M. 126 (F.B.), 4 C. W. N. 26.

3. Appellant entitled to have explicit opinion of Appellate Court on questions of fact.—Where the law allows an appeal, the appellant is entitled to have from the Court of Appeal that has to deal with them an explicit opinion on the questions of fact involved in the case, 22 C. 241. In a case of receiving stolen property, on appeal the Sessions Judge recorded that "if the evidence was of the usual type and it was impossible for the Court to say which side spoke the truth the first Court which had the evidence before it must be the best Judge and bear the responsibility of conviction." Held that the Appellate Court was the Judge of the facts as completely as the Court which originally tried the case and that as the Sessions Judge's judgment showed that he was doubtful the accused must get the benefit of doubt and be acquitted, 5 P. R. 1876; 6 P. R. 1898. Note 4 to s. 423. The Appellate Court ought to take its own view of the evidence which is before it, and not merely accept without question, the opinion of the Court of First Instance, 1890 A. W. N. 143. The accused in their grounds of appeal to the Sessions Judge challenged the evidence for the prosecution on various relevant grounds. The judgment of the Sessions Judge was as follows—'I have gone through the case, but I see no reason to interfere. The witnesses for the defence would not support the accused and after the evidence of two was taken, the rest were withdrawn by the counsel for the accused.—Held, that the judgment did not comply with the provisions of s. 367 and this section, 31 P. R. 1884. See also 32 C. 178, where it was held that an Appellate Court should notice briefly but clearly the objections urged on an appeal and how they were disposed of. Where the judgment of a Criminal Appellate Court is of the nature of a stereotyped one, which might answer for any case, it is not one in accordance with s. 367 and this section, but where the judgment, though not a long and elaborate one, affords a clear indication that the Court duly considered the evidence it is a good judgment and should not be set aside, 1 C. W. N. 169; 1 Rang. 301.

4. Section 537 does not cure absence of judgment.—Where the order made by the Appellate Court merely stated that the appeal is dismissed under s. 423, held, that s. 537 (a) did not apply as there was an absence of a judgment and not merely an omission or irregularity in a judgment, 17 Bom. L. R. 1035 = 14 Cr. L. J. 832.

5. What an appellate judgment should contain.—See Note 30 at p. 807. Judgment should contain among other things the point or points for determination, the decision thereon and the reasons of the decision,

33 C. 91. A judgment is not legal unless it contains at least (1) the point or points for determination raised by the Memorandum of Appeal, (2) the decision thereon, and (3) the reasons for the decision **8 N. L. R. 81 = 13 Cr. L. J. 599; U. B. R. (1913), 2 Cr. 169 = 14 Cr. L. J. 870.** It is difficult to lay down any rule with precision as to what judgment of an Appellate Court complies with and what judgment does not comply with requirements of this Code. The object, no doubt, of the Legislature in formulating rules as to judgments was partly to insure that a Criminal Court should consider the case before in its different bearings and should on such consideration arrive at definite conclusions and also one object may have been that the judgment should show that in fact the Criminal Court had considered the evidence in a case of first instance or in a case of appeal and had found in case of a conviction, that the facts proved to the satisfaction of the Court, brought an offence home to the accused person whom the Court convicted, **19 A. 506.** The judgment should contain a clear finding as to the common object, **22 C. 276; 33 C. 295,**—but if the accused have not been prejudiced the judgment will not be upset, **36 C. 158; 12 C. W. N. 88.**

6. Judgment when there are several accused, must deal with case of each accused.—An appellate judgment should show *on the face of it* that the case of each accused has been taken into consideration and reasons should be given as far as may be necessary, to indicate that the Court has directed judicial attention to the case of each accused. The appellate judgment cannot be read in connection with and as supplementary to the judgment of the Court of First Instance, but must be quite independent, and stand by itself, **35 C. 139, applied in 14 C. W. N. 49 = 11 Cr. L. J. 23 followed Mad. Cr. R. C. 599 of 1909 = 20 M. L. J. (Sh. N.) 13; 17 Cr. L. J. 496 (M.), 22 C. 241; 37 C. 91, and see also 12 Cr. L. J. 43 (C), 14 A. L. J. 279 and Note 5 under s. 423 at p. 875.** Especially in a case of rioting the judgment must deal with the evidence against each accused, **16 Cr. L. J. 735 (M.), 43 M. L. J. 505**

7. Judgment must be written by the Court.—See Note 15 under s. 367 at p. 804. The Magistrate should not get it written by a clerk, **Ratanlal 845. See also 6 M. 286, 4 C. L. J. 411**

8. Delay in passing judgment improper.—Delay in delivering judgment in criminal cases is not only unjust to the accused as it prevents them from appealing at once, but it is opposed to the principles of law, **5 C. P. Cr. 24. See also 14 A. L. J. 327; 20 C. W. N. 1296. See 33 A. 393** as to what a judgment in an appeal from a case under s. 110 should contain

9. Judgments not in accordance with law.—The following judgments were held not to be in accordance with the provisions of s. 367 and this section —

‘Read proceedings. I see no reason for interfering with the decision or sentence, appeal dismissed, **1898 A. W. N. 280.**

‘I see no reason to distrust the finding of the Lower Court. The sentence passed, however, appears harsh. I reduce the term of imprisonment to fifteen days. The fines and terms of imprisonment in default will stand,’ **13 C. 110.**

Where a Sessions Judge pronounced judgment as follows — “If believed, the prosecution evidence is sufficient to warrant the conviction. I decline to interfere.” *Held*, that the judgment would have been proper on appeal to the High Court against a conviction by a jury, but it does not satisfy the requirements of this section and s. 367. The Sessions Judge has to decide not whether the evidence, if believed, is sufficient, but whether, being sufficient, it is also worthy of belief, **Weir II, 536.**

A District Magistrate in disposing of an appeal recorded the following judgment — “The affray was a faction fight between members of the two parties into which the society of *D* was split up. There is no ground for doubting the justice of the Magistrate’s finding that the two appellants took part in the affray and that the party to which they belonged were the aggressors. The appeal is dismissed and the conviction and sentence are confirmed.” *held* that this was not a judgment in accordance with s. 367 and this section. From the judgment as it stands the High Court is unable to say that the Magistrate has duly considered the evidence in the case. He does not for instance, refer at all to the material circumstance that the complainant *M*, when first complaining to the Police patrol, did not mention the applicant as taking part in the affray, although the applicant seems actually to have been present when the complaint was made, **15 B. 11.**

A Sessions Judge upon hearing in a case of conviction under s. 392, I P C, recorded the following judgment — “Upon reading the record and grounds of appeal, and after hearing Mr. K, pleader for the accused, I see no sufficient grounds for interfering with the conviction or sentence and dismiss this appeal.” *Held* setting aside judgment and directing the re-hearing of appeal, that as the appeal was heard under s. 423 and not under s. 421, the Lower Appellate Court had no power to dismiss the appeal summarily, and that under the

circumstances it had failed to comply with the requirements of this section and s 367 of the Code, 1 Bom. L 225; 23 C. 420. See also 8 A. 514; 20 C. 333; 9 C. W. N. 23, 13 C. W. N. 167 and 192; 37 C. 194; 14 A. L. J. 2.

A judgment of the Appellate Court in the words 'I find no reason to interfere and no ground of appeal requires particular notice, this appeal is dismissed,' does not comply with the provisions of this section s. 267, 2 P. R. 1908 = 7 Cr. L. J. 279.

10. Power to order re-trial, after delivery of judgments—Notwithstanding the terms of s 369 which prevent an Appellate Court after signing its judgment from altering or reviewing it, except to correct a clerical error, it can by a subsequent order remedy an omission to order a new trial when it has merely set aside proceedings, as held without jurisdiction without making such order, 3 M. 48. See Note 47 at p 881

11. Whether section applies to judgments under s. 123 ?—It may be open to doubt whether the provisions of ss 367 and 424 which apply to judgments in trials and appeals, govern orders under s. 123, sub-s. 37 C. 91. See Note 11 at p. 160 and Note 2 at p 802.

12. Where appellate judgment defective, High Court may direct re-hearing of appeal.—It is the duty of the Judge hearing the appeal to state the facts and give the reasons for the conclusion he arrives at. The High Court will not, in revision, make up for the deficiencies in the appellate judgment by having recourse to that of the Court of First Instance. Where the appellate judgment is not in accordance with law, the High Court may remand the appeal for re-hearing and delivery of a proper judgment, 7 C. W. N. 30; 37 C. 194; 13 C. W. 167 and 192; 35 C. 138. Under the wide powers conferred by s. 423 (a) the High Court has power to direct the Lower Appellate Court to rehear the appeal. 43 P. W. R. 1912 = 7 P. L. R. 111. If the High Court directs the Lower Appellate Court to rehear the appeal as such omission is prejudicial to the prisoners, 15 B. 11; Ratnaselvam v. 9 C. W. N. 23.

425. (1) Whenever a case is decided on appeal by the High Court under this Chapter, it shall certify its judgment or order to the Court by which the finding, sentence or order appealed against was recorded or passed. If the finding, sentence or order was recorded or passed by a Magistrate other than the District Magistrate, the certificate shall be sent through the District

Order by High Court on appeal to be certified to Lower Court

Magistrate

(2) The Court to which the High Court certifies its judgment or order shall thereupon make such orders as are conformable to the judgment or order of the High Court and, if necessary the record shall be amended in accordance therewith

Note.—Practice—When a case is decided on appeal or revised by the High Court, the Court or Magistrate to which the High Court certifies its order will proceed under the provisions of this section or s. 442, issue, when necessary, a fresh warrant or order to the jailor.—Bom. H. C. Cr. Cir., p 54

Suspension of sentence pending appeal. Release of appellant on bail.

426. (1) Pending any appeal by a convicted person, the Appellate Court may, for reasons to be recorded by it in writing, order that the execution of the sentence or order appealed against be suspended and, if he is in confinement, that he be released on bail or on his own bond

(2) The power conferred by this section on an Appellate Court may be exercised also by the High Court in the case of any appeal by a convicted person to a Court subordinate thereto

(3) When the appellant is ultimately sentenced to imprisonment, penal servitude or transportation, the time during which he is so released shall be excluded in computing the term for which he is so sentenced

Notes.—1. Power under this section confined to the Appellate Court.—The Appellate Court may exercise the powers conferred by this section irrespective of the offence for which the accused is confined be bailable or not. In the absence of an appeal, the Sessions Judge has no authority to suspend a sentence

5 M. H. C. R. Appx. I. Where a Sessions Judge suspended the operation of a sentence passed by a second class Magistrate, *held*, that his action was illegal and that the time during which the sentence was suspended should not be excluded under this section in computing the term of the sentence. Though the result of illegal action of the Sessions Judge was to enable the accused to escape undergoing the greater portion of the sentence the High Court in setting aside the illegal order of the Sessions Judge, had no power to enhance the punishment, unless it were shown that the original order passed was inadequate, **Welf II, 537.**

2. Appellate Court cannot direct appellant to be treated as under-trial prisoner.—Under s 426 the Appellate Court has no power to pass an order that the prisoner who has been tried, convicted and sentenced in due course of law by a Subordinate Court should be tried as an under trial prisoner pending the disposal of his appeal, **16 Cr. L. J. 134**

3 Order for detention in a Reformatory is not a sentence.—Sections 8, 10 and 30 of the *Reformatory Schools Act 1897*, make a distinction between an order for detention and a sentence, s 53 I P C, does not include such orders among punishments. An Appellate Court has therefore, no power to suspend the carrying out of the order of detention passed in lieu of a sentence of imprisonment, **16 Cr. L. J. 134.**

4 Sentence of imprisonment cannot be suspended, to take effect at a future period, but must commence from the time that the sentence is passed. Where a Magistrate postponed the execution of a sentence of imprisonment for a stated period, at the request of the accused to allow the accused to appeal, *held*, that the sentence was bad in law, and could not be carried into execution, **12 W. R. 47 = 3 B. L. R. Ap. Cr 50.**

427. When an appeal is presented under section 417, the High Court may issue a warrant directing that the accused be arrested and brought before it or any Subordinate Court, and the Court before which he is brought may commit him to prison pending the disposal of the appeal or admit him to bail.

Arrest of accused in appeal from acquittal

Note.—See Note 1210 s 417. It is not necessary to give the accused notice before issuing warrant of **16 Cr. L. J. 670 (B)**

428. (1) In dealing with any appeal under this Chapter, the Appellate Court, if it thinks additional evidence to be necessary, shall record its reasons, and may either take such evidence itself, or direct it to be taken by a Magistrate, or, when the Appellate Court, is a High Court, by a Court of Session or a Magistrate

Appellate Court may take further evidence or direct it to be taken

(2) When the additional evidence is taken by the Court of Session or the Magistrate, it or he shall certify such evidence to the Appellate Court, and such Court shall thereupon proceed to dispose of the appeal

(3) Unless the Appellate Court otherwise directs, the accused or his pleader shall be present when the additional evidence is taken, but such evidence shall not be taken in the presence of jurors or assessors

(4) The taking of evidence under this section shall be subject to the provisions of Chapter XXV, as if it were an inquiry

Notes.—1 Powers conferred upon Criminal Appellate Courts by s 428 are not analogous to those conferred on Civil Appellate Courts by the Civil Procedure Code.—A Civil Court has ordinarily no jurisdiction to take evidence of its own motion, it has to decide the action on the evidence adduced by the parties. But a Criminal Court stands on a different footing. Section 540 gives power to the Magistrate at any stage of the inquiry or trial to examine any witness he may find necessary to come to a proper conclusion. Section 428 also in general terms gives power to the appellate tribunal to take additional evidence and before taking such evidence the Court must record its reasons for so doing **8 M. L. T. 413 = 11 Cr. L. J. 571; 8 M. L. T. 428 = (1910) M. W. N. 829 = 11 Cr. L. J. 734**

2. Scope of section.—When Appellate Court ought not to take further evidence.—This section contemplates further inquiry by taking additional evidence, when the conviction by the Lower Court has been based upon some evidence which might legally support it but which in the opinion of the Appellate Court is not

quite satisfactory. It does not empower an Appellate Court so to act in a case where there is no evidence legally capable of sustaining the charge, 9 B. L. R. Appx. XXXI = 18 W. R. 31. The section does not appear to be applicable where the prosecution having had ample opportunities to produce evidence, has failed to do so. *Per SUNDARA IYER, J.*, in 36 M. 457. When, however, the prosecution has preferred to adduce evidence and the Magistrate prevented them by holding that it was unnecessary, the case is one in which a retrial may be ordered or fresh evidence called for under this section, 36 M. 457. The powers conferred by this section are not intended to be exercised in cases in which the prosecution having had ample opportunities to produce evidence, have done so and the entire evidence falls short of sustaining the charge, 5 A. 217 at p. 221. See also 6 B. H. C. R. Cr. Ca. 64. The necessity for taking additional evidence must be apparent from something on the record and cannot be derived from external information, 3 L. B. R. 114. (See Note 7 to s. 417.) See also 19 M. 375. Appellate Court ought not to allow fresh evidence to be adduced merely because it is alleged to have been discovered after filing of the appeal, 31 M. 114 followed, 9 M. L. T. 323 = (1911) M. W. N. 136 = 12 Cr. L. J. 40.

Under s. 428 an Appellate Court cannot act upon any additional evidence which was not taken in the Lower Court unless the provisions of s. 428 of the Code are complied with, 21 A. L. J. 869.

3. **Section limited to appeals under Chapter XXXI.**—The power to take or call for further evidence, given by this section is expressly limited to appeals under this Chapter XXXI.

4. **Appellate Court cannot call for a finding nor act upon it.**—This section empowers an Appellate Court to merely call for evidence and not to call upon the Lower Court for finding. When an Appellate Court passes such an order, the proper order for the High Court to make is to set aside his judgment and direct him to restore the appeal and dispose of it according to law, 9 M. L. T. 406 = 12 Cr. L. J. 240; 16 Cr. L. J. 767 (M.). The Appellate Court cannot act upon such finding, 1914 M. W. 778 = 16 Cr. L. J. 79; but must come to its own conclusion upon the evidence taken by the Magistrate, 16 Cr. L. J. 767 (M.). See also 1 Pat. L. J. 99 = 17 Cr. L. J. 332.

5. **Appellate Court cannot direct further inquiry by Police.**—This section does not warrant an Appellate Court sending a case to the Police for investigation, it having been originally started by complaint in Court, 1900 A. W. N. 130.

6. **Reasons for taking additional evidence must be given.**—See 8 M. L. T. 418 = 11 Cr. L. J. 871; 8 M. L. T. 428 = 11 Cr. L. J. 734; but failure to do so would be merely an irregularity cured by s. 531, 9 M. L. T. 406 = 12 Cr. L. J. 210.

7. **Presence of accused may be dispensed with when additional evidence is recorded by High Court itself.**—Chapter XXX refers to the mode of taking and recording evidence in inquests and trials. Under this section and s. 375 the High Court could dispense with the presence of the accused, when additional evidence was recorded by itself. *Criminal Appeal 52 of 1906 Allahabad High Court*. The same procedure was adopted by the Madras High Court in hearing the appeals connected with the *Ranga Reddi Murder Case*.

8. **It is only as an Appellate Court, or when additional evidence is called for by Appellate Court, that a Court can record such evidence in absence of jurors or assessors.**—Where a Sessions Court in a trial by assessors for murder, relied on a statement by the deceased, and the evidence necessary to prove that statement was not recorded until after the close of the trial and the discharge of the assessors, it was held that the evidence was recorded *coram non iudice*, 15 A. 139. See also 19 M. 375.

9. **Practice—date for re-hearing must be fixed.**—Whenever a criminal appeal is sent back for further inquiry, the Appellate Court should invariably fix a date for the re-hearing of the case, taking care that the date so fixed is in each instance sufficiently remote to allow of a return being made to the order of remand.—*Per Cr. p. 240*

10. **Accused is not a witness.**—This section does not seem to authorize the examination of the accused as a witness and it does not empower any Appellate Court to take evidence regarding proceedings before a Magistrate, such as to depose to the truth of an allegation, that the Magistrate had refused to examine some witness. A prosecution regarding the falsity of this statement is therefore bad. A criminal appeal is in reality a continuation of the criminal case, 12 M. 431 at p. 433.

11. **Court asked to record evidence, not entitled to find.**—If the Court that takes the additional evidence is not the Appellate Court itself, it should merely certify the evidence to the Appellate Court and has no power to express any opinion on it or to record any judgment as the case then stood on the record. This is the function of the Appellate Court, 3 B. L. R. Ap. Cr. 62.

12. Subordinate Court taking fresh evidence can sanction prosecution.—When an Appellate Court directs further evidence to be taken by a Subordinate Court under this section it is competent for the latter Court before which such evidence is given if any offence against public justice as is described in s. 195 is committed before such Court by a witness whose evidence is being recorded therein to send the case for investigation to a Magistrate under the provisions of s. 476 **15 W. R. 64 = 6 B. L. R. 693 (F. B.).**

13. Taking additional evidence and finding upon it gives no right of further appeal.—On appeal from the conviction of a Deputy Magistrate the Sessions Court got additional evidence taken and on considering the same dismissed the appeal. It was contended that the prisoner had a further right of appeal. *Held* that no appeal lay for under the present Code the Appellate Court is directed to *dispose of the appeal* and not pass sentence judgment etc. as under the Code of 1861. The Appellate Court is not competent to pass a fresh sentence and it has no power to consider and determine a new case disclosed by the additional evidence except in so far as to affirm or modify or set aside the sentence under appeal or to act otherwise as provided by s. 423 (1) (b) under s. 430 the appeal judgment is final **27 C. 372** which practically *overrides 2 W. R. 13* and explains the changes in the law as laid down by the previous codes. Where an Assistant Magistrate decided a case without examining the witnesses for the defence the Sessions Judge on appeal ordered the evidence of those witnesses to be taken by the Assistant Magistrate and on the depositions being returned to him dealt with the case and confirmed the conviction and sentence of the Assistant Magistrate *held* that the judgment of the Sessions Judge though in form confirming the Assistant Magistrate's judgment and sentence was in substance an original judgment and that an appeal lay from it to the High Court upon the merits, **2 W. R. 13, 8 W. R. 69** See also **6 B. L. R. 433 = 15 W. R. 33, 8 W. R. 69 and 6 B. H. C. R. Cr. Ca. 64.**

14. When action under this section preferable to re-trial?—Where an Appellate Court found that three material witnesses had not been examined and making that one of the grounds, ordered a re-trial *held* that the proper procedure for the Appellate Court to adopt was to proceed under sub-sec. (1) of this section **31 C. 710.**

15. Distinction between directing further evidence, further inquiry or re-trial.—See ss. 437 and 423. A Sessions Judge or District Magistrate acting under s. 437 (otherwise than as an Appellate Court) can only direct further inquiry and has no power to take evidence or direct the taking of further evidence. The High Court alone as a Court of Revision under s. 439 has all the powers of an Appellate Court including the power under this section **6 C. L. J. 251 = 6 Cr. L. J. 357**. Where an Appellate Court directs a re-trial under s. 423 it cannot restrict the evidence to be taken to that mentioned in its order but should refer the case to be tried in view of the instructions in its order when it is open to the accused to adduce such additional evidence as he may desire **3 C. L. J. 303 = 3 Cr. L. J. 304**.

429. When the Judges composing the Court of Appeal are equally divided in opinion the case with their opinions thereon shall be laid before another Judge of the same Court and such Judge after such hearing (if any) as he thinks fit shall deliver his opinion and the judgment or order shall follow such opinion.

Procedure where
Judges of Court of
Appeal are equally
divided

Notes.—1 For similar provisions.—See s. 38 and 36 of the *Letters Patent* and **15 B. 452, 27 C. 501 and 692.**

2. Whole case referred to and not merely points of difference.—Where on a difference of opinion between two Judges the case is laid before a third Judge the whole case is referred to the third Judge and not merely the point or points on which the Judges differed and it is the duty of the Judge to whom the case is referred to consider all the points involved before he delivers his opinion and it will be according to the opinion of such Judge that the judgment will follow **33 C. 202.**

3. Where Judges agree as to one and disagree as to another accused.—I am not now concerned with the question of the trial of two prisoners with regard to one of whom the Judges composing the Court of Appeal may be agreed in their opinion while as regards the other the Judges may be equally divided in opinion. In such a contingency it is quite possible to maintain the view that, upon a reasonable interpretation of the term case what has to be laid before another Judge is the case of the prisoner as to whom the Judges are equally divided in opinion. *Per MOOKERJEE, J.* **35 C. 202**

4. Section does not apply to hearing of application under s. 195 (b).—The section does not apply to the hearing of application under s. 195 (b) to revoke a sanction granted by the Lower Court or to give a sanction refused by it. If the Judges are equally divided, the case is governed by s. 36 of the *Letters Patent* that is the opinion of the senior Judge prevails **22 M. L. J. 419 (F. B.) = 13 Cr. L. J. 209**

Hence, to revolve as if upon a point of support

Back. Turn the adamantine spindles round. *Allegro*
When to advance or stand or turn the way of battle *Molto*

Turn from thy fierce wrath. *Ex xxxii 12*
Turn ye turn ye from your evil ways for why will ye die?
Isa xxxii 11

The semitone) e
low last the
three being per
formed very
quickly, as a
triple preceded
ing the note over which the sign is placed
By turns (a) One after another alternately



God will move
turn my throne
When the pe

Impatience
To return

When you and a horse hair & turn together *Allegro* An engine is

Eastern priests in golden robes run
And turn their heads to imitate the sun

Page

Some
7 Co
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8 To
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precision
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grammatical
mode of a

Turn (1) To move round to have a circular
motion; to revolve entirely repeatedly, or per

Turn, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45, 46, 47, 48, 49, 50, 51, 52, 53, 54, 55, 56, 57, 58, 59, 60, 61, 62, 63, 64, 65, 66, 67, 68, 69, 70, 71, 72, 73, 74, 75, 76, 77, 78, 79, 80, 81, 82, 83, 84, 85, 86, 87, 88, 89, 90, 91, 92, 93, 94, 95, 96, 97, 98, 99, 100

what; there, well, firm, plique, firm, done, for, do well, good, foot,

Finality of orders on appeal

430. Judgments and orders passed by an Appellate Court upon appeal shall be final except in the cases provided for in section 417 and Chapter XXXII

Notes.—1 Section 417 gives a right of appeal to Government against acquittal Chapter XXXII deals with reference and revision.

2 Finality of judgments and orders.—See s 369 and Notes thereunder at pp. 934—938 Where a Sessions Judge erroneously dismissed an appeal on the ground that it was barred by limitation but on discovering the error, admitted the appeal and acquitted the accused the High Court held the order of acquittal and not open to review 19 B 732; 24 P R 1887 421 for non appearance of appellant it is open to C. R. Appx. XXIX, 5 N L R. 76 = 9 Cr L J 553.

Such an order of disposal without hearing on the merits is not a judgment 10 C. L. J 80 = 10 Cr L J 287 As to finality of judgment in *Sonhal Pargannas* see 12 C. 536 An appeal judgment on a sanction application is final 23 B 50 See also Note 3 to s 428 and Notes 18 to 20 to s 421

3. Section applies to High Courts.—An order rejecting an appeal summarily and without calling for records is final. It is immaterial whether such order is made before or after the papers are called for 4 B 101 *distinguishing* 7 Bom H C. R Cr Ca 67 See also 14 C. 42 and Note 8 to s 434 and Notes 12 to 16 to s. 369 and Note 7 to s 439

431. Every appeal under section 417 shall finally abate on the death of the accused and every other appeal under this Chapter (except an appeal from a sentence of fine) shall finally abate on the death of the appellant

Abatement of appeals.

Notes —1 Reason for the exception —We think that an appeal against a sentence of fine should not abate by reason of the death of the accused because it is a matter which affects his estate We have accordingly excepted this case.—*See Com Rep*

2. Result of the death of one of several appellants —Two persons were tried and convicted by a Sessions Judge of criminal breach of trust and sentenced each to one year's rigorous imprisonment and a fine of Rs. 1000 Both appealed to the High Court against the conviction and sentence and one of them died pending the decision of the appeal. The conviction and sentence on the living appellant were reversed but no order was passed as regards the dead one On the application of his nephew for reversal of conviction held that the appeal of the deceased appellant abated on his death but that his representatives had their remedy by application to the Governor in Council 19 B 714. Even the High Court cannot call for and examine the record of such a case with a view to revision and rectification 6 P R 1893. See *contra* 2 B 564 The words newly introduced meet the above Rulings.

3. Abatement of revision proceedings.—By analogy to s. 431 all applications by way of revision abate on the death of the applicant 6 P R. 1893 *contra* 2 B. 564.

4. Appeals against compensation directed under s. 250, do not abate.—Where compensation has been awarded under s. 250 and an application for revision against this order has been made pending which the petitioner dies the application does not abate also but can be prosecuted by his legal representatives, 24 P R. 1908 = 9 Cr L J 103.

CHAPTER XXXII *

OF REFERENCE AND REVISION

432. A Presidency Magistrate may, if he thinks fit refer for the opinion of the High Court any question of law which arises in the hearing of any case pending before him or may give judgment in any such case subject to the decision of the High Court on such reference and pending such decision may either commit the accused to jail or release him on bail to appear for judgment when called upon

Reference by Presidency Magistrate to High Court.

* An order under s. 4 cl (1) of Act XXXVII of 1901 withdrawing an accused person, is not open to revision, under this Chapter as all sentences passed in criminal cases are final, 12 C. 536.

Notes—1 Reference before hearing of case cannot be made.—A Presidency Magistrate cannot make reference under this section before the hearing of a case, 1 Bom L R 821

2 Reference to High Court must be on a question of law—A reference to the High Court under this section must be on a question of law as distinguished from one of fact *Ratanlal 838*, e.g. whether the words stand to ply for hire in s 22 of Bombay Act VI of 1863 include walking or driving slowly along the road for a fare is a question of fact and as the Act contains no definition of the expression stand to ply and in the absence of any definition extending the meaning of the word stand it should be understood in its popular sense *Ratanlal 539*

3 Practice of High Court on reference—Upon a reference under this section the High Court only deals with the particular points of law stated for its opinion but not with the facts of the case nor any other objection to the validity of the proceedings referred 33 C. 193. The order passed is conclusive both as to the merits of the case and as to the quantum of punishment 1890 A W N 223

4 Right to begin—In a reference by a Presidency Magistrate to the High Court as to whether on the facts stated any offence has been committed by any accused person it lies on the prosecution to make out that an offence has been committed and under the circumstances the prosecution must begin 19 C. 380

5 Except Presidency Magistrate no other Magistrate can refer for opinion—A District Magistrate has no power to make a reference. He can only bring a case before the High Court by way of revision. This section gives power only to a Presidency Magistrate 18 L R. 4 = 9 Cr L J 243. A Sessions Judge cannot refer a case to the High Court on a point arising in a pending appeal 13 A L J 477 = 16 Cr L J 433. See Notes 6 and 7 to s 438

433. (1) When a question has been so referred the High Court shall pass such order thereon as it thinks fit and shall cause a copy of such order to be sent to the Magistrate by whom the reference was made who shall dispose of the case conformably to the said order

(2) The High Court may direct by whom the costs of such reference shall be paid

Notes—1 High Court sitting in appeal cannot review—The High Court sitting in appeal cannot review an order passed by it under this section *Ratanlal 638*. See Note 7 under s. 439. But when the Magistrate does not dispose of the case conformably to the order of the High Court an appeal will lie under s 411 against the decision of the Magistrate

2 Power of High Courts to grant costs under this section—The High Court has no jurisdiction to grant costs in criminal cases except in those cases where the Code of Criminal Procedure makes express provision. The maxim *expressio unius est exclusio alterius* applied 45 M 913.

434. (1) When any person has in a trial before a Judge of High Court consisting of more Judges than one and acting in the exercise of its original criminal jurisdiction been convicted of an offence the Judge if he thinks fit may reserve and refer for the decision of a Court consisting of two or more Judges of such Court any question of law which has arisen in the course of the trial of such person and the determination of which would affect the event of the trial

(2) If the Judge reserves any such question the person convicted shall pending the decision thereon be remanded to jail or if the Judge thinks fit be admitted to bail and the High Court shall have power to review the case or such part of it as may be necessary and finally determine such question and thereupon to alter the sentence passed by the Court of original jurisdiction and to pass such judgment or order as the High Court thinks fit

Notes.—1. Analogous provisions.—(i) *Chartered High Court*.—See cls. 25 and 26 of the *Jellers Patent* printed in the Appendix

(ii) *Chief Court of Lower Burma*.—See ss 11 and 12 of the *Lower Burma Courts Act VI* of 1900

(iii) *Punjab*.—See Act XVIII of 1884

2. Reference purely discretionary.—It is in the discretion of the single Judge constituting the High Court whether or not he will reserve a point of law for the opinion of the High Court consisting of two or more Judges, 10 B. H. C. R. 75. In 22 B. 112 (*Tilak's Case*) the application was refused. The statement of the Judge who presides at a trial as to what has taken place at it is conclusive. Neither the affidavits of by-standers, nor of jurors, nor the notes of counsel, nor of shorthand writers are admissible to controvert the notes or statement of the Judge.

3. Point of law must be one arising in course of 'trial'.—When a point of law is raised before the accused is called upon to plead, it cannot be referred under this section to the Full Bench, even if the presiding Judge wished it, 28 C. 211.

4. Prisoner's counsel has the right to begin.—Where, on the application of such counsel, a question of law has been reserved for the decision of the Court under this section, the counsel for the accused must begin, 8 B. 200.

5. Power exercised by High Court is a power of review.—The power exercised by a Court sitting as a Court to decide questions of law reserved in criminal cases under this section is the power of review and the Court is a Court of reference and revision, 8 B. 200. This is the High Courts power of review referred to in s 369. See Note 12 at p 936 and 7 A. 672; 5 W. R. 61, 10 B. 176 (F.B.), 19 B. 732; 23 B. 50.

6. Power of High Court on point of law reserved, to consider merits of case.—The High Court on a point of law reserved under this section has power to review the whole case and to determine whether the admission of the rejected evidence would have affected the result of the trial, 1 C. 207 = 25 W. R. 36; 2 B. 61; 9 Bom. H. C. R. 353; 10 C. L. J. 13 = 10 Cr. L. J. 193, 32 B. 111; 17 C. 642; 25 M. 61; 4 C. W. N. 433. The question of appreciation of evidence is not one of law, 4 Bom. L. R. 666.

7. High Court is competent to dispose of case finally.—The accused being upon his trial for murder, two principal witnesses for the prosecution G and M, were tendered pardon by the committing Magistrate under s. 337, and were accepted by them. The Judge read to the jury statements (which had not been admitted in evidence) made by G and M, purporting to have been taken under s. 361, held, that the improper reception of such evidence constituted a decision erroneous in point of law calculated to prejudice the prisoner. Under s. 167 of the *Indian Evidence Act* and s. 537, the High Court went into the merits of the case quashed the conviction and acquitted the prisoner, 17 C. 642. See also 4 C. W. N. 433 and 25 M. 61.

8. Except under this section a Division or Full Bench of High Court cannot revise judgment of single Judge exercising criminal jurisdiction.—The powers of a single Judge in a matter with which he has jurisdiction to deal are the powers of the Court and cannot be in any way controlled by a Division or Full Bench of the Court. As no appeal lies, no revision lies, 1 P. R. 1909 = 9 Cr. L. J. 306; 4 P. R. 1909 = 9 Cr. L. J. 378. In 32 B. 111 (F.B.) it was held (in a case arising under the *Jellers Patent*) that in the absence of any reservation of the point by the trying Judge as provided by cl. 25 or of any certificate from the Advocate-General under cl. 26 the Court was precluded from re-opening a question which was decided by the Judge presiding at the trial. See also 35 M. 397.

435. (1) The High Court or any Sessions Judge or District Magistrate, or any Sub-

Divisional Magistrate empowered by the Local Government in this behalf

Power to call for
records of inferior
Courts

may call for and examine the record of any proceeding before any inferior Criminal Court situate within the local limits of its or his jurisdiction for the purpose of satisfying itself or himself as to the correctness, legality or propriety of any finding sentence or order recorded or passed, and as to the regularity of any proceeding of such inferior Court "and may, when calling for such record direct that the execution of any sentence be suspended and, if the accused is in confinement, that he be released on bail or on his own bond pending the examination of the record" *

* These words in " " were inserted by Act XXIII of 1932, s. 114

* *Explanation*—All Magistrates whether exercising original or appellate jurisdiction shall be deemed to be inferior to the Sessions Judge for the purposes of this sub-section and of section 437

(2) If any Sub-Divisional Magistrate acting under sub-section (1) considers that any such finding sentence or order is illegal or improper or that any such proceedings are irregular he shall forward the record with such remarks thereon as he thinks fit, to the District Magistrate

† (3) * * * * *

(4) If an application under this section has been made either to the Sessions Judge or District Magistrate no further application shall be entertained by either of them

Note—The old clause (3) stood as follows—

(3) Orders made under ss 143 and 144 and proceedings under Chapter XII and s. 176 are not proceedings within the meaning of this section

By the omission of this clause orders under ss 143 144 and 145 to 148 and 176 are now subject to revision 43 C 522 holding that the High Court has jurisdiction to set aside proceedings under s. 145 in consonance with the law as now amended. After the amendment by the omission of clause (3) of s. 435 it does not now seem necessary to have recourse to s. 107 of the Government of India Act (5 and 6 Geo. C. V 61) to set aside a proceeding under s. 145

I—NATURE AND SCOPE OF REVISIONAL JURISDICTION

Notes—1 Scheme of revisional jurisdiction, ss 435 to 439—General revisional jurisdiction is conferred by ss 435 438 and 439 Under these sections the Sessions Judge and the District Magistrate cannot themselves interfere except to suspend the execution of a sentence or grant bail but can only report to the High Court and the High Court may in its discretion exercise any of the powers referred in s. 439

(1) As regards dismissals of complaints under ss 203 and 204 (3) and orders of discharge there is no appeal as there is in cases of acquittal and conviction and the Legislature has not thought it sufficient to leave these orders to be dealt with under the general revisional jurisdiction already mentioned and has conferred special powers in regard to these orders on the High Court itself as well as on the Sessions Judge and District Magistrate Section 436 empowers Sessions Judges and District Magistrates to commit for trial direct in cases exclusively triable at Sessions In less serious cases not triable at Sessions it is open to the High Court Sessions Judge or District Magistrate to make an order for further enquiry 32 M 220 at p 233. Ss 435—438 prescribe the method by which the records of any criminal case come to the High Court and the power to deal with the record is prescribed by s. 439 Ss. 435—438 provide the machinery and s. 439 the power to deal with the record 36 M 275, 17 O C 25 = 15 Cr. L J 217 Ss. 435—439 must be read together 13 C. 608 at p 617; 40 C 477 (F B) and see Note 11 to s. 436 Note 4 to s. 437 and Note 3 to s. 439

2 This Chapter does not affect original jurisdiction of Magistrates—Revisional powers conferred on superior Courts cannot be regarded as in any way impliedly restricting the jurisdiction conferred on Magistrates to inquire into offences—*Per WHITE C J* 29 M 126 (F B). See also Note 26 at p 586 Note 13 to s. 436 and Note 3 to s. 437

3. Calling for record not a stage of any judicial proceeding—The call for the records of a case under this section by a District Magistrate etc. is not a judicial proceeding so as to give him jurisdiction to make an order under s. 476 in respect of a case disposed of by a Magistrate subordinate to him 15 M L J 459 = 3 Cr L J 118; 11 N L R 36 = 18 Cr L J 289 In 25 M 659, the Court refused to decide whether an order passed after and as the result of an examination of records under s. 435 was a judicial proceeding See Note 21

II—COURTS IN WHOM REVISIONAL POWERS ARE VESTED

4 High Court—See s. 439 and Notes thereunder as to the revisional powers of the High Court

5 Sessions Judges.—All Magistrates including the District Magistrate and a District Magistrate acting under s. 30 are inferior to the Sessions Judge for purposes of revision—The Magistracy are

* This explanation was added by Act XVIII of 1923 s. 116

† Sub-section (3) was omitted by 16 C.

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U. in the—

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U. den dran n (Gr. allos, for allos; whole and
divisor, tree) (F. allos, for allos; whole and
divisor, tree)

U. an ulterior manner, re-
-remote furthest final
boundary, hence, the

U. last reason argument, or
-last reason
-ultima, last] (Gram)

U. from Lat. ultimus, to come to an end from ultimus
the furthest last, superl. of alius, that is beyond
-see in pro]
1. Furthest most remote extreme last final
My harbor and my ultimate repose. Alia ton
Many actions not to procure fame are not conducive to the
our ul' some happy ones

U. or being, every where

U. ubiquitous (Fr. ubi, where) n. [Fr. ubi, where] Sp
where] Existence in all places or every where
at the same time omnipresence as the ubiquity
of God is not disputed by those who admit his ex
istence

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(11) *Sessions Judge cannot direct further inquiry after District Magistrate has dealt with case under s 435*—See 22 C. 873; 17 C. W. N. 431 = 14 Cr. L. J. 123 and Note 6 to s. 437

(12) *Sessions Judge can refer proceedings of District Magistrate under s 438 to High Court*—In the matter of reporting a case to the High Court for orders, both the Sessions Judge and the District Magistrate have concurrent jurisdiction, but the Sessions Judge has no jurisdiction to review an order made by the District Magistrate under s 437 refusing a further inquiry. It is open to the Sessions Judge to refer the matter to the High Court under this section, 22 C. 873; 17 M. L. J. 153 = 5 Cr. L. J. 132.

(13) *Sessions Judge can refer proceedings of District Magistrate exercising appellate jurisdiction*—Under the old section it was held that a Sessions Judge has no power to refer to the High Court the judgment of a District Magistrate given in the exercise of his appellate jurisdiction as he is not then an inferior Criminal Court to the Sessions Judge within the meaning of s. 435, 14 C. W. N. 206. But now under the amendment of sub-sec. (1) by the addition of the explanation that all Magistrates whether exercising original or appellate jurisdiction shall be deemed to be inferior to the Sessions Judge for the purposes of the sub-section, 14 C. W. N. 206 is no longer good law. It may be also noted that 3 Lah. 23 holds the same view as is embodied in the new explanation to sub-sec. (1).

(14) *Power of Sessions Judge to revise orders of District Magistrate under s 195 (6)*—In 30 A. 109, it was held that a Sessions Judge has no jurisdiction to revise an order of a District Magistrate setting aside an order of a third-class Magistrate refusing to sanction a prosecution under s. 211, I P. C. on the ground that the only Court to which an appeal lies from an order of a third-class Magistrate is the District Magistrate. See, however, the recent Full Bench Ruling in 30 M. 332 and Note 215 at p. 541.

(15) *Sessions Judge competent to revise proceedings of a District Magistrate acting in the exercise of his original criminal jurisdiction*—See 12 C. 473 (F.B.), 15 P. R. 1904 and Note 1 to s. 436.

10. Powers of District Magistrate—

(1) *District Magistrates cannot either on application or 'suo motu' act after Sessions Judge has dealt with case under this Chapter*—After the Sessions Judge had refused to interfere with an order of discharge by a second-class Magistrate the District Magistrate acting *suo motu* directed the committal of the accused. Held the committal was invalid. What the District Magistrate might not do on application he could not do *suo motu* by dispensing with an application. The fact that the District Magistrate passes the order of commitment without the knowledge of the Sessions Judge's refusal does not make it less illegal. The reason for the prohibition is the avoidance of a conflict between the orders of two district authorities having co-ordinate powers, 26 M. 477, Ratanlal 837 is no longer law, having regard to sub-sec. (4). But see 17 Cr. L. J. 497.

(2) *District Magistrate cannot direct further inquiry under s 436 when Sessions Judge has already passed orders under that section*—See Note 5 to s. 436.

(3) *District Magistrate cannot under s 438 refer proceedings of Sessions Judges to High Court—He must move the High Court through the Public Prosecutor*—A District Magistrate has no power to call for the record of a Sessions Court under this section as the District Magistrate is subordinate to the Sessions Judge, and the High Court will not interfere on a report under s. 438 made by a District Magistrate who is dissatisfied with the proceedings of a Sessions Judge. 2 N. L. R. 149 = 4 Cr. L. J. 422 where 23 C. 250 is followed and 9 A. 362; 13 W. R. 42 and 8 B. 307 are referred to. A District Magistrate has no power to refer the proceedings of a Sessions Judge acquitting an accused person, who had been convicted by a Bench of Magistrates, to the High Court, 6 C. L. R. 245; also 18 C. 186; 8 C. 875; 14 W. R. 25. If he considers that there has been a miscarriage of justice in the Court of Sessions, he should communicate with the Public Prosecutor as to the case in which he thinks such miscarriage has occurred, and invite his assistance to move the High Court with regard to it. (9 A. 362; 10 A. 146, 12 A. 534, 24 A. 346 followed); 25 A. 128, 1 B. L. C. 40 = 8 Cr. L. J. 161; *Mad H C Pro*, 27th September, 1885, 12 M. L. T. 170 = 1912 M. W. N. 812 = 23 M. L. J. 732 = 13 Cr. L. J. 714; 28 A. 91; 2 N. L. R. 149 = 4 Cr. L. J. 422; 23 C. 249; Ratanlal 601 and 623; or to take steps for an appeal against the order of acquittal by the Sessions Judge, Ratanlal 212, followed in 6 Bom. L. R. 1099, where it was held that when a District Magistrate finds that the sentence passed by a first-class Magistrate and confirmed in appeal by the Sessions Judge is inadequate, he is not competent to report the matter to the High Court under this section, but should bring the fact to the notice of the Local Government to have the High Court moved through the Public Prosecutor. In 10 A. 146 and 23 A. 91, the Allahabad High Court observed that, as a general rule, it would not entertain a reference from a District Magistrate which had for its object the enhancement of a

sentence passed by a Sessions Judge as a Court of appeal; see also 5 Lah 11. So also 6 Bom. L. R. 1099 = 1 Cr. L. J. 1115. In 36 A. 378, CHAMBER, J., held that it was very doubtful whether the District Magistrate is entitled as a matter of law to make a reference for the enhancement of sentence passed in a trial held by the Sessions Court, but assuming that he is so entitled it is extremely inconvenient that the District Magistrate should be allowed to criticise an order of a Court superior to him in this way. He should however, do so only in very special cases, 10 A 146, 15 M. 36. A District Magistrate has no power to criticise or refer to the High Court, the proceedings of a Court, like the Sessions Court, superior to his own Weir II, 563 and 566; nor is he competent to report to the High Court under this section an order passed by his predecessor in office. But the fact that the reference was improper need not necessarily prevent the High Court from passing the appropriate order under the circumstances of the case, as it has ample powers under s. 439, Ratanlal 652, 14 W. R. 25, 31 Bom. 47; 24 A. L. J. 224.

(iv) *District Magistrate cannot withhold order of Sessions Judge even if wrong*—The District Magistrate must forward the orders of the Sessions Judge to the Magistrates to whom they are addressed. He has no right to withhold the order because in his opinion it is not a legal order if he desires to obtain a revision of such orders, he should move the High Court through the Law Officers of the Government 9 A. 362 and 18 C. 185 referred to, 8 M. L. T. 83 = 11 Cr. L. J. 327.

IV.—OVER WHAT COURTS AND PROCEEDINGS REVISIONAL JURISDICTION MAY BE EXERCISED.

11. No revisional jurisdiction under this Chapter over proceedings of Courts other than 'criminal'.—The power to revise proceedings under this Chapter is confined to proceedings of *inferior Criminal Courts* and does not extend to the proceedings of *Civil or Revenue Courts*. A Sessions Judge or a High Court has therefore no power to call for the records of Civil Court. A Criminal Bench of the High Court cannot, therefore interfere with the proceedings of a Civil or Revenue Court under s. 195 or s. 476. See 26 A. 219 (F.B.), 1904 A. W. N. 170; 1902 A. W. N. 202; 23 A. 554; 31 A. 38; 8 C. W. N. 73, 40 C. 477 (F.B.) 26 M. 139; 36 M. 72, Weir II, 541 and 602; 4 L. B. R. 339 = 9 Cr. L. J. 28; 4 L. B. R. 138 = 7 Cr. L. J. 416; 7 L. B. R. 76 = 6 Bur. L. T. 144 = 14 Cr. L. J. 496; 1915 U. B. R. 111, 83 = 17 Cr. L. J. 82, 19 C. W. N. 447 = 21 C. L. J. 193 = 16 Cr. L. J. 286, 17 O. C. 25 = 15 Cr. L. J. 217 (where 40 C. 477 is approved, 6 O. C. 216, dissented from and 13 O. C. 198 = 11 Cr. L. J. 514 distinguished), nor over a Magistrate exercising civil powers, 9 Bom. L. R. 1347 = 6 Cr. L. J. 425. In 26 B. 785 the point was raised but not decided.

Contra.—In PUNJAB and CENTRAL PROVINCES it is held that it is competent to the High Court under ss. 435 and 439 to revise the orders made by Courts other than criminal in any proceeding under this Code, e.g., under ss. 476 and 195, 5 P. R. 1908 = 7 P. W. R. 1908 = 7 Cr. L. J. 281 (F.B.) 4 N. L. R. 140 = 8 Cr. L. J. 331.

12 Courts held to be not criminal—

(i) *Income-tax Officer is a Revenue Court and not a Criminal Court*.—An Income-tax Officer adjudicating upon a petition for reduction of income-tax or hearing an appeal under the *Income-tax Act II of 1886* is a Court and competent to sanction prosecution under s. 476, but the High Court has no power to interfere with such order under s. 435 as the Income-tax Officer is not a Criminal Court, 26 M. 72, 35 B. 642 (F.B.), 44 P. R. 1903 = 3 Cr. L. J. 123; 3 B. L. R. 66 = 10 Cr. L. J. 395 and 15 Cr. L. J. 2.

(ii) *District Registrar not a Criminal Court*.—District Registrar is not a Criminal Court within the meaning of this section and an order by him granting sanction cannot be revised, 14 Bom. L. R. 970 = 1 Bom. Cr. Ca. 216 = 13 Cr. L. J. 843; 33 A. 109. Cf. 30 M. 326 and Note 44 at p. 502.

(iii) *Settlement Officer under the Bengal Tenancy Act*.—An order made under s. 476 by an Assistant Settlement Officer under the Bengal Tenancy Act cannot be revised under s. 439, as it is not an inferior Criminal Court, 40 C. 477 (F.B.).

(iv) *Magistrate acting under s. 86 of the Bombay District Municipality Act*.—Under s. 86 of the *Bombay District Municipality Act, III of 1901*, a Magistrate hearing an appeal under that section is merely the appellate authority having jurisdiction to deal with the question of a civil liability. He is not a Criminal Court to which alone the revisional jurisdiction under this section is confined. See 11 Cr. L. J. 425, but see Note 14 (vii).

13. Cases where revisional jurisdiction is specially prohibited—

- (i) *Press Act*, s 22—See Note 40 to s 439¹
- (ii) *Extradition Act* XV of 1903—See *Appendix* and Note 41 to s. 439.
- (iii) *Reformatory Schools Act*—See *Appendix* and Note 39 to s 439

14. Courts and proceedings which have been held to be within the revisional jurisdiction—

(i) *Order under Eastern Bengal and Assam Disorderly House Act*—A Magistrate making an order under Act II of 1907 (E B and A Code) is an inferior Criminal Court and the High Court has jurisdiction to revise such order, as the information which lies at the root of the proceedings thereunder by virtue of s. 2 is to be received by a first class Magistrate, who is an official whose character is determined by this Code, **37 C. 237**

(ii) *Order under s 233 of the Cantonment Code, 1899*—An order purporting to have been made under s 233 of the *Cantonment Code, 1899*, is judicial order and not merely an executive order and therefore subject to the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court, **9 P. R. 1909 = 30 P. W. R. 1909 = 11 Cr. L. J. 17**. See also **1 P. R. 1906; 23 P. R. 1905**

(iii) *Orders under the Calcutta Municipal Act III of 1899*—The orders of a Magistrate under ss 449-450 of the *Calcutta Municipal Act* are open to revision by the High Court, **33 C. 237; 34 C. 341; 29 C. 491**. Where the Legislature by express enactment (s 645) vested a discretion in the General Committee, the High Court will not interfere if the acts done are within the provisions of law, **34 C. 30**.

(iv) *Inspector-General of Police—Act V of 1861*—Under ss 4 and 5 of Act V of 1861, the Inspector General of Police is a Magistrate and if he gives sanction his proceedings may be revised, **9 P. W. R. 1903 = 7 Cr. L. J. 291**.

(v) *Proceedings under Indian Railways Act*—A Magistrate's proceedings under s. 113 of the *Indian Railways Act* IX of 1890, are open to revision by the High Court under this section and s. 439, **13 P. R. 1891**.

(vi) *Forest Act VII of 1878*—The terms of s. 58 of the *Forest Act* do not exclude the revisional powers of the High Court over a subordinate tribunal in the exercise of its criminal jurisdiction where there has been material error in a judicial proceeding, **4 A. 417**.

(vii) *Bombay District Municipalities Act III of 1901*—In a case instituted under s 151 (2) of the Act, viz, the using of a place in a certain manner after notice has been given under s 151 (1) the mere fact of a notice being given is not conclusive evidence of the user of the place contrary to the notice. All the necessary ingredients of the offence must be proved as in any other criminal trial **8 B. L. R. 238 = 16 Cr. L. J. 235**

(viii) *Workmen's Breach of Contract Act XIII of 1859*—The High Court has power under ss 435 and 439 of the Cr Pro. Code to revise an order passed by a Magistrate directing either return of the advance or specific performance of the contract under para. 1 of s. 2 of the Workmen's Breach of Contract Act XIII of 1859, **43 B. 607**.

15. Powers of revision limited to proceedings of "inferior Courts"—Within the territorial jurisdiction of a High Court, all other Courts are inferior to it, in a Sessions Division the Sessions Court is superior to all other local Criminal Courts, and all such other Courts are inferior to it, and in a district all other Magistrates are by s. 17 subordinate to the Magistrate of the District, and consequently inferior to him and inferior as much for the purpose of s 435 as in any other respect, **12 C. 473 (F B)**

"Inferior," i.e., statutorily incompetent to hold or exercise equal powers. It carries with it the idea of subordination, which latter means inferior in rank" **9 B. 100**. It is more comprehensive than the word subordinate, **8 M. 18 (F.B)**. There may be inferiority without subordination as in the relation of a second or third-class Magistrate to the Court of Session, **12 C. 473; 10 C. 263 and 551, 7 A. 134**. A Magistrate is not competent to refer the proceedings of a superior Court to the High Court on the ground that they were improper, **6 C. L. R. 245 and 8 C. 876**. A Bench, Full or Divisional, of a High Court cannot revise orders of a single Judge of the High Court as there is no inferiority, **4 P. R. 1509 = 9 Cr. L. J. 378; 8 P. R. 1909 = 10 Cr. L. J. 314; 14 C. 42**.

(i) *All Magistrates including District Magistrate inferior to Sessions Judge*—See **12 C. 473 (F.B)**, **1889 A. W. N. 100**. Even a District Magistrate acting under s 30 is inferior to the Sessions Judge, **15 P. R. 1904**. See Note 1 to s. 436 and Note 5.

(vi) *First-class Magistrate inferior to District Magistrate*—The Court of a Magistrate of the first class is inferior and subordinate to that of the District Magistrate, who is superior in respect of executive as well as judicial functions to all other Magistrates, 9 B. 100; 8 M. 18 (F.B.), 7 A. 853 (F.B.), 12 C. 473 (F.B.), 33 P. R. 1885. The District Magistrate can therefore call for and examine the record of a proceeding before a Sub-Divisional Magistrate of the first class, even if the first-class Magistrate has been appointed an Additional District Magistrate under s. 10 (2) 25 P. R. 1903 = 9 Cr. L. J. 104.

(vii) *No revisional jurisdiction to Sessions Judges and Magistrates outside the limits of their Division or District*—Where sanction was granted and confirmed on appeal by the Magistrate of the District of South Arcot and a complaint laid before a Magistrate in the District of Chingleput, the Sessions Judge of Chingleput is not competent to revise the sanction proceedings or to report such proceedings to the High Court and to stay proceedings before the second-class Magistrate of Chingleput pending the result of the revision, 25 M. 137. See also 30 M. 136 in Note 4 to s. 403 as to the significance of the word 'situate' in sub-sec. (1).

16. Revision limited to proceedings of 'Courts' as such and does not extend to extra-judicial proceedings—

(i) *When a Magistrate acts as such, his proceedings will be liable to revision whatever he may call them*—When an illegal order is passed and action taken which involves matters coming within the purview of Law and Justice and within the scope of authority of the Courts, such authority cannot be ousted by the mere *ipse dixit* of the officer, that he was not acting as a judicial officer but in his executive capacity and the High Court can interfere by way of revision, 4 P. R. 1903 = 1 P. W. R. 1903 = 86 P. L. R. 1903 = 7 Cr. L. J. 202 and the validity of such an order may be tested on a prosecution for its disobedience, 11 C. W. N. 266. An order passed by a District Magistrate cannot be supported as an executive order in the absence of any statutory authority which would justify the making of it, 170 C. 283 = 15 Cr. L. J. 668. See Notes 10 and 11 to s. 439. In 7 A. L. J. 983 = 11 Cr. L. J. 476 it was held that when a Magistrate deals with the case as a Magistrate the Sessions Judge may proceed under this section. In this case the Collector who alone was empowered to levy a fine under s. 2 of Bengal Regulation VI of 1825 made over the case in his capacity as District Magistrate to the Joint Magistrate who levied a fine. Under s. 4 an appeal lay to the Board of Revenue. Held, the Sessions Judge was competent to deal with the case under s. 435 and the High Court set aside the sentence of fine. See Note 58 at p. 235, Note 58 at p. 264, Note 11 to s. 439 and Notes under s. 476.

(ii) *Judicial and executive order distinguished*—The scope of this section is very wide and the powers under it are not confined to calling for the records of judicial proceedings alone. The distinction however between a judicial and an executive proceeding is very simple.—The essence of a judicial proceeding is a declaration of the law on the particular case which has to be arrived at as the decision of certain legal relations 'est enim judicium lex ad factum singulare aptata' (Grotius de pure praeae C. I). The essence of an executive proceeding is an act to be done under such and such circumstances and inquired into when necessary with a view to determine whether in the particular case they call for or justify some particular. This distinction being borne in mind, the cases in which the superior may departmentally overrule the orders of his subordinate are easily discriminated from those in which a judicial review is necessary, Ratanlal 129. See also 29 M. 100; 4 P. R. 1903 = 7 Cr. L. J. 202. The test for deciding whether a particular officer is a Court, does not depend upon whether he is empowered to take evidence but whether he has been given jurisdiction by the constituted authorities to deal out justice in any particular defined class of cases. Per SADASIVIER, J., SUNDARA IYER, J., is of opinion that the true test is laid down in 24 M. 121 refers to *Rex v. Woodhouse*, (1906) 2 K. B. 501, where the test adopted appears to be 'whether there was a *lis* before the officer,' 35 M. 72. See Notes 35—44 under s. 195 and Notes 6—12 to s. 476.

(iii) *Extra-judicial orders not subject to revision*—The High Court cannot revise an extra-judicial order passed by a Magistrate, 1833 A. W. N. 25; nor can it give such opinion on questions submitted by the Lower Courts. The Lower Courts must instead of applying for instructions in such cases, pass orders and submit their proceedings for revision, 8 M. 18. Thus a Magistrate's order directing the observance of Municipal bye-laws which prohibit the slaughter of votive animals in private houses is not revisable under this section, 1833 A. W. N. 255. So a general circular prohibiting uncertificated pleaders from practising in the Criminal Courts in his District by a District Magistrate is an administrative matter. The particular pleader who has been refused may apply by revision, 19 M. L. J. 566 = 11 Cr. L. J. 69. In 1902 A. W. N. 175 the High Court declined to interfere with an order passed by a District Magistrate when he revised the list of petition writers who were allowed to practise within the precincts of the Court. A Collector as such is not subject to the revisional

Unbreech, *v* t [ump & p p UNBREECHED
(un breech), *p* pr & p UNBREECHING]

1 To remove the breeches of, to divest or strip of breeches

2 To free the breech of, as a cannon, from its fastenings or coverings

Unbreech'd (breech), *a* Not matted, pure genuine [ure]

Unbridle *v* t To free from the bridle

Unbridled *a* 1 Loosed from the bridle or out from the bridle hence unrestrained, violent as unbridled heat unbridled boldness unbridled passions

Unbroid'ed *a* Unbraided [ure] Chaucer

Unbuckle (buck), *v* t [ump & p p UNBUCKLED], *p* pr & p UNBUCKLING To loose from buckle, to unfasten, as, to unbuckle a shoe to unbuckle a girl's

Unbuild, *v* t To demolish to raise to destroy

Unburr, *v* t To remove the burr from as a

Unburden *v* t [ump & p p UNBURDENED], *p* pr & p UNBURDENING

1 To relieve from a burden or bur

2 To relieve from a burden or to unload

Unburthen *v* t 1 To rid of a load to free from a burden to ease to relieve

2 To throw off as a burden to unload to dis

Unbury (bur), *v* t To winter

Unbustle (bust), *v* t [ump & p p UNBUSTLED], *p* pr & p UNBUSTLING To loose from being

Unbustled by bustles to loose, to loose of bustles, to loose, to loose, to loose

Unbustle (bust), *v* t To die to die to die

Unbustle (bust), *v* t To die to die to die

Unbustle (bust), *v* t To die to die to die

Unbustle (bust), *v* t To die to die to die

Unbustle (bust), *v* t To die to die to die

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Unbustle (bust), *v* t To die to die to die

Unbustle (bust), *v* t To die to die to die

Unbustle (bust), *v* t To die to die to die

4 Something unknown or undetermined

Our shepherd's case in every man's case that is a certain sign for an uncertain sign

Unbustle (bust), *v* t To die to die to die

Unbustle (bust), *v* t To die to die to die

Unbustle (bust), *v* t To die to die to die

Unbustle (bust), *v* t To die to die to die

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Unbustle (bust), *v* t To die to die to die

Unbustle (bust), *v* t To die to die to die

18. Powers limited by ss. 436, 437 and 438.—The powers conferred by this section are limited to reporting under s. 438 and to the specific powers conferred by ss. 436 and 437. The Sessions Judge cannot himself issue proceedings criticising those of the Magistrates except on appeal, 7 M. H. C. R. Appx. XXVII.

19. Referring authority not entitled to record fresh evidence.—A Sessions Judge making a reference, after calling for records under this section, cannot take fresh evidence, 1832 A. W. N. 146, and neither can a District Magistrate, 3 Bom. L. R. 677; 12 A. L. J. 461 = 15 Cr. L. J. 575.

20. Records may be called for at any stage of proceedings.—See 22 C. 131 and 24 W. R. 4. Records may be called for even after the prisoner has served out his sentence, 7 A. 135 and where the accused is dead, 2 B. 564. But there is no provision in the Code which enables a Judge to stop a trial already commenced and to refer to the High Court any question or questions of law arising on the merits in that case, Ratanlal 214. In exceptional cases, where a bare statement of the facts without any elaborate argument is sufficient to convince the Court that the case is a bit one for interference at an intermediate stage the High Court will exercise its discretion in interfering, 2 B. L. R. 25 = 10 Cr. L. J. 237. Cf. Note 42 to s. 439.

21. No power to accord sanction on perusing calendar.—A Sub-Divisional Magistrate, acting under this section, has no authority to sanction prosecution on perusing the calendar, 7 M. 560 and 189; 15 M. L. J. 439 = 3 Cr. L. J. 118, as calling for an examination of proceedings under s. 435 does not constitute a judicial proceeding, 11 N. L. R. 36 = 15 Cr. L. J. 239. In 1903 A. W. N. 74 = 5 A. L. J. 562 = 7 Cr. L. J. 304, the first class Magistrate who discharged an accused, refused sanction to prosecute the complainant for an offence under s. 193, I P C. An application was then made to the District Magistrate who accorded sanction for prosecution under s. 211 I P C. Held the District Magistrate had no jurisdiction to pass such an order either under this section or s. 195 (6). The revisional powers of a District Magistrate do not include the powers conferred on a Court of appeal under sub-sec. (6) of s. 195. All that he could have done was to make a report to the High Court under s. 438, submitting the result of his examination of the record.

22. District Magistrate cannot take cognizance of case by way of revision against prisoner who has not appealed.—I and M were tried together and convicted of the same offences by a second-class Magistrate. I alone appealed, and in hearing his appeal, the District Magistrate took cognizance of the case against M and set aside the convictions and sentences against both the accused, and ordered their retrial. Held that the District Magistrate had no jurisdiction to reverse the conviction and sentence against M or to take cognizance of the case against him, except by reporting it to the High Court, Ratanlal 358; 3 Bom. L. R. 677.—M H C Pro, 19th April, 1875, *ibid*, 20th February, 1879. Also if the applicant for revision has the right of appeal, the High Court will not act, but will refer him to the exercise of the right before the proper Court, 1885 A. W. N. 293. See Note 47 to s. 439.

23. District Magistrate cannot direct trial of persons not before him.—When once the District Magistrate makes a case over for disposal to a Subordinate Magistrate it is out of his hands and he is not competent to pass any order relating to it, other than an order which might be made under this Chapter. Therefore, where in a case transferred by a District Magistrate, the Deputy Magistrate refused to order the trial of certain persons complained against, the District Magistrate was held not competent to order the trial of the said persons, 30 C. 449. See also 27 C. 798 and 979, and Notes 4 and 5 at pp. 580-581.

24. Decision of jury under s. 133, not liable to revision.—The decision of a jury under s. 133 is not a proceeding in a Criminal Court which the District Magistrate could call for and examine and refer to the High Court under this section Ratanlal 358; see Note 22 at p. 246. A District Magistrate may refer a case under s. 133 to the High Court under s. 438, 14 C. W. N. 85.

25. Power of Sessions Judge or District Magistrate to call for record of proceedings under s. 145.—When a Court has acted without jurisdiction in proceedings under Chapter XII, the Sessions Judge or District Magistrate can call for the record and report to the High Court under s. 438 because the powers under this section of the High Court, Sessions Judge and District Magistrate are the same, 5 C. W. N. 71. PRINSEP, J., in 5 C. W. N. 71 remarked that in such cases, it was the duty of the Sessions Judge and District Magistrate to refer the case to the High Court, because it would save the parties the expense of coming up to the High Court and the *ratio* of this decision cannot be too highly recommended, see also 4 C. W. N. 779; 3 C. W. N. 49 and 3 C. W. N. 593. If, however, the Magistrate was duly empowered to institute proceedings under s. 133, the

District Magistrate cannot call for the record, 23 C. 416; 14 C. W. N. 247. But see Preliminary Note to s. 435. The old subsec. (3) to this section has now been omitted, and therefore orders under s. 145 can be revised now.

26. Power to stay proceedings.—Whether a Sessions Judge or District Magistrate can stay proceedings or not, the call for records under this section, would virtually act as a stay of proceedings because while the record is with the superior Court the case before the Magistrate cannot proceed, not for want of jurisdiction but because the necessary papers are with the superior tribunal 9 C. W. N. 829. See Note 20.

27. District Magistrate cannot quash proceedings.—A Subordinate Magistrate being of opinion that no sanction under s. 197 was necessary, proceeded to try a case. On an application under s. 435 the District Magistrate, holding that sanction was necessary quashed the proceedings of the Sub Magistrate. *Held*, that the order quashing proceedings was clearly made without jurisdiction, as there is no provision of law which gives a District Magistrate power to interfere in this way, and that the proper course for him was to report the case for the orders of the High Court, if interference was considered necessary, 23 M. 540.

28. Power to order further inquiry upon mere consideration of evidence on record.—It is open to a Sessions Judge or District Judge under s. 437 to order further inquiry on the mere consideration of the evidence, 32 M. 220 (F.B.) *overruling* 31 M. 133. See Note 33 (v) to s. 437.

VI.—PRACTICE.

29. Parting with judicial records.—No Court is at liberty to part with its judicial records, except when called for by an Appellate Court or on the demand of a superior Court under this section. They must be retained in order to meet the contingency of such legal requisitions being made. For the purpose of any reference or report to the executive Government, copies of proceedings are sufficient, but for purposes of appeal or revision by superior Courts, the originals are indispensable, Ratanlal 123; 28 A. 268; 1904 A. W. N. 233; 30 A. 116.

30. Reference to be accompanied with explanation of inferior Court.—A Sessions Judge calling for the records of an inferior Court is, before referring the case to the High Court for orders, bound to call upon the inferior Court for an explanation of the order passed and should submit such explanation together with the rest of the record to the High Court, 8 C. 644. But the Sessions Judge or District Magistrate has no power to record any fresh evidence before making a reference. Such evidence must be disregarded 3 Bom. L. R. 677; 1903 A. W. N. 74 and see Note 19. The only case in which a District Magistrate can take further evidence is set out in s. 437.

31. Copy of order in appeal to be forwarded with proceedings to High Court.—When proceedings are called by the High Court from any Magistrate, the copy of any order made by the Appellate Court and transmitted to the Lower Court shall be forwarded to the High Court with the record and proceedings of the Magistrate.—*Bom. H. C. Cr. Cir.*, p. 47.

32. Practice—Cases simultaneously called for by Appellate and High Courts.—When the High Court calls on a Magistrate for the record of a case, which record has already been sent to the Sessions Court in
 When a case is called for at the same time,
 all comply with the order of the Court of

33. That Judge previously declined to interfere 'suo motu' is not a sufficient reason to refuse to re-open case when complainant applies for revision. See Note 37 to s. 437.

34. Affidavit of accused is useless.—Where a Magistrate has recorded that an accused person has pleaded guilty, an affidavit to the contrary sworn to by the accused is not admissible in evidence, on revision by the High Court. If there is any mistake about the matter, it is the *vakil* and not the client who ought to make an affidavit, 19 M. 209. See also 12 M. 451; 19 A. 200; 1908 A. W. N. 42 = 8 A. L. J. 98.

35. Order passed in revision in criminal proceedings.—An order passed by a single Judge of the High Court in the exercise of its criminal jurisdiction is one passed in a criminal trial, if the proceedings which give rise to the revision are a criminal trial, 27 M. 510; 2 L. W. 383 = 19 Cr. L. J. 464.

- * 436. On examining any record under section 435 or otherwise, the High Court or the Sessions Judge may direct the District Magistrate by himself or by any of the Magistrates subordinate to him to make and the District Magistrate may himself make, or direct any Subordinate Magistrate to make, further inquiry into any complaint which has been dismissed under section 203 or sub-section (3) of section 204, or into the case of any person (accused of an offence) † who has been discharged

‡ "Provided that no Court shall make any direction under this section for inquiry into the case of any person who has been discharged unless such person has had an opportunity of showing cause why such direction should not be made"

Notes.—1. Terms explained—

(i) *Inquiry*—See definition, s 4 (k) and Notes at pp 12 13

(ii) *Complaint*—See definition, s 4 (h) and Notes at pp 6—10 and see also Notes under Heading II to s 190 at pp 472—476

(iii) *Discharge* has two meanings, one, non technical as in s. 119 where it is merely equivalent to 'permitted to depart' and the other as in ss. 209, 253 and 259 '*Discharged*' in s 437 ought to be read as equivalent to "*discharged within the meaning of ss 209, 253 and 259 and a discharge* under s. 199 is not within the scope of the section,' 33 M. 85 In 36 A. 147, it was again held that a wide interpretation may be put upon the word '*discharged*' so as to include an order under s. 119 and see Notes 21 and 22 below. See ss. 119, 209, 213 (2), 253, 259, 305 (3) and (4), 308, 333, 423 484, 494 (a), 495 (2) for orders of discharge.

(iv) '*Accused*' means 'a person accused of an offence' and not a person against whom proceedings are taken under s. 110, 27 C. 662, 33 C. 8; 33 M. 85. *Contra* 24 A. 143; 36 C. 163

2. Section does not control powers of Magistrates to entertain fresh complaints after previous dismissal or discharge.—This section is only an enabling section and an order under it is not necessary for fresh proceedings being taken up on the same facts by the same Magistrate discharging an accused whether under s. 253 or s. 259 or the complaint is dismissed under s. 203 or s. 204, or by a Magistrate of co-ordinate jurisdiction, 29 C. 726; 29 C. 652; 29 M. 126 (F.B.) *overruling* 28 M. 255; 16 Cr. L. J. 73 (A.). See also 31 M. 543; 28 C. 102 and 211; 1 B. 64; 1 C. W. N. 57; 4 C. W. N. 26 and 46; 28 M. 310, 26 P. W. R. 1908 = 8 Cr. L. J. 249; 1 N. L. R. 18; 9 A. 85; 1906 A. W. N. 245 = 4 Cr. L. J. 89; 1895 A. W. N. 86; 16 Cr. L. J. 73 (A.), 36 A. 53; 8 S. L. R. 196 = 16 Cr. L. J. 174 or a successor of the Magistrate, 36 A. 129 *distinguishing* 22 A. 106. A Magistrate may revise a dismissed complaint even when the District Magistrate has refused to make a further inquiry 36 C. 415; 10 P. R. 1911 = 24 P. W. R. 1911 = 205 P. L. R. 1911 (F.B.) which *overrules* 33 P. R. 1894. Though such further inquiry is not actually illegal it should be only undertaken in exceptional cases and for good reason shown. In 11 P. W. R. 1910 = 11 Cr. L. J. 347, however, it was held that when a complaint has been dismissed by a Magistrate and the dismissal has been upheld by the Sessions Judge the successor of the Magistrate has no right to entertain a fresh complaint. The complainant's remedy is by application to the Chief Court and not by presenting a fresh complaint. Though the Magistrate may have jurisdiction to entertain a renewed complaint, the appropriate remedy for complaints wrongly dismissed is under s. 437, 4 B. L. R. 53 = 11 Cr. L. J. 532. See Notes 27 to 30 to s. 203 and Notes 14, 16 to 18 at pp. 1058 and 1059

I.—WHAT COURTS MAY DIRECT FURTHER INQUIRY.

3. Power of High Court under this section.—"It was the intention of the Legislature that the High Court should have a freer hand in interfering under s. 437 than under s. 439 and the powers of the High Court and the Sessions Judge and the District Magistrate are co-extensive under this section," 32 M. 220 (F.B.) at p. 233. Though the High Court has under this section, concurrent jurisdiction with the District Magistrate and the Sessions Judge, yet where a District Magistrate dismissed a complaint under s. 203 the High Court declined to entertain an application by the complainant under this section when no application had been made to the Sessions Judge, 25 A. 265 where 1904 A. W. N. 232 is followed. The reason or the mention of

* This section originally numbered 437 but was re-numbered 436 by s. 14

† These words were substituted for the words "accused person" by Act XVIII of 1922.

‡ Provision was added by s. 14.

the High Court in this section is obvious. Though s. 439 gives to the High Court all the powers of an Appellate Court under s. 423, the power mentioned in this section is not included in it (9 A. 52 at p. 55). See Note 43 to s. 439. 23 A. L. J. 20.

4. Power of High Court to direct further inquiry in case of discharge by Presidency Magistrate.—The High Court has power, under s. 439 read with s. 423 of this Code, to revise an order of discharge passed by a Presidency Magistrate and to direct a further inquiry, if there are good reasons for doing so, although no question of jurisdiction arises in the case (15 C. 608; 26 C. 746; 28 C. 632; 27 B. 84 followed, 7 C. W. N. 521 referred to, 27 C. 126; 6 C. L. J. 705 = 6 Cr. L. J. 490 and 33 C. 1282 discussed and dissented from (36 C. 995). The High Court acting under s. 439 may order the commitment of a person whom a Presidency Magistrate had discharged. Sub-sec. (4) of s. 439 points to the conclusion that all other powers under s. 439 not expressly excluded by that sub-section may be exercised by the High Court as a Court of Revision, 27 B. 84; 15 M. L. T. 200 = 14 Cr. L. J. 529 and Weir II, 255, where it was laid down that the fact the Superior Court might be disposed to take the view that the Magistrate discredited the prosecution evidence for insufficient reasons and discharged the accused without committing him for trial, is no ground for interference by it. See also 20 C. W. N. 1128.

5. Sessions Judge and District Magistrate should not review each other's orders.—See Notes 9 and 10 to s. 435. Both the District Magistrate and the Sessions Judge are competent to order further inquiry, but when further inquiry is refused by one of these officers, it would be an unseemly proceeding, to say the least, that it should be ordered by the other. If either the District Magistrate or the Sessions Judge thinks that the Sessions Judge or the District Magistrate is wrong he should refer the matter to the High Court under s. 438. He has no jurisdiction himself to review an order made by a Court having concurrent jurisdiction with himself, 22 C. 573. See now sub-sec. (4) to s. 435 and also Note 2 to s. 436, and the recent amendment of sub-sec. (1) of s. 435 and the new explanation added thereon making all Magistrates in their original as well as appellate jurisdiction subordinate to the Sessions Judge for purposes of sub-sec. (1) of ss. 435 and 437.

(i) *District Magistrate not competent to act when Sessions Judge has passed orders under this section*—Where a Sessions Judge has passed orders under this section, the District Magistrate acting under the same section should not pass orders of a contrary kind, but if he thinks that the Judge's orders are wrong, he should submit them to the High Court through the medium of the Public Prosecutor, 12 A. 434; 9 A. 362; 10 A. 146; 18 C. 186.

(ii) *Sessions Judge not competent to direct further inquiry when District Magistrate has dealt with the case under s. 435*—A complaint was made to a Deputy Magistrate who after considering a Police report on the matter ordered—'Enter mistake of law'. The complainant put in another complaint before the District Magistrate who sent the complaint to the Deputy Magistrate for judicial inquiry and report and after considering his report, decided that the case should be entered as false. The complainant then applied to the Sessions Judge who ordered a further inquiry under s. 437. Held following 6 C. W. N. 633 and 8 C. W. N. 456 = 1 Cr. L. J. 356 that the Deputy Magistrate's order must be regarded as an order dismissing the complaint and therefore the District Magistrate in directing further inquiry acted under s. 435 and the Sessions Judge was not competent to direct a further inquiry in view of sub-sec. (4) of s. 435, 17 C. W. N. 451 = 14 Cr. L. J. 123.

(iii) *Court of Session cannot refer applicant to District Magistrate*—When an application is presented to a Court of Session under this Chapter, it has no power to refer the applicant to the District Magistrate whose Court is one not of inferior, but of concurrent jurisdiction, with the Court of Session for the purposes of this Chapter, Ratanlal 525.

6. Additional Sessions Judge may act under this section.—See s. 438 (2).

7. Deputy Magistrate cannot direct further inquiry.—A Deputy Magistrate in charge of the current duties of a District Magistrate is not thereby invested with jurisdiction under this section, 11 C. 236.

8. District Magistrate may direct further inquiry when case discharged by himself.—Where a District Magistrate has passed an order of discharge, he is competent to revise his own order upon a fresh complaint and direct a further inquiry, 9 P. R. 1902. This section is not confined to cases in which the original inquiry was held by a Magistrate subordinate to the District Magistrate. A case originally discharged by himself the District Magistrate may under this section, make over to any Magistrate subordinate to himself for further inquiry, 28 C. 102. A District Magistrate, who on application under this section, refused to interfere with an order of discharge, may subsequently *suo motu* direct a further inquiry, on looking into the Police diary, 11 C. W. N. 11. See Note 37.

9. District Magistrate may order further inquiry when discharge made by specially empowered Magistrate.—Where a Subordinate Magistrate of the first class specially empowered under s 30 makes an order of discharge in a case which is triable exclusively by a Sessions Court, such order is open to revision by the District Magistrate under ss 436 and 437, 12 N. L. R. 94 = 17 Cr. L. J. 245.

10. Court which sanctioned prosecution not competent to order further inquiry.—The words 'try any case' in s 556 are wide enough to include any stage of the judicial proceeding in which the question of the guilt or innocence of the accused is finally adjudicated on. Where, therefore, a District Magistrate as President of a Municipality presided at the meeting of the Board which directed the prosecution of a Municipal servant, *he*, the District Magistrate was disqualified to direct further inquiry under s 437, 5 B. L. R. 137 = 13 Cr. L. J. 30 where 27 A. 25 is distinguished.

II.—WHO MAY BE DIRECTED TO MAKE FURTHER INQUIRY.

11. District Magistrate.—The language of this section shows that a District Magistrate, though exercising the enhanced powers under s 30, may be ordered by the Sessions Judge to make the further inquiry directed under this section, 15 P. R. 1904. The Legislature appears to have contemplated that the Magistrate of the district should exercise a discretion as to the selection of any Magistrate subordinate to him and this discretion seems to have been vested in the District Magistrate and not in the Sessions Judge.—*Per FIELD, J.*, in 10 C. 207. But in 8 M. 336, the High Court expressed the opinion that the further inquiry should ordinarily be made by the same Magistrate as made the first inquiry. The power conferred by this section is, however, purely a discretionary one, 15 C 633; 4 A. 143 and where this discretion is not properly exercised the High Court may set aside the order for further inquiry, 11 C. 81.

12. Subordinate of first-class Magistrate to District Magistrate.—A Magistrate of the first class is subordinate to the District Magistrate for purposes of this section 7 A. 853 (F.B.), 10 B. 131; 8 M. 18 (F.B.); 12 C. 473 (F.B.), 33 P. R. 1835.

13. Case specifically made over by District Magistrate cannot be withdrawn by Sub-Divisional Magistrate.—A Sub-Divisional Magistrate cannot properly withdraw a case specifically referred to by his superior, the District Magistrate, to a Subordinate Magistrate for further inquiry under this section, *Ratanlal 318*. But a Sub-Divisional Magistrate who is directed by the District Magistrate acting under this section to hold a further inquiry, is competent under s 192 to transfer the case to a second-class Magistrate subordinate to himself, *Weir II, 563*.

14. When further inquiry should be entrusted to discharging Magistrate?—When a further inquiry involves the taking and weighing of additional evidence, the function will generally be best performed by the same Magistrate who made the previous inquiry, though peculiar or prejudiced views, or even the possibility of them, may make it more desirable to bring a fresh mind to bear on the facts, *Ratanlal 328*; 4 L. B. R. 233 = 7 Cr. L. J. 493.

15. When further inquiry should be entrusted to a different Magistrate?—This section contemplates that further inquiry may be made by another Magistrate and the unsatisfactory way in which a Subordinate Magistrate has dealt with the case would be a good ground for ordering further inquiry by another Magistrate and such Magistrate may, if necessary, retake the evidence taken before the first Magistrate, 22 M. 210 (F.B.). *SANKARAN NAIK, J., dissenting*. When the further inquiry is into the effect of the evidence already on the record, or the testimony of the witness already examined, it will usually be desirable that the fresh consideration of the complaint should be entrusted to a different Magistrate from the one who has already formed an opinion on the case, *Ratanlal 329*. *Contra see* 8 M. 298 at pp. 293 and 333. Where a Magistrate discharged the accused without hearing all the evidence, expressing an opinion that "to affix the guilt to the accused is an impossibility" and that "there is a certain mystery about the whole proceeding which it appears impossible to clear up," the High Court in revision directed further inquiry to be made by another Magistrate who had nothing to do with the case, *Ratanlal 325*. But ordinarily the further inquiry should not be by a different Magistrate, 8 M. 298.

15-A. Further inquiry should not be entrusted to Magistrate of rank lower than first Magistrate.—When a District Magistrate orders further inquiry into a case tried by a first class Magistrate specially empowered he should not order further inquiry by another Magistrate not so empowered, 17 Cr. L. J. 245 = 12 N. L. R. 94.

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1. Introduction

(iii)

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III.—IN WHAT CASES FURTHER ENQUIRY MAY BE MADE.

16. Further inquiry may be made only when complaint dismissed or accused discharged.—This section does not apply to a case in which the complaint has not been dismissed under s 203 or under sub-sec (3) of sec. 204, or in which no accused has been discharged, 27 C. 638. See Note 8 to s 436 Where after the issue of warrant against certain persons the Magistrate does not think it proper to proceed further, the termination of proceedings against them is in effect an order of discharge, and it is therefore subject to revision under this section, 4 C. W. N. 242. An order directing further inquiry without regard to what is really the material consideration in such cases, the prospect of any public advantage from the case being re-opened, is one passed without jurisdiction and is liable to be set aside by the High Court in revision, 43 M. L. 1. 535.

(i) *Complaint which has not been dismissed cannot be revised*—Where one of the accused is tried for one offence only and is convicted of that offence, the complaint cannot be said to have been dismissed in regard to other offences for which the accused was not tried at all, 27 C. 638.

(ii) *Order directing a case to be struck off cannot be revised*—A Magistrate's order directing a case reported to him by the Police to be struck off is not a judicial order dismissing a complaint or discharging an accused person which can be reviewed by the Sessions Judge, Ratanlal 521. Where a Subordinate Magistrate made an order, as regards one of several accused that he should not be proceeded against and that the warrant and other processes against him should be withdrawn Held, that though the order of the Magistrate was bad in law, the District Magistrate had no jurisdiction under this section to set aside the order and direct a re-trial, 12 C. W. N. 68. 'Discharged' must be read as equivalent to discharged under ss 209, 253 and 259, 33 M. 85.

17. No further inquiry in cases of acquittal.—A Sessions Judge has no power to order further inquiry where the accused is acquitted by a Magistrate, 20 C. 633, nor a District Magistrate when the accused is acquitted by a Subordinate Magistrate under s. 245, 19 P. R. 1900. Such power can only be exercised by the High Court in revision under s 439 See 8 M. 236 and 24 M. 136 which latter case dissents from 20 C. 633 and overrules 23 M. 225. This section does not authorize the High Court to set aside an order of acquittal even when it is illegally and improperly passed, 21 W. R. 21. Nor is a Sessions Judge competent to set aside an order of acquittal, although such order might have been passed without any charge having been framed or evidence for defence taken, 1 A. L. J. 415. In 7 C. W. N. 493, a number of persons were charged under ss 143, 342 and 323, 1 P. C., but the Police did not send up several persons as the case against them was weak and the others were tried and acquitted by the Magistrate on the ground that the case was false. The District Magistrate sent for the records and directed that the acquitted persons and the others should be placed on trial, as he did not consider the case of sufficient importance to move the Local Government and the High Court. Held, that the District Magistrate did not rightly exercise his discretion in directing the re-trial of the acquitted persons and if he thought it necessary, it was his duty to have moved the Local Government to have the acquittal set aside, and that he erred in directing the re-trial of persons not sent up, as the facts of the case had been before a Court and that Court held the case to be false and that judgment had not been set aside. But see 14 C. W. N. 187 and Note 12 to s 403 When the acquittal is by a Court having no jurisdiction it need not be set aside, 31 A. 317. See also 7 C. W. N. 711; 1 C. W. N. 650; 2 C. W. N. 290; 4 C. W. N. 346; 23 C. 983; 24 C. 286; 15 P. W. R. 1893. But see *contra* 24 C. 528; 24 C. 211; 23 C. 632; 29 C. 728.

So also when instead of acquittal, wrong order of discharge is passed—If a Magistrate trying a summons-case, whatever procedure he adopts, finds no case made out against the accused and lets him go unconditionally, he acquits him though he may style his order of acquittal an order of discharge and tack on to it the number of some section of the Code which deals with discharge. The acquittal is none the less an acquittal and no order may be passed under this section for further inquiry, 8 M. L. T. 78 = 11 Cr. L. J. 350. When, after framing of charge, the trial is recommended under s. 350, the second Magistrate cannot pass an order of discharge but must acquit under s. 258 and if by mistake he passes an order of discharge, there can be no order for further inquiry, 38 M. 585; 17 Cr. L. J. 95 (M.).

18. No further inquiry when persons have never been before the Court.—In regard to persons accused who have never been before the Court at all, it cannot be said that they have been discharged, and that it is in the discretion of the Magistrate to proceed against them or not, but it is not such a case in which an order under this section can be made by the Sessions Judge directing the Magistrate to proceed with the case as regards those persons. Therefore, where a Sessions Judge passed an order directing further inquiry into the complaint against the accused against whom the Magistrate did not choose to proceed, *Held*, that his order was without jurisdiction 27 C. 638. See also 4 C. L. R. 452; 11 C. W. N. 218; 12 C. W. N. 65. But see 23 C. 437; 32 C. 783. A Court has no authority to direct further inquiry in respect of a person when

no complaint has been made against him and no other regular process has been issued against him, 39 C. 238. This section has no application to the case of persons accused of any offence who had never been before any Court. Therefore, where a Subordinate Magistrate, though competent to act upon a Police report against persons who were alleged in that report to have committed an offence, did not so act, *held* that it was not proper for the District Magistrate to pass an order directing proceedings to be taken against such persons unless he had withdrawn the whole matter from the Court of the Sub-Magistrate, 4 C. W. N. 242; 24 M. 136; 29 M. 126; 29 C. 457; 4 C. W. N. 346. But this section does not apply to a case in which a Magistrate has refused to proceed against some of the persons accused of an offence before the Police, as they never had been before him and had not therefore been discharged. The proper course for the District Magistrate to take would be to withdraw the case under s. 528, and deal with it on the evidence, as in the exercise of his discretion he thought fit and not to order a further inquiry under this section, 5 C. W. N. 488; 27 C. 979. Nor can the District Magistrate direct proceedings to be taken against certain persons in a case when he has transferred the case to the file of a Deputy Magistrate, 30 C. 449. See Note 28 to s. 203 and see also Note 7 to s. 190 at p. 471.

But it should be noted that in 30 C. W. N. 312 it is held that where on receipt of a complaint a Magistrate holds an enquiry under s. 202 of the Code and dismisses the complaint under s. 203. The Sessions Judge under s. 436 can only direct a full and proper enquiry of the same nature as the Magistrate has already held and cannot direct a further enquiry after summoning the accused. The practice of allowing the accused to be represented in an enquiry under s. 202 has been condemned.

19. No further inquiry in cases of conviction.—A Sessions Judge who, on examining the monthly criminal return of a first-class Magistrate, sends for the record and proceedings in a case in which an accused person has been convicted cannot legally order any further inquiry to be made. If he thinks that any further inquiry is necessary he must report the matter to the High Court which alone has power to order such inquiry to be made in such a case, Ratanlal 407.

20. Power of District Magistrate to direct further inquiry into offences, some of which form component part of offence of which accused is acquitted.—The accused was tried for being a member of an unlawful assembly with the common object of assaulting the complainant and after a trial under s. 147, I P C., was acquitted. The District Magistrate on motion ordered further inquiry into the offences under ss. 323 and 342 I P C. *Held*, that the offence under s. 323 being one of the offences which formed the subject of former trial, this matter cannot be re-opened, until the order of acquittal has been set aside. Further that no order within the scope of this section having been passed regarding the offence under s. 342, the Magistrate had no jurisdiction to order further inquiry with regard to that offence, 5 C. W. N. 72. Similarly, in 27 C. 858, the accused was tried and convicted of mischief, the only offence with which he was charged. The Sessions Judge being of opinion that the accused, had been lightly dealt with, ordered further inquiry against the accused and others for an offence under s. 144, I P C. *Held* such order was without jurisdiction, as none of the accused had ever been discharged of that offence nor was any complaint of any such offence made against them dismissed under s. 203 or s. 204 (3). See Note 2 to s. 403.

21. Further Inquiry in cases under Chapter VIII.—See Note 131 to section 123

(a) *Security for keeping the peace*—An application to take security under s. 107 does not amount to an accusation of an offence, 42 P. R. 1905 = 2 Cr. L. J. 697, and the Magistrate in such cases does not pass any order of acquittal or discharge, 6 P. R. 1911 (P.R.) = 153 P. L. R. 1911 = 30 P. W. R. 1911 = 13 Cr. L. J. 232; (1914) U. B. R. I. 3 = 15 Cr. L. J. 531; 6 P. R. 1911, 33 M. 83. See also 36 C. 183; 27 C. 656; 16 B. 661.

(b) *Security for good behaviour*—A person against whom proceedings are taken under s. 110 is an "accused person" within the meaning of this section. And if a person against whom proceedings are taken under Chapter VIII is discharged by a Subordinate Magistrate, the District Magistrate is competent to order further inquiry, 21 A. 107; 1659 A. W. N. 203; 24 A. 143 (*dissenting* from 1920 A. W. N. 206) and in 36 A. 147 the High Court refused to disturb the practice as laid down in the cases and *held* that the words of s. 437 do not prevent interpreting the word "discharge" in a large sense, 16 B. 661; 13 Bom. L. R. 505 = 13 Cr. L. J. 430; 33 B. 401. But in 27 C. 682 and 33 C. 8, it was held that proceedings under s. 110 cannot be regarded as on a complaint nor can they be regarded as a case in which an accused person has been discharged, for the terms "discharged person" and "discharge" in this section clearly refer to a person accused of an offence who has been discharged from a charge of that offence within the terms of Chapter XIX, 27 C. 662 was followed in 42 P. R. 1905. See also 13 C. W. N. 261. However, in 36 C. 183, it was held that a person against whom proceedings were taken under Chapter VIII was an accused person, to whom the provisions of s. 443 applied and the cases in 21 A. 107; 16 B. 661 and 33 C. 483 were followed. In 33 M. 83 it was held that s. 437 should not be applied to cases under Chapter

VIII, at any rate, where before making an order under s. 119 the Magistrate has called on the person into whose conduct the inquiry is made to establish his defence. It may be by analogy applied to a discharge made under s. 119 in circumstances resembling those in which a discharge is made under s. 253. The word "*discharged*" in s. 119 means only "*permitted to depart*." See also 36 M. 315. In view of the amendment of the new s. 436 by the insertion of the words "*accused of an offence*" after the word "*person*" it is submitted, that the Legislature has made it clear that to attract the application of s. 436 the person discharged must have been accused of an offence, and as in proceedings under s. 110 the person proceeded against, *is not accused of an offence*, therefore, this section cannot apply to such person. This amendment follows the rulings in 27 C. 682; 30 C. 163; and so the cases in 36 C. 163; 21 A. 107 holding to the contrary have become obsolete. See also 2 R. 30 which supports the above interpretation. See also 46 A. 235.

22. **Further inquiry in cases under s. 133.**—The section has no application to a proceeding under s. 133 which does not deal with any case of an offence. Therefore a Sessions Judge has no authority to direct a first class Magistrate to make a further inquiry where the Magistrate has dropped proceedings under s. 133 24 C. 395; 25 C. 425; 14 C. W. N. 55 and see Notes 60 and 61 to s. 133.

23. **Further inquiry in any case under s. 145.**—This section does not authorize the District Magistrate to order further inquiry in a case under s. 145 which is not directed to any offence at all, 20 C. 729; nor can the High Court, 30 C. 112. Thus, though a District Magistrate has no jurisdiction to revise the order of a Subordinate Magistrate striking off a possession case, yet when such Magistrate declined to take proceedings, the District Magistrate is perfectly competent to initiate proceedings acting on the same Police report, 6 C. W. N. 290. See also Notes 154 to 162 to s. 145.

24. **Further inquiry in case dismissed under s. 247.**—When a case against the accused who was absent at the trial of his co-accused is dismissed under s. 247 no order could properly be passed under this section against such absent accused, 4 C. W. N. 346. See Notes to s. 247.

25. **Further inquiry when proceedings stopped under s. 249.**—A District Magistrate cannot under this section set aside an order made by a Subordinate Magistrate under s. 249, 9 P. R. 1913 = 163 P. L. R. 1913 = 13 Cr. L. J. 860.

26. **Order of discharge by High Court under s. 332 cannot be set aside.**—When an order of discharge was passed upon the Advocate-General entering a *nolle prosequi* under s. 332 in a Sessions case before the Calcutta High Court, *held* it could not be aside by any tribunal, but it did not require to be set aside for initiation of fresh proceedings on the same charges, 16 C. W. N. 983 = 3 Cr. L. J. 488.

26-A. **No further inquiry in maintenance cases, s. 488.**—No further inquiry can be directed in respect of an order under s. 488 as an application for maintenance is not a complaint, 5 C. 536 as the defendant in such a case is not an accused, 17 C. P. L. R. 127 = 1 Cr. L. J. 664.

IV.—NOTICE TO ACCUSED.

27. **Notice necessary before making order for further inquiry.**—In a case of further inquiry notice should be given 20 A. 339, *approved* in 25 A. 375; 4 C. W. N. 100, 1 Bom. L. R. 782. Omission to do so is fatal to the validity of the order, 4 C. W. N. 100; 12 C. W. N. 822 = 8 Cr. L. J. 51; 44 P. W. R. 1911 = 12 Cr. J. 615. No order should be passed against an accused person without his getting an opportunity of being heard. Thus, where a rule was issued only on the District Magistrate to show cause why further inquiry should not be directed under this section, it was *held* the accused was entitled to be heard, 11 C. W. N. 316 = 5 Cr. L. J. 112; though the general rule is that the District Magistrate is the proper person entitled to be heard and not the private party interested in the result. See 25 C. 798; 31 C. 811. As to the question whether any notice to the accused to show cause is by law necessary if further inquiry is ordered under this section, it is now settled that no such notice is necessary in point of law, 15 C. 608; 10 B. 151 *followed* in 20 A. 339; 2 Bom. L. R. 586; 3 Bom. L. R. 703; 11 P. W. R. 1908 = 7 Cr. L. J. 347; 11 O. C. 261; 13 O. C. 289 = 11 Cr. L. J. 829. But no Court would be exercising a proper discretion in such a matter if, before proceeding under this section, it were to order a further inquiry in a case in which the accused person may have been discharged, without giving him an opportunity, by service of a notice to show cause against such an order being made, 15 C. 608; 2 C. W. N. 196; 32 C. 1090; 12 C. W. N. 822; 6 Bom. L. R. 877; 6 Bom. L. R. 479; 3 C. W. N. 249; 2 Bom. L. R. 556; 3 Bom. L. R. 703; 9 C. W. N. 219; 12 Cr. L. J. 110 (Bindh), 8 Bur. L. T. 133 = 15 Cr. L. J. 696; (1914) U. B. R. 1. 3 = 15 Cr. L. J. 531; 10 P. R. 1911 = 24 P. W. R. 1911 = 205 P. L. R. 1911 = 12 Cr. L. J. 368; 4 P. W. R. 1915 = 16 Cr. L. J. 214. The High Court of Allahabad felt itself [in 6 A. 367 and 9 A. 52 at p. 58 (F.B.)] bound to impress on Sessions Judges and Magistrates that in exercising the powers conferred by this section, they should, in the first place, always allow the person who has been discharged an opportunity of showing cause why there should not

be further inquiry before an order to that effect is made, and next that they should use them sparingly and with discretion. See also *Re M. L. T. 285* = 15 Cr. L. J. 619. In the earlier case it is said "Though the power conferred is wide, yet it must be remembered that it is a discretionary power confided only to the two principal tribunals in each district, and that the discretion is a judicial discretion to be exercised subject to the supervision and control of the High Courts," 14 M. 334 at p. 338 (F.B.) A question may be very clear to the superior Court acting under this section, but still it ought to give an accused already discharged an opportunity to be heard, 11 C. W. N. 173 = 5 Cr. L. J. 16. See also 3 C. L. J. 43; 14 P. R. 1891; 32 C. 1090; 17 P. R. 1893; 14 C. W. N. 234. Notice to show cause why commitment should not be directed under s. 436, is however sufficient notice for making an order for further inquiry under this section, 15 C. 75. Where there was however no manner of notice at all, the High Court might set aside the order for further inquiry as bad, 11 C. W. N. 35; 12 C. W. N. 822 = 8 C. L. J. 73 = 8 Cr. L. J. 51. S. 440 does not empower a Court to dispense with notice under s. 437, 89 C. 238; 15 Cr. L. J. 1 (C.), 5 Bar. L. T. 37 = 13 Cr. L. J. 301. And though the Code does not expressly require notice, it is but proper such notice should be given, especially where the further inquiry directed is for the purpose of reconsidering evidence already given, 5 Bom. L. R. 877; 19 Bom. L. R. 908. When a man has been through two inquiries and discharged, a third inquiry should not be ordered without notice, 12 A. L. J. 167 = 15 Cr. L. J. 39. The District Magistrate would exercise a sound discretion, if he gives such notice and hears the accused, *Welf II*, 245; 11 C. W. N. 316 = 5 Cr. L. J. 112; 2 Bom. L. R. 586; 6 Bom. L. R. 479; 3 S. L. R. 7 = 9 Cr. L. J. 415. In 8 Bom. L. R. 694 = 4 Cr. L. J. 329, *Astrov, J.*, remarked that whether notice should be given or not would depend on the circumstances of each case. See also 5 A. L. J. 74 = 7 Cr. L. J. 157; 15 A. L. J. 627; 16 A. L. J. 298.

28. Notice may be dispensed with, when complaint dismissed summarily.—When a complaint is dismissed under s. 203 or s. 204 (3) in the absence of any of the accused, notice to show cause might be dispensed with, 29 C. 457; 15 C. 608 at p. 624; 32 C. 1090; 20 A. 339; 2 Bom. L. R. 586; 11 P. W. R. 1908 = 7 Cr. L. J. 347; 11 O. C. 261 = 8 Cr. L. J. 342; 1903 P. W. R. 25; 30 A. 52; (1903) A. W. N. 45 = 5 A. L. J. 74 = 7 Cr. L. J. 157; 12 Cr. L. J. 45 (A.), 35 A. 78. Where a Magistrate proceeded against a few only, of a number of persons complained against and refused the complainant's application for process against the others, it was considered the refusal amounted to a dismissal of the complaint under s. 203 and so notice, for acting under this section might be dispensed with. But see 11 C. W. N. 316 = 5 Cr. L. J. 112 and 11 C. W. N. 35; 40 A. 138; 47 A. 722 = 23 A. L. J. 451.

29. Procedure when accused cannot be found.—It is competent to any Court which had issued orders to issue notice to the accused to cancel that order, 15 P. R. 1893. In 12 C. W. N. 22, a person whose complaint had been dismissed, applied to the High Court for an order for further inquiry and obtained a *rule nisi*. Service of notice was, however, found difficult as the whereabouts of the accused were not known. The High Court, instead of making the rule absolute as it could have done, if it had followed 25 M. 41, discharged the rule giving the petitioner leave to move again when notice could be served on the accused.

30. Accused not bound to appear on notice.—A notice of this kind is for the benefit of the accused, and it is by no means an objectionable practice to give to an accused person an opportunity of upholding the order of a Subordinate Court before it is reversed by a superior authority, although the accused may not be entitled by right to such an opportunity. At the same time the accused is under no legal obligation to avail himself of the opportunity if he does not wish to do so, 15 P. R. 1893. When action is proposed to be taken under this section, it is not summons in terms of s. 68 that should be served on the accused, but a notice to show cause why an order for further inquiry should not be made, so that he is free to appear and show cause or stay away, 6 A. 357; 22 C. 573.

Y.—WHEN FURTHER INQUIRY MAY BE DIRECTED AND WHEN NOT.

31. Further inquiry may be ordered only where discharge is illegal or perverse or evidence is obviously incomplete.—It is not open to a District Magistrate to order further proceedings in any case under s. 437. This section is limited by the words "on examining the record under s. 435;" and s. 435 lays down that a Court may call for and examine any record for the purpose of satisfying itself as to the correctness, legality

or propriety of any finding, sentence or order recorded or passed and as to the regularity of any proceedings of such inferior Court. It cannot therefore be said that if a Magistrate finds no illegality, or impropriety or irregularity and nothing incorrect in the proceeding, that he is empowered to set aside an order of discharge upon other grounds or no grounds at all, 16 C. W. N. 1078 = 13 Cr. L. J. 754. 'Correctness, legality or propriety of any finding' is an express enactment (see s. 435). Every finding, sentence or order is liable to review, not only on the ground of illegality, or irregularity, but also on the ground of incorrectness, that is to say, on the ground that it is wrong on the merits, 15 C. 603. But the omission of the word *improperly* before *discharged* at the end of the section would indicate that the powers conferred by this section are very wide and would embrace a case where the discharge is proper, but further inquiry is necessary, 9 A. 52 (F.B.) at pp. 57 and 58. It is, however, improper to interfere under this section with an order of discharge unless it is perverse or illegal, 234 P. L. R. 1902. This Court has often pointed out that where a man is discharged under circumstances which make the order of discharge equivalent to one of acquittal no further proceeding should be taken against him under s. 437 (8 P. R. 1900, 2 P. R. 1901 = 32 P. L. R. 1901, 8 P. R. 1909 = 10 Cr. L. J. 314 referred to). No invariable rule can be laid down but speaking generally, further inquiry after discharge is improper unless the order of discharge was manifestly perverse or foolish or was based upon a record of evidence which was obviously incomplete. 10 P. R. 1911 = 24 P. W. R. 1911 = 205 P. L. R. 1911 = 12 Cr. L. J. 364 (F.B.), 4 P. W. R. 1915 = 15 Cr. L. J. 214. So also when the order of discharge was passed because the complainant declined to produce any evidence, 19 P. W. R. 1915 = 16 Cr. L. J. 582. Thus when the trying Magistrate has arrived at the conclusion that no *prima facie* case had been made out against an accused person, the High Court cannot command him to arrive at a different conclusion on the facts. If the complainant had a good case according to law against the accused he may make a complaint to another Magistrate who will not be prevented from inquiring and adjudging by the mere discharge of the accused in a warrant case, Ratanlal 209. See also 2 C. P. L. R. 82 and 17 Cr. L. J. 235 = 12 N. L. R. 94, 20 P. W. R. 1916 = 17 Cr. L. J. 161; 9 P. R. 1913 = 8 P. W. R. 1913 = 13 Cr. L. J. 860.

32. *Power of ordering further inquiry should be used sparingly and with great circumspection.*—When an accused person has been three times subject to the harassment of a magisterial inquiry on charges dwindling in importance the series save in extraordinary circumstances, or the discovery of new and important evidence giving quite a different complexion to the affair, ought to close because it savours of oppression to send a man a fourth time before a Magistrate for inquiry into a serious charge on the evidence which has already been thrice pronounced insufficient or untrustworthy. As held by the Allahabad High Court in 9 A. 52 (F.B.) the power of ordering further inquiry should be used sparingly and with great circumspection. Ratanlal 328. See 4 A. 143; 11 C. W. N. 173 = 5 Cr. L. J. 16. Where a Magistrate, after taking the whole evidence and completing the inquiry, discharges the accused in a warrant case, there is only a technical difference between the discharge and an acquittal and so it could never have been intended that a discharged accused should be placed in worse position than one acquitted merely because the Magistrate considered the evidence so untrustworthy as not to furnish ground for a formal charge. Held that, where the Magistrate after taking all the evidence, discharges an accused person, this section does not empower the Sessions Judge to order a fresh trial in order that another Magistrate may consider the same evidence and pass an order, 2 C. P. Cr. 82. This case was approved in 31 P. L. R. 1900 and 100 P. L. R. 1901. See also 11 C. W. N. 173 = 5 Cr. L. J. 16; and the dissenting judgment of SUBRAMANIA Aiyar, J., in 29 M. 126 (F.B.). All Magistrates, and especially the one who formerly discharged the accused are bound to exercise due discretion, to take that discharge into account, and to avoid any such oppressive proceedings as may either expose them to punishment under s. 219 or s. 220 I P. C., or to a civil action on the part of the accused, Ratanlal 350.

33. When further inquiry may be ordered—

(1) *Real test for interference by the High Court*—The test for the interference of the High Court in revision with an order of discharge and for directing further inquiry under this section is, whether it would under similar circumstances have accepted an appeal from acquittal, if one had been preferred. Where the evidence for the prosecution was contradictory and insufficient for a conviction, and there was no suggestion that additional or further evidence was forthcoming the Punjab Chief Court in 1905 P. L. R. at p. 49 refused to interfere.

(2) *When Magistrate omitted to consider accused's admission in another case*—When a Magistrate had wrongly omitted to take into consideration the admissions made by the accused in another case the High Court, in the exercise of its revisional powers, ordered further inquiry, as it held that those admissions had an important bearing on the case, 13 B. 376.

(iii) *When on punishment of some accused, Magistrate refused to try others who had absconded.*—A complaint was made against several persons under ss. 147 and 323, I P. C. Some of them were tried and convicted, while others were reported to be absconding. One of these latter was arrested, but afterwards the warrants against all the absconding accused were withdrawn and the arrested accused released. The complainant then applied to the District Magistrate to revive proceedings, but he refused to interfere. *Held*, that if a body of men committed an offence, the Magistrate cannot say that he considers the punishment of some of them to be sufficient in regard to others who may be equally guilty, though probably in a different degree. The order of the District Magistrate is therefore wrong, and there should be further inquiry in such matter, 4 C. W. N. 560.

(iv) *Discharging summons-case without recording plea.*—When process was issued against the accused for an offence under s 506, I P. C., and he was tried under that section, but the Magistrate without recording his plea to that charge discharged him of an offence under s 500, I P. C., *held* the proceedings were irregular as the plea of the accused ought to have been taken, s. 242 and a further inquiry was ordered, 13 Cr. L. J. 438 (C).

(v) *Further inquiry can in case of discharge be directed upon same materials when no fresh evidence is forthcoming.*—The question, whether, after an inquiry by a first-class Magistrate and discharge of the accused, a Sessions Judge or District Magistrate has jurisdiction under this section to order "further inquiry" or a re-hearing upon the same materials which were before the first-class Magistrate, *ie*, when no further evidence is forthcoming has been a subject of much difference of opinion among the several High Courts. See 10 C. 207 and 1027, 12 C. 522; 6 A. 387, 21 A. 122, 1893 A. W. N. 150, 8 M. 296 and 336; 10 B. 131, but now the High Courts of Calcutta (*see* 15 C. 608, by a majority of 6 to 2), Allahabad 9 A. 52 (F.B.) and Madras, 14 M. 335 (F.B.) have come to agree with the decision of the Bombay High Court 10 B. 131, that a Sessions Judge or a District Magistrate has jurisdiction under this section to order further inquiry in cases of discharge under s. 253 or s. 259. "The intention seems to be to give revisional jurisdiction to the Sessions Court and District Magistrate in cases of improper discharge concurrently with that of the High Court, and to include an incorrect finding among the matters liable to revision and thereby to obviate the expense and inconvenience which the necessity to resort to the High Court might in such case entail."—*PER MUTTUSAMI AYYAR, J.*, in 14 M. 334 at p. 338. See also 13 B. 376; 17 P. R. 1898. The Chief Court of the Punjab expressed its agreement with the cases reported in 12 C. 522 and 8 M. 336 (now partially overruled) but it did not decide what was the actual meaning of the words "further inquiry," 63 P. R. 1837. See 14 P. R. 1891. In 2 P. R. 1901 it was held on the authority of 15 C. 608 that there may be cases in which an order for further inquiry, may be a re-hearing and re-consideration of the evidence already taken *eg* where the order of discharge is manifestly perverse or foolish and not in all cases a taking of fresh evidence but following 8 P. R. 1900 they also held that when a Magistrate has gone into the evidence and dealt with the case carefully an interference with his order of discharge would virtually be the conversion of the finding of an acquittal into one of conviction. See also 8 P. R. 1909 = 17 P. W. R. 1909 = 10 Cr. L. J. 314; 18 P. W. R. 1909 = 11 Cr. L. J. 110, 20 P. R. 1911 = 12 Cr. L. J. 364; 24 P. R. 1903.

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Sessions Judge may direct further inquiry when the discharge is due to misappreciation of evidence. There is nothing in this section to suggest that misappreciation of evidence in the Lower Court is not a ground of interference. The Sessions Judge or District Magistrate is not bound to refer the case to the High Court in case of difference of opinion with the Lower Court on the mere appreciation of evidence, but would be justified in ordering a reconsideration of the same evidence, 32 M. 220 (F.B.) overruling 31 M. 133; 15 C. 608 dissented from so far as it held that a reference to the High Court was necessary, SANKARAN NAIR, J., *contra*—Where the Sessions Judge or District Magistrate differs from the conclusion of the Subordinate Magistrate on the evidence, the only question is whether there should be a re-trial and no useful purpose is served by a further inquiry. The Sessions Judge or District Magistrate must, in such cases refer the matter to the High Court under s 438 and cannot order further inquiry under s 437. The powers conferred on District Magistrates and Sessions Judges by s. 437 are not wider than the powers conferred on High Courts by s. 439. It is only when the case requires re-consideration on some grounds other than in mere appreciation of evidence for reasons which have been held to justify the High Court interfering in revision that he can order further inquiry. See also 9 Cr. L. J. 366 (M.), 2 A. L. R. 25 = 10 Cr. L. J. 237. See also 17 Cr. L. J. 349 (B); 19 Bom. L. R. 350.

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34 No reference to High Court necessary in case of improper discharge.—When a District Magistrate considers that a Subordinate Magistrate has improperly discharged an accused person under s. 253, Ratanlal 213 and 290, or that he was wrong in not waiting later in the day before discharging the accused and doubted the legality of the order passed in his absence, he should not refer the case to the High Court, but should himself order further inquiry under this section, Ratanlal 933, though it may involve re-consideration of the evidence already taken without any additional investigation of facts, 1 Bom. L. R. 222; or when the Magistrate had made a very material error as to the law applicable and the inference to be drawn from the evidence for the prosecution which only had been heard, 33 F. L. R. 1900. But when a District Magistrate being of opinion that the Sessions Judge gave sanction for a prosecution on a mistaken view of the evidence referred the case to the High Court, the latter declined to interfere on the ground that questions of fact must be dealt with by the Court which might try the case Ratanlal 473. The proper function of a District Magistrate is criticism. He ought to point out to the Subordinate Magistrate, the reasons which may have led him to an incorrect conclusion, &c., reasons which may have been held to justify the High Court in interfering with a finding of fact to enable the Magistrate to come to a right conclusion and not dictate to him the decision to be pronounced, 31 M. L. 133 overruled by 32 M. 220 (see Note above). See also 1 C. 282 = 25 W. R. 30; 4 C. 647 and 1 C. L. R. 83; 32 M. 214.

35. When further inquiry should not be ordered—

(i) *On the mere strength of a Government resolution*—A District Magistrate passed the following order directing a retrial of the accused after a perusal of the papers referred to in G R 1209 of 1900—“This Court orders that the discharge of accused G in cases 91—96 be set aside and that he be put on trial before the Cantonment Magistrate for the offence of being in possession of stolen property, etc., under s. 411, I P C., with reference to the articles produced before the Court in these six cases.” Held, that it was not competent to the District Magistrate to order retrial by merely acting upon a resolution passed by Government on the representation of the Legal Remembrancer, and if he wanted to make use of the arguments in the resolution, he should have supplied the accused with the copy of the same, to enable him to meet if he could the arguments against him 2 Bom. L. R. 586.

(ii) *When question between parties is of a civil nature*—When a Subordinate Magistrate finds that the essence of the matter between the contending parties is of a civil nature, and that the question is in reality one to be fought out in a Civil Court, the District Magistrate is not authorized in such a case to order further inquiry under this section, 1 Bom. L. R. 832.

(iii) *When it is likely that Courts may take different views of the evidence*—When the nature of the case is such that Courts are liable to take different views of the evidence and of the probabilities, such a case is not one in which further inquiry ought to be ordered especially when a Civil Court and a Magistrate have disbelieved the evidence for the prosecution, 8 A. L. J. 45 = 12 Cr. L. J. 45. That it was conceivable another Magistrate might reasonably see the facts and probabilities on other mutual proportions is no reason for further inquiry. The District Magistrate must apply his own view to the case and come to a decision, 12 Cr. L. J. 110 (Slidh).

(iv) *When order has been made under s. 476 for prosecution of complainant*—As Sessions Judge has no power to direct further inquiry when an order has been made under s. 476 for the prosecution of the complainant under s. 21, I P C. If he is of opinion that the order is wrong he should refer the matter to the High Court for revision, 15 Cr. L. J. 1 (C.) followed, 15 Cr. L. J. 16 (C.). But now see ss. 476 A and 476-B.

(v) *Simultaneous order of commitment and further inquiry bad*—An order to make further inquiry and an order of commitment cannot be passed simultaneously, for, before the accused is committed, it would be necessary to consider the value of the entire evidence including the evidence taken on further inquiry—Cal. H. C. Pro., 4th March, 1886, 13 C. 121.

(vi) *Where complainant declines to produce evidence*—Further inquiry should not be ordered where the order of discharge was passed because the complainant declined to produce any evidence 19 P. W. R. 1915 = 15 Cr. L. J. 662.

36. Reasons for further inquiry must be given—In passing an order under this section, it is not ordinarily necessary that the Court should make a detailed examination of the evidence and give elaborate reasons because that might prejudice the trial afterwards, but it is desirable that the Court should give enough in the shape of reasons to show that its order is a proper one 32 C. 1090, 15 C. 603 (F B), 5 Bar. L. T. 37 = 15 Cr. L. J. 801; (1913) M. W. N. 638 = 14 Cr. L. J. 872. The Sessions Judge or District Magistrate should give some

reasons for his order. Otherwise, it is not possible for the High Court to exercise such supervision over the Magistrate's proceedings as is necessary, 3 C. L. J. 43. Where the order of the Sessions Judge did not state any proper grounds for directing a further inquiry it was set aside on revision 8 C. W. N. 456; 3 B. L. R. 7 = 9 Cr. L. J. 446; but see 4 L. B. R. 233 = 7 Cr. L. J. 493. The mere fact that the petitioner was one of the accused would not be sufficient to direct a further inquiry as regards the petitioner, simply because there was such a direction as regards the other accused, 13 C. W. N. 76 = 9 Cr. L. J. 303.

37. Can Court declining further inquiry, comply with fresh application for same?—A District Magistrate is competent to order further inquiry, although he may have declined to do so on a previous occasion in the same matter, Ratanlal 522. But where further inquiry is refused by the District Magistrate, his successor should not make such order in opposition to his predecessor's order. Under such circumstances the Sessions Judge is the proper person to make such order if he thinks fit to do so, 4 C. W. N. 100. Where a District Magistrate has once decided under this section that there is no case for further inquiry, he cannot subsequently order further inquiry. Such an order is an order reviewing the earlier one and is prohibited by s. 369, 5 Bar. L. T. 37 = 13 Cr. L. J. 301. But where a Sessions Judge *suo motu* called for the records of a case where the accused was discharged and returned the records as no order was necessary and subsequently the complainant applied to have the case re-opened, held the Sessions Judge was not prevented from entertaining such application and he could not refer the complainant to the High Court on the ground that he had passed orders before, 16 Cr. L. J. 711 (Bar). See Note 9.

VI.—DUTIES AND POWERS OF COURTS DIRECTING FURTHER INQUIRY.

38 What Court directing further inquiry cannot do—

(i) *No re-trial can be ordered*.—A District Magistrate cannot set aside an order of discharge and direct that the accused be put on his trial. All that he can do is to direct further inquiry leaving it entirely to the inquiring Magistrate to determine whether or not the evidence justified the accused being charged and put on his trial. The District Magistrate is not entitled to order *re-trial* under this section. The use of the word *re-trial* may probably prejudice the accused with a Subordinate Court, 1905 P. L. R. at p. 65; 2 Bom. L. R. 886.

(ii) *No power to direct fresh evidence being taken*.—This section does not authorize a Sessions Judge or a District Magistrate to take evidence or to direct evidence being taken, supplementing the evidence given in the Lower Court. The High Court alone has such powers acting under s. 439, 11 C. W. N. 275 = 6 C. L. J. 251 = 6 Cr. L. J. 357. See also 4 L. B. R. 42 = 6 Cr. L. J. 279.

(iii) *No power to direct that evidence should be taken and records returned*.—This section does not authorize a District Magistrate to direct the trying Magistrate to simply take down the evidence and return the records to him. The prosecution lawfully revived must be proceeded with according to law, 4 L. B. R. 42 = 6 Cr. L. J. 279.

(iv) *District Magistrate cannot direct re-issue of warrants*.—A District Magistrate has no power under this section to direct a Sub-Divisional Magistrate who has cancelled warrants, to re-issue the same, 1 C. W. N. 650, nor has he power to set aside an order of his predecessor in effect dismissing a complaint, 2 C. W. N. 290. See, however, Note 37.

(v) *No charge can be framed or directed to be framed*.—A Sessions Judge or District Magistrate cannot in the exercise of the power under this section himself frame the charge or order the Magistrate to frame the charge and try the accused. The District Magistrate might of course make the further inquiry himself and frame the charge in course of it, 32 M. 220 (F.B.), SANKARAN NAIR, J., *dissenting*.

(vi) *Fettering discretion of Subordinate Magistrate in further inquiry*.—A District Magistrate who refers a case to a Subordinate Magistrate for further inquiry has no authority to fetter him in the exercise of his judicial discretion as to the question whether the case should or should not be committed to the Court of Sessions, 15 M. 39. Where the accused were charged of offences under ss. 342 and 357, I P C., the Judge cannot direct an inquiry into an offence under s. 467 I P C., 10 Cr. L. J. 554 (A.). In making an order for further inquiry it is improper for the superior Magistrate to write a judgment which is practically a mandate to a Subordinate Magistrate, 12 N. L. R. 94 = 17 Cr. L. J. 245, referring to 32 C. 1090.

(vii) *No power to direct the Police to reconsider*.—Where a District Magistrate in setting aside the order of discharge concluded his order by observing "The case, therefore is re-opened and the Police are

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now at liberty to re-consider the whole position' *Held*, such an order is not contemplated by s. 437 and the proper order should have been to order the Sub-Magistrate to make further inquiry, 37 P. W. R. 1913 = 14 Cr. L. J. 596.

39. When directing further inquiry, complainant may be required to furnish security for costs of accused.—In 8 B. L. R. 196 = 16 Cr. L. J. 174, the High Court refused to order further inquiry unless the applicant (1) paid into Court the expenses incurred by the Government under s. 514 in respect of a previous complaint and (2) executed a bond with one surety undertaking to pay the reasonable costs of the accused in the event of his being acquitted or discharged and such acquittal or discharge not being reversed in appeal or revision. S. 526 (5) was cited as a precedent for the latter condition.

40. In making further inquiry, complainant may be taken 'de novo'.—Further inquiry does not mean proceeding on the evidence already taken. It means that evidence or other evidence, if there be any, should be taken *de novo* by that Magistrate who holds the further inquiry, 9 A. L. J. 310 = 13 Cr. L. J. 235. When for valid reasons, further inquiry is ordered to be conducted by another Magistrate, the inquiry should commence *de novo* 6 A. 367; 22 C. 573, 4 L. B. R. 233 = 7 Cr. L. J. 493.

Can a complaint be dismissed again after order for further inquiry?—An order for further inquiry directed to a Subordinate Court means that the case should be taken up again and that the question of dismissing the complaint, or charging the accused, as the case may be should again be considered and an appropriate order made as the result of such fresh consideration. *Per* WALLIS, J., 32 M. 220 (F.B.) at p. 234. See also 15 C. 608. When further inquiry is ordered into a complaint dismissed under s. 203, the Magistrate cannot again act under s. 203 but must proceed to enquire into or try the case under s. 204 11 C. W. N. 316.

41. In further inquiry, accused might be tried for any offence established by evidence.—A prosecution lawfully revived must be dealt with in accordance with law in the same way in which a prosecution originally instituted is dealt with. Therefore, when a Magistrate is to make a further inquiry, it was held that he was competent to try the accused for such offence as might be established by the evidence, 7 M. 454. He is not bound to try him for the very offence for which he was originally discharged. See 1 C. L. R. 83, 2 P. R. 1901.

42. No difference between fresh and further inquiry.—There is no substantial distinction intended to be denoted by the words 'fresh inquiry' in s. 436 and 'further inquiry' in s. 437, 15 C. 608. See also 14 M. 334; 8 M. 336.

437. * When on examining the record of any case under section 435 or otherwise, the

Power to order commitment. *Sessions Judge* or District Magistrate considers that such case is triable exclusively by the Court of Session and that an accused person has been improperly discharged by the inferior Court, the *Sessions Judge* or District Magistrate, may cause him to be arrested, and may thereupon, instead of directing a fresh inquiry, order him to be committed for trial upon the matter of which he has been, in the opinion of the *Sessions Judge* or District Magistrate, improperly discharged

Provided as follows —

(a) that the accused has had an opportunity of showing cause to such Judge or Magistrate why the commitment should not be made,

(b) that if such Judge or Magistrate thinks that the evidence shows that some other offence has been committed by the accused, such Judge or Magistrate may direct the inferior Court to inquire into such offence

Notes —As to the scope of this section, see 32 M. 220

1. *Sessions Judge* competent to direct commitment in cases of discharge by District Magistrate.—If the case be exclusively triable by the Court of Session the *Sessions Judge* may direct commitment even where the District Magistrate himself discharges the accused 7 A. 833; 12 C. 473, 8 M. 18; 9 B. 100. In 17 Cr. L. J. 223 (Oadh) the case in 9 B. 100 was followed

* This section which was originally numbered 436 was renumbered 437 by Act XVIII of 1923

2. Sessions Judge cannot act where District Magistrate has confirmed order of discharge.—*See Note 9 (i) to s. 435*

3. District Magistrate with special powers under s. 30 can direct further inquiry.—The expression *District Magistrate* used in this section, includes a District Magistrate possessing the extraordinary jurisdiction conferred by s. 30, 1904 P. L. R. 234.

4. Court of Session and District Magistrate can direct commitment without intervention of Magistrate.—There is nothing in this section to show that when the Court of Session or the District Magistrate directs a discharged person to be committed for trial the commitment thereupon must necessarily be made by the discharging Magistrate, whilst the first *proviso* to it shows that it may be made by the Sessions Court or District Magistrate as the power happens to be exercised by the one or the other, 10 B. 319; 23 C. 397. Under this section it is competent to a District Magistrate to make a committal himself or to direct a Subordinate Magistrate to make a committal. The words "*order him to be committed*" in this section do not mean more than *pass an order for his committal*, 31 M. 40; 10 B. 319 and 23 C. 397; (but *see* 4 W. R. 4). Where, however, the Magistrate is directed to commit he cannot be asked to record the defence evidence also, 4 N.-W. P. H. C. R. 50. *See also* 12 N. L. R. 94 = 17 Cr. L. J. 243.

5. Section limited to offences triable exclusively by Court of Session.—To give the District Magistrate or Sessions Judge jurisdiction to act under this section, the accused must have been charged with an offence triable *exclusively by the Court of Session* *ie.*, an offence shown to be so triable in the 8th column of Schedule II, 1904 P. L. R. 234; 1 A. 413 (F.B.). *See also* 3 P. R. 1897. Thus a Sessions Judge cannot direct commitment in respect of an offence under s. 411, 1 P. C., Ratanlal 42; 15 M. L. J. 373. In cases not covered by this section, if the District Magistrate thinks the Subordinate Magistrate has improperly discharged the accused he may either act under s. 437 or report the matter to the High Court under s. 439 8 M. 335. The High Court can commit, in any case without any restriction.

Charges of offences not exclusively triable by Sessions Court may be added—Where a District Magistrate committed the accused on charges of ss. 408 and 477 A, 1 P. C., in respect of which the accused had been previously discharged, it was contended (1) that the District Magistrate was not competent to make the order under s. 436 as the case against the accused was primarily one under s. 408 1 P. C., an offence not exclusively triable by a Sessions Court, and (2) that the District Magistrate was not competent to add a charge under s. 403 to the one under 477 A; *held*, that the District Magistrate had jurisdiction to make the order as the falsification of accounts was a substantial part of the affair, and it was open to the District Magistrate to consider that the case was triable exclusively by the Court of Session and next that once a proper order of commitment is made, it opened up the whole case and the District Magistrate is competent to add other charges intimately connected with the charge under s. 477 A and forming part of the same transaction 16 Bom. L. R. 80 = 2 Bom. Cr. Ga. 179 = 15 Cr. L. J. 292.

6. Section not applicable where accused acquitted.—Where the accused had been acquitted by a Magistrate, neither the District Magistrate nor the Sessions Judge has jurisdiction to proceed under the section or s. 437, 20 C. 633. But the acquittal must be one in substance and not merely in form. Thus, where a Magistrate used the words "acquitted and released" when he intended only to discharge, the Court of Session was *held* competent to direct a commitment under this section, 8 W. R. 41; 24 M. 135. *See Note 17 to s. 437*

7. Conviction for minor offence no bar to order of commitment for major offence.—Where an accused appears to have committed culpable homicide, his conviction by a Magistrate for a minor offence does not prevent his trial for murder, etc. The Sessions Judge, if he thinks there is a *prima facie* case, may call on the accused to show cause why a commitment should not be ordered, and may thereafter order his commitment if satisfied that there is sufficient cause for it, Ratanlal 337.

8. What amounts to 'discharge'.—The fact that no formal order of discharge for the graver offence has been passed is immaterial, for if the Magistrate convicts only for the minor offence, its effect is a discharge for the graver offence, by his declining to take action in respect of such graver offence, 15 C. 508. *See* 24 M. 136 which *overrules* 223 M. 221 and *dissents from* 20 C. 633. The refusal of a Magistrate to proceed against certain persons mentioned in the report of the investigating Police-officer, was *held* to be in effect an order discharging them, 4 C. W. N. 242. But until the Magistrate has so refused to act, a District Magistrate is not competent to proceed under this section or s. 437, 32 C. 783; 35 M. L. J. 667. *See Note 46 to s. 403*

9 Points to be considered in directing commitment.—An order by a Sessions Judge directing a Magistrate to commit an accused person who has been discharged by him simply because the offence is triable exclusively by the Court of Session is bad in law *Weir II, 260*. The fact that a superior Court might be disposed to take the view that the Magistrate discredited the prosecution evidence for insufficient reasons and discharged the accused without committing him for trial is no ground for interference by it. *Weir II, 255, 31 M 133*. Nor does a case come within the purview of this section merely because in the opinion of the District Magistrate the offence alleged to have been committed could not be adequately punished by a Magistrate, *1903 A W N 189 = 8 Cr L J 47*. It is the duty of the superior Court in considering whether an accused person has been improperly discharged within the terms of this section, so as to require him to be committed to the Sessions Court to consider all the grounds upon which such an order of discharge has been passed including a consideration of evidence which has not been believed or *held* to be sufficient to establish a *prima facie* case. Without doing so it would be impossible for the superior Court to find that the order of discharge was improper. Where the Magistrate had discharged the accused and the Sessions Judge refrained from considering the evidence of the witnesses whom the Magistrate considered to be unreliable because he thought he could hardly deal with all those questions without prejudging the case and without making it difficult for him to hear it with a jury but directed a committal *held* that the order must be set aside as it had not been made on full consideration of the merits of the case as disclosed by the evidence taken before the Magistrate *7 C W N 77, 13 B 376*. See also *1 Pat. L J = 17 Cr L J 330*.

10 When commitment should be made and when fresh inquiry—

(i) *When on the evidence already taken there is a clear case commitment should be made*—In a case triable exclusively by the Court of Session if the Sessions Judge or District Magistrate is satisfied that on the evidence taken there is a clear case for committal and there is no reason for desiring a further consideration by the Magistrate it would ordinarily be his duty to commit under this section without ordering a further inquiry *15 C 608*.

(ii) *Where trial Magistrate omitted to take evidence District Magistrate may himself take that evidence and commit*—A Subordinate Magistrate having dismissed a case under s. 380 I P C, without taking certain evidence which in his opinion would have been of little value the Magistrate of the district, on the application of the complainant took such evidence and committed the accused for trial before the Court of Session. *Held* on reference to the High Court that as further evidence in addition to that taken by the Subordinate Magistrate, was forthcoming the District Magistrate's action was sustainable on the principle laid down in *2 C 405, 4 C 15*.

(iii) *Where fresh evidence has since come to light, fresh inquiry must be held*—Where a District

could not be sustained, as the accused had not an opportunity of cross-examining on the fresh evidence and that the proper order under the circumstances would be to have directed a fresh inquiry under this section leaving the discretion of the Magistrate unfettered to commit or not *Weir II 550, 15 M 39*.

(iv) *After issuing notice for commitment may direct further inquiry*—A District Magistrate who had issued a notice to an improperly discharged accused as to why he should not be committed to the Court of Session is also competent on cause being shown to direct further inquiry *18 C 75*. See also *18 M 334* at p. 337.

(v) *Commitment cannot be made for offences which the accused was not charged*—An order by a Judge directing a Magistrate to commit an accused person who has been discharged at a preliminary inquiry to take his trial in a Court of Session must specify the particular acts constituting the offence charged. The Judge cannot direct a committal for offences with which the accused was in no way charged before the Magistrate, for otherwise a man might be committed for trial in respect of an offence of which he had never been accused or never even heard a word until apprehended under the commitment *10 B. L. R. 235 = 19 W R. 20, 21 W R. 41*. See also *10 Cr L J 354 (A)*. An order of commitment may however, be made without a charge both under this section and s. 380 *27 M. 54*.

11 Scope of the words 'under s. 435 or otherwise.'—The words or otherwise do not mean in any other way whatsoever but in any other way provided by the Code *10 C 263*. On the other hand if we put a wide and general construction the whole of the limitation necessarily implied in s. 435 would become unnecessary and such a result would suppose in the Legislature an absence of all intention, which ought not to be imputed

or presumed. See Note 3 to s. 439 and Note to s. 448. The reasons for exercising the power conferred by this section are reasons which should arise upon the materials to be found on the record and not upon extraneous matter, 1890 A. W. N. 147.

12. Notice to accused absolutely necessary before acting under this section.—The opportunity to show cause referred to in *proviso* (a) does not mean any opportunity, but the accused must have a special opportunity, *Ratanlal 593*. *Proviso* (a) being an exception to s. 440, notice to the accused is absolutely necessary, 1 C. L. R. 93; 24 W. R. 70; 1 B. 64. The order is liable to be reversed when no notice is given, on the ground that the order of committal and the commitment made thereunder are illegal, 6 M. 372, 22 W. R. 67. But where the Magistrate is asked to make further inquiry under *proviso* (b), then there is no express provision for notice. Also where the trial has been held without any objection on the ground of want of notice, and the omission has not occasioned a failure of justice the High Court will not in revision interfere, 7 C. 662 = 10 C. L. R. 8. Where a District Magistrate being of opinion that an accused person is improperly discharged makes an order to commit him to the Court of Session, without giving any notice to the accused, but the committing Magistrate before so doing issues the notice the irregularity in the proceedings of the District Magistrate comes within the terms of and is cured by s. 537, *Ratanlal 899* where 7 C. 662 is followed. In 15 M. L. J. 373, the District Magistrate directed a Sub-Divisional Magistrate to commit an accused person in regard to an offence not exclusively triable by the Court of Session, without giving the accused an opportunity to show cause before the District Magistrate himself. Held that not only the order was without jurisdiction, the opportunity to show cause, given before the Sub-Divisional Magistrate, could not be regarded as a compliance with the law, though the Sub-Divisional Magistrate forwarded a statement of the accused to the District Magistrate. The order of the District Magistrate was therefore set aside. This case was followed in 28 P. W. R. 1913 = 312 P. L. R. 4913 = 14 Cr. L. J. 605.

13. Section does not preclude revival of proceedings by same or another Magistrate.—Fresh proceedings may be taken by the Magistrate who passed the order of discharge or by another Magistrate without any order from a superior Court provided he is competent to take cognizance of the offence, 29 C. 726, 29 M. 126 (F.B.) which overrules 28 M. 255 and follows 29 C. 726, 1 B. 64. Even if the order of the District Magistrate or Sessions Judge directing a further inquiry be set aside as wrong, proceedings held by a Subordinate Magistrate, as a result of such order, need not necessarily be void if the Subordinate Magistrate had jurisdiction even without the order for further inquiry, 48 W. R. 39, and even if the District Magistrate had refused to order further enquiry the Subordinate Magistrate may take fresh proceedings, 36 C. 415. The Police and the Magistracy are not precluded by a Magistrate's orders of discharge from reviving a charge against a person who was discharged if in their judgment there is sufficient reason for holding that the discharge was made on a wrong view of the facts *Ratanlal 350*; 36 C. 415. See Note 3 to s. 437. Notes 16–18 to s. 253 and Note 11 to s. 209.

14. Section does not apply to Presidency Magistrates.—The provisions of this section and s. 437 do not apply to Presidency Magistrates who can revive a complaint even after discharge 1 C. W. N. 49 followed in 5 C. W. N. 169, 28 C. 211; 23 C. 652; 33 C. 1232 and 29 C. 726. But the High Court can interfere with the orders of Presidency Magistrates under s. 439 read with s. 423 36 C. 994, 14 M. L. T. 200 = 14 Cr. L. J. 529 (See Note 43 to s. 439, and under s. 15 of the *Charter Act* and s. 20 of the *Letters Patent*, 26 C. 746 and 27 C. 126.

15. Revision of order of commitment by High Court—Difference between sections 215 and 439.—An order of commitment made under this section, can be quashed by the High Court acting under ss. 435 and 439, on points of law as well as of facts though not under s. 215, 27 M. 54, 12 C. W. N. 117 = 6 C. L. J. 760 = 6 Cr. L. J. 406, 15 Cr. L. J. 373 (M.) 1908 A. W. N. 189. S. 215 refers only to a commitment actually made, 7 C. W. N. 327; 14 M. 338 at p. 338 and 15 C. 608 at p. 621. It is open to the High Court in its revisional jurisdiction to consider whether the Sessions Judge or District Magistrate acting under this section has or has not exercised a proper

the offence charged or where it is clear that the Court would not act on the evidence, 30 M. 224. It is evident from the words used in s. 436 that the fullest and widest discretion has been given to District Magistrates or Sessions Judges and when an order for commitment has been made, the High Court should be most unwilling to interfere and should require strong grounds before setting aside such an order, 26 A. 564, 13 A. L. J. 111 = 16 Cr. L. J. 139. See Note 45 to s. 439. But an order of committal, made by the High Court itself under s. 526 cannot be so revised, 27 M. 54.

16. High Court not to be moved ordinarily, where District authorities have power to grant relief.—Ordinarily the High Court will not be ready to exercise its revisional powers, where the District Magistrate or Sessions Judge have concurrent jurisdiction in the matter, 1887 A. W. N. 103, especially so as the order of the District Magistrate or Sessions Judge under this section or s. 437 is liable to be revised in its turn by the High Court, 15 C. 608 and p. 621, see Note 23 to s. 439

17. On fresh evidence Sessions Judge may grant relief once refused by High Court.—The District Magistrate having dismissed a complaint under s. 203, complainant's prosecution was ordered for an offence under s. 211, I P. C. The High Court refused to interfere with the order under s. 203 and the order directing prosecution. The Sessions Judge tried the complainant under s. 211, I P. C., and on acquitting him directed a further inquiry into his original complaint. *Held*, the order directing further inquiry was valid notwithstanding the previous refusal of the High Court, as the order now made by the Sessions Judge was upon materials totally different from those which were before the High Court when further inquiry was refused, 7 C. W. N. 80. Where however, a Sessions Judge acting under s. 476, sent an accused to be tried for an offence under s. 193, I P. C., the Magistrate discharged the accused. Then the Sessions Judge acting under this section, issued a notice to the accused calling upon him to show cause why he should not be committed for trial for an offence under s. 195, I P. C. *Held*, that his latter order should be set aside as it was open to the Sessions Judge if he thought proper, to have directed the accused to be committed for trial on the same evidence which was before him when he acted under s. 476 and that the accused having been discharged in the trial for the offence under s. 193, I P. C., it was not proper to order a prosecution for an offence under s. 195, I P. C., on the same facts, unless on exceptional grounds, *Weir II*, 549. See also 10 Cr. L. J. 554 (A.)

18. Witness should not be suddenly committed on information elicited in examination—Immediately after the petitioner's evidence had been recorded in the trial of certain persons, for giving false evidence, then being held in the Sessions Court, he was asked certain questions by the Sessions Judge as to his liability to be committed to the Court of Session on a charge of murder, and he was eventually so committed. *Held*, quashing the committal, that the consequences to public justice would be very serious if a witness, during the course of his deposition, and before being absolved from his oath as a witness, were liable to be suddenly called upon to show cause why he should not be committed for some other distinct and serious crime of which a Magistrate had discharged him *Ratanlal* 588. See s. 351

438. (1) The Sessions Judge or District Magistrate may, if he thinks fit, on examining under section 435 or otherwise the record of any proceeding, report for the Report to High Court. orders of the High Court the result of such examination, and, when such report contains a recommendation that a sentence be reversed or altered, may order that the execution of such sentence be suspended, and, if the accused is in confinement, that he be released on bail or on his own bond

(2) An Additional Sessions Judge shall have and may exercise all the powers of a Sessions Judge under this chapter in respect of any case which may be transferred to him by * "or under any general or special order of the Sessions Judge "

Notes —1. Courts empowered to report.—In addition to the two principal officers in each district—the Sessions Judge and District Magistrate,—this section confers a similar power on an additional Sessions Judge, but restricts it to cases transferred to him by the Sessions Judge 1903 A. W. N. 23; but the powers of a District Magistrate can never be exercised by the Joint Magistrate of the district, 14 W. R. 25. The expression *Joint Magistrate* is nowhere employed in the present Code. A Deputy or Sub-Divisional Magistrate though in charge cannot act under this section. See Note 7 to s. 435

2. Scope of the words "or otherwise."—We think that these words being words of general import and following the particular words, 'under section 435' must be construed according to the usual rule and that they mean not 'in any other way whatsoever' but 'in any other way provided by the Code' 10 C. 268. The Court declined to accept the contention that the words 'or otherwise,' gave the District Magistrate a power quite independent of the power conferred upon him in cases in which he has proceeded under s. 435. That these words cannot of course, have reference to any power outside the Code is clear from the fact that the Code created the judicial officers whose powers are dealt with therein and their powers must necessarily be

* The words in inverted commas were substituted for the words 'by the Sessions Judge' by Act XVIII of 1923



found within the four corners of the Code, 35 M. 275. The words 'or otherwise' were not intended to confer upon the District Magistrate the power to question the propriety of an order of a Sessions Court and refer the matter to the High Court, 23 A. 91; 23 C. 249; 2 N. L. R. 149 = 4 Cr. L. J. 422. See Note 11 to s. 436 and Note 3 to s. 439.

3. Limitations to powers of reference—

(i) *Limited to proceedings of inferior Criminal Courts*—s. 435 (1).—The power conferred by this section read with s. 435 upon a District Magistrate to make a reference to the High Court refers clearly to "proceeding before any inferior Criminal Court." By the words "or otherwise" in this section the Legislature never intended to give to a Magistrate the power to question the propriety of a judgment or sentence passed by a superior criminal authority such as a Sessions Judge 23 C. 249 and 250; 18 Bom. L. R. 796. It would be contrary to every principle to allow a District Magistrate to report against an order of the Sessions Court to which he is subordinate, 23 A. 91; 2 N. L. R. 149 = 4 Cr. L. J. 422; 23 M. L. J. 732 = 13 Cr. L. J. 714; 36 A. 378. This section does not empower a District Magistrate to refer to the High Court the proceedings of a Superintendent of Police, the latter not being a "Court subordinate to" Magistrate, Ratanlal 133. See Note 15 to s. 435 45 A. 851.

(ii) *Limited to errors apparent on face of record*—A reference to the High Court under this section should only be made for some reason specified in the section which appears from the inspection of the record, 1891 A. W. N. 80. But this interpretation seems to be too narrow. See 33 M. 1028 where MILLER, J., is of opinion that it is open to him to revise the proceedings of a Subordinate Court on grounds extraneous to the record as, e.g., where an order has been obtained by the trick or fraud of a party. He should also call for the explanation of the Subordinate Magistrate and embody such explanation in his report, 8 C. 644. See Note 30 to s. 435.

4. *Cases of acquittal not to be reported under this section*—If dissatisfied with an order of acquittal the proper procedure for a District Magistrate to adopt would be to move the Local Government to exercise its powers under s. 417 and not directly make a reference under this section 24 A. 346; 1902 A. W. N. 89; 15 M. 36. Any reference under this section, the object of which is to induce the High Court to set aside an acquittal, cannot be entertained on the revisional side, 25 A. 123. See also 19 W. R. 55, 13 P. W. R. 1907 = 5 Cr. L. J. 438 (where 13 P. R. 1905 is overruled and 12 P. R. 1906 referred to), 5 N. L. R. 4 = 9 Cr. L. J. 211; 8 M. L. T. 380 = 1910 M. W. N. 517 = 11 Cr. L. J. 622; 12 A. L. J. 235 = 13 Cr. L. J. 304. "It seems to me that to entertain proceedings by way of revision on a District Magistrate's report in a case where an appeal would lie from an acquittal is contrary to the spirit if not to the letter of sub sec. (5) of s. 439." Per MILLER, J., in 38 M. 1028; 44 C. 703; 5 L. 16.

5. *Power of reporting discretionary and when it may be exercised*.—The words "if he thinks fit" in this section indicate that the District Magistrate or Sessions Judge is not bound to refer every case in which he may detect an error, 20 W. R. 40.

(i) *Reference must be made when order contrary to law or sentence too severe*—When a Sessions Judge considers that a judgment or order is contrary to law or that the punishment is too severe, he may properly report the proceedings to the High Court, 20 W. R. 50. The District Magistrate should report to the High Court all cases in which he considers the orders of a Subordinate Magistrate to be illegal, leaving it to the High Court to determine whether or not the illegality requires correction, Welr II, 664. But the taking by the Sessions Judge, of a different view of the evidence from that taken by the Magistrate is no ground for a report or reference, 18 W. R. 7 and 39.

(ii) *Reference should be made only when there is a failure of justice*—If a punishable offence has been committed and a proper punishment has been inflicted he should abstain from further proceedings, unless from any irregularity, a failure of justice has been caused. Thus, where the recommendation would be merely to alter the conviction of an offence to another cognate offence no report should be made, 9 C. 847 = 12 C. L. R. 431.

6. When reference should not be made?—

(i) *When reporting officer might dispose of the matter himself*—Where an accused, charged with theft was discharged by a first-class Magistrate and District Magistrate referred the case to the High Court held, that the High Court need not interfere in a mere case of discharge, the District Magistrate being competent to take steps himself, should he deem it necessary, Ratanlal 290 (F.B.). Similarly, if a Subordinate Judge refuses to

grant sanction for prosecution, the Sessions Judge to whom he is subordinate might himself grant it, without referring to the High Court, *Ratanlal 937*; *9 W. R. 5*; *11 W. R. 24*. An Appellate Court is incompetent to refer to the High Court in a case in which an appeal lies to it, *7 P. W. R. 1910 = 62 P. L. R. 1910 = 15 Cr. L. J. 435*.

(ii) *Cannot refer when appeal or application pending*—The Sessions Judge is not competent to refer a case for enhancement of sentence, unless he has heard the appeal filed against the conviction. He can only refer the case under the provisions of s 438, when he is satisfied as to the propriety of the conviction, *6 A. L. J. 421*. Where a Sessions Judge hearing an appeal is of opinion that a person should be acquitted, he ought not to refer the case to the High Court, but he should himself dispose of the appeal, *13 A. L. J. 477 = 16 Cr. L. J. 433*. S 438 was not intended to enable the District Magistrate to get the opinion of the High Court on a question of law arising in a case pending before him or to transfer the decision of a difficult case pending before him to the High Court. The Magistrate can refer only in a case where the proceedings are not themselves the subject of a revision case in an appeal case pending before him as it is his duty to pass a judicial order himself in that case, *15 Cr. L. J. 472 (M)*. Neither s 438 nor any other provision of the Code authorizes a District Magistrate to refer a point of law arising in an appeal pending before him. It is the business of the District Magistrate to dispose of the appeal before him and if he should so improperly refer his order can be revised at the instance of the party aggrieved *7 P. W. R. 1914 = 62 P. L. R. 1994 = 15 Cr. L. J. 489*, *7 L. B. R. 251 = 15 Cr. L. J. 667*.

(iii) *Where trial void for want of jurisdiction*—When an offence is tried by a Court without jurisdiction the proceedings are void under s 530, and it is not necessary in case of an acquittal for the High Court to upset the acquittal before re trial can be had *8 B. 307*; *31 A. 317*, and see Notes 18 and 19 to s. 403.

(iv) *Magistrate should not make reference on mere representation of complainant*—A District Magistrate reported the proceedings of the second-class Magistrate of A on the representation of the District Superintendent of Police who had himself been the complainant in the case before that Magistrate. *Held* that the District Magistrate acted irregularly in forwarding with his own incomplete report the communication addressed to him by the complainant protesting against the second class Magistrate's decision. The circumstance that the complainant holds office as District Superintendent of Police, can give him no right to make any representation to the District Magistrate in the form of an official letter or memorandum in a case in which he is personally interested nor can the High Court take such letter or memorandum into consideration when dealing with the case *Ratanlal 340*.

(v) *When an order has already been made under s 435*—See *26 M. 477*, *17 M. L. J. 153 = 5 Cr. L. J. 132*, *10 P. R. 1912 = 14 Cr. L. J. 134* and see Note 9 under s 435.

7. **Provincial Magistrates not empowered to refer questions for opinion of High Court.**—There is no provision in the Code which enables a Judge to stop a trial already commenced and refer to the High Court any question or questions of law arising on the merits in that case *Ratanlal 214*. In *2 A. 771*, a Sessions Judge after having asked the assessors their opinion in a case which was being tried by him, suspended the trial of the case and made a reference to the High Court under this section on a question of jurisdiction which had arisen in the trial of the case. *Held*, that it was not intended that the section should be so used and that the Sessions Judge should have disposed of the question himself. The Code of 1861 like s 617 of the *Civil Procedure Code* of 1882 empowered the Sessions Court to send questions for the opinion of the High Court, but the present Code contains no such provision (except in the case of a Presidency Magistrate, see s. 432), *27 A. 25*; *Oodh H. C. 68* and *71*; *5 O. C. 316 (1902)*. See Note 5 to s 432. Also the difference in the language employed by the old Code, viz. 'shall refer' and 'may report' of the present Code is noteworthy.

8. **Conditions for suspension of sentence and admission of accused to bail**—Where the District Magistrate was not competent to refer a case under this section to the High Court he had no authority to admit the accused to bail, *18 C. 186*; nor has he such power under this section if the report does not contain a recommendation that the sentence be altered or reversed, *23 W. R. 40*, *3 C. L. R. 404*. Also the District Magistrate cannot exercise the power of suspending the sentence and admitting the accused to bail on a mere application for consideration of a case. He can do so only after consideration and on making the report.

9. **Power of Sessions Judge to stay proceedings pending revision by High Court**—Criminal proceedings, supported by a sanction were instituted against the accused. The accused put in a revision petition under s. 435 to the Sessions Judge against the order according sanction. The Sessions Judge ordered proceeding to be stayed, pending the disposal of the reference by the High Court. *Held*, that the order was *ultra vires* and that the Sessions Judge had no power to stay a prosecution instituted in pursuance of the sanction.

in a Court which is not subordinate to the Sessions Judge. This section provides in what way he may take action in favour of an accused pending the disposal of his reference and recommendation to the High Court. *Quære* Whether he could stay proceedings even where the Magistrate is subordinate to him? 26 M 137. In 9 P. W. R. 1916 it was laid down that a Sessions Judge has no power at all to stay criminal proceedings pending before a Magistrate subordinate to him. See however, 12 P. W. R. 1916.

10 Form and contents of reference—All references submitted to the High Court under this section are to be accompanied by the record of the case and by a statement of the case in English, giving—(1) a brief abstract of the case (2) the sentence or order of the Lower Court and the name of, and the powers exercised by, the Magistrate passing it (3) the particular portion of the finding sentence or order, which is considered incorrect, illegal or improper, or the particular portion of the proceedings which is considered irregular, (4) the grounds upon which it is proposed that the High Court should exercise the powers conferred by s. 439, (5) a state-

be accompanied by a letter and statement referred to above. The fact of the reference and a copy of its terms should be communicated by the Court making it to the Lower Court.—*Bom H C Cr Cir* p 47 C P Cr Cir requires the following information in addition to the above—Subordinate Courts should whenever it may seem desirable to do so be called on to submit an explanation with regard to the point on which it is proposed to make the reference and the explanation should be sent with the statement of the case. In cases in which an appeal lies from the sentence or order in respect of which it is proposed to make a reference, the reference should not ordinarily be made until the period of an appeal has expired. It is important to observe that the provisions of s. 391 *supra* extending the period during which the execution of a sentence or whipping may not be carried out in the case of an appeal being referred do not apply to a reference under this section so that when a recommendation is made that a sentence of whipping be reversed the execution of such sentence should always be suspended by express order under the provisions of the latter section.—C P Cr Cir No 46

11 What the report should contain—The recommendation should contain a definite recommendation that the sentence be altered or reversed 27 A 25 The Magistrate ought to give a brief abstract of the case and the grounds upon which he recommends the order or sentence he considers to be incorrect should be set aside by the High Court 9 Cr. L. J. 502 (M). The order of reference should set forth the point on which orders are required when a case is referred to under this section Oudh S. C. No 65

12 Referring Judge has no power to take evidence—S 438 does not empower the District Magistrate to take evidence and if he had power to take evidence it was only for the purpose of a recommendation to the High Court and the High Court cannot refer to such evidence to pass a final order in the case, 12 A. L. J. 461 = 15 Cr. L. J. 575 Neither s 435 nor s 438 nor any other section empowers a District Magistrate to take further evidence with a view to reporting the case 3 Bom. L. R. 677 See Note 19 to s 435

439. (1) In the case of any proceedings the record of which has been called for by itself or which has been reported for orders or which otherwise come to its knowledge, the High Court may, in its discretion, exercise any of the powers conferred on a Court of Appeal by section * 423, 426, 427 and 428 or on a

High Court's powers
of revision

Court by section 338 and may enhance the sentence and when the Judges composing the Court of Revision are equally divided in opinion the case shall be disposed of in manner provided by section 429

(2) No order under this section shall be made to the prejudice of the accused unless he has had an opportunity of being heard either personally or by pleader in his own defence

(3) Where the sentence dealt with under this section has been passed by a Magistrate acting otherwise than under section 34, the Court shall not inflict a greater punishment for the offence which in the opinion of such Court, the accused has committed, than might have been inflicted for such offence by a Presidency Magistrate or Magistrate of the first class.

(4) Nothing in this section applies to any entry made under section 273, or, shall be deemed to authorize a High Court to convert a finding of acquittal into one of conviction

(5) Where under this Code an appeal lies and no appeal is brought, no proceedings by way of revision shall be entertained at the instance of the party who could have appealed

*“(6) Notwithstanding anything contained in this section, any convicted person to whom an opportunity has been given under sub-sec (2) of showing cause why his sentence should not be enhanced shall, in showing cause, be entitled also to show cause against his conviction”

¹ Notes.—1. Sections of the Code indicating revisional jurisdiction.—*See* s 106 (3).—Power to require security for keeping the peace on conviction. S 423.—Powers of Appellate Court in disposing of appeal. S 426.—Power of suspending sentence and releasing appellant on bail pending appeal. S 427.—Power to order the arrest of the accused in appeal from acquittal. S 428.—Power of Appellate Court to take further evidence or direct it to be taken. S 338.—Power to direct tender of pardon. Under s 350, prov (6) the High Court may set aside any conviction passed on evidence not wholly recorded by the Magistrate before whom the conviction was had, if such Court be of opinion that the accused was materially prejudiced. *See also* ss 232, 437 and 520, which confer special powers of a revisional nature on the High Court

The changes effected in this section by the new amendment are few

Section 195 is omitted from sub-sec (1) because sub-sec. (6) of s. 195 giving power to revoke or grant sanction to the higher authority is omitted from s 195 under the present Code.

Sub-sec. (6) is newly added to this section. Under it an opportunity is given to an accused person of showing cause against his conviction when the High Court calls upon him to show cause why his sentence should not be enhanced. *See* 27 Bom. L. R. 1343 for a judicial interpretation of the sub-section (6).

ANALYSIS OF NOTES

- I Scope of revisional jurisdiction. Notes 2—8
- II When High Court will exercise its powers of revision. Notes 9—20
- III Preliminary conditions for exercise of revisional Powers. Notes 21—25
- IV How Powers of High Court invoked—Practice and Procedure. Notes 26—34
- V Powers of High Court to deal with Proceedings not expressly criminal. Notes 35—41
- VI General Powers of High Court in revision. Notes 42—52
- VII What Proceedings under the Code are subject to revisional jurisdiction of High Court. Notes 53—67
- VIII Interference by way of Revision with orders of acquittal. Notes 68—77
- IX Power to enhance sentence. Notes 78—87

I—SCOPE OF REVISIONAL JURISDICTION OF HIGH COURT.

2 Revisional jurisdiction under the old and present Codes.—The powers conferred by this section in the present Code, are larger than any exercised by the High Court under the Code of 1872, *Weir II, 533; 36 C. 44*. Under the 1872 Code revisional jurisdiction was limited to material error committed in *judicial proceedings*, i.e., if such error had occasioned a failure of justice, 19 W. R. 28. The Code of 1872 limited the High Court's power of revision to cases of *material errors* committed in *judicial proceedings*, while the present Code gives it a wider latitude by allowing it to act in its discretion. Interference with findings of facts will be regulated in the same manner as interference with the verdict of a jury, 14 B. 331; *Ratanlal 177*; also 21 C. 931. As to meaning of the term “*material error*,” *see* 19 W. R. 23; 20 W. R. 40, 21 W. R. 83; 24 W. R. 60, 2 M. 38; 2 C. 110, 2 A. 336; 3 A. 545. But it should be noted that s 439 must be read along with and subject to s. 435. Under the present amendment by the omission of sub-sec (3) orders made under ss 163 and 144 and proceedings under Chap XII and s 176 have now become proceedings liable to be revised. So under the present Code as amended these proceedings are proceedings within the meaning of s 435, and to this extent the power of the High Court is extended

3. S. 439 must be read along with and subject to s 435.—“It is clear that ss 435, 439 must be read together as pointed out by WILSON, J, in 15 C. 603 at p 617. S 439 must, therefore, be read along with and subject to the provisions of s 435.” It follows that an order made by a Civil or Revenue Court cannot be revised under s. 439, 40 C. 577 (F.B.). *See also* 28 A. 249. One of the referring Judges in 40 C. 577, IMAN, J, was however, of opinion that s 439 is much more general and much more extensive in its comprehension than s. 435 and does not

Vesper

Vesper

Vesper



Vestry, n. (Fr vestiaire, De vestier, Lat vestis-
rium. See VESTIARY)
A room appendant to a church, in which the vestments are kept.

Vestral d. [Lat. Vestalis belong-
ing to] Vestal See supra]

Simmonds

Vesta.

Vesta

Vesta

Vesta

embroidered vestment. Pope
with which land was covered,

Vest

Vest n. f. [Imp R. p. p. VESTED. p. pr. R. v. n.
VESTING.] [Lat. & It. vestire, Sp. Ir. l. i., & O.
Fr. vestir, V. Fr. vestir. See supra.]
To clothe with a garment or as if with a gar-

Had I been clothed with the monarch's power. Prue
3 (Law) To c. the with possession, to give an
immediate hard r. of a possession.

and that the High Court of Madras had no jurisdiction to quash on return to a writ of *certiorari*, the proceedings of a Divisional Officer in the mofussil deciding an appeal under the *Income Tax Act* while Sadasivier J. was of opinion that the power to issue the writ of *certiorari* to quash Judicial Proceedings passed by persons in the mofussil does belong to the Madras High Court though of course the power should not be invoked excepting very extraordinary cases, *see also* 29 C. W. N. 593.

7 High Court cannot revise its own judgments.—The first four lines of s. 439 show beyond all possibility of doubt that the record which is referred to in that section is the record of some Court other than the High Court. 14 C. 42 (F.B.). See Notes 15 to s. 39 and Note 3 to s. 439. The High Court has no power to review in order of one of its Judges, 7 A. 672.

(i) *Passed on appeal*.—When the High Court has dealt with a case as a Court of Appeal it will not afterwards deal with the same case as a Court of Revision, except possibly to cure a very manifest error. The Code nowhere allows a review of an order of the High Court in a criminal proceeding. Weir II. 573 whether appellate or revisional, 10 B. 176 (F.B.), 19 B. 732, 23 B. 59, S. C. 63, 1905 U. B. E. (Cr. P. C.) 35 = 2 Cr. L. J. 463, S. P. R. 1909 = 10 Cr. L. J. 318, 5 W. R. 61, 17 W. R. 2, 4 B. 101, 10 B. 176. Even the discovery of fresh evidence would not give the power of review. Ratanlal 552.

(ii) *Passed by single Judge exercising original criminal jurisdiction*.—There is neither appeal nor revision against the judgment of a single Judge exercising original criminal jurisdiction to a Division or Full Bench. 1 P. R. 1909 = 6 P. W. R. 1909 = 9 Cr. L. J. 306, 4 P. R. 1909 = 10 P. W. R. 1909 = 41 P. L. R. 1909 = 9 Cr. L. J. 378. See also S. C. 63, 10 B. 176, 27 A. 92, 14 C. 42.

(iii) *Passed by single Judge exercising revisional jurisdiction*.—See 1 P. R. 1909 = 9 Cr. L. J. 306, 4 P. R. 1909 = 10 P. W. R. 1909 = 41 P. L. R. 1909 = 9 Cr. L. J. 378, S. P. R. 1909 = 10 Cr. L. J. 318, 19 B. 732, S. C. 63, 14 C. 42, 7 A. 672, S. A. 545, 15 A. 61, 14 A. L. J. 61.

7-A. Exceptions.—

(i) *Appeal against the writ of Habeas Corpus*.—See s. 150 of the Letters Patent at p. iv of the Appendix. As revised under s. 439 is a matter of discretion, it would require a very strong case to allow an appeal against a decision of a single Judge. The High Court passed in revision, 24 M. L. J. 233 = 15 M. L. T. 230 = 15 Cr. L. J. 582.

(ii) *Order made summarily without notice*.—High Court can set aside an order of dismissal on appeal or application made without notice or default appearance. 10 C. L. J. 83 = 10 Cr. L. J. 257, 11 in 23 M. L. J. 371 = 12 M. L. T. 350 = 13 Cr. L. J. 710 it was held that the High Court has no power to review an order made by it in the exercise of its revisional jurisdiction even where the application had been dismissed and resumed and 7 M. H. C. R. 29 was distinguished. The power to rehear a petition once dismissed is not inherent in a Court. See s. 439, 1 to s. 439, and also T. A. 62. In 15 W. R. 33 = 9 B. L. R. 312, the High Court cancelled its order passed without notice to the Attorney General to be examined. See also 7 Bom. H. C. Rep. 67 and 15 B. 33 and 7 A.

Where the High Court under s. 439 enhanced sentence without giving the accused sufficient opportunity to be heard, the High Court acts without jurisdiction and its order is void *ab initio*. It is therefore open to the High Court, in exercise of its previous order, to send the case on the merits after giving proper notice to the accused. But when an order is passed in a criminal matter without notice to the accused, as soon as he is served and thereafter there is no power in the Court to review or alter the sentence. 47 M. L. J. 423 = 45 M. L. J. 435.

(iii) *Order made without jurisdiction*.—Under a misconception the High Court cannot leave to appeal to the District Court or make an order granting sentence in a proceeding under s. 100 of the Letters Patent. The High Court reviewed its own order and set aside the order granting leave to appeal. 47 C. 754. See also an unreported case reported in S. C. 53 = A. F.

(iv) *Order made under s. 439*.—See T. M. 34 order passed under s. 439 (i) = 15 C. 42 order passed under s. 439 = S. C. 63 (application for revision).

(v) *A writ of Habeas Corpus granted by a single Judge*.—When he grants a writ of Habeas Corpus he is bound to give notice to the State. 21 A. 177, T. A. 62, 14 A. L. J. 61. See also 15 B. 109 = 15 M. H. C. 46 = 15 Cr. L. J. 67.

8. Limits to the local jurisdiction of the Bombay and Calcutta High Courts.—

(i) *24 B. 451* was held that the District Court of Bombay has no criminal jurisdiction over the persons of a Hindu or Mahomedan who is a British subject or a Hindu or Mahomedan.

(ii) *Calcutta*.—The District Court of Calcutta has no jurisdiction over a person who is a British subject or a Hindu or Mahomedan, passed by the Government of the District of Calcutta, when exercising jurisdiction over offences committed in Calcutta, a place not covered by the District of Calcutta. 24 B. 451 = 24 B. 451 = 24 B. 451.

VILIPEND : *v* (Lat. *vil* *pendere*, from *colla* *vale*
and *pendere* to weigh, to value, *il* *vil* *pendere*, *Fr*
vilipendere *sp* *colla* *il* *vil* *pendere* *Fr* *colla* *il* *vil* *pendere* *Fr*

talk

Depraved discourse, infamous speech or

VINDICABLENESS, *n* The
vindicable

1131 *vil* *pendere* *v*

v to support or maintain as true or
against denial, censure, or objections, to de-
fend
justify

v to punish, to punish as, a war to
or punish infidelity [400]
God is more powerful to exact subject on and to
rebellion

6 To liberate

Fr *vindicare* *Fr* *colla* *il* *vil* *pendere* *Fr* *colla* *il* *vil* *pendere* *Fr*

v vindicator, *n* [L. *vindicare*, *Fr* *vindicare*] *v*
one who defends

288 or over the Political Resident at Manipur, 12 C. W. N. 602; 7 C. L. J. 171 = 7 Cr. L. J. 193. As to whether the High Court has still powers of revision under the Charter Act and the Letters Patent over the *North Cachar Hills*, see 26 C. 874. See Notes to s. 1 at p. 3.

II.—WHEN HIGH COURT WILL EXERCISE ITS POWERS OF REVISION.

9. *Power of revision is discretionary and ought not to be fettered.*—In dealing with an application under s. 195, JENKINS C.J., as one of a Bench laid down the principles which should guide the use of a discretion vested in Court by law as follows:—"Not one jot or one tittle can be taken away from or added to the plain and express provisions of the Legislature by any decision of the Court, nor can this discretion vested by the section in a Court be crystallised or restricted by any series of cases, it remains free and untrammelled, to be fairly exercised according to the exigencies of each case. When a tribunal, it has been said, is invested by Act of Parliament or by rules with a discretion, without any indication in the Act or rules of the grounds upon which the discretion is to be exercised, it is a mistake to lay down any rules with a view to indicate the particular grooves in which the discretion should run, for if the Act or rules did not fetter the discretion of the Judge, why should the Court do so, *Gardener v. Jay* (29 Ch. D. 50 at p. 53). And in the same spirit we find LINDLEY, L.J., declaring:—"It appears to me wrong in principle for any Court or Judge to impose fetters on the exercise by themselves or others of powers which are left by law to their discretion in each case as it arises" *Saunders v. Saunders*, (1897) P. 89 at p. 93. There are, however, certain rules of procedure to which any Court exercising its discretion would pay regard, and pre-eminent among them, possibly a compendious statement of all, would be the rule that the Court will be astute to see that there should be no abuse of administration of criminal justice. No one, therefore, would be permitted to use a penal law merely to satisfy his private ends or personal spite. "That would be to misuse it, 41 C. 446. In 23 B. 533 at p. 568, the same learned Judge remarked:—"If we have been entrusted with the responsibility of a wide discretion, we should be the last to attempt to fetter that discretion, and whenever it is argued that judicial decision has deprived us of the power that the Legislature has given us, I recall the words of an eminent English judge 'I desire to repeat' he said 'What I have said before, that this controlling power of the Court is a discretionary power, and it must be exercised with regard to all the circumstances of each particular case, anxious attention being given to the said circumstances, which vary greatly. For myself I say emphatically, that this discretion ought not to be crystallised, as it would become in course of time, by one Judge attempting to prescribe definite rules with a view to bind other Judges in the exercise of the discretion, which the Legislature has committed to them. This discretion like all other judicial discretions, ought as far as practicable, to be left untrammelled and free so as to be fairly exercised, according to the exigencies of each case. These weighty words appear to me to breathe the spirit, that should guide as in the exercise of our discretionary powers of revision. Thus may perhaps increase our responsibilities and add to our labours, but no one would shirk the one or grudge the other.' This decision was followed in 2 B. L. R. 23 = 10 Cr. L. J. 237; 5 N. L. R. 4 = 9 Cr. L. J. 211, 11 P. R. 1903 = 27 P. W. R. 1903 = 8 Cr. L. J. 230; 16 C. L. J. 453 = 13 Cr. L. J. 897. The revisional jurisdiction of the High Court can always be exercised,

to see whether there has been any error of law, any irregularity, any abuse of, a failure to exercise judicial discretion, such as would justify interference in revision, 10 N. L. R. 177 = 16 Cr. L. J. 161.

Code, to act on findings of fact embodied in the judgment of the Lower Court. In criminal cases on the other hand, there is no such statutory restriction to the exercise of our jurisdiction," 16 C. L. J. 453 = 13 Cr. L. J. 897, *per MOOKERJI, J.*, matters which are not urged before the first Court of Revision may be urged in moving the High Court, 40 C. 41.

(11) *High Court will not necessarily revise every order which may be illegal or irregular.*—Though according to the Privy Council Ruling in 25 M. 61, it must be held that a trial which is not warranted by the provisions of the Code is altogether illegal and void, and not merely irregular and within the purview of s. 537, yet it would be entirely inconsistent with the letter and spirit of this section to hold that in every case of illegal trial, the High Court is necessarily obliged to interfere without due regard to the circumstances of the particular case. The illegality of a trial is no doubt *prima facie* good and strong ground for the exercise or revisional jurisdiction, but it is not imperative on the Court to take such action in every case, however small and scant,

may be the necessity or reason for adopting such a course, so as to interfere with the conviction in every such case, especially where no prejudice is shown to have been caused by such illegality, 3 P. R. 1906 = 4 Cr. L. J. 75; 4 L. B. R. 315 (F B) = 9 Cr. L. J. 15, where the fact that the accused did not apply for revision was stated as a ground for not interfering. See also 29 P. W. R. 1913 = 14 Cr. L. J. 699 where following 19 P. W. R. 1910 = 11 Cr. L. J. 389, it was held that the High Court is not always bound to interfere under s. 439 even if the Court below is wrong in law where the accused has not been prejudiced. To justify interference it must be shown that there exists an error in law, and that the accused has been prejudiced by that error, 4 Bom. L. R. 685.

The power of revision should not be so exercised as to make one portion of the Code conflict with another, as would be the case were the High Court to permit the practice to grow up of invoking its interference in revision so as to give a right of appeal where such right is definitely excluded by other provisions of the Code, 36, A. 403.

10 There is no species of injustice which the High Court is powerless to correct.—I would be strongly inclined to hold that no hard-and-fast limitation should be placed on the exercise of our powers of superintendence over the proceedings of inferior Courts. I would hold with WOODROFFE, J., in 12 C. W. N. 678 = 7 Cr. L. J. 499, that there is no species of injustice which this Court would be powerless to correct under the Charter where its interference is called for, 27 C. 128; 27 M. 223; 31 M. 510; 28 M. 28, 21 M. L. J. 484 = 5 M. L. T. 273 = (1911) 2 M. W. N. 369 support the view that the High Court has plenary powers of interference under the Charter, where it is needed to inconvert injustice. See also 33 C. 63, 13 C. L. R. 275, 23 C. 709, although a narrower construction was adopted in 27 C. 892 and 6 C. L. J. 705 = 6 Cr. L. J. 490." Per SUNDARA IYER, J., in 14 M. L. T. 200 = 14 Cr. L. J. 529. Ss. 435 and 439 give the High Court power to control the propriety as well as the legality of a finding, sentence or order of any inferior Criminal Court, and that necessarily imports power to regulate or revise the proceedings leading up to such finding, sentence or order. If, therefore, a sentence has been passed or confirmed by a Court which could not legally try, or should not have properly tried the case, the High Court has a discretion to interfere, 9 M. L. R. 81 = 14 Cr. L. J. 385. It was contended that the Legislature did under s. 435 empower the High Court only to send for a record of a criminal case with a view to satisfy itself of the correctness, legality or propriety of any order passed therein and not to interfere with such order even

it has no power to
only such powers
powers of revision
were intended to be conferred on the High Court. The meaning of that section is that in any case to which
or not)
opened
vision
High
Court should be in a position to rectify cases of injustice or illegality when the person affected is unable to
appeal 27 C. 126 dissented from 45 P. R. 1935 distinguished 42 P. R. 1895 (25 C. 233, 22 C. 131, 2 A. 398, 20 B. 543,
8 P. R. 1904 = 1 Cr. L. J. 514 followed) 33 P. R. 1910 = 12 Cr. L. J. 50

11 If proceedings are not bona fide or are manifestly illegal, High Court will interfere in spite of statutory prohibition.—If it is established to the satisfaction of the High Court that the proceedings are not bona fide and that in substance their continuance would mean an abuse of the statutory provisions on the subject it is not only competent to the High Court but it is its obvious duty to interfere with the proceedings of a Magistrate even at the initial stage when the Magistrate has before him a Police report sufficient to justify the commencement of proceedings under s. 110 17 C. W. N. 238 = 16 C. L. J. 467 = 14 Cr. L. J. 8. When an illegal order is passed and action taken which involves matters coming within the purview of law, justice and within the scope of authority of the Courts, such authority cannot be ousted by the mere ipse dixit of the officer that he was acting not as a judicial officer, but in his executive capacity. The High Court will interfere, 4 P. R. 1908 = 7 Cr. L. J. 202; 17 O. C. 263 = 13 Cr. L. J. 663. Proceedings which merely purport to be under some provision of law which is not open to revision, but are not really so and do not conform to the statutory requirement will be dealt with in revision, see 26 A. 144; 24 B. 527; 26 C. 183 and other cases noted under Heading V below. The High Court will revise an order of a Magistrate made without jurisdiction in spite of a provision that a conviction under the particular Act shall not be open to appeal or revision, 2 B. L. h. 20 = 10 Cr. L. J. 233. It is true that s. 15 of the Extradition Act XV of 1903 ousts the jurisdiction of the High Court to inquire into the propriety of a warrant issued under Chapter III, but when the order of the Magistrate is sought to be justified under an authority supposed to be derived from the law but is, in fact, without jurisdiction not being sanctioned by it, we cannot but assume that the Magistrate has acted in his general

Visitatorial, a See VISITORIAL

Visitor (vo seel' er) n (Fr) A light cape or short cloak of silk or lace worn by ladies in summer

Visitor n See VISITOR

Visiting n a Authorized to visit and inspect, as a visiting committee

Visitor n



jurisdiction and as such his order is revisible by the Court and is liable to be set aside at the instance of the party whose liberty is affected by it 14 Cr L J 673 (C) where 7 Bom L R 433 = 2 Cr L J 439 and 21 P R. 1896 are referred to See Note 16 to s. 435

12. There can be no waiver as to defect of jurisdiction.—A plea of want of jurisdiction may be taken at any time even in the High Court or revision though not to may have consented to the jurisdiction will not cure the defect. Neither ignorance of parties nor silence on their part can vest give him. See 10 C. L. J. 432 = 11 Cr L. J. 1. No waiver on the part of the Magistrate authority to act in a manner not prescribed by the Legislature. See also 18 M. L. J. 330 = 3 M. L. T. 407 = 8 Cr L. J. 152, 9 N. L. R. 81 = 14 Cr L. J. 335; 1 B. L. R. 93 = 3 Cr L. J. 335, 9 Bom L R. 355 = 5 Cr L. J. 332, 12 C. W. N. 140 = 6 Cr L. J. 434; 9 A. L. J. 81 = 13 Cr L. J. 163 and Note 21 to s. 233. But see 4 L. B. R. 315 (F.B.) = 9 Cr L. J. 15, where it was held that though the trial was vitiated by misjoinder of charges not curable by s. 537 the conviction should not be set aside as the accused had not personally applied for revision as he pleaded guilty and as no injustice seemed to have resulted.

13. Consent of prisoner does not cure defective proceedings.—Proceedings prescribed by law must be followed.—Criminal proceedings are bad unless they are conducted in the manner prescribed by law and if they are substantially bad in themselves the defect will not be cured by any waiver or consent of the prisoner. When the irregularities are all unfavourable to the prisoner it is impossible for any Court to consider a waiver or consent as binding on him. It is the duty of Magistrate and all Criminal Courts to follow the procedure prescribed by law and there is no law which sanctions their intentional departure from that procedure and then attempting to protect themselves against the consequences of such departure by getting the accused person to say he consents to it. *In the vast majority of cases most prisoners not properly defended would probably assent to a very irregularity which the Judge or Magistrate trying his case choose to suggest.* There would be an end to all procedure if such an assent were held to warrant material and important irregularities.—Per MACPHERSON J in 2 C. 23 at p. 30, 25 W. R. 57, see also 6 C. 83 and 96 and 12 W. R. 3 = 3 B. L. R. 4. Ap Cr 20, which citing 36 L. J. 51 (P.C.) lays down that a prisoner on his trial can consent to nothing 4 L. B. R. 376, see also 46 M. 117.

14. Powers of revision are not limited by death of accused or expiry of sentence.—The High Court is competent in revision under this section to interfere with a conviction even after the expiry of the sentence 7 A. 135 or the abatement of appeal where justice to the deceased convict's family requires that the sentence should be altered.—Dr STOKES *Anglo-India Codes* Vol II p. 26. In many cases a man's status is altered by conviction and his future prospects in life may depend on the existence or annulment of the conviction. See 2 B. 564 and Note 34. In 16 Cr L. J. 272 (M) the Court however refused to revise an order under s. 144 which had ceased to be in force by efflux of time.

15. As a rule of practice powers of revision are limited by errors appearing on the record.—It has always been regarded as a sound rule of practice not to interfere when there is no error in law or on the face of the record 4 P. J. 255, 256, 257, 258, 259, 260, 261, 262, 263, 264, 265, 266, 267, 268, 269, 270, 271, 272, 273, 274, 275, 276, 277, 278, 279, 280, 281, 282, 283, 284, 285, 286, 287, 288, 289, 290, 291, 292, 293, 294, 295, 296, 297, 298, 299, 300, 301, 302, 303, 304, 305, 306, 307, 308, 309, 310, 311, 312, 313, 314, 315, 316, 317, 318, 319, 320, 321, 322, 323, 324, 325, 326, 327, 328, 329, 330, 331, 332, 333, 334, 335, 336, 337, 338, 339, 340, 341, 342, 343, 344, 345, 346, 347, 348, 349, 350, 351, 352, 353, 354, 355, 356, 357, 358, 359, 360, 361, 362, 363, 364, 365, 366, 367, 368, 369, 370, 371, 372, 373, 374, 375, 376, 377, 378, 379, 380, 381, 382, 383, 384, 385, 386, 387, 388, 389, 390, 391, 392, 393, 394, 395, 396, 397, 398, 399, 400, 401, 402, 403, 404, 405, 406, 407, 408, 409, 410, 411, 412, 413, 414, 415, 416, 417, 418, 419, 420, 421, 422, 423, 424, 425, 426, 427, 428, 429, 430, 431, 432, 433, 434, 435, 436, 437, 438, 439, 440, 441, 442, 443, 444, 445, 446, 447, 448, 449, 450, 451, 452, 453, 454, 455, 456, 457, 458, 459, 460, 461, 462, 463, 464, 465, 466, 467, 468, 469, 470, 471, 472, 473, 474, 475, 476, 477, 478, 479, 480, 481, 482, 483, 484, 485, 486, 487, 488, 489, 490, 491, 492, 493, 494, 495, 496, 497, 498, 499, 500, 501, 502, 503, 504, 505, 506, 507, 508, 509, 510, 511, 512, 513, 514, 515, 516, 517, 518, 519, 520, 521, 522, 523, 524, 525, 526, 527, 528, 529, 530, 531, 532, 533, 534, 535, 536, 537, 538, 539, 540, 541, 542, 543, 544, 545, 546, 547, 548, 549, 550, 551, 552, 553, 554, 555, 556, 557, 558, 559, 560, 561, 562, 563, 564, 565, 566, 567, 568, 569, 570, 571, 572, 573, 574, 575, 576, 577, 578, 579, 580, 581, 582, 583, 584, 585, 586, 587, 588, 589, 590, 591, 592, 593, 594, 595, 596, 597, 598, 599, 600, 601, 602, 603, 604, 605, 606, 607, 608, 609, 610, 611, 612, 613, 614, 615, 616, 617, 618, 619, 620, 621, 622, 623, 624, 625, 626, 627, 628, 629, 630, 631, 632, 633, 634, 635, 636, 637, 638, 639, 640, 641, 642, 643, 644, 645, 646, 647, 648, 649, 650, 651, 652, 653, 654, 655, 656, 657, 658, 659, 660, 661, 662, 663, 664, 665, 666, 667, 668, 669, 670, 671, 672, 673, 674, 675, 676, 677, 678, 679, 680, 681, 682, 683, 684, 685, 686, 687, 688, 689, 690, 691, 692, 693, 694, 695, 696, 697, 698, 699, 700, 701, 702, 703, 704, 705, 706, 707, 708, 709, 710, 711, 712, 713, 714, 715, 716, 717, 718, 719, 720, 721, 722, 723, 724, 725, 726, 727, 728, 729, 730, 731, 732, 733, 734, 735, 736, 737, 738, 739, 740, 741, 742, 743, 744, 745, 746, 747, 748, 749, 750, 751, 752, 753, 754, 755, 756, 757, 758, 759, 760, 761, 762, 763, 764, 765, 766, 767, 768, 769, 770, 771, 772, 773, 774, 775, 776, 777, 778, 779, 780, 781, 782, 783, 784, 785, 786, 787, 788, 789, 790, 791, 792, 793, 794, 795, 796, 797, 798, 799, 800, 801, 802, 803, 804, 805, 806, 807, 808, 809, 810, 811, 812, 813, 814, 815, 816, 817, 818, 819, 820, 821, 822, 823, 824, 825, 826, 827, 828, 829, 830, 831, 832, 833, 834, 835, 836, 837, 838, 839, 840, 841, 842, 843, 844, 845, 846, 847, 848, 849, 850, 851, 852, 853, 854, 855, 856, 857, 858, 859, 860, 861, 862, 863, 864, 865, 866, 867, 868, 869, 870, 871, 872, 873, 874, 875, 876, 877, 878, 879, 880, 881, 882, 883, 884, 885, 886, 887, 888, 889, 890, 891, 892, 893, 894, 895, 896, 897, 898, 899, 900, 901, 902, 903, 904, 905, 906, 907, 908, 909, 910, 911, 912, 913, 914, 915, 916, 917, 918, 919, 920, 921, 922, 923, 924, 925, 926, 927, 928, 929, 930, 931, 932, 933, 934, 935, 936, 937, 938, 939, 940, 941, 942, 943, 944, 945, 946, 947, 948, 949, 950, 951, 952, 953, 954, 955, 956, 957, 958, 959, 960, 961, 962, 963, 964, 965, 966, 967, 968, 969, 970, 971, 972, 973, 974, 975, 976, 977, 978, 979, 980, 981, 982, 983, 984, 985, 986, 987, 988, 989, 990, 991, 992, 993, 994, 995, 996, 997, 998, 999, 1000.

which Gover if an order w for tl fraud eve if it wa a Sessions Court on appeal took into consideration a decision of a Settlement Court made after the appeal judgment of the Sessions Court as to the possession of the parties to the case and reduced the sentence through the finding of the Settlement Court was contrary to the finding of the Sessions Court. See Notes 20 and 73 below

16. High Court though competent to deal with evidence in revision will not as a rule do so, except to prevent miscarriage of justice.—The High Court has jurisdiction to revise findings of facts in the case of findings of Courts of Appeal as well as of original Courts and the law imposes no limit to this jurisdiction except the decision of the Judges who have regulated the discretion by rules which in practice limit its jurisdiction. Per JARDINE J 14 B. 331, 10 C. 1057, 10 B. 131. It is unusual in revision to interfere with a finding of fact unless it is one so uncorrected 6 Bom. L. R. 1096 Code gives us no power to go into as a matter of practice held that in circumstances or where there is an error of law.—Per CHANDASARKAR J 28 B. 533 at p. 543. The rule of

Voe n See VAE

W Scott

told of security or of common sense "A con-
science void of offense toward God and toward
men" Acts xxi. 16 "void of corporal sense"
Milton
He that is void of wisdom depleth his neighbor Prov xi 13
3 Having no incumbent, unoccupied void

upon wings, flying, hence, passing from place to
place, current
The East in a river was now current, and out of it came in
the great current
2 Noble, light and quick, active, rapid
10000 touch

any or fashion of people at any
any time temporary mode, custom, or prac-
tice popular reception, — used now exclusively as
part of the phrase in vogue

One voice was vain
Wherever his voice may be I will follow myself that the
people of the living generation, on which he set forth what is
taught to their children in wisdom enter in Zion or in Vile

See VOICING

27 Substances which affect the smell in perfume or
fragrant odors as musk, harts-horn and the like

Canst thou thunder with a voice like him? Job xl 12
The floods have lifted up their voice Ps xlii. 3
My heart
Leaps at the trumpet's voice Ad lib.

Her voice was sweet soft
Gently, and low an excellent thing in woman
Thy voice is sweet c
John thy voice unto the angel who
3 Language words expression identification
of feeling or opinion

1 One is to be present with you now and to change thy
voice
Let us roll on God in the room of his church, etc.
4 Opinion or choice expressed, a voice
frag

See How now my master! here you choose
I am His law our common law
Some laws ordain and some attend the law
Of holy senates and elect by

5 Command, precept — chiefly in
language
We would not be obedient unto the law of U
God.

6 (Groom) A particular mode of in-
conjugation, style or a particular form
by means of which the relation of the sub-
ject to the action expressed by the indic

adjudged void invalid and of no force capable of
being avoided or confirmed
Such administration is not void but voidable by sentence

27 A voidable contract may be voided and con-
firmed to render it null and of no effect it must be avoided

2 Great spirit

his first
a green of
solid color
Faint
mixture of

to select

100.

a volume

10000

a little

a little

a little

a little

a little

a little

a little

a little

a little

a little

a little

a little

a little

a little

a little

a little

a little

a little

a little

a little

a little

a little

a little

a little

a little

voice n f [imp & p] VOICED (voiced)
voiced VOICING

1 The act of one who, or the

may be the necessity or reason for adopting such a course, so as to interfere with the conviction in every such case, especially where no prejudice is shown to have been caused by such illegality, 5 P. R. 1906 = 4 Cr. L. J. 75; 4 L. B. R. 315 (F.B.) = 9 Cr. L. J. 15, where the fact that the accused did not apply for revision was stated as a ground for not interfering. See also 29 P. W. R. 1913 = 14 Cr. L. J. 399 where following 19 P. W. R. 1910 = 11 Cr. L. J. 389, it was held that the High Court is not always bound to interfere under s. 439 even if the Court below is wrong in law where the accused has not been prejudiced. To justify interference it must be shown that there exists an error in law, and that the accused has been prejudiced by that error, 4 Bom. L. R. 685.

The power of revision should not be so exercised as to make one portion of the Code conflict with another, as would be the case where the High Court to permit the practice to grow up of invoking its interference in revision so as to give a right of appeal where such right is definitely excluded by other provisions of the Code, 36 A. 403.

10. There is no species of injustice which the High Court is powerless to correct.—“I would be strongly inclined to hold that no hard and fast limitation should be placed on the exercise of our powers of superintendence over the proceedings of inferior Courts. I would hold with WOODROFFE, J., in 12 C. W. N. 678 = 7 Cr. L. J. 499, that there is no species of injustice which this Court would be powerless to correct under the Charter where its interference is called for, 27 C. 126; 27 M. 243; 31 M. 510; 28 M. 28, 21 M. L. J. 484 = 9 M. L. T. 273 = (1911) 2 M. W. N. 369 support the view that the High Court has plenary powers of interference under the Charter, where it is needed to correct injustice. See also 33 C. 68; 13 C. L. R. 275; 28 C. 709, although a narrower construction was adopted in 27 C. 892 and 6 C. L. J. 705 = 6 Cr. L. J. 490.” *Per* SUNDARA IYER, J., in 14 M. L. T. 200 = 14 Cr. L. J. 529. Ss. 435 and 439 give the High Court power to control the propriety as well as the legality of a finding, sentence or order of any inferior Criminal Court, and that necessarily imports power to regulate or revise the proceedings leading up to such finding, sentence or order. If, therefore, a sentence has been passed or confirmed by a Court which could not legally try, or should not have properly tried the case, the High Court has a discretion to interfere, 9 N. L. R. 81 = 14 Cr. L. J. 385. It was contended that the Legislature did under s. 435 empower the High Court only to send for a record of a criminal case with a view to satisfy itself of the correctness, legality or propriety of any order passed therein and not to interfere with such order even though the High Court found it illegal, incorrect or improper and further that the High Court has no power to interfere with orders in respect of which no appeal would lie under this Code and that it has only such powers as are conferred on an Appellate Court under s. 423. *Held*, that under s. 439 very wide powers of revision were intended to be conferred on the High Court. The meaning of that section is that in any case to which s. 435 or 438 is applicable, the High Court can with reference to any particular order (whether appealable or not) exercise all or any of the powers which under s. 423 an Appellate Court could exercise if that order happened to be one open to appeal, and it was not intended by the Legislature that the High Court's powers of revision were to be limited merely to orders from which an appeal would lie. Obviously the main idea is that the High Court should be in a position to rectify cases of injustice or illegality when the person affected is unable to appeal. 27 C. 126 dissented from 45 P. R. 1885 distinguished 42 P. R. 1885 (25 C. 233, 22 C. 131, 2 A. 398, 20 B. 543, 8 P. R. 1904 = 1 Cr. L. J. 514 followed); 33 P. R. 1910 = 12 Cr. L. J. 50.

11. If proceedings are not bona fide or are manifestly illegal, High Court will interfere in spite of statutory prohibition.—If it is established to the satisfaction of the High Court that the proceedings are not bona fide and that in substance their continuance would mean an abuse of the statutory provisions on the subject, it is not only competent to the High Court, but it is its obvious duty to interfere with the proceedings of a Magistrate even at the initial stage when the Magistrate has before him a Police report sufficient to justify the commencement of proceedings under s. 110, 17 C. W. N. 238 = 16 C. L. J. 467 = 14 Cr. L. J. 5. When an illegal order is passed and action taken which involves matters coming within the purview of law, justice and within the scope of authority of the Courts such authority cannot be ousted by the mere *ipse dixit* of the officer that he was acting not as a judicial officer, but in his executive capacity. The High Court will interfere, 4 P. R. 1908 = 7 Cr. L. J. 202; 47 O. C. 283 = 15 Cr. L. J. 663. Proceedings which merely purport to be under some provision of law which is not open to revision, but are not really so and do not conform to the statutory requirement will be dealt with in revision, see 25 A. 144; 24 B. 527; 26 C. 183 and other cases noted under Heading V below. The High Court will revise an order of a Magistrate made without jurisdiction in spite of a provision that a conviction under the particular Act shall not be open to appeal or revision, 2 B. L. R. 20 = 10 Cr. L. J. 233. ‘It is true that s. 15 of the Extradition Act XV of 1903 ousts the jurisdiction of the High Court to inquire into the propriety of a warrant issued under Chapter III, but when the order of the Magistrate is sought to be justified under an authority supposed to be derived from the law but is, in fact, without jurisdiction, not being sanctioned by it, we cannot but assume that the Magistrate has acted in his general

jurisdiction and as such his order is revisible by the Court and is liable to be set aside at the instance of the party whose liberty is affected by it, 14 Cr. L. J. 673 (C) where 7 Bom. L. R. 433 = 2 Cr. L. J. 439 and 21 P. R. 1836 are referred to. See Note 16 to s. 435.

12. There can be no waiver as to defect of jurisdiction.—A plea of want of jurisdiction may be taken at any time, even in the High Court on revision, though not taken in the Courts below, and the fact the accused may have consented to the jurisdiction will not cure the defect, 16 W. R. 69 (79), 23 W. R. 59; 26 B. 50 at p. 53. Neither ignorance of parties nor silence on their part can vest a Magistrate with powers which the law does not give him. See 10 C. L. J. 432 = 11 Cr. L. J. 1. No waiver on the part of the petitioners could confer on the Magistrate authority to act in a manner not prescribed by the Legislature. See also 18 M. L. J. 330 = 3 M. L. T. 407 = 8 Cr. L. J. 152; 9 N. L. R. 81 = 14 Cr. L. J. 335; 1 B. L. R. 93 = 8 Cr. L. J. 335; 9 Bom. L. R. 358 = 5 Cr. L. J. 332; 12 C. W. N. 140 = 6 Cr. L. J. 434; 9 A. L. J. 51 = 13 Cr. L. J. 163 and Note 21 to s. 233. But see 4 B. R. 315 (F.B.) = 9 Cr. L. J. 15, where it was held that though the trial was vitiated by misjoinder of charges not curable by s. 537, the conviction should not be set aside, as the accused had not personally applied for revision, as he pleaded guilty, and as no injustice seemed to have resulted.

13. Consent of prisoner does not cure defective proceedings.—Procedure prescribed by law must be followed.—Criminal proceedings are bad unless they are conducted in the manner prescribed by law, and if they are substantially bad in themselves the defect will not be cured by any waiver or consent of the prisoner. When the irregularities are all unfavourable to the prisoner, it is impossible for any Court to consider a waiver or consent as binding on him. It is the duty of Magistrate and all Criminal Courts to follow the procedure prescribed by law, and there is no law which sanctions their intentional departure from that procedure, and then attempting to protect themselves against the consequences of such

376, see also 46 M. 117.

14. Powers of revision are not limited by death of accused or expiry of sentence.—The High Court is competent in revision, under this section to interfere with a conviction even after the expiry of the sentence 7 A. 135 or the abatement of appeal where justice to the deceased convict's family requires that the sentence should be altered.—DR. STOKES, *Anglo-Indian Codes* Vol II p. 26. In many cases a man's status is altered by conviction, and his future prospects in life may depend on the existence or annulment of the conviction. See 2 B. 564 and Note 34. In 16 Cr. L. J. 272 (M) the Court however refused to revise an order under s. 144 which had ceased to be in force by efflux of time.

15. As a rule of practice powers of revision are limited by errors appearing on the record.—It has always been regarded as a sound rule of practice not to interfere when there is no error in law or on the face of the record, 4 B. L. R. 686; 22 C. 998, 6 S. L. R. 121 = 13 Cr. L. J. 771 and not to interfere in cases of acquittal in

a Sessions Court on appeal took into consideration a decision of a Settlement Court made after the appeal judgment of the Sessions Court as to the possession of the parties to the case and reduced the sentence through the finding of the Settlement Court was contrary to the finding of the Sessions Court. See Notes 20 and 73 below.

16. High Court though competent to set aside a conviction, will not interfere to prevent miscarriage of justice.—The findings of Courts of Appeal as well except the decision of the Judges who have regulated the discretion by rules which in practice limit its jurisdiction. *Per JARDINE, J.*, 14 B. 331; 10 C. 1047; 10 B. 131. It is unusual in revision to interfere with a finding of fact, unless it is one so manifestly erroneous, that a miscarriage of justice would result from its being uncorrected, 6 Bom. L. R. 1096. "It is not correct to say that the law as laid down in the Criminal Procedure Code gives us no power to go into evidence in revision. The High Court has this power, but this Court has, as a matter of practice, held, that it will not go into evidence as a rule, but will interfere only under special circumstances or where there is an error of law"—*Per CHANDAVARKAR, J.*, 28 B. 533 at p. 545. The rule of

practice is to refuse to disturb a conviction when there is legal evidence, oral or documentary, to sustain it.—*Per ASTON, J.*, *ibid.* In 12 Bom. L. R. 21 = 11 Cr. L. J. 180, it is stated by CHANDAKAR, J., that it has been the settled practice of the Bombay High Court to refuse to interfere in the exercise of its revisional jurisdiction in regard to findings of fact, except on very exceptional grounds such as a mis-statement of evidence by the Lower Court, or the misconstruction of documents or placing by that Court of the onus of proof on the accused contrary to the law of evidence and, 8 B. 197, Ratanlal 244, 14 B. 331 are referred to. That in exceptional circumstances, the High Court may and should interfere on questions of fact is obvious, such as where there has been a conviction of a clearly innocent man, and but for the powers given to the High Court to interfere as a Court of Revision, the only remedy would be by petition to the Government to exercise its powers of prerogative.—*Per ASTON, J.*, in 8 Bom. L. R. 851 = 4 Cr. L. J. 446, 20 A. L. J. 276

* In revision it is open to the High Court to consider whether there has been any misappreciation of evidence, and if the Court has power to do so and if a convicted person claims to be heard to show that the Lower Courts have misappreciated the evidence in the case and that he has been unjustly convicted, it is not in my opinion, open to a Judge to say that it is within his discretion to permit or refuse him to do so or not, no doubt the sections only say that the High Court 'may' interfere in revision, but I think the word 'may' is the only word that could be used in the sections.' *Per SANKARAN NAIR, J.*, in 15 Cr. L. J. 233 (M.), but the other Judges did not concur with this view

(i) *Revisional jurisdictions not confined to errors of law*.—No doubt the High Court does ordinarily, when acting in revision take the facts as found by the Magistrate but, there is nothing in the Code to limit the Courts' power of interference to cases where the Magistrate has ignored or contravened an express provision of law. The High Court has power to revise an order whenever it is manifestly wrong, 14 M. L. T. 200 = 14 Cr. L. J. 523. The words of this section are very general and empower the High Court to send for the record of the case not only when it wishes to satisfy itself about the correctness of any finding, sentence or order, but as to the regularity of any proceedings in Subordinate Courts, 20 B. 543 = 11 P. 543; 9 N. L. R. 81 = 14 Cr. L. J. 335. Under this section every finding, sentence or order is liable to review not only on the ground of illegality or irregularity, but also on the ground of incorrectness, *et.*, on the ground that it was wrong on merits. An order of discharge is no exception to this rule, 15 C. 608; 31 M. 133. The High Court will interfere when the Lower Courts have erred in their inferences from facts as found and have found applicants guilty of offences which are not constituted by such facts, 8 S. L. R. 199 = 16 Cr. L. J. 230

(ii) *Will not interfere when accused has pleaded guilty*.—In a summary trial for an offence under the Cantonment Code, the Magistrate recorded in his order. Finally the accused admits his error in not having complied with the notice and throws himself on the mercy of this Court. *Held*, that this was equivalent to a plea of guilty and that the accused could not be heard in revision, except as to the extent or legality of the sentence, 1907 A. W. N. 204 = 6 Cr. L. J. 153, 4 L. R. 315 (F.B.) = 9 Cr. L. J. 15, but see 12 C. W. N. 140 = 4 Cr. L. J. 434

(iii) *High Court may go into evidence even in non-appealable cases*.—In cases in which the law allows no appeal, the High Court, as a Court of Revision, does not, except on the ground of an error of law or where the question is one of evidence except on exceptional grounds, exercise the powers of an Appellate Court. But where such exceptional grounds exist, the Court will exercise its discretion under this section and reverse the conviction and sentence.—*Per CHANDAKAR, J.*, in 9 Bom. L. R. 706 = 6 Cr. L. J. 70. There is nothing in the statute law, which precludes the High Court from interfering in the exercise of its revisional powers with convictions and sentences whether the ground of that interference be what is commonly called a question of fact or whether it to be a question of law. The *cursus curio* drawing a distinction between grounds of the former and grounds of the latter sort rests rather upon a principle of convenience than of law. The true rule is that the High Court will not interfere in revision unless it is satisfied that it is necessary to do so to prevent an otherwise irreparable injustice.—*Per ASTON, J.*, *ibid.*, see also 8 P. R. 1909 = 17 P. W. R. 1909 = 10 Cr. L. J. 314, 15 C. W. N. 835 = 12 Cr. L. J. 352.

17. When High Courts will not disturb findings of fact—

(i) *Careful and deliberate weighing of evidence will not be set aside*.—Where a Sessions Judge, after a careful and deliberate weighing of the evidence on the record, comes to a conclusion unfavourable to the accused, the High Court will not interfere, however much it might hold a contrary opinion as to the value of the evidence, 20 W. R. 61 = 12 B. L. R. 249. Where a Magistrate trying an accused person has dealt at considerable length with the evidence on the record and discharged the accused recording what appear to be sound reason for the conclusion arrived at by him, the High Court will not interfere with such order in revision on the ground

that the guilt of the accused is established by the evidence already recorded, 8 P. R. 1900; 2 P. R. 1901, 8 P. R. 1909 = 10 Cr. L. J. 314; 11 P. R. 1911 = 12 Cr. L. J. 217. Unless new and cogent evidence can be produced the High Court should not set aside the order of dismissal and direct further inquiry though there may be some irregularities, 13 P. W. R. 1909 = 11 Cr. L. J. 110; 6 A. 434; 8 C. 693; 24 A. 346. The High Court acting in revision under this section is bound to accept the finding of the Lower Court unless there is any error of law or procedure vitiating that finding or unless there are any special circumstances apparent on the record to show that in arriving at its conclusion of fact, the Lower Court has misapprehended the evidence, 12 Bom. L. R. 21; 20 P. W. R. 1914 = 123 P. L. R. 1914 = 15 Cr. L. J. 324.

(ii) *That High Court would or might come to different conclusion on the facts is no ground*—The High Court, as a Court of Revision, does possess the power of upsetting a finding of fact by the Lower Court on the ground of misappreciation of evidence. Such power, however, will not be exercised except for some very extraordinary reason. The circumstance that the Court itself might or would have come to a different conclusion is not such a reason, Ratanlal 177; 30 P. W. R. 1903.

(iii) *The mere fact that Appellate Court takes a different view of the facts is no ground*—A and B were convicted by a first class Magistrate who awarded them appealable sentences. B appealed to the Sessions Judge, who, holding that the evidence was not sufficient to establish his guilt, reversed the conviction and sentence. A did not appeal, but after B's release asked the Sessions Judge to refer his case to the High Court on the ground that the reasons for releasing B applied to his case also. Held that the mere fact that the Sessions Judge had taken a different view of the evidence from that which the Magistrate took, did not justify the High Court to interfere in revision, Ratanlal 977; 2 Bom. L. R. 334. When there is difference between the trying Magistrate and the Sessions Judge as to the credibility of certain witnesses the High Court will not interfere, as there is no point of law involved 18 W. R. 7, also 18 W. R. 39, 2 Bom. L. R. 334.

18 Cases where High Courts have gone into facts—(i) *Where by wrongly placing onus, injustice has resulted*—The High Court will interfere in revision where a Court has taken a wrong view of the facts through an error in law, e.g. where it places the burden of proof on the accused contrary to the principles illustrated in s. 101 of the Indian Evidence Act, Ratanlal 794. See 66 P. L. R. 1916.

(ii) *Where Courts have not properly applied the proper principles in dealing with accomplice evidence*—Where the Lower Courts have not considered the evidence from the point of view that the witnesses were accomplices and hearsay evidence was improperly admitted on important points, the High Court will go into the facts and reverse the conviction based on them, 2 C. W. N. 672. The High Court will not interfere on the mere ground that the rule of practice that an accomplice is unworthy of credit unless he is corroborated in material particulars, has not been adhered to by the convicting Court, unless there are exceptional circumstances calling for the exercise of their jurisdiction in the interests of justice, 11 Bom. L. R. 858 = 10 Cr. L. J. 433. In 3 P. W. R. 1911 = 12 Cr. L. J. 35, concurrent findings of fact were set aside by the High Court in revision as the Lower Courts had failed to scrutinize carefully the proof or corroboration of accomplice evidence.

(iii) *Where judgment is manifestly defective and insufficient to maintain order made*—Where a judgment is manifestly defective, and the findings contained therein are insufficient to sustain a conviction, the High Court on revision will examine the evidence in order to see whether the conviction may not be supported, 2 C. L. J. 416 (see Note below). If the Appellate Court has failed to do so, the High Court will interfere 13 C. W. N. 192 and 167; 14 C. W. N. 23.

Appellate Court though informal has appreciated the points which the prosecution had to establish and expressed opinion thereon 20 C. 333, but if it has failed to do so the High Court will interfere 13 C. W. N. 192 and 167; 14 C. W. N. 23.

(iv) *Where evidence is very doubtful or discrepant or the Courts have omitted to consider material evidence*—In 20 P. R. 1907 = 6 Cr. L. J. 263 and 13 P. W. R. 1909 = 11 Cr. L. J. 97 it was held that where the evidence against an accused person is weak, suspicious and inconclusive the High Court on revision side can examine and discuss the evidence on record, upset the concurrent findings of fact by both the Lower Courts and set aside the conviction. See also 13 C. W. N. 267 where the High Court interfered to prevent a miscarriage of justice arising from the alteration of date in the charge. A conviction based on evidence having a serious discrepancy therein, of which no notice had been taken by both the Lower Courts was set aside, 8 P. W. R. 1912 = 113 P. L. R. 1912 = 13 Cr. L. J. 483. In 23 P. W. R. 1912 = 13 Cr. L. J. 712, a conviction was set aside as the case seemed *ab initio* improbable and on account of enmity between the parties there was a strong element of doubt and see also 22 P. W. R. 1912 = 13 Cr. L. J. 533; 22 P. L. R. 1912 = 33 P. W. R. 1912 = 13 Cr. L. J. 774; 23 P. W. R. 1914 = 163 P. L. R. 1914 = 15 Cr. L. J. 591; 18 P. W. R. 1914 = 113 P. L. R. 1914 = 15 Cr. L. J. 521; 21 P. L. R.

4. To sit up or watch with at night as a

One who watches a watchman (Gls)

Be quiet, say the
The private music.

Beau & FL

His tongue did wait
In foul reproach.
Do you think I'd wait in any plot?
I heard a pop waiting in the oh many behind the
Sinner
Sinner

sett, to abandon

to do walk on (walk on) r [imp &] WALKED

To walk the plank to walk off the plank into the water

WALK on pine, the head forest keeper,
WALK on pine

To wait
Wait in the observation of the sun

W, A, L, K, P, long, S, T, S, S, S

1914 = 12 P. W. R. 1914; 7 P. W. R. 1915 = 16 Cr. L. J. 202; 23 P. W. R. 1915. In 12 P. W. R. 1913 = 66 P. L. R. 1913 = 14 Cr. L. J. 143, a concurrent finding of facts was set aside as the evidence was insufficient. See also 5 P. W. R. 1913 = 152 P. L. R. 1913 = 14 Cr. L. J. 320; 17 C. W. N. 294 = 14 Cr. L. J. 120; 43 P. W. R. 1913. An omission by an Appellate Court to consider certain earlier depositions of the prosecution witnesses containing statements different from or contradictory of statements made subsequently in depositions recorded at the trial, was held to amount to an error in law sufficient to warrant the setting aside of an Appellate Court's judgment, *Weir II, 573*. But the mere application of a party to examine the evidence in any case would not be sufficient ground for going into facts in revision. There must appear on the face of the judgment or order complained of or of the record, some ground to induce the High Court to think that the evidence ought to be examined in order to see that there has been no failure of justice. But no hard and fast rule can be laid down, each case will have to be dealt with according to its own circumstances. Where the judgment showed that the Magistrate was influenced by the evidence in a cross-case, the High Court in revision went into the evidence and acquitted the accused. The interference of the High Court in revision is not limited to matters of law, but it is fully competent to the High Court to enter into matters of fact, if it thinks fit. On the other hand, it is not bound to go into evidence, if it does not think fit, 22 G. 993 *quoted with approval* by ASTON, J. in 28 B. 533 at p. 549. In 25 P. W. R. 1910 = 11 Cr. L. J. 425, the Chief Court discussed the evidence and reversed the concurrent findings of fact and acquitted the accused as the evidence was merely circumstantial and not conclusive. In 15 Cr. L. J. 721 (Oudh) an order under s. 120 was set aside, as the matter had been before only one Court below.

(v) *Wrong construction of document*—The Chief Court of Punjab in 12 P. R. 1905 laid down that in revision, it would not ordinarily go behind the findings of the Lower Courts, but where the findings upon the facts are inadequate, and the construction of a document on which the question of guilt or innocence largely depends, erroneous, it has power to go fully into the facts. The Ruling in 12 W. R. 47 proceeded on a rather narrow view of the extent of the powers in revision. See also 1907 P. W. R. 20 = 6 Cr. L. J. 263; 13 P. W. R. 1909 = 11 Cr. L. J. 97. The High Court can also interfere in revision, where there appear mis-reading of the documentary evidence and fundamental errors in principle, which vitiate the conduct and disposal of the case, 25 B. 479.

(vi) *Where Courts have been misled by irrelevant matter*—The power to go into the evidence is not limited, however, to a consideration of whether there was evidence to justify the finding of the Lower Court. If

Sup. Vol. 443.

(vii) *When investigation has been defective*—A defective investigation was held to constitute such material error, as would justify the High Court in setting aside a conviction, *Weir II, 570*; 12 B. 377.

(viii) *Wrong exclusion of question to a witness*—A party asking for redress at the hands of an Appellate or Revisional Court on the ground that the Court below has wrongly excluded a question which the party wished to put to a witness, must state the form and substance of the question proposed to be put, to enable the Appellate or Revisional Court, as the case may be, to determine whether the particular question in each case was so framed as to make it admissible under the *Evidence Act*, 9 Bom. L. R. 1335 = 7 Cr. L. J. 24. See also 9 Bom. L. R. 706 = 6 Cr. L. J. 70.

19. High Court will interfere where Lower Court has abused or misused its discretionary powers.—

(1) This section does not debar the High Court from interfering, where in cases which require the exercise of discretion it appears upon the face of the proceedings that the Magistrate has exercised no discretion at all, or has exercised his discretion in a manner wholly unreasonable, 2 C. 110, *e.g.*, where a Magistrate declines to act on a complaint, 13 C. W. N. 103 or rejects sureties on private information without notice to them, 14 C. W. N. 138 or rejects them on unreasonable grounds, 35 C. 400; 14 C. W. N. 99; 37 C. 91. Thus, where an Appellate Court dismisses an appeal, and its order betrays little or no indication that it has examined the evidence or brought an independent judgment to bear on the main points, it becomes necessary to examine the case in greater detail than would ordinarily be justified, 16 P. W. R. 1907 = 6 Cr. L. J. 137; 13 C. W. N. 192 and 14 C. W. N. 23. See also 25 M. 61; 24 A. 254 and 2 P. R. 1903. Although ordinarily the High Court does not go into evidence when exercising its power of revision yet it will do so when necessary in any particular case, for instance, to ascertain whether a re-hearing should be directed, 4 C. L. J. 232. In 10 C. W. N. 446 = 3 Cr. L. J. 385, an application was made to the High Court to set aside an order of the Sessions Judge summarily dismissing an appeal. The High Court went into the evidence and

3 To attend on to accompany with ceremony
or respect {Ofs and rare}

4 To sit up, or watch with at night, as a dead
body
Wake, n 1 Act of waking or being awakened " Rise

3 A ridge or streak rising above the surface of
cloth, &c, hence, the texture of cloth
That's rougher for
And of a coarser work

One who watches a watchman {Ofs}

Walk a n the was a general
Be rather geyll ee
The pfrald much

Scas. & Pl

His tongue d-d walk
In foul speech

finding the evidence insufficient to sustain a conviction, instead of remanding the case for a re-hearing of the appeal on the merits, set aside the conviction and sentence and acquitted and discharged the accused. Where, however, the Legislature by an express enactment [s. 645 of the *Calcutta Municipal Act III* of 1899 (B.C.)] has vested a discretion in the General Committee the High Court under this section has no power to set aside or question acts done in the exercise of that discretion, if those acts have otherwise been done in accordance with the provisions of law, 34 C. 30.

(ii) *Withholding witness from examination*—Where a Sessions Judge did not allow a Police Inspector to be examined for the defence, and the accused was thereby prejudiced, and where the evidence taken by a Magistrate was admitted without the prisoner having an opportunity of examining an admittedly important witness, the High Court quashed the conviction and ordered a new trial, 34 W. R. 18.

20. *High Court will interfere when Lower Court refers to matters not on record*—An Appellate Court is in error if it relies upon document and evidence not forming part of the proceedings before the Magistrate, 5 Cr. L. J. 251 = 6 Cr. L. J. 357 referred to, but the High Court will not set aside the order if it is satisfied on a consideration of the case that the order is right, 8 M. L. T. 81 = 11 Cr. L. J. 221. Where a Magistrate based his decision not upon the evidence recorded, but upon unrecorded evidence taken verbally subsequently on the spot, the High Court quashed the conviction as it was impossible for the latter evidence to be seen in appeal, 24 W. R. 14, also 5 C. 184; 18 P. W. R. 1909 = 11 Cr. L. J. 110; 14 C. W. N. 99. See Note 15

III.—PRELIMINARY CONDITIONS FOR EXERCISE OF REVISIONAL POWERS.

21. *High Court will not interfere in revision, unless other legal remedies are exhausted.*—The High Court, in the exercise of its powers of extraordinary jurisdiction cannot, in criminal matters, interfere, unless all other remedies provided by law have been previously exhausted. Therefore, where parties who had been convicted of not by a Magistrate, and who having a right of appeal to the Sessions Court instead of doing so, move the High Court under s. 15 of the *Charter Act*, the Court would not interfere until that remedy had been resorted to, 3 C. 573; 2 A. 276, unless some illegality is shown in the proceedings of the convicting Court, 2 Bom. L. R. 334. Thus, where a Sub-Divisional Magistrate passed an order for taking security to keep the peace, the High Court declined to consider the merits of an application when the applicant had not applied to the District Magistrate under s. 125 for cancellation of the bond. Where the law provides a direct remedy, the High Court will not interfere in revision till such remedy has been availed of, 1905 A. W. N. 143. 2 Cr. L. J. 335; Ratanlal 826 and 977; 35 B. 253. See also 15 P. W. R. 1914 = 15 Cr. L. J. 279. 43 A. 497.

22. *Generally no revision where appeal lies.*—Sub-sec. (5) embodies the principle that the High Court, as a Court of Revision, will not interfere in the case of persons who could have appealed to the proper Court, but who have not done so, 3 C. 573; 1 C. L. R. 352; 2 A. 276; 1904 P. L. R. 1; 2 P. W. R. 1912; 35 B. 532. No doubt the High Court can interfere of its own motion as in cases where a person affected is debarred from moving it under s. 439 (5), but when the Court has not acted of its own motion in calling for the proceedings under s. 435, but at the instance of the applicant it would be a pure quibble to say that in spite of the provisions of s. 439 (5) the Court could do what the applicant wants of its own motion. This would be a mere evasion of the statute which the Court cannot permit 8 S. L. R. 229 = 10 Cr. L. J. 232. In 5 L. B. R. 129 = 11 Cr. L. J. 152, it was held the High Court will not in revision set aside the conviction of a person who has been released under s. 562 as it is open to such person to prefer an appeal under s. 480 against the conviction. If others, who were co-accused were acquitted on appeal, the proper course for those who have not appealed, would be to move the Local Government for the exercise of the prerogative of mercy under s. 401. Anyway, no Appellate Court other than the High Court, can on the appeal of one prisoner, alter the sentence of another prisoner in the same case, who has not appealed. The High Court alone, may, acting on revision, set aside such a sentence *Weir II*, 570; 19 W. R. 57. The High Court has this power, subject to s. 431, even where the accused is dead, 2 B. 564. The rule in 3 C. 573 is applied even to cases of acquittal by a Subordinate Magistrate. If the Local Government does not appeal under s. 417, or the District Magistrate does not move the Local Government to appeal, the High Court will not as a general rule entertain a reference direct from the District Magistrate under s. 438 and interfere under this section, 1903 A. W. N. 89; 33 M. 1025. See *contra* 1904 L. B. R. 209, where it was held by the Chief Court of Lower Burma, that sub-sec. (5) of this section is no bar to dealing in revision with a case reported under s. 433 by the Sessions Judge or District Magistrate of his own motion and not on the application of the accused, who could have appealed but did not do so. In Allahabad, it seems to be the practice for the High Court to act as a Court of Revision on an official communication from Government regarding a judicial matter, 1337 A. W. N. 144; 2 A. 522. Order dismissing a case for want of jurisdiction is open to revision as the order does not amount to one of acquittal against which an appeal could lie under s. 417, 9 A. L. J. 51 = 13 Cr. L. J. 169; 44 M. L. J. 366

23. Usually High Court will not interfere where there exists Court of concurrent revisional jurisdiction.—The High Court will not entertain an application for revision in cases where the District Court or Magistrate has concurrent revisional jurisdiction with the High Court, save on some special ground shown, unless a previous application shall have been made to the Lower Court, but in cases in which concurrent jurisdiction, is not possessed by the Lower Courts, no such general rule exists, 14 C. 837; 1890 A. W. N. 181; 1899 A. W. N. 132; 1897 A. W. N. 105, 14 B. 331. It is not the practice of the High Court to entertain an application for revision on the criminal side, where there exists a Lower Court having concurrent revisional jurisdiction, unless a similar application has first been presented to the Lower Court and has been rejected. 1905 A. W. N. 232; 1887 A. W. N. 105; Ratanlal 499; 30 A. 116; 1905 A. W. N. 279; 1890 A. W. N. 154; 23 A. 263; 1904 A. W. N. 233. The High Court will interfere only as a Court of last resort, 17 C. P. L. R. 107 = 1 Cr. L. J. 764. This principle has been extended to cases where the Judge can refer the case to the High Court, but cannot pass a final order himself, 36 C. 643. But in 16 Cr. L. J. 794 (M.), it was held that the jurisdiction conferred on the High Court is wide and ought not to be fettered by any hard and fast rule and all that is laid down by 36 C. 643 and 30 A. 116 is that the High Court will not *ordinarily* interfere except on special grounds 43 C. 534, 17 A. L. J. 800.

23-A. High Court will not interfere when the applicant is in contempt.—An accused person against whom a proclamation has been issued until he has come in and surrendered, must be regarded as in contempt, and in 2 N. W. P. 441 (F.B.) the High Court refused to entertain an application from an absconding accused until they were informed that he had surrendered himself.

24 Delay in applying to High Court in revision.—Though the objection taken in an application for revision be valid yet if it be made with very great delay, *e.g.*, nine months after the order of the Lower Court, the High Court will not interfere, 8 A. 514. If there is long delay in applying for revision unexplained by the applicant the High Court will exercise its discretion against interference in revision 27 A. 463; 1893 A. W. N. 65, 13 A. 203; 1907 A. W. N. 204 = 6 Cr. L. J. 153; 19 W. R. 39; 6 A. 434; 31 P. R. 1890; 1856 A. W. N. 83. By rules of the Court of the Judicial Commissioner of Sind, revision applications are not admitted unless presented within sixty days and the rule indicates that the High Court will not interfere in the case of a belated application, 5 B. L. R. 265 = 13 Cr. L. J. 531. In Bombay a Criminal Revision petition must be filed within sixty days, exclusive of the time taken for obtaining copies of judgment. In 8 B. L. R. 21 = 15 Cr. L. J. 662 refused to interfere with an order under s. 195 as no appeal had been preferred and the application was made at a late stage of the proceedings. See Bom. H. C. Rules, Appellate side, Ch. IV, R. 17 (2), (3).

25. Application by Government for revision—Delay.—It is not an inflexible rule that where either the Government on the one side or an accused on the other has a right of appeal but now (see *contra* sub-sec. 5) and does not exercise it, the powers of the High Court under this section cannot be exercised but in such cases, these powers should be sparingly used and, save in very exceptional circumstances, not at all in reference to questions of fact. Where an application was made by the Local Government for revision of an order of acquittal nearly ten months after a Sessions' trial and upwards of twelve months after the commission of the alleged crime, and where there was upon the face of the Judge's judgment, no error in law, and no appeal had been preferred upon a question of fact, *held* that under such circumstances the Court did not feel called upon to enter into the case at large, upon the merits, under a petition of revision 6 A. 534. See the remarks of STRAIGHT, J.

IV.—HOW POWERS OF HIGH COURT INVOKED—PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE.

26. Manner in which exercise of revisional powers is invoked immaterial.—The Court should act whenever it is desirable without regard to the way in which the information reached it, 4 S. L. R. 86 = 11 Cr. L. J. 593.

High Court may exercise its powers of revision upon information in whatever way received e.g.—Though the section gives the High Court power to call for cases not only judicial information but also to deal with a case "which otherwise comes to its knowledge," yet in most circumstances it is a right practice that Judges should be moved in open Court, Ratanlal 577; 2 B. 568; 16 B. 530 at p. 532. See also Note 4 to s. 493 and Note 81. See Resolution in the Fuller Case, Government of India Gazette 1887, p. 311.

(i) *Petition of complainant*.—Upon the petition of a private person occupying the position of a complainant, 2 M. 38, 1 A. 139; 24 W. R. 60; 2 A. 449; 24 A. 346; 2 S. L. R. 25 = 10 Cr. L. J. 237.

(ii) *High Court may act suo motu*.—The High Court has power *suo motu* to quash a conviction under s. 562 even though the convicts have not moved the High Court, 7 P. W. R. 1912 = 67. P. L. R. 1912 = 13 Cr. L. J. 476. The High Court may and frequently does exercise its power of revision, *ex mero motu*, 2 B. 564.

(iii) *Revisional powers may be put in force on credible information*—The powers conferred by this section are at all times to be exercised and they may be put in force not merely on matters coming before the Judge in Court, but also on matters coming to his knowledge on reliable information, *Wells II, 533*. The information upon which any of the authorities specified in this section might act may be of any character. But the proper course for the Government or a private party is to proceed by petition in open Court. Publicity is thus secured and a fuller hearing of the reason which move the Government in the interests of public order, or a private party in this own, *16 B. 580 at p. 582; 2 M. 38*.

(iv) *High Court may act on an official communication from Government to the Registrar*—See *1887 A. W. N. 144; 2 A. 522*.

(v) *High Court's revisional powers not affected by want of jurisdiction of the referring authority*—When a Sessions Judge, on appeal makes an order, and subsequently on discovering that the order was erroneous, reports the matter to the High Court, the reference is properly before the High Court, no matter whether the Sessions Judge had power to hear the appeal or not, *9 C. W. N. 549 = 2 Cr. L. J. 259*. The fact that the reference is improper need not necessarily prevent the High Court from exercising its powers of revision under s. 439, *Ratanlal 552; 14 W. R. 25*. In *14 A. L. J. 156* the High Court set aside an order alleged to be under s. 145 on a reference by the Sessions Judge though they were of opinion that the Sessions Judge should not have called for the records under s. 435.

(vi) *In case of inadequate sentence, District Magistrate may inform the High Court direct*—See Note 81. In *1 B. L. R. 40 = 8 Cr. L. J. 161*, the High Court refused to entertain a reference from the District Magistrate under s. 433 or a revision application by the Public Prosecutor under instructions from the District Magistrate which had for its object the enhancement of a sentence reduced by the Sessions Judge.

27. Does the issue of a rule open up the whole case?—Ordinarily the High Court will not hear the applicant on a point outside the rule, *6 C. W. N. 593; 33 C. 1237, 35 C. 133*; nor the opposite party. In *31 C. 710*, a rule had been granted at the instance of the accused to show cause why an order for a re-trial should not be set aside. Then the Crown for the first time came forward with the objection that there had been a misjoinder of charges at the first trial and therefore the conviction should be set aside and a re-trial ordered. *Held*, the objection for the Crown could not prevail. But the Court is not necessarily confined to the four corners of the rule either as to the points which it will consider or the form of its final order, *23 C. 347; 2 C. W. N. 81*. If one good point of law is made out, records may be called for and the petitioner is entitled to argue at the hearing such other points of law and procedure as may be raised by the petition, *7 B. 126*. A party may raise at the hearing a new point of law, though not mentioned in the rule, if the Judges granting the rule have directed that it will be considered at the hearing, *11 C. W. N. 567 = 5 Cr. L. J. 278*.

28. The form in which rule is issued does not fetter discretion of Bench hearing it.—Although rules to show cause are frequently granted on particular grounds the form of any rule granted would ordinarily be such as to leave the action which the Court should take in case the conviction is set aside to the discretion of the Court which hears the rule. Where a rule was granted to show cause why the conviction should not be set aside and the case sent back for re-trial and it came on for hearing before a Bench other than that which had granted it, *held*, that the terms of the rule did not prevent the Bench hearing it, from discharging the accused, *23 C. 347, 2 C. W. N. 81; 27 C. 820*.

29. Proper functionary entitled to show cause—If a rule is granted against the order of a Sessions Judge, he is the proper person to show cause, *7 C. W. N. 80*. Where a Magistrate wishes to show cause, he should instruct the Public Prosecutor, but should not address the Registrar of the High Court by letter, *4 C. 20 = 3 C. L. R. 93*. In showing cause it is not open to the trying Magistrate to submit observations with a view to supplement or add to his judgment. He may, however, submit his remarks in answer to the grounds urged by the petitioner for revision, *7 C. W. N. 839*. Where a rule is issued upon the Magistrate to show cause and the order sought to be set aside is one, for instance under s. 107, that is only intended to secure the peace of the district by binding down the petitioner, the Magistrate is the only person entitled to be heard. Any other party interested in the result of the order cannot appear, *25 C. 798*. The same principle was observed where an application was made to revoke sanction granted, *31 C. 811*. A Munsiff must show cause by counsel and not like a District Magistrate, *6 C. L. J. 713*.

30. Notice must go to accused—See sub-sec. (2) and Notes 83. A High Court may by virtue of s. 427 order the arrest of the accused without previous notice to him under sub-sec. (2) as a warrant of arrest is not an order to the prejudice of the accused within the meaning of that sub-section, *16 Cr. L. J. 870*.

31. It is optional with Court to hear parties or pleaders.—See s. 440 and Notes thereto

32. Can order made on default of appearance be restored?—A rule which had been discharged for the non appearance of the vakil for the petitioner, can be restored at any time before the order for the discharge had been drawn up, signed and sealed, 7 C. W. N. 7. An order dismissing an application for default of appearance is not a judgment and such an order may be set aside and the application may be heard and disposed of on the merits, 10 C. L. J. 80 = 10 Cr. L. J. 287. See also Note 2 to s. 430 and Note 11 to s. 369, but see Notes 7 and 7 A

32-A. After dismissal of petition, another petition on same matter cannot be entertained.—The decision in 23 M. L. J. 371 = 12 M. L. T. 350 = 13 Cr. L. J. 710 shows that the High Court has no power to restore a petition once dismissed for default. It is argued that that decision does not preclude the filing of a fresh petition for the same relief. Although the principle of *res judicata* is not applicable to criminal cases yet on grounds of justice and equity, Courts should discourage the agitation of the same matter once again before another Judge. If the dismissed petition cannot be restored, there is stronger ground for holding that a new petition will not lie. 1915 M. W. N. 786 = 16 Cr. L. J. 697 = 44 M. L. J. 27.

33. Abatement of revision application.—An application for revision must, by analogy to s. 431, abate on the death of the applicant, 6 P. R. 1893. But as s. 431 has been subsequently amended by the insertion of the words "except an appeal from a sentence of fine" a revision application against a sentence of fine does not abate and the principle applies to a case in which a compensation has been awarded under s. 250, 24 P. R. 1908 = 9 Cr. L. J. 103, 2 B. 564. See 16 Cr. L. J. 713 (M.) where it was held, that there can be no abatement of a criminal case on the death of the complainant.

Y.—POWERS OF HIGH COURT TO DEAL WITH PROCEEDINGS NOT EXPRESSLY CRIMINAL.

(34), (35), (36), (37), (38).—It should be noted that by the omission of sub-sec. (3) from s. 435 orders under ss. 143, 144 and proceedings under Chapter XII and s. 176 have now become proceedings liable to be revised under s. 439 and therefore the High Court can call for record of such proceedings under powers conferred by s. 439.

It should also be noted that orders under s. 176, *see*, inquest proceedings are now liable to be revised. It is needless to refer to the various cases that have become now obsolete in view of the omission of sub-sec. (3) of s. 435.

39. Orders under the Reformatory Schools Act, 1897.—See Notes 1—6 to s. 16 of the Act in Appendix IV

40. Orders for security or forfeiture under the Press Act, 1910.—An order under s. 8 of the Press Act I of 1910 for the deposit of security by the publisher of a newspaper is not revisable by the High Court, 17 C. W. N. 1245. Nor can the High Court question the legality of a forfeiture under s. 22 of that Act, 18 C. W. N. 1 = 14 Cr. L. J. 497.

41. Orders under the Extradition Act.—The High Court has no power to interfere in respect of a warrant issued by a Political Agent of a Native State under s. 7 of Act XV of 1903 in respect of an offence included in the first schedule, 36 P. W. R. 1908 = 3 P. R. 1909 = 9 Cr. L. J. 3, 43 C. 793. If an order purporting to be passed under this Act by a Magistrate is illegal, the High Court will interfere, 14 Cr. L. J. 673 (C.)

41-A. Orders under s. 161 (2), Bombay District Municipal Act.—High Court has power to revise such an order 21 Bom. L. R. 755.

41-B. Power to interfere with order passed under para. 1, s. 2 of the Workmen's Breach of Contract Act XIII of 1859.—The High Court has power, under ss. 435 and 439 of the Code to revise an order passed by a Magistrate directing either return of the advance or specific performance of the contract under para. 1 of s. 2 of the Workmen's Breach of Contract Act, 43 B. 607.

41-C. Demolition order passed by a Municipal Magistrate appointed under s. 531 of the Calcutta Municipal Act is subject to revision.—Wherein it is further held, that the Municipal Magistrate appointed under section 531 of the Calcutta Municipal Act of 1923 is a Court of inferior criminal jurisdiction within section 6 of the Code and orders of demolition passed by such Magistrate are subject to the revision by the High Court under sections 435 and 439 of the Code, 29 C. W. N. 898

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41-D Order by a District Magistrate to remove obstruction from a Municipal road under Bengal Municipal Act, ss 176, 178 and 202.—A proceeding under s. 202 of the Bengal Municipal Act is a judicial proceeding and the High Court has power to revise an order made thereunder, 52 C. 670.

VI.—GENERAL POWERS OF HIGH COURT IN REVISION.

42 High Court competent to interfere at any stage of case even without the record—The High Court has jurisdiction to take cognizance of and revise the proceedings of a Magistrate while they are in an interlocutory state of pending investigation, and may suspend such proceedings without having the record before it, it may also in such a case order bail to be taken from the person accused. If the Court were altogether unable to take such a step without having the record before it, the non-existence or non-production of a record could really effect a nullification of the High Court's powers of revision in some cases which by their nature would be cases in which it was most necessary that this power should be exercised, but the High Court ought not, except in extreme cases, to interfere with a Magistrate until it has the record before it, 20 W. R. 23 = 11 B. L. R. Ap. 8. A Court of Revision should be most reluctant to interfere in a pending case, but such interference is justified and necessary in order to prevent a clear abuse of the right of resort to a Criminal Court. Whereupon the admitted facts there is no justification for the charge against the accused he should not be left for a moment longer than is necessary in the position of a person accused of an offence and forced to defend himself against a charge for which there is no legal evidence to establish, 8 B. L. R. 143 = 16 Cr. L. J. 141 *follow.* 26 C. 786. See also 23 M. L. J. 505 = 16 Cr. L. J. 477. See 23 C. W. N. 23 where the Calcutta High Court interfered with magisterial proceedings in the preliminary stage under sections 107 or 110.

(i) *May direct that complaint should be dismissed and further proceedings stayed*—The High Court is competent to direct that a complaint should be at once dismissed as disclosing no criminal offence, 10 P. W. R. 1913 = 33 P. L. R. 1913 = 14 Cr. L. J. 128. When a man has been once tried and acquitted, and subsequent proceedings are taken against him, though as a matter of law the accused might not be entitled to the benefit of s. 403, yet where the circumstances are such that it is inexpedient that further proceedings should be taken, the High Court, acting under this section, may stop such further proceedings, 1905 A. W. N. 233 = 2 A. L. J. 673. Similarly, where a Magistrate overruled an objection that the prosecution was barred by limitation specially applicable to the case, his order was set aside on revision, 20 B. 543. See also 22 C. 131; 1 P. W. R. 1903 = 36 P. L. R. 1909 = 9 Cr. L. J. 151; 3 P. W. R. 1909 = 9 Cr. L. J. 154; 23 M. L. J. 505 = 16 Cr. L. J. 477, where the High Court interfered and stayed an illegal prosecution. But see 1 L. B. 2 Pat. 257, which holds that s. 439 of the Code does not authorize the High Court to direct a Subordinate Court to refrain from trying an accused person against whom such Court has issued process 2 Pat. 257.

(ii) *May interfere with interlocutory proceedings*—Very wide powers of revision were intended to be conferred on the High Court under s. 429 and it is with particular reference to non-appealable orders that the High Courts were empowered to act as Court of Revision. The High Court is competent at any stage of a case to interfere in order to exercise its powers of revision, 33 C. 63. Where, therefore, proceedings were instituted against a person under s. 110 for the third time, though on both the previous occasions he was acquitted and there was no fresh evidence and the original order was also defective, the Chief Court on the application of the accused quashed the proceedings at once, 33 P. R. 1910, 17 P. W. R. 1910 = 11 Cr. L. J. 337 (where 45 P. R. 1885 was distinguished 27 C. 126 was dissented from and 25 C. 233, 26 C. 786, 22 C. 131, 1899 A. W. N. 212, 23 B. 533 and 8 P. R. 1904 followed). There can be little doubt that though the power has to be exercised with great care, the High Court has jurisdiction to interfere at any stage of the proceedings, if it considers that in the interests of justice it should do so, no hard and fast rule can be laid down as regards the class of cases in which the High Court will interfere, 23 M. L. J. 505 = 17 M. L. T. 398 = 16 Cr. L. J. 477. Where the notice and interlocutory order passed under s. 112 were defective and could not form the basis of a proceeding under s. 110, the Chief Court set aside the proceedings so far taken by the Magistrate, he being at liberty to take fresh action under Chapter VIII, 18 P. W. R. 1910 = 11 Cr. L. J. 333. The High Court has jurisdiction to take cognizance and revise the proceedings of a Magistrate while they are in an interlocutory stage pending investigation, and may suspend such proceedings without having the record before it, 20 W. R. 23; 22 C. 131. It may also order bail to be taken from the person accused, 21 B. 543. But it will not interfere with interlocutory proceedings unless the case is of an exceptional nature. Sections 423 and 435 read with this section invest the High Court with power to be exercised whenever the Court thinks fit to correct errors in procedure, committed by Subordinate Criminal Courts, before the final order of acquittal or conviction is passed by such Subordinate Court 257 P. L. R. 1904; 10 A. L. J. 141 = 13 Cr. L. J. 413. In 23 M. L. J. 505 = 16 Cr. L. J. 477, the High Court set aside a charge on the ground that injury was likely to be caused by a vexatious and protracted trial. The words "any proceeding" at the commencement of the section make this clear. The

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Court can, therefore, pending trial, interfere with the interlocutory order of a Magistrate, refusing to summon certain witnesses for the defence, 130 P. L. R. 1901; 2 S. L. R. 25 = 10 Cr. L. J. 237. See *contra* 45 P. R. 1885. When a Subordinate Court improperly declines to record any evidence tendered, the High Court will interfere in any stage, 237 P. L. R. 1904; or if the Magistrate improperly declines to allow the cross-examination of prosecution witnesses, see Note 11 at P. 593 10 A. L. J. 144 = 13 Cr. L. J. 443. In 1 P. W. R. 1909 = 9 Cr. L. J. 151, the Chief Court interfere in a pending criminal case and directed that the name of one of the accused should be struck out of the complaint and that no further proceedings be taken against him. Where proceedings are initiated upon the complaint of an unauthorized person they are *ultra vires* and liable to be set aside at any time during the pendency of the case. An order refusing to examine a pardanashin woman on commission was set aside, 11 P. W. R. 1913 = 14 Cr. L. J. 3. The High Court has power to set aside an order of a Magistrate refusing to order the production of property alleged to be the proceeds of an offence under inquiry, 19 C. 52. The High Court has power to interfere with the order of a Magistrate charging the accused with an offence although no appeal lies in respect of the order. When once a Civil Court has adjudicated upon questions of right, save in exceptional cases, a Criminal Court ought not to go behind the finding of the Civil Court, 33 P. R. 1910 = 12 Cr. L. J. 50. When the High Court has stayed proceedings, the Magistrate is bound to stop the inquiry or trial, when credible information such as a letter or telegram from Counsel retained in the case, is shown to him, 2 C. W. N. 498; 5 C. W. N. 110, 19 M. 375. See 8 S. L. R. 238 = 16 Cr. L. J. 255, where the High Court set aside interlocutory order of a Magistrate refusing to let in evidence. See also 40 C. 54. In 14 A. L. J. 851, the High Court set aside an order calling upon a witness in a pending case to show cause why he should not be prosecuted for perjury. But see 20 M. L. T. 252; 16 A. L. J. 458 and 734; 23 A. L. J. 21; 47 M. L. J. 373.

(iii) *It is only in exceptional instances that the High Court will interfere in a pending case.*—It is only in very exceptional instances that the High Court will interfere in revision with the action of a Subordinate Court in respect of any pending case, and especially when such case has reached the stage when a charge has been drawn up and only the defence of the accused remains to be heard. No heard and fast rule can be laid down on the subject, but the interference of the High Court will be regulated by the particular circumstance of each case. But generally speaking, it seems inadvisable to interfere in a pending case, unless there is some manifest and patent injustice apparent on the face of the proceedings and calling for prompt redress. Where, therefore, neither the complaint nor the evidence for the prosecution made out any case against a person, the High Court quashed the proceedings against him, holding that it was most unfair to him that he should be called upon to rebut a charge which, upon the evidence was baseless, in so far as it affected him, 26 C. 786 *concurrent* in 1899 A. W. N. 212. No heard and fast rule can be laid down on this subject since it is impossible as well as undesirable to do so. But one safe practicable test would be this *viz.*, that a *bare statement of the facts of the case without any elaborate argument* should be sufficient to convince the High Court that it is a fit one for its interference at an intermediate stage, 25 C. 233 *followed* in 2 S. L. R. 25 = 10 Cr. L. J. 237. The High Court will interfere with interlocutory orders only under exceptional circumstances, 25 C. 233; 1 S. L. R. 30 = 9 Cr. L. J. 270.

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See also 3 P. W. R.

L. J. 373, 47 M. 722.

43. *Competent for High Court to direct further inquiry in cases of dismissal or discharge.*—(i) *By Mafussil Magistrates in the exercise of the original jurisdiction.*—See Note 4 to s. 436. The High Court has power under this section if it considers that an accused person has been improperly discharged, to order him to be committed for trial. 19 W. R. 56; 24 W. R. 23, 6 A. 40. See also 9 A. 52; 15 A. 203 which *dissent* from 8 A. 14, 27 C. 172; 16 B. 530 *followed* in 23 C. 350. The power is so clear from the terms of this section that s. 447 cannot be taken to limit it to Mafussil cases only. The High Court is empowered to exercise any of the powers conferred on a Court of Appeal by certain preceding sections including s. 423. It may set aside an order or discharge passed by a Presidency Magistrate and direct that the accused be arrested and forthwith committed for trial. This is one of the powers conferred by s. 423 and it is not necessary to exercise this power, that the Court should actually be hearing an appeal from acquittal. The section lays down that the High Court may exercise the same powers in revision, in any proceeding whatever, as it could have exercised in hearing an appeal from acquittal. It was the intention of the Legislature in framing this section to make its terms sufficiently wide and comprehensive to cover all cases not included in s. 436, 27 B. 84 which *approves* and *follows* 6 A. 40; 15 C. 609; 28 C. 746. The High Court has under ss. 435 and 439 all the powers of an Appellate Court which include a power to direct a re-trial or commitment, *a fortiori* it has power to set aside

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the order of a discharge, 36 C. 994 dissenting from 27 C. 126; 6 C. L. J. 705 and 33 C. 1232, where it was laid down that when a Presidency Magistrate dismisses a complaint the remedy is not either under s. 437 or this section, but under s. 15 of the *Charter Act*, though the question of the propriety or impropriety of the order does not strictly come within the authority vested by s. 15 of the *Charter Act*. See Note 5 to s. 436. High Court will not scrutinize orders of discharge if upon their face they bear token of careful consideration. The very language of this section shows that the object of the Legislature was to secure the setting right of a patent error or defect and not to give the High Court a roving commission either in the direction of stamping with approval the proceedings of a Lower Court, or in the direction of questioning about and looking to see if, possibly under a fair record, there lies some trace of possible error. In the absence of some well founded suspicion, it is inexpedient to scrutinize orders of discharge or other orders which upon the face of them bear token of careful consideration and appear good and lawful.—*Per KNOX, J.*, 1899 A. W. N. 135; 8 P. R. 1909 = 10 Cr. L. J. 314.

(ii) *Presidency Magistrate*.—See 36 C. 994; 27 B. 84; 14 M. L. T. 200 = 14 Cr. L. J. 529. The High Court has under ss. 439 and 423 all the powers of an Appellate Court which include a power to direct a re-trial or commitment, *a fortiori* it has the power to set aside the order of discharge and it is not necessary to have recourse to s. 15 of the *Charter Act* for the power of the High Court to revise the proceedings of Presidency Magistrate. See Note 5 to s. 436.

44. *High Court can in revision exercise all powers of Court of Appeal*.—The nature of the powers that the High Court has in revision is the same as that which a Court of Appeal has in the case of an appeal from any order against which an appeal is provided by the Codes, as in cases coming within ss. 405, 406, 14 M. L. T. 200 = 14 Cr. L. J. 529. Of all the Courts of Revision, the High Court alone has all the powers of an Appellate Court specified in s. 423, 20 C. 633; 23 M. 225, including the power to direct evidence to be taken which is not given to the Sessions Judge or the District Magistrate under s. 437, 11 C. W. N. 275 = 6 C. L. J. 251 = 6 Cr. L. J. 357; and in addition, it has the power of enhancing sentence, which no Appellate Court has. The only limitation is that specified in sub-sec. (4) of this section. See also 36 C. 994. In cases in which the law allows no appeal, the High Court will not, in revision, except on very exceptional grounds, exercise the powers of an Appellate Court, but where such exceptional grounds exist, as where the conviction is not in any degree supported by the evidence, 8 B. 197; 14 B. 115, at p. 118; *Ratanlal* 245; 2 C. W. N. 81; 14 B. 331, or it is in the interests of justice, 10 C. 1047; 18 W. R. 7, or where the inquiry in the Lower Court is faulty, 12 B. 377, or when the conviction rests on the testimony of accomplices, 14 B. 331; the High Court will, in the exercise of its revisional powers, deal with the evidence itself, *Ratanlal* 908. See 19 W. R. 30 = 10 B. L. R. 235; 14 C. 169; 15 C. 608 at p. 618. The High Court can set aside an acquittal and order a retrial or commitment, 7 C. W. N. 521.

45. *May quash commitments whether made under s. 436*.—It can quash a commitment made under s. 436 by a Sessions Judge or District Magistrate, on points of law as well as of facts 12 C. W. N. 117 = 6 C. L. J. 760; 30 M. 224. S. 215 is not a bar to such interference, 7 C. W. N. 327, but the High Court cannot revise an order made by itself directing a commitment under s. 526 (1) (*sup*), 27 M. 54. See Note 15 to s. 436 and Note 2 to s. 215. Though the High Court has power under this section to consider whether or not a Sessions Judge has exercised a proper judicial discretion under s. 436, in setting aside a Magistrate's order of discharge, and for this purpose, the High Court may consider the facts as well as the questions of law involved, yet it will only exercise this power where it is manifest that the Sessions Judge's order is improper, *e.g.* where there is no evidence to prove the offence charged, or where it is clear that the Court would not act on the evidence, 30 M. 224, where 7 C. W. N. 227; 14 M. 334 and 15 C. 621 are referred to.

But in 1 Rang. 526 it is held, that the High Court has no concern with the question of the credibility of the evidence, when there is in fact some evidence on the committal record which would justify the Sessions Judge in leaving the question of guilt or innocence to the jury. Credibility of the evidence is no question of law.

46. *May consider the propriety of and revise any sentence*.—The infliction of an inadequate punishment is undoubtedly an impropriety which the jurisdiction in revision is intended to remedy. *Per JARDINE, J.*, 16 B. 580; 15 W. R. 83, decided under the 1861 Code, is no longer law. Where, therefore, in the absence of clear evidence of the damage done, the Magistrate passed the maximum sentence, the High Court reduced the same, 2 Bom. L. R. 335. The High Court can interfere wherever it finds the Court below, in passing sentence, has failed to exercise a sound judicial discretion, 2 C. 110.

Whipping.—See the *Whipping Act*, Appx. and ss. 391–395. Where a sentence of whipping has been carried out, no other punishment can be awarded even if sentence is inadequate, 15 Cr. L. J. 538 (*Bar*).

47. Competent to deal with order against accused not before the Court while dealing with case of his co-accused—

(i) *While dealing with appeal of co-accused may deal with conviction of accused not appealing*—When out of two accused convicted and sentenced by a Sessions Judge, one only appealed and his conviction was set

W. R. 1909 = 11 Cr. L. J. 99; 12 Cr. L. J. 250 (Bar.), 7 P. W. R. 1916.

(ii) *May deal with conviction of accused not applying, while dealing with application for revision of another accused tried along with him*—In 9 P. R. 1909 = 30 P. W. R. 1909 = 11 Cr. L. J. 17, the Chief Court while setting aside the conviction on a revision petition held that it was open to the High Court under s. 439 to deal with the convictions of all the offenders who were tried together and found guilty on exactly similar facts, though only one had applied for revision. In (1911) 2 M. W. N. 170 = 12 Cr. L. J. 495, the conviction of an accused who had not applied was set aside in dealing with the application of a co-accused.

(iii) *When Appeal Court acquits some accused, High Court may in revision acquit the others who could not appeal*—Where a Magistrate tries several accused and passes appealable sentences on only some of them whom on appeal the Sessions Court acquits, the High Court may under this section revise the sentences on the others or these may be referred to the Local Government, 2 C. 110, 7 C. 447, 1933 A. W. N. 51. If the High Court in revision disagrees with the Sessions Judge, the order of acquittal might be set aside and the Sessions Judge ordered to rehear the appeal, 27 C. 320.

48. Is High Court competent to allow compounding of an offence in revision?—The High Court as a Court of Revision may give effect to the compounding of offences which the accused persons had agreed to, after the conviction was confirmed in appeal. As the Court may, in revision, remit the whole of the punishment not undergone, it may also give effect to the composition, 252 P. L. R. 1904, 32 A. 153. See 17 O. C. 92 = 15 Cr. L. J. 567, and see Note 9 to s. 345. The power conferred on the Court exercising powers of

Contra 18 C. W. N. 309 = 15 Cr. L. J. 4, the Calcutta High Court set aside the conviction under ss. 46 and 52 of the Bengal Excise Act and holding that it was a case to which ss. 236 and 237 were applicable, convicted him of an offence under s. 61 read with s. 46 cl. (a) and s. 2, cl. (12) though he was not charged with it and confirmed the sentence. But if there is no doubt as to the offence when the facts are established, ss. 236 and 237 have no application, 15 Cr. L. J. 41. But it is doubtful whether the High Court has power in revision, having regard to the last clause of this section to change a conviction under s. 379 to one under s. 295 I P C, where the Lower Court has acquitted an accused of the latter offence and convicted him of the former offence, Weir II, 577, I, 430. Where separate sentences for offences under ss. 147 and 353 I P C, for distinct offences are considered illegal, the High Court may in their stead substitute one aggregate or consolidated sentence sufficient to meet the offence of which the accused were convicted, 4 C. W. N. 243. On appeal or revision the accused person cannot be convicted of an offence of which he could not have been convicted by the Court which tried him, though it is open to the Court of Revision to alter a finding, provided the accused is not convicted of a more serious offence, 3 L. B. R. 232, where 25 A. 534 is distinguished, 27 C. 660 followed and 3 C. W. N. 367 and 653 referred to. When a prisoner is convicted by a subordinate tribunal of an offence within its jurisdiction and the evidence discloses an offence of a graver character beyond the jurisdiction of that tribunal, the High Court may quash the conviction and sentence for the minor offence and direct a trial before a tribunal having jurisdiction over the greater

49. Power to alter finding and confirm conviction.—In the exercise of its powers of revision it is open to the High Court to alter any finding and confirm a conviction and that if the evidence on the record in a case be sufficient to warrant a conviction, the Court would not be justified in setting such conviction aside, merely because the view taken of the evidence by the Lower Court is not sustainable, or some fact which ought to have been found by that Court is not found or found incorrectly, 22 C. 391. See 21 C. 827. In 19 C. W. N. 309 = 15 Cr. L. J. 4, the Calcutta High Court set aside the conviction under ss. 46 and 52 of the Bengal Excise Act and holding that it was a case to which ss. 236 and 237 were applicable, convicted him of an offence under s. 61 read with s. 46 cl. (a) and s. 2, cl. (12) though he was not charged with it and confirmed the sentence. But if there is no doubt as to the offence when the facts are established, ss. 236 and 237 have no application, 15 Cr. L. J. 41. But it is doubtful whether the High Court has power in revision, having regard to the last clause of this section to change a conviction under s. 379 to one under s. 295 I P C, where the Lower Court has acquitted an accused of the latter offence and convicted him of the former offence, Weir II, 577, I, 430. Where separate sentences for offences under ss. 147 and 353 I P C, for distinct offences are considered illegal, the High Court may in their stead substitute one aggregate or consolidated sentence sufficient to meet the offence of which the accused were convicted, 4 C. W. N. 243. On appeal or revision the accused person cannot be convicted of an offence of which he could not have been convicted by the Court which tried him, though it is open to the Court of Revision to alter a finding, provided the accused is not convicted of a more serious offence, 3 L. B. R. 232, where 25 A. 534 is distinguished, 27 C. 660 followed and 3 C. W. N. 367 and 653 referred to. When a prisoner is convicted by a subordinate tribunal of an offence within its jurisdiction and the evidence discloses an offence of a graver character beyond the jurisdiction of that tribunal, the High Court may quash the conviction and sentence for the minor offence and direct a trial before a tribunal having jurisdiction over the greater

Whether it will do so or not is a question not of law, but of expediency on the facts of the particular case, 7 M. H. C. R. Appx. Y; Weir II, 569.

50 Power to order restoration of property.—Reading s 423 (1) (d) and s 522 together, the High Court acting under this section may order restoration of property, 27 A. 415, where 25 C. 630 is *distinguished*, 36 C. 41. The High Court may in the exercise of its revisional powers pass an order under s 517 to refund the money received by false pretences, 15 Cr. L. J. 555 (Bar.). Also the High Court is competent to revise orders passed by Magistrates under s 514 or by the District Magistrate under s 515 15 P. R. 1903. Orders under s 523 are also subject to similar revision, 4 Bom. L. R. 42. In 35 B. 253, the High Court held that it had no jurisdiction to interfere with an order as to disposal of property where the party aggrieved had a right of appeal.

50-A. Limitation.—In exceptional circumstances the rule that application for revision must be made within 60 days may be departed from, 43 C. 1029.

51. Power to take fresh evidence or direct it to be taken.—The High Court may at its discretion direct fresh evidence to be taken, while acting under this section, 3 Bom. L. R. 677. A High Court may while acting in revision by virtue of s 428 call for additional evidence upon which it can itself come to a conclusion, but the High Court has no power to call for a finding or act upon it, 16 Cr. L. J. 767 (M.). But a District Magistrate or Sessions Judge acting under s 437, has no such power to take additional evidence or direct it to be taken, 6 C. L. J. 251 = 6 Cr. L. J. 357 and see Note 15 to s. 428.

52. Stay of proceedings in Criminal Court pending result of civil litigation.—In Weir II, 248 the High Court refused to issue a Mandamus where a Magistrate had in the exercise of his discretion refused to proceed with a criminal charge pending a civil action in respect of the same matter. See also Weir II, 249. If a Magistrate on a consideration of all the circumstances exercises his discretion and either stays proceedings in the criminal case pending the disposal of the civil suit or declining to do so, the High Court, as a Court of Revision will not as a general rule interfere with the exercise of such discretion, Weir II, 418. The High Court will not ordinarily stay proceedings in a Subordinate Criminal Court, merely because the same facts are being litigated in a civil suit, 31 C. 858. See also 23 C. 610; 8 C. W. N. 44; 6 C. W. N. 469; 8 C. W. N. 31; 9 C. W. N. 262; 30 M. 226; 10 C. W. N. 153 and 121; 14 C. W. N. 131; 31 M. 510; 34 C. 843; but will not do so when the lower Court thinks it expedient in the interests of justice that the trial should go on 35 C. 909; 26 B. 785; 8 S. L. R. 20 = 15 Cr. L. J. 661. In 23 C. 610 it was however laid down that ordinarily it is not desirable, if the parties to the two proceedings are substantially the same and the prosecution is but a private prosecution and the issues in the two Courts are substantially identical that both the cases should go on at one and the same time. The Magistrate might stay proceedings in his Court or the High Court might direct him to do so, if sufficient cause in that behalf, is made out. It is ordinarily a matter within the discretion of the Magistrate himself and it is doubtful whether the High Court has jurisdiction under the Code to quash pending proceedings. In all such cases the test is whether the accused would be prejudiced if the criminal proceedings are not stayed until the disposal of the suit and in this respect there is no difference between proceedings instituted in pursuance of a sanction and those instituted by a party when no such sanction is necessary, 16 Cr. L. J. 637 (M.). See also 15 Cr. L. J. 568 (M.), 8 S. L. R. 20 = 15 Cr. L. J. 661, 7 Bar. L. T. 73 = 15 Cr. L. J. 433. See also 18 B. 581 and 16 B. 729, where B. L. R. (F. B. Vol.) 426, *Igen v. Ingham* 14 Q. B. D. 316, and *Rex v. Simmon* 8 C. and P. 50 are referred to. See Notes under Heading XXIX at p. 546 and Notes under Heading IX to s. 476. See also 4, 8 and 9 F. W. R. 1916.

VII.—WHAT PROCEEDINGS UNDER THE CODE HIGH COURT MAY REVISE

53 Power of the High Court extends to 'any proceedings'.—See Notes 1 and 42.

54. Power to revise order granting bail.—The proceedings in which it has to be determined whether an accused person should be admitted to bail by a Magistrate is a judicial proceeding, and as such is cognizable by the High Court as a Court of Revision, 6 M. 63. If a Sessions Judge finding that there is no reasonable ground to believe that the accused is guilty, released him on bail under s. 497, the High Court will not interfere under this section or any other provision of law, 10 M. L. J. 411. Where DAVIES, J. seemed to be of opinion that the High Court had power to interfere under this section, if the Sessions Judge had passed an illegal order, but WHITE, C.J., doubted whether the High Court had any power at all, whether under the Code or the Charter Act, to interfere. See Note 7 to s. 497.

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55. Power to revise order refusing to grant copies.—Where a Magistrate refused to grant the accused copies of papers which were necessary for defence, the High Court, in the exercise of the powers conferred by this section, set aside the conviction. The Court remarked that the Magistrate acted contrary to law when he determined whether the documents, of which copies were required by the accused for his defence, were necessary or not, *14 W. R. 77*. In *15 C. W. N. 770*, on a Presidency Magistrate refusing to furnish copies of the notes of evidence to a party, the High Court under s. 45 of the Specific Relief Act ordered the records of the case to be brought up to the High Court and left with the Registrar, and allowed liberty to the party to take copies.

56. Interference with sanction orders under s. 195.—It should be noted that under the new Code as amended the necessity of a sanction under s. 195 is done away with. Instead of a sanction, under the recent amendments offences mentioned in s. 195 can only be taken cognizance of, upon a complaint instituted under s. 476. S. 476-B provides expressly for an appeal in cases where an application for such a complaint is either granted or refused. Therefore the question as to the revision of sanction orders under s. 195 cannot now arise.

57. Order under s. 478.—*See 15 M. 224.*

58. Power to revoke sanction granted under s. 197.—Having reference to this section, the powers of the High Court, appellate and revisional are co-extensive, and s. 195 does not confer on an Appellate Court any authority in respect of an order made by a Subordinate Court under s. 197, *26 C. 852*. *See also 1908 A. W. N. 273 = 5 A. L. J. 749 = 9 Cr. L. J. 39; 4 L. B. R. 138 = 7 Cr. L. J. 418.* High Court's power of interference in such cases is under s. 15 of the *Charter Act*.

59. Orders under s. 83.—*See Notes 19 to 21 to s. 88 and 9 P. R. 1903 = 29 P. W. R. 1903 = 8 Cr. L. J. 260.* In *23 P. L. R. 1915 = 16 Cr. L. J. 166*, it was however held following *22 C. 935* and *20 M. 88* that no revision lies against order of attachment. High Court cannot set aside sale duly made, *8 P. R. 1911 = 104 P. L. R. 1911 = 12 Cr. L. J. 142*.

59-A. Issue of warrant under s. 90 without recording of reasons.—Where accused has been let out on his own bond, a warrant under s. 90 without recording any reason as required by the section is illegal, *33 M. 1088*. *See s. 406 and notes thereon.*

60. Power to revise security proceedings under Chap. VIII.—*See s. 406 and notes thereon.*

Although the High Court seldom interferes in the preliminary stage with the discretion of the Magistrate taking action under the preventive sections, *e.g.* ss. 207 and 110 of the Code still when the materials on which such orders are based are clearly insufficient to support those orders, the High Court should interfere and quash the orders and proceedings under its revisional jurisdiction, *28 C. W. N. 23*.

61. Power to revise order passed under Chap. XI.—*See Notes under Heading XI, Chap. XI*. *See preliminary note to section 435*. Under the amended Code these orders can be revised by the High Court.

61-A. Power to revise orders under Chapter XII.—Owing to the amendment of s. 435 by the omission of clause (3) orders under Chapter XII of the Code are now proceedings within the meaning of s. 435 and therefore are revisable by the High Court. *See preliminary note to s. 435*. But it is held in *49 M. L. J. 593* that the High Court has no jurisdiction to entertain a petition for the appointment of a Receiver, pending the disposal of a criminal revision petition preferred against an order of the Lower Court passed under s. 145 of the Code.

61-B. Orders under s. 250.—*See Note 35 at p. 711*

61-C. Orders under s. 332.—The High Court is competent to revise an order under s. 332 fining an absent assessor or juror. *See Note to s. 332 at p. 846.*

62. Orders under s. 334.—The High Court may on revision set aside an order directing an accused person to pay costs of an adjournment on an application by the accused for transfer, *8 P. W. R. 1911 = 12 Cr. L. J. 274*.

62-A. Orders under s. 386.—No revision lies against order of attachment under s. 386, *23 P. L. R. 1915 = 16 Cr. L. J. 166; 22 C. 935; 20 M. 88*.

62-B. Orders under s. 437.—*See Note 14 to s. 437*

62-C. Orders under s. 471.—The passing of an order under s. 471 after an acquittal has been recorded cannot be said to alter a finding of acquittal into one of conviction. Therefore where the Court below acquitted an accused upon the ground, that he was in same but omitted to pass orders under s. 471, *Cr. P. C., held*, that the High Court had power in revision to pass an order under that section, *43 M. L. J. 72*.

63. Appellate orders under s. 435.—*See* 23 P. W. R. 1912 = 13 Cr. L. J. 567.

64. Orders in maintenance cases under s. 438.—The High Court has power under this section to set aside or modify a Magistrate's order, awarding maintenance under s. 438 or to direct further inquiry on the ground that the rate fixed by the order appears to be beyond the means of the person ordered to pay the allowance, *Weir* 11, 575. *See also* 16 M. 234; 5 B. H. C. R. Cr. Ca. 81, and Note 86 to s. 438.

65. Orders under ss. 514 and 515—Forfeiture of Bonds.—Under ss. 435 and 439 the High Court has power to revise orders passed by Magistrate under s. 514 or by the District Magistrate under s. 515. This general power is not taken away by the power given to the District Magistrate, 15 P. R. 1905 = 2 Cr. L. J. 131; 5 B. L. R. 179 = 13 Cr. L. J. 31; 159 P. L. R. 1917 (Cr.) *Mad Cr Rev Case 77 of 1907*. The cases in 3 C. 757 = 2 C. L. R. 403; 8 C. L. R. 72; 19 W. R. 1 and 2 P. R. 1883 were all decided under the Codes prior to 1882 and are obsolete. *See* Notes to s. 514 and Note 2 to s. 515.

66. Order for disposal of property under s. 517.—The powers conferred by ss. 435 and 439 on the High Court are larger than any previously exercised by it. The words "*any proceedings*" extend to an order made by a Magistrate under s. 517, *Weir* 11, 538; 36 C. 44, 17 Bom. L. R. 922.

66-A. Orders under s. 520.—*See* 27 A. 630.

67. Order for restoration of immovable property, 522.—The High Court has full power to interfere in revision with orders passed by Magistrates under s. 522, 35 C. 44; 27 A. 415 *followed*. *See* Note 50 above. *See* sub-sec. (3) of s. 522 which provides that an order under s. 522 may be made by any Court of Appeal, confirmation, reference or revision.

67-A. Order refusing to transfer a case under s. 528 whether revisable.—In 1 Rang. 632 it is *held* that High Court has no power to interfere in revision with an order to transfer a case under s. 528.

67-B. Orders under s. 545.—*See* 29 F. R. 1903.

67-C. Orders under s. 548.—*See* 6 C. 166, where an order refusing to grant copies was revised under s. 1 of the High Court's Act.

67-D. High Court interfering with revision in expunging remarks prejudicial to the character of a person neither a party nor a witness.—Where a Magistrate in a criminal case made observations against the character of a person who was neither a witness in nor a party to the proceedings and who had no opportunity of being heard, and upon material which was not legal evidence in the case, *held*, that it would be a denial of justice to allow such reflections to stand and they should be expunged from the judgment of the Magistrate, 6 Lah. 166. In a Bombay case it was *held* that it would be an extraordinary exercise of the powers of a High Court to order that remarks made against a complainant by a Magistrate while convicting the accused should be deleted. 19 Bom. L. R. 912. But *see* s. 561 A which was inserted newly by Act XVIII of 1923 and the note thereon.

VIII.—INTERFERENCE IN REVISION WITH ORDERS OF ACQUITTAL.

68. Revision against acquittal not usually encouraged.—Though the High Court has the power of

set aside in revision an order of acquittal though they were prepared to set aside the order of acquittal if the matter had come before it by way of appeal by the Local Government. Though the High Court has jurisdiction

on facts is no ground for exercising revisional jurisdiction in petitions against orders of acquittal, *K. L. SASTRI* SASTRI, J., 16 Cr. L. J. 600 (M.), 17 M. L. T. 437 = 16 Cr. L. J. 553 (M.), 17 Cr. L. J. 1. In 14 E. 352,

the Madras High Court remarked it would not ordinarily interfere by way of revision *in cases of acquittal*. In 1 A. 139 (F.B.) the High Court refused to interfere, even where the acquittal proceeded on an error of law. See also 27 A. 359; 25 A. 346, 25 A. 128; 1902 A. W. N. 200; 8 C. 895; 2 A. 276; 1 C. L. R. 332; 4 Cr. L. J. 37; 12 P. R. 1906; 14 P. R. 1905 which is now *overruled* by 13 P. W. R. 1907; 5 M. L. T. 258 = 11 Cr. L. J. 195; 10 Cr. L. J. 180 (B.), 1914 M. W. N. 124 = 15 Cr. L. J. 225. In 9 Bur. L. T. 47 = 17 Cr. L. J. 91, the High Court refused to consider an application for revision against acquittal. In 20 C. W. N. 862 an acquittal under s 247 was set aside as the absence was due to the death of the complainant and the case was one of considerable importance, 55 A. 332; 6 Lah. 16, 5 Patna 25.

69. High Court cannot interfere with acquittal where Public Prosecutor has withdrawn charge.—*See* s 494. If the Public Prosecutor withdraws a charge and the Court approves of it, the accused shall be acquitted and neither the Public Prosecutor nor the Judge is called on to give any reasons for his action. The High Court has no power to interfere with such an order of acquittal, 5 M. L. T. 216 = 11 Cr. L. J. 193.

70. Entry under s. 273 cannot be revised even if Court entering it is a High Court for limited purpose only.—A Court subordinate to the High Court may be declared to be a High Court under s 266 for the limited purpose of Chap XXIII. The High Court as defined in s. 4, although possessing revisional power over the said Subordinate Court in all other respects, will not have the power of reversing or interfering with any order passed by that Court under s 273. The said Subordinate Court when making an order under s 273 in Chapter XXIII acts as a High Court within the meaning of s 266—*Per MITTER, J.*, 14 C. 42 at p 48.

71. In exceptional cases alone High Court will interfere.—As a rule, where no appeal has been preferred by the Local Government from an original or appellate order of acquittal, the High Court will not interfere in revision, 13 P. W. R. 1907 = 5 Cr. L. J. 438; which *overrules* 14 P. R. 1905; 42 C. 612. See also 12 P. R. 1906; Weir II, 570 and 571. But where a Magistrate acquitted the accused disregarding the uncontradicted evidence and facts admitted which proved the guilt of the accused and acted illegally in treating a warrant-case as a summons case, the High Court interfered under this section on the application of the private complainant and setting aside the acquittal ordered a re-trial, Weir II, 572 = 15 M. L. J. 225. Although the High Court does not ordinarily interfere with orders of acquittal in revision, yet it cannot be expected that it would hesitate to do so, where the acquittal is based, not upon an appreciation of doubtful evidence, but upon a manifest error apparent on the face of the judgment, 9 Bom. L. R. 155 = 5 Cr. L. J. 171, 3 Bom. L. R. 584. The High Court set aside an acquittal when the accused were acquitted upon the result of local inspection and without taking the evidence of witnesses present, 39 C. 931. It will interfere where the acquittal is based solely on a mistaken view of the law, 6 A. L. J. 758 = 10 Cr. L. J. 417. So also where a trial was wrongly held to be barred under s 403, 12 Bom. L. R. 226. Where a Magistrate in a summary trial acquitted the accused, without examining all the witnesses for the prosecution, his order was set aside on revision 24 W. R. 62; 2 C. L. R. 389. A Magistrate cannot refuse to allow an accused person when put on his defence to recall the witnesses for the prosecution to be cross-examined by him 19 W. R. 53. Where a Magistrate acquitted the accused in a summary trial the High Court set aside the acquittal on the ground that the summary procedure was ill-adapted to the complicated nature of the case, 6 S. L. R. 101 = 13 Cr. L. J. 780; 6 S. L. R. 121 = 13 Cr. L. J. 771. See also 5 M. L. T. 258. Upon a proper interpretation of s 439, sub-sec. (4), a High Court, acting as a Court of Revision, is not competent to question an order of acquittal upon the merits thereof, nor can it direct a re-trial upon the ground that it takes a different view of the facts, or of the law applicable thereto, from that upon which the order of acquittal is based. It is only where an acquittal is illegal for some such reason as is given in s 530 (p), or where an incurable irregularity has occasioned a failure of justice the High Court can interfere, 5 N. L. R. 4 = 9 Cr. L. J. 211. Where it is plain that the Lower Court for reasons outside the merits of the dispute has really declined to decide the controversy and has dealt with matters which really do not decide the complaint before him, the High Court will interfere in revision from an order of acquittal, for example, where in a case of defamation as by stating a person to be of the "Chamar" caste the Judge has decided that the case ought to be dismissed because he regards it as trivial and contemptible but has not decided the issues requiring determination for a finding as to whether or not an offence of defamation has been committed, 18 A. L. J. 845.

The High Court declined on an application by the complainant to interfere under s 435 of the Code with an order of acquittal passed by a Sessions Judge agreeing with assessors, 25 Bom. L. R. 438 (3 Bom. L. R. 198, *distinguished*).

72. Revision against acquittal not restricted to errors apparent on face of record.—That the accused obtained his acquittal under s 247 by preventing the complainant from appearing by wrongfully arresting and

detaining him on a false charge of nuisance is not a ground for setting aside the order of acquittal in revision whether directly at the instance of the complainant or on a report of the District Magistrate. There is no reason to hold that the ground for interference should be apparent on the record, 33 M. 1028. See also 1891 A. W. N. 120 and Notes 15 and 20 above.

73. After setting aside acquittal, may direct re-trial or re-hearing of appeal.—The High Court has power under this section to revise an order of acquittal, though not to convert a finding of acquittal into one of conviction, 5 W. R. 2 and 32; 11 B. H. G. R. 117; 21 W. R. 21 = 12 B. L. R. Appx. XXII; 1 A. 1; 3 B. 150; 7 C. L. R. 142; 1904 P. L. R. 1; 6 S. L. R. 101 = 13 Cr. L. J. 780. In reference to orders of acquittal passed by a Court of Session in appeal, the High Court may, under this section, reverse such order and direct a re-trial of the appeal, the proper tribunal to conduct which is the Sessions Court, or such other Court of equal jurisdiction as the High Court may entrust, under s. 426 with the trial of the appeal, 9 A. 134; 27 C. 320; 19 A. L. J. 889. See also 23 A. L. J. 433; 24 A. L. J. 414.

74. High Court will not interfere with acquittal on reference under s. 438.—Usually the High Court will not interfere with an acquittal, when it is made the subject of reference under s. 438, 24 A. 346; 12 A. L. J. 255 = 15 Cr. L. J. 304; 25 A. 123; 1 S. L. R. 40 = 8 Cr. L. J. 161. For an exceptional case, see 7 S. L. R. 200 = 15 Cr. L. J. 553, where the Magistrate allowed a compromise at the instance of the relatives of the person deceased and the acquittal was not after trial on the merits. The High Court has jurisdiction to interfere with acquittal in revision under s. 439, but it will not exercise that jurisdiction on a reference by a Sessions Judge except where serious injustice has been caused by error of law, 42 M. 109.

75. High Court has jurisdiction to revise order of acquittal at the instance of complainant.—Provisions of sub-sec. (5) do not debar the High Court from revising an order of acquittal at the instance of the private complainant who could not appeal. "We entertain no doubt that we can deal with an order of acquittal in accordance with the practice of this Court in a series of cases," 38 C. 786. Though as a Court of Appeal, the High Court can consider an order of acquittal only on the appeal of the Local Government yet as a Court of Revision, it can deal with either an original or appellate order of acquittal, either when reported under s. 438, or whenever it may otherwise come to its knowledge. It can so act even on the application of a private prosecutor, 37 C. 320; 11 C. L. J. 113 = 11 Cr. L. J. 213, 18 P. R. 1833, 18 C. W. N. 1244 = 15 Cr. L. J. 722; 18 P. W. R. 1915 = 16 Cr. L. J. 657; 2 A. 443, 25 A. 123, 6 S. L. R. 121 = 13 Cr. L. J. 771; 39 C. 931. In 42 C. 612, JENKINS, C.J., distinguished 11 C. L. J. 113, on the ground that the error was one of pure law apparent on the face of the record, while the offence was one under s. 504, I P. C. "I have always understood that offences of an essentially or personal character, such as defamation or insult were viewed differently for the purpose of revision." See also 14 M. 363, 6 C. L. R. 245, 7 C. L. R. 142, 7 C. 447, 1893 A. W. N. 222. But the High Court should ordinarily exercise this jurisdiction sparingly and only where it is urgently demanded in the interests of public justice, 42 C. 612, 16 Cr. L. J. 553, 1915 M. W. N. 540 = 16 Cr. L. J. 600, 19 Bom. L. R. 354, 18 Cr. L. J. 519; U. B. R. (1917) 2nd Qr., 19, 18 Cr. L. J. 849, 18 A. L. J. 846, 41 B. 560.

76. Sub-sec. (4) does not limit the powers of Court of Appeal.—Sub-sec. (4) cannot be held to limit the powers of a Court of Appeal. It only limits the powers of the High Court when acting as a Court of Revision from converting a finding of acquittal into one of conviction. But s. 423 (b) has no such restriction, 37 M. 119. In 23 C. 973, it was contended upon sub-sec. (4) of this section, that the power under s. 423, sub-sec. 1 (b) to alter the finding must be held to be subject to the restriction, that the High Court cannot find the appellant guilty of any offence of which he had been acquitted by the Court below, but the High Court was of opinion that the clause did not limit the powers of the Court as a Court of Appeal, that it was only intended to limit in certain respects the revisional powers of the Court which would otherwise have been competent in revision to convert a finding of acquittal into one of conviction 44 A. 332.

77. Sub-sec. (4) limits power of High Court only where there is complete acquittal.—In 12 P. R. 1904 = 599 P. L. R. 1904, it was held the Chief Court had power in revision, where the accused had been convicted of one offence and acquitted of another, to convert the acquittal into a conviction. What was meant by acquittal in sub-sec. (4) of this section was a complete acquittal and discharge on all the allegations and facts charged and not an acquittal on one charge and conviction on another. Reading this section and s. 423 together, the Court considered that the High Court as a Court of revision had power at one and the same time to alter the finding and to enhance the sentence as might be lawful or desirable in accordance with the new finding. The juxtaposition of the words "*maintaining the sentence*" in s. 423, and "*may enhance the sentence*" in this section is not accidental but significant. See also 37 M. 119 where it was held that sub-sec. (4) refers to a case where the trial has ended in a complete acquittal and not to a case where a trial has ended in a

conviction but where the Court has wrongly applied the law or has wrongly found some fact not proved, and has, in consequence, held that the conviction should be under some section of the Code other than the section properly applicable and the accused has appealed against the conviction

But in a recent Bombay case, 12 P. R. (1904) is dissented from and where the accused was convicted by a Magistrate of voluntarily causing grievous hurt under s. 326, I P. C., but on appeal the conviction was altered to one of simple hurt (s. 323, I P. C.). An application having been made to the High Court for altering the conviction again to one under s. 326, *held* dismissing the application that the effect of the order of the Sessions Judge on appeal was that the accused was acquitted of the offence under s. 326¹ and that the High Court would not, under s. 439 convert a finding of acquittal to one of conviction. The word "acquittal" in s. 439 of the Code is not confined to a complete acquittal on all the charges framed, 26 Bom. L. R. 438.

IX.—POWER TO ENHANCE THE SENTENCE.

78. *High Court may alter finding and enhance sentence.*—The High Court has power while hearing an appeal as a Court of Revision to enhance sentence, 11 C. 530; 10 B. 254, so as to alter its nature, 6 A. 622 (F.B.) even in cases when the accused are tried summarily, Bom Cr Rul, 30th July, 1893 (F.B. in Chambers) to two years as provided for in sub-sec. (3) of this section. The effect of ss 423 and 439 being read together is that the High Court when hearing an appeal against a conviction may under s. 423 (b) alter the finding and then as a Court of Revision, may under s. 439 enhance the same so as to make it appropriate to the altered finding, 37 M. 119. In this case the High Court on an appeal against a conviction under ss 147–304, I P. C., gave the accused notice of revision and convicted him of an offence under s. 302, I P. C. The following cases were referred to, *Cr A 600 and Cr R C 400 of 1903*, where the accused had been acquitted under s. 302 and convicted under s. 304, the High Court gave notice of revision and convicted him of murder and sentenced him to death. In *Cr A 143 and Cr R C 437 of 1907*, where the accused was acquitted under s. 302, I P. C., and convicted under s. 325, the High Court on appeal by the accused gave notice of revision convicted the accused under s. 304 and enhanced the sentence. See Note 63 to s. 423. But see 27 Bom. L. R. 355 = 49 Bom. 450.

79. *Where accused convicted under two or more counts, legal to acquit of one charge and enhance sentence on others*—It is competent to the High Court as a Court of Revision in the case of an accused charged with two offences and sentenced separately to each of them, to set aside the sentence in respect of one charge and enhance the sentence in respect of the other, *Weir II, 35*. The alteration of a sentence of fine of Rs 50 to one of two months rigorous imprisonment, including seven days solitary confinement amounts to an enhancement, 416 P. L. R. 1904.

80. *When High Court will enhance sentence.*—'The principles upon which this Court habitually acts as a Court of Revision in relation to the enhancement of sentences where the law allows a discretion to the Court whose sentence is impugned are that it should not interfere if the sentence passed involve substantial punishment, and should interfere if the sentence is manifestly inadequate. The Court is, in particular, slow to interfere where interference would involve the imprisonment of persons already discharged from jail, though this circumstance is no insuperable obstacle. The Court also declines to interfere in order to enhance a sentence on the mere ground that it would itself have passed a heavier sentence contenting itself with pointing out that the sentence is so far light that heavier sentence would have been maintained'—*P. FLOWDEN, J.*, 7 P. R. 1899, 29 P. W. R. 1913 = 14 Cr. L. J. 599

(i) *Sentence must be manifestly inadequate*—Where the accused a constable, was charged under s. 223, I P. C. for negligently suffering an under trial prisoner to escape, and was convicted and sentenced to two months simple imprisonment, and the District Magistrate, considering the sentence to be inadequate, referred the case to the High Court, it was *held* that it was not merely because, circumstances occur to the Magistrate which would render necessary a more severe sentence or a different charge, that the High Court should interfere. There must be matter on the record of the case showing that the charge has been improperly framed or that the sentence passed is clearly inadequate to the offence, 20 W. R. 22. An enhancement of sentence should take place only when the sentence awarded is manifestly inadequate, and the powers of the High Court should be exercised only under exceptional circumstances, 17 P. R. 1898 (F.B.)

(ii) *Subsequent discovery that accused was an old offender no ground for enhancement*—Where owing to the negligence of the prosecution the accused was sentenced without certain previous convictions being proved and taken into account, and the Government applied in revision for a re-trial on the ground they had then obtained formal proof of the previous convictions *held*, that no re-trial could be ordered.

as there was no neglect of duty on the part of the convicting Magistrate, as to justify a retrial, 21 P. R. 1902; 43 P. R. 1905 = 42 P. L. R. 1909 = 3 Cr. L. J. 341; 9 S. L. R. 93 = 17 Cr. L. J. 3. Where the evidence of previous conviction is discovered after the trial, the High Court will not enhance the sentence in revision *Ratanlal* 457 and 461; 19 P. R. 1905; *Weir* II, 574.

(iii) *Discovery of fresh evidence after valid conviction no ground for setting it aside*—A valid conviction, arrived at by the Magistrate who had jurisdiction in the matter, cannot be set aside, simply because, subsequent to the trial and conviction fresh evidence has been discovered which may tend to convict the accused of an offence other than that for which he was convicted, 21 W. R. 47. But where the omission to record evidence that the accused had been previously convicted or is an habitual offender, has been caused by the failure on the part of the Magistrate to perform the duty imposed upon him as Magistrate by the Code in relation to the conduct of the prosecution in the case, the High Court, in the exercise of its powers of revision, is competent to direct a new trial, 36 P. R. 1884.

(iv) *When the Lower Court was incompetent to pass the sentence*—The penalty provided by s. 74 of the Companies Act, 1882, is a fixed and not a maximum penalty, 35 A. 173. Where, therefore, the Magistrate sentenced accused to a fine of Rs. 300 only under that section, the Chief Court enhanced the same, 19 P. R. 1914; 37 P. L. R. 1914 = 16 P. W. R. 1914 = 15 Cr. L. J. 250.

81. *Procedure when sentence is inadequate*—When it is necessary to ask Government to apply for revision of sentence, on account of the insufficiency of punishment awarded, this should be done immediately after the punishment is notified. Superintendents of Police should report all strikingly inadequate punishments at once to the District Magistrate.—*Bom. Pol. Man.*, p. 88. When proceedings are called for an appeal solely with a view to enhance the sentence, notice to that effect should be given to the appellant and to the District Magistrate, *Ratanlal* 179. It is not necessary that Government should instruct the Government Pleader to move the High Court to enhance the sentence. It is competent to the District Magistrates to bring to the notice of the High Court cases of inadequate sentences. The High Court has jurisdiction to enhance the sentence howsoever the case comes to its notice, 13 Bom. L. R. 1185 = 12 Cr. L. J. 604.

82. *In dealing with applications for enhancement, conviction treated as conclusive*.—It has been the invariable practice of the Bombay High Court in cases that come up before it for enhancement of sentence to accept the conviction as conclusive and to consider the question of enhancement of sentence on that basis, 32 B. 162. Where, however, it is proposed to enhance a sentence beyond the limit of the powers of the trying Magistrate the High Court should satisfy itself that the conviction is right, 9 S. L. R. 82 = 16 Cr. L. J. 712. In 6 S. L. R. 101 = 13 Cr. L. J. 780, the High Court set aside the conviction as the case has been tried summarily and directed a retrial. But see now sub-sec. (6) which is newly inserted under the amending Act of 1923. That sub-section expressly gives a right to an accused person to show cause against his conviction when he is called upon to show cause why his sentence should not be enhanced. So now 32 B. 162 has become obsolete.

83. *Service of notice upon accused necessary*.—A complainant applied under ss. 433 and 439 to set aside an order of compensation passed under s. 560 (now s. 250). *Held* that as the accused died, no order could be made, as none could be passed to the prejudice of an accused person who could not be served with notice, *Ratanlal* 634; but see 33 M. 89, sub-sec. (2) is an exception to the rules laid down in s. 440.

84. *Application for enhancement must be made before expiry of sentence*.—When the convicted persons have served out their sentences before an application for enhancement is made, the High Court will not interfere, 14 P. W. R. 1909 = 11 Cr. L. J. 99 following 7 P. R. 1889, where it is observed that the High Court is in particular slow to interfere when interference would involve the imprisonment of persons already discharged from jail though this circumstance is no insuperable difficulty. Similarly, where the imprisonment awarded on a summary conviction by a Magistrate, had already expired, the High Court declined to go into the case on a reference from the Sessions Judge, because it would be no advantage to the prisoner to do so and because if the Magistrate's proceedings were quashed the prisoner would be put to the risk of being tried again for the offence, 24 W. R. 71, especially where there is delay, (1912) 1 M. W. N. 50 = 13 Cr. L. J. 121. It is not fair to the accused to revise the conviction and direct him to be committed to the Sessions after he has undergone the full period of sentence inflicted by the Magistrate, because his previous convictions were not known at the time of sentence, 9 S. L. R. 93 = 17 Cr. L. J. 3. See also 29 P. W. R. 1913 = 14 Cr. L. J. 599, where following 19 P. W. R. 1910 = 11 Cr. L. J. 359, it was held that the High Court is not always bound to interfere under s. 439 even if the order of the Court below is wrong in law.

84-A. 'But see 28 Bom L. R. 900 where it is held, that it is competent to the High Court to impose an additional sentence of imprisonment on reference or revision even where the accused has served out the sentence of imprisonment inflicted upon him by the lower Court 1 Lah 453 doubted.

85 Application for enhancement by private complainant—In 5 B L. R. 86 = 11 Cr. L. J. 593, the sentence was enhanced on an application by a private complainant though it was contrary to the ordinary practice as the application was in the particular instance supported by a report from the District Magistrate In 26 Bom. L. R. it was held that a private complainant cannot move the High Court to enhance the sentence 26 Bom. L. R. 182.

86. Application for enhancement must be supported by Government Pleader—Enhancement of sentence is a very serious proceeding and where there is a proposal to that effect it ought, if it is a sound proposal, to be supported by the Government Pleader under instructions which will enable him to put before the Court cogent reasons why there should be an enhancement of the sentence 16 Bom. L. R. 202 = 7 Bom. Cr. Ca. 192 = 15 Cr. L. J. 385 = 45 A 332.

87. High Court's power to enhance sentence beyond power of trying Magistrate.—The power of enhancement conferred upon the High Court by s. 439 is limited only by cl. (3) of that section. That clause does not regard the difference in the powers of trying Magistrates under s. 32, but lays down the general rule that in cases of sentences passed by Magistrates and empowered under s. 34, the limit of enhancement shall be the sentence that might have been inflicted by a Magistrate or Magistrate of the first class, 9 B. L. R. 82 = 16 Cr. L. J. 712.

Optional with Court
to hear parties

440. No party has any right to be heard either personally or by pleader, before any Court, when exercising its powers of revision

Provided that the Court may, if it thinks fit, when exercising such powers hear any party either personally or by pleader, and that nothing in this section shall be deemed to affect section 439 sub-sec (2)

Notes —1. Conduct of the proceedings.—In the case of an appeal, the appellant has the conduct of the proceedings, Sessions Judge exercise its power

2. Right of parties to be heard in revision—The language of this section is rather curious, but in no way affects the provisions of ss. 436 and 439 (2). See 1 B 64 and 10 C. 268. The Madras High Court in the exercise of this discretionary power refused to hear Counsel who appeared in support of a petition to revise an order of acquittal, 14 M. 363, 14 W. R. 51. But the High Court of Calcutta always does hear Counsel in matters of importance, 19 C. 380 In 8 A. L. J. 237 it was stated that the Allahabad High Court as a matter of practice heard pleaders in revision In 1 B. 64 the Bombay High Court refused to hear Counsel against report made under s. 438, but it also refused to interfere as a Court of Revision. See 6 B. L. R. Appx. XLVI and 5 B L. R. Appx. LXX, as to the practice under the Code of 1872 where it was held that a private prosecutor was not allowed to be heard on a reference to the High Court In 11 C. W N. 316 an accused was heard as to why a further inquiry should not be directed against him though no rule was issued upon him. In 5 P. W. R. 1910 = 11 Cr. L. J. 211, JOHNSTONE J. refused to hear a pleader against a petitioner as he had moved the District Magistrate for his appointment to appear before the High Court and had been refused.

441. When the record of any proceeding of any Presidency Magistrate is called for by the High Court under section 435, the Magistrate may submit with the record a statement setting forth the grounds of his decision or order and any facts which he thinks material to the issue, and the Court shall consider such statement before overruling or setting aside the said decision or order.

Note.—A statement submitted by a Presidency Magistrate under this section must be regarded as a completion of the record and possesses a conclusive character as against affidavits, 12 B. 377. This section apparently applies to cases in which the sentence or order is not appealable See s. 411 Mere omissions by a Magistrate to record his reasons before referring a case under s. 202 for enquiry by the Police, and for dismissing a complaint under s. 203, is an irregularity But a statement filed under s. 441 supplies the omission. So,

after the filing of such a statement, such an omission does not call for the interference of the High Court with an order made under those sections, 5 M L T 79. The Calcutta High Court has held that no rule exists which can be binding on any Bench exercising criminal revisional jurisdiction as to whether a party may be heard through Counsel or Vakil instructed or retained or merely instructed by the Legal Remembrancer or Local Government.

442. When a case is revised under this Chapter by the High Court, it shall, *in manner heretofore provided by s. 425* certify its decision or order to the Court

High Court's order to be certified to Lower Court or Magistrate.

High Court's order to be certified to Lower Court or Magistrate. by which the finding, sentence or order revised was recorded or passed and the Court or Magistrate to which the decision or order is so certified shall thereupon make such orders as are conformable to the decision so certified, and, if necessary, the record shall be amended in accordance therewith

Notes —1. Scope of section—This section applies to all revisions by a High Court whether under s 435 or s 433 and the provisions that it must certify its decision or order to the Court by which the sentence, etc., was passed are incompatible with the notion that a High Court can *revise* its own finding, for it cannot certify to itself. 4 P. R. 1909 = 41 P. L. R. 1909 = 10 P. W. R. 1909 = 9 Cr. L. J. 378.

2 The result of every application for revision of a sentence under which the applicant is in confinement shall be notified direct to the officer in charge of the jail in which the applicant is confined by the Court from whose order the application for revision was preferred—*C P Cr Cir*, Part II, No 47 For Bombay Rule, see Book Cr C, pp 50-54, vide *Government Gazette* for 1896 Part I, pp 427 and 428

PART VIII.

SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS

CHAPTER XXXIII.*

SPECIAL PROVISIONS RELATING TO CASES IN WHICH EUROPEAN AND INDIAN BRITISH
SUBJECTS ARE CONCERNED

Note.—Chapter XXXIII is thoroughly recast by the Criminal Law (Amendment) Act XII of 1923. The object of this through revision of Chapter XXXIII is to reduce the differences in the cases of trials of European British subjects and Indians under the Code. The report of the Committee that was submitted to the Legislative Assembly, represents a compromise that could be effected between the interests concerned under the existing circumstances and the various racial considerations between Europeans and Indians that must be recognized as existing facts in spite of theoretical considerations based on pure justice. It would be best to give in the words of the report itself the effect of the compromise arrived at.

If the Bill is enacted the only privileges as regards the criminal procedure applicable to them which will be retained for European subjects of His Majesty as compared with Indian subjects of His Majesty will therefore be as follows —

- (a) the privilege of not being tried by Magistrates of the second or third class save for offences punishable with fine only not exceeding Rs. 50,
- (b) the privilege of being under different High Courts in the case of a few areas in which the pre-independence Judicial Administration is not very highly developed,
- (c) the privilege of being able to obtain writs in the nature of *habeas corpus* from High Courts and the Judicature established by Letters Patent when outside the limits of British India and
- (d) the exemption from the jurisdiction of Magistrate and Sessions Judges as regards the imposition of whipping and from the jurisdiction of special power Magistrates as regards the imposition of sentences of imprisonment exceeding two years.

The Committee accepted retention of each of these few privileges for one year. After that time the number of persons who will be entitled to the privileges will be reduced to 100, and will only be claimable by persons of European descent in the male line.

* Chapter XXXIII (ss. 413 to 443) has been substituted in the place of the old Chapter XXVIII ss. 413 to 443 (Amendment) Act, 1973 (XII of 1973).

The only existing distinction between the procedure in criminal trials applicable to Indian subjects of His Majesty and Europeans (other than European British subjects) and Americans is that referred to in paragraph 4 of this statement. The existing privileges are retained for these persons but they are also accorded by the Bill to Indian subjects of His Majesty.

In the Bill the procedure for the trial of cases in which racial considerations are involved is included in a Chapter which takes the place of the existing Chapter XXXII of Code. The remaining provisions of that Chapter which it is necessary to retain are distributed in appropriate places throughout the Code as is indicated in the notes on clauses which are appended to this statement.

As regards the new Chapter XXVIII it will be observed that it applies to offences punishable with imprisonment which are alleged to have been committed outside a presidency town. The first step to be taken to secure that such a case shall be tried under the provisions of the Chapter is a claim to be made by the accused person before the Magistrate. Unless such a claim is made at one of the stages indicated for the trial of a summons-case or of a warrant-case or for the inquiry preliminary to commitment the provisions of the Chapter will not apply. The Magistrate then makes such inquiry as he thinks necessary. As a guide to the Magistrate in coming to a finding as to whether the case should be tried under the provisions of the Chapter or not it is provided that if the complainant and the accused persons or any of them are respectively European and Indian British subjects or Indian and European British subjects he shall find that the case should be tried under the provisions of the Chapter. For other cases with which both European British subjects and Indian British subjects are connected the Magistrate must be satisfied that it is expedient for the ends of justice that the case shall be so tried. This it is observed is the same criterion as that now contained in clause (e) of sub-section (1) of s 526 of the Code of Criminal Procedure relating to the powers of a High Court to transfer criminal cases. If the Magistrate rejects the claim the person has a right of appeal to the Sessions Judge whose decision is final and if the claim is rejected by the Magistrate the Magistrate is required to stay the proceedings until the expiration of the period allowed for the presentation of the appeal or if an appeal is presented until it has been decided. The period allowed for the presentation of an appeal is fixed by the amendment of the Indian Limitation Act 1908 made by clause 39 of the Bill at seven days. The persons who will be included within the term complainant for the purpose of these provisions are then defined by the proposed s 444. Incidentally public servants and officers and servants of companies, associations or bodies to which the Local Government by general or special order may declare the provisions of the section to apply will not be included within the definition merely because they have made a complaint or given information in their official or quasi-official capacity. The procedure in summons-cases punishable with imprisonment which has been referred to in paragraph 6 of this statement is then laid down. For warrant cases which would normally be triable under the provisions of Chapter XXI of the Code if it is found that the case ought to be tried under the provisions of the Chapter a Magistrate is required if he does not discharge the accused to commit the case for trial to the Court of Session whether the case is or is not exclusively triable by that Court. Normally in the Court of Session the case will then be tried by a jury of mixed nationality the majority of the jurors being either Indians or Europeans and Americans according as the accused person is an Indian or an European subject of His Majesty. *Statement of Objects and Reasons—Racial Distinctions Committee Report 1923*

Preliminary note. Trial of Europeans by jury whether substantive right or mere matter of procedure—Where an European had claimed to be tried by jury and was committed on 11th June 1923 to the Sessions Court but that right to be tried by jury was taken away by Act XII of 1923 which came into force on the 1st of September 1923 and the accused appeared before the Sessions Judge in October 1923 and asked for trial by mixed jury held that the right of trial by jury was a substantive right and not a mere matter of procedure and that the accused who had this right under Chapter XXXIII of the old Code when he was committed for trial, could not be deprived of it by the amendment of that code by Act XII of 1923 6 Lah 292

443. (1) Where in the course of the trial outside a presidency town of any offence punishable with imprisonment the accused person at any time before he is committed for trial under section 213 or is asked to show cause under section 242 or enters on his defence under section 256 as the case may be claims that the case ought to be tried under the provisions of this Chapter, the Magistrate in putting into or trying the case after making such inquiry as he thinks necessary, and

Determination regarding applicability of this Chapter

after allowing the accused person reasonable time within which to adduce evidence in support of his claim, shall if he is satisfied—

- (a) that the complainant and the accused persons or any of them are respectively European and Indian British subjects or Indian and European British subjects or
- (b) that, in view of the connection with the case of both an European British subject and an Indian British subject, it is expedient for the ends of justice that the case should be tried under the provisions of this Chapter, record a finding that the case is a case which ought to be tried under the provisions of this Chapter, or, if he is not so satisfied record a finding that it is not such a case

(2) Where the Magistrate rejects the claim the person by whom it was made may appeal to the Sessions Judge, and the decision of the Sessions Judge thereon shall be final and shall not be questioned in any Court in appeal or revision

(3) Where the Magistrate rejects the claim, he shall stay the proceedings until the expiration of the period allowed for the presentation of the appeal or if an appeal is presented, until it has been decided

Note—“Presidency town shall mean the local limits for the time being of the ordinary original civil jurisdiction of the High Court of Judicature at Fort William, Madras or Bombay as the case may be s. 3(4) General Clauses Act X of 1897

444. For the purposes of section 443, complainant means any person making a complaint or, in relation to any case of which cognizance is taken under clause (b) of section 190 sub-section (1) any person who has given information relating to the commission of the offence within the meaning of section 154

Definition of ‘complainant’

Provided that a Public Prosecutor a public servant a member, officer or servant of any local authority a railway servant as defined in section 3 of the Indian Railways Act 1890 or an officer or servant of any company, association or other body to which the Local Government may, by general or special order published in the *Local Official Gazette* declare the provisions of this section to apply shall not by reason only of the fact that he has made a complaint of or given information of an offence in his capacity as such Public Prosecutor public servant railway servant, member, officer or servant be deemed to be a complainant within the meaning of this section nor shall a Police-officer be so deemed by reason only of the fact that a report under section 173 relating to a case has been made by or through him

445. (1) Where a Magistrate or a Sessions Judge decides under section 443 that a case ought to be tried under the provisions of this Chapter and the case is a summons-case, the Magistrate trying the same shall direct that the case be referred to a Bench of two Magistrates and shall send a copy of such order

Procedure in summons-cases.

to the District Magistrate who shall forthwith provide for the constitution of a Bench of two Magistrates of the first class of whom one shall be an European and the other an Indian for the trial of the case

(2) Where the Magistrates constituting the Bench by which a case is tried under this section differ in opinion the case, together with their opinions thereon, shall be laid before the Sessions Judge who may examine any party or recall and examine any witness who has already given evidence in the case, and may call for and take any further evidence and shall thereafter pass such judgment, sentence or order in the case as he thinks fit and as is according to law

(3) Any person convicted by a Bench under this section shall have the same right of appeal as if he had been convicted by a Magistrate of the first class and any person convicted by

a Sessions Judge under sub-sec (2) shall have the same right of appeal to the High Court as if he had been convicted by the Sessions Judge at a trial held by the Sessions Judge under this Code

(4) In any case in which it is impracticable to constitute a Bench in accordance with the provisions of sub-sec (1) in any district the District Magistrate shall transfer the case for trial by a like Bench to such other district as the High Court may by general or special order, direct.

(5) Notwithstanding anything contained in this section the Local Government may by notification in the *Local Official Gazette* direct that all summons-cases tried under the provisions of this Chapter in any district specified in the notification shall be tried as if they were warrant cases in accordance with the provisions hereinafter in this Chapter laid down for the trial of warrant cases

446. (1) Where a Magistrate or a Sessions Judge decides under s 443 that a case

Procedure in war
rant-cases

ought to be tried under the provisions of this Chapter and the case is a warrant case the Magistrate inquiring into or trying the case shall if he does not discharge the accused under section 209 or section 253, as the case may be, commit the case for trial to the Court of Session whether the case is or is not exclusively triable by that Court

(2) Where an accused is committed to the Court of Session under sub-section (1) the Court shall proceed to try the case as if the accused had required to be tried in accordance with the provisions of section 275 and the provisions of that section and the other provisions of Chapter XXIII so far as they are applicable shall apply accordingly

Provided that where the trial before the Court of Session would in the ordinary course be with the aid of assessors and the accused or all of them jointly require to be tried in accordance with the provisions of s 284 A the trial shall be held with the aid of assessors all of whom shall in the case of European British subjects be persons who are Europeans or Americans or in the case of Indian British subjects be Indians—

Note—See for the meaning and scope of this section and the sections 443 and 275 and for the meaning of the phrase Ordinary course in the proviso to s 446 5 Lah 515

Court to inform
accused persons of
their rights in certain
cases

447. If at any stage of an inquiry or trial under this Code it appears to the Magistrate that the case is or might be held to be a case which ought to be tried under the provisions of this Chapter, he shall forthwith inform the accused person of his rights under this Chapter

References to Ses-
sions Judge to be con-
strued as references
to High Court in
Rangoon.

448. For the purpose of the trial in Rangoon of any person under the provisions of this Chapter, references to the Sessions Judge shall be construed as references to the High Court of Judicature at Rangoon

Special provisions
relating to appeal.

449. (1) Where—

(a) a case is tried by jury in a High Court or Court of Session under the provisions of this Chapter or

(b) a case which would otherwise have been tried under the provisions of this Chapter is under this Code committed to or transferred to the High Court and is tried by jury in the High Court, or

(c) a case is tried by jury in the High Court in a presidency-town and the High Court grants leave to appeal on the ground that the case would, if it had been tried outside a presidency town, have been triable under the provisions of this Chapter, then, notwithstanding anything contained in section 418 or section 423, sub-section (2), or in the Letters Patent of any High Court, an appeal may lie to the High Court on a matter of fact as well as on a matter of law.

(2) Notwithstanding anything contained in the Letters Patent of any High Court, the Local Government may direct the Public Prosecutor to present an appeal to the High Court from an original order of acquittal passed by the High Court in any such trial as is referred to in sub-section (1)

(3) An appeal under sub-section (1) or sub-section (2) shall, where the High Court consists of more than one Judge, be heard by two Judges of the High Court.

Notes.—1. Powers of the High Court under s. 443.—Although in ordinary cases tried by jury there is no appeal except on a matter of law (*see* s. 418 of the Code), since the amendment of the Code by Act XVIII of 1923 an appeal is competent in cases tried by jury under the provisions of Chapter XXXIII "on a matter of fact as well as on a matter of law," and so on a reference by a Sessions Judge under s. 307 the High Court can go into the facts of the case. It follows that in such a case 41 C. 621; 26 Bom. L. R. 610 have little application. 6 Lah. 98.

2. Applicability of the section.—Where a case triable under the provisions of Chapter XXXIII has been actually tried at the High Court Sessions under Chapter XXIII without a claim on the part of the accused under s. 275 for a trial under Chapter XXXIII, appeal would lie only under s. 418 and not under s. 449. Further, that such a claim on the part of the accused must be made before the first juror is called and accepted 3 Rang. 220.

3. Whether an appeal, on matters of facts as well as on matters of law, lies when an order for trial under s. 443 is erroneously made.—When an accused person claimed to be tried as an European British subject but omitted to be tried under the provisions of Chapter XXXIII and the Magistrate passed an order that he should be dealt with under s. 443 which order was not objected to by the prosecution an appeal would lie on matters of fact as well as on matters of law as contemplated by s. 449 (1) even though it would appear that the distinction between a claim to be tried as an European British subject and a claim to be dealt with under the provisions of Chapter XXXIII was not properly appreciated by the Magistrate and that there was hardly any foundation for the claim to be tried under the provisions of Chapter XXXIII 29 C. W. N. 260.

4. Right of appeal under s. 449.—The omission to make a claim under s. 528-A does not affect the question of appeal under s. 449 (1) (c), if the conditions in s. 443 (1) (a) and s. 441 (1) (b) exist, and it is not necessary to show that a claim was made before, and found by the Presidency Magistrate. Ss. 528-A and 528-B have no application to s. 449, 52 C. 347 = 29 C. W. N. 447. The same principle is laid down in 52 C. 636 = 29 C. W. N. 438 and it was further held that s. 449 (c) gives an absolute right of appeal when the applicant for leave to appeal shows that the case would if it had been tried outside a presidency-town would have been triable under Chapter XXXIII. On general principle it is desirable that such applications should be made to a Divisional Bench rather than to a single Judge.

450 to 463.—(Repealed)

Note.—Sections 453, 454, 455 and 459 have taken the shape of an additional Chapter XLIV which was inserted by the Criminal Law (Amendment) Act XII of 1923. These sections have now become supplementary provisions relating to European and Indian British subjects and others and are now enacted as s. 528-A, 528-B, 528-C and 528. Ss. 456, 457 and 458 have become parts of ss. 491 and 491-A. S. 460 is to be found in s. 284-A. S. 462 has become a part of s. 326.

Wood-pigeon (pī'ūn), *n.* (*Ornith*) The ring dove (*Columba* sp.)

Wood-pile (pī'ūn), *n.* A small mass of a grayish color, having a hollow horn on the bladder part of the head. It is a characteristic of wood.

Wood-rat (rāt), *n.* (*Zoöl*) A rat of the family *Rattus* found in the woods, *Neotoma floridana*.

Wood-screw (skrū), *n.* The screw or screw of a wood.

Wood-screw (skrū), *n.* A compact variety of asbestos.

Wood-ruff (ruff), *n.* From wood and ruff or ruff. A plant of the genus *Asperula*.

Wood-ruff (ruff), *n.* A plant of the genus *Asperula*, a species of rush having flat leaves.

Wood-sage (sage), *n.* From wood and sage. A herb, *Salvia*, a species of sage seen on herbs.

Wood-screw (skrū), *n.* A screw made of iron, and furnished with a sharp thread for insertion in wood.

Wood-sage (sage), *n.* The time when there is no sap in a tree. [Written also wood sage.]

Wood-sage (sage), *n.* A species of sage found in North America. [Written also wood sage.]

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which constitutes a most essential material of clothing in all cold and temperate climates.

2 Short, thick hair, especially when crimped or curled.

3 (Bot) A sort of pubescence or a clothing of dense curling hairs on the surface of certain plants.

Wool-hall (hāl), *n.* A hall or mass of wool.

Wool-hall (hāl), *n.* One who removes little bits, knots or extraneous matter, from wool, or the surface of woolen cloth.

Wool-shearer (shēr), *n.* One whose occupation is to comb wool.

Wool-shearer (shēr), *n.* One who removes little bits, knots or extraneous matter, from wool, or the surface of woolen cloth.

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terial of edge tools. It has in combination a mixing portion of alumina and silica.

Word (wōrd), *n.* [A-S & O Sax word, O Fris word, Ger word, L. uer & D. uord. Both from, both & then over. Over, O Fris & L. Lett, uer, uer, uer, allied to Lat. uerbo.]

1 The spoken sign of a conception or idea, an articulate or vocal sound, or a combination of articulate and vocal sounds, uttered by the human voice, and by custom expressing an idea or idea as a single component part of human speech or language.

2 A constituent part of a sentence, a term, a vocable.

3 The sound of a word.

4 Hence, the written or printed character of characters, expressing such a term, as the word is a page.

5 Talk, discourse, language — in the plural.

6 Account, tidings, message.

7 Signal, order, command.

8 Language considered as implying the faith or authority of the person who utters it, statement, affirmation, declaration, promise.

9 One who speaks, a speaker.

10 A desire not the reader should take up word.

11 Verbal contention, dispute.

12 Some words there grow to be common and are so.

13 A brief remark or observation, an expression, a phrase, clause or short sentence.

14 The law is fulfilled in one word even in this, that thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself.

15 One who speaks, a speaker.

16 The Scripture considered as the revelation of God to man.

17 A word of mouth, orally.

18 A word.

19 A word.

20 A word.

21 A word.

22 A word.

23 A word.

24 A word.

25 A word.

26 A word.

27 A word.

28 A word.

29 A word.

30 A word.

CHAPTER XXXIV

LUNATICS

464. (1) When a Magistrate holding an inquiry or a trial has reason to believe that the accused is of unsound mind and consequently incapable of making his defence the Magistrate shall inquire into the fact of such unsoundness and shall cause such person to be examined by the Civil Surgeon of the district or such other medical officer as the Local Government directs and thereupon shall examine such surgeon or other officer as a witness and shall reduce the examination to writing

* (1 A) Pending such examination and inquiry the Magistrate may deal with the accused in accordance with the provisions of section 466

(2) If such Magistrate is of opinion that the accused is of unsound mind and consequently incapable of making his defence he shall † “record a finding to that effect and” shall postpone further proceedings in the case

Note.—The amendment in sub-sec. (2) requires the Magistrate to record a finding if he is of opinion that the accused is of unsound mind and incapable of making a defence.—*Statement of Objects and Reasons* (1914)

Notes—For procedure where accused though not insane does not understand proceedings see s. 341. See Act XXXVI of 1888 as to wandering and dangerous lunatics. Ss 464—468 and 472—475 deal with the procedure in the case of an accused who is of an unsound mind at the time of the trial and see ss. 469—472, 468, 474 and 475 as to the case of an accused who is of an unsound mind at the time of the trial but the question is whether he was of sound mind at the time of the offence

1 Section does not deal with question whether accused was or was not insane when offence committed.—This section has nothing to do with the question whether the accused person was or was not of unsound mind at the time when he is alleged to have committed the offence of which he is accused 1900 A W N 47 The inquiry under this section will only affect the prisoner's trial and not the result after trial. The test of insanity at the time of the commission of the offence is whether the prisoner knew at the time that he was doing wrong. 24 W R 8, 12 M 459, 10 B 512 The law presumes every person of the age of discretion to be sane unless the contrary is proved and when a lunatic has lucid intervals the law presumes the offence of such to have been committed in a lucid interval unless it appears to have been committed during derangement Ratanlal 172 The fact that the conduct of the accused at the time of trial was unusual and that his father was insane do not justify the conclusion that the accused was at the time of committing the offence by reason of unsoundness of mind incapable of knowing the nature of the act or that he was doing what was wrong and contrary to law Ratanlal 10 The test of insanity under this section is that a person accused before a Magistrate is of unsound mind and incapable of making his defence. Under such circumstances the Magistrate should not acquit him but must proceed under s. 466. Weir II, 581, see 10 W R 27, 1 W R 11, 11 M L T 24, 13 Cr L J 24 and Notes to s. 341

2 Provisions of this Chapter do not override general rules of procedure.—The provisions of this Chapter are subsidiary provisions for dealing with an exceptional class of persons charged with offences and are not to be construed to override the general rules of procedure except in so far as the special provision is clearly incompatible with the general provisions 11 P R 1894 When a charge of an offence to which Chapter XIII applies is made before a Magistrate he ought in the first place to make an inquiry into the truth of the charge it is only when he is satisfied after such inquiry that there is a *prima facie* case against the accused that he can make the inquiry prescribed by this section into the question of the unsoundness of mind of the accused person etc.—*Ibid*

3 Magistrate must inquire into fact of unsoundness.—The language of this section is that ‘when a Magistrate holding not about to commence an inquiry and consequently incapable of making his defence the Magistrate shall inquire etc. The provision of this section certainly contains a sound sense it appears to be sound law for the Legislature can never have intended that a person should

* This sub-section was inserted by Act XVIII of 1923

† The words inserted in square were inserted by s. 6 of

ion of Articulates See ANIMAL KINGDOM, and also LIZARDUS
 6 Figuratively, an interval tormentor, something that gnaws or afflicts one's conscience
 Have a variety of the common lizards (LIZARDUS) named from its color
 Wormy (LIZARDUS) is -

Love not the world, neither the things that are in the world
 If any man love the world, the love of the Father is not in him
 For all that is in the world—the lust of the flesh, and the
 lust of the eyes, and the pride of life—is not of the Father
 But is of the world
 1 John 1

be liable to be treated as a lunatic by the executive Government on the report of Criminal Court after a summary inquiry into his state of mind alone merely because somebody has chosen to make a charge against him possibly a groundless charge before a Magistrate.—*Per FLOWDEN, J., 11 P R 1894* A Magistrate cannot consign a lunatic to an asylum or jail on his own mere unprofessional opinion. He must have before him the deliberate statements of a medical officer reduced to writing and subjected to the test of cross-examination. *1 Bur L R. 87* A mere certificate of a medical man is not enough. *9 W R. 23*. Where upon the report of a Civil Surgeon that the accused person was of weak intellect a Magistrate discharged the accused and made him over to his brother for safe custody it was *held* that the proceedings were illegal because if the order was made under s. 466 the Civil Surgeon should have been examined and if under s. 470 the accused should have been detained in custody and the case reported to Government. *Weir II, 580*. In the city of Bombay the *Police Surgeon* is the medical officer to be examined (*Ga ette* 1877 p 339) while in Madras it is the officer in medical charge of the Penitentiary (*Ga ette* 20th August 1878 Pt. I p 474) and in the districts all medical officers in independent charge are competent to give evidence under this section (G O No 2224 Judicial dated 23rd August 1883). In addition to expert testimony the Magistrate may also take evidence as to the ordinary habits and behaviour of the accused and his demeanour both before and after the commission of the offence charged. *5 C. 826, 42 A. 137*

4. Magistrate should not try accused when he finds him incapable of making defence.—If after inquiring into the fact of the unsoundness of mind of the accused and examining the Civil Surgeon the accused appears to be insane and unable to understand questions and to return intelligent replies the Magistrate should follow this section and not s. 341 and should act on his opinion under s. 466. *Ratanlal 832*. When a Magistrate finds that the accused is quite incapable of making his defence he ought not to try him and acquit on the ground of insanity. If the accused be afterwards found to be capable of making his defence the procedure prescribed in ss. 467, 468 and 473 should be followed. *Weir II, 581*. The postponement contemplated by this section is to be *sine die* and as the postponement is caused by circumstances over which the Court has no control cases postponed under this section may be excluded in preparing the annual statement of the average duration of cases in the Criminal Court. *J C. Oudh No 70 of 1886*

465. (1) If any person committed for trial before a Court of Session or a High Court appears to the Court at his trial to be of unsound mind and consequently incapable of making his defence the jury or the Court with the aid of assessors shall in the first instance try the fact of such unsoundness and incapacity, * and if the jury or Court as the case may be is satisfied of the fact the Judge shall record a finding to that effect and shall postpone further proceedings in the case and the jury if any shall be discharged.

(2) The trial of the fact of the unsoundness of mind and incapacity of the accused shall be deemed to be part of his trial before the Court.

Note—This amendment provides for the discharge of the jury in the event of the Court being satisfied that the accused is of unsound mind and incapable of making his defence. —*Statement of Objects and Reasons* (1914).

Notes—1 Sections 464 and 465 to be applied only when accused's sanity at the time of trial is questioned.—These two sections refer to the procedure to be adopted by a Magistrate or other Court on coming to the conclusion that a person put on trial before the Magistrate or Court is of unsound mind and incapable of defending himself that is to say actually of unsound mind when placed before the Magistrate or other Court. These two sections have nothing whatever to do with the question whether the accused person was or was not of unsound mind at the time when he is alleged to have committed the offence of which he is accused. *1900 A. W N 47*. See Note 1 to s. 464.

2. Fact of unsoundness of mind at time of trial should first be put before jury before calling on prisoner to stand his trial.—The power given to the jury to try the fact of unsoundness of mind is in accordance with the decision in *10 B L R. Ap. 10 = 19 W R. 15*. The second paragraph is based on the same decision. Where a person committed to a Court of Session appears to the Court to be of unsound mind and consequently unable to make his defence it is obligatory on the Court to try first the fact of such insanity and incapacity

* The words in inverted commas were substituted for the words "and, if satisfied, shall pass judgment accordingly and thereupon the trial shall be postponed" by Act XVIII of 1923.

before calling on the prisoner to stand his trial, and not to continue to try the fact, throughout the trial of the prisoner, 1905 A. W. N. 2. A Sessions Judge in his charge to the jury told them that, in his judgment, the accused was, at the time of his trial, exhibiting symptoms of unsoundness of mind, and he directed them to find whether the accused was insane at the time he committed the offence *held*, that the issue as to whether the accused was of sound mind *at the time of the trial*, and incapable of properly making his defence, was a preliminary issue to that put by the Sessions Judge, and should have been first submitted to the jury, 19 W. R. 45; 1882 A. W. N. 106; 10 W. R. 37. The trial was set aside as bad and retrial ordered. Again, where the accused confessed to having killed his wife and pleaded *guilty* at his trial for murder, and the Sessions Judge recorded briefly the evidence of two prosecution witnesses to determine whether the offence committed was or was not culpable homicide amounting to murder, and he found that the offence was murder and sentenced the accused to transportation for life on the ground "that the accused without being actually insane, so as not to be aware of what he was doing, appears to be decidedly a man of weak intellect." On appeal it was urged that the accused was insane or at any rate incapable of understanding the charge against him. The Chief Court set aside the conviction and ordered an inquiry under this section before retrial on the charge, 54 P. R. 1905 = 169 P. L. R. 1905 = 3 Cr. L. J. 80.

3 Where accused's sanity is doubted, the fact should be tried.—Where a Sessions Judge entertains doubts as to the sanity of the accused he should not merely put questions to him, but should try the fact of such unsoundness of mind by examining the Civil Surgeon, or some other medical officer, and by taking such evidence as might have been procurable from the village at which the accused resides with the view of ascertaining whether the accused had, at any time prior to the commission of the crime, exhibited symptoms of insanity, 1 B. H. C. R. 33. See the procedure adopted in 2 W. R. 33. Where an accused person is found to be insane before the completion of his trial, the Judge should postpone the trial and report the case to the Local Government, instead of trying the accused when he is incapable of making his defence and acquitting him on the ground that he committed the offence charged when he was incapable of knowing that he was doing wrong, 1 W. R. 11. Where in the course of his examination under s. 364 the accused said that he was not in his senses when he tried to rob, *held*, that the Court of Session should have acted under s. 465 and tried the fact whether on the date the accused was called on to plead the accused was or was not of unsound mind and capable or incapable of making his defence, 15 A. L. J. 239.

4 Stay of proceedings by Sessions Court.—A Sessions Judge has no power to stay proceedings and to direct inquiry as to the state of the accused's mind, because it appeared to him problematic whether he was capable of making his defence. The proper procedure to be followed is provided by this section, *Weir II*, 137, 3 W. R. 57.

5. Procedure when case is postponed.—When a Magistrate finds that an accused person was of unsound mind, and incapable of making his defence when put before him for trial, he should postpone further proceedings and take action under this section, 1900 A. W. N. 47, after a case has been reported to Government under s. 466, it should not be struck off, but should be kept on the register of pending cases, 6 W. R. 3. When a trial is postponed under this section on the ground of the insanity of the prisoner and the consequent incapacity to make his defence it should not be resumed at the point at which it was previously stopped, but should be commenced *de novo* when the Court finds him capable of making his defence, *Weir II*, 532. See Note 4 to s. 464.

6 Prosecution must prove sanity of accused.—When a jury is impanelled, the onus is on the prosecution to prove the sanity of the defendant, *R v Davies*, (1853) 3 Car. and Kir. 328. The jury may form their own judgment of the defendant's sanity or insanity by his demeanour without any evidence being given, if he shows strong symptoms of insanity, it is unnecessary to ask him if he wishes to cross-examine any witnesses who are called or to make any remarks or offer evidence, *R v Goode*, (1837) 7 Ad. and EL 536, *Halsbury Laws of England*, Vol. IX, p. 354. See also 51 C. 584; 51 C. 827.

466. (1) Whenever an accused person is found to be of unsound mind and incapable of making his defence, the Magistrate or Court, as the case may be, * "whether the case is one in which bail may be taken or not," may release him on sufficient security being given that he shall be properly taken care of and shall be prevented from doing injury to himself or to any other person, and for his appearance when required before the Magistrate or Court or such officer as the Magistrate or Court appoints in this behalf

Release of lunatic pending investigation or trial.

* The words in inverted commas were substituted for words "If the case is one in which bail may be taken" by Act XVIII of 1923

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The ludicrous effect upon the wren's face of all such
 wrenches in the truth is illustrated every where. The wren's
 face is a ball

*“(2) If the case is one in which, in the opinion of the Magistrate or Court, bail should

Custody of lunatic. not be taken, or if sufficient security is not given, the Magistrate or Court, as the case may be, shall order the accused to be detained in safe custody in such place and manner as he or it may think fit and shall report the action taken to the Local Government

Provided that no order for the detention of the accused in a lunatic asylum shall be made otherwise than in accordance with such rules as the Local Government may have made under the Indian Lunacy Act, 1912

Note.—This section is amended so as to allow bail to be granted at the discretion of the Court in any case in which the accused is a lunatic and the amendment also permits the accused to be kept in custody. The object in view is to delegate the power of the Local Government and to do away with the existing distinction in procedure between bailable and non bailable cases. *Statement of Objects and Reasons* (1914).

Note —1 Jurisdiction of Criminal Courts over lunatics—The authority of the Criminal Court over an accused declared to be of unsound mind ceases after the transmission of such accused to the place of safe custody appointed by the Local Government, and it does not revive until he (the accused) is sent back to the Magistrate under s. 473 on a certificate that he is capable of making his defence, 2 C. 336. See 3 W. R. 70 as to custody in non bailable cases pending orders of Government.

467. (1) Whenever an inquiry or a trial is postponed under section 464 or section 465, the Magistrate or Court as the case may be, may at any time resume the inquiry or trial, and require the accused to appear or be brought before such Magistrate or Court

(2) When the accused has been released under section 466 and the sureties for his appearance produce him to the officer whom the Magistrate or Court appoints in this behalf, the certificate of such officer that the accused is capable of making his defence shall be receivable in evidence

Note—While under s. 464 the examination of the medical witness is necessary the certificate of such officer is sufficient for a renewal of proceedings under sub-sec. (2) of this section.

Procedure on accused appearing before Magistrate or Court. **468.** (1) If when the accused appears or is again brought before the Magistrate or the Court as the case may be, the Magistrate or Court considers him capable of making his defence, the inquiry or trial shall proceed

(2) If the Magistrate or Court considers the accused † to be still incapable of making his defence, the Magistrate or Court shall again act according to the provisions of section 464 or section 465, as the case may be ‡ and if he the accused is found to be of unsound mind and incapable of making his defence shall deal with such accused in accordance with the provisions of section 466

Note.—1 Inquiry or trial should commence “de novo.”—When a trial is postponed on the ground of insanity of the prisoner, it should not be resumed at the point at which it was previously stopped but should be commenced *de novo*, when the Court finds him capable of making his defence, *Weir II, 382.*

469. When the accused appears to be of sound mind at the time of inquiry or trial, and the Magistrate is satisfied from the evidence given before him that there is reason to believe that the accused committed an act which, if he had been of sound mind, would have been an offence, and that he was at the time when the act was committed, by reason of unsoundness of mind incapable of knowing the nature of the act or that it was wrong or contrary to law, the Magistrate shall proceed with the case, and if the accused ought to be committed to the Court of Session or High Court, send him for trial before the Court of Session or High Court, as the case may be.

* Sub-sec. (2) was substituted for the original sub-sec. (2) by Act XVIII of 1923, s. 122

† The word “person” was omitted by *ibid*

‡ The words in inverted commas were added by Act XVIII of 1923

2 An author.

This pitch assistant writers do report, both define. *Writ*.
 3 A clerk in the East India Company service,
 who, after having served a certain number of years,
 becomes a factor. *Siamonda*

Writer of the talles (Eng. Law) An officer of the ex-
 chequer of England who sits as clerk to the auditor of
 the receipt, who writes upon the talles the whole letters
 of the talles bills. The use of talles in the exchequer
 has been abolished. *Wharton* — *Writer* to the signet,
 one of a class of lawyers in Scotland nearly correspond-
 ing to a notary and a notarial clerk in the American prac-
 tice — called also clerk to the signet

Writers to the signet derive their name from the
 circumstance that they were anciently clerks in the office
 of the signetary or sign. By whom writs were prepared
 and sealed under the royal signet or seal. And when the
 signet became employed in judicial proceedings they ob-
 tained a monopoly of the privilege of acting as agents or
 attorneys before the Court of Session. *Barrell*

Writer's-office (riv) n The office of a writer

Write (rit) v f [imp & p writen] WRITEN
 Write (rit) v p & (th) n WRITING (i) A
 scribble, to scribble write. See WRITING

1 To twist with violence, to distort, to writing
 His features even which he by a polysyllable. *Spenser*
 A writes staff his step unstable going. *Spenser*

2 To twist with violence, to distort, to writing
 Then thou first knew pain. *Shakespeare*
 Her mouth she twisted her forehead taught in frown. *Shakespeare*

3 To twist, to distort, to pervert
 His little wrinkles arms, and mighty hands. *Shakespeare*
 Lay naked on the wooden. *Shakespeare*

4 To twist, to distort, to pervert
 The reason which he fletcher sheweth the least part of his
 meaning is to be that where his words are written. *Shakespeare*

5 To twist, to distort, to pervert
 The soldier brought me to follow the example of their
 courage in which up money from them by every age he of
 attorney before the Court of Session. *Barrell*

Write (rit) v f 1 To twist, to distort, to pervert
 After every attempt, he felt that he had failed, and was
 with shame and vexation. *Shakespeare*

Write (rit) v f 2 To twist, to distort, to pervert
 To write with agency

Write (rit) v f 3 To twist, to distort, to pervert
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Write (rit) v f 26 To twist, to distort, to pervert
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Write (rit) v f 27 To twist, to distort, to pervert
 To write with agency

improper; mistaken; incorrect; as, the wrong side
 of a garment, to hold a book with the wrong end
 upward.

I have directed you both, I have directed you to wrong
 places. *Shakespeare*

2 Not suitable to the highest and best end, not
 morally right, deriving from rectitude, not just
 or equitable, not right or proper, not legal or
 righteous as a wrong practice, wrong ideas, wrong
 measures, wrong inclinations and desires, wrong
 judgment.

3 Not according to truth, erroneous, as, a wrong
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Wyvern

Wyvern (rit) n A mythical creature with the head and wings of a dragon and the tail of a lizard.

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Notes.—1. Committing Magistrate to inform jail authorities to place accused under careful surveillance.—Whenever a Magistrate, acting under this section, shall send for trial before the Court of Session an accused person regarding whose sanity at the time of committing the offence he entertains any doubt, he shall at the same time inform the jail authorities of the supposed state of the accused, in order that he may be placed under careful surveillance prior to his trial before the Court of Session.—*Bom H C Cr Cr*, p 18

2. A Magistrate rightly commits for trial at the Sessions, a prisoner charged with murder, whom he finds to be sane at the time of the preliminary investigation, although he was insane, when he committed the act 9 W. R. 23

470. Whenever any person is acquitted upon the ground that, at the time at which he is alleged to have committed an offence, he was, by reason of unsoundness of mind, incapable of knowing the nature of the act alleged as constituting the offence, or that it was wrong or contrary to law, the finding shall state specifically whether he committed the act or not.

Notes.—1. Acquittal on ground of lunacy.—"Nothing is an offence which is done by a person who, at the time of doing it by reason of unsoundness of mind is incapable of knowing the nature of the act or that he is doing what is either wrong or contrary to law" S 84, I P C.

2 Fact of unsoundness must be distinctly proved.—The fact of unsoundness of mind is one which must be clearly and distinctly proved before any jury is justified in returning a verdict under s. 84, I P C. Every man is presumed to be sane and to possess a sufficient degree of reason to be responsible for his crimes, until the contrary is proved, 20 W. R. 70 = 13 B. L. R. Appx. XX, *Ratanlal 172*, 1 W. R. 19; 1901 A. W. N. 132; 33 M. 550. See also *R v Oxford & St. Tr. (N.S.) 497*; *R v Stokes*, 3 C. and K. 185. Finding of acquittal within the terms of this section must be after a trial by a regularly constituted Court. So where the Sessions Judge without choosing assessors proceeded himself to try this point, took evidence and delivered judgment, the proceedings were quashed and a re-trial ordered with assessors, 5 N.-W. P. H. Cr. 110. See Note 1 to s 464

3 Procedure—discharge of accused.—When a Magistrate is of opinion that the accused is of sound mind at the time of the trial but was insane when he committed the act, he should not be discharged under s 253. Such a procedure is illegal and the Magistrate should have acted under this section and s. 471. *Weir II*, 582

4 Confession of guilt—Opinion (evidence) as to state of accused's mind.—The accused killed his brother in law, there being apparently no enmity or quarrel between them. His explanation was that he killed the deceased in order that he might die by the order of the public authorities and so go to heaven. No medical evidence had been taken as to whether the accused was or had been of unsound mind. *Held*, that the explanation if accepted as indicating the thoughts of the accused at the time of doing the act, did not fall within the definition of unsoundness of mind sufficient to excuse crime, inasmuch as it indicated a consciousness that the act was contrary to law. *Held* also, that it was expedient to have the opinion (evidence) of a medical witness as to state of accused's mind (past and present), *Weir II*; 583. See also 9 B. L. R. 171 = 17 Cr. L. J. 79

5 ... the English Judges to certain questions ... Cl. and Fin. 200 = 2 Eng Rep. 718, 4

1st—What is the law respecting alleged crimes committed by persons afflicted with insane delusion in respect of one or more particular subjects or persons, as, for instance, where at the time of the commission of the alleged crime the accused knew he was acting contrary to law, but did the act complained of with a view, under the influence of insane delusion, of redressing or revenging some supposed grievance or injury, or of producing some supposed public benefit?

2nd—What are the proper questions to be submitted to the jury when a person, alleged to be afflicted with insane delusion respecting one or more particular subjects or persons, is charged with the commission of a crime (murder for example), and insanity is set up as a defence?

3rd—In what terms ought the question to be left to the jury, as to the prisoner's state of mind at the time when the act was committed?

"4th.—If a person, under an insane delusion as to the existing facts, commits an offence in consequence thereof, is he thereby excused ?

"5th.—Can a medical man, conversant with the disease of insanity, who never saw the prisoner previously to the trial, but who was present during the whole trial and examination of all the witnesses, be asked his opinion as to the state of the prisoner's mind at the time of the commission of the alleged crime, or his opinion whether the prisoner was conscious, at the time of doing the act, that he was acting contrary to the law, or whether he was labouring under any and what delusion at the time ?

To these questions the Judges (with the exception of MAULE, J., who gave on his own account a more qualified answer) answered as follows —

To the 1st question — "Assuming that your Lordships' inquires are confined to those persons who labour under such partial delusions only, and are not in other respects insane, we are of opinion, that, notwithstanding the party did the act complained of with a view, under the influence of insane delusion of redressing or revenging some supposed grievance or injury, or of producing some public benefit, he is nevertheless punishable, according to the nature of the crime committed, if he knew, at the time of committing such crime, that he was acting contrary to law, by which expression we understand your Lordships to mean, the law of the land."


To the 2nd and 3rd questions — That the jury ought to be told in all cases that every man is presumed to be sane, and to possess a sufficient degree of reason to be responsible for his crimes, until the contrary be proved to their satisfaction, and that, to establish a defence on the ground of insanity, it must be clearly proved that, at the time of the committing of the act, the party accused was labouring under such a defect of reason, from disease of the mind, as not to know the nature and quality of the act he was doing or, if he did know it, that he did not know he was doing what was wrong. The mode of putting the latter part of the question to the jury on these occasions has generally been, whether the accused, at the time of doing the act, knew the difference between right and wrong, which mode, though rarely, if ever, leading to any mistake with the jury, is not, as we conceive, so accurate when put generally and in the abstract, as when put to the party's knowledge of right and wrong in respect to the very act with which he is charged. If the question were to be put as to the knowledge of the accused, solely and exclusively with reference to the law of the land, it might tend to confound the jury, by inducing them to believe that an actual knowledge of the law of the land was essential in order to lead to a conviction, whereas the law is administered upon the principle that everyone must be taken conclusively to know it, without proof that he does know it. If the accused was conscious that the act was one which he ought not to do, and if that act was at the same time contrary to the law of the land, he is punishable, and the usual course, therefore has been to leave the question to the jury, whether the party accused had a sufficient degree of reason to know that he was doing an act that was wrong, and this course we think, is correct, accompanied with such observations and explanations as the circumstance of each particular case may require.

To the 4th question — "The answer to this question must, of course, depend on the nature of the delusion, but making the same assumption as we did before that he labours under such partial delusion only, and is not in other respects insane, we think he must be considered in the same situation as to responsibility as if the facts with respect to which the delusion exists were real. For example, if, under the influence of his delusion he supposes another man to be in the act of attempting to take away his life and he kills that man, as he supposes, in self-defence, he would be exempt from punishment. If his delusion was that the deceased had inflicted a serious injury to his character and fortune, and he killed him in revenge for such supposed injury, he would be liable to punishment."

And to the last question — "We think the medical man, under the circumstances supposed, cannot in strictness be asked his opinion in the terms above stated, because each of those questions involves the determination of the truth of the facts deposed to which it is for the jury to decide, and the questions are not mere questions upon a matter of science, in which case such evidence is admissible. But where the facts are admitted and not disputed, and the question becomes substantially one of science only, it may be convenient to allow the question to be put in that general form, though the same cannot be insisted on as a matter of right." For decided cases in India on the subject, see 1 W. R. 1; 7 W. R. 64, 7 W. R. 42, 8 W. R. Cr. (Let.) 19; 23 C. 604; 10 B. 512, 12 M. 459; 22 C. 817; 14 B. 564; 10 C. W. N. 723; 34 C. 636; 8 P. R. 1339; 42 B. R. 1337; 16 P. W. R. 1909 — 94 P. L. R. 1909, the opinion of lay persons on the question of sanity is not of much value, 15 O. C. 321 — 14 Cr. L. J. 81.

balance sheet of 1967 was as follows:

PE A person in England is considered as **gent** in order to the gentry. The word is Latin used in the United States unless as a title in law proceedings and instruments designating occupation and this only in particular States.



[*kr* *groma*, from *guf*, to join } A
distance, varying in value from four to
at usually about five {*East* *South* } *es*

We're out of groceries and know nothing
 All our groceries have lighted holes
 The way to camp death.

We're day nine On the day last past, on the day

2 To give in return for labor expended, produce, as payment or interest on what is expended, as, money at interest yields six or ten per cent.

u, o, i u, a, y, long; u, ō, i, u, a, y, short, care, far, last, fall, what, there, very, term

5. Recommendation to Local Government to commute sentence.—Where the accused was not so insane as to gain the benefit of s. 84, I P C, but the Judge was of opinion that the accused was at the time of the commission of the crime suffering from mental derangement, the record was forwarded to the Local Government with a recommendation that the case may be dealt with under s 401, 23 C. 604; 10 B. 512; 16 P. W. R. 1909 = 11 Cr. L. J. 105. In 1914 U. B. R. III 28 = 16 Cr. L. J. 95 a mental derangement which fell short of unsoundness of mind described in s 84, I P C, was held to be a good ground for passing the lesser sentence. As to the Court's power to order detention of lunatic until orders from Government were received after acquittal in the trial, see 20 Bom. L. R. 629.

471. (1) Whenever "the finding" states that the accused person committed the act alleged, the Magistrate or Court before whom or which the trial has been held, shall, if such act would, but for the incapacity found, have constituted an offence, order such person to be detained † safe custody in such place and manner as the Magistrate or Court thinks fit, ‡ "and shall report the action taken to the Local Government" §

Person acquitted on such ground to be kept in safe custody

|| Provided that no order for the detention of the accused in a lunatic asylum shall be made otherwise than in accordance with such rules as the Local Government may have made under the Indian Lunacy Act, 1912

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Power of Local Government to relieve Inspector General of certain functions.

** (2) The Local Government may empower the officer in charge of the jail in which a person is confined under the provisions of section 466 or this section, to discharge all or any of the functions of the Inspector General of Prisons under †† section 473 or section 474

Note.—Original sub-secs (2) and (3) of s 471 were repealed by the *Indian Lunacy Act*, IV of 1912.

Note 1—**Scope of the section.**—Under the old section it was held that s. 471 of the Code does not compel the Court to send the accused to a lunatic asylum. All that is necessary is to see that such safeguards are taken as would keep the accused from mischief, 42 M. L. J. 72. See also 43 B. 134

In 43 B. 134 it was held that the Court can order under s 471 that the accused be detained in custody in jail until the further orders of Government and that the case be reported for further orders of Government. In 25 Bom. L. R. 286, 43 B. 134 was dissented from and it was held that under s. 471 the Court, in a case where it finds that an offence has been committed by a lunatic, must confine itself to making an order that he should be kept in safe custody. It is then for the Government to decide under their own powers the future fate of the person concerned and it was no duty of the Court to report the case for further orders of the Local Government as the last 12 words "and shall report the case for the orders of the Local Government" were repealed by Act X of 1914. Under the new amendment the words "and shall report the action taken to the Local Government" are newly added. Previously the words, "and shall report the case for orders of the Local Government" which occurred at the end of sub-sec (1) were held not to authorize the Court to send the accused to a lunatic asylum or jail, but the Court had to submit a report of the case to the Local Government. Now under the new amendment a Court is competent to direct the detention of the accused in an asylum or jail. After making such order, under the new amendment, the Court is required to submit a report to the Local Government of the action taken under s 471, so under the new amendment the Court can take action under s 471 without reporting the case for the orders of the Local Government.

2. High Court will not interfere with verdict of jury.—Where the question for decision is one on which all unprofessional opinion is likely to be equally good, the High Court expressed its unwillingness to interfere with the unanimous finding of a jury of educated men, come to on evidence before them, without the very clearest proof that they were mistaken. It is the duty of the Judge and not of the High Court to report the case for the orders of Government, 19 W. R. 43.

* The words in inverted commas were substituted for the words "such judgment" by Act XVIII of 1923

† The word "detained" was substituted for the word "kept" by 1914

‡ The words in inverted commas were inserted by 1914

§ The words "and shall report the case for the orders of the Local Government" were repealed by Act X of 1914

¶ The provision was inserted by 1914

** Or ainal subsections (2) and (3) were repealed by Act IV of 1912

†† Original subsection (1) was renumbered (4) by 1914

‡‡ The word and phrase "section 472" were repealed by Act X of 1914

3. Section should be applied to accused persons who labour under defects which make their trial impossible.—In 37 P. R. 1899 it was held that in accordance with English practice when the accused persons are not insane but labour under defects which render their trial impossible they should be treated as insane persons and confined during the King's pleasure. This was followed in 13 P. R. 1911 = 12 Cr. L. J. 613. See also 27 C. 365. In *R v Pritchard* 7 C. and P. 303, where a prisoner arranged on an indictment for felony, appeared to be deaf, dumb and also of non sane mind ALDERSON, B. put three distinct issues to the jury, directing the jury to be sworn separately on each (1) Whether the prisoner was mute of malice or by the visitation of God, (2) Whether he was able to plead, (3) Whether he was sane or not, and on the last issue they were directed to inquire whether the prisoner was of sufficient intellect to comprehend the course of the proceedings of the trial, so as to make a proper defence to challenge a juror to whom he might object, and to understand the details of the evidence and he directed the jury that if there was no certain mode of communicating to the prisoner the details of the evidence so that he could clearly understand them and be able properly to make his defence to the charge against him, the jury ought to find that he was not of sane mind. See also *R v Dyson*, 7 C. and P. 305; *R v Whitfield* 3 C. and K. 121. The directions in *R v Pritchard* were approved of in *R v Berry*, 1 Q. B. D. 447 and *Ex parte Emery*, (1909) 2 K. B. 81. In the last case the accused was totally deaf and unable to read or write. On being called on to plead he stood mute. The jury found that he was mute by visitation of God and being again sworn found that he was not capable of conducting his defence. It was held that this finding amounted to a finding that the accused was insane within the meaning of s. 2 of the *Criminal Lunatics Act*, 1800. *Archbold*, pp. 191—194.

472.

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Note 1.—Section 472 was repealed by the *Indian Lunacy Act* IV of 1912, s. 101 and Sch. II. Provision is now made for inspection of lunatics by ss 28—30 of the said Act.

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473. If such person is * “detained” under the provisions of section 466, and † “in the case of a person detained in a jail, the Inspector General of Prisons or, in the case of a person detained in a lunatic asylum the visitors of such asylum or any two of them” shall certify that in his or their opinion such person is capable of making his defence, he shall be taken before the Magistrate or Court, as the case may be at such time as the Magistrate or Court appoints, and the Magistrate or Court shall deal with such person under the provisions of section 468, and the certificate of such Inspector General or visitors as aforesaid shall be receivable as evidence

Procedure where lunatic prisoner is reported capable of making his defence

474. (1) If such person ‡ is ‘detained’ under the provisions of section 466 or section 471 and such Inspector-General or visitors shall certify that, in his or their judgment, he may be § “released” without danger of his doing injury to himself or to any other person the Local Government may thereupon order him to be § “released” or to be detained in custody or to be transferred to a public lunatic asylum if he has not been already sent to such an asylum, and, in case it orders him to be transferred to an asylum, may appoint a commission consisting of a judicial and two medical officers

Procedure where lunatic confined under s 466 or s. 471 is declared fit to be discharged.

(2) Such commission shall make formal inquiry into the state of mind of such person, taking such evidence as is necessary, and shall report to the Local Government, which may order his || “release” or detention as it thinks fit.

*— This word substituted for the word “confined” by Act XVIII of 1923

†— These words were substituted for the words “such Inspector-General or visitors” by *ibid*

‡— This word was substituted for the word “confined” by Act XVIII of 1923

§— This word was substituted for the word “discharged” by *ibid*

||— This word was substituted for the word “discharge” by *ibid*

*** 475.** (1) Whenever any relative or friend of any person detained under the provisions of section 466 or section 471 desires that he shall be delivered to his care and custody, the Local Government may, upon the application of such relative or friend and on his giving security to the satisfaction of such Local Government that the person delivered shall—

(a) be properly taken care of and prevented from doing injury to himself or to any other person, and

(b) be produced for the inspection of such officer, and at such times and places, as the Local Government may direct, and

(c) in the case of a person detained under section 466, be produced when required before such Magistrate or Court, order such person to be delivered to such relative or friend

(2) If the person so delivered is accused of any offence the trial of which has been postponed by reason of his being of unsound mind and incapable of making his defence, and the inspecting officer referred to in sub-section (1), clause (b), certifies at any time to the Magistrate or Court that such person is capable of making his defence, such Magistrate or Court shall call upon the relative or friend to whom such accused was delivered to produce him before the Magistrate or Court, and, upon such production the Magistrate or Court shall proceed in accordance with the provisions of section 468, and the certificate of the inspecting officer shall be receivable as evidence.

CHAPTER XXXV.

PROCEEDINGS IN CASE OF CERTAIN OFFENCES AFFECTING THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE

*** 476.** (1) When any Civil, Revenue or Criminal Court is, whether on application made to it in this behalf or otherwise, of opinion that it is expedient in the interests of justice that an inquiry should be made into any offence referred to in section 195, sub-section (1), clause (b) or clause (c), which appears to have been committed in or in relation to a proceeding in that Court, such Court may, after such preliminary inquiry, if any, as it thinks necessary record a finding to that effect and make a complaint thereof in writing signed by the presiding officer of the Court, and shall forward the same to a Magistrate of the first class having jurisdiction, and may take sufficient security for the appearance of the accused before such Magistrate or if the alleged offence is non bailable may, if it thinks necessary so to do, send the accused in custody to such Magistrate and may bind over any person to appear and give evidence before such Magistrate.

For the purposes of this sub-section a Chief Presidency Magistrate shall be deemed to be a Magistrate of the first class

(2) Such Magistrate shall thereupon proceed according to law and as if upon complaint made under section 200

(3) Where it is brought to the notice of such Magistrate, or of any other Magistrate to whom the case may have been transferred, that an appeal is pending against the decision arrived at in a judicial proceeding out of which the matter has arisen, he may, if he thinks fit, at any stage adjourn the hearing of the case until such appeal is decided

Note.—Referring to the amendment of this section, the Select Committee say—

“The changes that we have made in the proposed s. 476 are not of great importance. We have provided that a Court can act on application made to it or *suo motu* and after such preliminary inquiry, if any as it thinks necessary. For the words “committed before it or brought under its notice in the course of a

* Section 475 was substituted by Act XVIII of 1923

† Sections 476 (A) and 476 (B) were substituted for section 476 by Act XVIII of 1923

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judicial proceeding" we have substituted the phraseology used in the proposed new s. 195. We have substituted "may make a complaint" for "shall make a complaint" and in view of the criticism of the words "nearest first class Magistrate" we have provided that a complaint should be sent to a first-class Magistrate having jurisdiction. For the words "if he thinks expedient in the interests of justice, which we think might hamper a Magistrate in the exercise of his powers of adjournment, we have substituted 'if he thinks fit'. In order to give effect to the decision arrived at in our consideration of cl. 114 that proceedings under s. 476, etc., should be subject to revision, we have introduced words which will make it necessary for the Court to record an order.

The whole section has been redrafted by the recent amendment. And the changes made by the amendment are given in the Select Committee Report quoted above.

Under the new amendment, under s. 476 the Court can act on application made to it or *suo motu* and may make a complaint to a first-class Magistrate having jurisdiction. Under the old law it was not necessary to make a formal complaint and the Court could send the case for inquiry or trial to the nearest first class Magistrate. But under the new amendment it is necessary that such first class Magistrate should have jurisdiction to try the case.

Instead of "and committed before it or brought under its notice in the course of a judicial proceeding" the amending Act has substituted the words "which appears to have been committed in or in relation to a proceeding in that Court." The probable effect of this amendment is to widen in some respects and in other respects to restrict the scope of the section.

Sub-sec. (3) added by the amending Act gives power to a Magistrate to adjourn the hearing of a case until the decision of an appeal preferred over the proceeding out of which the matter arose.

ANALYSIS OF NOTES.

- I Scope of section. Notes 1—5
- II Courts empowered to act under this section. Notes 6—12.
- III Limit of time for taking action. Note 13
- IV In respect of what offences action may be taken. Notes 20—24
- V Points to be considered before taking action. Notes 25—35
- VI Necessity for preliminary inquiry. Notes 36—40
- VII Practice and Procedure of Court sending case. Notes 41—51
- VIII Jurisdiction and Powers of Court to whom case is sent. Notes 52—57
- IX. Revisions of Orders under this section. Notes 58—64
- X Stay of Proceedings. Notes 65—68
- XI Appeal. Note 69

I—SCOPE OF SECTION

Notes.—1 The changes introduced by the amendment.—The changes effected by the amendment are noted above, s. 476 had to be re-cast in view of the changes introduced in s. 195 under the amending Act (XVIII of 1923). Under s. 195 as amended the necessity of a sanction for the cognizance of certain offences mentioned in that section is dispensed with. Now s. 195 lays down the conditions necessary for the cognizance of certain offences by a Court. Under the old s. 195 a sanction or a complaint could be preferred by a Court of law. But now under that section as amended no sanction can be given. In short s. 195 now deals with the limitations that exist to the cognizance of offences by a Court.

Analysing s. 195 therefore it will be seen that under cl. (a) of sub-sec. (1) a complaint in writing of the public servant concerned or of some other public servant to whom he is subordinate, is now necessary for the cognizance of offences under ss. 172 to 188, I P C. The complaint referred to in cl. (a) is an ordinary complaint against an accused person, filed by the public officer concerned. The only difference being that there is no necessity of examining a public servant as complainant as provided in s. 200, sub-cl. (aa).

Clause (b) of s. 195 provides that offences under ss. 193 to 196, 199, 200, 205 to 211 and 223, I P C., can only be taken cognizance of on the complaint in writing of a Court concerned, under circumstances mentioned in cl. (b).

Clause (c) of s. 195 provides that in the case of ss. 463, 471, 475, 476, I P C., cognizance can only be taken on the complaint in writing of the Court concerned under circumstances mentioned in cl. (c).

As far as the complaints by public servants under cl. (a) are concerned, there is no section in the Code requiring any special procedure with regard to such complaints. The public servants concerned in the prosecution of offences mentioned in cl. (a) are reasonably expected to file a direct complaint against an accused person. (See Report of the Select Committee quoted at p. 440 under s. 195.)

But with regard to offences mentioned in cls. (b) and (c) a special procedure is laid down under s. 476. Under that section a Court can only proceed by making a complaint with regard to an offence which appears to have been committed in or in relation to a proceeding in that Court. It should be remarked that s. 476 is the only section that authorizes a Court to proceed against delinquents under cls. (b) and (c) of s. 195. It is already stated that now there can neither be a complaint nor a sanction under s. 195. See 25 Bom. L. R. 239.

A sanction to prosecute granted after September 1st, 1923, when the Criminal Procedure Code of 1898 was amended by Act XVIII of 1923, is illegal, (51 C. 652 followed) 26 Bom. L. R. 1233.

2. Under the old Code there was a conflict of decision as to the working of ss. 195 and 476. In some cases (e.g. 32 B. 184, 40 M. 100; 42 M. 540 (F.B.)) it was held that ss. 195 and 476 must be read together and were supplementary and not independent of each other. These cases held that s. 476 must be read along with s. 195 and the qualifications mentioned in s. 195 are to be treated as incorporated in the provisions of s. 476 and it was further held that an offence under s. 467, I P. C., committed by a person not a party to the proceeding does not come within the purview of s. 467 and therefore the Court is not competent to direct prosecution of such a person (40 M. 100). But in 32 M. 49, SANKARAN NAIR, J., held that s. 476 is a self-contained section and the power of the Court to direct a prosecution under s. 476 is not restricted by the circumstances mentioned in s. 195. Therefore it was held that under s. 476 a Court can direct the prosecution of a person for an offence under s. 467, I P. C., though he was not a party to the proceeding in that Court (32 M. 49; 40 A. 24; 18 B. 581; 14 Bom. L. R. 969; 34 C. 531), 40 A. 24.

Now under the present amendment of both the sections, it seems that the Legislature intends that both ss. 195 and 476 must be read together and that cls. (b) and (c) of s. 195 must be treated as incorporated in s. 476 and therefore s. 476 can only apply to those offences mentioned in s. 195 if they are committed by the person or in the circumstances mentioned therein, and therefore the Court is not competent to pass an order under s. 476 directing the prosecution of a person who is not a party to the proceeding for an offence under s. 467, I P. C. Under the present amendment s. 195 lays down the necessity of a complaint by specified persons for the cognizance of offences and s. 476 lays down the procedure that is to be followed in cases of offences mentioned in cls. (b) and (c) of s. 195. Therefore it is clear that s. 476 deals with the procedure required to be followed under s. 195. The cases holding contrary views on the interpretation of ss. 195 and 476 are however noted below.

3. Relation between ss. 195 and 476—

(i) *Is s. 476 supplementary to s. 195?*—Under cls. (b) and (c) of s. 195 it is open not only to the Court trying the case, but also to the Court to which such Court is subordinate either to grant a sanction or to prefer a complaint for the prosecution of the offender, although the superior Court may have had nothing to do with the trial of the case itself. How that complaint may be preferred is not stated in that section, but stated in s. 476 (1), because cl. (2) of this section says that the proceedings adopted by a Court under cl. (1) shall be treated as being in the nature of a complaint. 32 B. 184. "The confession that so often arises on this subject would disappear if Magistrates would regard the first three sub-sections of s. 195, the last four sub-sections of s. 195 and the two sub-sections of s. 476 as the three subdivisions of one section, the first laying down the two main subjects to be dealt with, sanctions and complaints, the second dealing with sanctions and the third with complaints," 9 N. L. R. 154 = 19 Cr. L. J. 33. But the Madras High Court has dissented from this view, 32 M. 49 (F.B.) where WHITE, C.J., expresses the opinion (at p. 54) that s. 476 is a self-contained section. Sub-sec. (1) gives the Court power to put the law in motion and sub-sec. (2) provides for the procedure to be followed when the law has been put in motion. SANKARAN NAIR, J., (at pp. 53-55) is also of opinion that an order under s. 476 is not a complaint under s. 195, but it is also open to a Court instead of following the procedure prescribed by s. 476 to present a complaint like any other ordinary person before a Magistrate. But MILLER, J., approves of 32 B. 184 and dissents from the view of the majority. See also 7 A. 871; 21 M. 124; 9 Bom. L. R. 1180 = 6 Cr. L. J. 326 and see Weir II, 596, where it was held that a Court is not precluded by this section from sanctioning the institution of a complaint by an officer of the Court or otherwise, instead of itself sending down the accused to a Magistrate of the first class.

(ii) "*Offence referred to in s. 195—The sections must be read together*—These words do not mean merely the offences covered by the sections of the I P C. mentioned in s. 195, but they mean the offences covered by those sections and committed under the qualifying circumstances mentioned in s. 195, a number of decisions is in favour of the view that the qualification mentioned in s. 195 (b) is to be treated as incorporated in the latter provision, (*see 7 C. L. J. 373 = 12 C. W. N. 575 = 7 Cr. L. J. 340; 5 C. W. N. 106*), but upon the question of the effect of cl. (c) of s. 195 upon s. 476, judicial opinion is divided (*see 18 B. 531; 22 C. 1004; 14 Bom. L. R. 968 = 13 Cr. L. J. 843; contra 15 M. 224, 37 C. 250*). In *18 M. L. T. 433 = 16 Cr. L. J. 797*, it was held following *15 M. 224*, that s. 476 applies only to those offences mentioned in s. 195 if they are committed by the person or in the circumstances mentioned therein and therefore a Court is not competent to pass an order under s. 476 directing the prosecution of a person not a party to the proceeding for an offence under s. 467, I P. C. *See 36 M. L. J. 443 (F.B.)*. The wider view held in *22 C. 1004; 18 B. 531; 14 Bom. L. R. 968 = 13 Cr. L. J. 843* and the dictum of SANKARAN NAIR, J., in *32 M. 49—57*, that s. 476 must be construed as being entirely self contained and that the offences mentioned in s. 195 must be referred to without any of the restrictions of qualifications that are to be found there as to the circumstances in which the offence is committed, was not adopted. *See also 12 P. R. 1905. See 21 Cr. L. J. 56.*

4. *Difference between complaint under s. 195 and order under s. 476.*—Where offences against public justice are committed, it will be well, if Courts availed themselves more fully of the provisions of this section, instead of leaving the prosecution to private parties who often use the sanction granted to them for the gratification of private ends, *26 B. 785*. In *Welz II, 589*, the proceedings of a Sessions Court according sanction under s. 195, of its own motion, without notice to the parties concerned and the forwarding of these proceedings to a District Magistrate, instead of to the nearest Magistrate of the first class were not viewed as taken under this section and were set aside as illegal.

(i) S. 195 is not confined to judicial proceedings while s. 476 is so restricted

(ii) A complaint may be made under s. 195 when the matter requires investigation, but an order under s. 476 can be passed only when a *prima facie* case is made out.

(iii) The complaint under s. 195 must be made before a Magistrate having jurisdiction under the ordinary provisions of the Code while s. 476 confers an exclusive jurisdiction on the 'nearest' first-class Magistrate who may not have any power to try if a complaint were laid before him under s. 195. *See Notes 52 and 53.*

(iv) The Magistrate to whom a case is sent under s. 476 has to dispose of the case after 'inquiry' or 'trial' as the case may be, but not upon the result of any investigation by a Police-officer, etc., as a Magistrate taking cognizance of a complaint under s. 195 is entitled to do under s. 203

(v) A first-class Magistrate cannot order an investigation into a case sent to him under s. 476 as there is no examination of the complainant

(vi) The High Court has power to revise the orders passed under s. 476 at least by Civil or Criminal Courts, but it has no power to reject or to direct the Magistrate to reject a complaint preferred under s. 195.—*Per SANKARAN NAIR, J., in 32 M. 49 at pp. 57-58.*

(vii) An order granting sanction is subject to an appeal under s. 195, while there is no appeal against an order under s. 476, *34 C. 551 (F.B.)*

(viii) A sanction or a complaint under s. 195 may be given or made at any time, but an order under s. 476 must be made promptly, *34 C. 551; 32 M. 49*

5. *Under the old section a Presidency Magistrate could not fall within the definition of a Magistrate of the first class as used in this section.*—But now under the present amendment by the addition of the last paragraph to sub-sec. (1). The Chief Presidency Magistrate is regarded as a Magistrate of the first class for purposes of this section. So rulings in *9 Bom. L. R. 1160 = 5 Cr. L. J. 326* and *32 M. 49 at p. 57*, have become obsolete.

5-A.—As to the relation between this section and s. 195, *see 17 Cr. L. J. 470, 475; 1 Pat. L. J. 298 = 18 Cr. L. J. 797.*

5-B. *Whether ss. 476 and 476-A apply to a forged document produced in Court, the person forging the document neither being a party to the proceeding nor producing the document in Court.*—A person who possibly forged the document which was produced in Court cannot be proceeded against under s. 476-A of the Code if there be no grounds for supposing that he did so for the purpose of using it in Court and there is nothing to show that it was he who used the document in Court, *28 C. W. N. 880.*

BAB

Supplement.

BEARER

II.—COURTS EMPOWERED TO ACT UNDER THIS SECTION.

6. **What is a Court?**—Notes 11 to 16 to s. 435 The word 'Court' in this section evidently means a Judge or body of Judges to whom the public administration of justice as regards any particular subject or subjects has been delegated by the Government. The test for deciding whether a particular officer is a Court does not depend upon whether he is empowered to take evidence, *e.g.*, an arbitrator or commissioner appointed to take evidence does not constitute a Court. There may be Courts like Appellate Courts who are not empowered to take evidence but decide upon evidence taken by others. There need not be two parties arrayed as opponents. The test is whether there was *alias* before the officer. See *R v Woodhouse*, (1906) 2 K. B. 501. He must have been given jurisdiction by the constituted authorities to deal out justice in any particular defined class of cases, 36 M. 72 approving 25 M. 121 where it was held that a Tahsildar acting under *Income-tax Act* III of 1869 was a Court as he was a tribunal empowered to deal with a particular matter and authorized to receive evidence bearing on that matter in order to enable him to arrive at a determination. See also 37 B. 365 where 17 C. 872 is followed and *Royal Aquarium v Parkinson*, (1892) 1 Q. B. 431.

A Court to which an application purporting to be under s. 83, Transfer of Property Act, is made is entitled under s. 476 of the Code to make a complaint with respect to documents filed with the application, 4 P. 24

6-A. **The Court which tried a case and not the Court in which the complaint was merely filed, is empowered under s. 476 to complain**—Where on a complaint having been transferred to another Court and dismissed under s. 203, the Magistrate before whom the complaint was filed took action under s. 476 for s. 211, I P C., and transferred the same for action to another Magistrate. Held, that the Court before which the complaint was filed had no jurisdiction to proceed under s. 476. If a complaint under s. 476 is to be made, it should be made by the Court which tried the case and not by the Court before which the complaint was merely filed. 30 C. W. N. 504.

7. **Section not applicable to Village Magistrates in Madras.**—Village Magistrates in the Madras Presidency are not bound in the circumstances mentioned in this section to follow the procedure laid down herein. A complaint of any offence referred to in s. 195, when made by a Village *Munsiff*, is, therefore, sufficient to give jurisdiction to the Magistrate complained to, to inquire into the offence—*M H C Pro*, 6th July, 1885

8 What are not Courts within the meaning of this section—

(i) **Registrar under the Land Registration Act III of 1877**—Having regard to the provisions of s. 483 a Registrar under the *Land Registration Act* III of 1877 is not a Court, Civil, Criminal or Revenue, within the meaning of this section, therefore if in an inquiry under s. 74 of the said Act, false evidence is given before him, he cannot send the offender to a Magistrate under this section, 2 C. W. N. 244. See Note 28 to s. 195

(ii) **Registration Officer under the Registration Act**—See 14 Bom. L. R. 970 = 13 Cr. L. J. 845; 16 Bom. L. R. 945 = 2 Bom. Cr. Ca. 264 = 16 Cr. L. J. 106. In 1 Bom. L. R. 686, the accused on the sanction of the District Registrar were prosecuted for giving false evidence and convicted and sentenced, but the High Court reversed the conviction and sentence on the ground that the statements being outside the question before the Registrar, viz., the execution of the documents, the District Registrar was not "acting in execution of that act." In 10 C. W. N. 222 = 2 C. L. J. 619 = 3 Cr. L. J. 112 it was held that a District Registrar is not a Court empowered to act under this section while holding a departmental inquiry into certain alleged irregularities against a Sub Registrar. Where a District Registrar on receipt of a complaint against a Sub-Registrar held a departmental inquiry, found the complaint to be false and made a report to himself as District Magistrate and in this latter capacity sanctioned prosecution of the complainant under ss. 182 and 211, I P C., held, whether he purported to act under s. 195 or s. 476 the order was bad. He could not take action under s. 476 as the alleged offence or offences could not be said to have been committed before him or brought to his notice as a Court in the course of a judicial proceeding, 11 C. L. J. 111 = 11 Cr. L. J. 212

Where the District Registrar who was also the District Magistrate found a certain document to be a forgery and ordered the prosecution of the party for an offence under s. 471, I P C., held that although the District Registrar was not a Civil Criminal or Revenue Court within the meaning of s. 476 of the Code, he could, as District Magistrate take cognizance of the offence under s. 190 (1) (c), and that the presentation of the document before the Sub-Registrar was a sufficient user of the document. 2 P. 459.

(iii) **Collector holding inquiry for determining who shall pay stamp duty, not a Court**—In 7 C. W. N. 793, a document was presented for registration to a Sub-Registrar who impounded and sent it to the Collector. The alleged executant, when called upon to pay the penalty, denied execution and the Collector ordered

a Deputy Collector to hold an inquiry On the report of the Deputy Collector that the document was a forgery, the Collector acting under this section, directed the prosecution of the person who presented the document for registration. *Held*, that neither the Collector nor the Deputy Collector acted as a Court in making the inquiry for determining who should be called upon to pay the stamp duty and penalty.

(iv) *Collector holding inquiry under s 46 of the Land Revenue Act (U P III of 1901)*.—A Collector holding an inquiry under s. 46 of the *Land Revenue Act* (U P III of 1901) acts merely as a Revenue Officer and not as a Court, 13 O. C. 193 = 11 Cr. L. J. 814.

(v) *Collector under the Land Acquisition Act*.—A Deputy Collector acting under the *Land Acquisition Act* is not a judicial officer, nor can he be properly regarded as a Revenue Court within the terms of this section. He has no authority given to him to administer an oath or require verification of claims. Therefore he cannot take cognizance of any offence committed in the course of proceedings before him and send the offenders to a Magistrate under this section, 27 C. 820 followed in 7 C. W. N. 249. See 6 A. 103

(vi) *Officer holding departmental or executive inquiry not a Court*.—See Note 19 See 15 A. L. J. 654.

(vii) *Election Commissioners are not a Court within the meaning of s. 476*, 47 A. 934 = 23 A. L. J. 845; 46 A. 611; 23 A. L. J. 355.

9. What Courts held competent to act under this section—

(i) *Income-tax Collector is a Court*.—In 36 M. 72 it was held that an Income-tax Collector holding an inquiry under the *Income-tax Act* is a Revenue Court. In 8 Bom. L. R. 477 = 4 Cr. L. J. 34, it was held that an Income-tax Collector is not a Court within the meaning of this section and not being a Court, the High Court was not competent to revise an order made by him purporting to be under this section. But in 33 B. 642 (F.B.) it was held that an Income-tax Collector was a Revenue Court within the meaning of cls. (b) and (c) of s. 195. In 44 P. R. 1905 = 187 P. L. R. 1905 = 3 Cr. L. J. 123, it was held that a Collector hearing objections to the assessment under the *Income-tax Act II* of 1886, is a Revenue Court and his proceedings are judicial proceedings so that an order made by him under this section, when he found a false declaration had been made to him within the meaning of s. 25 of the *Income-tax Act* is perfectly valid and though the High Court cannot revise such an order of the Collector, the Board of Revenue can. See also 4 A. L. J. 701 = 1907 A. W. N. 277 = 6 Cr. L. J. 350; 3 B. L. R. 66 = 10 Cr. L. J. 395 and Note 13 under s. 435. A Collector deciding an objection to the assessment of income-tax may possibly be regarded as a Revenue Court (44 P. R. 1905 = 3 Cr. L. J. 123) and an order arising out of the assessment proceedings if passed under s. 476 may be open to revision by the High Court but if the order for prosecution was passed not by the officer hearing, the objection but on his report by the Collector under s. 36 of the *Income-tax Act* such an order cannot be revised by the High Court (3 B. L. R. 66 = 10 Cr. L. J. 395, 15 Cr. L. J. 2 (Oadh). An Income-tax Officer adjudicating upon a petition for reduction of income-tax or hearing an appeal under the *Income-tax Act* is a Court.

(ii) *Officers under the Bengal Tenancy Act VIII of 1885*.—A Collector who is called on under the *Bengal Tenancy Act* to appraise crops, is a Court, 17 C. 872. Under Rule 40 of *Bengal Act VIII* of 1885 the Assistant Settlement Officer has all powers exercisable by a Civil Court in the trial of suits and receiving evidence on oath is within such power, 37 C. 52. A Sub-Divisional Officer to whom an inquiry under s. 53, cl. (3) of the *Tenancy Act* is transferred is competent to record a proceeding under this section, 40 C. 465, 43 C. 1086

(iii) *Mamlatdar's Court under Bombay Act II of 1906*.—A Mamlatdar's Court is competent to pass an order under s. 476, 15 Bom. L. R. 53 = 14 Cr. L. J. 80 where 5 B. 137; 4 Bom. L. R. 970; 9 Bom. L. R. 896 = 6 Cr. L. J. 225 and 14 Bom. L. R. 947 are referred to. See Note 36 (iv) at p. 501

(iv) *Magistrate holding an inquiry under the Legal Practitioners Act, 1879*.—A Magistrate holding an inquiry under s. 23 of the *Legal Practitioners Act*, 1879, is a Court, 9 A. L. J. 156 = 13 Cr. L. J. 190. See Note 16 (iii) (a) to s. 435

(v) *Tahsildar holding inquiry under Madras Act III of 1869*.—A Tahsildar when holding an inquiry as to whether a transfer of names in the land register should be made or not, is a Revenue Court and, as such, competent to act under this section, 24 M. 121. See Notes 36 at (i), p. 501

(vi) *Competency of first Court which has partly heard the case, to act under the section after the case is subsequently transferred to another Court*.—The circumstance that a case has passed out of hands of a Court, for instance, by an order of transfer, after it has been partly heard does not deprive

Cash'-boy, n In large retail stores a messenger who carries the money received by the salesmen from customers to a cashier, and returns the proper change [U &]
Cash'-mere', n A kind of dress goods for ladies' wear, made with a soft and glossy surface like cashmere
Cash, n [Add] 3 A pocket, a small box for jewels [Dor] Shak

tion of coral, ivory, tortoise-shell, amber, malachite, and the like. It is used in the manufacture of jewelry and many small articles.

Ce-lot'-o-my, *n.* [Gr. *ektomēnē*, from *ektō*, hernia, and *temnō*, to cut.] (Surg.) The act or operation of cutting, to relieve strangulated hernia.

Ce-nā'-thē, *n.* [From Gr. *cenē*, empty, and *thē* =

flower) (54) The absence of essential organs (stamens or pistils), a flat variety, one hundred pounds a seed of the United States a hundred weight

| | |
|---|--------------------|
| Cental, a {See supra} Re | * |
| a hundred weight, consists | |
| Cental system, the method of | * |
| hundred-weight | |
| Cent-tare, a {Fr. from Lat | * * * |
| area, a piece of level ground | |
| superfices, containing one square meter or about 1550 | sq. ft. of area or |

Centennial, *n.* [L*at*] 1 An occasion or celebration occurring once in a hundred years.
Centennial, *n.* A centennial occasion, the celebration of the one hundredth anniversary of any event. [U.S.]
Centennial, *n.* (Naut.) A small craft that sails

center-board, *n* (zén-tŕ) In small craft that ply in shallow waters, a board or plank keel, which may be drawn up or let down through a case, *a sliding keel* {U S}

center's fence, *n* The property or quality of tending to recede from the center, or of being centrifugal
R W Emerson

Cent'shop, n. A small retail shop where only articles costing a few cents are sold. {U S} 22

...marked both by
...in the structure of the hand,
...to which the rest of the body di-
...by its members to the mass of the

Мног, но крат и високот бивајќи во системот на лф-
древка, тој издвојувањето од степенот на
определеност, која карактеризира нејзината структура

CHU-kuh-kuh, n [*see* CHU] A noisy rattling sound, especially that of a rattle or of a rattlesnake. *CHU-kuh-kuh, n* [*see* CHU] A noisy rattling sound, especially that of a rattle or of a rattlesnake.

Ere-brain, *n.* [See cerebral] (Philo) The doctrine or theory that psychological phenomena are functions or products of the brain only.

Ere-brain'ist, *n.* One who accepts or teaches ere-

brain *n* [Lat. *cerebrum*, brain, and terminal -itis] {Pathol.} Inflammation of the cerebrum
brain-eroid *a* [Eng. *cerebrum*, and Gr. *elder*, form] Resembling or analogous to the cerebrum or brain
brain-er *n* [Lat. *crassus*, plant like wax, from *crere* wax, -reference to the spouts being easily bent]

CERASUS, *n.* A genus of plants of the rosaceæ family. They are natives of Central and South America, and some species produce beautiful flowers.
CERASIFERA, *a.* {**LAT.** *cera*, wax, and *ferre*, to produce }
 Producing wax
CERISE (*sau-ree'*), *a.* **FR.** a cherry. See CHERRY } Cherry

Pyrausta, *n*. See *CRUTCH*
Pyrausta, *n*. { *id* } Certified check, *a* bank-check,
the validity of which is certified by the bank on which
it is drawn
Pyrausta, *n*. } *a* The same as *CRUTCH*, 2.
Pyrausta, *n*. }

Thalassidroma, n. [See *ASTRID*] (*Zool*) The group of sea-birds; the *terodiles*.

Thalassidroma, n. [Lat *thalas*, and *Gr* *halas*, a lake and] (*Zool*) One of a tropical family of snake-like lizards (*Chelonia*), having four quite small and rudimentary

Chalcomphala, *n*. [Gr. *chalco*, bronze, and *Empyala*, *q*. *v*.] {*Ch*.} Copper flies, or yellow copper-
flies; a common size of copper, containing copper, iron, and sulphur.

Chan'cel'ery, n The office of a chancellor; chan-
cellorship

Chan'cery, n [Id.] To get or ~~put~~ in chan'cery
(flouring), is get the head of an ~~bird~~ under one's
left arm, so ~~that~~ one can peck ~~it~~ with the
one's

Change-singing, the continual production, without repetition, of such changes.
Chank, n. [Sk. *chankā*. See *CHANK*.] {*Chank*} The name of the touch-shell in Ceylon and elsewhere, as bordering on the Indian *Chank*.

§ 14-110d, Attendant of a chaplain or a
chaplain, protection afforded by a chaplain
chaplain, or (see CHAPTER, 2) To return with a
chaplain or with others E. Security
chaplain, or with others E. Security

conflict, distilled from aromatic herbs, — made at the monastery of La Grande Chartreuse, near Grenoble, France.

lucida (Linn.) (1759), n. [Fr. *lucide*, from *lucere*, to shine, the name of a real or fictitious character] The said to have made grotesque display of his talent to his fallen comrade, Napoleon I., in the presence of his adherents to an obscure slave (foreigner) who had been

hacksack, n. That strap to a horse's back
 heave, v. To throw or toss
 heave, n. [Aid] 4. Assurance; confidence
 heave, n. Impudent; character; trait
 heave, n. [Aid] 4. Assurance; confidence
 heave, n. Impudent; character; trait
 heave, n. [Aid] 4. Assurance; confidence
 heave, n. Impudent; character; trait

khimicheskii, π [for **khimicheskii** See **Chemistry**] The force exerted between the atoms of elementary substances whereby they unite to form chemical compounds, chemical attraction, affinity, — sometimes used as a general expression for chemical activity or relationship.

-mose *n* { } Chemical action taking place (Rev)
 An interesting membrane, electrocapillary
 membrane enable, *n* Pertaining to, or produced by
 the membrane (Rev)
 the quip's -accept, *n* An Italian gold coin, the same
 as a scudo and zecchino, *v*
 deri-mose, *n* { } *deri-mose* { } (Est) *deri-mose*

probably the copy of Scripture
was wing (*Ampelis Carolinensis*) -- so called from
its fondness for cherries.

(Fr had head, disc from skirt, hood,
the chest)

1997, 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014, 2015, 2016, 2017, 2018, 2019, 2020, 2021, 2022, 2023, 2024, 2025, 2026, 2027, 2028, 2029, 2030, 2031, 2032, 2033, 2034, 2035, 2036, 2037, 2038, 2039, 2040, 2041, 2042, 2043, 2044, 2045, 2046, 2047, 2048, 2049, 2050, 2051, 2052, 2053, 2054, 2055, 2056, 2057, 2058, 2059, 2060, 2061, 2062, 2063, 2064, 2065, 2066, 2067, 2068, 2069, 2070, 2071, 2072, 2073, 2074, 2075, 2076, 2077, 2078, 2079, 2080, 2081, 2082, 2083, 2084, 2085, 2086, 2087, 2088, 2089, 2090, 2091, 2092, 2093, 2094, 2095, 2096, 2097, 2098, 2099, 2100, 2101, 2102, 2103, 2104, 2105, 2106, 2107, 2108, 2109, 2110, 2111, 2112, 2113, 2114, 2115, 2116, 2117, 2118, 2119, 2120, 2121, 2122, 2123, 2124, 2125, 2126, 2127, 2128, 2129, 2130, 2131, 2132, 2133, 2134, 2135, 2136, 2137, 2138, 2139, 2140, 2141, 2142, 2143, 2144, 2145, 2146, 2147, 2148, 2149, 2150, 2151, 2152, 2153, 2154, 2155, 2156, 2157, 2158, 2159, 2160, 2161, 2162, 2163, 2164, 2165, 2166, 2167, 2168, 2169, 2170, 2171, 2172, 2173, 2174, 2175, 2176, 2177, 2178, 2179, 2180, 2181, 2182, 2183, 2184, 2185, 2186, 2187, 2188, 2189, 2190, 2191, 2192, 2193, 2194, 2195, 2196, 2197, 2198, 2199, 2200, 2201, 2202, 2203, 2204, 2205, 2206, 2207, 2208, 2209, 2210, 2211, 2212, 2213, 2214, 2215, 2216, 2217, 2218, 2219, 2220, 2221, 2222, 2223, 2224, 2225, 2226, 2227, 2228, 2229, 2230, 2231, 2232, 2233, 2234, 2235, 2236, 2237, 2238, 2239, 2240, 2241, 2242, 2243, 2244, 2245, 2246, 2247, 2248, 2249, 2250, 2251, 2252, 2253, 2254, 2255, 2256, 2257, 2258, 2259, 2260, 2261, 2262, 2263, 2264, 2265, 2266, 2267, 2268, 2269, 2270, 2271, 2272, 2273, 2274, 2275, 2276, 2277, 2278, 2279, 2280, 2281, 2282, 2283, 2284, 2285, 2286, 2287, 2288, 2289, 2290, 2291, 2292, 2293, 2294, 2295, 2296, 2297, 2298, 2299, 2300, 2301, 2302, 2303, 2304, 2305, 2306, 2307, 2308, 2309, 2310, 2311, 2312, 2313, 2314, 2315, 2316, 2317, 2318, 2319, 2320, 2321, 2322, 2323, 2324, 2325, 2326, 2327, 2328, 2329, 2330, 2331, 2332, 2333, 2334, 2335, 2336, 2337, 2338, 2339, 2340, 2341, 2342, 2343, 2344, 2345, 2346, 2347, 2348, 2349, 2350, 2351, 2352, 2353, 2354, 2355, 2356, 2357, 2358, 2359, 2360, 2361, 2362, 2363, 2364, 2365, 2366, 2367, 2368, 2369, 2370, 2371, 2372, 2373, 2374, 2375, 2376, 2377, 2378, 2379, 2380, 2381, 2382, 2383, 2384, 2385, 2386, 2387, 2388, 2389, 2390, 2391, 2392, 2393, 2394, 2395, 2396, 2397, 2398, 2399, 2400, 2401, 2402, 2403, 2404, 2405, 2406, 2407, 2408, 2409, 2410, 2411, 2412, 2413, 2414, 2415, 2416, 2417, 2418, 2419, 2420, 2421, 2422, 2423, 2424, 2425, 2426, 2427, 2428, 2429, 2430, 2431, 2432, 2433, 2434, 2435, 2436, 2437, 2438, 2439, 2440, 2441, 2442, 2443, 2444, 2445, 2446, 2447, 2448, 2449, 2450, 2451, 2452, 2453, 2454, 2455, 2456, 2457, 2458, 2459, 2460, 2461, 2462, 2463, 2464, 2465, 2466, 2467, 2468, 2469, 2470, 2471, 2472, 2473, 2474, 2475, 2476, 2477, 2478, 2479, 2480, 2481, 2482, 2483, 2484, 2485, 2486, 2487, 2488, 2489, 2490, 2491, 2492, 2493, 2494, 2495, 2496, 2497, 2498, 2499, 2500, 2501, 2502, 2503, 2504, 2505, 2506, 2507, 2508, 2509, 2510, 2511, 2512, 2513, 2514, 2515, 2516, 2517, 2518, 2519, 2520, 2521, 2522, 2523, 2524, 2525, 2526, 2527, 2528, 2529, 2530, 2531, 2532, 2533, 2534, 2535, 2536, 2537, 2538, 2539, 2540, 2541, 2542, 2543, 2544, 2545, 2546, 2547, 2548, 2549, 2550, 2551, 2552, 2553, 2554, 2555, 2556, 2557, 2558, 2559, 2560, 2561, 2562, 2563, 2564, 2565, 2566, 2567, 2568, 2569, 2570, 2571, 2572, 2573, 2574, 2575, 2576, 2577, 2578, 2579, 2580, 2581, 2582, 2583, 2584, 2585, 2586, 2587, 2588, 2589, 2590, 2591, 2592, 2593, 2594, 2595, 2596, 2597, 2598, 2599, 2600, 2601, 2602, 2603, 2604, 2605, 2606, 2607, 2608, 2609, 2610, 2611, 2612, 2613, 2614, 2615, 2616, 2617, 2618, 2619, 2620, 2621, 2622, 2623, 2624, 2625, 2626, 2627, 2628, 2629, 2630, 2631, 2632, 2633, 2634, 2635, 2636, 2637, 2638, 2639, 2640, 2641, 2642, 2643, 2644, 2645, 2646, 2647, 2648, 2649, 2650, 2651, 2652, 2653, 2654, 2655, 2656, 2657, 2658, 2659, 2660, 2661, 2662, 2663, 2664, 2665, 2666, 2667, 2668, 2669, 2670, 2671, 2672, 2673, 2674, 2675, 2676, 2677, 2678, 26

[illegible]

and

more than thirty feet in length carrying a single sail
 Cich'cha sin (bān) n The receptacle placed behind
 the dirt that is washed in
 Cich'wa fer n A catch-drain

derives his exalted position from the
civilization which characterizes his
ceph a-lōm'e-ter u (Or cephal
a measure) (Sura

traveler } A variety of red clay from the American
the red in the Upper Missouri river } the Colorado d.

species produce beautiful flow
erful and [Lat. area u
ax
oz) a [Fr. acher

See KRASLITS
[Ad 1] Cert. Fed. check a bank-check
which is certified by the bank on which

CHEMICAL *n* [From chemistry and Gr *chemia* = mixture] Chemical action takes place through an intervening membrane electro-capillary [Am.]
CHEMO-STATIC, *a* pertaining to or producing chemostasis
CHEQUIN (*'keent*) *n* An Italian gold coin the same as equino and tech *n* q v
CHICKEN - *n*

Cavalier n {see CAVALIER} A gallant aruke, a
 knight to Master Bardolph and to all the crew about
 the tavern. {see CAVERN} To hollow out
 a cavity in a cavern or caverns. R W 50 as

100 BARS OF CRYSTAL 2
100 BARS OF CRYSTAL 2

The same as Exercise 2.

Pro Cause

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1548

Contra—Punjab.—It is only the individual Judge or Magistrate before whom the offence was committed in Court who can take action under this section (34 C. 551 and 35 C. 114 *followed*, 29 M. 331 *not followed*). 6 P. R. 1909 = 12 P. W. R. 1909 = 10 Cr. L. J. 158 = 17 Cr. L. J. 40. It was *held* in 10 P. L. R. 1911 = 4 P. W. R. 1911 = 12 Cr. L. J. 68 (*following* 35 C. 114 and 6 P. R. 1909) that even where the preliminary inquiry has been commenced by the proper officer who issued that notice, his successor cannot be competent to complete the inquiry and pass an order under s. 476, but *see* 4 Lah. 58.

The word "Court" in s. 476 of the Code includes the successor of a Judge before whom the alleged offence was committed or to whose notice the commission of it was brought in the course of a judicial proceeding, and therefore it was held that the successor of the Sessions Judge could direct a prosecution under s. 476 though the alleged false evidence was given before his predecessor, 4 Lah. 58. *See* 7 Lah. 108.

11. Powers of Appellate Court to institute proceedings under this section.—Under the old section it was held that where a Subordinate Judge refuses to grant sanction, a District Judge has on appeal, jurisdiction to take action under this section, but in so doing, he should himself proceed according to sub-sec. (b) of s. 195 read with this section, 32 B. 154 where 34 C. 551 (F.B.) is *dissented from*. It is not competent to the District Judge to direct the Subordinate Judge to prosecute the offender. On disposal of an appeal, it is competent to the Court of First Instance as also to the Court of Appeal to take action under this section, 16 C. L. J. 569 = 14 Cr. L. J. 32. But it is an unusual and not a proper procedure for an Appellate Court, which did not hear the evidence, to order the prosecution for perjury of a witness for making false statements in his deposition in the Lower Court on materials in support of the prosecution, which were not before the Lower Court and which the witness had no opportunity for explaining while in the box, 10 C. W. N. 1091 = 4 Cr. L. J. 219. But *see* now s. 476 A which expressly authorizes the Appellate Court to take action under s. 476.

12. Powers of High Court in revision to take steps under this section.—In 11 A. L. J. 113 = 14 Cr. L. J. 127, the High Court in revision set aside an order under s. 195 and directed proceedings under s. 476. In 37 C. 13 it was *held* on the authority of 34 C. 551 that a District Judge was not competent while dealing with an application under s. 195 (6) to set aside the sanction and himself take steps under this section and the Full Bench ruling prevented the High Court as much as a District Judge from taking action under s. 476. In view, however, of 37 C. 642 (F.B.) this case cannot be regarded as good authority. Calling up records under s. 435 is not a judicial proceeding, 7 M. 560 (*see* Note 21 to s. 435) and therefore a District Magistrate has no power to make an order under this section merely on calling up the records. In this case the application was made after the lapse of one year from the termination of the case in which the offence was committed in the Sub Magistrate's Court. *See* 1908 A. W. N. 74 = 5 A. L. J. 582 = 7 Cr. L. J. 304. *See* also the Select Committee Report in the preliminary note, *supra*.


Since the amendment of the Code by Act XVIII of 1923 the power of private prosecution is taken away in connection with offences relating to proceedings in Court and the amended Code has given a definite right of appeal against complaints drawn up by Courts as a general rule it is inadvisable for the High Court to interfere in revision with an appellate order refusing to withdraw complaints. 7 Lah. 103; 26 Bom. L. R. 289.

III.—LIMIT OF TIME FOR TAKING ACTION.

13. Appropriate time for making an order under this section.—There is nothing in this section either impliedly or expressly limiting the time within which action under s. 476 should be taken. All that can be said is that the offences in respect of which action has to be taken being offences against the administration of justice, prompt action is desirable. At the same time, the Court will have to take into consideration the advisability of taking action before the proceedings in which the offence is committed are concluded or before the appeal in any such proceedings is over or before the connected civil litigation is disposed of except in Madras and in some cases in Calcutta, the other High Courts are of opinion, that no time limit ought to be imposed for the Courts to act under this section.

Madras.—The power conferred by this section can be exercised by the Court only in the course of the judicial proceeding or at its conclusion, or so shortly after as to make it really the continuation of the same proceeding in the course of which the offence was committed or brought to its notice. 32 M. 45 (F.B.); 31 M. 140 (F.B.) MILLER, J., however, who *dissented* from the majority view was of opinion that though the section contemplates immediate action, it does not expressly or impliedly exclude what may be called action subsequent. The words 'when the Court is of opinion' are wide enough to embrace any point of time at which the opinion is formed whether during or after the close of the proceedings and there is nothing in the rest of the section to

Coelenterata in 21 [67 under hollow and *Leptasterias* in 21



Body
and water
surface
for water for
other water
to water
to water
for water

indicate that the opinion must in all cases be formed as soon as the offence is committed, 31 M. 140 at p. 150 and 32 M. 49 at p. 53. See also 15 M. L. J. 439 = 3 Cr. L. J. 118; (1911) 2 M. W. N. 98 = 12 Cr. L. J. 327. In 36 M. 72, SUNDARA IYER, J., with whom SADASIVA IYER, J., concurred, was of opinion that delay in directing the prosecution cannot be regarded as one of entire absence of jurisdiction in the Court in passing the order. "The Court has inherent jurisdiction to make the order. Taking it that it is bound to do so at a particular time it is not easy to say that the passing of the order after the lapse of time would be a ground for holding it to be made without jurisdiction. At any rate I do not think that the High Court would be bound to quash the proceedings on account of a defect of jurisdiction of this character." A delay of five days is not material, if proceedings are taken within reasonable promptitude, that is, so shortly after the conclusion of the proceedings as to make it practically the continuation of the same proceeding, it will suffice, (1912) M. W. N. 1206 = 13 Cr. L. J. 823. In 17 Cr. L. J. 515 it was held that action under this section could be taken while the proceedings are not finished, 44 M. 422 (F.B.)

Illustrations—(a) A witness was examined on the 17th September and judgment was delivered on the 8th October. On the 29th October the Judge issued notice to the witness why he should not be prosecuted. The witness's explanation was received on the 15th November and the order for prosecution was made on the 16th November held by the Full Bench that the order made after an interval of three weeks was made without jurisdiction 32 M. 49 (MILLER, J., dissenting), 31 M. 140 (F.B.) followed and 32 B. 185 not followed (b) On information given to the Police by the petitioner an investigation was made and a preliminary inquiry held on the conclusion of which on the 11th July, the accused was discharged. On the 23rd August, the District Magistrate refused to set aside the order of discharge. On 25th September, a notice to show cause was issued and on the 3rd November an order was made for the prosecution of the complainant under s. 211, I P C., held by the Full Bench (MILLER, J., dissenting) that the order was without jurisdiction, 31 M. 140 following Weir II, 597; 15 M. L. J. 439 = Weir II, 601-A and 34 C. 551; 29 M. 331 considered. See 25 M. L. T. 18 where the last case was followed. (c) In the absence of anything to show that the Magistrate's order under s. 476 is part of the proceedings in the trial in which the alleged offence was committed, it is made without jurisdiction, 6 M. L. T. 92 = 10 Cr. L. J. 8, 8 M. L. T. 81 = 11 Cr. L. J. 479. (d) During the pendency of an execution case which was dismissed on 27th July, 1911 it was brought to the notice of the Judge that an offence under s. 186, I P C., had been committed. On an application for sanction, order was made on the 25th November under this section held, order bad 25 M. L. J. 593 = 14 M. L. T. 512 = 1913 M. W. N. 1002 = 14 Cr. L. J. 624. (e) Where in execution proceedings a District Munsiff passed an order under s. 476 not of his own motion, but on the suggestion of the District Judge 19 days after the termination of the execution proceedings, held the delay was fatal to the validity of the order 10 M. L. T. 333 = 12 Cr. L. J. 496. See also 13 Cr. L. J. 283, where proceedings were instituted five months after close of trial.

Calcutta.—Action under this section should, as far as possible, be prompt and expeditious, 37 C. 642. The power conferred by s. 476 is exercisable only at or immediately after the conclusion of the trial in which the offence was committed. "The terms of s. 476 indicate that the desirability of prosecuting the offender must be present to the mind of the Court during the proceedings in the course of which the offence was committed or brought to its notice. It was never intended that when the proceedings had terminated, the attention of the Court should be subsequently drawn by some private person to the fact that in those proceedings there had been committed some offence in contempt of the Court's authority or against public justice which deserved punishment. The commission of the offence and the desirability of a prosecution should be so patent as to move the Court at the time to take action without the stimulus of an application by some interested person"—GEIDT, J., in 34 C. 551 (F.B.) quoted with approval by WHITE, C.J., in 31 M. 140. See also 40 C. 444.

Illustrations—(a) An order made four months after a criminal trial had concluded, by the successor in office of the Magistrate who had tried the case directing the prosecution under s. 476 is bad, 34 C. 551. (b) The petitioner laid an information before the Police which the Police reported to be false. On this report the Deputy Commissioner directed a judicial inquiry into the matter by a Deputy Magistrate who, after inquiry came to the conclusion that the information was false and submitted his report on the 4th February, 1908, to the Deputy Commissioner for orders, who ordered the prosecution of the petitioner under s. 211, I P C. The order was set aside by the High Court following 33 C. 30 as one made without jurisdiction and the record was returned to the Deputy Magistrate. The Magistrate again inquired into the matter and on the 14th August, 1908, ordered the prosecution of the petitioner, held, the order was legal, 13 C. W. N. 128 = 11 Cr. L. J. 4. ~

Clashed, a Inclosed in a cyst.
 Still etc, n A small cyst

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indicate that the opinion must in all cases be formed as soon as the offence is committed, 31 M. 140 at p. 150 and 32 M. 99 at p. 53. See also 15 M. L. J. 489 = 3 Cr. L. J. 118; (1911) 2 M. W. N. 99 = 12 Cr. L. J. 327. In 36 M. 72, SUNDARA IYER, J., with whom SADASIVA IYER, J., concurred, was of opinion that delay in directing the prosecution cannot be regarded as one of entire absence of jurisdiction in the Court in passing the order "The Court has inherent jurisdiction to make the order. Taking it that it is bound to do so at a particular time it is not easy to say that the passing of the order after the lapse of time would be a ground for holding it to be made without jurisdiction. At any rate I do not think that the High Court would be bound to quash the proceedings on account of a defect of jurisdiction of this character." A delay of five days is not material, if proceedings are taken within reasonable promptitude, that is, so shortly after the conclusion of the proceedings as to make it practically the continuation of the same proceeding, it will suffice, (1912) M. W. N. 1206 = 13 Cr. L. J. 825. In 47 Cr. L. J. 515 it was held that action under this section could be taken while the proceedings are not finished, 45 M. 422 (F.B.)

Illustrations—(a) A witness was examined on the 17th September and judgment was delivered on the 8th October. On the 29th October the Judge issued notice to the witness why he should not be prosecuted. The witness's explanation was received on the 15th November and the order for prosecution was made on the 16th November, held by the Full Bench that the order made after an interval of three weeks was made without jurisdiction, 32 M. 49 (MILLER, J., dissenting) 31 M. 140 (F.B.), followed and 32 B. 184 not followed (b) On information given to the Police by the petitioner an investigation was made and a preliminary inquiry held at the conclusion of which on the 11th July, the accused was discharged. On the 28th August, the District Magistrate refused to set aside the order of discharge. On 25th September, a notice to show cause was issued and on the 3rd November an order was made for the prosecution of the complainant under s. 211, I P C., held by the Full Bench (MILLER, J., dissenting) that the order was without jurisdiction, 31 M. 140 following Weir II, 597; 15 M. L. J. 499 = Weir II, 601-A and 34 C. 551; 29 M. 331 considered. See 29 M. L. T. 18 where the last case was followed. (c) In the absence of anything to show that the Magistrate's order under s. 476 is part of the proceedings in the trial in which the alleged offence was committed, it is made without jurisdiction, 6 M. L. T. 92 = 10 Cr. L. J. 8; 8 M. L. T. 81 = 11 Cr. L. J. 479. (d) During the pendency of an execution case which was dismissed on 27th July, 1911 it was brought to the notice of the Judge that an offence under s. 186, I P C., had been committed. On an application for sanction, order was made on the 25th November under this section, held, order bad 25 M. L. J. 593 = 14 M. L. T. 512 = 1913 M. W. N. 1002 = 14 Cr. L. J. 625. (e) Where in execution proceedings a District Munsiff passed an order under s. 476 not of his own motion, but on the suggestion of the District Judge 19 days after the termination of the execution proceedings, held the delay was fatal to the validity of the order 10 M. L. T. 333 = 12 Cr. L. J. 496. See also 13 Cr. L. J. 283, where proceedings were instituted five months after close of trial.

Calcutta.—Action under this section should, as far as possible be prompt and expeditious, 37 C. 662. The power conferred by s. 476 is exercisable only at or immediately after the conclusion of the trial in which the offence was committed. The terms of s. 476 indicate that the desirability of prosecuting the offender must be present to the mind of the Court during the proceedings in the course of which the offence was committed or brought to its notice. It was never intended that when the proceedings had terminated, the attention of the Court should be subsequently drawn by some private person to the fact that in those proceedings there had been committed some offence in contempt of the Court's authority or against public justice which deserved punishment. The commission of the offence and the desirability of a prosecution should be so patent as to move the Court at the time to take action without the stimulus of an application by some interested person.—GEIDT, J., in 34 C. 551 (F.B.) quoted with approval by WHITE, C.J., in 31 M. 140. See also 40 C. 414.

Illustrations—(a) An order made four months after a criminal trial had concluded, by the successor in office of the Magistrate who had tried the case directing the prosecution under s. 476 is bad, 34 C. 551. (b) The petitioner laid an information before the Police which the Police reported to be false. On this report the Deputy Commissioner directed a judicial inquiry into the matter by a Deputy Magistrate who, after inquiry came to the conclusion that the information was false and submitted his report on the 4th February, 1908, to the Deputy Commissioner for orders, who ordered the prosecution of the petitioner under s. 211, I P C. The order was set aside by the High Court following 33 C. 30 as one made without jurisdiction and the record was returned to the Deputy Magistrate. The Magistrate again inquired into the matter and on the 14th August, 1908, ordered the prosecution of the petitioner, held, the order was legal, 13 C. W. N. 289 = 11 Cr. L. J. 4.

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Allahabad—There is nothing in s. 476 which requires a Court to take action, if at all, immediately after the conclusion of the case in which the offences are said to have been committed or within any fixed time thereafter, 37 A. 344, where the Madras decisions were referred to and not followed. Except under very special circumstances, proceedings under s. 476 should be taken at an early date after the decision of the original case, 11 Cr. L. J. 20 (A.) Though it is desirable that any action taken under s. 476 should be as prompt as possible, yet, s. 476 lays down more than one starting point from which such action should be taken, 6 A. L. J. 392 = 9 Cr. L. J. 219. See also 10 A. L. J. 247 = 13 Cr. L. J. 707; 34 A. 393; 1901 A. W. N. 177.

Illustrations—(a) An *ex parte* decree of 1907 was transferred from Court A to Court H for execution against judgment debtor N. In execution, N's objections were overruled and he was imprisoned and released in April, 1908. Another decree against N was transferred from Court B to H, in proceedings in execution of that decree in August, 1908, the Court at H found on inquiry that both the suits against N were false suits brought at the instigation of G and committed him for trial under ss. 210, 109, 467/109, 471/109 and 468/109, *he d.*, that the committal was good. The words "brought under its notice" were wide enough to cover an offence which may have been committed in another *forum* and on some previous occasion provided it is brought under the notice of the Court inquiring and making an order under s. 476. The judgment of GEIDT, J., in 34 C. 551 (F.B.) approved, 81 M. 140 and 9 C. W. N. 859 discussed and not followed, 6 A. L. J. 392 = 9 Cr. L. J. 219. (b) A District Magistrate's order giving sanction refused by a Sub-Magistrate was set aside by the High Court for want of notice to accused. Thereafter the District Magistrate instituted proceedings under s. 476. Held, order bad, 11 Cr. L. J. 20 (A.) (c) See also 1 A. L. J. 315 and 333. In the former a Magistrate after ceasing to preside over the Court and while engaged on some other duty in the same district made an order under this section in respect of a case tried by him. In the latter, a complainant was prosecuted under s. 211 and acquitted. After the acquittal the same Magistrate who accorded sanction for the prosecution, now acting in the capacity of a District Magistrate ordered the prosecution of the complainant for perjury. In both cases the order was set aside as calculated to bring the administration of justice into contempt. (d) The High Court in revision against an order granting sanction under s. 195 set aside the order and directed proceedings under s. 476, 11 A. L. J. 113 = 14 Cr. L. J. 127.

Bombay.—There is nothing in the language of the section which makes it incumbent upon a Court acting under it to exercise the power within any period or at any particular time. Such a construction necessitates the importing into the section of words which are not there, and for which there is no necessary implication from the language used by the Legislature, 32 B. 184 at p. 190. See also 13 B. 384 and 34 B. 83. 20 Bom. L. R. 998; 43 B. 300.

Sindh.—It will be found on careful perusal extremely difficult to extract from the words of the section any provision either impliedly or expressly limiting the time within which action should be taken. No limitation has been imposed to prevent a prosecution being filed in the ordinary way under s. 195 and it is difficult to see why it should have been thought necessary to limit the more convenient procedure under s. 476, 7 S. L. R. 187 = 15 Cr. L. J. 511 where the Bombay view was followed. See 17 Cr. L. J. 77.

Punjab.—See 83 P. L. R. 1916; 29 P. R. 1916 (Cr.).

IV.—IN RESPECT OF WHAT OFFENCES ACTION MAY BE TAKEN?

14. The offence must be one 'referred to in s. 195'—Scope of 'any offence referred to in s. 195'.—See Notes 2 and 3, *supra*. There is a conflict of authority as to whether these words mean only the offences covered by the sections of the I. P. C. mentioned in s. 195 or do they mean the offence mentioned in those sections and committed under the qualifying circumstances described in s. 195. So far as the effect of cl. (b) of s. 195 upon s. 476 is concerned, the authorities are in favour of the view that the qualification mentioned in the former section is to be treated as incorporated in the latter. See 7 C. L. J. 373 = 12 C. W. N. 575 = 7 Cr. L. J. 340 and 5 C. W. N. 106. Therefore no order for prosecution can be made under s. 476 when the alleged offence under s. 211, I. P. C., has been committed in the course of a Police investigation and not in reference to any proceeding in a Court, 14 C. W. N. 339 = 10 C. L. J. 568 = 11 Cr. L. J. 37, *distinguishing* 7 C. L. J. 371 = 7 Cr. L. J. 333 and 33 C. 30. As to the question of effect of cl. (c) of s. 195, 13 B. 531 and 22 C. 1004 hold the view that the qualifying circumstances mentioned in s. 195 are not to be incorporated in ss. 476 and 478 so that the Court has jurisdiction to proceed under s. 478 whether the offence of forgery was committed by a party to the proceeding or by a witness or whether it has been committed in respect of a document merely produced, but not given in evidence. See also 12 P. R. 1897. But the Madras High Court in 15 M. 224 has held that the qualification

Crown-shell n. (Zool.) See ACORN SHELL.

Cryptocerythral line, a. [From Gr. *κρυπτός*, hidden

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s. (Bot.) f
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Cyrene n.
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is fed a. Inclosed in a cyst
is the ele. n. A small cyst
is the n. [From Gr. *κύριος* a |
and *κύριος* to hold.] (Zool.) The ^{the} ~~the~~ pro-
independent life a mass of pro-
nucleus thus differing from the a
nuclei are present. A free in ag-
is to plasma n. [From Gr. *κίνησις* a
motion a hold.] The same but t
is more generally known as pro-
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mentioned in s 195, cl (c), makes s. 476 inapplicable if the offence under s 471, I P C., has been committed in respect of a document not given in evidence. *See* Notes 24, 159 and 160 to s 195. *See also* Note 7 to 195.

15. Is it necessary that the person whose prosecution is ordered must be a party or witness in the proceedings?—*See* Notes 2 and 3, *supra*. It should be noted that under the present amendment, it appears to be intended by the Legislature that ss 195 and 476 must be read together. Section 476 is supplementary to s. 195 and all the qualifications mentioned in s 195, cls. (b) and (c) of sub-section (1) must be treated as incorporated in s. 476. Therefore, s 476 can apply to those offences mentioned in s. 195 if they are committed by the persons or in the circumstances mentioned therein and therefore a Court may not be competent to pass an order under s 476 directing the prosecution of a person who is not a party to the proceeding in the case of an offence mentioned in cl. (c) of sub-sec. (1), s. 195. So it is submitted that the decision in 43 B. 300 holding that under s. 476, a Court can direct the prosecution of a person who is not a party can no longer be supported. All that is required is that such an offence as is referred to in this section should be either committed in or in relation to a proceeding in that Court, provided the terms of section 195, sub-section (1) cls. (b) and (c) are satisfied.

In 24 A. L. J. 122 the effect of the amendments of ss 476 and 195 was discussed at length and the view of the learned Judges is that now after the Amending Act of 1923, sections 476 and 195 must be read together and all those conditions mentioned in clauses (b) and (c) of sub-section (1) of s 195 must be held to have been incorporated in s 476 so as to render the scope of s 476 co-extensive with cls. (b) and (c) of s 195. Also *held*, that under s. 476 the Court cannot prosecute by a complaint a person who is not a party to the proceeding before it as that condition is laid down by clause (c) of s 195. So a witness not being a party to the proceeding cannot be proceeded against by a complaint under s 476. But, at the same time, it will be remembered that s 195 being a restrictive section, there is nothing in that section and s. 476 to prevent the Munsifi, without recourse to s 476, from making a complaint under the ordinary law in respect of the offence under s 471, I P C., when it was committed before him by a witness who was not a party to the proceeding.

In 2 Rang 374 it is now decided that it is not open to a Court to make a complaint under s 476 of the Code in respect of any person other than persons who are parties to the proceedings before it. 3 Rang 43.

In 3 Rang. 303, 2 Rang. 374 was distinguished and it was held that in respect of offences enumerated in s 195 (1) (b) of the Code the powers of the Court to complain are not confined only to the parties before it.

It is competent to a Court to sanction the prosecution under s. 476, I P C., of a minor's guardian who applies for the probate of a forged will, 14 Bom. L. R. 968 = 1 Bom. Cr. Ca. 212 = 13 Cr. L. J. 848. *Contra*—18 M. L. T. 438 = 16 Cr. L. J. 797. But a person not a party who is accidentally in Court

15-A. Whether complaint necessary under s. 476 for the prosecution of a party to a proceeding where the document produced is not given in evidence by the party himself.—It is now held by the Bombay High Court in 27 Bom. L. R. 607 = 49 B. 608 that s 195 (c) of the Criminal Procedure Code covers any document produced or given in evidence in the course of a proceeding whether produced by the party who is alleged to have committed the offence or by anyone else (5 Pat. L. J. 135 distinguished).

16. Offence under s. 467, I P C., is within the Intendment of s. 195.—Though s. 467, I P C. is not mentioned in s 195, yet sanction is necessary as s. 463, I P C., which is one of the sections mentioned therein covers s 467, I P C., 14 C. W. N. 479 = 21 Cr. L. J. 280.

Offence under s 474, I P C.—No sanction is necessary for a prosecution under s. 474, I P C., 19 C. W. N. 125 = 16 Cr. L. J. 309.

17. "Offences committed in or in relation to a proceeding in that Court."—Under the old section action could be taken with regard to offences committed before a Court or brought under its notice in the course of a judicial proceeding. Under the new amendment the words 'and committed before it or brought under its notice in the course of a judicial proceeding' are dropped and in their stead the words 'which appears to have been committed in or in relation to a proceeding in that Court' are substituted. The probable effect of this, it is submitted, would be to restrict the scope of the section and perhaps cases like 6 A. L. J. 392 and 40 A. 118 in which the offence was committed neither before the Court nor in relation to a proceeding in that Court but in another jurisdiction, will not be covered by the wording of the present section.

The following cases under the old section are retained for their academic interest

Under the old section offence must be committed before the Court or brought to its notice in a judicial proceeding.—The powers conferred by this section can only be exercised if the offence in respect of which a prosecution is ordered has come to the cognizance of the Court in a *judicial proceeding*, 40 C. 444. This section applies only to judicial proceedings, 4 C. W. N. 366; 7 M. 560; 8 A. 103; 2 C. L. J. 612 = 3 Cr. L. J. 81; 13 P. R. 1915 = 154 P. L. R. 1915 = 16 Cr. L. J. 251. 'All the High Courts are agreed that the offence for which a prosecution can be ordered under s. 476 must have been either committed before the Court making the order or brought to its notice in the course of a judicial proceeding before it. There is and can be no difference of opinion on this point, because the language of the section is perfectly plain.' The illegality of passing an order in respect of an offence not complying with such conditions cannot be cured by s. 537, 11 N. L. R. 36 = 16 Cr. L. J. 289.

(i) *Offence committed before it.*—Where a District Magistrate without examining the complainant refers his case to a Subordinate Magistrate for inquiry and report, and on the strength of that report, initiates prosecution against the complainant under s. 211, I P C, his order is bad, as the offence is not committed before him, 27 C. 921. Neither the High Court nor the District Magistrate can take action under this section for an offence committed before a Subordinate Court, 37 C. 13. See also 4 C. W. N. 205; 14 C. W. N. 63, 78 and 306; 1904 A. W. N. 170 = 1 A. L. J. 481.

(ii) *Court cannot take action under s. 476 for the purpose of obtaining notice of an offence.*—In respect of an offence not committed before him nor brought to his notice in a judicial proceeding but brought to his notice in a Police report, a Magistrate cannot afterwards set up a judicial proceeding for the purpose of again informing himself of what he already knew so as to artificially create for himself jurisdiction under s. 476. That would be a reducing of the law to absurdity. In respect of an offence already notified to him extra judicially he could not have jurisdiction to proceed under s. 476, 11 N. L. R. 36 = 16 Cr. L. J. 289.

(iii) *The judicial proceeding in which the offence is committed need not be the same judicial proceeding in which the offence is brought to notice of Court.*—See 32 B. 184, 6 A. L. J. 392 = 9 Cr. L. J. 219 and Note 13, *Contra*, MADRAS, see Note 13.

(iv) *Brought to its notice in a judicial proceeding.*—Where a District Magistrate had sanctioned the prosecution of one S, who was alleged to have given false evidence before a second class Magistrate in a Forest Case, and directed that it should take place before a Head Assistant Magistrate, held, that he had no jurisdiction to act under this section, since the alleged offence was not brought to his notice in the course of a judicial proceeding, 18 M. 487. See also 12 W. R. 69 = 4 B. L. R. Ap. Cr. 9 and 34 P. R. 1886 as to the precise meaning of the words "brought under its notice in the course of a judicial proceeding." The words "brought under its notice" are wide enough to cover an offence which may have been committed in another *forum* and on some previous occasions, 6 A. L. J. 392 = 9 Cr. L. J. 219. These words are wide enough to include the proceedings before an arbitrator to whom the proceedings in a suit had been referred and a decree passed on the award, 33 A. 396. Where complaint was made of an illegal seizure of cattle to a Subordinate Magistrate and that officer reported the matter to a Joint Magistrate for action on the Revenue Side, and the Joint Magistrate forwarded the complaint to a Cantonment Magistrate for trial. Held, that the Joint Magistrate had no power to make the order as the alleged offence was not brought to his notice in the course of a judicial proceeding, *Weir II*, 593. Where the petitioner made a deposition before a Subordinate Magistrate and after the making of the deposition, the Sub-Divisional Magistrate transferred the case to his own file and the deposition of the witness was not put in evidence nor was he examined at the trial before the Head Assistant Magistrate, on account of his non appearance in obedience to a summons until after the disposal of the case. Held, that the order of the Head Assistant Magistrate made under this section in respect of the alleged false statements contained in the deposition before the Subordinate Magistrate was made without jurisdiction, because the petitioner's offence was not brought to the notice of the Head Assistant Magistrate in the course of a judicial proceeding, *Weir II*, 593. But see 21 C. W. N. 735. Similarly, where a person had been examined as a witness in support of the prosecution by a Subordinate Magistrate in a case of theft and subsequently on the transfer of the case to the file of the Head Assistant Magistrate, he did not appear before that officer in obedience to a summons nor was the deposition made before the Subordinate Magistrate put in evidence, but nevertheless the Head Assistant Magistrate in discharging the accused, found that the evidence given by the witness before the Subordinate Magistrate was false. After the trial was over the witness appeared before the Head Assistant Magistrate and deposed that what he had stated before the Subordinate Magistrate was false and thereupon the Head Assistant Magistrate directed his prosecution under

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this section *Held*, that the order of the Head Assistrate Magistrate was *ultra vires* and made without jurisdiction, as the evidence of this particular witness was not brought to his notice in the course of a judicial proceeding, *Weir II*, 593 Where the Police reported a complaint made to them to be false and the District Magistrate thereupon directed the Deputy Magistrate to make an inquiry and on receipt of the Deputy Magistrate's report, the District Magistrate passed final orders on the Police report directing, under this section, the prosecution of the complainant for an offence under s 211, I P C *Held*, that the order was without jurisdiction as it was passed with regard to a matter which did not come before a District Magistrate in the course of a judicial proceeding, 33 C 30. The proper course in such a case should have been to direct the Police to lodge a complaint, 7 C. L. J. 371 = 7 Cr. L. J. 338. In 9 C. W. N. 1030 an application was made before the District Magistrate on behalf of a mother for the recovery of the custody of a female child from her grandfather. The District Magistrate ordered the Deputy Magistrate to hold an inquiry, in the course of which the grandfather stated that the child had already been married, and on receipt of a report to that effect from the Deputy Magistrate the District Magistrate dismissed the application. The District Magistrate on a subsequent application came to the conclusion that the statements made before the Deputy Magistrate by the grandfather and the alleged husband were false and directed their prosecution under this section. *Held* that the alleged offence of perjury had not been brought to the notice of the District Magistrate in the course of a judicial proceeding within the meaning of this section and therefore the proceedings of the District Magistrate were *ultra vires*. See also 14 C. W. N. 63 and 78. One B, a stranger presented a complaint to the District Magistrate alleging that A had given false evidence in a criminal trial in the Court of a Subordinate Magistrate and praying that A might be punished, whereupon the District Magistrate directed the prosecution of A *held* that the order was bad as the false statement was not made before the District Magistrate nor brought to his notice in a judicial proceeding, 13 P. W. R. 1913 = 68 P. L. R. 1913 = 14 Cr. A. J. 107. A Magistrate being of opinion that a Police witness had not spoken the truth stated in his judgment that he left the witness to the mercy of the Superintendent of Police. Thereupon the Superintendent of Police to whom the judgment was sent, forwarded the same to the District Magistrate, who remarked that it was a case in which proceedings should be taken under s 476. The Superintendent forwarded the papers to the successor of the trial Magistrate, the trial Magistrate having been transferred. The succeeding Magistrate initiated proceedings under s 476, *held*, he had no jurisdiction inasmuch as the offence had neither been committed before him nor was it brought to his notice in the course of any judicial proceeding, 17 Cr. L. J. 40 (Oadh). See also (1911) 2 M. W. N. Jour. 107.

18. No prosecution will lie in respect of statement in affidavits by accused persons—No oath can be administered to a person accused of an offence in connection with the criminal matter in which he is accused and therefore no prosecution will lie in respect of false statements contained in a document purporting to be an affidavit sworn to by an accused person, 3 A. L. J. 99 which follows 19 A. 200. See 12 M. 331, *Weir II*, 686, 1, 176.

Y.—POINTS TO BE CONSIDERED BEFORE TAKING PROCEEDINGS.

19. Notice desirable but not indispensable—Opportunity should be given to the accused to show cause before passing an order under this section, *Weir II*, 587; 7 M. 189. It is always fairest and a course that should be followed that a notice should be given to the party concerned, but the section nowhere says that notice shall be given and at the best the want of notice is a mere irregularity in procedure, 10 A. L. J. 248 = 13 Cr. L. J. 707, where 11 Cr. L. J. 20 distinguished. See also 3 Bur. L. T. 101 = 12 Cr. L. J. 85; 1915 U. B. R. 111, 83 = 17 Cr. L. J. 82. In strict law a notice is not an indispensable preliminary to an order under this section, 15 C. W. N. 691 = 14 C. L. J. 123 = 12 Cr. L. J. 209, where 20 C. 349 and 474, 7 Bom. L. R. 84 = 2 Cr. L. J. 34 are followed. When the materials before the Court are insufficient, notice must go, 6 A. 101, 17 O. C. 25 = 13 Cr. L. J. 217.

20. Preliminary inquiry must be held when necessary.—See Notes under Heading VII

21. Must order under s 476 be based on strictly legal evidence?—In 21 M. L. J. 795 = (1911) 2 M. W. N. 9 = 10 M. L. T. 47 = 12 Cr. L. J. 323, SUNDARA AIVAR, J., was of opinion that an order under s. 476 based on statements which do not constitute legal evidence is illegal. The same principles which apply in granting sanction should be followed in passing orders under this section. The words "when any civil Court is of opinion that there is ground for inquiring into any offence" must be construed as meaning "when there is legal ground for inquiring and therefore an order based partly at least on what appeared at the preliminary investigation under s 202 was illegal" while AIVAR, J., was of opinion that the wording of sub-sec. (1) is wide enough to cover the consideration of other than

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strictly legal evidence on the record and therefore an order under sub-sec. (1) ought not to be set aside because it proceeds (wholly or partly) on a consideration of the result of a preliminary inquiry under s. 202. During a civil suit in the Court of the District Judge, a witness gave evidence. After the decision of the case the District Magistrate held a departmental inquiry, forwarded the proceedings to the District Judge and applied for sanction to prosecute the witness for forgery. The District Judge refused sanction but on perusing the records of the departmental inquiry issued notices to the witness and directed his prosecution. Held that the Judge ought not to have looked at the records of the departmental inquiry which was not evidence in the case and that he acted with material irregularity in ordering a prosecution without having before him at least some material in the shape of evidence which went to show that there is reason to believe that the offences have been committed and without making an inquiry himself, 13 Cr. L. J. 43 (A). See also 26 M. L. J. 435 where it was held that a sanction under s. 195 need not be based on legal evidence.

22. Power given by this section must be used with great care and deliberation.—In delivering judgment in 1 C. 450, MACPHERSON, J., remarked 'The power given by this section should be used with care and due consideration. And it is by no means in every instance in which a party fails to prove his case that the Judge who has decided against such party is justified in exercising the powers given him by this section. So long as it is a case as to which there is any possible doubt, or in which it is not perfectly certain that the Judge's decision must be upheld in the event of there being an appeal in the civil suit, the Judge acts indiscreetly and wrongly if the moment he has given his judgment in the civil suit, he exercises the power given him by this section. At the same time if, in the course of the civil trial the Judge has before him clear and unmistakable proof of a criminal offence, and if, after the trial is over, he, on consideration, thinks it necessary to proceed at once, of course it may be right to do so. Judges should however, bear in mind that criminal prosecutions are frequently suggested by successful litigants merely to prevent an appeal in the civil suit, and they should be careful not to lend themselves to such suggestions too readily. They should also recollect that when they proceed under s. 476, the responsibility for the prosecution rests upon the Judge entirely, such a prosecution being a very different thing from a prosecution instituted on the complaint of a private party and merely sanctioned by the Court under s. 195, cl. (b). See also 8 C. 435. The order should disclose a reasonably well founded and deliberate judicial opinion that there was ground for inquiry and the power given by this section should be used with care and consideration, 1901 A. W. N. 177. See also 37 C. 13.

23. There must be reasonable probability of conviction—but question of guilt or innocence not to be decided.—There must be a reasonable probability of conviction, because without that there could be no ground for another Magistrate to waste his time in holding the inquiry. But the section does not say that before a Magistrate orders a prosecution he must try the whole case and be absolutely satisfied that the accused cannot by any possibility escape a conviction. 9 N. L. R. 184 = 15 Cr. L. J. 33. No sanction should be granted unless there is a reasonable probability of conviction. It would be an abuse of the powers vested in a Court of Justice, if sanction were granted or upheld on the principle that though the conviction of the party complained against is a mere possibility, it is desirable that the matter should be thrashed out so that it may be decided whether or not an offence has been committed. No doubt the authority which is called upon to grant a sanction under s. 195 or to take action under s. 476 need not and should not decide the question of guilt or innocence of the party against whom proceedings are to be instituted, but great care and caution are required before the criminal law is set in motion, and there must be a reasonable foundation for a charge in respect of which prosecution is sanctioned or directed, 37 C. 250, where 7 A. 874, 12 C. W. N. 3 = 6 Cr. L. J. 356 and 1 C. 450 are referred to. There is yet another reason why no Court should take action under s. 476 without inquiring thoroughly into the matter and being satisfied that there is what may be called fairly good case against the accused. It is that persons complained against by a Court under s. 476 are deprived of the protection given to them by s. 203 against frivolous and unnecessary prosecution by other complainants, 10 N. L. R. 177 = 16 Cr. L. J. 161. See also 8 C. W. N. 927, 1900 A. W. N. 149, 23 C. 532, 20 C. 349, 21 M. 124. In 13 A. L. J. 1111 = 16 Cr. L. J. 817, KNOX, J., dissented from the views held in 37 C. 13 and 37 C. 250 that sanction ought not to be granted when the evidence before the Court granting the sanction is such that the probable result will be acquittal and held that all that a Court granting sanction has to see is that a *prima facie* case has been made out upon the evidence before it for inquiring further into the question whether or not any of the offences punishable as set out in s. 195 has or has not been made out. KNOX, J., seems to make a difference between sanctioning a prosecution under s. 195 and taking action under s. 476 and holds that in the former case an application for sanction must be carefully considered before the

When there is a dispute between the two parties over a property it is

s. 195 but the Court ought to proceed under s. 476, 11 A. L. J. 113 = 14

Cr. L. J. 177 and see Notes to s. 195 at pp 510 to 515. It is not in every case which a Magistrate considers to be

resembling powerd
 Fudge = : To make shift to contrive to cast about
 to strain one's invention [Colley]
 London Spectator

user height than the type set using

H.

H. is a [Of alga, blood, and crust,
 1 from Ictavia, to stand] [Med] L.

Magistrate ought not to take proceedings under s. 476 until the close of the trial, the reason being as pointed in 8 Bom. H. C. R. 126 that such action is eminently calculated to intimidate subsequent witnesses and defeat the object of the trial, but that is a consideration which affects the accused under trial and not the witness whose prosecution is ordered, 17 Cr. L. J. 77 (Sindh), see also 16 Cr. L. J. 114 (C). But see 20 M. L. T. 232.

27. **Propriety of criminal prosecution when appeal is pending against the original proceedings.**—If in the course of a proceeding, either civil or criminal, a Judge or Magistrate finds clear grounds for believing that either the parties to the proceeding or their witnesses have committed perjury or any other offence against public justice, he is justified in directing criminal proceedings against such person under this section without any further inquiry than that which he has already held in his own Court. As a matter of discretion and propriety, it is right for a Court, before committing a person on a charge of perjury upon his own uncontradicted statement to await the hearing of the appeal, where an appeal is pending in the case in which he is charged with such perjury, 6 C. 303 following B. L. R. (Sup. Vol.) 426 = 5 W. R. (Civ. Mts.) 24. See also 13 B. 109; 7 B. H. C. R. 29; 23 C. 532 and 610; 16 C. 730; 20 C. 349; 13 M. 144; 16 A. 80; 21 M. 124; 15 B. 729; 18 B. 531. The High Court cannot, as a Court of Civil Appeal, interfere, 8 C. L. R. 143. The High Court ought not to stay the criminal proceedings where the Court below has refused to do so and has thought it fit in the interest of justice to take immediate action, 35 C. 909. See Note 67.

28. **According of sanction under s. 195 no bar to acting under this section.**—The fact that the Court may have given sanction under s. 195, to a person to complain of an offence specified therein, does not affect its power to act under this section should it deem it necessary, 13 R. 334; 34 B. 83; 29 M. 331. But in Madras this power must be read subject to 31 M. 140 and 32 M. 49. When a Magistrate sanctions the prosecution in the absence of any application before him, his order must be taken to be one made under this section, 7 M. 189; and conversely sanction may be given after a proceeding under s. 476 has been set aside on a technical ground, 11 Cr. L. J. 327 (C).

29. **Court must form its own opinion.**—Where a Munsiff in making an order under this section for the prosecution of a person for an offence committed before him purported to act not of his own accord, but on the responsibility of the District Judge who himself had no jurisdiction to pass such an order, held the order of the Munsiff was bad inasmuch as it was only nominally his, but the opinion was the opinion of the District Judge 6 A. L. J. 924 = 10 Cr. L. J. 525. See Note 44 and 17 Cr. L. J. 40 (O).

VI.—NECESSITY FOR PRELIMINARY INQUIRY.

30. **Holding of preliminary inquiry is discretionary and its absence will not render order bad.**—Ordinarily it is not necessary that there should be a preliminary inquiry before an order under this section is made, 6 C. 303. Preliminary inquiry is discretionary to be had or not as the Court thinks fit, 20 C. 474; 6 C. W. N. 295; 1 C. L. J. 630 = 2 Cr. L. J. 656, 26 M. L. J. 486 = 15 Cr. L. J. 271. In strict law for proceeding under this section, neither notice to show cause why the party should not be sent before a Magistrate for a trial nor a preliminary inquiry indispensable, 7 Bom. L. R. 84 = 2 Cr. L. J. 54, 14 Bom. L. R. 597 = 1 Bom. Cr. Ca. 154 = 13 Cr. L. J. 689. The adoption of a rigid rule to that effect would simply introduce a new stage as a matter of imperative necessity, 15 A. 392; 34 A. 267; 20 C. 474. An order under this section sending a case for inquiry to a Magistrate, is not necessarily bad, because the Court did not make a preliminary inquiry before making such order. The law requires only such preliminary inquiry as may be necessary, 5 A. 62, nor is omission on the part of a Sessions Judge to hold such inquiry a sufficient ground for reversing the conviction when the omission does not appear to have affected the merits of the case.—*M. H. C. Pro*, 5th January, 1882. For other cases, see 5 C. 184 at p. 187, 2 C. L. R. 315; 9 W. R. 3; 23 P. R. 1836. See Notes 97—101 at pp 516—518. 4 Pat. 434.

It is absolutely essential to the validity of an order under s. 476 of the Code that the Court which passes the order should apply its mind to the matter upon its merits.

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| Judge | | s. 476 The Sessions |
| Judge | | order of the Sessions |
| | | himself and ordered |

prosecution on his own initiative. 21 A. L. J. 930, but see 24 A. L. J. 122.

31. When preliminary inquiry desirable—

(1) *Generally when materials already before Court are not sufficient to establish a 'prima facie' case—*

Where the parties to a civil suit filed a compromise after part of the evidence was recorded and the suit was dismissed and five days later the Judge *suo moti* took cognizance of the case afresh and without calling upon

the defendant to show cause directed his prosecution for fabricating false evidence in respect of provisions not relied on by the defendant. *Held*, that the order was bad as he had not recorded any finding on the question of the genuineness or otherwise when deciding the suit and he ought to have given the persons concerned an opportunity of showing cause, 17 O. C. 25 = 15 Cr. L. J. 217; 7 B. L. R. 187 = 13 Cr. L. J. 541. See also 6 C. 440 = 7 C. L. R. 330. Where the materials already before the Court are insufficient in themselves to establish a *prima facie* case it is better to make preliminary inquiry, 19 C. 345. When a suit did not come on for trial, but was settled out of Court, the Civil Court was competent to hold a preliminary inquiry to determine whether *prima facie* one of the specified offences had been committed before it by the false personation of the person who had confessed judgment, 19 C. 345; 12 P. R. 1897. See also 6 A. 114 and 98; 8 C. L. R. 143; 2 P. R. 1883; 19 A. L. J. 56.

(ii) *When offence has not been committed before the Court*—Where a suit for the recovery of money due on a bond was referred to arbitration, and the arbitrator decided that the bond was a forgery and the Magistrate directed a prosecution, *held*, that the Magistrate should not have granted a sanction without making an inquiry to satisfy himself whether there were materials to justify a prosecution, 6 A. 101. A Subordinate Judge, on the report of his bailiff that he was obstructed by A and B in executing a warrant of attachment of the moveable property of a judgment debtor, gave sanction for the prosecution of A and B under s 186, I P C, without making a preliminary inquiry into the truth or otherwise of the report, and sent the case to a first-class Magistrate for trial under this section. *Held*, that the Subordinate Judge would have better complied with the requirements of this section if, before acting on the mere report of the bailiff, he had made an inquiry of his own, Ratanlal 701. Where a complaint is made to the Police and a report is made that the complaint is false, the Magistrate will not exercise a proper discretion if he forthwith, on the receipt of the Police report, orders the prosecution of the complainant under s 211, I P. C. The Magistrate should give the complainant full opportunity to have a proper judicial inquiry into the truth of the complaint. But, if advantage is not taken of the opportunity, the Magistrate may either accord sanction under s 195 to some person desirous of prosecuting, or himself make the complaint under s 195. If a judicial inquiry is made, the Magistrate may proceed under this section, 5 C. W. N. 106. See also 7 M. 139; 14 C. 707; 27 C. 821 and 13 Cr. L. J. 43 (A.), 15 C. W. N. 691 = 14 C. L. J. 123 = 12 Cr. L. J. 209.

(iii) *When the identity of the offender, or offence is uncertain*—A preliminary inquiry ought to be held when it is uncertain as to who the accused person is, 23 C. 532, 16 C. 730; 20 C. 349 and 474 or where the offence is uncertain, 1 C. 450.

32. *Successor in office may pass order without preliminary inquiry.*—The authority of 9 C. W. N. 839; 34 C. 551; 25 C. 114 that it is not competent to the successor in office to pass an order under this section without an independent investigation is very much shaken by 37 C. 642. All that was intended to be laid down was that if an offence has been committed not in Court but outside the Court, an investigation may be necessary to enable the Court to ascertain the facts justifying an order under s 476, 14 C. L. J. 123 = 15 C. W. N. 691 = 12 Cr. L. J. 209.

33. Practice and procedure in preliminary inquiry—

(i) *Oath may be administered and evidence taken*—Inquiry must be on evidence, one mode of making an inquiry is certainly to take evidence (17 C. 872) and if the Court can take evidence it is a judicial proceeding, s 4 (m), 37 C. 52 and see 8 Bom. L. R. 539 = 4 Cr. L. J. 183. But see 6 W. R. 41.

(ii) *Person implicated not to be subjected to examination*—A person against whom proceedings are to be taken under this section ought not to be subjected to any examination in the preliminary inquiry, Weir II, 538. See 17 Cr. L. J. 316 (Bar.), where it was held that such a person is in the position of an accused and cannot be examined as a witness.

(iii) *Person implicated need not be present*—It is not necessary that the preliminary inquiry, contemplated by this section, should be conducted in the presence of the accused. All that the Court making inquiry has to do is to satisfy itself that there are *prima facie* grounds for sending the case for investigation to a Magistrate, 9 W. R. 3; 7 M. 224; 6 C. W. N. 235.

(iv) *Manner of recording evidence*—Though the Magistrate made a preliminary inquiry under s. 476, and presumably examined witnesses in the course of that inquiry he made no record of their statements. We do not find in the Code any provision with regard to the manner in which the evidence in such inquiry should be recorded. But we are of opinion that for further reference a summary of the statements should have been made, 42 C. 240.

Иъ по-ѣр по-ѣтаръ = for the under example: (1) A lever of flint lying beneath the surface; and not on the surface in the position of a ...
fruit and yā, earth

(v) *Not necessary to give accused opportunity to cross-examine*—A Magistrate refusing to give the accused opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses does not act illegally, or with material irregularity, 33 A. 267. The person implicated has no right to cross-examine the then accused, 18 Bom. L. R. 234. But see 19 A. L. J. 56 where refusal to give opportunity to cross-examine witnesses by the lower Court was set aside in revision by the High Court and a preliminary inquiry ordered, 6 Pat. L. J. 146; 44 M. L. J. 74.

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VII.—PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE OF COURT SENDING CASE.

35. *Procedure when offence not covered by s. 195.*—A District Judge cannot direct the arrest and prosecution of a person under s. 411, I P. C., as such an order is not warranted by the provisions of this section. If, in the course of the hearing of a case before him, he thinks that someone should be proceeded against under s. 411, he can proceed under Chapter XVI of the Code by instituting a complaint in the ordinary way also, Ratanlal 515. See 9 Bom. L. R. 1160; Weir II, 598.

36. *Procedure when two contradictory statements are made in two different Courts.*—Where the evidence given before the committing Magistrate was contradicted by the same witness before the Sessions Judge, it is not competent for the Sessions Court to order the trial of the accused for perjury without specifying which of the depositions made by the accused was false, especially when there is nothing on the record to show that the Judge was satisfied that the evidence given before himself was false, 3 L. B. R. 204 = 4 Cr. L. J. 469. When prosecution is ordered in respect of two contradictory statements made in two different Courts, an order under this section of one of the Courts alone is insufficient. Both Courts must make an order under this section in respect of the alternative charge, 16 M. L. J. (Sh. N.) 40; or at all events, the Court which desires to take action should obtain the sanction of the Court before which the other statement was made, unless it is itself a Court to which the other is subordinate, 6 C. 496 = 7 C. L. R. 497. In *Tilak's Case*, 4 Bom. L. R. 750 an offence under s. 211, I P. C., alleged to have been committed in the Court of Poona City Magistrate was brought to the notice of the District Court of Poona in the course of a civil judicial proceeding. The District Judge acted under this section and sent the case down to the first-class Magistrate, Poona. *Held*, that the offence was not cognizable by the first-class Magistrate, as there was neither the previous sanction nor the complaint of the Poona City Magistrate or of the Sessions Court to which he is subordinate. The fact that the District Court and the Sessions Court are represented by one and the same individual will not in any way cure the illegality. But see 6 A. L. J. 392 = 9 Cr. L. J. 219.

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38. *Court may direct prosecution when moved by stranger.*—In 13 Cr. L. J. 1 (C.) it was suggested that as the Court does not ordinarily grant sanction under s. 195 to a person in no way connected with the proceeding the Court should similarly refuse to direct a prosecution under s. 476 when the fact of the commission of an offence has been brought to its notice by a stranger, but the Court refused to accept the limitation suggested. See, however, 13 P. W. R. 1913 = 14 Cr. L. J. 107 and Note 23. In 34 C. 551, GEIDT, J., was of opinion that it was not intended that when the proceedings had terminated and passed beyond the reach of the Court, the attention of the Court should be subsequently re-drawn by some private person to the fact that in those proceedings there had been committed some offence in contempt of the Court's authority or against public justice which deserved punishment and in 31 M. 140, WHITE, C. J., approved of these remarks. So also in 6 A. L. J. 924, (Note 35) an order by a Munsiff at the suggestion of the District Judge was set aside.

39. *Offences must be specified and the order sending case must not be vague.*—Although s. 643 of Act X of 1877 gives Civil Courts powers similar to those conferred on Civil, Criminal or Revenue Courts alike, by this section, the whole law as to the procedure in cases within that section is now embodied in this section. Where a Judge, having disbelieved the evidence of a witness, directed the record of the case to be sent to a

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Yām-tho-p'ī-t'ral, a. [lat. lumbus loin, and sacrum,] Yī-ch'ī-n'le n. (C'c. Adverse a.) obtuse-temperamented
 Yū ny a. (booster) from [weat c] Cray mental-
 ground - also written [weat c] [low V B]
 Yī-ch'ī-g'lio, n. See Li 5-0112

M.

M'Ā CH'ĪN'J' (ma-ahsen') n. [Add] B. A. stage, structure get-up An actors make-up means that the face is painted with white
 c. verb 1/1011

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 {But} Having a single [results and degrees] Having of
 seem ing to have the power of being present in the of

Magistrate with a view to his inquiring whether or not he had voluntarily given false evidence, *held*, on a motion to quash the order, that the Judge had no power to send a case to a Magistrate except when, after having made such preliminary inquiry as may be necessary, he is of opinion that there is sufficient ground (i.e., ground of a nature higher than mere surmise or suspicion) for directing judicial inquiry into the matter of a specific charge, and that the Judge is bound to indicate the particular statements or averments in respect of which he considers that there is ground for a charge, into which the Magistrate ought to inquire, and that the order was bad, because the Judge had made no preliminary inquiry and because it was too vague and general, 1 C. 430 followed in 1900 A. W. N. 149; 8 S. L. R. 179 = 16 Cr. L. J. 104; 1 P. R. 1910 = 11 Cr. L. J. 90. See also 14 A. L. J. 818; 52 C. 378

40. **Order must specify the accused person.**—A Court ought not to send a case when it is uncertain as to who the accused person is. See 23 C. 392; 16 C. 730; 20 C. 349 and 474. Where a District Judge being of opinion that the forgery of a document produced before him was committed either by the plaintiff or by the defendant, sent both of them to the nearest first class Magistrate, so that the guilty party might be proceeded against, *held*, that the order was illegal and must be set aside in revision under s. 439, 163 P. L. R. 1905 = 3 Cr. L. J. 73, 23 A. 249 followed 2 Lah. 68.

41. **Order must show that it was part of the proceedings in the trial.**—In the absence of anything to show that the Magistrate's order under s. 476 is part of the proceedings in the trial in which the alleged offence was committed the order is made without jurisdiction (31 M. 140 and 32 M. 49 followed), 6 M. L. T. 92 = 10 Cr. L. J. 8

42. **Case cannot be sent to third-class Magistrate for inquiry or to Sessions Judge without commitment.**—When a Criminal Court sends a case under this section to a third-class Magistrate to hold a preliminary inquiry, the offence being exclusively triable by the Court or Session, the third class Magistrate has no jurisdiction to hold an inquiry or to commit, 7 M. 189. See 15 M. 131. Nor can the Magistrate send the accused to the Sessions Court, without holding a preliminary inquiry under Chapter XVIII, and making a valid order of commitment, *Wehr II*, 555. But a Civil Court may send a case to a Criminal Court for investigation without specifying the particular officer by whom it is to be investigated, 13 W. R. 45, *contra* 4 N.-W. P. H. C. R. 86.

43. **Simultaneous order under this section and s. 250 legal.**—A Magistrate may simultaneously send down the complainant under this section for an offence under s. 211, 1 P. C., and order him to pay compensation under s. 250, 21 M. 237; 27 M. 69 and 30 C. 123 (F B), where 22 C. 536 and 26 C. 181 are explained.

44. **Taking security from accused before drawing up proceedings under this section illegal.**—A Sessions Judge is not competent to direct a witness alleged to have given false evidence in a judicial proceeding before him to give security to appear before him, when called upon to answer charges yet to be framed under s. 193, 1 P. C., it is open to him to take immediate action under this section, if he considers it expedient, 8 C. W. N. 630.

45. **Irregular order.**—(1) *Optional order is bad.*—Where a Magistrate on an application by a private party for sanction under s. 196 against X Y, made an order to the effect "I charge X Y with perjury, and I make the case over to (another competent Magistrate) or in the alternative, I accord sanction to the applicant to prosecute X Y, for an offence under s. 182, 1 P. C., etc." *Held*, that such an option of this kind was no order at all and was altogether invalid, 23 A. 234. A Court may either grant a sanction or proceed under this section, but if it grants the sanction and merely sends the accused to a Magistrate, it does not comply with the requirements of this section, 13 B. 109 at p. 112.

(2) *Order with a view to commit to Sessions is bad.*—Again, where a Judge proceeding to act under this section, made an order arresting the accused "with a view to commit him to the Court of Sessions," *held*, that the order, so far as it was made with a view to commit the accused to the Sessions Court, was wrong, but the Magistrate should have sent the case to the nearest first-class Magistrate, 3 Bom. L. R. 185.

(3) *Order sending the case to a District Magistrate.*—An Assistant Collector trying a Rent Suit, made an order to the effect "as the plaintiff knowingly and voluntarily told a lie, it will be fair that he be proceeded against under s. 193, 1 P. C., it is therefore ordered that the record of the case be herewith submitted to the Collector for starting a case under s. 193." On receipt of this order, the Collector, who was also District Magistrate directed that a case under s. 193, 1 P. C., be instituted against *Sundar Sirup* and made over for decision to M. Magistrate of the first class. *Held per Knox, J.*, that the Assistant Collector intended to act under this section when he made the order, and in any event, his order was a complaint either under s. 476 or s. 195 made to the District Magistrate though that officer was addressed as Collector, and the District Magistrate on receipt of such complaint had jurisdiction under s. 192 to make the order he made, 26 A. 814. But in 30 P. R.

copper two hundred and fifty feet in length, having a diameter of one twentieth of an inch.
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1905 = 105 P. L. R. 1905 a Revenue Court being satisfied from perusal of certain documents tendered in evidence, that they were forgeries, sent the case to the District Magistrate for action, *held*, that such a proceeding was a complaint within the meaning of s. 195 but did not constitute a proceeding under this section. See also 23 P. R. 1901; 13 B. 109 and 1915 U. B. R. III, 91 = 17 Cr. L. J. 59.

(iv) *Order merely directing prosecution without sending case to Magistrate*—An order under s. 476 which merely directs the prosecution of the accused, but omits to direct the accused to be taken before the nearest first-class Magistrate is utmost an irregularity cured by s. 537, 37 M. 317. Cf 12 A. L. J. 881 = 15 Cr. L. J. 700.

(v) The fact that a Magistrate directed a prosecution for an offence under s. 211, I P C., while the offence really falls under s. 182, I P C., does not render the order bad, 8 S. L. R. 179 = 16 Cr. L. J. 104.

(vi) As an order under s. 476 of the Code directing a prosecution of offences under ss. 193 and 196, I P C., amounts to a complaint under s. 200 of the Code, the Court before making an order must hold an inquiry and must specify by its order (1) the witnesses to prove the complaint, (2) the false evidence complained against, (3) whether a person complained against knew that the evidence which he was using as genuine was false. An order not specifying these matters but leaving them to be fished out by the trying Magistrate is liable to be set aside as illegal. 48 M. 395.

(vii) Where the Chief Presidency Magistrate made a complaint to himself under s. 476 (1) of the Code and then transferred the same to the third Presidency Magistrate for disposal, the latter after having enquired into the case committed the accused to the High Court Sessions for trial, *held* that the procedure followed was substantially correct. The Chief Presidency Magistrate in taking the cognizance of a complaint made by himself and sending it to the third Presidency Magistrate made a mistake but a technical one only, not going to the root of the case. There was nothing in the Code to prevent the Chief Presidency Magistrate from taking cognizance of his own complaint. Taking cognizance of a complaint is not a judicial act. 30 C. W. N. 276.

(viii) A proceeding drawn up by a Magistrate sanctioning the prosecution of an accused under s. 211, I P C., with a request that the case may be disposed of according to law does not amount to a formal complaint within the meaning of s. 4 (h) and cannot be also regarded as a complaint under s. 476 of the Code, 82 C. 668.

But see 3 Rang. 48 where instead of making a formal complaint the Court ordered the prosecution of the appellants under s. 476 of the Code, and forwarded a copy of the order to the District Magistrate for the necessary action, it was *held* that this was merely a formal defect and did not vitiate the order.

VIII.—JURISDICTION AND POWERS OF COURT TO WHOM CASE IS SENT.

46. *Order sending case is of itself sufficient to confer jurisdiction on Magistrate to whom accused is sent*.—When the case is sent to the nearest Magistrate, the order sending down the case is of itself sufficient to confer jurisdiction, 16 M. 461, where SHEPARD, C.J., says "The substitution of the description 'nearest' for 'having power to try' in the 1872 Code is significant." The power to send the supposed offender to the nearest Magistrate of the first class is quite irrespective of the local jurisdiction of the Magistrate to whom the offender is forwarded. S. 177 in no way curtails the power under this section. It affects only the power of private complainants and the Police and not the power of a Magistrate acting under this section, Ratanlal 85. See also 26 M. 640; 32 M. 49 at p. 57. In 1 S. L. R. 84 = 8 Cr. L. J. 209, it was, however, *held* that the word

jurisdiction. The Magistrate to whom the accused was committed to the

During the trial a witness stated that On an application made under s. 195

under s. 476 and sent the It should be noted that under the present

it to a first-class Magistrate having Magistrate of the first class

the evidence given by him before the committing Magistrate for sanction after the completion of the trial, the trial Judge case to the nearest first-class Magistrate at Alipore, 43 section as amended a Court acting under section 476 must jurisdiction and it is not now enough merely to send a

47. The word 'nearest' refers to area of Sub-Magistrate of Pundam made an order under Assistant Magistrate of Polachi within whose nearer to Coimbatore than to Pollachi. *Held*, the must be construed reasonably. It has reference is required to be sent and not necessarily to his

not to distance of headquarters.—The the case for inquiry to the Head geographically Pundam was was not invalid. The word 'nearest' of the Magistrate to whom the case Sending the case to another

Magistrate not the nearest is an irregularity cured by s 537 (b) 1 S. L. R. 84 = 8 Cr. L. J. 209. But now under the recent amendment the word "nearest" is dropped and "having jurisdiction" is put instead thereby making the meaning clear

48. Officer before whom offence committed should not himself try the case in another capacity.—See s. 487. When the officer presiding over the Court exercises revenue as well as magisterial jurisdiction and an offence is committed before him sitting as a Revenue Court, it will not be a proper compliance with the provisions of this section for the officer presiding to make the case over to himself as the nearest Magistrate of the first class, 2 A. 403. The obvious intention of the Legislature is that the officer before whom the offence is committed should not himself charge and try the accused, 15 W. R. 83; 12 W. R. 18. But a Sessions Judge is not by reason merely of having, as a District Judge, ordered an inquiry under this section disqualified under s. 487 from trying the case or hearing any appeal when the case has been tried by a Lower Court, nor is he personally interested in the case within the meaning of s. 556 18 C. 766; 7 C. W. N. 703.

49. Powers of Magistrate to whom case is sent.—(1) *Magistrate must dispose of the case sent to him.*—A Magistrate is bound to proceed with the case sent to him by a Civil Court by adopting the procedure laid down in the Code. In 26 B. 785, it was held, that the Magistrate was bound to proceed with the case sent to him by a Civil Court under this section, the words "such Magistrate shall thereupon proceed according to law" being imperative. Nor can he refuse to take cognizance of an offence, on a case sent to him by a Civil Court under this section, 13 B. 109. When an attaching peon reported to a Munsiff of obstruction in carrying out execution proceeding, held the Munsiff was competent to proceed under this section and send the case to the District Magistrate for the prosecution of the persons who obstructed the attachment, and the Magistrate was not justified having regard to sub-sec (2) of this section, in refusing to take cognizance of the case, 31 C. 664. See also 7 A. 871.

(ii) *May discharge*—He is competent to discharge the accused under s 253 if in his opinion the evidence against the accused is not sufficient to warrant their committal to the Court of Session. The Sessions Judge has power, under s 436 should he see fit to order the case to be committed, 5 B. H. C. R. Cr. Ca. 41.

(iii) *Cannot return case*—If the case is sent by a Civil Court, the Magistrate is bound to complete the inquiry and cannot return the case to the Civil Court, 3 B. L. R. Ap. Cr. 47; 7 B. H. C. R. Cr. Ca. 29; 12 W. R. 41.

(iv) *May dismiss complaint*—If the order under s. 476 is made without jurisdiction, the Magistrate is competent to dismiss the complaint, 10 M. L. T. 339 = (1911) 2 M. W. N. 431 = 12 Cr. L. J. 556.

(v) *Proceedings cannot be dropped because sanction is subsequently given*—If after drawing up a proceeding under this section, ordering prosecution under s 193, I P C., and while the prosecution is still being proceeded with, sanction is given in respect of the same, the original proceeding is not dropped but such sanction is really a continuation of the same proceeding, 9 C. W. N. 127 = 2 Cr. L. J. 13.

50. Magistrate to whom case is sent cannot direct compensation to be paid if he dismisses case.—A Magistrate to whom a case is sent under this section has no jurisdiction while acquitting the accused to direct compensation to be paid. The decree-holder complained to the Civil Court of obstruction and proceedings were directed under s 476 and after the trial the Magistrate directed the decree-holder to pay compensation. Held, the order was not valid under s 250 as the decree holder was not the complainant, 14 Bom. L. R. 1166 = 1 Bom. Cr. Ca. 237 = 14 Cr. L. J. 1. See Note 18 at p 706.

51. Does cancellation of order under sub-sec. (1) operate as stay of proceedings under sub-sec. (2)?—Where a Munsiff decreed in plaintiff's favour, holding the suit bond to be genuine and, at the same time, sent down the defendant under this section to the nearest first-class Magistrate to be tried for an offence under s 193, I P C., and on appeal the Appellate Court finding the defendant's evidence to be true reversed the Munsiff's decree. Held, the result of the civil appellate judgment must be taken to be, that the order of the Munsiff under this section was not maintainable, as the basis of that order had gone, and that, on production of the appellate judgment it was the duty of the Criminal Court to withhold its hands and to proceed no further, and even if the defendant had been convicted by the Criminal Court and the conviction upheld by the Sessions Judge, the High Court would set aside the conviction, although the accused did not move the High Court to quash the proceeding as soon as the judgment of the Civil Appellate Court was pronounced in his favour, 12 C. W. N. 1 = 6 C. L. J. 703 = 6 Cr. L. J. 354. Where a Magistrate dismisses a complaint and directs a prosecution under this section and the Sessions Judge directs further inquiry setting aside the order of dismissal but passed no order in respect of the order under s 476, held the said order remains good until it is

quashed. It does not cease to be operative, all that 12 C. W. N. 1 = 6 C. L. J. 703 lays down is that when the Appellate Court dissents from the opinion of the first Court that a statement made by a person was false and reverses the decree of that Court, the order of the first Court under s 476 directing the prosecution of the deponent should be quashed and not that the order ceases to be operative without being quashed. Therefore the Magistrate to whom the case has been sent may continue the inquiry, 21 M. L. J. 793 = 10 M. L. T. 47 = (1911) 2 M. W. N. 9 = 12 Cr. L. J. 323. In 6 L. B. R. 49 = 13 Cr. L. J. 492 it is laid down that if an order under s. 476 (1) directing an inquiry by another Magistrate is set aside, it is just and proper that proceedings under sub-sec. (2) before that Magistrate shall also cease.

IX.—REVISION OF ORDERS.

52. Sessions Court cannot revise.—A Deputy Magistrate having decided that certain witnesses (who had given evidence before himself and before two other Magistrates on different occasions relating to charges of rioting and causing hurt) had wilfully committed perjury on one occasion or another, ordered them to be prosecuted for perjury and bound them over to take their trial. The Sessions Judge set aside the said order, deeming it undesirable that sanction to prosecute should be given under the circumstances. *Held*, that whether the Deputy Magistrate had intended to pass an order under this section or to make a complaint under s. 195 (1) (b) the Sessions Judge had no power to interfere, 23 M. 203 followed in 7 Bom. L. R. 84 = 2 Cr. L. J. 54. It is the High Court alone that has power to revise under s. 439 under its general powers of superintendence. A Sessions Judge has no such power, 34 C. 42. See also 14 C. W. N. 132.

53. Sessions Judge cannot under s. 437 direct further inquiry when the original Magistrate has not only discharged the accused, but directed prosecution of complainant.—A Sessions Judge has not the power to set aside an order of discharge when the prosecution of the complainant has been ordered under s. 476 for an offence under s. 211, I P C., and if the Sessions Judge is of opinion that the order should be set aside, he should refer the matter to the High Court, 13 Cr. L. J. 1 (C) followed, 15 Cr. L. J. 16 (C). See Note 35 to s. 437.

54. High Court competent to revise.—See Note 57 under s. 439. The High Court is competent in the exercise of its revisional powers to interfere with an order of a Subordinate Court, made under this section, directing the prosecution of any person for offences referred to in that section. The High Court, under s. 439 has the powers conferred on a Court of Appeal by s. 423 to alter or reverse any such order of an inferior Criminal Court, 26 B. 785 (where 16 C. 730; 21 M. 124; 20 C. 349; 23 C. 610 are relied on) *contra*, see 13 B. 109; Ratanlal 895; 13 M. 144; 15 A. 80. It will be seen that there was a conflict of opinion between the High Courts on this point. But now the Legislature has limited this power of interference of superior Courts. See s. 537, cl. (b). The case in 26 M. 93 where a Full Bench of the Madras High Court took the view that an order under this section, being in the nature of a complaint is not subject to revision by the High Court, was expressly repudiated by all the other High Courts in India and is now overruled by 33 M. 43 (F.B.) where it was held following 21 M. 124 (F.B.) that the High Court has power under s. 439 to interfere, on grounds other than want of jurisdiction when a Criminal Court has taken action under s. 476 and no change was effected in the revisional power of the High Court by the Code of 1898. Under the 1882 Code orders under this section were doubtless subject to revision under s. 439 and the words in sub-sec. (2) of the present Code, do not operate to make the proceedings of the Magistrate merely a complaint. Sub-section (1) contemplates an order being passed after such inquiry as may be necessary, and that order is something more than a complaint as defined in the Code, for a Magistrate who receives it, is bound to take action on it and has not the option of postponing the issue of process under s. 202 or dismissing it under s. 203. The words "as if on complaint made and recorded under s. 200" do not mean that the proceedings taken under sub-sec. (1) is to be regarded merely as a complaint and not as an order. The words added to s. 537 certainly contemplate such orders as being subject to revision, and moreover it is not one of the sections enumerated in sub-sec. (3) of s. 435, 3 L. B. R. 234 (F.B.) = 5 Cr. L. J. 123. In 28 A. 349, STANLEY, C.J., was of opinion that an order under this section sending a case to a Magistrate, is not really a complaint though it is of the nature of a complaint. See 23 A. 349; 26 A. 249; 1903 A. W. N. 22 = 4 A. L. J. 811 = 7 Cr. L. J. 3; 1903 A. W. N. 27 = 4 A. L. J. 803 = 7 Cr. L. J. 1; 26 B. 785; 8 C. W. N. 73; 1 L. B. R. 236; 3 Bar. L. T. 101 = 12 Cr. L. J. 85; 3 Bar. L. T. 119 = 11 Cr. L. J. 734; 4 Bar. L. T. 246 = 13 Cr. L. J. 521; 1904-06 U. B. R. (Cr. P.) 4; 1907 U. B. R. (Cr. P.) 1 = 6 Cr. L. J. 25; 4 N. L. R. 150 = 8 Cr. L. J. 351; 9 N. L. R. 184 = 15 Cr. L. J. 33; 5 P. R. 1903 = 103 P. L. R. 1908 = 7 Cr. L. J. 281; 153 P. L. R. 1911 = 33 P. W. R. 1911 = 12 Cr. L. J. 216; 29 M. 100; 40 Cr. 477 (F.B.) It is open to the High Court to consider in revision whether the person against whom the order is made is prejudiced by the absence of a preliminary inquiry, 20 C. 349; 15 C. W. N. 691 = 14 C. L. J. 123 = 12 Cr. L. J. 209; 7 B. L. R. 187 = 15 Cr. L. J. 841; 19 C. W. N. 127 = 18 Cr. L. J. 320; 48 B. 401 = 26 Bom. L. R. 239; 7 Lah. 108.

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of character it is to the offspring

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in a play (Ore)

Pre-pentive a Candy to be presented h
not on directly before the mind presentative
posed to representative and sym bol c

by Liebreich

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at a certain price within a certain time
based upon
and call authority to buy and sell stocks at a
certain

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55. **High Court will not interfere merely because on facts it may take a different view.**—Where a Magistrate had taken upon himself the responsibility of starting a case under ss 182 and 211, I P. C., and he does this advisedly and his order shows that he has acted with circumspection and mature deliberation, his order should not be lightly interfered with, on a mere question of fact by the High Court in revision, 1908 A.W. N. 27 = 4 A. L. J. 803 = 7 Cr. L. J. 1. Similarly, the Chief Court of Punjab in 18 P. R. 1902 laid down that revision should be granted only if there be some error of law, some irregularity some abuse or failure to exercise jurisdiction and not simply because the Revisional Court has formed a different opinion from that of the Courts below on the merits of the case. In 23 A. 249, STRACHEY, C.J., remarked that if the Court below had proceeded upon merely fanciful ground or grounds so obviously wrong that it could not be said to have formed a serious judicial opinion at all then the High Court would interfere, even on the merits, but such power would not be exercised where the Court below had arrived at a judicial opinion on substantial grounds, merely because the High Court disagrees with that opinion. The High Court must have regard to the nature of the revisional jurisdiction and must not in a case arising under s. 476 any more than in any other case allow what would virtually be an appeal from the Court below, 35 C. 909; 9 N. L. R. 184 = 15 C. R. L. J. 33. The High Court will, however, set aside an order when the ordering Court in forming whatever opinion it did takes action on merely fanciful ground or grounds so empty, so obviously wrong that it could not be said to have formed a serious judicial opinion at all, 10 N. L. R. 177 = 16 Cr. L. J. 161; 18 Cr. L. J. 1015.

56. **Power of High Court under s. 439 to revise orders made by Courts other than criminal.**—It is now held by all the High Courts except Bombay and Punjab in 7 P. W. R. 1903 = 5 P. R. 1903 = 7 Cr. L. J. 231 and 26 B. 785, that a Criminal Bench cannot revise orders made by Courts other than criminal. See Note 11 under s. 435.

(i) **Civil Court**—A Criminal Bench of the High Court cannot interfere under s. 439 with proceedings of Civil Courts under this section. Application must be made under s. 115 of the *Civil Procedure Code* V of 1903 40 C. 477, 8 C. W. N. 73, a Criminal Bench may deal with such orders only if authorized by the Chief Justice under s. 14 of the *High Courts Act* 40 C. 477 (F.B.) See 23 A. 554 (F.B.) which overrules 26 A. 249; 30 M. 311, 31 M. 510, 26 M. 139, 4 L. B. R. 133 = 7 Cr. L. J. 416, 7 L. B. R. 76 = 6 Bur. L. 144 = 14 Cr. L. J. 498; 34 A. 393, 4 L. B. R. 339 = 9 Cr. L. J. 24, 17 O. C. 25 = 15 Cr. L. J. 217; 17 M. L. T. 288 = 16 Cr. L. J. 232; 1915 U. B. R. III, 83 = 17 Cr. L. J. 82. An order by a Settlement Officer acting under Chapter X of the *Bengal Tenancy Act*, is revisable only under s. 115 of *Civil Procedure Code* or under s. 15 of the *High Courts Act*, 40 C. 477 (F.B.) 31 M. L. J. 440.

(ii) **Revenue Court**—When an order under this section is made by a Collector, the High Court cannot interfere in revision as the Collector is not an inferior Criminal Court. The application, if any, for revision should be presented to the Board of Revenue to which alone the Collector is subordinate, 4 A. L. J. 701 = 1907 A. W. N. 277 = 6 Cr. L. J. 350, 3 B. L. R. 66 = 10 Cr. L. J. 395; 15 Cr. L. J. 2 (Qadh), 38 M. 72, 14 A. L. J. 1077. Of course, the Collector would have had no jurisdiction to proceed under this section unless he had been acting as a Revenue Court. In 1902 A. W. N. 202 a Revenue Court made an order under this section and forwarded the accused to the District Magistrate, who acted under subsec. (2) of this section, transferred the case to a Magistrate subordinate to him. After an unsuccessful application to the Sessions Judge to set aside the order, the High Court was moved in revision. Held, that neither the High Court nor the Sessions Judge had any jurisdiction in the matter. If the object of the application was to question the original order of the Revenue Court, the Appellate or Revisional jurisdiction was in the superior Revenue Court and as regards the only order passed by the District Magistrate it was a perfectly legal order made under subsec. (2) of this section.

(iii) **District Registrar**—High Court cannot revise the orders of a District Registrar, 35 A. 109.

56-A. **Procedure when Bench of Chartered High Court hearing petition from order passed by Civil Court divided.**—When the Judges or a Division Bench differ in a matter under revision before them under s. 115, *Civ P C*, the opinion of the senior Judge prevails, cl. 36 of the Letters Patent and not s. 93, *Civ P C*, being applicable 19 M. L. T. 591 = 17 Cr. L. J. 42.

57. **Board of Revenue cannot revise order of Revenue Court.**—The Board of Revenue has no power to set aside the order of an Income-tax Collector directing proceedings under s. 476, 36 M. 72.

58. **Procedure to be adopted when Munsiff desires to show cause.**—A Munsiff, as a judicial officer, cannot under this section direct the prosecution of a person under ss 228 and 500, I P. C., in respect of contempt

- [From the *φασος*, speckled, iron ore, stone] [*Paion*] A pilchard and in abundance in the *πρω πη*
- [Gr *φωλλισμα*, to stammer] Ital
- stuttering
- αὐδισθησιμότης] = [Gr *φωδον*, exception, formation, from *αἰσθη*

of Court and defamation. If the Munsiff desired to show cause against the rule issued by the High Court in respect of such a proceeding he should appear by Counsel, 6 C. L. J. 713

X.—STAY OF PROCEEDINGS.

59. **Power of Chartered High Court to stay proceedings under this section.**—The Madras High Court even when it was of opinion that it could not revise the orders under this section [25 M. 88 (F.B.)] held, that it had the power to stay proceedings instituted under this section by a Civil Court during the pendency of an appeal. The power of general superintendence of s. 15 of the *Charter Act* and transfer (s. 19 of the *Letters Patent*) implied the power to send for the records in any case in the Lower Courts which must of necessity stay further proceedings in that case. The High Court has the power to point out to the subordinate Courts the inexpediency of trying a case when it is likely to interfere with the due course of justice (34 C. 843 referred to), 31 M. 510; 18 M. L. T. 591 = 17 Cr. L. J. 42; 43 A. 180.

60. **Power of High Court to stay proceedings.**—See 16 B. 729, 26 B. 735; 23 C. 610, 31 C. 859, 30 M. 225 and Notes under Heading XXIX, at pp. 546 and 547 and Note 54 to s. 439. *Quare*, whether the High Court in the exercise of its civil revisional powers has power to stay criminal proceedings, 35 C. 909, 23 C. 610; but the Criminal Court should be asked to stay proceedings, 8 C. W. N. 31.

61. **When stay of criminal proceedings desirable.**—(a) *Pending suit*—It would be a dangerous doctrine to lay down any hard and fast rule to the effect that a criminal trial or inquiry should of necessity be stayed, simply because a civil suit has been instituted between the parties in which some or all of the matters materially in issue in the criminal case would have to be determined, until the civil litigation was finally decided. The case in 34 C. 843 lays down no general rule. A Court may well hesitate to give sanction to prosecute his adversary for an offence alleged to have been committed during the pendency of a civil litigation as, if it acceded to his request, it must, to some extent at least give him an unfair advantage by enabling him to hold over the head of his adversary for at least six months the threat of a criminal prosecution which might or might not eventually be undertaken. But it is a very different thing to ask a Criminal Court which after inquiry held with this very object in view, has come to the conclusion that there are grounds for starting criminal proceedings against an individual to stay its hand indefinitely or at any rate, possibly for some years, because that individual has filed a civil suit. As held in 35 C. 909 it is very desirable that such a prosecution should be entertained as speedily as possible while the evidence on both sides is fresh, 13 C. W. N. 393 = 11 Cr. L. J. 4. In this case the civil suit was instituted nearly eight months after the criminal inquiries began and after the petitioner had been called on to show cause why he should not be prosecuted. It is not an invariable rule that the criminal proceedings should be stayed during the pendency of civil litigation regarding the same subject matter. Certain property was attached in execution of a decree. Thereupon accused No. 1 applied to have the attachment raised on the ground that he had purchased the property from the judgment-debtor under a sale-deed executed long before the date of the attachment. In the summary inquiry before the Civil Court, he produced the sale-deed which was supported by the evidence of accused No. 2. The Civil Court found that the deed was a forgery and rejected the claim and then, holding an inquiry under this section committed both accused to the Sessions Court on charges of perjury and forgery. During the pendency of this inquiry, accused No. 1 filed a civil suit to establish the genuineness of the sale deed and to set aside the attachment. He also applied to the High Court to quash the commitment or stay criminal proceedings pending the disposal of the civil suit. Held, refusing the application, that the mere fact that a regular suit was filed to establish the genuineness of the sale-deed was not a sufficient ground for quashing the commitment or for adjourning the trial pending the hearing of a civil suit, 18 B. 581. Where on the refusal of the District Registrar to register certain documents, suits were instituted by the petitioners for the registration of the documents and the District Registrar ordered the prosecution of the petitioners for forgery of the documents, the High Court being of opinion that the petitioners had followed regular course prescribed by law to obtain registration stayed the criminal proceedings for three months only, in order to prevent the petitioners postponing the criminal proceedings for a long time by introducing delays in the conduct of the civil suit, 14 C. W. N. 151. See also 13 Cr. L. J. 1 (C), 9 P. W. R. 1916 and 8 P. W. R. 1916.

(b) *Criminal Proceedings instituted when civil suit pending*—When a civil suit is pending, proceedings are instituted in respect of an offence under s. 474, I P. C., alleged to have been committed in the course of such suit it is expedient that Criminal Proceedings should be deferred pending the final disposal of the civil suit, 19 C. W. N. 125 = 16 Cr. L. J. 309

(c) *Pending appeal*—Though ordinarily the High Court will not interfere with the discretion of the trying Magistrate and stay proceedings in a Criminal Court, pending the disposal of a second appeal on the

[illegible]

civil side yet it will undoubtedly do so when imperatively required in the interests of justice 8 C. 308; B L R. Sub Vol 426; 16 B 729, 18 B 881; 26 B 785; 5 C W N 44; 5 C L J 233; 23 C 610; 14 C W N 131, 34 C. 843, 31 M 510 It was held in 35 C. 909 following 26 B 785 that where a Civil Court on passing orders

of civil proceeding is not a sufficient reason to quash under s 215 a commitment made under s. 478. See also 14 Bom L R 968 = 1 Bom Cr Ca 212 = 13 Cr L J 843 and 21 P W R. 1912 = 23 Cr L J. 175

62 Sessions Judge cannot stay proceedings of Civil Court.—A Civil Court acting under s 478 or s 478 not being an inferior Criminal Court within the meaning of s. 435 a Sessions Judge has no jurisdiction under these sections to stay the proceedings taken by a Civil Court as he cannot call for the records in such a case Welr II, 602 See also Note 26 at p 1050

XI—APPEAL

Under the new amendment it will be found that s. 476-A enables a superior Court to make a complaint where the Subordinate Court has omitted to do so and under s 476-B an appeal is expressly provided for from orders under s 476

476-A. The power conferred on Civil Revenue and Criminal Courts by section 476

sub-section (1) may be exercised in respect of any offence referred to therein and alleged to have been committed in or in relation to any proceeding in any such Court by the Court to which such former Court is subordinate within the meaning of section 195 sub-section (3) in any case in which such former Court has neither made a complaint under section 476 in respect of such offence nor rejected an application for the making of such complaint and where the superior Court makes such complaint the provisions of section 476 shall apply accordingly

Notes—1 Under the old Code there was a conflict of decisions as to whether an Appellate Court can institute proceedings under this section when the Lower Court has omitted to do so (e.g. 32 B 184, 34 C. 551, 10 C. W N 1091).

But now under the present amendment under the new s. 476-A a superior Court may complain where a subordinate Court has omitted to do so.

2 Direction to complain by the higher Court pending an application for sanction before a lower Court.—The pendency of an application for sanction before a lower Court does not prevent a higher Court from granting a sanction under s 476-A of the code 26 Bom L R 713

476-B. Any person on whose application any Civil Revenue or Criminal Court has

refused to make a complaint under section 476 or section 476-A, or against whom such a complaint has been made may appeal to the Court to which such former Court is subordinate within the meaning of section 195 sub-section (3) and the superior Court may thereupon after notice to the parties concerned direct the withdrawal of the complaint or as the case may be itself make the complaint which the Subordinate Court might have made under section 476 and if it makes such complaint the provisions of that section shall apply accordingly

Appeals

Notes—1 No appeal to the High Court against an order made under section 476 B.—Reversional jurisdiction not ordinarily exercised.—No appeal lies under the provisions of the Criminal Procedure Code against an order made by the Court to which the Court making a complaint under s. 476 is subordinate

Although the High Court may in extraordinary cases exercise revisional powers in cases falling under s 476-B of the Code yet generally speaking where the Lower Appellate Court withdraws a complaint made under s. 476 it is very difficult for the High Court to interfere in revision.

The question whether a complaint should be made under section 476 is almost invariably a matter of discretion and if the trial Court or the Court to which it is subordinate thinks that no complaint should be made it is not desirable that the High Court should interfere.

Under s 476 as amended the Court is directed, in case it thinks that proceedings should be taken, to make a complaint in writing signed by the presiding officer of the Court and forward the same to a Magistrate of the first class having jurisdiction

A Court proceeding under s 476-B should, if it quashes the direction to prosecute, direct with drawal of the complaint, it is not enough to direct that the sanction granted by the trial Court should be withdrawn, 26 Bom. L. R. 289.

2 **Abatement of appeal on the death of the appellant.**—The right of appeal under s. 476-B does not survive on the death of the appellant and the appeal abates. 47 A. 359.

3. **The duty of the Appellate Court under s. 476-B.**—In deciding an appeal under this section the Appeal Court should reconsider the entire matter on its merit and should take a complete review of all the facts and if the Appellate Court is not satisfied that a *prima facie* case has been made out, the order appealed against must be set aside. The words "the offence which appears to have been committed" mean the facts before the Court, unless rebutted, show that an offence has been committed. 23 A. L. J. 515.

4. **Operation of ss. 476-A and 476-B.**—From the scheme of the new amendments it appears that if the Subordinate Court has neither made a complaint under s 476 nor rejected an application for the making of a complaint, then the Superior Court may take action under s. 476-A and make a complaint. But where the Subordinate Court has rejected the application or has granted that application by a formal complaint, then, the procedure contemplated by the Code is by way of an appeal to the Superior Court under s 476-B

Further, *held* that an appeal under s 476 B of the Code is barred under Art. 154 of the Limitation Act if filed more than thirty days after the order rejecting the application under s 476 52 C. 1009

5. **Whether an appeal lies to the High Court under s. 476-B from an appellate order of the District Judge making a complaint which the Subordinate Judge refused to make.**—*Held*, that no appeal lies under s 476-B of the Code to the High Court from an appellate order of the District Judge making a complaint under s 476, which the Subordinate Judge might himself have made but refused to make, 6 Lah. 56.

But *see* 5 Pat. 262 where 6 Lah. 56 is disapproved and it is *held* that an appeal lies on behalf of the person against whom complaint is made by the District Judge. In the Patna as well as the Lahore case the facts were the same. In both the cases the Sub-Judge had refused to make a complaint and from this order an appeal was preferred under s 476-B to the District Court, and the District Court passed an appellate order under s. 476-B to lodge a complaint. It goes without saying that in the case of every order to file a complaint whether made by a subordinate or superior Court the procedure laid down under s 476 is to be followed in sending the complaint to the nearest Magistrate etc though the application may be made by a party under s. 476 or 476-A or the party may ask the Court to file a complaint in an appeal under s 476-B

The Patna High Court appears to hold that an appeal is provided under s 476 B in all cases where, 'Any person against whom a complaint under s. 476 has been made by any Court. (See 5 Pat. 274)' This is how the s 476-B is construed by the Patna High Court. The words 'any Court' may mean the Court of First Instance or the Appeal Court and would include both the Sub-Judge and the District Judge. And the conclusion arrived at by the Patna High Court is that where any Court whether the trial Court or the Appeal Court lodges a complaint by following the procedure under s 476, a right of appeal is given under s 476-B to a person against whom such complaint is filed.

But it is submitted that the Patna decision cannot be upheld, and, on the contrary, the decision in 5 Lah. 56 correctly interprets s 476-B for the following reasons—

(1) The policy of the Criminal Procedure Code is not to allow two appeals as a rule in criminal matters. According to the construction put by the Patna High Court on s. 476-B there would be two appeals under that section.

(2) The words "or s. 476-A" in s. 476-B would be quite superfluous, because every District Judge taking action under s. 476-A will have to proceed under s. 476 and to file a complaint under s. 476. So even without the mention of s. 476-A in s. 476-B an appeal would lie under that section as the actual complaint is filed by the District Judge under s. 476.

(3) **Section 476-B has the words—**

"Any person on whose application."—The word application is very important and clearly indicates the circumstances under which an appeal is allowed under s. 476-B.

STORE-CLOTHES

Store-clothes

Supplement.

Under this section an appeal is only allowed in the following cases —

(a) When an application is made under s. 476 to the trial Court, *i.e.*, Sub-Judge and he refuses to grant it.

(b) When an application is made for the *first time* to the District Court under s. 476 (where no application was made to the trial Court, *i.e.*, Sub-Judge) and the District Court acts under s. 476 A.

For purposes of appeal, s. 476-B contemplates an order refusing a complaint or making a complaint on an application by a party either under s. 476 or 476-A. Over such an order on such an application only a right of appeal is allowed under s. 476-B. This section does not seem to contemplate a right of appeal over an appellate order rejecting or making a complaint, which order is itself passed in an appeal under s. 476-B and which cannot be said to have been passed on an application either under s. 476 or 476-A.

On this point, *see also* 26 Bom. L. R. 289, 52 Cal. 478.

6 Whether revision lies to the High Court over an appellate order passed under s. 476-B.—As regards revision all the High Courts seem to have been agreed that in most cases revision lies to the High Court over an appellate order passed under s. 476-B by a District Court. *See* 26 Bom. L. R. 289, 52 Cal. 478; 5 Lah. 56; 5 Pat. 262. But the Allahabad High Court has held that there is no revision to the High Court under s. 439 in case of an order passed under s. 476-B by a superior Civil Court. 24 A. L. J. 217; 26 All. 249 (F.B.) followed. In this case the Munsiff dismissed an application under s. 476 and refused to file a complaint. There was an appeal over this order to the District Judge and the District Judge under s. 476-B allowed the appeal and ordered a complaint to be filed under s. 476. Under these circumstances it was held that where an order is passed under s. 476 by a superior Civil Court the case does not fall under s. 439 because ss. 435 and 439 must be read together and under these sections High Courts have power to revise the Records of only Criminal Courts and not Civil Courts.

The word proceeding in ss. 435 and 439 refers to a criminal proceeding, and therefore where a superior Civil Court acts under s. 476-B the proceeding is a civil proceeding and not a criminal one and so ss. 435 and 439 cannot apply to such a proceeding and therefore there cannot be any revision.

In 26 Bom. L. R. 289 the proceedings concerned were in the Civil Courts, and revision was sought over an order of the District Judge in a civil matter and still it was held that though an appeal would not lie over an order passed by a District Judge under s. 476-B still revision may lie under s. 439 though the High Court as a rule, will not interfere with the discretion of the Lower Courts. In view of the remarks in 24 A. L. J. 217 the decision in 26 Bom. L. R. 289 will have to be re-considered.

7. Limitation in the case of an appeal under s. 476-B against an order making a complaint.—Limitation begins to run from the date of the making of the complaint and not from the date of the order of the District Judge directing that a complaint be drawn up because s. 476-B of the Code gives a right of appeal to a person against whom a complaint has been made. 7 Lah. 77. Cf. Note 4 above for limitation in case of rejection to file a complaint.

477. (Power of Court of Sessions as to such offences committed before itself) omitted by s. 129 of Act XVIII of 1923

The Joint Committee Report, 1922, says—

Section 477 is inconsistent with section 476 as proposed by the Bill because the latter section made it obligatory on the Court to make a complaint and send it to a first class Magistrate. This defect has been removed by one of the amendments we have made in section 476, but we are doubtful whether s. 477 should stand. We considered a proposal to enable a Court of Sessions to try a case committed to it after a complaint had been made by itself but we do not think it desirable that a Court which has instituted the proceedings should dispose of the case itself, and we have therefore, introduced a clause into the Bill repealing s. 477."

478. (1) When any such offence is committed before any Civil or Revenue Court, or brought under the notice of any Civil or Revenue Court in the course of a judicial proceeding, and the case is triable exclusively by the High Court or Court of Sessions or such Civil or Revenue Court thinks that it ought to be tried by the High Court or Court of Sessions, such Civil or Revenue Court may, instead of sending the case under section 476 to a Magistrate for inquiry, itself complete the inquiry, and commit or hold to bail the accused person to take his trial before the High Court or Court of Sessions as the case may be.

Power of Civil and Revenue Court to complete inquiry and commit to High Court or Court of Sessions.

- Time'-lock, n.** A lock having clock work attached, which, when wound up, prevents the bolt being withdrawn when locked, until a certain interval has elapsed.
- Tim'o-crāt'le, a.** Belonging to, or constituted by, *ocree* *See G. C.*
- Tin'e-a, n.** [Lat. a moth.] (*Eutoma*) A genus of diptera, to which the common *tin-e* belongs.
- Tin'type, n.** " " " " " "
- Tip'cart, n.** the body can
dump the load
- Tip'si fy, v. t.** " " " " " "
- Tithe, a.** [S. *tithe*], mough, many thousand. *Shat* | T
- Ti'u bite, v. t. or i.** [Add] 2 To rock, or roll as

(2) For the purposes of an inquiry under this section the Civil or Revenue Court may* exercise all the powers of a Magistrate, and its proceedings in such inquiry shall be conducted as nearly as may be in accordance with the provisions of Chapter XVIII, † and of Chapter XXXIII in cases where that chapter applies and shall be deemed to have been held by a Magistrate"

Notes.—1. Scope of the words "any such offence."—These words mean an offence referred to in s. 195, and not an offence referred to in that section qualified by the circumstances under which it is committed, i.e., committed by a party to any proceeding, in any Court, in respect of document given in evidence in such proceeding, as described, in cl. (c) of s. 195 of the 1882 Code, 22 C. 1005; 19 B 531, *contra* 15 M. 224 and see Notes 3 and 20 to s. 476, 37 C. 250. This section must also be regarded as supplementary to s. 195

2 Preliminary inquiry necessary and the procedure under Chapter XVIII must be strictly followed—A Civil Court has no power to order the commitment of a person for offences under ss. 471, 466 and 193, I P C., without holding the preliminary inquiry required by this section, 22 W. R. 52 Where a Court elects to commit the accused itself, the procedure as to preliminary inquiry into cases triable by a Sessions Court (Chapter XVIII) must be strictly followed, 4 M 227 = Weir II, 585. The preliminary inquiry must be conducted strictly under Chapter XVII If the offence has not been committed before Court itself, or if the offence be one not exclusively cognizable by a Court of Sessions (or one which in the opinion of the Court ought to be tried by a Court of Sessions) the Court which considers further inquiry to be necessary cannot commit the case to the Court of Sessions, but must send it to a competent Magistrate, 4 B 287, *see* 15 A. L. J. 805; 40 A. 32.

3. After taking steps under s. 476, Court cannot proceed under this section—The procedure prescribed in this section, viz., of completing the investigation and committing the accused, etc., is only alternative, and when a Civil Court has once sent a case for inquiry under s. 476 before a first class Magistrate, and the latter discharges accused under s. 209, the Civil Court has no power to revive the case against the accused and issue notice upon him to show cause why he should not be proceeded against before itself, *Ratanlal* 959.

4. Proceedings which may be construed as orders under this section—An Assistant Sessions Judge before whom a witness gave a false deposition, took cognizance of the case under s. 190 (c) in his capacity as District Magistrate On objection being taken for want of previous sanction under s. 195 alleging that the action taken by the officer as a District Magistrate was not tantamount to a sanction by him as a Civil Judge *held*, that the action taken by the officer was in effect action which as a Civil Judge he was perfectly competent to take under this section as the offence was brought under his notice as a Civil Court in the course of a judicial proceeding As a Civil Judge he could either transfer the case to himself as a Magistrate for enquiry or completing inquiries as a Civil Judge commit the accused 9 Bom L R. 212 = 5 Cr. L J 202. No action having been taken on a sanction a complaint was lodged by the *Karkun* of a Magistrate under the orders of the Magistrate in the Court of the nearest first-class Magistrate *Held* that the proceedings were instituted under s. 476, 34 B. 88

5. Sessions Judge not entitled to stay proceedings of Civil Courts under this section.—A Civil Court acting under s. 476 or this section, not being an inferior Criminal Court within the meaning of s. 43a, a Sessions Judge has no jurisdiction to call for the records of a Civil Court and to stay the proceedings relating to an inquiry into a charge of an offence held by that Court under this section, *Weir* II, 602, *see* Note 68 to s. 476.

6 Stay of criminal proceedings pending civil litigation.—*See* Note 67 under s. 476.

7. Whether an order of commitment under this section by a Judge of the High Court can be quashed.

quashed, 43 M. 351.

* The words and figure "subject to the provisions of s. 413" were omitted by Act XII of 1923

† These words and figure "—" were inserted by *Id.*

V.

VÄCTIL-LA TÖRY, a. Inclined to Facillate, Vég'és able, a. [All] Vegetable, flannel, a textile America, though a few occur in Central America and the West Indies
waving Hatched material, manufactured in Germany from a down or

479. When any such commitment is made by a Civil or Revenue Court the Court shall send the charge with the order of commitment and the record of the case to the Presidency Magistrate, District Magistrate or other Magistrate authorized to commit for trial and such Magistrate shall bring the case before the High Court or Court of Sessions as the case may be together with the witnesses for the prosecution and defence

Procedure of Civil or Revenue Court in such cases

Notes.—See s. 206 as to Magistrates authorized to commit for trial

480. (1) When any such offence as is described in sections 175 178 179 180 or section 228 of the Indian Penal Code is committed in the view or presence of any Civil Criminal or Revenue Court the Court may cause the offender to be detained in custody and at any time before the rising of the Court on the same day may if it thinks fit take cognizance of the offence and sentence the offender to fine not exceeding two hundred rupees and, in default of payment to simple imprisonment for a term which may extend to one month unless such fine be sooner paid

Procedure in certain cases of contempt

(2) Nothing in † section 29 A or Chapter XXXIII* shall be deemed to apply to proceedings under this section

Notes.—1 Scope of the sections referred to—S 175—Omission to produce a document before a public servant by a person legally bound to produce such document S 178—Refusing oath when duly required to take oath by a public servant S 179—Refusing to answer a public servant authorized to question S 180—Refusing to sign a statement made to public servant when legally required to do so S 228—Intentional insult etc. to a public servant sitting in any stage of a judicial proceeding

2 Form of warrant—As to the form of warrant in certain cases of contempt when fine is imposed, see Sch V Form No 38 As to the form of the record see s 481 Cf Notes at pp 101 and 11 of the Appendix

3 Prevarication may amount to contempt—Prevarication by a witness may though it does not necessarily amount to a contempt of Court within the meaning of s 228 I P C and under this section 10 B H C R 69, see *contra* 4 B H C R Cr Ca 6 and 7, 15 W R 5

4 Latitude must be allowed to counsel in conducting the case—See Notes 1 and 2 under s 484 Some latitude should be allowed to a member of the Bar insisting in the conduct of his case upon his question being taken down or his objection noted where the Court thinks the question inadmissible or the objection untenable There ought to be a spirit of give and take between the Bench and the Bar in such matters and every little persistence on the part of a pleader should not be turned into an occasion for a criminal trial unless the prisoner's conduct is so clearly vexatious as to lead to the inference that his intention is to insult or to interrupt the Court 6 Bom L R 541 An irrelevant question put to a witness cannot amount to a contempt under s 228 I P C though a persistence in vexatious or irrelevant questions after warning might amount to a contempt 44 P R 1867 But see 46 B 973

5 When there is no intention to insult, there can be no contempt—See Note 1 under s. 484—Where an accused person in making an application for transfer of the case pending against him inserted in such application assertions of a scandalous or defamatory nature concerning the trying Magistrate held that there being no intention on the part of the applicant to insult the Court but merely to procure a transfer of his case the conviction under s 228, I P C was bad 1893 A. W N 145 An application for transfer from a particular Court on the ground of a probable miscarriage of justice is not a contempt 34 P R. 1869 A Court has power to deal with an accused only if he committed one of the offences enumerated herein a person therefore cannot be convicted under this section for walking with creaking shoes near the Court room 5 M. L. T 236 = 9 Cr L J 309 In 33 A 284 the case in 1898 A. W N 145 was followed

6 No contempt, unless Magistrate sitting in course of judicial proceedings—In an inquiry held by a second-class Magistrate about a breach of the peace which arose in consequence of a dispute between two castes the accused said to the Magistrate in a defiant and insolent manner that he would never permit the

* The words whether he is an European or not are substituted by Act XII of 1923

† The words s. 29 A or Chapter XXXIII were substituted for the words and figures s 412 or s 414 by Act VII of 1923

and other substances in the form of a powder, — used as a yellow pigment — Patent y-Bow, a pigment, com-; T-Best, ado [See East] Ent; in the begin y; for d note] y-Bow

Z.

ZIGZAG, v. To move in a zigzag manner. R. Downing | profusion of showy flowers The species are mainly mal (y-y, soul, and h-y, discourse) Animal py
from Mexico (sing to, or contain Zo-B'te, a [Gr (See an animal) Containing the remains of organized bod es — used of rock or soil

THE METRIC SYSTEM OF WEIGHTS AND MEASURES.

MEASURES OF CAPACITY

| METRIC DENOMINATIONS AND VALUES. | | | EQUIVALENTS IN DENOMINATIONS IN USE. | |
|----------------------------------|---------------|----------------------|--------------------------------------|------------------------|
| Names | No. of Liters | Cubic Measure | Dry Measure | Liquid or Wine Measure |
| or Stere | 1,000 | 1 cubic meter | 1,356 cubic yds | 584 1/2 gal |
| | 100 | 1 cubic meter | 2 bush 3.35 pss | 264 1/2 gal |
| | 10 | 10 cubic decimeters. | 9.08 quarts. | 2.64 1/2 gal |
| | 1 | 1 cubic decimeter | 908 quarts | 16 1/2 gal |
| | .01 | 1 cubic centimeter | 61,023 cubic in. | 34 1/2 gal |
| | .001 | .1 cubic centimeter | 610,230 cubic in. | 237 1/2 gal |
| | | | .061 cubic in. | 2 1/2 dram. |

SCHEME OF THE WEIGHTS AND MEASURES OF THE METRIC SYSTEM

| RATIOS | LENGTH | SURFACES | VOLUMES | WEIGHTS |
|-----------|------------|----------|------------|-------------------|
| 1,000,000 | - | - | - | Millic or Tonneau |
| 100,000 | - | - | - | Quintal |
| 10,000 | Megameter | - | - | Nivogram |
| 1,000 | Kilometer | - | - | Kilogram or Kilo. |
| 100 | Hectometer | Hectare | Hectoliter | Hectogram. |
| 10 | Decameter | - | Decaliter | Decagram |
| 1 | Meter | Are | Liter | Gram |
| .1 | Decimeter | - | Deciliter | Decigram |
| .01 | Centimeter | Centare | Centiliter | Centigram |
| .001 | Millimeter | - | Milliliter | Milligram. |

It will be seen from this table that ten millimeters equal one centimeter ten centimeters equal one decimeter and so on.

MEASURES OF LENGTH

| METRIC DENOMINATIONS AND VALUES | EQUIVALENTS IN DENOMINATIONS IN USE |
|---------------------------------|-------------------------------------|
| Megameter | 10,000 meters |
| Kilometer | 1,000 meters |
| Hectometer | 100 meters. |
| Decameter | 10 meters |
| Meter | 1 meter |
| Decimeter | .1 meter |
| Centimeter | .01 m (or .001 meter) |
| Millimeter | .001 meter |
| | 6,213 7/8 miles |
| | 0.62137 mile or 3,280 ft. 10 in |
| | 39.37 inches |
| | 39.37 inches |
| | 39.37 inches |
| | 39.37 inches |
| | 39.37 inches |
| | 39.37 inches |

MEASURES OF SURFACE

| METRIC DENOMINATIONS AND VALUES | EQUIVALENTS IN DENOMINATIONS IN USE |
|---------------------------------|-------------------------------------|
| Hectare | 10,000 square meters |
| Are | 100 square meters |
| Centare | 1 square meter |
| | 2.47 acres |
| | 119.6 square yards |
| | 1,550 square inches |

WEIGHTS.

| METRIC DENOMINATIONS AND VALUES | | | EQUIVALENTS IN DENOMINATIONS IN USE. |
|---------------------------------|-----------------|---|--------------------------------------|
| Names | Number of Grams | Weight of what Quantity of Water at Maximum Density | Avoidupo We ghts |
| Millic or Tonneau | 1,000,000 | 1 cubic meter | 2,204 6 pounds |
| Quintal | 100,000 | 1 hectoliter | 220 46 pounds |
| Nivogram | 10,000 | 1 decaliter | 22 846 pounds |
| Kilogram or Kilo | 1,000 | 1 liter | 2 246 pounds |
| Hectogram | 100 | 1 deciliter | 2 246 pounds |
| Decagram | 10 | 10 cubic centimeters | 3 774 grains |
| Gram | 1 | 1 cubic centimeter | 15 432 grains |
| Decigram | .1 | 1 cubic centimeter | 1 543 grains |
| Centigram | .01 | 10 cubic millimeters | 154 3 grains |
| Milligram | .001 | 1 cubic millimeter | 15 432 grains |

COMMON MEASURES AND WEIGHTS, WITH THEIR METRIC EQUIVALENTS.

The following are some of the measures in common use, with their equivalents in measures of the Metric System —

| COMMON MEASURES | EQUIVALENTS | COMMON MEASURES | EQUIVALENTS |
|-----------------|-------------------------|-----------------|---------------------|
| An inch | 2.54 centimeters | A cubic yard | 764 55 cubic meters |
| A foot | 30.48 centimeters | A cord | 128 cubic feet |
| A yard | 91.44 meter | A liquid quart | 946 35 liters |
| A rod | 5.029 meters | A gallon | 3 785 liters |
| A mile | 1.609 kilometers | | |
| A square inch | 6.45 square centimeters | | |
| A square foot | 929 square centimeters | | |
| A square yard | 8361 square centimeters | | |
| A square rod | 25.3 square meters | | |
| An acre | 4046.86 square meters | | |
| A square mile | 2.59 square kilometers | | |
| A cubic inch | 16.39 cubic centimeters | | |
| A cubic foot | 28.316 liters | | |
| A cubic yard | 764.555 cubic meters | | |

castes to be friendly even if the Magistrate were to shoot him dead" The Sub-Magistrate thereupon fined him Rs 50 and the Joint Magistrate reversed the conviction on the ground that he was not sitting in any stage of a judicial proceeding and this reversal was upheld by the High Court as perfectly correct, *Weir II, 603*. While a Tahsildar was hearing a civil case, he allowed the proceedings to be interrupted by the accused, a lambardar, who had brought part of a sum due from him for revenue and in the course of which the accused was alleged to have abused the Tahsildar and was prosecuted, *held* that the Tahsildar was not sitting in any stage of a judicial proceeding and the conviction under s 228 was unsustainable 40 P. R. 1881; *see also* 35 P. R. 1886.

7. Section not applicable to village headmen in Madras.—The head of a village is a Criminal Court, but he cannot take cognizance of a contempt under this section, because under no provision of the law has he power to fine.—*Mad. H C Pro, 26th July, 1870* Ss. 480—482 do not apply to Village Munsiff therefore, where a Village Munsiff was intentionally insulted in the discharge of his Magisterial duties by the accused, who was thereupon convicted by a second-class Magistrate on Police report *held*, that the conviction was right as the Magistrate had jurisdiction and the want of sanction or complaint on the part of the Village Munsiff was a defect curable by s. 537, 15 M. 131.

8. Contempts must be dealt with before rising of Court.—The procedure laid down in this section should be strictly followed. The provisions of the section should be applied *then and there*, at any rate before its rising, by the Court in whose view or presence a contempt has been committed which it considers should be dealt with under this section. Where a Magistrate, in whose presence contempt was committed, took cognizance of the offence immediately, but in order to give the accused an opportunity of showing cause, postponed his final order for some days, *held* that, under the circumstances, it was doubtful whether there was any necessity for the Magistrate to postpone the final order until the accused has had an opportunity of showing cause against it, and that he should have directed the detention of the accused and dealt with the matter at once or before his rising, 11 A. 361. When a proceeding under this section was instituted immediately after the reading out of a final order and it was objected that the judicial proceedings have been concluded by the reading of the final order, the Court could not proceed under this section *held*, that the accused was rightly convicted under this section, 16 P. R. 1897—*Per ROE, C.J.* It might also be *held*, that the whole sitting of a Court for the disposal of judicial work from the opening to the rising of the Court is a judicial proceeding and that the necessary interval between the conclusion of one case and the opening of another is a stage in a judicial proceeding. S 482 need not be read with this section and that section does not require the Magistrate to draw up proceedings on the same day that the offence is committed, 35 C 161. The rule applies only to action taken under this section.

9. Change of capacity of offended officer does not give jurisdiction.—An officer before whom whilst acting in a particular capacity an offence under s. 228, I P C., is committed, cannot in another capacity take up and try the offence. Where the officer does not follow the procedure laid down in this section the case must be tried by an officer other than the person before whom the contempt was committed 12 W. R. 18. *See also* 15 W. R. 2. The Ruling in 22 W. R. 10 to the effect, that if the Court does not proceed under this section or s. 482 it cannot make the contempt the subject of a complaint under s. 195 to a Magistrate, is perhaps of doubtful authority having regard to the language of s. 195.

10. Sentence cannot be passed in excess of Rs. 200 for Interruption.—Notwithstanding the provisions as to punishment in s. 228 I P C., a Court, proceeding itself under this section (*i.e.*, when dealing with an offence) cannot pass a sentence in excess of that prescribed herein, *Weir II, 603*. If it considers a fine too light a sentence for the offence, it ought, under s. 483 to refer the case to some competent Magistrate, 10 W. R. 47; *Ratanlal 64*.

11. Right of appeal.—An appeal lies from an order under this section. *See* s 486 and a Sessions Judge cannot decline to interfere on appeal, merely because in his opinion '*the matter is a mere trifle*'. He is bound to hear the appeal, and to come to a finding, whether the conviction is legal or illegal, *Ratanlal 978*.

12. Imprisonment in default to be in Civil Jail.—Though the section is silent as to the jail in which the imprisonment is to be carried out, the offender is generally sent only to the Civil Jail. Where a person is committed to jail for contempt, the Government is bound to supply him with rations, in the same way in which they are supplied to the other prisoners in the jail, 3 W. R. Cr. (Let.) 21.

13. No process fee payable by party.—No fee is chargeable for serving and executing any process such as a notice, rule, summons or warrant of arrest which may be issued by any Court of its own motion, solely for the purpose of taking cognizance of and punishing any act done or words spoken in contempt of its authority,

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14. **Has a Chartered High Court power to punish for contempt of inferior Courts?**—In *Governor of Bengal v. Moti Lal Ghosh*, 41 C. 173, the Calcutta High Court held, that it had no jurisdiction to punish, as an offence in a summary proceeding conducted in relation to a proceeding, in a mofussil Criminal Court, such as commenting on a case pending before that Court and differed from the decision of the Madras High Court in 21 M. L. J. 832 (F.B.) = 12 Cr. L. J. 525, where it was held that the High Court had jurisdiction to punish in a summary proceeding contempts of inferior Courts. See Note 1 under section 2 of the Appendix.

15. **Comment on pending proceedings may amount to contempt.**—It is a contempt of Court to make comment on a pending case if the comment can in the least be taken to have the effect of prejudicing the trial of an accused person, 14 Bom. L. R. 231 = 1 Bom. Cr. C. 105 = 13 Cr. L. J. 461. An article in a newspaper reflecting on the party to a suit, more especially when he is under cross-examination is a contempt of Court, 15 C. W. N. 771. As the law now stands it is only the Chartered High Court that have power to punish for such contempts.

16. **Suit against Magistrate for punishing person under this section when offence committed.**—Where a Magistrate charged a person with an offence under s. 228, I P. C., alleged to have been committed by the accused by walking in view of the Magistrate with shoes on, while discharging his duties as a Magistrate and it was found that he acted *bona fide*, held no suit could be maintained against him in damages, 9 M. L. T. 444.

481. (1) In every such case the Court shall record the facts constituting the offence, with the statement (if any) made by the offender, as well as the finding and sentence.

(2) If the offence is under section 228 of the Indian Penal Code, the record shall show the nature and stage of the judicial proceeding in which the Court interrupted or insulted was sitting, and the nature of the interruption or insult.

Notes.—1. **Disregard of procedure will lead to reversal of conviction.**—Where the procedure laid down in this section, as respects the recording of facts constituting the offence with any statement that the offender may make, as well as the finding and sentence was disregarded, the High Court set aside the conviction as illegal, 4 M. H. C. R. 229. The directions of this section "to record facts constituting the offence" are mandatory, and the omission to record the particulars mentioned herein any proceedings taken under s. 480 is fatal to such proceedings, 10 C. W. N. 1062 = 4 C. L. J. 415 = 4 Cr. L. J. 210.

2. **Record must show nature and stage of judicial proceeding.**—Where all that appeared from the record was that the Court of a Tahsildar was at a certain village for the purpose of attesting transfers in his capacity of a Revenue Court and that the accused had in the course of a conversation acted insolently and were convicted under s. 480, but the record did not show that at the time of the insult the Tahsildar was acting in any stage of a judicial proceeding held, the conviction must be set aside for non-compliance with the provisions of sub-sec. (2) 36 P. R. 1886. Where there is no evidence on the record from which it can be gathered what was the judicial proceeding or what was the stage of that proceeding which was interrupted, the order cannot be sustained though any irregularity can be cured by s. 537, 15 Cr. L. J. 621 (M).

3. **Specific offence charged must be stated and opportunity of answering it given.**—A contempt of Court being a criminal offence, no person can be punished for such unless the specific offence charged against him is distinctly stated, and an opportunity given him of answering—*In re Pollard*, (1890) L. R. 2 P. C. 106; 13 C. W. N. 685 = 19 M. L. J. 324 (P.C.).

4. **Trivial incidents ought not to be magnified into offences.**—See 4 M. H. C. R. 146 at p. 147, where the Appellate Court held it to be no contempt, a laugh and hesitation in speaking, which the Lower Court held to be one. It was found there was no intention to insult the Judge. As to whether prevarication would constitute contempt, see also 5 M. L. T. 286 = 9 Cr. C. L. J. 309. Notes 3 and 5 under s. 480 and Notes to s. 484.

482. (1) If the Court in any case considers that a person accused of any of the offences referred to in section 480 and committed in its view or presence should be imprisoned otherwise than in default of payment of fine or that a fine exceeding two hundred rupees should be imposed upon him, or such Court is for any other reason of opinion that the case should not be disposed of under section 480 such Court after recording the facts constituting the offence and the statement of the accused as hereinbefore provided, may forward the case to a Magistrate

Procedure where Court considers that case should not be dealt with under section 480

Scriptures Expounded and Illustrated" (London, 1856), * The Englishman's Greek Concordance of the New Testament" (New York, 1859), Smith's "Dictionary of the Bible" (London, 1864), and the Scripture Vocabularies contained in the Dictionaries of Perry, Knowles, Smart, Worcester, and Ogilvie * For the proper names in the Apocrypha, the books themselves in this collection have been carefully examined. A similar course has been pursued in regard to the names contained in the Douay Bible. Particular attention has been paid to the orthography, and, in all cases of doubt, the original editions of both versions have been diligently collated with the best modern editions, in order to insure as great a degree of accuracy as possible.

The pronunciation of Modern Geographical and Biographical Names has been attended to by Dr. Joseph Thomas, of Philadelphia, the author of the system of pronunciation in Lippincott's "Gazetteer of the World." His aim has been to exhibit the pronunciation of such modern proper names, — including those of distinguished living persons, — together with such names of eminent mediæval characters, as, from their foreign, unusual, or irregular spelling, might occasion perplexity in reading or public speaking. The account of the Elements of Pronunciation of the Principal Modern Languages of Continental Europe has been very carefully prepared, and will be found sufficiently comprehensive and complete for the purposes of those for whom it is more especially designed. The system of notation employed is that used in the body of the Dictionary, with additional signs for foreign sounds, and it serves, in most cases, to exhibit the pronunciation with precision, and in all other cases, with such an approximation to the true sound as, in English discourse, is practically preferable to a minute and idiomantic accuracy.

As an appropriate accompaniment to these two vocabularies, there are given an "Etymological Vocabulary of Geographical Names" and a list of 'Common English Christian Names, with their Pronunciation, and their Equivalents in Several Other Languages,' which, it is thought, will prove both interesting and instructive to those who have occasion to consult them.

The Table of "Quotations, Words, Phrases, &c. from the Greek, the Latin, and Modern Foreign Languages" has received careful revision and many important additions. The three parts, or alphabets into which, in former editions, it was distributed, have been blended into one for the greater convenience of the consulter. In its present improved form, it is believed to be as complete and satisfactory as any within the reach of the public.

The Table of 'Abbreviations' given in former editions of the Dictionary has been thoroughly revised and greatly enlarged, and, for general use, it now forms one of the most extensive lists of the kind to be found in any work of reference in the language.

The Table of 'Arbitrary Signs' has been very much improved by the addition of many new characters, and by the explanation of such as originally possessed a significance other than that conventionally assigned to them. With the single exception of the symbols originally used to distinguish the asteroids, no notice has been taken of signs which have become obsolete as those used in Doomsday Book and by astrologers and the other chemists. Full lists of these may be found in Crabb's "Universal Technological Dictionary," Savage's "Dictionary of the Art of Printing," Johnson's "Typographia," and other like works.

The repetition in a classified arrangement, at the end of the book, of the wood-cuts distributed through it, and the addition of numerous larger engravings that could not be introduced into the main vocabulary, give to the work an enhanced value, which, it is believed, will be generally recognized and appreciated.

Boston, July 1864

* The Scripture Vocabulary in the work here referred to (Ogilvie's "Comprehensive English Dictionary" London and Glasgow, 1864) is by Richard Cull, F. S. A.

having jurisdiction to try the same and may require security to be given for the appearance of such accused person before such Magistrate or if sufficient security is not given shall forward such person in custody to such Magistrate

(2) The Magistrate to whom any case is forwarded under this section shall proceed to hear the complaint against the accused person in manner hereinbefore provided

Notes—1 Trial to be by officer other than the one before whom contempt was committed—

Section 482 distinctly contemplates that the trial is to be by a judicial officer other than the person before whom the contempt was committed. There is nothing to warrant the inference that an officer before whom while acting in a particular capacity a contempt has been committed punishable under s 228 I P C can in another capacity take up and try the offence an offence committed against himself. If he could do so it would be in violation of that fundamental rule in the administration of justice that no man can be a judge in a case wherein he is interested. *Per* NORMAN J 12 W R 18 at p. 21

2. Case not to be dismissed because Court is unable to record any statement.—The Court should record a statement of facts constituting contempt and the statement of the accused and then forward the case to a Magistrate 11 W R. 49 Where a Court proceeding under this section was unable owing to the offender—a barrister—having left the Court house to record any statement from him explanatory of his conduct held that the dismissal of the case on the ground of no such explanatory statement being recorded was improper *Weir II, 604; 6 M. H. C. R. Appx. XVI*

3. Section 480 does not limit the time for institution of proceedings under s. 482.—A Court acting under this section is not bound to take proceedings on the same day as it is when acting under s 480 35 C 161

When Registrar or Sub Registrar to be deemed a Civil Court within sections 480 and 482.

483. When the Local Government so directs any Registrar or any Sub-Registrar appointed under the Indian Registration Act 1877 shall be deemed to be a Civil Court within the meaning of sections 480 and 482

Note.—*The Indian Regulation Act III of 1877* is now repealed and the law on the subject consolidated by Act XVI of 1908. In Madras (G O No 229 Judicial 10th February 1890) and in United Provinces (*Allahabad Gazette* 1888 Pt I p 378) every District Registrar has been declared to be a Civil Court within meaning of ss 480 and 482. This section is based on 13 B L R. Appx. XL = 22 W R. 10, but no notification has yet been issued with regard to Sub-Registrars and exceptional provisions like those embodied in section are not to be drawn out into their logical consequences 12 B 36. See also 2 C. W N 244 and Note 8 under Heading II to s 476.

484. When any Court has under section 480 or section 482 adjudged an offender to punishment for or forwarded him to a Magistrate for trial refusing or omitting to do anything which he was lawfully required to do or for any intentional insult or interruption the Court may, in its discretion discharge the offender or remit the punishment on his submission to the order or requisition of such Court or an apology being made to its satisfaction

Discharge of offender on submission or apology

Notes—1. Court will always do well to accept earnest assurances of pleaders that there was no intention to insult the Court.—A pleader was tried and punished for contempt by a Munsiff for having used certain words which the Judge thought was derogatory to his position and the Munsiff declined to accept the assurance of the pleader that the words were never meant to apply to the Court. The High Court postponed the case in order to give the Munsiff an opportunity to consider whether he should not accept the assurance with these remarks. I think that the learned Munsiff should have accepted that assurance as coming from a gentleman of the standing, of the pleader as a full and real assurance that he never intended to make use of that expression and did not use that expression with reference to the Court. The Judge will always do well to give the fullest belief to the words addressed to him in real earnestness from a gentleman at the Bar. The Munsiff not having accepted the assurance his Lordship accepted the same as sufficient and set aside the order punishing the pleader 11 A L J 955 = 14 Cr L J 637. See Note 4 to s 481

2. Courts ought not to take too much notice of sudden lapses during movements of excitement.—Litigants are bound to conduct themselves in an orderly manner but too much notice should not be taken of the sudden lapse during a moment of excitement, into language which is unfortunately too common among

wide scope. A middle course is the one which has been actually followed. It is evident that many articles which may seem to one person of questionable importance, will be held by another to be of special value as throwing light upon passages which to him would otherwise be perplexing or obscure.

The Vocabulary is of course, chiefly designed to elucidate the works of British and American writers, but names occurring in the literature of other modern nations have been introduced wherever they have become well known to the public through the medium of translations, or when they seemed, for other reasons, to be worthy of insertion.

In accordance with the plan of the Vocabulary as indicated in the title such English French German and other Pseudonyms as are frequently met with in books and newspapers have been given for the benefit of the general reader. No pretence, however is made to completeness or even to fullness in this respect. The bibliographer will find here little or nothing that is new to him, and he must still have recourse to his Barber, Quérard and Weller, and other writers of the same class. Names like *Francus*, *Melancthon*, *Alcazar*, *Coolumpanus* &c. assumed by learned men after the revival of classical literature being in general merely the Latin or Greek equivalents of their real names and being also the only names by which they are now known in history are excluded as not germane to the work. For a similar reason no notice is taken of such names as *Massena*, *Metastasio*, *Philidor*, *Pontmaine*, *Voltaire* &c.

Many eminent characters in political and literary history are often known and referred to by surnames and soubriquets or nicknames which they have borne as the *Master of Sentences*, the *Scurge of God*, the *Singapore*, the *Wiard of the North*, the *Little Corporal* &c. 'Nicknames' said Bayard 'should never be despised: it is by such means mankind are governed.' The Vocabulary embraces the more important of these but names like *Caligula*, *Zarbarossa*, *Trafalgar* &c. which have entirely superseded the real names of the persons designated by them have not been regarded as properly coming within the purview of the present undertaking. Nor has it as a rule been thought advisable to admit simple epithets such as *the Bold*, *the Good*, *the Great*, *the Unruly*, *the Courteous* &c. the omission of which can hardly be considered a defect since their significance and the reason of their imposition are usually too obvious to excite inquiry. This rule however has not been uniformly observed. Here as elsewhere in the Vocabulary that discretionary power has been freely exercised to which every author of a dictionary or glossary is fully entitled and which he is often compelled to use.

A considerable space has been allotted to familiar names of Parties, Sects, Laws and Statutes to poetical and popular names of Seas, Countries, States, Cities &c. to ancient geographical names which have become interesting from their revival in poetry or otherwise and to certain long-established and important Personifications. In general nicknames of Parties and Sects such as *Radicals*, *Shakers* &c. which have been adopted by those to whom they were at first derisively applied or which have passed into history and common use as the regular and appropriate names, are not designally included. In a majority of cases, they are given in the body of the Dictionary. Most of the historical by names inserted such as *Day of Dupes*, *Exit*, *May Day*, *Wonderful Parliament*, *One*, *Bill*, *William*, *Peter* &c. are those which are not to be found under the proper heads in Encyclopedias and other books of reference. Popular designations connected with American History and Geography have been freely given in all cases where they have seemed to be well suited and fitted to illustrate past or contemporary events or characters.

A slight departure from the strict limits of the plan has been thought allowable in the case of a few quasi-historical or real but obscure per-

sons places and things, such as *John O'Grady*, *Mrs. Glasse*, the *Shawnee Press* &c. which are often referred to in literature or conversation, and of which no account can be obtained except through an amount of research and toil impracticable to most readers.

In conformity with the course elsewhere pursued in this Dictionary illustrative citations have been given when it seemed expedient.

In the explanation of names, statements borrowed in great part from our author have been diligently collated with other statements derived from independent and often widely separated sources, and they have been freely on a large abridged or otherwise modified, according to the necessity of the case, or as would best subserve the purpose of the work. On the other hand where the information required has been found already stated in the best way no hesitation has been felt in adopting the exact language of a writer and beyond this general explanation no acknowledgment of indebtedness seems necessary.

To determine the pronunciation of proper names is unquestionably the most difficult requirement of Orthography, and little or no attention has hitherto been paid to the pronunciation of such as are peculiar to the literature of fiction. In the absence not merely of a trustworthy guide but of any guide at all the writers may sometimes have gone astray, but he has been anxious to enable himself of all the information he could obtain. In particular he has made a thorough examination of such of our vernacular poets as are esteemed classics, and has occasionally adduced passages from their writings to show the pronunciation adopted by these "best judges of pronunciation" as Walker says of them or more rarely to show the sound they assign to particular letters or syllables. If the decisions or opinions he has given prove in general to be well grounded the credit will not be wholly due to him, since he has enjoyed the advice and assistance of gentlemen whose superior opportunities of becoming acquainted with the best usage both at home and abroad and whose critical taste and familiarity with all that pertains to the subject of orthography afford the assurance that they speak ecologically and wisely. In regard to the notation the system followed in the case of English names is the same as that used in the Dictionary proper and in the case of names from other modern languages it is the same as that used in the Pronouncing Geographical and Biographical Vocalaries appended to the Dictionary (For further explanations see pp. xxxix and lxxi.)

In the preparation of this Vocabulary works of general literature have been examined as extensively and thoroughly as time and opportunity have rendered possible. In addition use has been made of a large number of works devoted to the various branches of literary history, and valuable assistance has been derived from the principal Reviews and the published writings of the best essayists. Not a few more worthy names and facts have been gleaned from Encyclopedias, Biographical Dictionaries, Gazetteers and other works of reference which have been systematically searched for this purpose. These sources of information are altogether too numerous to be particularized in this place while to specify a few and make no mention of others of equal importance would be an invidious distinction.

In conclusion the author would return his sincere thanks to the many friends who have contributed in different ways to the completion and survey of his Vocabulary. Conscious that the successful accomplishment of his task is his full extent and on a first attempt is more than could be reasonably expected of any individual, he asks a candid criticism of his labors and correct notes or suggestions from any quarter, especially suggestions of additional names accompanied with explanations, references or citations — if sent to him through the publishers will be gratefully received and adopted if possible in a future edition.

lower class of rustics and is not meant to be taken seriously. When the offender was detained and adopted a submissive attitude when brought before the Court later after the excitement had worn off due admonition sufficient for preservation of order at the most a petty fine would meet the necessities of the case. **23 P. W. R. 1912 = 13 Cr. L. J. 567**

485. If any witness or person called to produce a document or thing before a Criminal

Imprisonment or
commitment of person
refusing to answer or
produce document

Court refuses to answer such questions as are put to him or to produce any document or thing in his possession or power which the Court requires him to produce and does not offer any reasonable excuse for such refusal such Court may for reasons to be recorded in writing, sentence him to simple imprisonment or by warrant under the hand of the presiding Magistrate or Judge commit him to the custody of an officer of the Court for any term not exceeding seven days unless in the meantime such person consents to be examined and to answer, or to produce the document or thing. In the event of his persisting in his refusal he may be dealt with according to the provisions of section 480 or section 482 and in the case of a Court established by Royal Charter shall be deemed guilty of a contempt.

Notes — 1 Form of warrant of commitment see Sch. V Form No 39

2 Complainant is not a witness — A complainant can hardly be held a witness punishable for refusing to answer under this section and even a witness cannot be punished for not answering a question which is irrelevant to the real issue or which he is not legally bound to answer, **13 B. 600**

3 Duty of witness when incriminating question put. — If a witness does not desire to have his answers used against him on a subsequent criminal charge he must object to answer although he may know beforehand that such objection if the answer is relevant is perfectly futile so far as his duty to answer is concerned and must be overruled. **3 M. 271 (F.B.) followed in 12 B. 440**, where it was held that protection is afforded only to answers which a witness has objected to give or which he has asked to be excused from giving and which then he has been compelled by the Court to give (*BIRDWOOD J., assenting*). See also **21 C. 392, 16 A. 83, 32 C. 756**. The same construction was put on the Canadian Act in *Queen v. Williams* **26 Can. R. 583** overruling *Queen v. Hender Sholl* but the Chancery Divisional Court has pronounced in *Queen v. Hamman* **34 Can. Law Journal No 5 p. 164** a contrary opinion, holding that the immunity embodied in the section 5 of the *Canadian Evidence Act* (which is substantially identical with s. 132 of the *Indian Evidence Act*) extends even to persons who had not objected or asked to be excused from answering incriminating statements. **2 C. W. N. 169**

4 Not bound to answer questions asked with a view to criminal proceedings being started — If a Judge asks questions with a view to criminal proceedings being taken against the witness the witness is not bound to answer them and cannot be punished for not answering them under s. 179. **1 P. C. 10 B. 183**

5 Commit him to custody — It is advisable but not necessary to limit the period of commitment to a fixed time. When a person is in custody for contempt of Court any application for release should be made to the committing Judge. **1 Ind. Jur. N. 8. 23.**

6 Power of Chartered High Court to commit for contempt. — The power of the Chartered High Courts to commit for contempt is not under this Code and the Penal Code but under the Common Law of England. *Maddrell v. The Justices of British Guiana* **5 Moore's P. C. C. (N.S.) 466**. See also *The Champion* **2 Atkins 459, in re Davies **L. R. 1 Q. B. D. 236, 3 C. W. N. 346, 1 Hyde 79, 10 C. 109 = 10 1 A. 171, 33 B. 240****

Appeals from con-
viction in contempt
cases

486. (1) Any person sentenced by any Court under section 480 or section 485 may notwithstanding anything hereinbefore contained appeal to the Court to which decrees or orders made in such Court are ordinarily appealable.

(2) The provisions of Chapter XXXI shall so far as they are applicable apply to appeals under this section and the Appellate Court may alter or reverse the finding or reduce or reverse the sentence appealed against.

wider scope. A middle course is the one which has been actually followed. It is evident that many articles which may seem to one person of questionable importance will be held by another to be of special value as throwing light upon passages which to him would otherwise be perplexing or obscure.

This Vocabulary is of course chiefly designed to elucidate the works of British and American writers, but names occurring in the literature of other modern nations have been introduced wherever they have become well known to the public through the medium of translations or in any way they seemed, for other reasons to be worthy of insertion.

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A considerable space has been allotted to familiar names of Partes, Gods, Laws and Battles to poetical and popular names of Seas, Countries, States, Cities, &c. to ancient geographical names which have become interesting from their revival in poetry or otherwise, and to certain long-established and important Personages. In general nicknames of Parties and Sects such as *Methodists*, *Shakers*, &c. which have been adopted by those to whom they were at first derisively applied or which have passed into history and common use by their peculiar and appropriate names are not descriptively included. In a majority of cases they are given in the body of the Dictionary. Most of the historical names inserted such as *Day of Dupes*, *Evil May*, *day*, *Wonderful Parliament*, *Onion Bill*, *Western Reserve*, &c. are those which are not to be found under the proper heads in Encyclopedias and other books of reference. Popular designations connected with American History and Geography have been freely given in all cases where they have seemed to be well settled and fitted to illustrate past or contemporary events or characters.

A slight departure from the strict limits of the plan has been thought allowable in the case of a few quasi-historical or real but obscure persons

some places and things such as *John O'Grady*, *Mrs. Glasse*, the *Shore*, *Press*, &c. which are often referred to in literature or conversation and of which no account can be obtained except through an amount of research and toil impracticable to most readers.

In conformity with the course elsewhere pursued in this Dictionary illustrative citations have been given when it seemed expedient.

In the explanation of names statements borrowed in great part from one author have been diligently collated with other statements derived from independent and often widely separated sources and they have been freely enlarged, abridged or otherwise modified according to the necessity of the case, or as would best subserve the purpose of the work. On the other hand when the information required has been found already stated in the best way no hesitation has been felt in adopting the exact language of a writer and beyond that general explanation no acknowledgment of indebtedness seems necessary.

To determine the pronunciation of proper names is unquestionably the most difficult requirement of Orthography, and little or no attention has hitherto been paid to the pronunciation of such names as are peculiar to the literature of fiction. In the absence not merely of a trustworthy guide but of any guide at all, the author may sometimes have gone astray but he has been careful to avail himself of all the information he could obtain. In particular he has made a thorough examination of such of our vernacular poets as are esteemed classic and has occasionally adduced passages from their writings to show the pronunciation adopted by these "best judges of pronunciation" as Walker styled them or more rarely to show the sound they assign to particular letters or syllables. If the declaimer or orator has given proof in general to be well grounded the credit will not be wholly due to him since he has enjoyed the aid and assistance of gentlemen whose superior opportunities are of becoming acquainted with the best usage both at home and abroad and whose critical taste and familiarity will afford it pertains to the subject of orthography to assume that they speak correctly and wisely. In regard to the notation the system followed in the case of English names is the same as that used in the Dictionary proper, and in the case of names from other modern languages it is the same as that used in the Pronouncing Geographical and Biographical Vocabularies appended to the Dictionary. (For further explanations see pp. xxxix and lxxx.)

In the preparation of this Vocabulary works of general literature have been examined as extensively and thoroughly as time and opportunity have rendered possible. In addition to use has been made of a large number of works devoted to the various branches of literary history and valuable assistance has been derived from the principal Reviews and the published writings of the best essayists. Not a few noteworthy names and facts have been gleaned from Encyclopedias, Biographical Dictionaries, Gazetteers and other works of reference which have been systematically searched for this purpose. These sources of information are altogether too numerous to be particularized in this place while to specify a few and make no mention of others of equal importance would be an invidious distinction.

In conclusion the author would return his sincere thanks to the many friends who have contributed in different ways to the completion and accuracy of his Vocabulary. Conscious that the successful accomplishment of his task in its full extent and on a first attempt is more than could be reasonably expected of any individual, he asks a candid criticism of his labors and correct ones or suggestions from any quarter—especially suggestions of additional names accompanied with explanations—of names or citations—if sent to him through the publishers will be gratefully received and adopted, if possible in a future edition.

(3) An appeal from such conviction by a Court of Small Causes in a presidency town shall lie to the High Court and an appeal from such conviction by any other Court of Small Causes shall lie to the Court of Session or the Sessions division within which such Court is situate

(4) An appeal from such conviction by any officer as Registrar or Sub-Registrar appointed as aforesaid may when such officer is also Judge of a Civil Court be made to the Court to which it would under the preceding portion of this section be made if such conviction were a decree by such officer in his capacity as such Judge and in other cases may be made to the District Judge or, in the presidency towns to the High Court.

Note.—Ordinarily appealable, i.e. in the majority of cases 11 B 438 at p 440 In Civil cases an appeal lies from an order, refusing an application to commit for contempt of Court 25 C 236

487. (1) Except as provided in sections* 480 and 485 no Judge of a Criminal Court or Magistrate other than a Judge of a High Court† shall try any person for any offence referred to in section 195 when such offence is committed before himself or in contempt‡ of his authority, or is brought under his notice as such Judge or Magistrate in the course of a judicial proceeding

Certain Judges and Magistrates not to try offences referred to in s. 195 when committed before themselves

(2) Nothing in section 476 or section 482 shall prevent a Magistrate empowered to commit to the Court of Session or High Court from himself committing any case to such Court

Notes.—1 **Prohibition is personal**—The prohibition contained in this section is a personal prohibition the mischief to be prevented being that the same person should not decide a matter which he may have already pre-judged 1 M 305, but curiously enough having regard to the language of the section where sanction was given by an officer in his capacity as a revenue officer the trial of the case by the same officer as Deputy Magistrate was held not illegal Weir II, 613 A second-class Magistrate who issues an order under s 144 has no jurisdiction to punish for its disobedience 10 B H. C. R. 424, 1 B 339, 24 M 282, Ratanlal 904 which distinguishes 18 B 380, 13 C. W. N 223. Also a Magistrate whose summons has been disobeyed has no jurisdiction to try the offence Weir I, 62, II, 612. See Note 65 to s. 144

2 **Exemption for Judges of High Court.**—The High Court as a Court of record has the power of summarily punishing for every contempt without sending the accused for trial to the ordinary Courts of criminal jurisdiction 8 W. R. 32 See the remarks of BASHAM AIVANGAR J in 24 M 523 at p 543

3. **Prohibition extends to Sessions Judge.**—A Sessions Judge is not competent to try the case of a person who has given false evidence before him in a Criminal case In other words the prohibition in the section extends to Sessions Judge 14 A 354. A Sessions Judge who has omitted to take action under s 477 in respect of an offence referred to in s. 195 committed before his own Court has no jurisdiction to try such offence notwithstanding that it may be exclusively triable by a Sessions Court Weir II 609 But in Weir II, 607, it was held that a Sessions Judge who was the Judge before whom an offence under s. 193 I I C was committed is not precluded by this section from hearing an appeal in the case Weir II, 607

4. **Section applicable to Presidency Magistrates.**—Under this section the Chief Presidency Magistrate has no jurisdiction to try a person for an offence under s. 188 I P C. for disobedience of his own order The terms of this section are wide enough to include a Presidency Magistrate and where the High Court sets aside a conviction for the reason that the trying Magistrate had no jurisdiction it is not the duty of the High Court ordinarily to direct a re-trial. The order of the High Court merely setting aside the conviction and sentence is no obstacle to the accused being re-tried on the same charge at the instance of the prosecution 12 C. W. N 246 = 7 C. L. J 70 = 7 Cr. L. J 103.

5 **Prohibition is restricted to Judges of Criminal Courts or Magistrates.**—Where sanction was given by an officer in his capacity as a revenue officer the trial of the case as Deputy Magistrate was held not illegal Weir II, 613. A District Judge who has sanctioned the prosecution of a party for forgery is not debarred from

* The figures 477 were omitted by Act XXVII of 1923

† The words "and the Recorder of Rangoon" were repealed by the Lower Burma Courts Act VI of 1906 See s. 48 and the second Schedule.

‡ As trials for contempt of authority of a Criminal Court or Magistrate in British Baluchistan see Bri 14 Baluchistan Criminal Justice Regulations VIII of 1896 Schedule s. 16

trying the offence in his capacity of a Sessions Judge, 6 B. 479; 14 A. 334. It would be inconsistent to hold that a Sessions Judge may under s 477 try an offence committed before him as Sessions Judge, but that he may not try such an offence if committed before him as District Judge. The prohibition is restricted to a "*Judge of a Criminal Court*" and that being so, a strict construction must be placed on the words "as such Judge," and it must be held that they do not include a Judge of a Civil Court or a District Judge, 16 C. 766 at p 771 (F B) *overruling* 16 C. 121; *followed in* 18 B. 390. Nor is a Sessions Judge debarred from hearing an appeal from a conviction by the District Magistrate to whom he had sent the case for inquiry, under s. 476, while acting as District Judge, 7 C. W. N. 708. This circumstance would not also constitute "personal interest" within the meaning of s 556. The illustration to s 556 is *distinguished* in the above Ruling. See Note 9 below and Note 7 to s 477.

6. Magistrate not excluded when sanction is in respect of offence not committed in Court.—Whereupon a report by a Police-officer that false information was given by A, the District Magistrate gave sanction to his prosecution for giving such information; *held*, that this section does not apply to the case and prevent the District Magistrate from hearing the appeal against the conviction of such person inasmuch as the offence was not committed before himself, etc., within the meaning of this section, 27 C. 437, nor does this section prevent the District Magistrate from trying the case himself. Section 195 (1) (b) has reference to an offence under s 211, 1 P. C., but only when such offence is committed in, or in relation to any proceeding in Court 12 P. R. 1905 = 74 P. L. R. 1905 = 2 Cr. L. J. 66. Where a false charge is made to the Police and on their report, the District Magistrate directs the prosecution of the informer, there is nothing to prevent his trying the case himself. See Note 9 below.

7. Magistrate not excluded, unless matter had been before him in course of judicial proceeding.—B charged certain persons with theft before a Police-officer, who brought it to the notice of a Magistrate having jurisdiction. The Magistrate directed the Police to investigate into the truth of such charge. Having ascertained that such charge was false the Magistrate took proceedings against B on a charge of making a false charge of an offence, and convicted him of that offence. *Held*, that as such false charge was not preferred by B before such Magistrate, the offence of making it was not a contempt of such Magistrate's authority and such Magistrate was not precluded from trying B himself, nor was his sanction or that of some superior Court, necessary for B's trial by another officer. 3 A. 322.

8. Magistrate not excluded, if offence was committed before him in a non-criminal capacity.—Magistrate is not debarred by this section from trying an accused person under s. 174, 1 P. C., for disobedience of a summons issued by him in his capacity as a *Mamlatdar*, 18 B. 380 (F.B.) but see *Ratanlal* 70 and 804. Where the accused would not allow the attachment of his property in execution of a decree of the Cantonment Small Cause Court, the Judge of that Court had no jurisdiction as a Magistrate to try him under s. 186, 1 P. C., 22 P. R. 1879. Where a Settlement Officer, who was also a Magistrate, summoned as Settlement Officer a person to attend his Court and such person neglected to attend, and such officer as a Magistrate charged him with an offence under s. 174, 1 P. C., and tried and convicted him on his own charge, *held*, that such conviction was illegal, 2 A. 405, 13 M. 24; 14 A. 334. The *Madras Law Journal* (Vol. 4, p 287) observes with regard to the Ruling in 18 B. 380, "there can be no doubt in this case the policy of the law has evidently been frustrated by the language of the section. There can be no reason for recording him as competent merely because he issued summons in a different capacity. If the policy of the law has been that the accused will not have a fair trial, if the disobedience for which he is tried is the order of the trying officer, regard must be had to the sameness of the individual, and not to the sameness of capacity. However as the language of the section stands there can be only one interpretation of it."

9. Magistrate excluded if offence was before him as a Criminal Court.—Accused was summoned to produce certain documents, but failed to produce them, saying that they were not in his possession. The Magistrate, having found that the statement was incorrect charged him with having committed an offence under s 175, 1 P. C., and himself tried and convicted him, *held* that the Magistrate was precluded by this section from trying the case himself and that none of the sections excepted (*re*, ss 477, 480 and 485) was applicable to the case, 13 M. 24. An order whether original or appellate granting or refusing sanction under s. 195 is a judicial proceeding. A Magistrate who has refused to set aside an order sanctioning a prosecution on a charge of perjury, has no jurisdiction under this section to try the case himself, 20 M. 333, 16 A. L. J. 432; 23 C. W. N. 520.

10. Prohibition in section extends to all contempts.—S 473 of Act X of 1872, which, except as therein provided, forbids a Court to try any person for an offence committed in contempt of its own authority, is not

In the fabulous history of England it is related that the first labour was achieved by a giant who called his own name Colossus.

Almászor A prominent character in Dryden's tragedy of *The Conquest of Granada*.
 After all, I say with Almászor "Know that is our own king."

The Holy Trinity A personification of the sup-
remacy as idolatry included as
emitting pass on for gain. The
ed with Washington Irving
that great ob e t of us v real G ro-
and require to be a man no de o de o s
H fr up The Create s diapt
The poem

Richard Arle Esq in the pay is a noble lord, as the evidence as to which he is a man of honor is to the effect that he is a man of honor, the fact of a gentleman.

Am's ret The name of a lady married to F. Schomore in Kyncher's "Fury Queen" she represents the effect on the devotedness of a loving and tender wife.

IN a-chah-ah Cloots (Maia) A woman married by Baron Jean Baptis Cloots who was born in Cleves in 1743. He conceived the idea of uniting the human race and traveled through England, Germany Italy &c denouncing all kings, priests and rulers and even the Deity. His wife, Maria Cloots, was in allusion to the Egyptian goddess Isis of the same name, who flourished about a century before the Christ an era and who traveled to Greece and other countries for the purpose of gaining knowledge in order to improve the people of the

A nice re-on Moore A name some may give to
Thomas Moore the poet who in 1807 published
a translation of the Odes of Anacreon

In east with us as pretty a house
As e're b'd hou n that h n n an better
Described by Braham & and Anacron Moore Dye.

Disciple of Painters A native given to
 names Albani (15 S 1666) a distinguished poet-
 of Italy He was so called on account of the
 a tone of his style and his avowed love of su-
 perior

A naïve on of 12 r s h d (p r a h d) A na
sometimes given to Hañ [d] l o s s b e l e n g a p e
whose odes and lyric compositions. M e t h o r d
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a nû're on of the Guillotine Answered
by the French to Bertrand Barrère for B. 7
Sept 10 1793 p told nt of the Convent o der
2 / on acco nt of the flower and poe

the reign of terror—see WILKINS or GREEN
as in all the (as in all us) The (as in all
of a novel by Thomas Hope (1790-1830)—a w

to escape the consequences of his own crimes and
becomes a renegade and the most extreme

Albion New A name for the new tract of land on the north west coast of North America. It was originally applied by Sir Francis Drake in 1579 to the whole of what was then called Columbia, but it was afterwards confined to that part of the coast which extends from 43 to 49 N lat and is now included within the State of Oregon and Washington Territory.

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Ai tzu (bin The anc
 land and until Cera at me the appe a ken ot
 A f G ca Bri du It is said to be do
 mean ng a sh and

[illegible]

is
I may as well
let a woman

Journal of Management Education 30(6)

1. The first group of people who are not in the labor force are those who are not in the labor force because they are not in the labor force.

1

1. *Chlorophyll a* and *Chlorophyll b* were determined by the method of Arar and Collins (1971) using a Shimadzu 1601 UV-Visible Spectrophotometer. The concentration of chlorophyll was expressed in $\mu\text{g mL}^{-1}$.

and another was in
France from Africa. Among many

O lundo Fajano," took up the thread of
 a story where I quado had left it, and
 the ball in love he set with Medoro and
 the other two.

The fact of his sex a good...

Both a cynic and the poet of Chatterlain
Angelle Doctor (Lat Doctor Angelus) T
Aquinas (1225-1274) the most famous of the

We extend the end of the year at Aqueduct as the water has been changed, but we have been the same.

2 The wife of Gen Gao Dand in Mo. res. in
name. See DAND - General
1 The deputy of V. n. ent. in Fhite.
At first he is

Measure for Measure ...
a delegated power w/ h rigor and keen in-
telligence, but on y to enable h in the most
graceful manner to pass on for Judge ...
a young nobleman named Claudio ...

[illegible]

limited to offences falling under Chapter X of the I P C, but extends to all contempts of Courts, 1 B. 339. The words in contempt of authority are general, and are not to be construed as limited to cases where the alleged offence is in the nature of a contempt of Court, 24 M. 262; 18 B. 380 (F B)

11. **Giving false evidence in judicial proceeding is contempt of Court.**—The offence of intentionally giving false evidence in a judicial proceeding cannot be tried by the Magistrate before whom the false evidence is given. The offence being an attempt to pervert the proceedings of a Court to an improper end, is a contempt of its authority 10 B H.C.R. 73; 1 A 625 (F.B); 1 B. 311, and therefore the Magistrate himself cannot try a person for giving false evidence before himself 7 M. H. C. R. Appx XXVII; 22 W. R. 49, 1 A. 129, or for the abetment of such an offence 7 M. H. C. R. Appx XXVII. Under the 1872 Code a Court of Session had no power to commit to itself a person charged under s 193 I P C, with giving false evidence before itself, 4 C. 570 = 3 C. L. R. 599; 3 M. 254, 5 C. 184 at p 187; 2 A. 403. But now s. 477 makes an exception in the case of a Sessions Judge. Where, however, a Sessions Judge without taking action under s 476 or s 477, merely sanctioned the prosecution of the accused for having given false evidence in a trial before him and they were committed for trial by a Magistrate on the charge for perjury and was tried and convicted by the same Sessions Judge, held that the trial was without jurisdiction and the conviction must be set aside, *Weir II, 609*.

12. **Duty of Court when sufficient ground forthcoming**—Where a Court thinks that there is sufficient ground for inquiring into a charge mentioned in s 195 it should proceed under this Chapter, observing the provisions of this section 3 A. 62.

13. **Even when Judge qualified to try, transfer may be desirable**—Where a District Magistrate had procured the initiation of a number of proceedings against the same person and one of them which had resulted in conviction came up before him in appeal the High Court considering that it was not altogether seemly that he should hear the appeal, ordered its transfer to the Sessions Judge, 24 W. R. 58. See also 5 M. H. C. R. 212 as to the desirability of transfer in similar circumstances. But the circumstance that the Sessions Judge had expressed an opinion unfavourable to a person accused of an offence belonging to a class of cases, excepted by this section from the general rule that no Court shall try an offence committed in contempt of its own authority, is in itself no ground for transferring the trial to another Sessions Court, such a state of things being one the existence of which the law necessarily contemplates, when it authorizes a Sessions Judge to try such cases, *Weir II, 608*.

14. **Accused must always be given opportunity for explanation.**—A conviction without giving an opportunity to the accused for explanation is bad, 13 C. W. N. 683 = 19 M. L. J. 324 (F C), *re Pollard, L. R. 2 P. C. 106 (1888)* = 5 Moore P. C. N. S. 111.

CHAPTER XXXVI

OF THE MAINTENANCE OF WIVES AND CHILDREN

488. (1) If any person having sufficient means neglects or refuses to maintain his wife or his legitimate or illegitimate child unable to maintain itself, the District Magistrate a Presidency Magistrate, a Sub-Divisional Magistrate, or a Magistrate of the first class may, upon proof of such neglect or refusal, order such person to make a monthly allowance for the maintenance of his wife or such child, at such monthly rate, not exceeding* "one hundred" rupees in the whole, as such Magistrate thinks fit, and to pay the same to such person as the Magistrate from time to time directs

(2) Such allowance shall be payable from the date of the order, or, if so ordered, from the date of the application for maintenance

(3) If any person so ordered fails without sufficient cause to comply with the order, any such Magistrate may, for every breach of the order, issue a warrant for levying the amount due in manner hereinbefore provided for levying fines and may sentence such person, for the whole or any part of each month's

Enforcement
order

* The words in " " were substituted for the words " 600 " by 1922

himself in a pastoral ode entitled "Astrophel" See
STELLA

allowance remaining unpaid after the execution of the warrant, to imprisonment for a term which may extend to one month *or until payment if sooner made*

Provided that if such person offers to maintain his wife on condition of her living with him and she refuses to live with him, such Magistrate may consider any grounds of refusal stated by her, and may make an order under this section notwithstanding such offer, if he is satisfied that *there is just ground for so doing*

* * Provided, further, that no warrant shall be issued for the recovery of any amount due under this section unless application be made to the Court to levy such amount within a period of one year from the date on which it became due "

(4) No wife shall be entitled to receive an allowance from her husband under this section if she is living in adultery, or if, without any sufficient reason, she refuses to live with her husband or if they are living separately by mutual consent

(5) On proof that any wife in whose favour an order has been made under this section is living in adultery or that without sufficient reason she refuses to live with her husband or that they are living separately by mutual consent, the Magistrate shall cancel the order

(6) All evidence under this Chapter shall be taken in the presence of the husband or father, as the case may be, or, when his personal attendance is dispensed with, in the presence of his pleader, and shall be recorded in the manner prescribed in the case of summons-cases

Provided that if the Magistrate is satisfied that he is wilfully avoiding service, or wilfully neglects to attend the Court, the Magistrate may proceed to hear and determine the case *ex parte*. Any order so made may be set aside for good cause shown, on application made within three months from the date thereof

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† (7) The Court in dealing with applications under this section shall have power to make such order as to costs as may be just

§ (8) Proceedings under this section may be taken against any person " in any district where he resides or is or where he last resided with his wife or, as the case may be, the mother of the illegitimate child

Note.—For levy of fines see ss. 386—389, for recording evidence in summons-cases, see s. 355. Imprisonment may be simple or rigorous. See s. 3 (25) of the *General Clauses Act* 1897, § A. 240. The jurisdiction conferred by this section is not punitive and is preventive rather than remedial, 3 F. R. 1893. The N Y Cr P Code (ss. 914—926) treats the subject as a special proceeding of a criminal nature.—*Stokes Anglo-Indian Codes*, Vol. II p. 29, introduction

Notes.—(1) Changes in the section by the amending Act XVIII of 1923. Instead of rupees fifty rupees hundred can now be given as maintenance allowance per month. In sub-sec. (3) instead of the words ' wilfully neglects ' the words ' fails without sufficient cause ' are substituted by a new proviso to sub-sec. (3). A period of one year is laid down for the recovery of arrears of maintenance. Original sub-sec. (7) is omitted see now s. 340 which expressly provides for the right of giving evidence.

The word ' accused ' is deleted from sub-sec. (8) and in its stead the word ' person ' is substituted thereby making it clear that the person proceeded against under this section is not an accused person.

2. Forms of warrant.—As to forms of warrant of imprisonment on failure to pay maintenance see Sch. Y, Form No. 40, and to enforce the payment of maintenance by distress and sale see No. 41

* This proviso was added by Act XVIII of 1923

† Sub-section (7) (original) was omitted

‡ S. 340 (ss. (8) and (9) were re-numbered respectively (7) and (8) by s. 41

§ The word in ——— were substituted for the words ' the accused may be proceeded against ' by Act XVIII of 1923

It is within the memory of even middle-aged persons that the south western portion of our country was in as lawless a state as ever were the borders of England and Scotland, and with no better skill to hang up ruffians to swing in the wind.

A. Lamb. Monthly

The hero of a well known novel originally written in French by . . . He is represented as a young woman who has all the keys of a certain apartment. She gratifies her the absence of her lord and is not remains of his former wives the rancorous lust and cruelty. If she recovered by means of an intelligence on the key which opened the door of room, and she is told to prepare obtains the favor of a duke who is rescued by the timely arrival of faintly despatch her brutal husband. that the original *Elle* heard was *Cher* Lais, who was made Marshal of France, and as possessed of princely revenues, had numerous by the murder of his wife, a very impious and detested crime. If he encouraged and maintained vice, he was reprobate and corrupted young persons, he might attach them to him, and after for the sake of their blood for his chamber. At length the woman-state crime committed, he was executed to be burned at the stake in 1440. He killed a third another of Henry VI, came to the Tower of the Duke of Suffolk to the Tower, and so much displeased the people that he had not been made great duke, and he was not the common to and dry places. For the common to and dry places, and when they could find no more, they attempted any and all the means to and to the matter, and the name of the Duke of Suffolk was the name of the Duke of Suffolk.

A count of 100 . . . 1 to 100

ANALYSIS OF NOTES.

- I Scope and nature of proceedings. Notes 3—8
- II Jurisdiction and competency of Courts. Notes 9—17
- III Conflict of orders of Civil and Criminal Courts. Notes 18—21
- IV. Conditions necessary for an order for maintenance. Notes 22—28
- V Wife's right to maintenance. Notes 29—37
 - (a) Special rights of Muhammadan wives. Notes 38—45
- VI. Right of children to maintenance. Notes 46—53.
- VII Contents of order awarding maintenance. Notes 54—61
- VIII Practice and procedure. Notes 62—66
- IX. Enforcement of order for maintenance. Notes 67—77
- X. Cancellation of order awarding maintenance. Notes 78—81
- XI Further inquiry, appeal, revision. Notes 81—85

I.—SCOPE AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS.

3. Chapter applies to European British subjects.—See 10 P. R. 1871; 49 M. L. J. 335.

3-A. Enforcement in India of maintenance orders made outside India.—Now under Act XVIII of 1921 provision is made for the enforcement in British India of maintenance orders made in other parts of His Majesty's Dominions and Protectorates and *vice versa*. Under that Act the Court of the Chief Presidency Magistrate or the District Magistrate is constituted a Court of summary jurisdiction and under certain conditions and circumstances mentioned in that Act the Chief Presidency Magistrate in a Presidency town or the District Magistrate in the Mofussil is empowered to enforce such maintenance orders made outside British India. This jurisdiction is somewhat analogous to the Magisterial jurisdiction under s. 488.

4. Nature of proceedings under this Chapter.—(i) *Proceedings are judicial proceedings*—See s. 4 (m) at pp 13-14. The proceedings under this Chapter are judicial proceedings in their nature, and must not be conducted as if they were ministerial matters. The notes of evidence must not be inadequate and vague, and the order recorded should be on distinct findings of fact, 5 A. 224; 5 Bom. H. C. R. 81.

(ii) *Proceeding is a 'criminal case' within the meaning of s. 528*—A proceeding under this section is a criminal case within the meaning of s. 528 and the District Magistrate may withdraw a case instituted under this section from the file of the first-class Magistrate to his own file 5 P. R. 1903 = 2 Cr. L. J. 40. Cf 25 B. 179; 28 C. 709.

(iii) *Order awarding maintenance is order made in a 'criminal trial' within meaning of s. 15 of Letters Patent*—See 17 M. L. T. 330 = 16 Cr. L. J. 326.

(iv) *Maintenance proceedings under s. 488 wholly governed by the provisions of the Criminal Procedure Code*—In a maintenance proceeding under s. 488 when the plea of insanity is set up on behalf of the counter petitioner, the Magistrate is bound to hold a judicial inquiry into his sanity and put him, if necessary, under medical observation, 43 M. 333 = 43 M. L. J. 137.

5. *Proceeding under this Chapter not a civil suit*.—The proceedings under this Chapter do not amount to a civil suit where the issue is to the social standing of the wife and the amount of alimony appropriate, or the kind of education children of a person in the father's position ought to receive and the amount, if any property payable in schooling fees for them. These are questions beyond the scope of this Code. The Code in providing 'maintenance' does not intend to go further than to ensure to the wife or children food, clothing and lodging. It does not provide for schooling fees 1909 U. B. R. L. 17 = 11 Cr. L. J. 40.

6. *Neglect or refusal to maintain is no "offence" and the person proceeded against is not an accused person in the ordinary sense*—Effect thereof.—Though cls. (7) and (9) refer to the defendant in a maintenance case as an 'accused' it is clear from the nature of the proceedings as also from the facts that an oath can be administered to him that he is not an accused person in the ordinary sense of that term, 17 C. P. L. R. 177 = 1 Cr. L. J. 884. The neglect or refusal to maintain mentioned in this section is not an 'offence' as defined in s. 4 (o) that is to say, is not an act or omission made punishable by law and therefore, (1) s. 177 does not determine the

F. W. T.

It is within the memory of even middle-aged persons that the south western portion of our country was as lawless a state as ever were the borders of England and Scotland and with no better H it to hang up ruffians to swing in the wind

It is within the memory of even middle-aged persons that the south western portion of our country was as lawless a state as ever were the borders of England and Scotland and with no better H it to hang up ruffians to swing in the wind

R. W. T.

place of inquiry, 13 P. P. 1883; 3 P. R. 1693; (2) s 20, cl (ii) of the *Court-fees Act*, 1870, does not apply to processes issued under this section, 18 M. 234; (3) when the Magistrate orders a person to make a monthly allowance under this section there is no conviction of any offence and no appeal lies 7 W. R. 10; 5 Bom. H. C. R. 84; (4) ss. 202 and 203 are inapplicable to such proceedings and a Magistrate having jurisdiction to determine such application cannot refer it to his subordinate for inquiry or dismiss it on his report, 29 P. R. 1903 = 3 Cr. L. J. 421; 11 M. 199, (5) proceedings are of a civil nature and parties are competent witnesses. See s 120 of the *Evidence Act* and sub-sec. (7), 18 A. 107; 18 B. 453; 18 C. 781; (6) compensation cannot be awarded to accused, 6 M. L. T. 281 = 11 Cr. L. J. 456 following 16 M. 234

7. Statutory right created by section is independent of and not controlled by personal law.—(i) Of a wife—Under the law of the *Shea* sect of Muhammadans, a *moola* wife is not entitled to maintenance but such a provision of the law does not interfere with the statutory right to maintenance, given by this section, 8 C. 736 = 11 C. L. R. 237; 6 W. R. 60; 19 M. 461; 5 A. 226; and children of a *nikah* wife are legitimate, 18 W. R. 23. The fact that under the personal law a person is bound to maintain is not conclusive, e.g., a wife under the Muhammadan Law is entitled to maintenance during *iddat*, 20 M. L. J. 12 = 10 Cr. L. J. 502

(ii) Of a child—An illegitimate son of a Hindu by a non-Hindu woman (here a Christian) is not entitled under Hindu Law to maintenance (4 C. L. R. 154, referred to). He may be entitled to maintenance under this section, but his rights hereunder, can be enforced only by the particular remedy provided by the section, and to the extent herein provided. Consequently, he cannot enforce it by suit, nor does the right survive the death of his putative father. In the case of illegitimate children entitled to claim maintenance under the common law, i.e., the personal law applicable to them, the statutory remedy given by this section will only be a cumulative remedy and will not take away the remedy under the common law to enforce such right by action against the father during his life-time or after his death against his estate, 27 M. 13. The father of a child born during the continuance of the form of marriage known as *sumbundhum* under the *Marumakkathayam Law* as observed by the *Nayar* community of *Malabar* is liable to have an order made against him for its maintenance under this section, 22 M. 246 and 247 (footnote). See the subject of the liability of a *Numbodri Illom* property to maintain the *Nayar* children of one of the members of the *Illom*, discussed at great length by the Full Bench of the Travancore High Court in A S 147 and 171 of 1079 (*Malabar Law Quarterly* Vol. 1, p. 37). The right of a wife and of children to be maintained by the husband and by the actual father, is a statutory right, and the duty is created by express enactment independent of the personal law of the parties. If the children be illegitimate, the refusal of the mother to surrender them to the father is no ground for refusing an allowance for maintenance. If the children be legitimate and the parties are governed by the Muhammadan Law, the mother may have the right to custody until they attain the age of seven years, and in any case they are entitled to be maintained till then. But if the parties are governed by *Marumakkathayam Law*, it is doubtful whether the father could be held to have neglected his duty to provide for his children, if they are actually being maintained by the *karnavan* of the mother's *tarwad* who is bound by law to maintain them. *Quare?* Whether the *karnavan* of the mother's *tarwad* has any *locus standi* to make an application for the maintenance of her children, when the law has imposed the same duty on himself and when he himself has sufficient means to perform that duty, 19 M. 461. It was however held in 25 M. L. J. 335 = 14 M. L. L. 223 = 14 Cr. L. J. 597, that the fact of the child belonging to a well-to-do *tarwad* had nothing to do with the liability of a father who has sufficient means to maintain his child and neglects to do so. But this view was dissented from in 19 M. L. T. 23 = 17 Cr. L. J. 16, where it was held that s 488 has no application to cases of children having independent means of their own or have a right to be maintained by a *tarwad*.

Although the offspring of a *sambundhum* is not entitled to an order for maintenance against the father in case the *tarwad* has means to maintain. But where the *tarwad* is not in a position to maintain an order for maintenance may be passed against the father under s 468 46 M. L. J. 324.

8 Cases where special marriage laws were considered—

(i) *Sumbundhum marriage*, 22 M. 246, 22 M. 247 (footnote).

(ii) *Marumakkathayam Law*—Moplahs, 19 M. 461.

(iii) *Jati Karao marriage*, 4 N.-W. P. 128

(iv) *Chinese marriage*, 7 Bur. L. T. 71 = 15 Cr. L. J. 534.

(v) *Karen marriage* 15 Cr. L. J. 590 (Bur.)

(vi) *Muhammadan marriage and divorce*—See Notes 38—45

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—Eliza Mann, Ben DUNN, Cambridge

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II.—JURISDICTION AND COMPETENCY OF COURTS.

9. Meaning of the words 'may order.'—The use of the word 'may' in this section shows that a Magistrate has a discretion to decide in what cases the award of maintenance may properly be made, though the discretion has to be exercised judicially and reasonably and not capriciously, 31 M. 185. See also 20 M. 470.

10. Jurisdiction—place where complaint to be instituted—There was some conflict of opinion on this point. In 9 B. 40, 3 P. 1893 and 24 C. 633 it was held that the application must be tried where the husband resides while in 5 N. W. P. 237 and 13 A. 348 it was held that the application must be heard where the wife resides, but the law is now settled by sub sec. (9) in accordance with the decision in 9 B. 40 and 24 C. 633. The general rule enunciated in s. 177, does not apply to proceedings under this section, 13 P. R. 1895; 3 P. R. 1893. Sub-sec. (9) does not give the wife or child the right to select a *forum* other than that where the husband or father is then residing or last resided with the applicant, 1904 U. B. R. L. Cr. Pro., p. 10 = 1 Cr. L. J. 645. Occasional visits of a husband to a wife who lives apart from him, do not give jurisdiction to a Magistrate in the district in which the wife resides. For purposes of cl. (9) a man may be said to reside with the mother of his illegitimate children, if he visits her only occasionally at her settled abode, so long as he has the intention of continuing to so visit her, and where she has no permanent residence elsewhere, two months' stay at a place where she is occasionally visited by the father of the children, is sufficient to constitute that place as 'residence' for purpose of this section, 5 B. L. R. 220 = 13 Cr. L. J. 522.

Reside—The construction of the words 'residence,' 'dwelling' as used in ss 16 and 20 of the *Civil Procedure Code* and in other statutes has been considered in several decisions, see 3 B. 227; 6 B. 100; 18 B. 290; 1 A. 51; 21 C. 634; 5 M. H. C. R. 101, 38 C. 964. A man may have a number of residences, 3 A. 91 (P.G.). A man who has no permanent place of residence resides where he is for the time being, 8 M. 205; 25 B. 176. *Alexander v Jones*, L. R. 1 Ex. 133. Temporary residence sufficient to give jurisdiction, 21 C. W. N. 812.

11. Proceedings of Magistrate not empowered void—If any Magistrate not being empowered by law in this behalf passes an order of maintenance his proceedings shall be void. S 530, cl. (n). A second-class Magistrate is not entitled to act under this section, 22 W. R. 30, unless he be a Sub-Divisional Magistrate. A Magistrate of the first class, though not empowered to take cognizance of an offence, may act under this section 5 N. W. P. H. C. R. 237.

12. Magistrate to whom complaint is made cannot refer case for inquiry to Subordinate Magistrate.—A Magistrate has no power under this section to refer a complaint, for inquiry and report to a Subordinate Magistrate, and any order passed upon such report is illegal 11 M. 199. A Magistrate cannot direct an inquiry under this section to be made by a Magistrate of a rank below the first class, *Welf II*, 617. The petition not being a complaint within the meaning of s 4 (h), the Magistrate to whom it is presented, should hear the case himself, and cannot refer it to a Subordinate Magistrate and dismiss it on his report, as s. 203 is inapplicable to such a petition, 29 P. R. 1905 = 90 P. L. R. 1905 = 2 Cr. L. J. 421.

13. Can fresh application be entertained after previous dismissal?—"Res judicata."—When a duly empowered Magistrate has decided a matter under this section by dismissing the application after hearing the evidence offered, the District Magistrate cannot entertain the complaint *de novo*, 1 C. L. R. 89; 17 Cr. L. J. 106 (C.). The petitioner's remedy, if any, is in a superior Court. There is no appeal against the order, but it is subject to revision under s. 439, 5 B. H. C. R. Cr. Ca. 81; 7 W. R. 10; 20 W. R. 53; but the dismissal of a complaint on one state of facts is no bar to the Magistrate awarding maintenance on a complaint based on a different state of facts which may subsequently arise *Welf II*, 633. The rejection of an application in one district for want of jurisdiction, is no bar when application is renewed in the district having jurisdiction, 5 N.-W. P. H. C. R. 237. See 9 B. 40. The principle of *res judicata* is applicable to criminal as well as civil proceedings. Therefore, where, a husband, who had been ordered to pay maintenance to his wife, objected to its continuance on the ground of her adultery, and that objection was adjudicated upon by the Magistrate, another Magistrate is wrong in re-opening matters already adjudicated upon, and his order directing discontinuance of the allowance is illegal, 5 A. 224. 17 Cr. L. J. 106; 24 P. R. 1916 (Cr.). But see 4 L. B. R. 337 = 9 Cr. L. J. 21. Where an application under sec. 488 Cr. Pro. Code, for the maintenance of an illegitimate child was dismissed for default and the Magistrate entertained a fresh application. Held, that there was no bar to the Magistrate entertaining the fresh application inasmuch as there was no adjudication of the first application. 24 C. W. N. 37.

14. When first order becomes inoperative, fresh application may be entertained.—A Magistrate ordered a husband to maintain his wife. Against this order the husband applied to the High Court. Subsequent to this, an agreement was entered into between the parties but the husband did not act up to his promise. On the application of the wife to enforce the former order, it was *held* that the Magistrate was right in not enforcing it, as it had become inoperative when the agreement began to operate, but that, if the wife applied again under this section *de novo* the Magistrate should deal with any fresh application on its merits. *B. H. C. Cr. Rule*, No. 8 of 15th March, 1883; 1883 A. W. N. 217; 27 A. 433.

15. Magistrate not competent to restore case once dismissed.—The Code does not empower the Magistrate to re-hear a petition once dismissed. 9 C. W. N. 125 = 1 C. L. J. 214 = 2 Cr. L. J. 13; 17 Cr. L. J. 106 (C). See also *Weir II*, 623.

16. Who may enforce order for maintenance.—Any Magistrate in any place where the person against whom the order is made may be, may enforce the order, under s. 490. A second-class Magistrate may enforce it, *Ratanlal* 238. But s. 490 does not deprive the Magistrate who made the order of the power of enforcing it. 4 M. 230, 7 L. B. R. 116 = 15 Cr. L. J. 701. As to the powers of such Magistrate there is some conflict as to which, see Notes 5 and 6 to s. 490 and Note 68-A.

17. Who may cancel order for maintenance.—An application under sub-sec. (4) or (5) to have an order for maintenance passed under sub-sec. (1) set aside should be made to the Magistrate who passed the original order or to his successor in office who and who alone has jurisdiction in the matter, 25 A. 543, but see 10 M. 13 and Note 6 to s. 490.

III.—CONFLICT OF ORDERS OF CIVIL AND CRIMINAL COURTS

18. Effect of order on jurisdiction of Civil Courts.—(i) *Order for maintenance does not bar civil suit for declaration that no maintenance is payable*.—In 18 A. 29 it was *held* following 20 W. R. Civ. 53, that the order for maintenance cannot be set aside by a suit in a Civil Court praying for a decree to the effect that the wife in whose favour such order was made has no right to maintenance. See also 32 C. 479, where it was stated that if the Magistrate had made an order granting maintenance possibly a suit would not lie in the Civil Court to set aside that order. But in 30 M. 400 it was *held* following *Weir II*, 615 and 14 C. 276 that the Magistrate's order for maintenance does not take away the jurisdiction of the Civil Court and a suit claiming a declaration that maintenance is not payable is maintainable and 18 A. 29 was distinguished. An order for maintenance passed in favour of an illegitimate child, at the instance of the mother, furnishes a good cause of action to the alleged father for a declaratory suit against the child and mother that the child was not his illegitimate son, 17 O. C. 331 = 25 In. Ca. 325, where the above cases are discussed, see also 9 O. C. 43 = 3 Cr. L. J. 229.

(ii) *Order refusing maintenance does not bar suit in Civil Court for maintenance*.—A Hindu woman applied under this section to a Magistrate for maintenance of her child alleging that the defendant was its putative father. The Magistrate refused maintenance and she sued in a Civil Court. The defendant contended that the order of the Magistrate was conclusive and the suit was there ore not maintainable. *Held*, this section does not bar a suit in any Civil Court. It simply enables a Magistrate to pass an order for maintenance under a given state of circumstances. Further, s. 11 of the *Civil Procedure Code* of 1882 (s. 9 of Act V of 1908) allows a suit in respect of a matter of a civil nature, unless the suit is barred by a special enactment. There being no enactment barring the cognizance of the suit it was maintainable. It was contended also that the Hindu Law does not authorize maintenance being granted to illegitimate children (7 M. L. A. 18). *Held*, apart from Hindu Law, maintenance is awardable in such cases, on general principles. The defendant having begotten the child, was bound to provide for its maintenance. 32 C. 479.

(iii) *Civil Courts cannot issue injunction against Magistrates*.—Civil Courts cannot grant injunction restraining the Magistrate from enforcing an order under this section, 30 M. 400. The person in whose favour the decree is passed should apply to the Magistrate and satisfy him that by the order of the Civil Court his order for maintenance cannot be enforced and ask him on the authority of 5 C. 553 and 7 B. 150 to abstain from giving any further effect to his order for maintenance. 14 C. 276—289.

(i) *Civil Court not competent to set aside order of Magistrate*.—It is not competent to a Civil Court to make a decree setting aside an order of maintenance by a Magistrate, *Weir II*, 614; 33 C. 479, 18 A. 29, 20 W. R. (Civ.) 53.

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He went in Demogorgon's hall
 To see the secrets of the world unmade, *Spencer*
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 Of Demogorgon's. *Myers*
 The heroine of Shakespeare
 The hero of Urquhart

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Donaghy, the Donaghy, a family name.

You might have sat, like *Donny and Jim*, and scattered each other, and killed and roared like a pair of pigeons on a porch.

Dark and Bloody Ground, The An expression often used in allusion to Kentucky, of which

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Donaghy, the Donaghy, a family name.
Donaghy, the Donaghy, a family name.

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first order, *Weir II*, 614. It is not open to a Magistrate to ignore a final decree of a Civil Court, the jurisdiction vesting in him under this section, being auxiliary to that of the Civil Court. Where, therefore, an order of a Magistrate directing maintenance has been superseded by the decree of a Civil Court, the Magistrate is not entitled to enforce his previous order, *Weir II*, 615; 14 C. 276; 23 B. 434; 9 O. C. 49 = 3 Cr. L. J. 529, 15 Cr. L. J. 609 (Oudh).

21. Magistrate not competent to entertain application when previous decree is in force.—A woman is not entitled to an order under this section from a Magistrate, when a decree for maintenance obtained by her in a Civil Court is in force, *Weir II*, 615. When the husband has obtained a decree for restitution of conjugal rights and which decree is in full force, an application for maintenance by the wife under this section ought not to be entertained, (1910) U. B. R. I, 34 = 11 Cr. L. J. 662; 33 M. L. J. 449.

But in 46 A. 877 = 22 A. L. J. 806 it was held that where the decree for restitution of conjugal rights against wife was passed by Civil Court and thirteen months after the passing of the decree the husband was found illtreating the wife so much that she had to leave him, the Magistrate was justified in passing an order under s. 483 for maintenance as the applicant was quite justified in refusing to live with her husband.

21-A. An alimony order of the Probate, Divorce and Admiralty Division in England is no bar to a wife's application under s. 483.—It is now held in 49 M. L. J. 333 that a monthly alimony order of the English Probate, Divorce and Admiralty Division is no bar to an application by the wife under s. 483 if, in fact, the husband has neglected to maintain his wife either by payment of alimony or otherwise. In such a case, the Magistrate's power to order maintenance is not taken away.

Enforcement in India of maintenance orders made outside India.—See now for the enforcement in British India of maintenance orders made in other parts of His Majesty's Dominions and Protectorates and *vice versa* Act XVIII of 1921 (*Maintenance Orders Enforcement Act*).

IV.—CONDITIONS NECESSARY FOR AN ORDER FOR MAINTENANCE.

22. Any person having sufficient means may be directed to maintain his wife or child.—The law requires that the person on whom the order of maintenance is issued, must have sufficient means to support, 1882 A. W. N. 179. An able-bodied man who is not prevented by any physical infirmity from working may be presumed to have sufficient means to support himself and his child, (1911) U. B. R. I, 90 = 13 Cr. L. J. 162. The onus is on him to show that he has no sufficient means. The fact that the husband may be of slender means does not justify absolute refusal of an order for some maintenance, *Weir II*, 617. The fact that the father or husband is a professional beggar, *Weir II*, 616, or is an undivided member of a Hindu family, 13 M. 17, or is a youth of 16 years and still studying at school, 4 N.-W. P. H. C. R. 123, does not relieve him from the obligation imposed by this section of maintaining his wife or legitimate or illegitimate child.

23. Order may be made only against husband or father of child.—In the case of a minor husband, his father cannot be ordered to pay maintenance to son's wife, 26 P. R. 1903, nor can the father be made jointly liable with the son as no such arrangement is contemplated by s. 483. 12 P. R. 1914 = 15 Cr. L. J. 571; 31 P. R. 1914 = 15 Cr. L. J. 529.

24. Proof of valid marriage and existence of marital relation necessary.—A woman is not entitled to obtain a Magistrate's order under this section until she has proved that she is validly married to her alleged husband, and that she is justified in living apart from him, nor can a Magistrate pass an order before he finds that the complainant is the wife of the defendant, 16 B. 269. When the validity of the marriage is questioned it is for the applicant to prove that she was the legally married wife according to the personal law by which the parties are governed, 7 Bar. L. T. 71 = 15 Cr. L. J. 483. Unless there is such proof, no order can be made under this section, 7 L. B. R. 270 = 16 Cr. L. J. 39. It is only one proof of the existence of the relationship of husband and wife that a Magistrate can make an order (under this section) of maintenance to a wife, but where the cessation of conjugal relation has been proved, the responsibilities attached thereto must cease and a Magistrate is competent to stay an order maintenance already made and to refuse to issue his warrant and to try all questions raised before him which affect the right of the woman to receive maintenance, 5 C. 558 = 5 C. L. R. 21; 5 A. 226. Where the marriage is disputed, the Magistrate should himself try and decide the question and not refer the parties to a civil suit, 11 P. R. 1891. In proceedings under this section, *census records* are not, however, admissible as evidence, notwithstanding anything to the contrary in the *Indian Evidence Act*. See s. 12 of Act X of 1900. When the evidence of marriage is doubtful but it is proved that the parties co-habited for several

years as man and wife, the presumption that there was a valid marriage will prevail, 17 Cr. L. J. 412. *Karoo marriage among Jats valid*—Amongst the Jats a "karo" marriage is valid, and as the children are entitled to inherit to their father, a woman so married is entitled to claim maintenance from her husband, 4 N. W. P. H. C. R. 128. See also 6 W. R. 60.

25. *Means of wife does not relieve husband.*—A husband having sufficient means, is bound to maintain his wife and is not relieved of the obligation, by the circumstance that the wife may have relations able and willing to maintain her, Weir II, 615; 11 C. W. N. 6; 16 Cr. L. J. 20 (M). The proposition that a wife who has ample means of her own is not entitled to maintenance is not correct. The contention that in *Burma* the earnings of a wife are the joint property of herself and her husband and that when the husband leaves the wife in the enjoyment of the whole of her earnings, there is no neglect or refusal cannot be sustained, 10 Bur. L. R. 166. That the wife may earn by her own labour is no consideration, 1837 A. W. N. 107.

26. *Child must be in existence and "unable to maintain itself."*—For meaning of the word 'child,' see Note 47. No order under this section can be passed for the maintenance of an unborn child, 3 N. W. P. H. C. R. 70; Weir II, 618. It is obvious that the words "unable to maintain itself" refers to a child and not to a wife, 10 Bur. L. R. 166; 1 Cr. L. J. 293 (Bur). The father is bound to maintain the child whatever the position of the mother may be, 7 Bur. L. T. 24 = 15 Cr. L. J. 278. Inability is a necessary condition. A child who is deaf and dumb and unable to maintain itself, is entitled to maintenance, although it may have arrived at the age of majority, 5 N. W. P. H. C. R. 237. The fact that the child is not in a starving condition cannot be set up in answer to an application under this section. The questions which the Magistrate has to decide are (i) is the child unable to maintain itself? (ii) has the father neglected or refused to maintain it? 8 Bur. L. R. 96. Where it was alleged that a girl 17 years old, the daughter of a dancing woman was old enough to maintain herself, held the law will not treat prostitution as a profession by which a girl might earn her livelihood and maintain herself, 27 M. 565.

In 2 Rang. 682 the words "unable to maintain itself" were interpreted to mean inability to earn a complete livelihood, such as an adult person might earn without depending on any other person. A father being bound to maintain his child under the age of majority, in fixing the sum payable the Court should pay no regard to the fact that the child is able to contribute towards its support by means of its own labour or work of any kind.

27. *Does the inability refer to physical inability or to poverty?*—The inability referred to in the section relates to the absence of sufficient maturity of physical and mental development in the child rendering it in consequence unable to earn its living by its own efforts and does not refer to inability through poverty or absence of means, 25 M. L. J. 255 = 14 M. L. T. 222 = 14 Cr. L. J. 297; but this view was dissented from in 19 M. L. T. 23 = 17 Cr. L. J. 16 and it was held that no order can be made in favour of a well-to-do child or a child having a legally enforceable claim against a friend. See Note 4 (ii).

28. *In case of illegitimate children paternity must be clearly established.*—The Court would be wrong in taking into account the similarity of the names and the features of the child, and the defendant, 16 C. 781. When maintenance is claimed for an illegitimate child it is not enough to find that the defendant may have been the father, but the Magistrate must be able to find that in all reasonable probability, none else could have been, Weir II, 621. A wife can be examined as to possession of her husband during her married life, without independent evidence being first offered to prove the illegitimacy of her children, 18 B. 448. Acts of familiarity before the time that the bastard child could have been begotten are received as corroborative evidence, see subsecs. (6) and (7) and *Cole v. Manning*, L. R. 2 Q. B. D. 611. See Note 75 below.

29. *Actual neglect or refusal to maintain must be established—order cannot be made on contingency of default.*—A neglect or refusal to maintain his wife by the husband may be by words or by conduct; it may be expressed or implied, 9 Bom. L. R. 259 = 5 Cr. L. J. 234. When the defendant has denied his paternity, that is a fact from which the Court may infer neglect to maintain, 6 B. L. R. 278 = 14 Cr. L. J. 293; it is not open to a Magistrate, even in the case of the parties (husband and wife) consenting, to make an order awarding maintenance on the contingency of a default thereafter on the part of the husband to maintain. To give jurisdiction to a Magistrate, an actual neglect or refusal to maintain must be established Weir II, 620. Before passing an order under this section a Magistrate ought to ascertain whether the husband had been called upon to maintain his wife having regard to the condition of Hindu society, 22 W. R. 29. As to a husband's liability to maintain a Muhammadan child, see 21 W. R. 64. The ground upon which the order is based, should be set out in the order issued—*M H C No. 214 November, 1876*. A mere general refusal is not good.

Expounder of the Constitution A title given to Daniel Webster (1795-1852) on account of his elaborate expositions of the Constitution of the United States

F.

Faciunt Johanes. One who is good at any thing, who can turn his hand to any kind of work,—the Latin equivalent of Jack-of-all-trades

"To know the double-headed eagle
With many inscriptions, across the sea,
Father of French History (V. l. red. Du)

father (or husband) does not in fact maintain his child or wife, he neglects to do so § Bar L R 96 Where both the parties agree to live together no 'refusal to maintain' can be inferred from the deposition of the wife who asserted that though she was willing to live with her husband, the latter refused to maintain her, 45 P W R 1914 = 213 P L R 1915 = 15 Cr L J 86

The fact that the husband who is in arrears of maintenance has been adjudicated an insolvent is conclusive that he is unable to pay the amount due and therefore is not guilty of wilful neglect within the meaning of s 488 (3) of the Code 50 Cr 867

V—WIFE'S RIGHT TO MAINTENANCE

30 When wife is not entitled to order for maintenance.—See sub-sec (4).—(i) *When husband and wife are living separately by mutual consent*—A wife is not entitled to receive an allowance under this section, if she and her husband have entered into an agreement which provides for their living separately and they are so living separately by mutual consent Ratanlal 870

(ii) *When private arrangement is made for her maintenance*—Where the maintenance of a wife was by arrangement made at the time she began to live separately from the husband provided for by the assignment to her of some land held that the Court had no jurisdiction to award her additional maintenance on the ground that the yield of the land was insufficient for her maintenance Weir II, 648

(iii) *When wife leaves husband of her own accord without sufficient reason*—The proviso to

all treats her so as to make it impossible for her to live in the house this will amount to refusal or neglect on his part to maintain her § Bom L R 614, 21 P W R 1914 = 115 P L R 1914 = 15 Cr L J 529

(iv) *When she is living in adultery*—Where there has been desertion by a wife of her husband for many years coupled with adultery and no attempt has been made to seek the husband's pardon for past misconduct the wife is not entitled to an order for maintenance merely because at the time when she makes her application she may not be living in adultery Ratanlal 506 See Note 36

(v) *Adultery accompanied with loss of caste*—The use of the word 'may' in this section shows that a Magistrate has a discretion to decide in what cases the award of maintenance may properly be made though the discretion has to be exercised judicially and reasonably and not capriciously Thus where the wife was

(vi) *When she fails to show cause why she should not live with her husband*—When an application for maintenance under this section came on for hearing the husband of the woman appeared and offered to maintain her if she agreed to live with him. The applicant not appearing on that date the Magistrate dismissed her application. Some time after she applied for the restoration of her cause alleging that the non appearance was due to illness. The Magistrate however refused to restore the case, and holding that there was no power given to him by the Code to restore a case of this nature rejected her application. Held that there was nothing illegal in either of the orders made by the Magistrate. The respondent admitted that the petitioner was the wife and offered to maintain her on condition of her living with him. Then under sub-sec (3) of this section if she refused to live with him the Magistrate would have to consider any grounds of refusal stated by

to ask for an adjournment on the ground of illness. Held further the application to re-hear the petition already dismissed was not made under any section of the Code giving the Magistrate any power to set aside his previous order and hear the case again. Consequently the High Court declined to interfere 1 Cr L J 214 = 2 Cr L J 218 where 1 Cr L R 89 is distinguished

31 It is no longer necessary for wife to prove habitual cruelty.—In the proviso the words that he actually has treated his wife with cruelty are omitted and the words that there is some ground for so doing

Expounder of the Constitution A title given to Daniel Webster (18.-18 2), on account of his elaborate expositions of the Constitution of the United States.

Lyre, Jāne (tr). The heroine of Miss Charlotte

F.

Fac-istum, Je bñ'n'? One who is good at any thing, who can turn his hand to any kind of work, — the Latin equivalent of Jack-of-all-trades.

are substituted. This alteration gives Magistrates larger discretion in giving maintenance—*Sel. Com. Rep.* The present Code does not restrict payment of maintenance when the wife is living separately to cases in which she has been treated with habitual cruelty, U. B. R. (1897—1901) 1, 104 is no longer law, 4 Bar. L. T. 269 = 13 Cr. L. J. 85. Where it is proved that a husband has not refused or neglected to maintain his wife, a Criminal Court acting under this section, has no jurisdiction to make an order upon the husband for her maintenance, on the ground that the husband has been guilty of cruelty to her. But that is a very different thing from holding that no evidence of cruelty can be admitted in a proceeding under this section to prove, not indeed cruelty as a ground for separate maintenance but the conduct and acts of the husband from which the Court may draw the inference of neglect or refusal to maintain the wife. A neglect or refusal by the husband to maintain his wife may be by words or by conduct. It may be expressed or implied. In order to find out the intention of the Legislature in enacting a particular provision in a Statute, it is a canon of interpretation, that the Court must have regard to the context of the whole section and not confine itself to its words, detached from the whole of its context. It is a rule of construction that in interpreting a section which is ambiguous, the Court may look into the state of the law, as it existed before the Statute containing the section was passed, 9 Bom. L. R. 359 = 5 Cr. L. J. 334, where 6 N.-W. P. H. C. R. 205 and 5 Bom. L. R. 614 are referred to.

32. *Rallings under old Code, as to what amounts to cruelty in law.*—The previous Codes used the term 'cruelty'. There was no definition of cruelty, but it was held that the criterion of legal cruelty justifying a wife's desertion is the same in this country as in England, viz., whether there has been actual violence of such a character as to endanger personal health or safety, or whether there is the reasonable apprehension of it, 1 B. 164. See also 19 C. 84. The word 'cruelty' is not necessarily limited to personal violence, 11 A. 480. A false charge of incest is tantamount to cruelty, *Münner*, 4 Swab and Trist 24. Refusing to take food or water from the wife amounts to cruelty, 1 B. 164 at p. 166. The present Code, however, omits the word *cruelty* and uses instead "just ground for so doing". What is just ground will have to be determined with reference to the circumstances of each individual case. See 8 B. L. R. Appx. XIX. If a husband, knowing that he is in such a state of health that by having connection with his wife he will run the risk of communicating the venereal disease to her, recklessly has connection with her and thereby communicates the disease to her, he is guilty of cruelty, *Boardman v. Boardman* L. R. 1 Prob. and Mat. 223. If force, whether physical or moral, is systematically exerted to compel the submission of a wife to such a degree and during such a length of time as to injure her health, and renders a serious malady imminent, although there be no actual physical violence such as would justify a decree, it is legal cruelty, and entitles her to a judicial separation—*Kelly v. Kelly*, L. R. 2 Prob. and Mat. 31, 59. See 1 B. 164 at p. 174; *Tomkins v. Tomkins*, 1 Swab and Trist 168.

33. *What are not just grounds for refusing to live with husband?*—(i) *Minority of wife*—The Court has no authority to award maintenance when the husband offers to maintain the wife in his house merely because the wife is a minor and it might be better she should live with her parents, 1 P. R. 1882.

(ii) *Incompatibility of temper and presence of a second wife in the house* are not legally sufficient for the award of a separate maintenance to a wife, 21 P. R. 1873, 30 P. R. 1831, 31 P. R. 1832, 2 P. R. 1878. The fact, that a younger wife is likely to suffer annoyance from the elder wife and there is reason to fear that her husband may not protect her from such annoyance, is not sufficient cause for refusing to live with her husband, 1904 U. B. R. Cr. P. C. I., p. 10 = 1 Cr. L. J. 543; (1910) U. B. R. 34 = 11 Cr. L. J. 662. But if the husband is found to treat her unkindly owing to the presence of the other wife, she may claim separate maintenance. 14 P. R. 1901. But disagreement with husband's family is no sufficient ground for separate maintenance, 21 P. R. 1870. The inability of a husband and wife to agree to live together is no ground for decreeing separate maintenance, 6 W. R. 59.

(iii) *Marrying a second wife*—Where polygamy is allowed, the fact that the husband has married a second wife is not a sufficient reason, within the meaning of this section to justify the award of separate maintenance, 7 M. 187; 66 P. R. 1887; *Ratanlal* 7; 12 P. R. 1914 = 15 Cr. L. J. 577. She can only claim maintenance

ing her maintenance under s. 488, 4 L. B. R. 340 (F.B.) = 9 Cr. L. J. 25 overruling 4 L. B. R. 146. Similarly, if a man marries a second wife and she does not know of the previous marriage she may refuse to live with the chief wife and claim maintenance, 3 Bar. L. T. 154 = 11 Cr. L. J. 750. But if she had knowledge it would be otherwise, U. B. R. (1897—1901) 1, p. 104.

The ancient and noble family of Tom Piel which has ob- all, but a drossy be d of the basest blood of Europe. Pe

(iv) *Husband keeping a concubine in the house*—Concubinage is so far recognized among Hindus that the circumstance of a Hindu husband keeping a concubine in his house will not entitle a wife to a maintenance allowance, provided the husband is willing to receive her and treat her with the consideration which is due to her position as a wife, *Weir II, 641, 17 M. 280*. The question in each case will be whether the conduct of the husband is such as the wife consistently with self-respect and due regard to her position as wife can live in the house of the husband. Therefore adultery on the part of the husband may constitute sufficient cause for refusing to live with him, *20 M. 470 (F.B.)*.

(v) *Husband's failure to pay dowry*—The fact that in a civil suit by the husband for restitution of conjugal rights, the wife successfully resisted his claim by a plea of unpaid prompt dowry is not a sufficient reason for her refusal to live with her husband, *6 P. R. 169; 15 P. R. 1880*.

34. What is a proper offer to maintain?—(i) *It must be bona fide*—An offer to maintain must be a *bona fide* offer and not made with the object of escaping obligation, *13 Cr. L. J. 55 (Birma)*.

(ii) *It must be an offer to maintain with the consideration due to her position as a wife*—See *17 M. 260, 20 M. 470*.

(iii) *Must the offer extend to observing conjugal duties?*—An offer by a Hindu, having two wives, to maintain his first wife by allowing her to live in his house, and by supplying her with grain to be cooked and eaten separately, coupled with a refusal to live with her as husband and wife, does not come within the meaning of the proviso to this section, *6 M. 371*. This was *disapproved of* in *16 B. 269*, where it was *held* that there is no authority for the proposition that the words "as his wife must be read into the proviso to subsec (3) and that it is sufficient that the husband has offered to maintain his wife in his house. When no neglect or refusal to maintain is found against the husband, it is for the wife to establish a justifying cause for her living apart. The object of this section is to provide for maintenance and not to enforce conjugal duties, *42 M. L. J. 266*".

35. What are not sufficient grounds to refuse maintenance.—(i) *Suspicious conduct of wife*—A Magistrate cannot refuse to make an order of maintenance merely because he considers the conduct of the applicant open to suspicion. The matters recognized by this section as disentitling a wife to maintenance, must be proved to justify dismissal of an application for maintenance, *Weir II, 647*.

(ii) *Refusing to attend a Panchayat convened to consider her conduct*—A wife's refusal to attend a Panchayat convened to consider a charge of adultery against her, is no reason for rejecting an application by her under this section, *15 Cr. L. J. 52 (M.)*.

(iii) *Delay in applying for maintenance*—Delay on the part of a wife in complaining of her husband's neglect to maintain her, is no ground for dismissing the complaint, *Weir II, 615 and 616*. A wife does not lose her right to maintenance, because she may not have advanced her claim, immediately on her husband's desertion of her, *Weir II, 616*.

husband. The husband subsequently took a woman to live with him as his mistress, and she lived with him up to the time when this case came on for hearing before the Magistrate, and before the Magistrate, the wife agreed to return to her husband within a week on his putting away his mistress and promising to have nothing more to do with her, but subsequently she refused to abide by that arrangement. *Held*, that an offer made in Court by the husband to give up his mistress does not deprive the wife of her right of refusal to live with her husband. *14 Bar. L. R. 240 = 8 Cr. L. J. 422*. The wife's right to refuse is not demolished by the fact that the husband was driven to concubinage by his wife's continued refusal to live with him. Where the breach between husband and wife is irremediable and it is impossible for the latter to return to the husband and live with him, after many years' separation, without fresh trouble and dispute, she will be entitled to live separately and get maintenance, *26 P. W. R. 1914 = 170 P. L. R. 1914 = 13 Cr. L. J. 554*.

(v) *Change of religion by husband*—The rejection of an application for maintenance by the wife of a Christian, who has reverted the Hinduism is wrong *4 M. H. C. R. Appx. III*.

36. Meaning of 'adultery' and 'living in adultery' as used in this section.—(i) *Adultery*—Under the I P. C., adultery is an offence committed by a man against another man in respect of the wife of the latter and it is an offence which cannot be committed by a woman. Adultery under the I P. C. is not committed by a man who has sexual intercourse with an unmarried woman, or with a widow, or even with a married woman whose husband consents to it. But adultery in this section is used in the wider and ordinary sense of voluntary

sexual connection between either of the parties to the marriage, and someone, married or single of the opposite sex other than the offender's own husband or wife. This construction is not inconsistent with s. 4(2). Therefore adultery on the part of the husband, not being such as would be punishable under 1 P.C., may nevertheless constitute sufficient cause for the wife separating from her husband and enable her to claim maintenance under this section, 20 M. 470 (F.B.), *overruling* 17 M. 260.

(ii) '*Living in adultery*'—The words "*living in adultery*" refer rather to a course of conduct or at least to something more than a single lapse from virtue, and therefore a single act of adultery does not necessarily amount to living in adultery, so as to disentitle the wife from applying for maintenance under this section, 30 M. 332 (where 26 A. 326 and 20 M. 470 are referred to), 5 N. L. R. 19 = 9 Cr. L. J. 390. Where the wife who applied for maintenance had some two years prior to the date of the application given birth to an illegitimate child, but since that time, had been living with her parents and leading a chaste and respectable life, it could not be said she was living in adultery within the meaning of this section so as to disentitle her to maintenance, 26 A. 326, where 1831 A. W. N. 31, 62 and 113 are referred to. But when the wife was found guilty of adultery with a low caste man which led to her expulsion from caste it is not necessary to prove that she is living in adultery, 31 M. 185. Where the husband disclaimed paternity of a child born to his wife and the wife in consequence, took to living in her father's house, *held* in the absence of proof that she was living in adultery, the wife was entitled to an order under this section, 1331 A. W. N. 113; 37 and 62. See also 26 A. 326; 1904 A. W. N. 23. In 1831 A. W. N. 62, the exact questions to which alone the Magistrate should address himself in an application of this nature, are set forth at great length. See also 29 C. W. N. 647.

37. Cancellation of order for maintenance.—See Notes under Heading X below.

38. Is it not open to a wife to make a contract discharging husband's true liability?—Where a wife first applied for maintenance for herself and child, but on receipt of a certain lump-amount from the husband, withdrew her application, and later on, again applied, stating that the lump-amount has been expended, and the husband objected that the lump amount had been paid in final settlement of all her claims, *held*, that on such application, the duty of the Magistrate is (i) to find out whether the husband has sufficient means and (ii) whether he refuses or neglects to maintain the applicant, and on the last point, he must find out, whether the settlement made by the husband still furnishes a sufficient means for the wife's support. Although if the lump-sum has been invested, it would have yielded a sufficient income to maintain her for the rest of her days, this question is immaterial, if in fact the money was spent or lost and is no longer yielding a sufficient income. The language of the section is inconsistent with a wife making a contract to absolve the husband from liability. The object of the law being to prevent the wife, whom her husband is able to support, from becoming a burden to other people, this object would not be attained by a contract which ultimately leaves the wife, to the charity of her neighbours. The section does not say that a wife is not eligible for maintenance, if she is able to support herself or if she has made a bad use of the money which her husband gave her sometime back, 1905 U. B. (C. Fr.) 45, where 1892—96 U. B. R. 64 and 1897—1901 U. B. R. 103 are referred to. This decision seems to require re-consideration as it is open to the parties to live separately by mutual consent.

SPECIAL RIGHTS OF MUHAMMADAN WIFE

39. Muhammadan wife not bound to go to Kazi before seeking help of Court—Where the wife is not bound to seek the assistance of the Kazi, before applying to the Magistrate for

40. Moota wife is entitled to maintenance.—See 8 C. 736; 8 W. R. 60, and N

41. Husband's marriage with wife's step-mother, sufficient reason for sep marriage of a Muhammadan with the step-mother of his wife, being prohibited, the will not live with her husband, during the continuance of his marriage with her step-m

42. Husband liable to maintain wife till date of divorce.—Where the defence cause against an order of maintenance passed against him and he divorced his

7 B. 180; where 19 W. R. 73 dissented from, 21 P. R. 1894.

43. Magistrate must enquire into plea of divorce.—When a husband pleads the maintenance of his wife pleads non-liability on account of his having caused the divorce, Magistrate to entertain and enquire into such plea, and if he finds it established, he

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at least after such date as the divorce operates, 21 P. R. 1894. The Magistrate is bound to entertain such application and determine the question, 1915 U. B. R. I. 53 = 16 Cr. L. J. 531; 17 O. C. 260 = 15 Cr. L. J. 646. In *Weir II*, 620, it is said the Magistrate is bound to enquire into the validity of the plea, and if he finds in the affirmative, then no further maintenance can be ordered. See also Note 2 to s 489.

44 Right of divorced wife to maintenance during 'iddat'.—*Iddat* is the period during which a woman whose marriage has been dissolved by divorce or death is bound to wait before she is free to marry again. *Iddat* is primarily imposed with a view to ascertain whether the woman is pregnant, so that the paternity of the child that is born to a woman whose marriage has been dissolved may be fixed. Under the Hanafi Law, a divorce (*talak*) whether revocable (*rajai*) or irrevocable (*bayan*) does not completely destroy the relationship of husband and wife until after the expiry of the period of *iddat*. Therefore a wife is entitled during *iddat* to an order for maintenance under s 488. She is also entitled during the period of *iddat* to the benefit of an order for maintenance which had been made in her favour before divorce—the pronouncement of *talak*, 20 M. L. J. 12 = 10 Cr. L. J. 502 following *Weir II*, 617; 5 A. 228 and 19 A. 53; 5 P. R. 1905 = 85 P. L. R. 1903 = 2 Cr. L. J. 40 dissenting from 1885 A. W. N. 29, 4 Bae. L. T. 13 = 12 Cr. L. J. 82. But an order for maintenance for a time subsequent to the period of *iddat* is illegal, unless pregnancy is alleged, *Weir II*, 617; 19 W. R. 73; 5 A. 228; 5 P. R. 1905.

45 Order does not deprive husband of right to divorce.—An order made by a Magistrate, directing a Muhammadan husband to pay a sum monthly for the maintenance of his wife, does not deprive such husband of his inherent right to divorce his wife, and after such divorce the Magistrate's order can no longer be enforced 8 B. H. C. R. Cr. Ca. 95, 7 B. 180; 14 C. 276; 1 Bom. L. R. 345; 19 A. 50 (F.B.), 19 W. R. 73 = B. L. R. Ap. XXXIII. The dissolution of the bond of marriage when once validly effected must have the result of stopping the operation of a Magistrate's order made in favour of a wife, 17 O. C. 260 = 15 Cr. L. J. 646; 21 P. R. 1894; 1915 U. B. R. I., 53 = 16 Cr. L. J. 531. See Note 5 to s. 490.

46. Repudiation of wife by husband having come to her knowledge is good divorce.—A Muhammadan against whom an order for the maintenance of his wife had been passed under this section, paid into Court the arrears due from him, with a sum in addition on account of the wife's *iddat*, and in an application accompanying such payment set out in clear terms that he had repudiated his wife. The repudiation was three times repeated in the application. *Held*, that this having come to the knowledge of the wife was a good divorce under the Muhammadan law, and that it was not necessary that the writing of divorce should be specially addressed to the wife, 1999 A. W. N. 83. According to the Hanafi Law it is not necessary that the *talak* or words of repudiation should be addressed directly to the wife to constitute a valid divorce, 33 M. 22 where 4 C. 588 is dissented from and 30 B. 537; 35 C. 181 approved. An order under this section for the maintenance of a Muhammadan wife, passed more than three months and thirteen days after divorce, by words which had not been repeated three times, was held to be illegal, 1888 A. W. N. 116.

VI.—RIGHT OF CHILDREN TO MAINTENANCE.

47. Meaning "of child".—The word 'child' as used in the section, simply means son or daughter. Reference to age is purposely omitted in the section, the object being any son or daughter is entitled to claim maintenance so long as he or she is unable to maintain himself or herself, 23 P. W. R. 1910 = 11 Cr. L. J. 527. The word 'child' means one who has not attained the age of majority, 37 M. 565. See Note 26 above as to the meaning of "unable to maintain itself." See Note 26 and 2 Rang. 682.

48. Is a child having means of its own entitled to maintenance?—In 25 M. L. J. 355—14 Cr. L. J. 597 it was held that if the child is not of sufficient maturity to earn a livelihood, then, even if that child belongs to a well-to-do *farwad*, the liability of the father is not taken away. But this view was dissented from in 19 M. L. T. 23 = 17 Cr. L. J. 16 where it was observed as follows:—"I think the ability contemplated by the section applies as much to the case of a child which has got means of its own or which is entitled in law to be maintained, and is being maintained, as in this case, as to a child which is able to earn by its own exertions. This is a summary procedure provided by this section, and it does not cover entirely the same ground as the Civil Liability of the father to maintain his child. It does not seem to have been within the contemplation of the legislature that a child which is well-to-do should be entitled under s 488 to an order for maintenance as against its father," 19 M. 461 was referred to.

49 Is it open to Magistrate to refuse order for maintenance if father offers to maintain children if they live with him?—A mother, who has the custody of the child and who has to maintain it, is entitled, so long as that state continues, to the allowance granted for the maintenance of the child, *Weir II*, 630.

on the protection of a lover, who scandalously

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Exhibition, prince of dumbness.

Kut

Asipagom is not more united to *Asipagom* than every one
 of *Asipagom* is united to all his reverend brethren.

Har'pl-er or **Har'per** *Macaulay* Some mysterious person

A father cannot refuse to maintain his children on the ground that they are not living with him, *U. B. R.* 1902-03; 1 Cr. P. 7; 12 Bar. L. R. 33 = 2 Cr. L. J. 830; *U. B. R.* 1910, Cr. P. C. 1 = 11 Cr. L. J. 499; 8 Bar. L. T. 134 = 16 Cr. L. J. 656; (1910) 1 *U. B. R.* 34 = 11 Cr. L. J. 862. If the father wishes the children to live with him his obvious course is to get an order from the proper authority giving him the custody of the children. Living together in the case of husband and wife is a thing of a special character. It is an incident of matrimony. See also 25 M. L. J. 335 = 14 M. L. T. 223; 8 Bar. L. T. 134 = 16 Cr. L. J. 656. Merely sending a man to go and ask the child to come and live with the father does not amount to an offer to maintain the child and absolve the father of his liability, 7 Bar. L. T. 34 = 13 Cr. L. J. 278. A mother having the custody of her child applied under this section for its maintenance by its father. Before the receipt of summons under her application the father had neither asked for the custody of the child nor offered to provide for it in any way. He now made an offer in Court to maintain the child, if it was left with him. *Held*, that a present offer to maintain will not take away the Magistrate's jurisdiction under this section to order him to pay for the child's maintenance, 1905 *U. B. R.* (Cr. P. C.) 39 where 1902 *U. B. R.* (Cr. P. C.) 7, 19 P. R. 1894, 16 W. R. 62 and 2 L. B. R. 46 are referred to. See Note 50. *Contr.*—A father offering to maintain his children on condition that they live with him cannot be said to refuse to maintain them and though by express provision of law an order of maintenance can be passed, notwithstanding such offer in favour of a wife on certain specified grounds, there is no similar provision in the children, 18 P. R. 1894; 21 P. W. R. 1916 = 15 Cr. L. J. 529. Where a father has custody of his minor children and is maintaining them properly, the mere fact that they go and live with their mother would not make him liable to be charged for maintenance, though he refuses to maintain them unless they return to his custody 8 L. B. R. 103 = 15 Cr. L. J. 217. The proper course for the mother is to get a certificate of guardianship of her children by proving that the father is an unfit person and when this has been done to resort to the provisions of this section if the father refuses to make an allowance for the child 18 P. R. 1894. See 22 P. R. 1917 (Cr.).

But in a Bombay case it was *held* that with regard to the maintenance of children it is sufficient under sub-sec. (1), s. 488 if the neglect or refusal to maintain them is proved. On such proof the Magistrate can make an order for the payment of a monthly allowance for the maintenance of each child to such person as the Magistrate from time to time directs. An offer to maintain the children in the future is not sufficient of itself to debar the Magistrate from making an order. Of course the Magistrate is entitled to take such offer into consideration, 27 Bom. L. R. 359 = 49 B. 562.

(i) *Father not relieved of liability when mother is of right entitled to custody, as under the Muhammadan law*—Under Muhammadan law, the mother is entitled to the custody of her children till they reach the age of puberty, even when she has been divorced by her husband, but that does not relieve the father from the obligation of maintaining the children. Where, therefore, a Muhammadan father contended that as the mother (his divorced wife) had the custody of the children, he was not bound to maintain them but that he was willing to maintain them, if the children were made over to him *held*, that the father was bound to pay for the maintenance of the children in the custody of the mother and that his conduct amounted to a refusal or neglect within the meaning of this section, 6 Bom. L. R. 536. When however, the child is a girl admittedly between 14 and 15 years of age and therefore of puberty, the father is entitled to custody, even if the treatment of her mother by the father is against him. The father should not be charged with her maintenance if he offers to support her in his own house, 11 P. L. R. 1904.

50. *Magistrate not competent to go into the question of the lawful guardianship of a child*—In determining questions under this Chapter, a Magistrate has no power to enter into any question as to the lawful guardianship of a child. There is nothing in the Code which would warrant a Magistrate in ordering a mother to surrender her illegitimate child to its father, although such child be of the age of maturity. A refusal by the mother to make over the custody of child in such a case would be no ground for stopping an allowance previously ordered, 4 C 374 followed in 17 P. R. 1885. See also 19 M. 461. When a father offers to maintain his children, a Criminal Court has no jurisdiction, merely because he refuses to make a money allowance to the children who prefer to remain with their mother apart from him, to make an order that he shall do so, nor in a summary proceeding under this section is the Court competent to enter upon an enquiry as to the fitness or unfitness of the father to act as guardian of his children, 18 P. R. 1894.

51. *Children living with adulterous mother or removed from the father without his consent, not entitled to maintenance*—A father cannot be ordered to pay a maintenance allowance for a child live with its mother, while the latter is living in adultery, *Weir II*, 630; nor where the children their mother from their father's custody and without his consent although he was entitled equally with the mother and the latter has prevented the children from returning to him.

3 (Nestor) A name under which Steele assumes
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52. What are not proper grounds for refusing maintenance.—(i) *That the mother of the illegitimate children is a married woman*—The circumstance, that the mother of illegitimate children is a married woman, is in itself no ground for dismissing the claim for their maintenance. The intention of the Legislature is to enforce the liability of the husband of a woman and of the male parent of an illegitimate child as the person primarily responsible for their maintenance, **Weir II, 619**, and the words of this section are sufficiently wide to include a married woman, claiming maintenance for her illegitimate children from the putative father, **18 B. 468**.

(ii) *Divorce of mother*—Even a valid divorce of the mother will not free the father, from liability to maintain his children, **1 Bur. L. R. 143**.

(iii) *Decision of Civil Court on the claims of the mother*—A decision of the Civil Court, refusing to enforce a contract or agreement against a man for a maintenance of a woman cannot preclude either the woman from applying or a Magistrate from making an order for the maintenance of their illegitimate child, **17 W. R. 49**.

(iv) *That the mother is living separately from her husband*—A Muhammadan mother being the natural guardian of her minor daughter, would be entitled to claim maintenance for the child even though she is living separately from her husband and may have no valid grounds to refuse to live with her husband, **15 C. W. N. 27**. See also the case in **15 C. W. N. 136** (Christians).

(v) *That the mother has sufficient means to maintain the child*—The father is bound to maintain his child whatever the position of the mother may be, **7 Bur. L. T. 34 = 15 Cr. L. J. 278**. But if the child itself has sufficient means or is entitled to be maintained out of the mother's *tarwad*, an order for maintenance cannot be passed, see Note 48.

53. Is it open to a lawful guardian to compromise the claim of a child under this section?—A compromise made by the lawful guardian of a minor, acting *bona fide* for his benefit, cannot be set aside even at his instance, except on proof of fraud. Therefore, where a mother on behalf of her illegitimate minor children compromised and renounced a future claim for their maintenance, by executing a document in consideration of the payment of Rs 300, *held*, that under the circumstances there could be no neglect to maintain within the meaning of this section, **Weir II, 631**. But where there is nothing to show that the agreement was really for the benefit of the child and the presumption from the circumstances under which the compromise was made, being that the child would be materially injured by such a manifestly inadequate adjustment of its claim to maintenance during minority, the agreement is not binding on the child or any person who may become the guardian subsequent to the death of the mother, **13 P. R. 1885**. See **25 A. 165**; **8 Bur. L. R. 96**. The better view is, that a father cannot divest himself of his liability to maintain his child by any agreement with his wife or mother of the child, **Weir II, 648**. It is submitted that the statutory right cannot be compromised unless such power is specially recognized by the Statute. The Magistrate is not competent to consider such a compromise. Compare Note 38 at p. 1188.

54. Order awarding maintenance to child cannot be cancelled.—See Note 79.

VII.—CONTENTS OF ORDER AWARDING MAINTENANCE.

55. Considerations in fixing the rate of maintenance.—In determining the amount of maintenance no luxury should be allowed but necessaries of life should be considered according to the station in life of the applicant and the means of the respondent, **4 Bur. L. T. 269 = 13 Cr. L. J. 53**. 'Maintenance' is intended for food, clothing and lodging. It does not include schooling fees, **U. B. R. 1909, 1 Cr. P. 17 = 11 Cr. L. J. 40**. See Note 5.

56. Rupees one hundred represent the maximum amount each person entitled to maintenance can get.—In the case of twins, a separate sum should be awarded for each. Also, the order may include more than one bastard child if begotten by the same man upon the same woman, *Skinn*, **1 Bott. 470**. Where a wife applied for maintenance for herself and her four children and the Magistrate ordered the husband to pay Rs 50 for maintenance of the wife and Rs 10 for each child every month. *Held*, that the order was legal. The husband was liable to maintain his wife and each of his children and the Magistrate might order him to pay as much as Rs. 50 for each of them if each child was living with a different person, and the fact that all the children were at the time in custody of the mother cannot affect the question of what should be paid to each child, **4 Bur. L. T. 139 = 12 Cr. L. J. 383**. Under the new amendments rupees one hundred is now fixed as the maximum under s. 488. See **49 M. L. J. 335**.

King Esternère The hero of an ancient

legend
King Goldemar See GOLDENMAN

Lat. lat. but. lat. est. lat. est. lat. est. lat. est.

Lady Bountiful A character in Farquhar's
"Beaux' Stratagem"

Lat. lat. but. lat. est. lat. est. lat. est. lat. est.

57. Magistrate in passing order at certain rate cannot direct prospective increase of rate.—An order fixing a sum for the maintenance of a child, containing a prospective order for an increase of the amount awarded as the child grows older, is unauthorized by law, 2 N.-W. P. H. C. R. 436; 12 C. 535; 14 M. 398. A Magistrate cannot make an order for maintenance at a progressively increasing rate, but he can from time to time alter it under s. 489. In the case of a child, the allowance should be such a proper allowance, as may suffice for the maintenance of the child, till it is able to maintain itself, 2 N.-W. P. H. C. R. 434. If the father (or husband) is aggrieved, he could apply to the Magistrate under s. 489, 9 W. R. 1. A Magistrate in passing an order for maintenance at a certain rate, cannot direct a prospective increase of the rate. The fact that a child who has been awarded maintenance, has grown older would no less constitute 'a change in the circumstance of the person receiving the allowance' within the meaning of s. 489 than would the death of the child or the birth of another, and therefore the rate can be varied under s. 489, as the child gets older, 14 M. 398.

58. Magistrate cannot fix duration of maintenance.—A Magistrate is not competent in any case to fix the duration of maintenance to children until they come of age, 13 P. R. 1894; Weir II, 634. But in England an order of payment "till the child shall no longer be chargeable on the Parish" was held good, *Matthews*, 2 Salk 475; *Johnson*, Comb. 69.

59. Order cannot be retrospective.—An order directing the payment of maintenance with retrospective effect from a certain date is illegal. Under subsec. (2), the allowance can be made, at the most, from the date of the application for maintenance, Weir II, 635. But an order directing payment *in advance* from the date of the Magistrate's order is perfectly legal, *Ratanlal* 189.

60. Payment of maintenance must be monthly and in coin.—The payment ordered must be a monthly payment. An order directing payment of two cloths annually, Weir II, 627, or grain, Weir II, 626 and 627; 19 P. R. 1911; 3 P. R. 1887, or providing separate residence, is not in accordance with the Code 31 P. R. 1887; 1 P. R. 1876. To such an order an alternative one for a specified quantity of grain cannot be added, 3 P. R. 1887. But where a compromise filed by the parties and accepted by the Magistrate contained an agreement that an annual sum was to be paid to the wife for the value of cloth, held that effect could be given to the general intention of the parties as disclosed by the *rasi* by allotting in the monthly maintenance the value of the cloths agreed to be paid annually, Weir II, 634. In England when a father was ordered to pay £9 in gross and after that so much weekly, the order was held good. *Odum*, 1 Salk 124; 1 Bott. 497; 26 Bom L. R. 186.

60-A. Conditional order illegal.—An order for maintenance passed on condition that the woman resides in her house is illegal, 14 P. R. 1917 (Cr.).

61. Order for payment into public treasury is illegal.—An order directing the payment of a maintenance allowance into a public treasury is not sanctioned by law, Weir II, 627.

62. Magistrate cannot make order in terms of compromise—when claim settled amicably, case should be dismissed.—A Magistrate purporting to act under this section, cannot assume the functions of a Civil Court and give judgment in accordance with a bond evidencing a compromise entered into between a husband and a wife. Where a claim for maintenance is amicably settled by the parties the Magistrate should simply dismiss the petition, if pending before him, Weir II, 629, 42 P. R. 1883; 39 P. R. 1905 and see Note 72.

VIII.—PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE.

63. Ordinarily inquiry must be full as in warrant-case.—Ordinarily the inquiry should be full as in the trial of a warrant-case. But when an order directing a monthly payment of a fixed sum of money was made on the consent of the parties, the necessity for taking evidence being thereby dispensed with, held, that the order was not illegal, Weir II, 629.

(i) *Should not be summary*—Proceedings under this section cannot be conducted as in a summary trial under Chapter XXII. Evidence must be recorded as prescribed by s. 355. Where summary procedure was adopted the High Court in 20 C. 351 directed a fresh trial.

(ii) *Evidence must be duly recorded*—An order awarding maintenance without recording evidence, Weir II, 628, or on the evidence taken by a Subordinate Magistrate and order passed thereon in the absence of the defendant husband, is illegal, 11 M. 199, 361 P. L. R. 1905. The various elements required to sustain an order under this section must be strictly proved by evidence recorded on oath, 13 W. R. 19. The Magistrate cannot dispose of the case upon knowledge acquired by him in another case, 8 W. R. 67. Proceedings under this

cotton crop and was utterly vanquished. The last power
has been consumed.

King Goldemar. See GOLDEMAR
King Gunther. See GUNTHER
King Horn.

"... beautiful. A character in French
"L'œuvre d'art."

He (Southern) complains that he (the man) is
to be a perfect jack-of-all-trades - not only a
quadrant merchant, but also a jack-of-all-trades.

section are judicial in their nature and must not be conducted as if they were ministerial matters. The notes of evidence therefore must not be inadequate and vague, and the order recorded should be one on distinct findings of fact, 5 A. 224.

64. Attendance of complainant may be dispensed with.—There is nothing in the section which requires the personal attendance of the person in whose favour the order for maintenance is made. It is left to the discretion of the Magistrate to dispense with the attendance of the complainant, 19 P. R. 1903 referring to 3 P. R. 1893, 12 A. 69; 15 C. 775; 21 C. 593.

65 "Ex-parte proceedings."—Inquiry ought not to be conducted in absence of accused unless Magistrate is satisfied that he is wilfully absent.—In a case under this section, the defendant was summoned to appear before a Magistrate on a certain day, but the summons did not specify the place of appearance. *Held*, that the Magistrate ought not to have passed an *ex-parte* order in the defendant's absence as there was no failure to appear, because no place was specified at which the petitioner was to appear, 7 M. H. C. R. Appx. XLIII. In the Court of a District Magistrate, an application was made against a person for the maintenance of an illegitimate child on the ground that he being its father, neglected to maintain it. The District Magistrate made over the complaint to an Honorary Magistrate of the first class for inquiry. The Honorary Magistrate after a lengthy inquiry, reported the case to be false. But the District Magistrate not satisfied with the result, ordered process to issue against the putative father and made over the case to a Deputy Magistrate. This officer, without issuing any notice to the father asked the pleader who conducted for him the proceedings before the Honorary Magistrate, to conduct the case. The pleader declined on the ground that he had no instructions. Thereupon the Deputy Magistrate proceeded with the case *ex-parte* and ultimately made an order against the petitioner. *Held* that the provisions of sub-sec. (6) of this section had not been complied with. The evidence was not taken by the Deputy Magistrate in the presence of the petitioner. That ought to have been done, unless the personal attendance of the petitioner has been dispensed with, in which case it ought to have been taken in the presence of his pleader. Unless the Court was satisfied that the petitioner was wilfully avoiding the service of summons or wilfully neglecting to attend the Court, evidence should not have been taken *ex-parte*, 1 C. L. J. 102. Summons was served on the husband of one P under this section to attend the Court, either in person or by duly authorized wakil on a certain day, but on that day the case was postponed to another day, although the wakil of the husband was present. In the meantime the case was again adjourned to another day, and notice was served on the pleader. When the case was called on a *mukhtyar* appeared on behalf of the husband, but the Magistrate refused to hear him and decided the case, *ex-parte*, holding that the husband wilfully neglected to attend. *Held* that in the circumstances of the case, although the Magistrate was justified in refusing to hear the *mukhtyar*, he was not entitled to proceed *ex-parte*, 2 Bom. L. R. 700. See proviso to sub-sec. (6) for power to set aside *ex-parte* order.

66. Duty of Magistrate when husband offers to maintain his wife.—When the husband offers to maintain his wife the Magistrate must consider any ground of refusal on the part of the wife to live with her husband and receive evidence which may be offered one side or the other, 8 W. R. 67. Where an offer to maintain the wife is made, the Magistrate should ask the woman whether she is willing to live with the petitioner. If she refuses, it is for the Magistrate to consider the grounds of such refusal and pass such order as he thinks fit, 9 Cr. L. J. 501 (M.), 1883 A. W. N. 233. Failure to determine the question is equivalent to an omission to determine the question of neglect or refusal and is an error in law, 6 N. W. P. H. C. R. 205.

67. Non-payment of process-fee.—An application for maintenance should not be dismissed on failure of the applicant to comply with an order for payment of process-fee, neglect to maintain not being an offence and process-fees being leviable under the *Court-fees Act* only in respect of an offence, 16 M. 231. But now under s 204, sub-sec. (3), Magistrate may dismiss the complaint if fees are not paid within a reasonable time.

IX.—ENFORCEMENT OF ORDER FOR MAINTENANCE.—Sub-sec (3).

68 Before passing order of commitment, Magistrate must be satisfied that non-payment of the maintenance was due to wilful neglect.—Before an order for imprisonment can be passed, it must be proved that the non-payment of the maintenance is the result of wilful negligence on the part of the defendant, 22 C. 291; followed in 25 C. 291, 25 A. 183. Imprisonment cannot be awarded in anticipation of default, 5 M. H. C. R. Appx. XXXIV.

68-A. Jurisdiction of Magistrate who made the order to enforce it, is not ousted by change of residence of party ordered.—The provisions of s. 490 cannot be held to derogate from s. 488 (3). He can issue a warrant under s. 386 for the distress and sale of any moveable property belonging to the person against whom

generally conferred upon Dr Samuel Johnson.

(Lord Harve. A vulgar name for the sea.)

this order is passed. Such a warrant can be executed either within the local jurisdiction of the Magistrate or without such limits under s. 357 when it has been endorsed by the District Magistrate within the local limits of whose jurisdiction the moveable property is found. S. 490 merely provides an alternative course by enabling the person in whose favour the order was passed to apply direct to a Magistrate in any district where the person bound by the order may be, 7 L. B. R. 116 = 15 Cr. L. J. 701. See Note 3 to s. 490.

In 27 Bom. L. R. 63 = 49 B. 906 it was held per LAWFETT, J., that under s. 488 (3) read with s. 386 (1) (a) it is competent to a Magistrate to issue a warrant for levying the amount of maintenance due by attachment and sale of any moveable property belonging to the person ordered to give maintenance even if such property consists of a share in a joint Hindu family property.

69. Imprisonment is not punishment for contempt of Court's order, but merely a means of enforcing payment.—The imprisonment which can be awarded under this section is not a punishment for contempt of the Court's order, but merely a means of enforcing payment of the amount due, and upon the payment of that amount being made, the defendant is entitled to his release. "It cannot be regarded as a punishment for the breach of the order, for if that were the case, the punishment would follow upon the breach of the order, irrespective of any success or the reverse in the levying of the amount by warrant, whereas that is not what the section enacts. According to the express terms of the section the disobedience of the order may be never so gross and wilful, and yet, if the amount ordered to be paid is realized in full by execution of the warrant, no sentence of imprisonment is to follow. This conclusively shows that the sentence is not for the disobedience or contempt of the Court's order. Nor again would it be right to hold that the sentence of imprisonment is an absolute sentence for the law says that the Magistrate may sentence such person for the whole or any part of each month's allowance remaining unpaid to imprisonment. That shows that the imprisonment is for the unpaid portion of the maintenance, or, in other words, that it is owing to default of payment of the unrealized portion of the maintenance, and if that is so, the imprisonment that is ordered ought to cease upon payment being made. —Per BANERJEE and SALE, JJ., in 22 C. 291 at p. 296. The imprisonment, if served, does not absolve the person from liability for arrears of maintenance, 3 W. R. 61. See also 12 P. R. 1919 (Cr.)

70. Defaulter entitled to be released as soon as payment is made.—*'Or until payment if sooner made'*—These words in sub-sec. (3) supersede the decisions in 8 M. 70 and Weir II, 639. Now the defaulter is entitled to be released as soon as payment is made, 20 M. 3. They are in accordance with the decision in 22 C. 291, see Notes 69 and 71.

71. Enforcement of payment of accumulated arrears.—(i) *Enforcement of payment of arrears is in discretion of Magistrate*—No hard-and-fast rule can be laid down as to whether a Magistrate should grant or refuse an application for recovery of arrears of maintenance. The Magistrate should ascertain in each case under what circumstances the arrears came to accumulate and if there was no good reason why the application for recovery should not have been made with greater promptitude, whether it would be equitable and in accordance with the spirit of the Criminal Procedure Code to enforce payment of the accumulation. The Magistrate should also consider whether he should enforce payment of any part of the arrears, where in his opinion it is not proper to enforce payment of the whole of the arrears, 1909 U. B. R. 114, Cr. Pro., pp. 19 and 21 = 11 Cr. L. J. 79 where 20 M. 3 is distinguished. But now see proviso newly added to sub-sec. (3) proceeding that an application for maintenance amount must be made within one year from the date on which it became due.

(ii) *Only one warrant may be issued for the whole of the arrears due at the time of issue*—Where six months' arrears were due an order for separate warrants of commitment awarding a separate sentence of imprisonment of one month on each warrant is bad in law, as the law contemplates a single warrant of commitment in respect of the arrears due at the time of the issue, 22 C. 291, 7 M. H. C. R. Appx. XXXVII, Ratanlal 801, 31 P. R. 1880, 7 Bar. L. T. 225 = 15 Cr. L. J. 434.

(iii) *Mode of computing sentence awardable in default of payment of arrears*—Is a Magistrate competent to order more than a month's imprisonment at one time? ALLAHABAD AND BURMA—A warrant for the levy of arrears of maintenance for fifteen months is not illegal, but one month's imprisonment would alone be awardable in default as if the warrant only related to a single breach of the order. "The third paragraph of s. 488 ought to be strictly construed, and as far as possible, construed in favour of the subject. Under the section a condition precedent to the infliction, of a term of imprisonment is the issue of a warrant in respect of each breach of the order directing maintenance, and after distress has been issued, *et cetera* bona *et cetera* the term. The section contemplates one warrant and one punishment and not a cumulative warrant and cumulative punishment."—Per STRAIGHT, J., 9 A. 240. See also P. J. L. B. 816; U. B. R. (1903-04) L. 2. On the other hand

considers the character a dramatic fiction. "None of the materials that constitute the more authentic history of Robin Hood prove the existence of such a character in the shape of his misadventures."

Robin a mistress dear, his loved Marian
Was partner of the woods, chief lady of the game.
Her either lurked to the bow, and daintily-dressed,
With low and quieter arrow. *Drayton*

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Mammon A Syrac word used in the Scriptures to signify either riches or the god of riches. By fallen Belshazzar, Milton makes Mammon one of the fallen angels, and portrays his character in the following lines—

From heaven, the least credit spirit that fell
From heaven, for even to his passions and thoughts
He came downward bent, admiring more
The riches of heaven, a palace of golden gold,
Than sought divine or holy joys enjoyed
In vision beatified by him first
In contemplation taught.

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Man of blood An expression which occurs in the Old Testament (1 Sam. xiv. 7), in a metaphorical sense, to signify a man of blood, and which refers to that plan to King David. The application of the term to any man of violence is a natural supposition, and it would seem to have been employed by the Puritans in reference to Charles I.

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the Madras High Court has held that such imprisonment is not limited to one month. The procedure contemplated by the Code appears to be to deduct the sum levied from the sum due, and then to ascertain how many months' arrears the balance represents. The maximum imprisonment that can be imposed will then be one month for each month's arrears and if there is a balance representing the arrears for a portion of a month, a further term of a month's imprisonment may be imposed for such arrear, 20 M. 3 *overruling* 6 M. H.C.R. 22, *approved in* 25 C. 291; 12 P. R. 1877. The Burma Chief Court in 7 Bur. L. T. 225 = 7 L. B. R. 351 = 15 Cr. L. J. 434, *held, following*, 9 A. 240, and *dissenting from* 20 M. 3, that when a Magistrate issued a warrant for arrears of maintenance for more than one month and when the allowance for more than one month remained unpaid after the execution of the warrant, he was not competent to pass a sentence of imprisonment exceeding one month. *Per* ORMOND, J., "I can find nothing to support the conclusion that the section authorizes one month's imprisonment for every month's arrears when one warrant is issued for the recovery of several months' arrears. The words 'for the whole or any part of each month's allowance remaining unpaid after the execution of the warrant' in cl (3) should be read as meaning 'for the whole amount or any part of a month's allowance remaining unpaid on each occasion after the execution of the warrant'." See also 8 M. 70.

72. *When order for maintenance cannot be enforced.*—(i) *If defaulter becomes insolvent.*—An insolvent who has obtained a protection order, is not liable for arrest or imprisonment in respect of arrears of maintenance when such arrears are included in the schedule filed by him. Maintenance ordered to be paid is not a fine, penalty or forfeiture, but it is a purely civil liability and a debt within the meaning of s. 13 of the *Insolvent Act* (11 and 12 Vict., Chapter 102). Its enforcement by a Criminal Court cannot affect the matter, 5 C. 536 = 5 C. L. R. 458.

(ii) *If defaulter dies, order cannot be executed against his estate.*—Sub sec. (9) is quite explicit in regard to the necessity for the presence of the party against whom the evidence is being taken and on his death the order cannot be enforced against his estate, 41 C. 88. Cf. *Harrington, in re, Wilder v Turner*, (1906) 2 Ch. 687.

(iii) *If the claim has been released or rendered inoperative by decree.*—When an application is made to a Magistrate to enforce an order for maintenance, passed under this section, such Magistrate is not bound to enforce the order if the defendant proves that the claim for maintenance has been released, 10 M. 13, *e.g.*, by operation of law, or by divorce, 5 A. 226; 15 A. 143 *overruled by* 19 A. 50, 1895 A. W. N. 29 and see Note 45. If, in disposing of a suit, a Civil Court decides any matter which might have the effect of disentitling a wife to maintenance, a Magistrate, who has awarded maintenance, is bound, in the interests of justice, to take the judgment of a Civil Court into consideration before proceeding to pass a fresh order enforcing payment of the allowance, *Weir II*, 614; 14 C. 276; or by agreement of parties, 36 P. R. 1902, but see *Weir II*, 649. If any agreement is made after the order of the Magistrate, it has the effect of superseding the previous order and whatever rights it might give rise to in a Civil Court, neither the agreement nor the order was one that could be enforced summarily under this section, 42 P. R. 1888. A Muhammadan wife applied for maintenance under this section. Pending proceedings the parties compromised and in terms of the compromise, an order was made under this section that the husband should give his wife half his land and a house to reside in, or in default Rs. 9 a month. Subsequently the husband divorced the wife, and the wife executed the order of maintenance. The Sub-Divisional Magistrate set aside the order of his predecessor as to the gift of half of the husband's lands and house and ordered that the wife might receive arrears of payment of Rs. 9 for the period of her *iddat* and thereafter that Rs. 5 per mensem would be paid for the upkeep of her two boys. A warrant was issued for the realization of the total arrears. The District Magistrate found that the case should have been dismissed in the first instance and the order for execution refused on the ground that according to the principles laid down in 42 P. R. 1888, the enforcement of an order of compromise under this section falls within the jurisdiction of a Civil Court and not of a Criminal Court. *Held*, on revision, the view of the District Magistrate should be upheld, 39 P. R. 1905 = 108 P. L. R. 1905. An agreement by a husband to maintain his wife by giving her a house and jewels and by delivering to her annually a certain quantity of grain and money cannot be made the subject of an order under this section nor enforced under it, 6 M. 283; 12 P. R. 1890.

(iv) *If wife has been divorced.*—When a divorce is proved, the order for maintenance becomes *functus officio* and ought not to be further executed, 1 Bom. L. R. 346. See Note 45 and Note 5 to s. 490. See also 19 W. R. 73.

(v) *If the wife has voluntarily returned to her husband.*—Wife returning to live with husband subsequent to order renders the order ineffectual subsequent to the date of her return, and if she subsequently

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leaves him again or is turned out the former order cannot be given effect to, but she must institute fresh proceedings, 1888 A. W. N. 317. See Note 14

(i) *Sufficient cause*.—Under sub-sec. (3) of s. 488 before a Magistrate puts a maintenance order in execution he is bound to consider the sufficiency of the cause alleged and refuse execution if he is satisfied if the cause is sufficient. The phrase "sufficient cause" in sub-cl. (3) as amended shows that the Magistrate should use a judicial discretion after looking to all circumstances of the case, 48 M. L. J. 494.

73. *What are not proper reasons for refusing to enforce order.*—(i) *Rule of maintenance too high*.—A Magistrate cannot refuse to enforce an order for maintenance when in a further inquiry, evidence is given to show that the allowance granted was excessive, but he can revise the rate of maintenance to be allowed subsequent to the date of such inquiry, Weir II, 836. Though upon a change of circumstances being shown, the existing order may be modified, still, so long as that order remains in force, it must carry with it its proper consequence, 22 C. 291.

(ii) *Delay*.—Where an application for recovery of accumulated arrears is made after great delay, a Magistrate should not, even when declining to enforce payment of arrears refuse to enforce payment from the time of the new application, as the order of maintenance deserves to be enforced as long as it holds good, 1909 U. B. R. 111, Cr. Pro., pp. 19 and 21 = 11 Cr. L. J. 79, where 4 Bur. L. R. 29 approved and 20 M. 3 distinguished. But see now proviso newly added to sub-sec. (3) prescribing a period of one year within which to apply for the maintenance amount.

(iii) *That the party does not reside within the district*.—See Note 3 to s. 490

74. *Arrears cannot be recovered by suit.*—A suit will not lie to recover arrears of maintenance, the order must be enforced according to the provisions of the section, 2 P. R. 1878 (Clv). But the Jagir income of a person when collected by revenue authorities can be taken in satisfaction of the arrears of maintenance due under an order passed against such person, 3 P. R. 1889.

75. *Breaking open inner door for execution of warrant.*—A Police-officer, entrusted with the execution of a warrant for the levy of the amount of maintenance recoverable under this section, can break open an inner door of the house of the person against whom the order is made. The principle laid down in 8 B. H. C. R. A. C. 127, as regards civil processes, applies *a fortiori* to criminal processes, Ratanlal 431.

76. *Court-fee on application for arrears of maintenance due.*—Application to enforce payment of maintenance already awarded, under this section, is chargeable with a fee of eight annas under Sch. II, Article 1 (b) of Act VII of 1870. The defaulter cannot be ordered to repay the said fee. Ratanlal 433.

77. *Date of enforcement may be postponed by consent of parties.*—Where the date of the enforcement of the order is postponed by consent of the parties to a date other than the date of the order, the High Court will not interfere, Weir II, 633.

78. *Security cannot be taken in anticipation of default.*—This section does not provide for the taking of security in anticipation of default, 24 W. R. 72.

X—CANCELLATION OF ORDER AWARDING MAINTENANCE

79. *Sub-sec. (5) applies only to orders in favour of wife.*—No power to cancel order awarding maintenance to a child.—There is no provision in this section for cancelling an order awarding maintenance to a child, though enforcement may be declined, 17 P. R. 1885. Where an order has been passed by a competent Court for payment of maintenance to a child, the only power that exists for modifying such an order is that given by s. 489, 1904 A. W. N. 149. A Magistrate has no power to cancel a previous order made by another Magistrate for the maintenance of a child of a divorced Muhammadan wife, who has married again. Such an order of cancellation is illegal. A Magistrate has no power to cancel an order under this section except on the ground of change of circumstances mentioned in s. 489, 27 A. 11. See Note 4, s. 489, 43 M. 503 = 43 M. L. J. 123.

80. *Order for maintenance of child not affected by decree for restitution of conjugal rights.*—Where after a wife obtained an order under this section for the payment of a sum by the husband for the maintenance of their child, the husband subsequently obtained a decree for restitution of conjugal rights against the wife. Held, that the husband was not absolved from the liability to pay maintenance. It may be otherwise if he obtained an order for guardianship of the child, 6 L. B. R. 127 = 14 Cr. L. J. 98 and also 2 L. B. R. 46. The cases in 13 W. R. 52, 23 B. 434 27 A. 433, all deal with the effect of a decree for restitution of conjugal rights on an order for the maintenance of a wife.

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NAMELESS CITY Ancient Rome — so called because it had an elder and mysterious name which it was said to have. The name is said to have been Greek.

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81. Order in favour of wife must be cancelled on proof of her living in adultery.—It is open to a husband, upon whom an order for the maintenance of his wife has been made, to prove after such order that his wife is living in adultery, and upon such proof a Magistrate is justified in cancelling his order, 8 B. H. C. R. 124; 1882 A. W. N. 168; 24 C. 633; 5 A. 224; 5 N. L. R. 19 = 9 Cr. L. J. 390. Where on the application of a wife to enforce an order granting maintenance, the husband pleaded (i) that the wife was of bad character, (ii) that she had agreed to take a sum less than the amount ordered and (iii) that he was willing to take her to live with him, if she will be of good character, and the Magistrate dismissed the pleas without making an inquiry and sentenced the husband, *held* setting aside the sentence, that the pleas set up were good and ought to have been inquired into, 36 P. R. 1902. A Magistrate rejected the application of the husband for cancellation of the order of maintenance on the ground that it was not proved that the petitioner's wife was at the time living in adultery although she might have committed adultery seven months before. *Held*, that adultery committed by a wife subsequent to an order obtained by her for maintenance, disentitles her to claim a continuance of maintenance and entitles the husband to apply for cancellation of the order if it amounts to living in adultery, *Ratanlal* 353; 1882 A. W. N. 168. In a proceeding for cancellation of an order for maintenance, the evidence of adultery should not be general and inconclusive, but specific and cogent, 1893 A. W. N. 56. The birth of an illegitimate child is not enough under cl (5) to cancel an order previously passed, 5 N. L. R. 19 = 9 Cr. L. J. 303.

82. Order cannot be cancelled on production of disputed compromise.—It is not competent to a Magistrate to cancel an order for maintenance on the ground that the parties have entered into an arrangement evidenced by a deed the validity of which is denied by the complainant, until it has been declared by some competent tribunal to be binding on the parties, *Weir* II, 649.

XI.—FURTHER INQUIRY, APPEAL AND REVISION.

83. District Magistrate not competent to direct further inquiry.—When an application for maintenance is refused by a Deputy Magistrate, a District Magistrate cannot direct a further inquiry under s 437, 25 A. 545. See also 1 C. L. J. 102.

84. No appeal lies against order awarding maintenance.—When the Magistrate orders a person to make a monthly allowance under s 488, there is no conviction for any offence and no appeal lies, 7 W. R. 10; 5 Bom. H. C. R. 81.

85. No Letters Patent appeal against order of single Judge made in revision.—No appeal lies under s 15 of the Letters Patent, against the order of a single Judge made on a revision petition against the order of a Magistrate under s 488, as the order is one passed in a criminal trial. In 5 Bom. H. C. R. 81 it was *held* that maintenance proceedings were judicial proceedings of a Criminal Court from which no appeal lay, 17 M. L. T. 330 = 16 Cr. L. J. 326.

86. Revision.—When the order of a Magistrate under s 488 is no longer enforceable in consequence of a decree of a Civil Court as, e.g., when subsequent to the order of a Magistrate directing a person A to pay maintenance to an illegitimate child, a Civil Court decrees in a declaratory suit brought by A that he is not the father of the illegitimate child, the High Court acting in revision may set aside the order awarding maintenance, 16 Cr. L. J. 609 (O).

87. High Court may revise or direct further inquiry.—When a father-in-law is ordered to pay maintenance to his son's wife, 5 B. H. C. R. Ca 81, 4 N. W. P. H. C. R. 123; 26 P. L. R. 1903; 12 P. R. 1915 = 15 Cr. L. J. 577, or where the rate of maintenance is excessive, the High Court has power to set aside or modify the Magistrate's order or to direct further inquiry with a view to decide what amount should be allowed, *Weir* II, 575 and 634, and see Note 6 to s 489.

489. (1) On proof of a change in the circumstances of any person receiving under

Alteration in allow
ance section 488 a monthly allowance, or ordered under the same section to pay a monthly allowance to his wife or child, the Magistrate may make such alteration in the allowance as he thinks fit, provided that if he increases the allowance, the monthly rate of † one hundred rupees in the whole he not exceed

‡ (2) Where it appears to the Magistrate that in consequence of any decision of a competent Civil Court, any order made under section 488 should be cancelled or varied, he shall cancel the order or as the case may be vary the same accordingly.

* This section was renumbered by Act XXIII of 1923,

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Notes.—1. Does this section apply to the total discontinuance or merely to an alteration of the amount?—These words refer not only to a change in the pecuniary circumstances of the person paying or receiving the allowance, but to a change in any of the circumstances which might be taken into consideration in passing an order under s. 488, 21 P. R. 1894. They do not refer to a change in the status of the parties which would entail a stoppage of the allowance, 19 A. 50 (F.B.) *overruling* 15 A. 143. See also 1885 A. W. N. 29; 8 B. H. C. Cr. Ca. 93; 7 B. 180; 14 C. 276. The words "*the Magistrate may make such alteration etc.*" preceded as they are by the word "*if*" and followed as they are by a limitation as to the amount of the monthly allowance clearly indicate that the "*alteration in the allowance*" contemplated by this section only amount to a power to alter the amount and not to a total discontinuance thereof.—*Per MURDOCH, J.*, in 5 A. 226. See also 5 C. 558. But a change of circumstances may be the result of divorce among Muhammadans, 19 W. R. 73 = 10 B. L. R. Appx. XXXIII or to the wife living in adultery. It may be said that these cases are covered by s. 488 (5), but the better view seems to be, that this section applies as well to a case of total discontinuance of the allowance. Thus, in 1877, petitioner was ordered to pay a maintenance allowance to his daughter. In 1884, the daughter was married and was living with her husband, who was willing to maintain her. On petitioner's application under this section for a cancellation of the order of 1877, the Magistrate declined to interfere on the ground that in his opinion, the husband was not bound to maintain his wife, until she attained puberty, *held* that the order of the Magistrate, declining to interfere, could not be supported, the husband having in virtue of the marriage under taken the obligation of supporting his wife, (the daughter of the petitioner) the latter was no longer in a position to require an allowance from her father, *Weir II*, 650. See also 11 C. W. N. 100 which adopts the same view. See Note 72 to s. 488 and Note 5 to s. 490.

2. What would be valid change in circumstances?—A Magistrate may under this section, from time to time, alter the rate of the monthly allowance granted as maintenance under this section as, *e.g.*, the child getting older or the birth of another child or death of a child 12 C. 535, 14 M 398. But in 27 A. 11, a Muhammadan wife who had obtained an order for the maintenance of her infant child got a divorce and married another husband. The first husband sought to set aside the order of maintenance on the ground that the second husband had undertaken to maintain the child. *Held* there was no such change in the circumstances of the infant as is contemplated by this section, which is the only provision in the Code which empowers a Magistrate to modify an order under s. 488 for maintenance of children. Similarly, a husband cannot claim a reduction of the amount of allowance, ordered to be paid by Court, to his deserted wife on the mere ground that she might possibly be able to earn something by her own labour, 1887 A. W. N. 107.

3. Reduction of rate—Such order operates only prospectively.—A Magistrate has no power to reduce the rate of maintenance which has accrued due in arrears. An order reducing the rate can operate only as regards payment accruing after date of the order of reduction *Weir II*, 650.

4. Court acting under this section not to question propriety of original order.—In dealing with an application for increase of maintenance, a Magistrate has no jurisdiction to enquire into the propriety or other wise of the order for maintenance originally made, *Weir II*, 650.

5. Is a party desirous of getting order set aside bound to proceed under this section?—When a person against whom an order for maintenance is made considers that such an order should no longer be in force against him for some reason such as, *e.g.*, the existence of a subsequent agreement, he should apply under this section to the Magistrate who passed the original order, 9 W. R. 1; 17 P. R. 1885. He should not raise the objection before the Magistrate enforcing the order under s. 490, 25 A. 165. When the parties make an agreement, subsequent to the order under s. 488, modifying its terms it will be competent to the party interested to apply under this section and get the order altered 25 A. 165. But see Note 5 to s. 490.

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7. Effect of a decree for restitution of conjugal rights on an order for maintenance.—When a decree for restitution of conjugal rights is passed but the husband does not execute it and goes on paying maintenance, it is not open to the Court to increase the amount on a fresh application by the wife as the first order is put an end to by the decree, 21 Bom. L. R. 766. But in 49 M L J. 269 where a husband against whom an order for maintenance was passed under s. 488 subsequently obtained a decree for restitution of the conjugal rights and it appeared to the Court that he was not at all anxious to get his wife back to live with him on the ordinary terms of husband and wife. *Held* that as the object of the restitution decree was merely to get the maintenance order cancelled and not a *bona fide* wish to live amicably with her, the Court should not exercise its discretion under s. 489 (2) and cancel the order for maintenance.

The title of a celebrated novel by Eliza Follen, and the name (adopted by him from her) of its heroine, a virtuous and innocent country girl, whose virtue is destroyed by violence, as well as all the means of seduction, but who perseveres in the paths of rectitude, notwithstanding her being raised to the station of the lawful participant in his rank and

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490. (1) A copy of the order of maintenance shall be given without payment to the person in whose favour it is made, or to his guardian, if any, or to the person to whom the allowance is to be paid, and such order may be enforced by any Magistrate in any place where the person against whom it is made

Enforcement of
order of maintenance

may be, on such Magistrate being satisfied as to the identity of the parties and the non payment of the allowance due.

Notes—1. 'May be enforced'—The word 'may' was substituted for the word 'shall' in Act X of 1882 and the object of the Legislature in making the above alteration obviously was to enable the Magistrate to consider any reasons that may be urged against the enforcement of the order than those for which separate provision is made by s 488 (5) and s 489, 16 Cr. L. J. 609 (O).

1-A. Remission of Court-fee.—In the exercise of the power conferred by s 35 of the *Court fees Act VII of 1870*, the Governor General in Council is pleased to remit the fees payable under the said Act on a copy of the order when the copy is given under s. 490 to the person named therein—*Gazette of India*, 1886, Pt. I, p 506. Under rules passed by the Calcutta High Court under s 20 cl (iv) of the *Court fees Act*, a fee of one rupee has been fixed for serving and executing a warrant for the levy of maintenance of a wife or child, and also a per centage on the amount of maintenance levied, viz., 2 per cent. on sums not exceeding Rs. 100 and when the sums exceed Rs 100, then 2 per cent. on Rs 100 and 1 per cent. on the amount of excess, such percentage is to be deducted from the proceeds of any property sold, or to be paid with the amount levied and with the other costs of process as stated in the warrant—*Calcutta Gazette*, 1874, p 478, 21 W. R. Rules, etc., 12

2 Order directing payment in advance—A Magistrate's order directing the payment of maintenance allowance in advance from the date of the Magistrate's order is legal under s 538 of Act X of 1872 (now this section) *Ratanlal 189*.

3. Section does not deprive Magistrate making order of power of enforcing it.—This section does not deprive the Magistrate who has made an order for maintenance, of the jurisdiction given him by s. 488 (3). When the defendant is beyond his jurisdiction he may, in his discretion, exercise the jurisdiction or refer the applicant to the Magistrate having jurisdiction at the place where the defendant is to be found **4 M. 230**. In **7 L.R. R. 116 = 15 Cr. L. J. 701**, the case in **4 M. 230** was considered and it was held that the law gives the applicant the option of proceeding either in the Court which originally passed the order of that having local jurisdiction over the respondent, but there is no authority under which either of those Courts could refuse to exercise a jurisdiction which it possesses merely on the ground that some other Court also have concurrent jurisdiction

4. Competency of second-class Magistrate to enforce order duly made—A second-class Magistrate of a place, where the husband is at the time is competent to enforce the order for maintenance made against such husband by any competent Magistrate in that behalf, *Ratanlal 288*.

5. Magistrate bound to consider every plea that may affect enforcement of order.—Where in answer to an application for enforcement of an order under s 488 for the maintenance of a wife, the party against whom such order is subsisting, pleads that he has lawfully divorced his wife and therefore the order can no longer be enforced it is the duty of the Court hearing the application to entertain and consider such plea and if it finds the plea established, to decline to enforce the order for any period subsequent to the date when the marriage ceased to subsist between the parties. In such case, where the parties are Muhammadans the marriage will be deemed to subsist until the expiration of the *iddat* **19 A. 50 overruling 15 A. 143**. The Magistrate should likewise decline if the defendant proves that the claim has been released, **10 M. 13**, or that the wife has voluntarily returned to live with the husband **1893 A. W. N. 217**. With the return of the wife the previous neglect or refusal ceases to exist, and if a new cause for proceeding under s 488 subsequently arises it must be proved by fresh evidence **1904 U. B. R. Cr. P. C. 1, p 10**. The conditions specified in the second clause of this section have special reference to cases in which enforcement is sought at a place other than that in which the order was originally passed, or by a Magistrate other than the one who passed it and cannot be considered exhaustive, and it is open to any party to such order to show cause against its enforcement and to ask for its cancellation or alteration on any of the grounds specified in ss. 488 and 489 in one and the same petition, and inasmuch as the Magistrate's order for maintenance of a wife must be in favour of a person bearing that legal character under the personal law which governs the parties such order cannot enure for the benefit of and cannot be enforced in favour of one who no longer bears that character under the law, and it is incumbent on the Magistrate, when

Pendant to his Fortunes and Misfortunes "a young **Philosopher of the** . . .
 man of warm feelings and lively intellect, self con | *philosophic* in country } The . . .
 16

the question is raised before him to satisfy himself that the woman still possesses the character by virtue of which she was enabled to obtain an order of maintenance, 21 P. R. 1894. It is the duty of a Magistrate who is applied to enforce an order for maintenance passed under s. 488 on an objection being raised that the woman has ceased to be a wife by reason of subsequent divorce, to enquire whether there has been, or has not been a legal and valid divorce and if he finds that there has been a valid dissolution of the marriage he ought not to issue an attachment warrant or otherwise to execute the order, it having become in fact *functus officio*, 17 O. C. 260 = 15 Cr. L. J. 648. The cessation of the conjugal relationship by reason of a subsequent divorce or the decision of a competent Court on the question of marital or filial relationship in question can justify a refusal 16 Cr. L. J. 609, 1915 U. B. R. I. 53 = 16 Cr. L. J. 531.

6 Are powers of executing Magistrate other than the one who made the order limited by terms of this section?—In 10 M. 13 it was *held* that a Magistrate other than the one who made an order under s. 488 was competent to decline to enforce the order for reasons not within the terms of this section *e.g.*, that the claim had been released. But in 25 A. 163, HOOV. J., declining to follow 10 M. 13, *held* that a Magistrate called upon, under this section, to enforce an order of maintenance under s. 488 has no jurisdiction to take into consideration anything further than (i) the identity of the parties (ii) the non-payment of the allowance and (iii) where the person to whom the maintenance is awarded is the wife, that she still holds the position of wife. The fact that the parties had made an agreement subsequent to the order, modifying its terms is not a matter for the Magistrate's consideration in enforcing the order. If the person against whom the order for maintenance is made considers that such an order should no longer be in force, for some reason other than those mentioned above it is for him to apply under s. 489 to the Magistrate who passed the original order or to his successor in office. See Note 20 to section 489 as to effect of Civil Court decree.

CHAPTER XXXVII.

DIRECTIONS OF THE NATURE OF A HABEAS CORPUS

Power to issue directions of the nature of a *habeas corpus*

491. * (1) "Any High Court may, whenever it thinks fit, direct—

(a) that a person within the limits of its † "appellate criminal jurisdiction be brought up before the Court to be dealt with according to law,

(b) that a person illegally or improperly detained in public or private custody within such limits be set at liberty,

(c) that a prisoner detained in any jail situate within such limits be brought before the Court to be there examined as a witness in any matter pending or to be inquired into in such Court,

(d) that a prisoner detained as aforesaid be brought before a Court martial or any Commissioners acting under the authority of any commission from the Governor General in Council for trial or to be examined touching any matter pending before such Court martial or Commissioners respectively,

(e) that a prisoner within such limits be removed from one custody to another for the purpose of trial and

(f) that the body of a defendant within such limits be brought in on the Sheriff's return of *cepi corpus* to a writ of attachment

(2) ‡ The High Court may from time to time frame rules to regulate the procedure in cases under this section

(3) Nothing in this section applies to persons detained under the Bengal *St. le Prisoners Regulation*, 1818 Madras Regulation II of 1819 or Bombay Regulation XXV of 1827, of the *State Prisoners Act 1850* or the *State Prisoners Act 1858*

* The words "any High Court" were substituted for the words "any of the High Courts of Judicature at Fort William Madras and Bombay" by Act XII of 1923

† The words "appellate criminal" were substituted for the words "ordinary original civil jurisdiction" by s. 6 d

‡ The words "High Court" were substituted for the words "each of the said High Courts" by Act XII of 1923

The Irish regard one of the true & story of this class want
 to make St. Patrick a homophone of St. Peter & make all

The north of Swift is the north of Mephistopheles; the
 north of Voltaire is the north of Luc
 Macready

Q. A triangle -- Quadrilateral The At

Note.—Under the old section power under this section was expressly given only to the High Courts at Calcutta, Madras and Bombay within their ordinary original civil jurisdiction. Under the new amendment all the High Courts are empowered to act under this section within the limits of their appellate criminal jurisdiction, *see* 43 M. L. J. 396 (F.B.) and also 46 C. 52; 52 C. 319 = 29 C. W. N. 88.

Notes.—1. The Regulations and Acts referred to in the section relate to State prisoners. For similar powers conferred on provincial Magistrates, *see* s. 452, as to European British subjects, *see* s. 456.

2 Habeas Corpus.—This, the most celebrated prerogative writ in the English law, is a remedy for a person deprived of his liberty. It is addressed to him who detains another in custody, and commands him to produce the body, with the day and cause of his caption and detention, and to do, submit to, and receive whatever the Judge or Court shall consider in that behalf.—WHARTON'S *Law Lexicon*

"*Capi corpus et poratum habeo*"—(I have taken the body and have it ready) a return made by the Sheriff upon an attachment *Capias*, etc., when he has the person, against whom, the process was issued, in custody

3. Are the High Courts still entitled to issue writ of 'habeas corpus'?—In 39 C. 164 the question was raised whether the writ of *habeas corpus* has not been altogether abolished and, if so, whether it is competent to the Indian Legislature to take away that supreme right, but the point was not decided as s. 491 was held to apply in the circumstances of the case.

In 28 Bom. L. R. 471 it was specifically held that the High Court of Bombay has jurisdiction to issue a writ of Habeas Corpus for the production of a person outside British India, provided it is satisfied that he is in the custody or control of a person within its jurisdiction

5 Scope of sub-section (a)—*Dealt with according to law*, is a phrase of such wide and general meaning that it is fairly open to many constructions. In the case of children it might not unreasonably be extended so as to take in what ordinarily happens when the parties have recourse to the Courts under the Guardian and Wards Act instead of under this section, 12 Bom. L. R. 891 = 11 Cr. L. J. 687. By s. 491, it appears to be entirely left to the discretion of the Court whether it should or should not direct the person to be brought before it to be dealt with according to law, but Rule 794 of the Bombay High Court Rules deprives the Court of all further discretion and commands that in the absence of cause being shown against the rule which is a very different thing from allowing the Court to exercise its discretion even where technically the cause is inadequate, the Court shall pass an order that the person or persons improperly detained shall be delivered to the person entitled to their custody, 12 Bom. L. R. 891 = 11 Cr. L. J. 687.

5. Scope of sub-section (b).—The sub-section itself provides that the remedy, which the Court gives, goes no farther than setting the persons detained at liberty, 12 Bom. L. R. 891 = 11 Cr. L. J. 687. *A de facto* guardianship of children would be sufficient to sustain a conviction under s. 391, I P C., and as against strangers such guardianship would entitle him to an order for restoration to his custody under s. 491. Sub-sec. (2) does not apply when the children are not illegally or improperly detained, 8 M. L. T. 300 = 11 Cr. L. J. 641. A Hindu father who has become a *Sanyasi*, is not the guardian of his children and he does not regain his rights in the natural family if he renounces his *sanyas*, 21 M. L. J. 195 = (1911) 1 M. W. N. 36 = 8 M. L. T. 300 = 11 Cr. L. J. 641.

The applicant came from village which was once British territory, but was recently ceded to the Raja of Benares under a treaty. For some years past, he lived and carried on business in Bombay. On 17th September, 1924, he was arrested by the Police Commissioner under s. 3 (a) of the Foreigners Act. On 23rd September, he applied to the High Court under s. 491. No order of Government under s. 3 of the Foreigners Act was forthcoming, on October 14 when the application was finally heard. *Held*, that under the circumstances the applicant should be set at liberty inasmuch as in the absence of any order of Government, his continued detention was an illegal or improper detention within the meaning of s. 491 (1) (b) or alternatively he was not being dealt with according to law within the meaning of s. 491 (1) (a). 25 Bom. L. R. 1252 = 49 B. 222.

The Police in Calcutta cannot retain custody under s. 5 of the Calcutta Immoral Traffic Act of a girl removed from a brothel after she has attained the age of 16 years. 30 C. W. N. 72

6. The sole consideration for Court ought to be the benefit and welfare of person brought before it.—Parents and guardians cannot divest themselves of their right of guardianship by contract. A delegation of parental authority is revocable at any time, and it is the duty of the parents and guardians to revoke it if used to the detriment of the children. And it is also open to the Court within whose jurisdiction the children are

found to revoke it at any time if sufficient cause be shown for interference. Ordinarily, no doubt the Court will be very slow to interfere with parents or the arrangement made by parents for the custody and education of their children, but it will deprive them of such custody if it be absolutely necessary in the interests of the children, and *a fortiori* it will for similar reasons take the children out of the custody of persons selected by the parents especially when the parents have put it out of their power to interfere themselves, for the protection of their children. The jurisdiction of the Courts in such cases is essentially a parental jurisdiction and that description of it involves that the main consideration to be acted upon in its exercise is the *benefit or welfare of the child*. The term 'welfare' in this connection must be read in the largest possible sense, that is to say, as meaning that every circumstance must be taken into consideration and the Court must do what under the circumstances a wise parent acting in the true interests of the child would or ought to do. *The Queen v Gynghall*, (1893) 2 Q. B. D. 232. The welfare of the child is not to be measured by money only, or by physical comfort only. The word must be taken in its widest sense. The moral and religious welfare of the child must be considered as well as its physical well being. Nor can the ties of affection be disregarded, *re M. Grath*, (1893) 1 Ch. 143. Even a father, if it be shown that cruelty or corruption is to be apprehended from him, would be deprived of the custody of his children, *The King v Greenhill*, (1838) 4 A. and E. 264, and so would a mother be deprived of her custody if she is living in open adultery. *In re G.*, (1899) 1 Ch. 719. It is well established that the Court will not ordinarily force a minor more than fourteen if a boy, and more than sixteen if a girl, to remain in a custody to which he or she objects, and that before deciding as to the custody of younger children who are still old enough to form an intelligent preference, it will take account of their wishes as one element in the case, *Pollard v Rouse*, 33 M. 258. The underlying principle of every writ of *habeas corpus* (and proceedings under this section) is to ensure the protection and well-being of the person brought before the Court under that writ. The real interest and well being of the person ought to be not only the determining but the sole consideration, 12 Bom. L. R. 891 = 11 Cr. L. J. 687. Courts of Equity in England always exercise a discretionary power to control the father's or guardian's legal rights of custody, *Queen v Gynghall*, L. R. (1893) 2 Q. B. D. 232. Thus a master is not entitled to a *habeas corpus* for the purpose of recovering the custody of an apprentice, who of his own accord had entered the service of another person, the object of the writ being merely to protect personal liberty, *R v Reynolds*, 6 P. R. 497 (1795). A contract of apprenticeship cannot be specifically enforced against a minor either directly or by restraining him by taking service under others or by restraining others from employing him, *Le Francisco v Barnum* (1899) 43 Ch. D. 165; 33 M. 258. In India, cases of conflict frequently arise between parents or guardians of minors and Christian Missionaries. The principles governing such conflict are laid down in 18 B. 307; 1 M. L. T. 347; 23 C. 290 and 18 B. 636 and see also 60 P. R. 1901 (Clv.) = 167 P. L. R. 1901. In 11 Bom. L. R. 75 = 9 Cr. L. J. 214, there was a conflict between the mother and the executor of the father as regards custody of a minor and it was held that the former is entitled to the custody of the person of the minor as against the latter unless there was in the will a specific appointment of the executor as guardian. In 12 Bom. L. R. 891 = 11 Cr. L. J. 687, the contest was between the Muhammadan mother and father to the custody of two children. By Hindu as well as by English law the father is the natural guardian of his children during their minorities but this guardianship is in the nature of a sacred trust and he cannot therefore during his life-time substitute another person to be guardian in his place. If he affects to do so, the authority conferred upon the substituted guardian is revocable, and the question whether the father is entitled to revoke it depends on the infants' interests, welfare, parentage and religion. *Hesant v Narayansah* 4 In. Ap. CCCXIV = 38 M. 807 (P.C.) 43 M. 299.

7. Procedure—(i) *Application to whom made*—When an application is made under this section, it should be made to the Judge appointed to exercise ordinary original criminal jurisdiction of the High Court (*Quære per MACLEAN, C.J.*, whether that is the proper Court) 2 C. W. N. 333, 44 C. 76. Where a Divisional Court has refused to grant a rule nisi for *habeas corpus*, the Court of Appeal has no original jurisdiction to grant such a rule, *Le Gros, ex parte* 30 T. L. R. 249. But see now 52 C. 319 which holds that the Criminal Appellate Bench has jurisdiction to deal with an application under s. 491.

(ii) *Right to begin*—When the person who obtains a rule under s. 491 is brought before the Court his counsel begins, 39 C. 164—172.

(iii) *May be granted in civil or criminal proceeding*—A writ of *habeas corpus* may be granted in a civil or criminal proceeding, *R v Barnardo*, L. R. 23 Q. B. D. 305, 33 M. 258.

(iv) *Appeal lies against order*—The petitioner as step mother claimed to be entitled to the custody of her deceased husband's minor son who was living with D his maternal uncle. She obtained a rule calling upon D to show cause why the child should not be delivered to her. After argument the rule was discharged.

Held, that the order discharging the rule was a judgment within the meaning of cl. 15 of the *Letters Patent*, 1865, and that, therefore, under that clause the petitioner had a right to appeal against the order, 14 B. 555; where a single Judge of the High Court, acting under this section (or s. 456) refuses, an application for release from illegal custody an appeal lies under cl. 15 of the *Letters Patent*, as such order is a judgment, and not passed in a criminal trial, though it may be said to have been passed in a criminal matter, 29 C. 236 (F.B.), 28 Bom. L. R. 471.

8. Alien enemy not entitled to writ—See *Weber, ex parte* 31 T. L. R. 602, where it was held that an alien enemy is not entitled to a writ of *habeas corpus*. But an alien enemy would be entitled to apply, see 18 B. 636.

9. Power of High Court to issue order under this section when person detained under warrant issued under Extradition Act, 1903—It was laid down in 39 C. 164, that the High Court has jurisdiction under this section to issue an order and to examine whether a person detained in public custody under the *Indian Extradition Act* is legally detained, and this jurisdiction is not taken away merely because the Government of India have already issued a warrant for surrender under sub-sec. (8) of s. 3 of the said Act. The power of the High Court to interfere otherwise by way of revision, *e.g.*, under s. 491 is untouched, 42 C. 793. But see also 46 C. 82. See now 52 C. 319 for the effect of the amendment of section 491.

Powers of High Court outside the limits of appellate jurisdiction

* 491-A. 'Any High Court established by Letters Patent may exercise the powers conferred by section 491 in the case of any European British subject within such territories, other than those within the limits of its appellate criminal jurisdiction, as the Governor General in Council may direct'

PART IX.

SUPPLEMENTARY PROVISIONS

CHAPTER XXXVIII.

OF THE PUBLIC PROSECUTOR

Power to appoint Public Prosecutors

492. (1) The Governor General in Council or the Local Government may appoint, generally, or in any case or for any specified class of cases, in any local area, one or more officers to be called Public Prosecutors

† (2) The District Magistrate, or, subject to the control of the District Magistrate, the Sub-Divisional Magistrate may, in the absence of the Public Prosecutor, or where no Public Prosecutor has been appointed, appoint any other person, not being an officer of Police below † such rank as the Local Government may prescribe in this behalf to be Public Prosecutor for the purpose of any case §

Note.—Referring to the amendment of this section, the Select Committee say—

We are doubtful whether the second amendment made by the Bill in s. 492 really effects what was intended. In some places there are special Police Acts and they do not invariably give the Local Government power to delegate to Assistant Superintendents the powers of a District Superintendent. Moreover, there is a variety of nomenclature and we think it better to leave it to the Local Governments to prescribe the rank of Police-officers who may be appointed Public Prosecutors for the purposes of a particular case

Notes—1. Who is a Public Prosecutor?—See s. 4 (f) for definition.

(1) Pleader appointed with District Magistrate's permission is not Public Prosecutor—In a criminal appeal pending before the Chief Court, R, a brother of the murdered man, petitioned the District Magistrate for permission to support the conviction in the Appellate Court, and permission being granted, engaged the services of a pleader for that purpose. *Held*, that the order on R's petition did not constitute such pleader a Public Prosecutor under this section, 29 P. R. 1835

* This section was inserted by the Criminal Law (Amendment) Act XII of 1923 s. 31

† The words 'in any case committed for trial to the Court of Session' were omitted by Act XVI of 1923

‡ The words 'such rank as the Local Government may prescribe in this behalf' were substituted for the words 'the rank of Assistant District Superintendent' by s. 10

§ Any case substituted for 'any case' by s. 10

aging apprehensions, which all of them get together and
 suit to share and this is the reason of the badness
 Bunyan

the name of Bordello as the title of a poem See
 PARINATA.
 B's's-t-d (so'chil'd) A servant of Amphitryon in
 "his play of this name Mercury, availing
 "himself of his disguise as a slave."

lost with his whole crew, in mid-ocean, on the
 homeward voyage.

B's's-t-d The name of Sir Patrick Spens is not mentioned
 in history, but I am able to state that tradition has po-
 versified it. It is a little island of Feroe Strangers used on
 a Grecian group living over again at Norway there is a
 "r tumbling which has been known to be
 rom time immemorial at the grave of
 "men". The people know not its be-
 tional appellation of the spot and they
 id to tell. Spens is a Scottish not a French
 name. It is then a forced conjecture that
 took place off the linen boat coast of the
 mds which did not then belong to the crew."

name under which Pope satirized John
 y, in the "Prologue to the Epistles." See
 47.

as tremble. — What! that this of all?
 but mere white cord of wind?
 scarce, what! has Jove's feet?

one a butterfly upon a wheel? For
 "Philosopher" is
 "Fooling."

artificial look
 of Nicholas

Introduced by
 III, canto vii,
 our adventures

recorded. It is a . . . d to express a
 voted to the fair sex.

My honest spouse of Dover, I see
 Thoa was of her ivory count.

Stagnation. A surname given to Aristotle (B.C.
 384-322), from Stagnira in Macedonia the place of his
 birth. [Often improperly written Stagnation.]

See page 47 for the Supper of the Kings
 See page 47 for the Supper of the Kings

Starvation Duns. Henry Dundas the 2d
 Lord Melville — so called from having first in-
 troduced the word starvation into the English lan-
 guage, in a speech in Parliament, in 1794, on an
 American debate.

Steeple. A nickname for Stephen, given by James
 George Villiers Duke of Buckingham in all
 of his fine face. "And it was very liberal
 singular compliment to the splendor of his
 having reference to Acts vi. 15 where it is
 St. Stephen, "All that sat in the council,
 steadfastly on him, saw his face, as it tai
 to face of an angel."

(Lat. the star) A name given by Fr.
 Sidney, in a series of satirical poems entitled
 "Phyllis and Stella," to an English Dilettante
 and Lady Rich, — to whom he was at one time
 bed. She was a sister of Lord Leicester.

A poetical name given by Swift to Miss Estlin
 on, whose tutor he was, and whom in 1714
 rarely married.

Or. A Grecian herald in the Trojan war
 Homer describes as "great hearted brave"
 Stentor, accustomed to shout as loud as fifty
 men.

In this design he raised up his eagle for the throne of
 and, taking up his bow, began to shoot
 in the language of a Stentor.

(a mo.) A drunken Butler, in Shakespeare's
 "Import."

A servant to Fortia, in Shakespeare's "Mer-
 t of Venice."

Stagnation. A sobriquet given during
 American civil war, to Thomas Jonathan (Stonewall)
 (1812-1863), a general in the service of the Con-
 federate States. This famous appellation had been
 in an expression used by the Confederate Gen-
 eral Bee on trying to rally his men at the battle of
 Bull Run, July 21, 1861, — "There is Jackson
 and he looks like a stone wall." From that day he was
 known as Stonewall Jackson, and his command as
 Stonewall Brigade.

Stagnation. A period (See Sturm und
 Drang) in the literary history of Germany the
 great intellectual central
 — very when

(ii) *Prosecutor appointed for special case is not a Public Prosecutor*.—A person appointed by a District Magistrate to conduct prosecution in a Sessions Court for the purpose of a case has not the power of a Public Prosecutor with regard to withdrawal under s. 491, 8 A. 291 (F.B.), 1856 A. W. N. 94; Weir II, 653; but now see s. 495 (2).

2. In criminal cases, the Crown by the Public Prosecutor is the party and not the complainant.—The offence is dealt with as an invasion of the public peace and not a mere contention between the complainant and the accused. The Crown is therefore the party and not the complainant, 13 B. 339. See also 30 A. 525.

3. Non-appointment of Public Prosecutor does not invalidate trial.—The provisions of s. 270 that every trial before a Court of Session shall be conducted by a Public Prosecutor is merely directory. The absence of a Public Prosecutor in a Sessions trial or a defect in his appointment, is at most an irregularity curable under s. 537, 35 P. R. 1887.

4. Powers of Government Pleaders to withdraw.—The powers of Government Pleaders, who have not been appointed Public Prosecutors, under this section, to withdraw prosecutions are limited to the circumstances described in s. 240 Weir II, 652.

5. Convicting Magistrate must not be appointed as Crown Prosecutor.—In 8 B. H. C. R. Cr. Ca. 126, the High Court censured the appointment of the Magistrate, who in the first instance had tried and convicted the accused to be Crown Prosecutor to conduct an inquiry subsequently directed in the same case in the following terms:—"The appointment as Crown Prosecutor of the Magistrate, who tried the case, was a most improper and singular proceeding. To convert a Judge into an Advocate seeking to uphold his decision before another tribunal is at least in the annals of British jurisprudence quite unprecedented, and most objectionable, as he has a personal interest in the case, which a Public Prosecutor should not have. Having accepted the office, the Magistrate ought to have endeavoured to perform its duties with that calmness and impartiality which should ever characterize a Public Prosecutor. See also the remarks of NORMAN, J., in 4 B. L. R. Appx. L. But they may be so appointed. In the United Provinces all Joint Magistrates and Assistant Magistrates exercising first-class powers, have been empowered to prosecute in Sessions trials.—*Government Notification*, 31st December, 1870.

6. Public Prosecutor represents the Crown and not the Police.—The purpose of a Criminal trial is not to support at all cost a theory, but to investigate the offence and to determine the guilt or innocence of the accused. The duty of a Public Prosecutor is to represent not the Police but the Crown and this duty should be discharged by him fairly and fearlessly and with a full sense of the responsibility that attaches to his position. The guilt or innocence of the accused is to be determined by the tribunals appointed by law and not according to the tastes of anyone else. 42 C. 422, 42 C. 957. See Note 2 at p. 766.

7. Duty of a Public Prosecutor.—It has been well said by a learned Judge: "The Counsel for the prosecution has most accurately conceived his duty, which is to be an assistant to the Court in the furtherance of justice, and not to act as Counsel for any particular person or party. He should not by statement aggravate the case against the prisoners, or keep back a witness, because evidence may weaken the case for the prosecution. His only object should be to aid the Court in discovering truth. A Public Prosecutor should avoid any proceeding likely to intimidate or unduly influence witnesses on either side. "There should be on his part no unseemly eagerness for, or grasping at, conviction." *Per WESTROFF, C.J.*, "In the case of Crown prosecution in England, where the Attorney-General or Solicitor General is conducting the case for the prosecution there is never the least vestige of animosity or prejudice. It is regrettable that the practice and procedure here in India is different, and I see no reason why that prevailing in England should not be adopted. —*Per MACLEAN, C.J.*, 8 C. W. N. 17.

and functions of the *Legal Remembrancer* in the Calcutta High Court, see 7 C. W. N. 11 and Note 4 to s. 417. See also 12 P. R. 1916, and 42 C. 422, as to the duty of the prosecutor to call witnesses.

(iii) *Can the District Magistrate direct Public Prosecutor to file complaint?*—A person cannot delegate to another the right to file a complaint. A District Magistrate cannot, therefore, authorize the Public Prosecutor to file a complaint on his behalf, 13 P. R. 1915 = 185 P. L. R. 1915 = 20 P. W. R. 1915 = 16 Cr. L. J. 251. See, however, Note 3 to s. 4 (A) at p. 7.

- and) the name of *Bordello* as the title of a poem See / lost, with his whole crew, in misceen, as the
homeward voyage.
- The name of *Sir Patrick Spens* is not now used
but I am able to state: it tradition has
In the little island of Papa New may one of its
group lying over against Norway there is a
or island, which has been known as the
from time immemorial as "the town of
k Spens . . . The people know well of the
traditional appellation of the spot and they
used to tell *Spens* is a Scottish not a Scan-
name is it? If on a forced conjecture that
reck took place off the west coast of the
islands, which did not then belong to the crown
nd
- A name under which Pope *asthree dda*
reep, in the "Prologue to the *Edifice*," by
ANNY
- *porus* bumble. — What! that the end of silk?
is that more white end of thread? or is it
or some what? can "porus" be?

8 No Court fees for documents required by Public Prosecutor.—Copies of all documents which a Public Prosecutor may require have been exempted from Court fees—*Government of India Notification*, 21st January, 1886.

9 Madras Rules as to Public Prosecutors—See pp 154 155 of the *Madras Criminal Rules of Practice*, 1912

493. The Public Prosecutor may appear and plead without any written authority before any Court in which any case of which he has charge is under inquiry, trial or appeal and if any private person instructs a pleader to prosecute in any Court any person in any such case, the Public Prosecutor shall conduct the prosecution and the pleader so instructed shall act therein, under his directions

Public Prosecutor may plead in all Courts in cases under his charge Pleaders privately instructed to be under his direction

Notes—1 Public Prosecutor always at liberty to avail himself of private help—When the assistance of counsel has been accepted that assistance cannot be excluded at any of the stages of the trial **11 B. H. C. 102.**

2 Counsel instructed by a private person cannot conduct a prosecution on behalf of Government in a trial before a Court of Session without being specially empowered by the District Magistrate, Counsel so instructed can attend and watch the case on behalf of their client, but they cannot conduct the prosecution **Ordh 8 C. No 31** In no Court is a pleader (in the meaning of the Code) appointed by or on behalf of the complainant and not by or for Government entitled to conduct the prosecution in a trial as a matter of right **29 P. R. 1888** See Notes to s. 270

* * * * *

494. Any Public Prosecutor * may, with the consent of the Court, in cases tried by jury before the return of the verdict and in other cases before the judgment is pronounced withdraw from the prosecution of any person, † “either generally or in respect of anyone or more of the offences for which he is tried,” and upon such withdrawal—

Effect of withdrawal from prosecution.

(a) if it is made before a charge has been framed, the accused shall be discharged † “in respect of such offence or offences,”

(b) if it is made after a charge has been framed, or when under this Code no charge is required he shall be acquitted † “in respect of such offence or offences”

Notes—1 Section does not apply to security proceedings under Chap VII—Ss. 494-495 apply only when the proceedings could end in an acquittal or discharge of the accused Security proceedings do not contemplate the framing of a charge at all and as the result of the proceedings neither an order of discharge nor of acquittal is to be passed Hence ss. 494-495 do not apply to security proceedings **36 M. 315** See Note 10 to s. 430

2 Prisoner charged or committed to Sessions must be acquitted and not discharged—When a person is committed to the Sessions on a charge he cannot be discharged but must be acquitted under cl. (b) **12 M. 35** Certain persons were charged by a District Magistrate with the offence of robbery The complainant moved the High Court praying that inasmuch as the charge of robbery was against more than five persons, and he had not been charged with robbery, an order should be made directing the accused to be committed to the Sessions charged with robbery, and this being so the only order the Magistrate could pass if he permitted that charge to be withdrawn was an order of acquittal under cl. (b) of this section and the High Court declined to make any order, **1904 A. W. N. 277 = 2 A. L. J. 30 = 2 Cr. L. J. 21**

3 Public Prosecutor can withdraw either generally or in respect of anyone or more of the charges.—A Public Prosecutor could under the old section only withdraw all the charges under trial or none He was

* The words “appointed by the Governor General in Council or the Local Government” were omitted by Act XVIII of 1923
† The words “— were inserted by *ibid*”
‡ The words “— were added by *ibid*”

not competent to withdraw one only of the charges. But under the new amendment he can either withdraw generally or in respect of any one or more of the charges.

4. Practice—Reasons for withdrawal of charge.—If the Public Prosecutor withdraws a charge and the Court approves of it, the accused shall be acquitted. Neither the Public Prosecutor nor the Judge is called on to give any reasons for his action, 5 M. L. T. 216. But see 22 C. W. N. 69; 49 C. 1105.

On a permission for withdrawal under s. 494 it is not necessary to record reasons for such permission, 2 Pat. 708.

But in a Rangoon case it is held that prosecutors, with the exception of the Advocate-General may not withdraw from a prosecution without giving reasons and without the consent of the Court. In withholding or according consent the Court is acting in a judicial capacity and it must record its reasons, 1 Rang. 756 (23 C. W. N. 69 *follo cet*).

5. Withdrawal after charge bars re-trial.—An order of acquittal on the withdrawal of the prosecution after charge is a valid acquittal to which s. 403 applies, 9 N. L. R. 26 = 14 Cr. L. J. 135. See Note 26 to s. 403. Second trial and conviction after such discharge is illegal. Where the accused was charged with an offence under s. 304, I P. C., and on the Public Prosecutor having, with the consent of the Court, withdrawn from the prosecution, was acquitted and discharged by the Sessions Court after taking the opinion of the assessors on the evidence recorded in the case, held, that the Public Prosecutor having withdrawn from the prosecution with the consent of the Court, an acquittal should have been recorded without taking the opinion of the assessors. An acquittal was a matter of right to the accused, whatever the opinion of the assessors might be, Ratanlal 307.

5-A. Summons-case Public Prosecutor withdrawing from prosecution.—In a summons-case, the Public Prosecutor withdrew from the prosecution before the accused had been served and the accused was acquitted under s. 494 of the Code. Held, under s. 429, that the Rule of English Law requiring the accused to have been tried as well as acquitted in order to bar further proceeding which is embodied in section 494 of the present Code is inapplicable to the statutory acquittals subsequently introduced into the Code, i.e., the sections now numbered 494, 247, 345, which are intended to bar further proceedings whether the accused can be said to have been tried or not, 40 M. 976.

6. Further inquiry should not be directed when charge properly withdrawn.—When it is not shown that the order of discharge under this section when it was made was not a proper order, no further inquiry should be directed under s. 437, (1911) 2 M. W. N. 74 = 12 Cr. L. J. 440. Fresh proceedings may be instituted if further evidence is forthcoming.

7. Revision.—(i) *High Court cannot revise order of acquittal*—The High Court has no power to interfere with an acquittal under this section, 5 M. L. T. 216.

(ii) *Can High Court interfere with discretion of Magistrate?*—*Quære* whether the High Court has power to interfere in revision with the discretion of a Magistrate in giving his consent to the withdrawal of the prosecution under s. 494, (1914) M. W. N. 776 = 15 Cr. L. J. 641.

8. Accused against whom charge is withdrawn competent witness against co-accused—Where several accused were charged before the Magistrate under the *Gambirg Act* (Bom. IV of 1877) and before any evidence had been let in, the Public Prosecutor withdrew, with the consent of the Magistrate, from the prosecution of two of the accused, and they were discharged and they were examined as witnesses for the prosecution held following 5 Bom. H. C. R. Cr. 1 and 1 B 610–619 that they were competent witnesses. See 47 C. 154. *Per* WHITWORTH, J., dissenting that 'the accused were discharged solely that they might be used as witnesses, and not upon a consideration of the evidence which affected them. The consent of the Court was not based upon judicial considerations and therefore the accused were not competent witnesses,' 25 B. 422; 47 C. 154.

9. Withdrawal of prosecution against an accomplice.—A Local Government in India has no power to tender a conditional pardon to an accomplice for the purpose of his being examined as a competent witness, against others accused with him, 33 C. 1353, where 1 B 610 and 10 C. W. N. 847 are followed. See Note 8 at p. 850. An accomplice if not an accused under trial in the same case, is a competent witness, and may be examined on oath. The prosecution must be withdrawn and the accused discharged under this section before he would become a competent witness. But if the Court purporting to act under this section, sanctions the withdrawal of the prosecution but *omits* to record an order of discharge, and the accused continues to be kept in custody, his position is in no way changed from that of an accused, 23 C. 1353 where 2 A. 260, 15 B. 661,

23 B 213, 7 W R. 44, 10 C L R 553 20 A 426 3 B H C. R. Cr. Ca. 59, *R v. Rudd* Cowp. 331 (1773) are referred to. But where the accused person is in fact discharged from custody by virtue of a withdrawal of his prosecution and the Magistrate trying the case takes judicial notice of such withdrawal at the omission to use the formal word "I discharge this accused" would be at most an irregularity curable under s. 537 (a). Where there has been an effective withdrawal of the prosecution against an accomplice and his position as a witness could not be adversely affected even though the Court did not comply with the clear provisions of s. 494 (a) held that the accomplice was a competent witness though no formal order of discharge was passed 7 A. L. J. 86 = 11 Cr. L. J. 21, 18 C. W. N. 1219 = 15 Cr. L. J. 693 where 33 C. 1353 is distinguished. See also 5 C. L. J. 271 = 5 Cr. L. J. 142 and Notes 18-20 at p. 740. See also 18 Bom. L. R. 266 = 17 Cr. L. J. 256.

495. (1) Any Magistrate inquiring into or trying any case may permit the prosecution to be conducted by any person other than an officer of Police * below a rank to be prescribed by the Local Government in this behalf † but no person other than the Advocate-General Standing Counsel Government Solicitor, Public Prosecutor or other officer generally or specially empowered by the Local Government in this behalf shall be entitled to do so without such permission.

(2) Any such officers shall have the like power of withdrawing from the prosecution as is provided by section 494 and the provisions of that section shall apply to any withdrawal by such officer.

(3) Any person conducting the prosecution may do so personally or by a pleader.

(4) An officer of Police shall not be permitted to conduct the prosecution if he has taken any part in the investigation into the offence with respect to which the accused is being prosecuted.

Notes.—1 An officer of Police, not below a rank to be prescribed by the Local Government.—IN MADRAS Police-officers not below the rank of a first-grade Head Constable in charge of a Police-station have been empowered to conduct prosecutions. (G. O. No. 1564 Judicial, dated 19th July 1887) IN THE PUNJAB no Police-officer below the rank of a Deputy Inspector is permitted to conduct a prosecution. (*Punjab Gazette* 1887 Part I page 84) IN BENGAL (*Pub. Man.* Vol. I page 271) IN ASSAM (*Wm.* page 186) IN THE UNITED PROVINCES (*Id.* page 215) and IN THE CENTRAL PROVINCE (*Central Provinces Gazette* 1893 Part II page 131 *Wm.* page 155), no Police-officer below the rank of a Sub-Inspector has been authorized to conduct the prosecution, and IN BURMA an officer not below the rank of a Sergeant of Police (*Burma Gazette* 1886 Part I page 360).

2. Permission granted to unqualified persons to appear for prosecution.—The words "any person" include persons other than certificated pleaders. It is however discretionary with the Criminal Courts in each case to permit such persons to conduct the prosecution.—*W. H. C. Pro.* 2nd September 1892. The High Court, as a Court of Review, has no power to revise an order passed by a Magistrate in the exercise of his discretion under this section permitting a person to conduct a prosecution, *Weir II, 655; 1914 M. W. N. 776 = 11 Cr. L. J. 641*. In *P. R. 1905* the Punjab Chief Court in declining to interfere with the order of a Magistrate refusing permission to allow the prosecution to be conducted by a pleader remarked, that it is not improper for the District Magistrate if he considered that the too frequent appearance of pleaders for the prosecution in petty criminal cases was detrimental to the interests of justice to advise Courts subordinate to him by a general circular on the subject. See also 12 M. L. J. 354 = *Weir II, 471* and *Weir II 400*.

3. Private Prosecutor can do so only with permission of Court.—With the exception of the Advocate-General Standing Counsel Government Solicitor or other officer generally or specially authorized by the Local Government in that behalf, no person whether Counsel or Attorney, can claim the right to conduct the prosecution of any criminal case without the permission of the Presidency Magistrate, 6 C. 59, 17 Cr. L. J. 458.

4. Private Prosecutor may appear personally or by pleader.—Any person whether a private complainant or not, when permitted to conduct a case as prosecutor may instruct Counsel to appear 11 B. H. C. R. 107.

* As to conduct of prosecution by Police-officers in Upper Burma, note that nothing in this section, see Regulation V of 1902, Schedule XIV (*Upper Burma Criminals, Just. & Reg. Act*) in British Baluchistan see the *British Baluchistan Criminal Justice Regulation VIII of 1896* Schedule, s. 17. See also s. 115 of the *Indian Railways Act IX of 1890* as to conduct of the prosecution in Railway cases.

† The words "with the previous sanction of the Governor-General in Council" were omitted by Act XXVIII of 1928.

5. Reason for the exclusion of Police investigating officer from prosecuting.—In all important cases, and especially in cases of murder and dacoity, the Police-officer making the investigation should be examined as a witness, regarding the circumstances of the investigation. It is generally important to the trying authority to know why, where and when the accused persons were arrested. It is often important to ascertain what the witnesses said when they were first questioned by the Police, and whether such statements agree with those subsequently made by the witnesses in Court, *Ratanlal 173*. See also 18 W. R. 18; 8 B 534

6. Conduct of prosecution by investigating Police-officer improper, but trial not invalidated.—Where a Police Inspector got information that persons were carrying on a wagering business and having satisfied himself, obtained a warrant under s. 6 of the *Bombay Gambling Act* IV of 1887 and effected the arrest of the accused and the seizure of their books, *held*, that the Police Inspector had taken a part in the investigation within the meaning of sub-sec. (4) of this section though he may not have examined any of the witnesses, and consequently, the Police Inspector was not qualified to take any part in the proceedings, except as a witness. Where the Police Inspector thus disqualified is allowed to conduct the prosecution, it is a grave irregularity, but unless the accused were prejudiced the irregularity does not invalidate the trial but is cured by s. 537, 26 B 533.

7. Quære whether stranger may be permitted to conduct prosecution.—It is doubtful whether the words 'any person' in s. 495 would include an absolute stranger who had no connection in the remotest degree with the prosecution and whose desire to help the prosecution was based on a personal grudge only " 11 A. L. J. 313 = 14 Cr. L. J. 389. In this case the High Court set aside the order granting permission

8. "Any such officer."—Withdrawal by unauthorized person.—These words in cl. (2) refer only to the "Advocate-General, Standing Counsel, Government Solicitor, Public Prosecutor or other officer generally or specially empowered by the Local Government in this behalf" mentioned in sub-sec. (1). If an Advocate, privately engaged by the complainant and permitted by the Magistrate to appear for the prosecution without draws from the prosecution the effect provided in s. 494 does not follow in other words the trial proceeds 1908 U. B. Cr. P. G. 15 = 10 Cr. L. J. 14. Even if a Police Inspector is specially permitted to conduct a prosecution under cl. (1) he would not be competent to withdraw the case under cl. (2) 1911 M. W. N. 108 = 9 M. L. T. 203 = 11 Cr. L. J. 722. But see 46 C. 700. Where on the day appointed for the hearing and before the inquiry, a Police Inspector appeared and said that he withdrew the case against the accused and the Magistrate thereupon discharged the accused, *held*, that the Magistrate had no power to pass such an order and further enquiry was ordered. The Police Inspector had not been permitted to conduct the prosecution under s. 495 and if he was not so permitted, he would have had no power to withdraw the case under s. 495 (2) even if he came within the purview of the words 'any such officer' in that clause 1911 M. W. N. 106. An acquittal following on the withdrawal by an unauthorized officer is of no effect, 10 Cr. L. J. 501 (M)

A Prosecuting Inspector cannot be regarded as a Public Prosecutor for purposes of withdrawal under s. 495 (2) 46 A. 88.

CHAPTER XXXIX.*

OF BAIL

496. When any person other than a person accused of a non bailable offence is arrested or detained without warrant by an officer in charge of a Police-station, or appears or is brought before a Court, and is prepared at any time while in the custody of such officer or at any stage of the proceedings before such Court to give bail, such person shall be released on bail

Provided that such officer or Court, if he or it thinks fit, may, instead of taking bail from such person, discharge him on his executing a bond without sureties for his appearance: and in after provided

† Provided, further, that nothing in this section shall be deemed to ~~apply to any person~~ of section 107, sub-section (4), or section 117, sub-section (3)

* The provision of this Chapter and of Chapter XLIII shall so far as may be apply to bail given ~~under the provisions of the Indian Railways Act IX of 1880~~

† This proviso was added by Act XVIII of 1923

Notes.—1. See s 4 (b) for definition of "bailable" and "non-bailable;" and s. 4 (p) for definition of "an officer in charge of a Police-station," s 55 for an example of an arrest of a person not accused of an offence, s 86 for the taking of bail by a Magistrate, s. 60, etc., for the production before a Magistrate and see s 514 for forfeiture of bail bond

1-A. For form of bond and bail-bond.—See s 555 and Schedule V, Form Nos. III, XXV, XLII.

Court-fees—Bail-bonds exempt.—Under s 19, cl xv of the *Court-fees Act* VII of 1870, bail-bonds in criminal cases, recognizances to prosecute or give evidence, and recognizances for personal appearance or otherwise are exempted from Court fees.

2. General nature of the right to be admitted to bail.—"Bail" is not intended to be punitive, but only to secure the attendance of the prisoner at the trial. *Per* RUSSELL, L.C.] *In re Charles Rose*, 14 Times L.R. 215. See also *in re Barronet*, (1852) 1 EL. v BL 1; *Reg v Scaife*, (1841) 9 Dowl 553; 2 C. W. N. 125. The detention of an accused under trial is not intended to be penal, but its object is to secure attendance, 35 C. 174, but see Note 2 to s 498. The seriousness of an alleged offence and some evidence of its perpetration by the accused would, however, justify detention. "We may express a hope that Magistrates will always be lenient to accused persons at any rate, until they are convicted." *Per* PARSONS, J., 22 B. 549. A Magistrate is not competent to refuse bail, unless the law sanctions such refusal, 1 C. L. R. 130.

3. Difference between 'recognizance' and 'bail.'—S 496 coupled with Form XLII of Sch. V contemplates two kinds of security, namely, (1) the simple recognizance of the principal and (2) security with sureties. Where an Act provides for release on 'bail' that means 'security with sureties' and this is the meaning which has been attached to the word in the practice and procedure of the Courts as distinct from the simple recognizance of the principal, 15 C. W. N. 736 = 12 Cr. L. J. 358. 'Bail' means the freeing or setting at liberty one arrested or imprisoned upon others becoming sureties by recognizance for his appearance at a day and place certainly assigned, he also entering into his own recognizance. The party is delivered (or bailed) into the hands of the sureties and is accounted by law to be in their custody, they may, if they will, surrender him to the Court before the date assigned and free themselves from further responsibility.

4. Bail may be claimed as of right by person not accused of non-bailable offence.—It must be understood that for every bailable offence, bail is right and not a favour, detention in the lock up is the alternative, not the original order. The bail demanded should never be excessive with reference to the social status of the party. The amount of bail and the offence charged with, the section under which it is punishable, should always be stated on the face of the order directing the accused to be detained in the lock up. Bail may be tendered and must be accepted at any time before conviction. *Punjab Cr.*, Vol II, p 239. Arrested under the proviso of s 114, applied to be released on bail, but the District Magistrate trying the case refused to bail the accused on the ground of expediency and his pleader's inability to show a provision in the Code how a bail could be claimed. *Held*, that under this section bail may be claimed as of right not only by one accused of bailable offence, but by "any person other than a person accused of a non-bailable offence" who is arrested or detained without warrant by an officer in charge of a Police-station or appears or is brought before a Court, 6 C. P. Cr. 31. It has, however, been *held* in 36 M. 474, that s 496 does not give an absolute right to bail to any person who is not charged with a non bailable offence and that section must be read along with other provisions of the Code giving a special right of detention to a Court. Therefore the provision in s 107, cl (4) that a Magistrate before whom a person is sent under that section (may in his discretion detain such person in custody until the completion of inquiry) is not subject to or controlled by s. 496. See 14 C. W. N. 133. Notes 11 and 7 below. See 9 B. L. R. 138 = 17 Cr. L. J. 77. See now the new proviso to the section which expressly says that powers under s 107, cl. (4) are not subject to the operation of ss 496 and 117, cl. (3).

5. Who may release on bail.—(i) See ss 57 (2), 59 (3), 60, 63, 169, 170, 496, 497, for powers of Police officer to release on bail, (ii) ss 76 86, 91, 167, 186 217, 426, 427, 466, 475, 476 477, 478 496, 497 for the general powers of Courts to release on bail, (iii) s 432 for bail by a Presidency Magistrate on making a reference, (iv) s 438 for bail by District Magistrate when making reference, (v) ss 432, 438 for powers of Sessions Judge to release on bail, and (vi) ss 426, 434 498 for powers of High Court.

6. Leaving decision as to sufficiency of bail to Police illegal.—The practice of leaving to the Police the decision as to the sufficiency of bail, when bail has been ordered by the Court, is contrary to law. The duty of deciding as to its sufficiency or otherwise is with the Court itself and not with the Police, 15 C. 453, though the Court may call for a report from the Police. Cf Notes 89—91 at p. 203.

7. Bail and detention in custody in cases under Chapter VIII—See ss. 107 (4) 123 (2) and 114, Notes 33 and 34 at pp 161 and 162 and Notes 79—88 at pp 202 203. Where a person appeared in answer to a summons requiring him to find security for good behaviour for one year, and the Magistrate adjourned the hearing of the case in order that the accused person might produce evidence as to character, *held* that the Magistrate was empowered to take a personal recognizance from the accused person for his appearance at the adjourned hearing. **6 N-W. P. H. C. R. 366; 12 Cr. L. J. 533 (B).** See Note 4. The words 'at any stage of the proceedings' indicate that there is nothing to confine the operation of this section to a period anterior to the hearing. See **17 Cr. L. J. 77.** See now the new *proviso* to s. 496 which expressly lays down that ss. 107, cl. (4) and 117, cl. (3) are not subject to section 496.

8. Magistrate may make himself personally responsible if bail improperly refused—If bail be improperly refused, the Magistrate in addition to an action for damages will be liable under s. 166 or s. 342, I P C. But the refusing or accepting of bail is a judicial and not merely a ministerial duty (*contra* see **29 M. 100**), and a mistake in the performance of that duty without malice, will not be sufficient to sustain an action. **2 M. H. C. R. 396**

9. Money may be deposited instead of executing bond.—S. 513 permits of a deposit of a sum of money or Government Promissory Notes to be given, except in the case of a bond for good behaviour, in lieu of executing a bond.

10. Bond should be by accused and not by agent, when personal attendance of accused dispensed with.—Where the personal attendance of an accused person is dispensed with a recognizance bond if deemed necessary, should be taken from *him* and not from *his agent* though he may appear by agent. **5 B. H. C. R. Cr. Ca. 64.**

11. Section applies to Appellate Court—Reasons for refusing bail must be given—The petitioners who were convicted of bailable offences appealed to the District Magistrate and applied for bail. The District Magistrate admitted the appeal but made the order "bail refused" on the bail petition without giving any reasons. The petitioners then moved the High Court. *Held* the fact that no reasons were given was ground sufficient for the granting of bail by the High Court. *Held further*, that as the District Magistrate could only have acted in the exercise of his jurisdiction as regards bail under s. 496 he was obliged to grant bail under that section. **14 G. W. N. 138**

497. (1) When any person accused of any non bailable offence is arrested or detained without warrant by an officer in charge of a Police-station or appears or is brought before a Court he may be released on bail, but he shall not be so released if there appear reasonable grounds for believing that he has been guilty of* 'an offence punishable with death or transportation for life'

When bail may be taken in case of non bailable offence.

† Provided that the Court may direct that any person under the age of sixteen years or any woman or any sick or infirm person accused of such an offence be released on bail

— (2) If it appears to such officer or Court at any stage of the investigation, inquiry or trial, as the case may be that there are not reasonable grounds for believing that the accused has committed † 'a non bailable offence' but that there are sufficient grounds for further inquiry into his guilt, the accused shall pending such inquiry be released on bail or at the discretion of such officer or Court on the execution by him of a bond without sureties for his appearance as here after provided

§ "(3) An officer or a Court releasing any person on bail under sub-section (1) or sub-section (2) shall record in writing his or its reasons for so doing

§ '(4) If, at any time after the conclusion of the trial of a person accused of a non bailable offence and before judgment is delivered, the Court is of opinion that there are reasonable grounds for believing that the accused is not guilty of any such offence, it shall release the accused if he is

* The words — were substituted for the words "the offence of which he is accused" by Act XVIII of 1923

† The words — were substituted for the words "such offence" by *ibid*

‡ This proviso was added by *ibid*.

§ These sub-sections were added by Act XVIII of 1923

in custody on the execution by him of a bond without sureties for his appearance to hear judgment delivered

* (5) A High Court or Court of Session and, in the case of a person released by itself any other Court may cause any person who has been released under this section to be arrested and may commit him to custody

Note.—Referring to the amendment of the section the Select Committee say—

"It was pressed upon us that the provisions as to bail in non-bailable cases are much too stringent. One suggestion made to us was that in s. 497 'We should delete all words after 'may be released on bail' in sub-sec. (1) and the whole of sub-sec. (2). The result would have been to give all Courts full discretion in the matter of allowing bail in non-bailable cases and we felt generally that this was going too far. What we have done is to allow the Court or Police-officer to release on bail in a non-bailable case unless there appear to be reasonable ground for believing that the accused has been guilty of an offence punishable with death or transportation and as some safeguard against this we have provided for a review by the Sessions Court or the High Court of any order admitting to bail in a non-bailable case. Some of us—including all the official members of the Joint Committee—are of opinion that this decision goes too far and that in the end it will not tend towards the administration of justice."

Notes.—1. See Chapter V A for arrest without warrant s. 170 etc., for appearance before Magistrate s. 167 for detention in Police custody and s. 344 for remanding accused into custody

2. **General rule in non bailable cases.**—Under the old law the general rule was that bail could not be granted in respect of non-bailable offences except under special circumstances (8 Bom. L. R. 470 = 36 C. 158). But under the new amendment the intention of the Legislature seems to be to make the rule with regard to the granting of bail less stringent and now except in the case of offences punishable with death or transportation for life an accused person can be ordinarily admitted to bail.

With regard to persons under the age of sixteen or any woman or any sick or infirm person the Legislature has further relaxed the stringency of the law with regard to the granting of bail even in the case of offences punishable with death or transportation for life.

2 A. **Meaning of the words "punishable with death or transportation for life."**—The phrase "death or transportation for life" in s. 497 does not extend to offences punishable with transportation for life only but means only those offences for which death and transportation for life are alternative sentences. The case in 2 Rang 546 which by implication ruled that the phrase "punishable with death or transportation for life" covers offences punishable only with transportation for life, is *dissented from* 3 Rang 538.

3. **Section does not control powers to defer taking of evidence.**—This section assumes that evidence has been taken, and provides for the release of the accused on bail, if the evidence so taken is not such as to raise a strong presumption of the guilt of the accused person but this section does not import that the taking of the evidence may not be deferred, 6 M. 63 at p. 65. See 11 B. L. R. Appx. B. It is, however, the right of an accused person to demand that the charge against him should be tried without any unreasonable delay and such delay will dispose the Court to grant the bail, 36 C. 168.

4. **Proceedings involving determination as to bail are judicial.**—The proceedings in which it has to be determined whether an accused person has to be admitted to bail by a Magistrate is a judicial proceeding and as such cognizable by the High Court in its revisional powers, 6 M. 63 at p. 65.

5. **Bail cannot be demanded when accused is discharged.**—Where a Magistrate after inquiry comes to the conclusion that the case against the accused is not proved, and discharges him, he has no authority to demand bail. It is only in cases where further inquiry is pending and the accused has not been discharged that bail can be demanded under this section 10 W. R. 34 = 1 B. L. R. (S.N.) 26. Bail cannot be demanded merely because more evidence might turn up.

6. **Sub-Magistrate's order as to bail not subject to revision by District Magistrate.**—The discretionary power vested in a Magistrate by this section is not revisable by the District Magistrate. If he considers the order as to bail passed by a Subordinate Magistrate to be wrong he should report it to the High Court. He ought not to have made a transfer the mode of giving effect to his opinion that the order was wrong 22 B. 549. A District Magistrate has no power to order re-arrest of a person released on bail by a Sub-Divisional Magistrate, 4 Bar. L. T. 70 = 12 Cr. L. J. 244.

7. Revision of bail order by High Court.—Where a Sessions Judge, after considering the evidence comes to the conclusion that there are no reasonable grounds for believing the accused guilty, and admits him to bail, the High Court will not go beyond the finding and discharge the bail, either under s. 439 or under any other provision of law, 10 M. L. J. 411 See 1 C. L. R. 130; 5 A. L. J. 419 = 1908 A. W. N. 195 = 8 Cr. L. J. 49. But even where both the Sessions Judge and trying Magistrate have refused bail it is open to the High Court to grant bail 36 C. 174. See Note 2 to s. 498 and Note 54 to s. 439, now under sub-sec. (5) a High Court or a Court of Session has power to revise an order of bail, and the Court granting bail can review its own order

8. Remand order to be made in presence of accused.—An order for remand should be passed in the presence of the accused person. To remand is to re-commit to custody and therefore as a magisterial commitment requires the presence of the prisoner, his remand or re-commitment also requires that presence so as to give him an opportunity of applying to be admitted to bail, 4 B. L. R. Appx. I. M H C. Pro., 10th June, 1867 See Note 16 at p. 883.

9. Magistrate may cancel bail under sub-sec. (3), but must give reasons.—If it appears subsequently on the production of further evidence that a case has been made out against the accused released on bail, it is competent for the Magistrate to declare the bail bonds cancelled and to direct the accused to surrender, 10 C. W. N. 1093 = 4 Cr. L. J. 221; 36 C. 166 at p. 173; 36 C. 174. Reasons must be recorded for cancelling the bail, (1911) 2 M. W. N. 133 = 12 Cr. L. J. 503. Where an accused person had been let out on his bond it was held in 38 M. 1038 that a warrant issued for his arrest without recording reasons was illegal. See now sub-sec. (3) as amended.

10. Duty of Court to release on bail when further remand applied for.—See 6 M. 63 and 69, 36 C. 174, 11 N. L. R. 162 = 16 Cr. L. J. 705 and Notes 18—20 at pp. 883-884. The High Court would be very cautious in interfering with the discretion of the Magistrate in a case, where the prosecution, after the inquiry has begun before the Magistrate, does not tender evidence that the accused has some guilty connection with the non bailable offence, Ratanlal 892.

11. Validity of bond to appear before Police.—The wording of ss. 499 and 514 makes it abundantly clear that a Police-officer in charge of a Police-station has power to make it a condition of a bond that the accused person shall attend before the Police at the time and place mentioned in the bond, and that if he fails so to attend and a Magistrate of the first class is satisfied that the bond has been forfeited, any person bound by the bond can be called upon to pay the penalty thereof. To hold that in such cases the bond can be conditioned merely for appearance before a Court would render nugatory the provisions which enable the Police to take bail-bonds from accused persons during the course of the inquiries and would moreover make meaningless the provisions of s. 499 and s. 514. 11 C. 77 dissented from it it intended to lay down a general proposition that a bail bond under s. 497 cannot be conditioned for the appearance of the accused before the Police, 22 P. R. 1913 = 6 P. L. R. 1914 = 6 P. W. R. 1914 = 14 Cr. L. J. 631. See Note 4 to s. 514

12. Bail under the Criminal Law (Amendment) Act 1908.—See Note 5 to s. 498

12-A. Bail under the Extradition Act.—See 26 Bom. L. R. 984.

13. American cases.—If facts do not sustain the charge of murder contained in a warrant bail may be allowed.—*People v. The Sheriff of Westchester*, 1 Park 159. In a case of a man slaughter, where there is no reasonable doubt of the prisoner's guilt, bail will not be allowed—*Ex-parte, Taylor*, 5 Cow. 39. But even in a capital case bail ought to be allowed, unless the proof be evident and the presumption great. *People v. Perry*, 8 Abb. 27; *People v. Hyler*, 2 Park 570. That a case has been twice tried and the jury in both cases disagreed presents a proper case for admitting to bail.—*People v. Perry*, 8 Abb. Pr. (N.S.) 27.

498. The amount of every bond executed under this chapter shall be fixed with due regard to the circumstances of the case, and shall not be excessive, and the High Court or Court of Session may, in any case, whether there be an appeal on conviction or not direct that any person be admitted to bail, or that the bail required by a Police-officer or Magistrate be reduced.

Power to direct admission to bail or reduction of bail

Notes.—1. Power and scope of High Court and Sessions Court to bail.—The High Court has concurrent jurisdiction with that of a trying Magistrate and not merely revisional jurisdiction, 36 C. 174—*Per MITRA, J.*, at p. 177. The provisions of this section are not controlled by those of s. 497, and it is open to the High Court or a Court of Session, to admit any person to bail for good and sufficient cause, the general rule, however, in

respect of non bailable offences is, that bail is not to be taken except in special circumstances, *Weir II, 657*. An accused should not, however, be admitted to bail, where the probability of his conviction being wrong depends on a mere technical ground *Ratanlal 430*.

The provisions of s 498 of the Code are particularly wide and the Sessions Judge has power thereunder to admit to bail a person whose case has been referred under s 123 (2), pending the hearing of the reference, *50 C. 989*.

(i) *Even before case is put up before Magistrate*—In granting bail, the High Court and the Court of Session have unlimited powers of judicial discretion. They can exercise the power soon after the arrest of the accused by the Police, even before the case is sent up to a Magistrate, *7 Bnr. L. R. 86*.

(ii) *Accused committed for trial may be let on bail*—The Sessions Judge has power to admit to bail the accused committed for trial on a charge of a non bailable offence, *1882 A. W. N. 234 (F.B)*

(iii) *Even convicted person may be let on bail*—S 498 is not confined to cases prior to conviction. In *1908 A. W. N. 195 = 5 A. L. J. 419*, it was stated that s 498 gives the High Court and the Court of Session very wide powers to admit to bail, even where an accused person has been convicted and has not appealed. Under s 390 of the 1872 Code it was held in *1 A. 151 (F.B)* and *1882 A. W. N. 234 (F.B)* that bail could not be granted in the case of a convicted person but the grounds on which the decisions rest are no longer tenable by the changes introduced by the Legislature. But see Note 3

2. Principles which should guide High Courts in granting or refusing bail.—The main question for consideration in determining matters of bail is whether there are reasonable grounds for believing the accused guilty of the offences charged. Other considerations must also arise in deciding this question, and one of these, which has always guided English and Indian Courts, is whether there are any grounds for supposing that the accused would abscond.—*PER MITRA, J.*, in *36 C. 174*. But see *36 C. 168*, where it is laid down that in exercising its discretion under s 498 the High Court should not confine its attention only to the question, whether the prisoner is likely to abscond or not. There may be other circumstances, which may also affect the question of granting bail to accused persons charged with crimes of a grave character. The English cases are not necessarily a safe guide in interpreting sections of the Code. "As the High Court, our power to grant bail 'in any case' as given by s. 498 is quite unfettered, though we consider that in exercising our discretion we ought to take into consideration the limitations on the power of other authorities to grant bail imposed by s. 497, *37 C. 412*. 'We think that the rule laid down in s 497 for the guidance of Courts other than High Court is a rule founded upon justice and equity and one which should be followed by us as well as by every other Court unless anything appears to the contrary. The extended powers given to the High Court under s 498 are certainly not to be used to get rid of this very reasonable and proper provision of the law,' *42 C. 25*. See also Note 2 to s 496 and Note 2 under s 497

(i) *Bail pending inquiry before Magistrate*—An accused person ought to be released on bail until reasonable grounds are made out on the evidence, for believing him to be guilty. When a Magistrate issued warrants for the arrest of certain persons for a non bailable offence, against whom there were no reasonable grounds on which he might believe that they were guilty of the offence for which another person was accused on facts inconsistent with their guilt, the Calcutta High Court directed that on their arrest, they should be admitted to bail, *10 C. W. N. 1093 = 4 Cr. L. J. 221*. Where there has been unreasonable delay in trying the accused and no evidence is adduced after remand, the High Court will be disposed to grant bail, *36 C. 166*. It is no doubt the case that a High Court has absolute discretion in the matter of granting bail and is not bound by the provisions of s. 497, but the Legislature having placed the initial stage of dealing with crimes with Magistrates and having in fact enacted that persons accused of non bailable offences shall not be released on bail except under the terms of s 497, a High Court is bound to follow the general law as a rule, and not to depart from it except under very special circumstances, especially so in the initial stages of a case, *6 L. B. R. 172 = 14 Cr. L. J. 171*.

(ii) *When Sessions Judge has been moved*—The High Court will not ordinarily interfere where a Session Judge acts with due care in the exercise of his discretion, *5 A. L. J. 419 = 1908 A. W. N. 195 = 8 Cr. L. J. 49*.

3. Jurisdiction of Sessions Court to release on bail person convicted by itself pending appeal.—Where a Sessions Judge after convicting the accused, released them on bail pending their appeal to the High Court, *held*, he had no jurisdiction to do so in spite of the use of the words "any person" in this section. The High Court can do so, but not the convicting Court itself. The latter Court has given its final opinion that the

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accused is guilty and deserves imprisonment. It cannot then consistently with the principle of finality indicated in 10 B 176 (F.B.) vary its own order by admitting the convicts to bail. The word "any" in the section must be read, subject to the limitation that is implied in that principle. The section indicates generally the powers of a Sessions Judge to release on bail all prisoners, who, he thinks, may be found to have been wrongly convicted, and whose case he can either deal with himself or has power (s. 438) to refer to the High Court. The section does not give him power in any way to alter or vary his own order, 4 Bom. L. R. 55. See also 15 P. R. 1903. *Contra*, see Note (iii). As to rulings under the old Code where the language employed was "any accused person," see 1 A. 151 (F.B.), 1 B. R. L. Ap. Cr. 7; 23 W. R. 40 at p. 42.

4 Power of High Court to admit to bail, pending appeal to Privy Council.—Where a person who was convicted at the Criminal Sessions of the Madras High Court, which conviction was reviewed by the High Court under s. 26 of the *Letters Patent* obtained from the Privy Council special leave to appeal and the Privy Council had on the petitioner's application for bail expressed the opinion, that the matter of bail should be decided by the High Court, and an application was accordingly made to the High Court, *held*, that the High Court had jurisdiction to release the accused on bail, pending the decision of the Privy Council, and having regard to the rule laid down by the Judicial Committee in *ex parte Carew*, L. R. 1897 A. C. 719, as to the circumstances in which an appeal in a criminal matter would be admitted by the Privy Council *held* that the accused ought to be released on bail, 24 M. 161.

But the Punjab Chief Court held that after deciding a criminal case, whether on Original Appellate or Revision side and upholding the conviction of a prisoner, it has no power under s. 498 to the Code to suspend the operation of his sentence and to release him on bail on his asserting his intention to appeal to His Majesty in Council, because (a) the section does not refer to a case where the Court is *functus officio*, but refers to cases where the Court has still some power left as regards the sentence of the accused, (b) the Criminal Procedure Code does not provide for an appeal to the Privy Council and does not provide, for the release of the accused appealing to the Privy Council 15 P. R. 1903 = 19 P. W. R. 1905 = 8 Cr. L. J. 89 where 4 Bom. L. R. 55 is referred to and 24 M. 161 distinguished.

The High Court has no power, after disposal on revision of a case tried by a Magistrate, to grant bail under s. 498 of the Code or cl. 41 of the *Letters Patent*, 1865 in order that a petition may be made to the Privy Council for special leave to appeal or until such petition has been disposed of by the latter, *per* RICHARDSON, J.—The High Court has no inherent jurisdiction to liberate an accused on bail. 50 C. 585.

5 Special powers of High Court to grant bail—

(i) *Coroners Act*, 1871.—In 31 C. 1, it was *held* that after a Coroner has drawn up an inquisition against a person under Act IV of 1871, and committed him to prison the High Court alone is empowered to release such person on bail, but now by the amending Act IV of 1908 the Magistrate to whom the accused is sent under s. 26 has power to release on bail.

(ii) *Extradition Act XV* of 1903.—See Appendix II. The Extradition Act provides for bail to be furnished by person accused of certain crimes and the matter is one which must be regulated by this Code. The High Court has the fullest discretion in the matter, but regard must be had to the provisions of s. 496 and the circumstances of the case, 15 C. W. N. 736 = 12 Cr. L. J. 358.

(iii) *Sindh Frontier Regulation III* of 1892.—An application for bail on behalf of an accused who is being tried by a Jirgah of Elders under s. 8 of the Sindh Frontier Regulation does not lie to the High Court under s. 498 5 S. L. R. 105 = 12 Cr. L. J. 568.

(iv) *Criminal Law (Amendment) Act*, ss 12 and 14.—See Appendix XII. Where the provisions of Part I of the Criminal Law (Amendment) Act have been applied to proceedings before a Magistrate in respect of an offence, the Sessions Judge ceases to have jurisdiction to grant bail under s. 498 the exercise of such jurisdiction being inconsistent with the special procedure prescribed in the said part. The proper Court to apply to for bail in such a case is the High Court whose power to admit to bail is not affected by the Act, 37 C. 439. But the High Court in exercising its discretionary power under that section, will take into consideration the terms of s. 12 of the Act, 37 C. 412.

(v) *S 50 of the Indian Insolvent Act*.—The Criminal Procedure Code has no application to such a case, 17 B. 334.

6. No Letters Patent appeal against order of single Judge refusing bail.—An order refusing bail to an accused is an order in a criminal trial. It is not a judgment within the meaning of clause 15 of the *Letters Patent* and no appeal lies against such an order of a single Judge 19 M. L. J. 478 = 11 Cr. L. J. 279.

respect of non bailable offences is, that bail is not to be taken except in special circumstances, *Weir II, 657*. An accused should not, however, be admitted to bail, where the probability of his conviction being wrong depends on a mere technical ground *Ratanlal 480*.

The provisions of s. 498 of the Code are particularly wide and the Sessions Judge has power thereunder to admit to bail a person whose case has been referred under s. 123 (2), pending the hearing of the reference, *30 C. 969*.

(i) *Even before case is put up before Magistrate*—In granting bail, the High Court and the Court of Session have unlimited powers of judicial discretion. They can exercise the power soon after the arrest of the accused by the Police, even before the case is sent up to a Magistrate, *7 Bur. L. R. 86*.

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accused is guilty and deserves imprisonment. It cannot then, consistently with the principle of finality indicated in 10 B 176 (F.B.) vary its own order by admitting the convicts to bail. The word "any" in the section must be read, subject to the limitation that is implied in that principle. The section indicates generally the powers of a Sessions Judge to release on bail all prisoners, who, he thinks, may be found to have been wrongly convicted, and whose case he can either deal with himself or has power (s 498) to refer to the High Court. The section does not give him power in any way to alter or vary his own order, 4 Bom. L. R. 55. See also 15 P. R. 1903. *Contra*, see Note (iii). As to rulings under the old Code where the language employed was "any accused person," see 1 A. 151 (F.B.), 1 B. R. L. Ap. Cr. 7; 23 W. R. 40 at p 42.

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But the Punjab Chief Court held that after deciding a criminal case whether on Original Appellate or Revision side and upholding the conviction of a prisoner, it has no power under s. 498 to the Code to suspend the operation of his sentence and to release him on bail on his asserting his intention to appeal to His Majesty in Council, because (a) the section does not refer to a case where the Court is *functus officio* but refers to cases where the Court has still some power left as regards the sentence of the accused, (b) the Criminal Procedure Code does not provide for an appeal to the Privy Council and does not provide for the release of the accused appealing to the Privy Council 15 P. R. 1903 = 19 P. W. R. 1903 = 8 Cr. L. J. 89 where 4 Bom. L. R. 55 is referred to and 24 M. 161 distinguished.

The High Court has no power, after disposal on revision, of a case tried by a Magistrate, to grant bail under s. 498 of the Code or cl 41 of the Letters Patent 1865 in order that a petition may be made to the Privy Council for special leave to appeal or until such petition has been disposed of by the latter, *per* RICHARDSON, J.—The High Court has no inherent jurisdiction to liberate an accused on bail. 50 C. 535.

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(ii) *Extradition Act XV of 1903*.—See Appendix II. The Extradition Act provides for bail to be furnished by person accused of certain crimes and the matter is one which must be regulated by this Code. The High Court has the fullest discretion in the matter, but regard must be had to the provisions of s. 496 and the circumstances of the case, 15 C. W. N. 736 = 12 Cr. L. J. 358.

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(iv) *Criminal Law (Amendment) Act*, ss 12 and 14.—See Appendix XII. Where the provisions of Part I of the Criminal Law (Amendment) Act have been applied to proceedings before a Magistrate in respect of an offence the Sessions Judge ceases to have jurisdiction to grant bail under s. 498 the exercise of such jurisdiction being inconsistent with the special procedure prescribed in the said part. The proper Court to apply to for bail in such a case is the High Court whose power to admit to bail is not affected by the Act, 37 C. 439. But the High Court in exercising its discretionary power under that section will take into consideration the terms of s. 12 of the Act, 37 C. 412.

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7. Application for bail containing irrelevant or scandalous matter not to be entertained.—Where a prisoner applied to the High Court to be admitted to bail pending the disposal of his appeal and the petition contained defamatory allegations, consisting, *inter alia*, of irrelevant attacks on the trying Magistrate and other officers in the service of the Government of India, the Court refused to allow the petition to be filed, and ordered it to be returned, 13 B. 488.

499. (1) Before any person is released on bail or released on his own bond, a bond for such sum of money as the Police-officer or Court, as the case may be, thinks sufficient shall be executed by such person, and, when he is released on bail, by one or more sufficient sureties conditioned that such person shall attend at the time and place mentioned in the bond, and shall continue so to attend until otherwise directed by the Police-officer or Court as the case may be

(2) If the case so require, the bond shall also bind the person released on bail to appear when called upon at the High Court, Court of Session or other Court to answer the charge.

Notes.—See Notes under s 514 for forfeiture of bond.

1. Form—As to form of bond and bail bond on a preliminary inquiry before a Magistrate, see Sch. V, Form No 42.

2. Contents of bond.—(i) *Must provide for money penalty*—17 C. P. L. R. 113 = 1 Cr. L. J. 854. (ii) *Time and place must be mentioned*—Time and place must be mentioned in the bond itself, 1885 A. W. N. 44. (iii) *Total of surety bonds not to exceed amount of accused's own recognizance*—When an accused person is released on bail with sureties, the sureties should ordinarily be made jointly and severally liable for the same amount as the accused, and cannot be made liable for more. The total of the sums recoverable from them must not exceed this amount, 2 L. B. R. 235; 1905 U. B. R. 31 = 2 Cr. L. J. 463. But see 36 C. 562, Note 22 to s. 514.

3. Is it illegal to require the daily attendance of accused?—There is nothing illegal in requiring the accused to execute a bond for appearance daily, 6 Mad. H. C. R. Ap. 38. But see 20 W. R. 23 = 11 B. L. R. Ap. 8 where it is stated that it is impossible to say that admitting him to bail upon recognizances condition in such a way is the same thing as releasing the prisoner.

4. Bond may be conditioned to appear before Police.—The words "until otherwise directed by the Police-officer" show that a bond under s. 497 may be conditioned to appear before the Police and the provisions of s. 497 are not limited to appearance before the Court, 22 P. R. 1913 = 6 P. L. R. 1914 = 6 P. W. R. 1914 = 14 Cr. L. J. 631. See Note 11 to s. 497 and Note 4 to s. 514.

5. Only one bond from accused and his sureties.—In a good behaviour case it was held that only one bond should be taken from the accused and his sureties for one determinate amount, the sureties engaging to be bound jointly and severally for the same amount as the accused so that it may be realizable from anyone of the obligors. There is no warrant in law for taking separate bonds from the accused and his sureties individually and severally, exceeding in the aggregate the amount for which the accused is liable, 30 P. R. 1890. See also Form No 42 Sch. V.

6. Magistrate must himself decide on fitness of sureties.—See Note 6 to s. 496. See Notes 89–91 at p 203.

500. (1) As soon as the bond has been executed, the person for whose appearance it has been executed shall be released, and, when he is in jail, the Court admitting him to bail shall issue an order of release to the officer in charge of the jail, and such officer on receipt of the order shall release him

(2) Nothing in this section, section 496 or section 497 shall be deemed to require the release of any person liable to be detained for some matter other than that in respect of which the bond was executed

Form.—As to form of warrant, to discharge a person imprisoned on failure to give security, see Sch. V, Form No. 43.

501. If, through mistake, fraud or otherwise, insufficient sureties have been accepted, or if they afterwards become insufficient, the Court may issue a warrant of arrest directing that the person released on bail be brought before it and may order him to find sufficient sureties, and, on his failing so to do, may commit him to jail

Power to order sufficient bail when that first taken is insufficient.

Note.—Power to cancel bond or increase amount of bail.—When a surety for good behaviour has once been accepted a Magistrate has no power subsequently to cancel the security bond though he may be of opinion that the surety is an unfit person, 1 C. W. N. 394; 16 P. R. 1905; 28 P. R. 1901 See Note 97 at p 205 A Magistrate is justified in increasing the amount of bail if by further enquiry the case turns out more serious than he first imagined, 4 P. W. R. 1912 = 66 P. L. R. 1912 = 13 Cr. L. J. 474.

502. (1) All or any sureties for the attendance and appearance of a person released on bail may at any time apply to a Magistrate to discharge the bond, either wholly or so far as relates to the applicants

Discharge of sureties.

(2) On such application being made, the Magistrate shall issue his warrant of arrest directing that the person so released be brought before him

(3) On the appearance of such person pursuant to the warrant, or on his voluntary surrender, the Magistrate shall direct the bond to be discharged either wholly or so far as relates to the applicants and shall call upon such persons to find other sufficient sureties and, if he fails to do so, may commit him to custody

Note.—Magistrate must act on application of surety.—It is only on the appearance of the person released on bail, that the bond of the sureties is discharged (sub-sec. 3). When a surety applies for a cancellation of his bond under this section there is no such thing as hearing the application on the merits. The presentation of the application itself, imposes upon the Magistrate the duty of issuing a warrant for the arrest of the accused. Hence, if a surety after once presenting an application for the cancellation of his bail bound, fails to appear in person or by pleader, such failure cannot deprive him of his right to treat the bond as cancelled. When once the application is presented and received, there is no option left to the Magistrate but to act under this section, 9 Bom. L. R. 1285

CHAPTER XL

OF COMMISSIONS FOR THE EXAMINATION OF WITNESSES

503. (1) Whenever, in the course of an inquiry, a trial or any other proceeding under this Code, it appears to a Presidency Magistrate, a District Magistrate, a Court of Session or the High Court that the examination of a witness is necessary for the ends of justice and that the attendance of such witness cannot be procured without an amount of delay, expense or inconvenience which, under the circumstances of the case, would be unreasonable, such Magistrate or Court may dispense with such attendance and may issue a commission to any District Magistrate, or Magistrate of the first class, within the local limits of whose jurisdiction such witness resides, to take the evidence of such witness

When attendance of witness may be dispensed with.

Issue of commission and procedure thereunder

(2) When the witness resides in the territories of any Prince or Chief in India in which there is an officer representing the British Indian Government, the commission may be issued to such officer

(3) The Magistrate or officer to whom the commission is issued, or, if he is the District Magistrate, he or such Magistrate of the first class as he appoints in this behalf, shall proceed to the place where the witness is or shall summon the witness before him and shall take down his evidence in the same manner, and may for this purpose exercise the same powers, as in trials of warrant-cases under this Code.

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(4) Where the commission is issued to such officer as is mentioned in sub-section (2) he may delegate his powers and duties under the commission to any officer subordinate to him whose powers are not less than those of a Magistrate of the first class in British India

Notes—See Chapter XXV for the mode of taking evidence in inquiries and trials

1. Power given by s. 503 cannot extend beyond India.—S 503 provides for the issue of a commission in criminal cases in India where the witness is residing in India or in the territories of any Prince or Chief in India. There is no provision in this Code for the issue of a commission in criminal cases for the examination of a witness residing elsewhere, **10 Cr. L. J. 571 (A.), 5 B. 338.**

(i) *No power to issue commission for examination of witnesses in England.*—The High Court has no authority in a criminal case pending before it to issue a commission or a letter of request to the English Courts for the examination of a witness residing in England, *see also 20 P. R. 1878* Statute 22 Vict., Cap 20 (if it has any reference to criminal cases at all) merely enables the English, Scotch or Irish Courts to enforce attendance of a witness before the person named in, and appointed by, the order of Courts in India or else where in His Majesty's dominions. The Courts in British India must only look to the Code of Criminal Procedure for authority to make such an order, and no such authority exists in this Code. Rules 54–59, Ord XXXVII of the rules of the Supreme Court of Judicature in England, have been made to carry into effect the provisions of 22 Vict. Cap 20, s. 6, and other Acts. But where the Act itself does not authorize the issue of a letter of request independently of the issue of a commission, the rules made under the Act cannot authorize the issue of such commission, **10 Cr. L. J. 571 (A.).**

(ii) *No power to issue commission to a Colonial Court to take down evidence.*—In **5 B. 338** it was held that the Bombay High Court had no power to issue a commission to Mauritius in a criminal case. *See also* the statement of the Advocate-General at **p. 337 of 3 B. 334**. The powers given by this Code (s. 503) cannot of course extend beyond India, nor has the law been altered by the *Evidence Commission Act*, 1885, 48 and 49 Vict., Cap 74, s. 3 which deals with taking evidence in criminal cases and enables Indian and Colonial Courts required by mandamus to take evidence in a criminal case arising beyond their jurisdiction to take such evidence in a particular manner. It does not, however, empower Indian or Colonial Courts to mandamus other Courts abroad to take evidence in criminal cases. In England under **13 Geo. III, c. 68, ss. 40, 41, 45** and **1 Will. IV, c. 22, ss. 1 and 2** the Court of King's Bench is authorized to issue a mandamus to Indian and Colonial Courts in certain criminal cases, but Indian and Colonial Courts have no power to issue a mandamus, to another or to English Courts to take evidence in criminal cases and there is in my opinion no provision of law by which witnesses in criminal cases arising at Chidambaram can be exercised in Ceylon—*Opinion of the Advocate General, Madras dated 27th February*, embodied in **G. O. No 464, Judicial, 12th March 1904**

(iii) *No commission can issue to French India.*—As evidence taken before French Courts is inadmissible in criminal trials before English Courts and as the French Government is advised that it is not open to them to empower a British Consular Agent to administer an oath and enforce the attendance of witnesses within French territory, there appears to be no way in which commissions issued by English Courts in criminal cases for the examination of witnesses in French India can be executed, unless s. 503 of the Criminal Procedure Code is amended. Sessions Judges and Magistrates are therefore requested to discontinue the issue of commissions under this Court's Circular No. 2781, dated 13th October, 1886, which is hereby recalled except in so far as it relates to commissions issued for execution in British India by French Courts.—*H. C. Cir., 4th October, 1887, Nos 23–49 Madras Rules, Nos 24 and 25, p. 12.*

(iv) *Can commission issue to Nepal?*—Is Nepal in British India? *See 7 G. W. N. 635* and Note 14

2 Section 503 applies to issue of commission only in cases pending before Courts therein specified.—Where the District Magistrate purporting to act under this section ordered a Subordinate Magistrate before whom the case was pending to examine one of the witnesses in her own house, *held*, that the order was illegal, as this section related to the issue of a commission and not to a case where the trying Magistrate had to examine a witness himself, and that even if the order be treated as an order for issue of a commission, the District Magistrate could not pass such an order without a reference under s. 806, being made to him **2 B. L. R. 8 = 10 Cr. L. J. 211**

3. Application for commission must be made after commitment to the Court to which case is committed.—A committing Magistrate though he is competent to examine a witness on commission in the course of the inquiry, has no jurisdiction after making the order of committal, to issue a commission, so that the evidence recorded might be available, if need be, at the trial before the Court of Session or high Court

The party who desires to have witnesses examined on commission, must apply for it after the commitment either to the High Court or to the particular Judge exercising original criminal jurisdiction or to the Court of Session as the case may be, 19 C. 113 followed in 19 B 749 at p. 758. The view of WILSON, J, in the Calcutta case, that the application should be made before the commencement of the trial, and an application made during the trial and after the jury had been sworn was too late, because a trial and a commission could not go on at the same time, seems to be opposed to the plain language of subsec. (1), which empowers a party to apply for a commission at any time, in the course of a trial.

4. Commission to examine in criminal cases, purely discretionary.—[In 8 C. 398, WILSON, J, refused the application of a witness (who was 63 years old and unable to attend on account of sickness), saying that, in a criminal case, the issue of a commission would be a most unsatisfactory course of proceeding, and one dangerous to the interest of the prisoner. The issue of a commission is entirely in the discretion of the Court.

5. Expense or inconvenience of securing attendance of witnesses not sufficient ground for issue of commission.—Inconvenience to a witness is no ground for issuing commission especially when the question of identification of stolen property was a most material one, and the evidence of the owner and his wife and servant was of the utmost importance, the whole case resting on such evidence, and as regards the ground of expense, the sum of Rs 500, it must be said, was not large or unreasonable, considering that the entire case rested on the evidence of those witnesses, and that the accused had not had an opportunity to cross-examine these witnesses as his position did not permit him to make arrangements for that purpose. *Held*, that the Sessions Judge was not justified in issuing a commission under this section. Also if evidence taken on a commission in an inquiry be admitted at the trial, the circumstances stated in s. 33 of the *Evidence Act* to excuse the attendance of the witness must be established and inconvenience to witnesses is not a ground allowed by s. 33 of the *Evidence Act*, 5 A. 224.

6. Commission to examine expert witness not desirable.—Where an expert witness in handwriting appears to be the principal witness in the case, no application to examine him on commission should be granted, 9 M. L. T. 334 = (1911) 2 M. W. N. 97 = 12 Cr. L. J. 64

7. Witness residing within the jurisdiction of the Court may be examined on commission.—There is nothing in the language of this section to support the contention that the Court has no authority to examine a witness by commission when he is within the jurisdiction. Where a Government servant, who had executed his recognizance to appear and give evidence for the prosecution at a criminal trial at Bombay, was subsequently ordered to a distant station on public service, and could not, with due regard to public interests, return to Bombay in time for the trial. *Held* on the application to Government, that his evidence might be taken by commission before his departure from Bombay 6 B 285. In 24 C. 551 it was doubted whether a Presidency Magistrate or High Court has power to issue a commission for examination of a witness within the Presidency town. See Note 12.

8. Right of *pardanashin* to be examined on commission.—A *pardanashin* woman summoned as a witness in a criminal case has a right to be exempted from personal attendance at Court and to be examined on commission, see 4 C. 20 = 3 C. L. R. 93, 15 C. 775, Weir II, 659; 42 C. 19. In 11 P. W. R. 1913 = 14 Cr. L. J. 3, the High Court directed the Magistrate to examine a *pardanashin* witness on commission and remarked that a Magistrate need not to assume that a woman who is the daughter of a prostitute is not *pardanashin* when it is alleged that she is living a married life and she is obviously entitled as such to be treated with respect despite her lowly origin.

Contra—See 5 A. 92 where it was *held*, that it cannot be admitted as a general principle that *pardanashin* ladies, whose evidence is required in criminal trials are to be allowed to compel the Courts to examine them at some other place than the Court house itself. Although there is no provision in the Code which protects *pardanashin* ladies from appearing in a Court of Justice, nevertheless it is very undesirable to compel the attendance of such persons. Where a Magistrate considered it necessary to take the evidence of a *pardanashin* lady, who objected to appear in Court, the High Court directed him to make arrangements so as to take her evidence either in an empty Court room in the presence of himself, the accused and the pleader for the prosecution, or, if no empty Court room were available, in his own private room or some other room in the Court building, 12 A. 69. See also 1 S. L. R. 5 = 9 Cr. L. J. 249, Note 1 under s. 506, Note 3 above and Notes 9 and 10 at p. 592.

9. Complainant can be examined on commission.—The term *witness* will certainly include the complainant. If a complainant calls himself to testify to matters within his knowledge, he will, as regards such

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testimony, be a witness for the prosecution and the issue of a commission for his examination is perfectly legal, 10 P. R. 1895, 11 P. W. R. 1913 = 43 P. L. R. 1914 = 14 Cr. L. J. 3, and more so, when the complainant is a *pardanashin* lady, Weir II, 659. The terms of s. 503 are very wide. They refer not only to an inquiry or trial, but to any other proceeding and a complainant is a witness and may be examined on commission, 42 C. 19.

Contra.—Where a *pardanashin* lady sets the criminal law in motion, *i.e.*, is a complainant, her position is not the same as that of an ordinary lady witness. It is the right and privilege of the accused to have her evidence taken in his presence in Court. Were it otherwise, it is impossible to conceive the dangers and mischief that would arise, 5 A. 92.

10. **Mode of examining *pardanashin* ladies of rank in Presidency-towns.**—There being no District Magistrate or Magistrate of the first class in a Presidency town, to whom the commission could be sent, it is doubtful whether a Presidency Magistrate or the High Court has under this section power to issue a commission for examination of a witness within the Presidency town. But there is nothing to prevent a Presidency Magistrate from examining a witness residing within his jurisdiction at some place other than the Court house, 24 C. 551. *Gosha* women who are cited by parties as witnesses need not be compelled to attend Court for the purpose. If the witness secures a house or room near the Court house, her evidence may be recorded there, regard being had to her *gosha* being preserved, 12 Cr. L. J. 501 (M.), 4 S. L. R. 257 = 12 Cr. L. J. 393. See 16 C. 233 and Notes 2 to 5 to s. 353.

11. **Admission of secondary evidence when witness examined on commission.**—Where a commission to take evidence issues to any place beyond the jurisdiction of the Court issuing the commission, it is not necessary in order to admit secondary evidence of the contents of a document, that the party tendering it should have given notice to produce the original, nor is it necessary to prove a refusal to produce the original, 9 C. 939.

12. **Onus of proving that evidence taken on commission is admissible is on party who relies on evidence.**—In a case where a commission was issued under this section for the taking of the evidence of witnesses in Nepal and the accused was convicted on such evidence held that the *onus* of proving that Nepal is in British India, as defined by s. 3 (27) of the *General Clauses Act* X of 1897, lies on the party who alleges that the evidence taken there, is proper evidence and on their failing to do so, the conviction must be set aside 7 C. W. N. 635. *Quere*—Whether Nepal is in British India?

13. **Evidence taken on commission issued by Magistrate, admissible in subsequent stage of same case.**—Under the previous Codes it was held that the evidence of a witness taken upon commission is not admissible in a criminal trial held before the High Court, unless it can be shown that such evidence was so taken by an order made by that Court under s. 76 of Act X of 1875 (same as the present section), or unless it is admissible under s. 33 of the *Evidence Act* 6 C. 532; 19 C. 113; 6 A. 224; 19 B. 749. But see now cl. (2) of s. 507 and Notes 1 and 2 thereunder.

14. **Fresh objections may be taken to admissibility of documents after return of commission.**—If when evidence is taken before a commission, a document is tendered and objected to on any ground, the opposite party is not precluded from objecting to the document at the trial on any other ground, it not being necessary to state all the objections to the admissibility of a document, when it is first tendered, 9 C. 939.

15. **Commission evidence admissible in trial for offence committed on high seas.**—Evidence taken under a commission is admissible in a trial for an offence committed on the high seas, the procedure applicable being that of the Court by which the trial was held, *i.e.*, *lex fori*, 16 C. 233.

16. **Delegation of commission is permitted by sub sec. (4).**—Under s. 503 of Act X of 1882, when commission was issued to an officer representing the British Indian Government for examining a witness residing in a Native State, he was bound to execute such commission personally and could not delegate his function to a subordinate, 1895 A. W. N. 106. This difficulty has now been removed by the addition of sub-sec. (4).

17. **Magistrate executing commission, whether Court for purpose of granting sanction.**—During the pendency of a Sessions case, a witness was examined on commission under this section. Subsequently, the Deputy Magistrate who examined the witness on commission being applied to, granted sanction to prosecute the witness under s. 193, I P C. Held that the proper authority to grant sanction in the matter was the Sessions Court, and not the Deputy Magistrate who acted only as a Commissioner, although the Commissioner appointed under this section, may be a Court within the meaning of this section for the purpose of issuing process against the witness and for recording his evidence, still he was not a Court within the meaning of s. 193 (1) (b). The word *Court* in s. 195 means, the Court whose duty it is to consider the evidence and to decide whether it is true or false, 11 C. W. N. 909 = 6 Cr. L. J. 160. See Note 69 at p. 509.

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18 Examination of Mint Master, etc., in cases of false coining.—When the evidence of an officer, connected with the Mint of the Currency Department is required as to the genuineness or as to the spuriousness of a coin or currency note the Courts and Magistrates are recommended to send the coin or note to the Mint Master or to the Commissioner of Paper Currency as the case may be under cover of their Court seal or by a messenger whose evidence can afterwards be taken and at the same time to issue a commission for the examination of such officer or a witness under the provisions of this section. This rule prevents the great inconvenience of officers being called away from their duties on mere ordinary occasions. In special cases a careful discretion is to be exercised regard being had to the conditions above stated.—*Bom Bk Cr p 33*

19 Commission sent to Hyderabad (Deccan).—With a view to secure uniformity of practice in respect of commissions issued by Criminal Courts for the examination of witnesses at Hyderabad the following particulars have been communicated for information and guidance by the Secretary to the Resident and should be observed by all Courts in these Provinces.—As a rule all such commissions should be addressed to "The First Assistant Resident" and all remittances sent with such commission should be made payable to "The First Assistant Resident" without giving the name of the gentleman holding the appointment. No commission should ordinarily be addressed to the Resident, nor should any remittance be made payable to him. No commission should be sent direct to His Highness the Nizam's Minister without the intervention of the Residency office. Distant dates should be fixed for the return of commissions and names of the witnesses to be examined should be given in full with their correct address. The street or lane where they reside should as far as possible be ascertained and stated. Commissions for examination of witnesses residing at Secunderabad (Husen Sagar), or at Bolarum (Alwal) should be invariably addressed to the Cantonment Magistrate Secunderabad and the Superintendent of Police Bolarum respectively and remittances in such cases should be made payable to the officer to whom the commission is addressed. Remittances intended for the First Assistant Resident should be made payable at Hyderabad and not at Secunderabad.—*C P Cr Cr Pt II No 53*

20 Translation of commission when to be made.—Commission sent for execution to any place where the language is different from that of the Court issuing them should be accompanied by translations in the language of such place or in English. Para 98 *Bom H C Cr Cr p 77*

21 Madras rules as to examination of witnesses on commission issued by French Courts.—The following rules approved and sanctioned in G O No 2336 Judicial dated 4th September 1886 have been made by the Madras High Court.—Commissions in criminal cases issued by French Courts for the examination of witnesses residing within the jurisdiction of any Criminal Court in this Presidency, shall be executed by such Court free of cost any expenditure incurred on account of batia and travelling expenses of witnesses being debited to the contingent fund of such Court.—(*H C Cr*) 13th October 1886 No 2781

22. American cases.—A commission is a process issued under the seal of the Court and the signature of the clerk directed to one or more persons designated as Commissioners authorizing them to examine the witness upon oath on interrogatories annexed thereto and to take and return the deposition of the witness according to the directions given with the commission.—S 638 of N Y Cr P C. A commission will not be granted for the examination of the plaintiff in his own behalf whilst he is a fugitive from justice residing in a foreign territory *McMonagle v Konkey* 14 Hun 328. The power to issue a commission is an innovation on the common law and must be strictly pursued *Dwintely v Howland* 1 App Fr 87. It depends solely upon the statute 44 How Pr 432. Application must be made upon affidavit showing (1) the nature of the crime charged (2) the state of proceedings in the action and that issue of fact has been joined therein (3) the name of the witness and that his testimony is material to the defence of the action and (4) that the witness resides out of the State. S. 6319 N Y Cr P C. It is not necessary to state what proof is expected.—*Eaton v North* 7 Barb 631. Affidavit may be made by agent or attorney (*ibid*) or by a third party.—*Demar v Van Zant* 2 Johns. Cas 69

504. (1) If the witness is within the local limits of the jurisdiction of any Presidency Magistrate the Magistrate or Court issuing the commission may direct the same to * such Presidency Magistrate who thereupon may compel the attendance of and examine such witness as if he were a witness in a case pending before himself

Commission in case of witness being within Presidency-town.

* The words — were substituted for the words the said presiding Magistrate by Act XVIII of 1923

* (1 A) When a commission is issued under this section to a Chief Presidency Magistrate, he may delegate his powers and duties under the commission to any Presidency Magistrate subordinate to him

(2) Nothing in this section shall be deemed to effect the power of the High Court to issue commissions under the Slave Trade Act, 1876, s 3

1 Scope of the reference to the Slave Trade Act.—The statute referred to in the last paragraph is for the punishment of offences relating to the slave trade by British subjects or other persons protected by the British Government, and s 3 enable the High Court to obtain evidence by commission in such cases.—PRINSEP The Act referred to is 39 and 40 Vict. Chap 46

505. (1) The parties to any proceeding under this Code, in which a commission is issued may respectively forward any interrogatories in writing, which the Magistrate or Court directing the commission may think relevant to the issue and the Magistrate or officer to whom the commission is directed † "or to whom the duty of executing such commission has been delegated" shall examine the witness upon such interrogatories

(2) Any such party may appear before such Magistrate or officer by pleader, or, if not in custody, in person and may examine cross-examine and re-examine (as the case may be) the said witness

Notes.—1 American cases.—Witness must answer each question specifically.—*Union Bank v. Torry* 5 Duer 626 Witness is not allowed to read his answer from a paper prepared beforehand.—*Creamer v. Jackson* 4 Abb Pr. 413, *Commercial Bank v. Union Bank* 11 N. Y. 203 An objection to a question as leading must be made on settlement of the interrogatories or it is waived.—*Harlewood v. Hemmings*, 3 Th and C. 787. A party who has taken the testimony of a witness residing abroad under a commission may read the deposition though the witness be in Court he is not bound to call the witness but he may be called and examined by the other side.—*Phoenix v. Baldwin* 14 Wend 62

506. Whenever, in the course of an inquiry or a trial or any other proceeding under this Code before any Magistrate other than a Presidency Magistrate or District Magistrate it appears that a commission ought to be issued for the examination of a witness whose evidence is necessary for the ends of justice, and that the attendance of such witness cannot be procured without an amount of delay expense or inconvenience which under the circumstances of the case would be unreasonable, such Magistrate shall apply to the District Magistrate stating the reasons for the application, and the District Magistrate may either issue a commission in the manner hereinbefore provided or reject the application

Notes.—1 District Magistrate may issue commission for examination of purdah witnesses.—The District Magistrate has power to issue commission for the examination of female witnesses in suitable cases

a
b
of dispensing with the attendance of such women 18 L R 5 = 9 Cr L J 249 This case did not decide that an application for commission should be granted unless there were special reasons to the contrary It merely decided that a District Magistrate was competent to issue commission for examination of witnesses in suitable cases 48 L R 257 = 12 Cr L J 398

2 District Magistrate cannot issue commission without reference.—See Note 2 to s 503

* This sub-section was inserted by 1864
† The words "—" were inserted by 1864

507. (1) After any commission issued under section 503 or section 506 has been duly executed, it shall be returned, together with the deposition of the witness examined thereunder, to the Court out of which it issued, and the commission, the return thereto and the deposition shall be open at all reasonable times to inspection of the parties, and may, subject to all just exceptions, be read in evidence in the case by either party, and shall form part of the record

Return of commission.

(2) Any deposition so taken if it satisfies the conditions prescribed by section 33 of the *Indian Evidence Act*, 1872, may also be received in evidence at any subsequent stage of the case before another Court

Notes.—1. **Object of sub-section (2)**—Sub-sec. (2) is based on the case reported in 19 B. 749. Its insertion is thus accounted for—“Various High Courts have held that the depositions taken under this Chapter are only evidence in the Court from which the commission issued, and that if the evidence is required in another Court, a fresh commission must be issued. We have therefore, provided that depositions may, subject to certain qualifications, be received at subsequent stages of the case.”—*See Com Rep* See the next Note.

2. **Practice.—Admissibility of evidence taken on commission by committing Magistrate.**—Evidence taken under a commission issuing from the Chief Presidency Magistrate's Court, during the course of inquiry before him, cannot be used in evidence at the trial before the High Court under this section, 19 C. 113 approved in 19 B. 749; 6 C. 532. This difficulty is now removed by sub-sec. (2). Depositions of a witness taken on commission issued by the committing Magistrate and forming part of the record of his inquiry is admissible in evidence at the trial in the Sessions Court under s. 33 of the *Indian Evidence Act*, if the requirements of the proviso to the section have been satisfied. Much difficulty will be experienced, if the actual presence of the accused, so as to afford him an opportunity of cross-examining, were insisted on but the requirements of s. 33, *Indian Evidence Act*, are satisfied if the accused could have submitted cross-interrogatories, 19 B. 749. See 16 C. 233, where evidence taken on commission was held to have been rightly admitted on the trial of a seaman for an offence committed on the high seas

3. **Deposition recorded in Colony not admissible as evidence.**—Government accorded sanction under s. 188, for prosecuting a person in respect of offences punishable under ss. 405, 408 409 and 477 A, I P C., which were committed by him in Singapore. The complainant moved under s. 506, for the issue of commission for the examination of four important witnesses in Singapore. The Advocate-General gave as his opinion that Government has no power under s. 189, to direct that depositions recorded in Singapore be admitted as evidence in British India, and that the Government of Singapore cannot be asked to direct the Magistrate having jurisdiction at Singapore to summon the witnesses and record the depositions as the said section has no application to a case in which the Court of inquiry or trial is incompetent to issue a commission. *Madras G O No 1803, Judicial*, dated 27th December, 1909. See Note 1 to s. 503

508. In every case in which a commission is issued under section 503 or section 506, the Adjournment of inquiry, trial or other proceeding may be adjourned for a specified time quiry or trial. reasonably sufficient for the execution and return of the commission

Note.—The discretion given by this section must be exercised in a reasonable manner, so as not to subject the accused person to unnecessary detention. See the remarks of WILSON, J., in 19 C. 113.

CHAPTER XLI.

SPECIAL RULES OF EVIDENCE.

509. (1) The deposition of a Civil Surgeon or other medical witness, taken and attested by a Magistrate in the presence of the accused, or taken on commission under Chapter XL, may be given in evidence in any inquiry, trial or other proceeding under this Code, although the deponent is not called as a witness.

Deposition of medical witness.

Power to summon medical witness.

(2) The Court may, if it thinks fit, summon and examine such deponent as to the subject matter of his deposition,

Notes.—1. Evidence of medical witness how to be recorded—

Bombay—The section requires that the deposition of a medical witness should not only be taken also attested in the presence of the accused by the Magistrate in order to render it admissible in proceedings. An attestation in the following form should, therefore, always be appended to such depositions—

“Taken before me and signed by me in the presence of the accused.

(Signature of Magistrate)’

Date

—*Bom. H. C. Cr. Cn.*, p. 18

Bengal and Assam—In order to secure compliance with provisions of this section Magistrate hereby directed to sign at the foot of the depositions of medical witnesses a certificate as follows—“The foregoing deposition was taken in the presence of the accused who had an opportunity of cross-examining the witness. The deposition was explained to the accused and was attested by me in his presence.—*Magist. Calcutta Gazette*, 27th May, 1891, Part I p. 547 *Assam Gazette*, 6th June, 1891 Part III, p. 326.

When the attestation is wanting the Sessions Judge should summon such witness to give his evidence. **R. A. Agra, 7th June, 1862, p. 122.** The circumstance that the evidence of the Civil Surgeon given in evidence was not interpreted to the accused was held to be of small importance, where it was understood by prisoner's counsel, and all necessary questions were put to the witness, **24 W. R. 50.** The insertion of italicized words enables the deposition of a medical witness taken on commission, to be put in evidence which could not have been done under the previous Code, **13 C. 129.**

2. Deposition must be interpreted to accused to enable him to cross-examine witness.—Before a medical officer leaves the Court, his deposition is to be fully interpreted to the accused, who is to be allowed to cross-examine. In order to ensure that the medical officer's deposition may in all cases be admissible under this section, the Magistrate must sign at the foot of it a certificate in the following form—“The foregoing deposition was taken in the presence of the accused, who had an opportunity of cross-examining the witness. The deposition was explained to the accused, and was attested by me in his presence.” This is, of course, especially necessary when the deposition is taken in an inquiry preparatory to commitment to the Sessions. *C. P. Cr. Cr.*, Part II No. 55 *N. W. P. H. C. Cr. Cr.*, para. 38, p. 17.

3. Magistrate's record must show that deposition was taken and attested in accused's presence.—Before the deposition of a medical witness, taken by a committing Magistrate can be given in evidence at trial before the Court of Session, it must either appear from the Magistrate's record or be proved by the evidence of witnesses to have been taken and attested in the accused's presence, not merely presumed under s. 111 (c) of the *Evidence Act* to be so taken and attested, **9 A. 720.** This section does not enact that a deposition of a Civil Surgeon shall be taken and attested by the Magistrate in the presence of the accused. What it provides is that a deposition of a Surgeon, if so taken and attested, may be put in evidence. A Magistrate should take and attest a deposition in the presence of the accused, and should also, by the use of apt words on the face of the deposition make it apparent that he has done so. Section 80 of the *Indian Evidence Act* does not affect the matter, **10 A. 174** at p. 173. The examination of a medical witness taken and attested may be given in evidence in any criminal trial, but in order that such evidence may be admissible against any individual accused person, the examination must have been taken in the presence of the accused person, **8 C. 739 = 12 C. L. R. 233; 18 C. 129, 4 C. W. N. 49.** Where no objection was taken when the evidence was put in, that the evidence had not been taken in the presence of the accused, it was held that such irregularity, even if it existed, did not vitiate the proceedings, as it was not shown that it had prejudiced the prisoner, **8 C. 739 = 12 C. L. R. 233.**

4. Any Magistrate may take the deposition.—“Taken and attested before a Magistrate.” It is not necessary that the committing Magistrate while holding the preliminary inquiry **1893 A. W. N. 15**

5. Civil Surgeon's extra-judicial opinion is no evidence.—The only opinion of a Civil Surgeon which can be considered in judicially dealing with the case, is an opinion expressed by him when examined as a witness on oath. A copy of a letter from the Civil Surgeon containing expressions of his opinion is inadmissible in evidence as it is extra-judicial, **8 C. 211 = 10 C. L. R. 11; 12 W. R. 23,** but the medical officer who held a *post mortem* examination, may use the report to refresh his memory when giving evidence, **9 C. 45; 11 C. L. R. 569.**

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6. **Substance of report from medical subordinate is no evidence.**—The substance of a report from a subordinate medical officer, with an expression of concurrence by the Civil Surgeon, cannot be read in evidence under this section, 11 W. R. 2. A Sessions Judge is not authorized to allow a surgeon to describe the *post mortem* appearances merely from the knowledge acquired by him from a perusal of the notes made by another surgeon, Ratanlal 549.

7. **Post-mortem report not evidence—how it may be used.**—The only use of the medical officer's report will be to assist the Police in getting up the case, to refresh the memory of the medical officer at the time of giving his deposition and to aid the judicial officer in framing his queries. It cannot be admitted as evidence [except under s. 32, cl. (2) and s. 33 of the *Evidence Act*] nor is it sufficient to read it over to the medical officer and swear him to the truth of it, his deposition must be recorded *de novo* and at length in the presence of the accused. The Magistrate should therefore look into the case and make himself acquainted with its particular features, before the medical officer enters the Court, in order that proper questions may be asked.—C P Cr. Cir., Part II, No 55, 6 C. W. N. 98. A *post mortem* report is not evidence. The person who made the report can use it to refresh his memory when giving evidence but the report itself is not admissible in evidence. Therefore when another medical expert is being asked his opinion on facts hypothetically stated the facts cannot be taken from the report but must be taken from admissible evidence on the record, 9 C. 435—11 C. L. R. 569; 27 C. 295, 11 W. R. 25. A *post mortem* report is not admissible as evidence except to contradict the officer who made it. It may, however, be used by that officer when under examination for the purpose of refreshing his memory, 27 C. 295.

8. **The real use of and abuse of medical evidence.**—It is not the proper way to try a case to rely on mere theories of medical men or skilled witnesses of any sort against facts positively proved, 11 W. R. 25. A Judge is not entitled to discard the whole of the direct evidence of credible and unimpeached witnesses who depose that with their own eyes they saw certain things done, upon the strength of the opinion of a medical witness, to the effect that those things could not have been done, 1839 A. W. N. 74; nor should a Judge elect himself into a medical expert without taking proper medical evidence 1833 A. W. N. 139. As a matter of precaution, medical evidence as to the cause of death should never be dispensed with in a case of murder, although prisoner admits having killed the deceased and pleads extenuating circumstances.—N. A. Agra, 2nd January, 1862, p. 1.

Medical witnesses in murder cases—In all cases of murder, the committing Magistrate should bind over the medical witness to attend at the Sessions Court at the trial unless grave inconvenience will be caused thereby.—See Rule 204 of the Madras Rules of Practice. If he is not bound over the special circumstances necessitating a departure from the above rule should be noted in the preliminary register.

9. **Procedure in case depending entirely on medical evidence.**—In a case depending almost entirely upon the medical evidence, the evidence of the Civil Surgeon should not be tendered or accepted as sufficient evidence. All the evidence before the Magistrate as to the symptoms should be taken and the Civil Surgeon should be examined as an expert in regard to the case of those symptoms. Weir II, 660.

10. **When medical officer need not be examined by committing Magistrate**—Except in the case provided for in s. 512 the examination of a medical witness taken in the absence of the accused is inadmissible in evidence in a criminal trial. When, however, there is sufficient *prima facie* evidence to warrant a commitment to the Sessions Court and the evidence of the medical officer is likely to be of a formal character and great inconvenience would result from his being summoned to a Magistrate's Court at a distance from the Sadar station, the examination need not be taken before the Magistrate, but the attendance of the medical officer before the Sessions Court should be ensured by the committing Magistrate. Under all other circumstances the Magistrate should invariably record the evidence of the medical officer before himself, Ratanlal 81.

11. **Medical certificate is no evidence**—The certificate of a medical officer as to the cause of death of a deceased person is no evidence. The facts contained therein must be proved by examining such officer as a witness. It is not sufficient to ask him merely to attest the accuracy of the statements made in the certificate. *M H C. Pro*, 18th July, 1881. This section does not in any way preclude the Sessions Judge from calling the Civil Surgeon and examining him as a witness and this should be done in every case in which the deposition taken by the Magistrate is essentially deficient or requires further explanation or elucidation, 9 C. 435—11 C. L. R. 569.

12. **Medical officer's previous deposition not to be put in, unless he resiles from that deposition.**—The evidence of a medical officer, before the committing Magistrate, whether attested or not by the Magistrate, ought not to be admitted under s. 288, unless he resiles from his original deposition, 4 C. W. N. 46. But see 8 C. 799—12 C. L. R. 233.

a river or estuary where

U.

Uker (6 or 7) frontiers, hence, Ukraine (frontier-land)

tract)

20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 100 101 102 103 104 105 106 107 108 109 110 111 112 113 114 115 116 117 118 119 120 121 122 123 124 125 126 127 128 129 130 131 132 133 134 135 136 137 138 139 140 141 142 143 144 145 146 147 148 149 150 151 152 153 154 155 156 157 158 159 160 161 162 163 164 165 166 167 168 169 170 171 172 173 174 175 176 177 178 179 180 181 182 183 184 185 186 187 188 189 190 191 192 193 194 195 196 197 198 199 200 201 202 203 204 205 206 207 208 209 210 211 212 213 214 215 216 217 218 219 220 221 222 223 224 225 226 227 228 229 230 231 232 233 234 235 236 237 238 239 240 241 242 243 244 245 246 247 248 249 250 251 252 253 254 255 256 257 258 259 260 261 262 263 264 265 266 267 268 269 270 271 272 273 274 275 276 277 278 279 280 281 282 283 284 285 286 287 288 289 290 291 292 293 294 295 296 297 298 299 300 301 302 303 304 305 306 307 308 309 310 311 312 313 314 315 316 317 318 319 320 321 322 323 324 325 326 327 328 329 330 331 332 333 334 335 336 337 338 339 340 341 342 343 344 345 346 347 348 349 350 351 352 353 354 355 356 357 358 359 360 361 362 363 364 365 366 367 368 369 370 371 372 373 374 375 376 377 378 379 380 381 382 383 384 385 386 387 388 389 390 391 392 393 394 395 396 397 398 399 400 401 402 403 404 405 406 407 408 409 410 411 412 413 414 415 416 417 418 419 420 421 422 423 424 425 426 427 428 429 430 431 432 433 434 435 436 437 438 439 440 441 442 443 444 445 446 447 448 449 450 451 452 453 454 455 456 457 458 459 460 461 462 463 464 465 466 467 468 469 470 471 472 473 474 475 476 477 478 479 480 481 482 483 484 485 486 487 488 489 490 491 492 493 494 495 496 497 498 499 500 501 502 503 504 505 506 507 508 509 510 511 512 513 514 515 516 517 518 519 520 521 522 523 524 525 526 527 528 529 530 531 532 533 534 535 536 537 538 539 540 541 542 543 544 545 546 547 548 549 550 551 552 553 554 555 556 557 558 559 560 561 562 563 564 565 566 567 568 569 570 571 572 573 574 575 576 577 578 579 580 581 582 583 584 585 586 587 588 589 590 591 592 593 594 595 596 597 598 599 600 601 602 603 604 605 606 607 608 609 610 611 612 613 614 615 616 617 618 619 620 621 622 623 624 625 626 627 628 629 630 631 632 633 634 635 636 637 638 639 640 641 642 643 644 645 646 647 648 649 650 651 652 653 654 655 656 657 658 659 660 661 662 663 664 665 666 667 668 669 670 671 672 673 674 675 676 677 678 679 680 681 682 683 684 685 686 687 688 689 690 691 692 693 694 695 696 697 698 699 700 701 702 703 704 705 706 707 708 709 710 711 712 713 714 715 716 717 718 719 720 721 722 723 724 725 726 727 728 729 730 731 732 733 734 735 736 737 738 739 740 741 742 743 744 745 746 747 748 749 750 751 752 753 754 755 756 757 758 759 760 761 762 763 764 765 766 767 768 769 770 771 772 773 774 775 776 777 778 779 780 781 782 783 784 785 786 787 788 789 790 791 792 793 794 795 796 797 798 799 800 801 802 803 804 805 806 807 808 809 810 811 812 813 814 815 816 817 818 819 820 821 822 823 824 825 826 827 828 829 830 831 832 833 834 835 836 837 838 839 840 841 842 843 844 845 846 847 848 849 850 851 852 853 854 855 856 857 858 859 860 861 862 863 864 865 866 867 868 869 870 871 872 873 874 875 876 877 878 879 880 881 882 883 884 885 886 887 888 889 890 891 892 893 894 895 896 897 898 899 900 901 902 903 904 905 906 907 908 909 910 911 912 913 914 915 916 917 918 919 920 921 922 923 924 925 926 927 928 929 930 931 932 933 934 935 936 937 938 939 940 941 942 943 944 945 946 947 948 949 950 951 952 953 954 955 956 957 958 959 960 961 962 963 964 965 966 967 968 969 970 971 972 973 974 975 976 977 978 979 980 981 982 983 984 985 986 987 988 989 990 991 992 993 994 995 996 997 998 999 1000 1001 1002 1003 1004 1005 1006 1007 1008 1009 1010 1011 1012 1013 1014 1015 1016 1017 1018 1019 1020 1021 1022 1023 1024 1025 1026 1027 1028 1029 1030 1031 1032 1033 1034 1035 1036 1037 1038 1039 1040 1041 1042 1043 1044 1045 1046 1047 1048 1049 1050

510. Any document purporting to be a report under the hand of any Chemical Examiner or Assistant Chemical Examiner to Government, upon any matter or thing duly submitted to him for examination or analysis and report in the course of any proceeding under this Code, may be used as evidence in any inquiry, trial or other proceeding under this Code

Report of Chemical Examiner
Notes.—1. Letter or certificate of a medical officer no evidence.—A letter of a medical officer expressing an opinion is not evidence under this section, 12 W. R. 25; 9 C. 435 = 11 C. L. R. 569, but only the report. See Note 11 to s. 509

2. Original report should be put in evidence.—The original report of the Chemical Examiner bearing his signature, and not a copy of the report, should be put in evidence, 15 W. R. 49 = 6 B. L. R. Appx. CXXII.

3. Report to be signed by officer having personal knowledge.—In order that the report of the Chemical Examiner relating to the discovery of poison in matter submitted to him for examination, may be admitted in evidence under this section, it must be signed by the officer who detected the poison, and who from personal knowledge, can certify to the correctness of the result embodied in it, Weir II, 661.

4. Any Chemical Examiner or Assistant Chemical Examiner.—The word 'any' would cover an "Additional Chemical Examiner" and the word was specially introduced to meet 10 C. 1028.

5. When substances should be sent to Chemical Examiner?—Substances ought not to be sent to the Chemical Examiner for analysis when there is neither a reasonable suspicion that poison has been used, nor anything in the *post mortem* examination of the bodies leading to such supposition. Magistrates should limit their references to that officer to cases of urgent necessity, and in which the local medical officer cannot afford the information required. Civil Surgeons and District Superintendents of Police are to remember that the duty of making a reference to the Chemical Examiner and of requiring that officer to make a report, which shall be admissible under s. 510 of the Criminal Procedure Code, lies solely within the province of the Magistrate conducting the inquiry for which information on the character of the suspected substance is required, such references should not, under any circumstances, be made by them directly. If the Civil Surgeon can give a decided opinion regarding stains supposed to be those of blood, it is unnecessary to refer to the Chemical Examiner. But, if the Civil Surgeon is unable to settle the question and, if evidence on it is desirable, it should be referred to the Chemical Examiner. Besides a copy of the *post mortem* examination, the Chemical Examiner should be furnished with replies to the following queries which replies the officer making the investigation has been directed to enter in his special diary—

(a) What interval was there between the last time that the person, who is supposed to have been poisoned, ate or drank anything and the first appearance of symptoms of poisoning? (b) What interval was there between the last time of eating or drinking and the death of the person (if death occurred)? (c) Did the person move from the place where the first symptoms were noticed? If so, how far did he go? (d) What were the first symptoms? (e) Did vomiting or purging occur? (f) Did the person become drowsy or fall asleep? (g) Were any cramps or twitching of the limbs observed or tingling of the skin or the throat complained of? (h) Mention any other symptoms noticed. The Magistrate making the reference should give the Chemical Examiner all the information that may guide him to the correct analysis of the substance forwarded. It seems to be apprehended by some officers that such particulars might influence the judgment of the Chemical Examiner, whereas analysis rests on facts and ascertained phenomena, not on opinion, and in order to guide the Examiner, he should be furnished with the fullest possible details regarding symptoms and *post mortem* appearances—*Reg. and Ord., N W P.*, s. 10, p. 364

6. Link to connect evidence.—When committing cases, Magistrates must take care to send up evidence to prove that a body sent to hospital for *post mortem* examination is really the body of the person referred to in the case under trial or that an article analysed by the Chemical Examiner was actually the article sent to him for analysis in the case under trial. Sessions Judges must insist on being furnished with such evidence and must not record either the Criminal Analyst's report or the evidence of the medical officer until the connecting links requisite to render them admissible have been established, 1 Bar. & R. 634. See also 1910 M. W. N. 77 at p. 99.

7. Duty of Judge to warn jury when dealing with Chemical Examiner's report.—The jury must be warned that before using the Chemical Examiner's report they must be satisfied on the evidence that the substances examined were in fact what they were said to be. 13 C. W. N. 180 = 13 C. L. J. 147. See also 10 C. 1028

J.

K.

alamazoo [Ind.], a term derived from *stora* via through the water, which by fraction for *la* others

maus [Ind.], smoky water, also said to signify

L.

Abrador [Sp.], named by the Spaniards *Terra Labrador*, 'cultivable land,' to distinguish it from

of the ranch.

of the ranch
ber wood 1— from the
woody
Mendocino, formerly Mendocino Indian from Arch
Mendocino, a university, and Skt, pallana, a town
" university town."

Previous conviction
or acquittal how
proved

511. In any inquiry trial or other proceeding under this Code, a previous conviction or acquittal may be proved in addition to any other mode provided by any law for the time being in force —

(a) by an extract certified under the hand of the officer having the custody of the records of the Court in which such conviction or acquittal was had to be a copy of the sentence or order or,

(b) in case of a conviction either by a certificate signed by the officer in charge of the jail in which the punishment or any part thereof was inflicted or by production of the warrant of commitment under which the punishment was suffered

together with in each of such cases evidence as to the identity of the accused person with the person so convicted or acquitted

Notes—1 Proof of identity of old offender by finger impressions.—The manner in which a previous conviction may be proved is not limited to the method laid down in this section. Any relevant evidence upon which a Court can properly base a finding that the accused before it was on some previous occasion convicted for an offence will do as well as the methods indicated in this section. The papillary ridges on the bulbs of fingers and thumbs by means of which finger impressions are made while proved to be almost beyond change from birth to death are never wholly repeated in the case of the fingers of any other person and they therefore furnish a surer test of identity than any other comparable bodily feature. Where two prints, made on different occasions resemble one another in the *minutæ* and contain 10 points of disagreement an irresistible conclusion arises that they were made by the same finger. The evidence of identification is thus both positive and negative and confirmation from other source is superfluous. Under s 45 of the *Evidence Act* as amended by Act 1 of 1899 expert evidence may be given on finger impressions while s 73 has been applied to them with necessary modifications so as to permit of comparison being made for arriving at a finding on the basis of their decipherment. But a document called a *finger impression slip* without authoritative signature or certificate of any kind showing it to be an authorized record of Police acts cannot be regarded as a public document within the meaning of s 74 of the *Evidence Act*. Even if it is assumed that it is such a public document it is nevertheless necessary under s. 81 of the *Evidence Act* to prove it. The mere production of it does not prove it and for evidentiary purposes such a document is no better than blank paper with the accused's finger impressions on it. **3 N L R. 1=5 Cr L J 220** See also **6 Q P L R. (Cr) 3, 1 Q W N 33 and 32 G. 750**. The moment there is some evidence of the identity of the accused on the record such as that a person of the same name as the accused and having a father of same name was convicted in the same district the accused may be asked to explain it under s. 342 and if he makes admissions further proof is unnecessary. **4 N L R. 163=9 Cr L J 56**. See Notes 12 and 15 to s. 342

2 By production of previous judgment.—Previous convictions should be proved by copies of judgments or by any other documentary evidence of the fact but having regard to the scope of s 342 an examination of the record is not necessary. **See justification 23 C 689, e s. 310 (c) and s 33 of**

3. An extract certified.—But a mere *Kaifat* from the record office is not sufficient. **6 B L R Appx CLI=15 W R 53.**

512. (1) If it is proved that an accused person has absconded and that there is no immediate prospect of arresting him the Court competent to try or commit for trial such person for the offence complained of may in his absence examine the witnesses (if any) produced on behalf of the prosecution and record their depositions. Any such deposition may on the arrest of such person be given in evidence against him on the inquiry into or trial for the offence with which he is charged if the deponent is dead or incapable of giving evidence or his attendance cannot be procured without an amount of delay expense or inconvenience which under the circumstances of the case would be unreasonable

Record of evidence
in absence of accused

ELEMENTS OF PRONUNCIATION

OF THE PRINCIPAL MODERN LANGUAGES OF CONTINENTAL EUROPE

VOWELS

17. *Le* or *li* as the sound of the French *u* (See 5,
 22- Perpetua the double vowels see Observation 1 p 163

except *ue* for the *not*
 The following, *uep*

18. *B* at the end of a word in German is pronounced like *p*. Between
 2 similar to *r* with which it is often
 This sound of *ß* is formed by *br-*

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6. Link to connect evidence—When committing cases Magistrates must take care to send up evidence to prove that a body sent to hospital for *post mortem* examination is really the body of the person referred to in the case under trial or that an article analysed by the Chemical Examiner was actually the article sent to him for analysis in the case under trial. Sessions Judges must insist on being furnished with such evidence and must not record either the Criminal Analyst's report or the evidence of the medical officer until the connecting links requisite to render them admissible have been established, 1 Bar. & R. 634. *See* also 1910 M. W. N. 77 at p. 99.

7. Duty of Judge to warn jury when dealing with Chemical Examiner's report—The jury must be warned that before using the Chemical Examiner's report they must be satisfied on the evidence that the substances examined were in fact what they were said to be. 18 C. W. N. 180 = 43 Cr. L. J. 147. *See* also 10 C. 1026

Syracuse [Sicily] said to have been named from a
city in the vicinity, called *Syraco*.

and town
river of the rock

read

Turkey
East Indies
Yard (Lat rolls away) name
and of Salween, the Indian of the sea
or Salween, the Indian of the sea
Venezuela (sp) little Venice, so named as
count of some Indian villages which the first
querors found on Lake Maracaybo
Venice (Lat Venezia) from the province of
the territory of the ancient Venetians of which the
islands formed a pond very green most mountains

in this

f the beauti-
h hand.
ne n or
ow pine
uch.

me Corcoran
can "What do you
Spaniards from the
re to an inquiry con
Kreodu

 \mathbb{Z}

Z
Zanguebar, sea or sea-coast, of the Zangis &
neeroes
Zante a corruption of its ancient name Zanthos
Zürich a corruption of Lat Thauricum from Thau-
ricus (son of Theodoric) who rebuilt the city
and destruction by Att II

Zante a corruption of Lat Thaurum (from Thauric a corruption of Lat Theodorie) who rebuilt the fortress and structure by Attia

U

Embagoes [in] clear lake shallow
Utrecht See TILCUM Part 1

pro 1 | Transylvania
wood -- so called by
o dtl in wood; frontier
t a corruption of rapana; Trapezus
d to have been so named be
III.

cases of Wall
ri ed
Tunis from its ancient name Tunetu
Turin [Lat. Turinam Augusta] in north
name [Lat. Turinam] the four
Tavaloosa [Ind.] black bla warrior
Tusany [Lat. i sch.] country of the Litauel of
tracade
Tweed from Brit. tued [the border or limit of
country named from the Castle of Trol [Trawl
the ancient city of Austria.

Tyrol named from the ancient Tyrol
near Meron the ancient Tyrol
the union of the country with Austria

U

of [redacted] clear lake shallow
[redacted] Part 1

Embargo
Utrecht Sea T. Licht

Previous conviction or acquittal how proved.

511. In any inquiry trial or other proceeding under this Code a previous conviction or acquittal may be proved in addition to any other mode provided by any law for the time being in force —

(a) by an extract certified under the hand of the officer having the custody of the records of the Court in which such conviction or acquittal was had to be a copy of the sentence or order or,

(b) in case of a conviction either by a certificate signed by the officer in charge of the jail in which the punishment or any part thereof was inflicted or by production of the warrant of commitment under which the punishment was suffered

together with in each of such cases evidence as to the identity of the accused person with the person so convicted or acquitted

Notes —1 Proof of identity of old offender by finger impressions.—The manner in which a previous conviction may be proved is not limited to the method laid down in this section. Any relevant evidence upon which a Court can properly base a finding that the accused before it was on some previous occasion convicted for an offence will do as well as the methods indicated in this section. The papillary ridges on the bulbs of fingers and thumbs by means of which finger impressions are made while proved to be almost beyond change from birth to death are never wholly repeated in the case of the fingers of any other person and they therefore furnish a surer test of identity than any other comparable bodily feature. Where two prints made on different occasions resemble one another in the *minutiae* and contain no points of disagreement an irresistible conclusion arises that they were made by the same finger. The evidence of identification is thus both positive and negative and confirmation from other source is superfluous. Under s 45 of the *Evidence Act* as amended by Act V of 1899 expert evidence may be given on finger impressions while s 73 has been applied to them with necessary modifications so as to permit of comparison being made for arriving at a finding on the basis of their decipherment. But a document called a *finger impression slip* without authoritative signature or certificate of any kind showing it to be an authorized record of Police acts cannot be regarded as a public document within the meaning of s 74 of the *Evidence Act*. Even if it is assumed that it is such a public document it is nevertheless necessary under s 81 of the *Evidence Act* to prove it. The mere production of it does not prove it and for evidentiary purposes such a document is no better than blank paper with the accused's finger impressions on it. *3 N L R 1 = 5 Cr L J 220*. See also *6 C P L R, (Cr) 3; 1 C W N 33* and *32 C. 759*. The moment there is some evidence of the identity of the accused on the record such as that a person of the same name as the accused and having a father of same name was convicted in the same district the accused may be asked to explain it under s 342 and if he makes admissions further proof is unnecessary. *4 N L R 183 = 9 Cr L J 56*. See Notes 12 and 15 to s 342.

2 By production of previous judgment.—Previous convictions should be proved by copies of judgments or by any other documentary evidence of the fact but having regard to the scope of s 342 an examination of the accused in respect of those convictions is without legal warrant or justification. *28 C 589*, where *26 C. 49* is referred to. Another mode of proof would be by hearing evidence. See s. 310(c) and s 33 of the *European Vagrancy Act IX* of 1874 Appendix V.

3. An extract certified.—But a mere *Kaafat* from the record office is not sufficient. *6 B L R Appx CLI = 15 W R 53*.

512. (1) If it is proved that an accused person has absconded and that there is no immediate prospect of arresting him the Court competent to try or commit for trial such person for the offence complained of may in his absence examine the witnesses (if any) produced on behalf of the prosecution, and

Record of evidence in absence of accused.

record their depositions. Any such deposition may on the arrest of such person be given in evidence against him on the inquiry into or trial for the offence with which he is charged. If his deponent is dead or incapable of giving evidence or his attendance cannot be procured without an amount of delay expense or inconvenience which under the circumstances of the case would be unreasonable

ELEMENTS OF PRONUNCIATION

OF THE PRINCIPAL MODERN LANGUAGES OF CONTINENTAL EUROPE

VOWELS

e a i o u y æ œ ɔ ɛ ɐ ɪ ʊ ʌ ɒ ɔ ɛ ɐ ɪ ʊ ʌ ɒ

17 I or e has a sound of the French (See § 17)
21 I or e has a sound of the French (See § 17)

5 U in the French is pronounced like the French u in French and in Dutch between two vowels or at the end of a word
in Dutch when it is easy to say like the French u in French and in Dutch between two vowels or at the end of a word
co and loo If it is spelt with a p or b it is pronounced like the French u in French and in Dutch between two vowels or at the end of a word

6 u in the French is pronounced like the French u in French and in Dutch between two vowels or at the end of a word
ep in the French is pronounced like the French u in French and in Dutch between two vowels or at the end of a word

D F O

7 As in Dutch the usual sounds are y l o a u f som in
in a long A B in Swedish sounds like the French u in French and in Dutch between two vowels or at the end of a word

8 As in Dutch the usual sounds are y l o a u f som in
in a long A B in Swedish sounds like the French u in French and in Dutch between two vowels or at the end of a word

oe sound k our on

in un d the ti be in the of a word. In the same it is un used

ry son

ly pro

to en d hat

harmful

to

d f h or h

(the) to

sally

to h. h.

(2) If it appears that an offence punishable with death or transportation has been

Record of evidence
when offender un-
known committed by some person or persons unknown, the High Court may direct that any Magistrate of the first class shall hold an inquiry and examine any witnesses who can give evidence concerning the offence. Any depositions so taken may be given in evidence against any person who is subsequently accused of the offence, if the deponent is dead or incapable of giving evidence or beyond the limits of British India.

Notes—1. The object of the new sub sec. (2).—"The Bombay High Court suggested that the provisions of this section should be extended to cases where the offender is unknown and should not be confined to cases where he had absconded. We think, however, that a distinction should be drawn between the two cases, and therefore in adopting the Bombay High Court's suggestion we have provided that its procedure shall only apply to cases of great gravity, that it should only be put in force under an order of the High Court and that mere delay, expense or inconvenience in obtaining the presence of the deponent should not be sufficient ground for making the deposition evidence against the person subsequently accused."—*Sel. Com Rep*

2. Dying declaration must be properly proved.—Dying declarations are not covered by the provisions of this Chapter and they must be properly proved like any other statement on the record, 17 P. R. 1911 = 13 Cr. L. J. 225. The mere fact that the Magistrate who recorded the statement was also the committing Magistrate could not dispense with the necessity of proving dying declarations by taking a statement from the Magistrate, 239 P. L. R. 1912 = 14 Cr. L. J. 131. There is nothing in s. 32 of the *Indian Evidence Act* to justify a Court in going beyond the ordinary rule that every statement on the record must be properly proved. *See* Notes 22—28 to s. 162.

3 Section can be availed of only when the witness is dead or cannot be procured.—This section can be made applicable only where the witness is dead or cannot be procured and though s. 145 of the *Evidence Act* admits of previous statements being referred to for purposes of cross examination it gives no authority to a Court to treat such statements as evidence against an accused. Statements previously made by a witness to a Magistrate and recorded in the absence of the accused cannot be treated as evidence in the Sessions Court if the witness was living and could be procured, 157 P. L. R. 1911 = 12 Cr. L. J. 214. In Criminal Appeal 890 of 1905 (Allahabad), the appellant was charged under s. 400, I. P. C. He was not found and some evidence was recorded against him under this section. After his arrest, the evidence so recorded was tendered against him and admitted. *Held*, that before the evidence of any witness, recorded under this section can be admitted against the accused, it must be strictly proved that the witness is dead or cannot be found or cannot be produced without an unreasonable amount of delay or expense. *See also* Note 3 to s. 509. The latter part of this section seems clearly to intimate that the witnesses for the prosecution should be examined in the presence of the accused when practicable notwithstanding that their statements have been previously recorded in his absence, the commitment was quashed because there was no evidence against the accused except that of witnesses examined in the absence of the accused, and it was not impracticable to obtain the attendance of these persons at the inquiry before the Magistrate, 22 W. R. 33. But *see* next Note.

4 Commitment on evidence taken in absence of absconding accused not necessarily bad.—Where an absconding prisoner is, upon his arrest, tried and committed upon the strength of the evidence taken in his absence and pleaded to the charge, his commitment cannot be quashed. If, however, the Sessions Judge thinks that the prosecution has not laid basis for the reception of evidence taken under s. 512, he should adjourn the trial and summon under s. 540, such witnesses as he may deem material. 12 C. L. R. 120.

5. The fact of absconding must be alleged, tried and found.—Proceedings under this section should commence by evidence being taken and recorded (1) that the accused has absconded, and (2) that due pursuit having been made, there is no immediate prospect of arresting him. *Pun Cr* 499. "Abscond" means not mere absence from the jurisdiction, but "to go out of the jurisdiction of the Court or to be concealed in order to avoid any of their processes" and also that after due pursuit he cannot be arrested, 1890 A. W. N. 100; 1896 A. W. N. 182, 8 A. 672. Where an accused has absconded and it is intended to record evidence against him under this section, it is requisite that the fact of absconding should be alleged, tried and established before the deposition is recorded. 10 C. 1097. Where it is intended to apply this section, it should be shown that when the former deposition was taken the accused had absconded and after due pursuit could not be arrested, 81 W. R. 12. Where there was no finding to that effect evidence recorded under this section was held inadmissible. 21 P. R. 1883. When there is no finding by the Magistrate at the time of taking evidence that the accused had

EXPLANATION OF ABBREVIATIONS AND SIGNS

EMPLOYED IN THE VOCABULARIES OF MODERN GEOGRAPHICAL AND BIOGRAPHICAL NAMES

| | | | | | |
|------------|--------|-------------|---------------|-------------|----------|
| <i>Ar</i> | Arabic | <i>Hung</i> | Hungarian | <i>Sp</i> | Spanish |
| <i>Dan</i> | Danish | <i>Norw</i> | Norwegian | <i>Sw</i> | Swedish |
| <i>Nem</i> | French | <i>Port</i> | Portuguese | <i>SJa</i> | Sanskrit |
| <i>Fr</i> | French | <i>pron</i> | pronunciation | <i>Turk</i> | Turkish |
| <i>Ger</i> | German | <i>Lat</i> | Latin | | |

out, and on like out is house. In repeating let

(See 26 *)

s and h, small capitals, indicate the sound of the German ch, c to it (See 37 *)

OBSERVATIONS

NECESSARY TO BE BORNE IN MIND BY THOSE WHO MAKE USE OF THE TWO FOLLOWING VOCABULARIES

absconded and there was no immediate prospect of arresting him, other evidence to that effect is inadmissible when the accused is found and it is proposed to use the previous evidence, 33 A. 29. But See 16 A. L. J. 902 = 41 A. 60 where 33 A. 29 is distinguished. See 6 Loh. 439 following 41 A. 60.

6. Evidence adduced at trial of co accused is no evidence against absent accused when tried subsequently.—The accused with other persons was charged with murder. The accused had absconded at the time of the preliminary inquiry, and his associates were committed to the Sessions and convicted; held, that the evidence given in the Sessions trial of the co-accused was not taken as evidence against the absconder, and therefore it could not be used against the accused at his trial, as s. 33 of the Evidence Act would not apply, and as the prisoner was not a party to the proceedings and had no opportunity to cross-examine, 8 A. 672. It was held in this case that the evidence taken by the committing Magistrate was admissible as he had recorded that the accused had absconded.

6-A. Evidence taken for another purpose at a previous trial cannot be converted into evidence against absconding accused at his subsequent trial under this section.—Evidence given at a trial for another purpose cannot be, by an *ex-post facto operatio*, converted into an equivalent of what is called a deposition taken under s. 512 when, at the time of taking the evidence, the question of recording a deposition under that section was never intended, 24 A. L. J. 394.

7. In what circumstances evidence under this section should be recorded.—A Magistrate cannot reject an application of the complainant to summon witness or to call on them to produce documents because the accused has absconded and no inquiry into the case was then before the Court. This section is specially intended for enabling the Magistrate to record evidence in the absence of an absconding accused, 2 Bom. L. R. 707. See *Central Provinces Rules*.—In all cases of heinous crime, such as murder, dacoity, heavy burglary, or highway robbery, if the accused person escapes pursuit it is the duty of the Police after making every possible inquiry, and getting all the information in their power, to forward, within four months from the date of the occurrence, all witnesses who can give any testimony regarding the circumstances, to the nearest Magistrate, in order that their depositions may be taken under s. 512. These depositions will prove of the utmost importance in the event of the discovery and apprehension of the criminal. A good Police-officer will never lose sight of a crime that has occurred in his jurisdiction until he is convinced that all further efforts to discover the criminal are hopeless. It not unrequently has happened that months, or even years, after the commission of some crime, circumstances have brought its perpetrators to light. In such cases, after so long a time has elapsed, most of the particulars connected with the crime have faded from the recollection of those who were cognizant of them at the time of its occurrence, but, if the depositions of these persons were taken when every thing was still fresh in their memories, the record becomes most valuable for prosecution.—*C P Pol Man*, p 177.

Punjab Rules.—Sec. 512 provides that whenever it is proved that an accused person has absconded and there is no immediate prospect of arresting him, any Court competent to try or commit such person for trial for the offence complained of may, in his absence, examine the witnesses produced for the prosecution and record their depositions and such depositions may on the arrest of the accused person be used in evidence against him, if the deponent is dead or incapable of giving evidence, or his attendance cannot be conveniently procured. It is also to be noted in connection with this that s. 164 enables a Magistrate to record in the same manner as evidence any statement regarding an offence made by an accused person whomsoever it may implicate. Proceedings under s. 512 (1) should commence by evidence being taken and recorded (1) that the accused person has absconded and (2) that due pursuit having been made, there is no immediate prospect of arresting him. In cases where the crime has terminated fatally or where medical evidence would ordinarily be required at the trial, the evidence of the medical officer as to the cause of death, or as to the injuries inflicted should invariably be recorded. *Pun Cr*, Vol II, pp 150-151.

CHAPTER XLII.*

PROVISIONS AS TO BONDS

513. When any person is required by any Court or officer to execute a bond, with or without sureties, such Court or officer may, except in the case of a bond for good behaviour, permit him to deposit a sum of money or Government promissory notes to such amount as the Court or officer may fix, in lieu of

Deposit instead of
recognizance.

executing such bond

* The provisions of this Chapter shall so far as may be apply to bonds executed under section 192 of Act IX of 1890 (*Indian Railways Act*)

Notes.—1. Reasons for the exception in case of bonds for good behaviour.—See 2 N-W. P. H. C. R. 293, as to the reasons for the exception, the object being that sureties should be responsible for the good behaviour of the person bound over. Where a person was ordered by a first-class Magistrate to execute a bond for Rs. 25 for his good behaviour for six months and to deposit a sum of Rs. 7, which would be returned to him at the end of the six months if he had not in the meanwhile violated the order, held that the order as to deposit was illegal under ss 109, 118 and this section of the Code, *Ratanlal 671*.

2. Surety cannot be allowed to deposit money instead of executing bond.—The deposit allowed under s 513 in substitution only of the bond which the principal himself would otherwise execute, not in substitution of any bond which his surety executes *32 B 449*

514. (1) Whenever it is proved to the satisfaction of the Court by which a bond under this Code has been taken, or of the Court of a Presidency Magistrate or Magistrate of the first class,
 Procedure on for
 forfeiture of bond or, when the bond is for appearance before a Court, to the satisfaction of such Court,

that such bond has been forfeited, the Court shall record the grounds of such proof, and may call upon any person bound by such bond to pay the penalty thereof, or to show cause why it should not be paid

(2) If sufficient cause is not shown and the penalty is not paid the Court may proceed to recover the same by issuing a warrant for the attachment and sale of the moveable property belonging to such person or his estate if he be dead

(3) Such warrant may be executed within the local limits of the jurisdiction of the Court which issued it, and it shall authorize* the attachment and sale of any moveable property belonging to such person without such limits, when endorsed by the District Magistrate or Chief Presidency Magistrate within the local limits of whose jurisdiction such property is found

(4) If such penalty is not paid and cannot be recovered by such attachment and sale, the person so bound shall be liable by order of the Court which issued the warrant, to imprisonment in the civil jail for a term which may extend to six months

(5) The Court may, at its discretion, remit any portion of the penalty mentioned and enforce payment in part only

(6) Where a surety to a bond dies before the bond is forfeited, his estate shall be discharged from all liability in respect of the bond † ***

‡ "(7) When any person who has furnished security under section 106 or section 118 or section 562 is convicted of an offence the commission of which constitutes a breach of the conditions of his bond, or of a bond executed in lieu of his bond under section 514 B, a certified copy of the judgment of the Court by which he was convicted of such offence may be used as evidence in proceedings under this section against his surety or sureties, and, if such certified copy is so used, the Court shall presume that such offence was committed by him unless the contrary is proved

Note.—Referring to the amendment of this section, the Sel. Com. say—

* We note that preference has been expressed for the draft of sub sec (7) as contained in the original Bill and on the whole, we have preferred to restore the original draft. It provides that in proceedings against a surety a certified copy to the judgment may be used to prove the commission of the offences which constituted a breach of the bond, but that this proof may be rebutted. It was indeed suggested to us that we should make a certified copy of the judgment conclusive proof but we are inclined to think that this would go too far."

* The word attachment substituted for the word distress by Act XVIII of 1923

† The words "but the party who gave the bond may be required to find a new surety" were omitted by *ibid*

‡ This subsection was inserted by *ibid*

[illegible]

Notes.—1. See ss. 76 and 91 for instance where bonds may be required, ss 106 and 107 for bonds for keeping the peace, ss 109 and 110 for good behaviour bonds, s 217 for bond from complainant and witnesses after commitment, ss. 57 and 169 for bonds taken at the instance of the Police. See ss 112 and 125 for proceedings in security for keeping the peace and good behaviour and s 499 for bail bonds of accused and sureties.

2. Forma.—See Schedule V, Forms XLIV to LIII. A notice to show cause must be in Forms 45, 46 and 49 of Schedule V.

3. Effect of amendment to sub-sec. (2) and of sub-sec. (6).—These amendments 'will enable proceedings to be taken against the estate of a deceased surety where his liability accrued before his death'—*Statement of Objects and Reasons*. The provisions apply to all bonds, whether executed by principals, sureties or witnesses.

4 Application of section.—The provisions of this section apply to all bonds whether executed by principals, sureties or witnesses.

(i) *To bonds for production of persons before Police*—As there is no provision in the Code authorizing a Police-officer to take a surety-bond for the production of any person before the Police, such a bond is *ab initio* void, and a Magistrate has no power to alter it and impose fresh obligations thereunder, 11 C. 77. But this has been *dissented from* in 22 P. R. 1913 = 14 Cr. L. J. 831. See Note 11 to s 497. But in 42 B. 400 it was held that the Presidency Magistrate of Bombay had no jurisdiction under s 514 of the Code to order forfeiture of bonds taken under ss 106 and 107 of the City of Bombay Police Act, 1902.

(ii) *To bonds under the Madras Abkari Act I of 1836*—When an Abkari Inspector forwards a bail bond taken by him under the *Madras Abkari Act* s 43 to a Magistrate having jurisdiction to try the offence of which the person bailed was accused, the Magistrate is not to be regarded as a mere executing officer, but has the same discretion which he would have had if a defaulter had failed to appear before his own Court: he should call upon the defaulter to show cause, why the penalty should not be enforced in accordance with the procedure laid down in this section, 18 M. 43.

(iii) *To bonds under the Indian Railways Act 1890*—This section is made applicable to bonds executed under s 123 of the *Indian Railways Act* IX of 1890.

(iv) *Magistrate taking bond for appearing before another Magistrate*—If a Magistrate takes a bond from the accused to appear before another Magistrate, the bond is not invalid, 2 Bom. L. R. 589.

(v) Presidency Magistrate, Bombay, cannot order forfeiture of a bond taken by Police under s 107 of City of Bombay Police Act, 20 Bom. L. R. 379.

5. Who can determine forfeiture of bond?—S 514 in its opening clause deals, first of all with bonds generally and then with a bond for appearance before a Court. So far as the bonds generally are concerned, there is a provision that action may be taken by the Court by which the bond has been taken or by the Court of a Presidency Magistrate or a Magistrate of the first class. But in the case of a bond for appearance before a Court, the tribunal indicated is that Court and there is no other tribunal. Where from the terms of a bond, the appearance is to be before the Sessions Court a Deputy Magistrate has no jurisdiction to initiate proceedings for forfeiture of the bond. The Sessions Judge has no jurisdiction to delegate that power under s. 516 which deals with the levy of the amount only, 14 C. W. N. 259 = 10 Cr. L. J. 248. A bond was taken for appearance before a Magistrate at Karjat. On default notice was issued by that Magistrate. Meanwhile the case was transferred to the Magistrate at Chalapur who forfeited the bond and directed the accused's penalty. Held, the latter Magistrate had no jurisdiction as he was not the Magistrate who had taken the bond or before whom the accused had to appear on the date of default and that s. 531 does not apply, 16 Bom. L. R. 84 = 2 Bom. Cr. Ca. 183 = 15 Cr. L. J. 295.

PRACTICE

6. Proceedings are in the nature of a civil proceeding.—The proceeding to realize a penalty is of the nature of a civil proceeding, and the person against whom it is held is competent to give evidence on oath in his own behalf, and is also entitled to go into evidence, 15 W. R. 87. See also 4 C. (865 F.B.).

Proceeding is not a 'criminal trial'—In a proceeding under this section no charge need be drawn up, but after the Magistrate has satisfied himself by evidence of the breach of the bond, he may at once call upon the person concerned to pay the penalty, or show cause why it should not be paid. It would seem therefore that the proceeding cannot be held to be a trial in the sense of the Code, 2 M. 159.

7. Sufficient evidence must be recorded before issuing notice to show cause.—The words "who is proved" imply that evidence on oath should be taken by the Magistrate as to the forfeiture of the bond.

bond, before calling on the party bound thereby to pay the penalty or show cause why he should not do so. The use of the words 'whenever it is proved' make it necessary that evidence should be taken and recorded by the Magistrate in the usual way in order to afford a foundation for his jurisdiction to call on the party to show cause and to declare his recognizance forfeited. When this is not done, there is a failure of jurisdiction, and the defect cannot be cured by silence, neglect or waiver, positive or negative of the party interested, 11 B. H. C. R. 170; 10 C. L. R. 571. The procedure prescribed in this section is an exception to the general rule, 'that a man charged with an offence can only be convicted on evidence taken in his presence' see the judgment of the referring Judges in 4 C. 865.

(i) *Magistrate must be satisfied that default was wilful*—In proceeding to forfeit a recognizance under s 219 (514 (1) (2), (3)) a Magistrate is bound to form a reasonable opinion that there has been a wilful default before issuing the process—(H C Cr, 9th April, No 686)

8. *Notice to show cause should be given to surety*.—Before a warrant can be issued for attaching the property of a surety, he should be called on to show cause why he should not pay the penalty mentioned in his bond and it must appear clearly on the face of the record that he had such notice given him, 15 W. R. 82; 7 B. L. R. Appx. XXXVII; 9 W. R. 4. A mere verbal or unrecorded order to show cause is not sufficient. The notice must be in Forms 45, 46 and 49 of Sch. V

9. *On failure to show cause Magistrate may decide on evidence already recorded*—If no cause is shown or if the party called upon, declines to cross-examine the witnesses, the Magistrate may of course proceed to dispose of the case upon the evidence as it stands, that is on the evidence already recorded by him in the absence of the party before issuing the notice to show cause. It is obviously sufficient for the purposes of justice that the party has had the opportunity of cross-examination, 4 C. 865 (F.B.).

Absence of agent—Forfeiture of recognizance—If the agent of the accused neglects to attend when the case is called on, the recognizance bond may be held to be forfeited and the accused made liable for the payment of the penalty. A Magistrate has no legal authority to secure the attendance of an agent by such a bond, 5 B. H. C. R. Cr. Ca. 64. See ss 116 and 205 under which agents may appear

10. *When party appears to show cause there must be a regular judicial trial and legal enquiry*.—There must be a regular judicial trial and legal enquiry before the punishment can be inflicted, 12 W. R. 54 = 3 B. L. R. Appx. CLV; 155, 10 C. L. R. 571. 'The language of s 514 does not indicate that the final order making a person bound by a bond to pay can be made without taking any evidence in his presence or giving him an opportunity of cross-examining the witnesses on whose evidence the forfeiture is held to be established' per BANERJEE J. 'Before it can be declared that a bond executed by a surety is forfeited, there must be a formal finding arrived at after taking evidence in the presence of such surety, which evidence must prove that the principal person has so acted as to necessitate or render it advisable that the surety should by reason of the act of the principal forfeit his bond' per WILKINS, J., 25 C. 440.

(i) *No charge to be framed*—See 2 M. 169 Note 6

(ii) *Party must be allowed to adduce evidence and Magistrate must issue summonses for appearance of the defendant's witnesses*—See 11 C. 77; 25 C. 440.

11. *Party charged to have opportunity to cross-examine witnesses*—A Magistrate is not justified in

examined by the party showing cause upon the occasion when cause is shown against the rule, 4 C. 865 (F.B.) = 4 C. L. R. 243. The mere fact of the person for whom another stands surety being convicted of a breach of the peace ought not to be sufficient to make the surety bond executed by the latter liable to forfeiture without any evidence taken in the presence of the surety to show that the forfeiture has been incurred, 25 C. 440.

EVIDENCE

12. *Evidence taken at another trial not legal evidence*.—Evidence taken in another trial and admitted for the purpose of inquiry under this section is no legal evidence against the accused, 12 W. R. 54 = 3 B. L. R. Appx. CLV; 10 C. L. R. 571; 11 B. H. C. R. 170. The record of a case to which the obligor was not a party and which was not tried before the Magistrate by whom the bond in question had been called for, was held to be no evidence as to the obligor's liability in the matter then before the Court, 1891 A. W. N. 183. See also Note 10 above.

13. *Party charged may himself give evidence*—See Note 6 above

14. Admissibility of previous judgment of conviction—

(a) *As against principal*—When the bond is given by the person bound down to keep the peace, the judgment convicting him of a breach of the peace is admissible in evidence against, and may form a sufficient basis for an order under s 514, he having had an opportunity of cross-examining the witnesses on whose evidence the forfeiture is held established, 25 C. 440; 4 C. 885 (F.B.).

(b) *As against the surety* Is it necessary for making the surety liable to re adduce evidence of breach of the bond by the principal?—In the case of a surety bond on condition that it shall be forfeited if the person for whom it is given is convicted of a breach of the peace, the judgment in the case in which such person is convicted would be admissible in evidence against the surety under s. 43 of the *Evidence Act* as evidence of the fact of conviction, which is a relevant fact in the case, 25 C. 440. The mere production of the original record or of a certified copy of the original record of the trial in which the principal had been convicted of breaking the peace within the period covered by a bond would not be conclusive, if indeed it would be any evidence against the surety in a proceeding under this section. Where the bond is given by a surety and the condition in the bond is that it shall be forfeited not if the principal party is convicted of a breach of the peace, but if he commits a breach of the peace, the judgment convicting the principal of a breach of the peace is no evidence against the surety who was no party to it, to prove that the party bound down to keep the peace has really committed a breach of the peace. Such a fact must be proved by evidence taken in the presence of the surety, unless it is admitted by him, 25 C. 440; 11 C. 77. The previous conviction is not an estoppel, because the nature of the proceedings is charged and the surety had never had an opportunity of contesting the conviction, 15 W. R. 87. But this view is not accepted in *Allahabad* and *Punjab*. Where a person has given a security bond under s 118 for the good behaviour of another and the principal during the term for which the bond is in force is convicted of an offence punishable with imprisonment, the production of the conviction, and, if necessary, of proof of identity of the principal is sufficient evidence upon which the Magistrate is authorized to issue notice to the surety under this section to show cause why the penalty of the bond should not be paid. In such a case it is for the surety to show what cause he can. It is not incumbent on the Magistrate to re-summon the witnesses on whose evidence the principal was convicted and practically to re-try the case against the principal, 21 A. 86 followed in 32 P. R. 1903 and 226 P. L. R. 1911 = 12 Cr. L. J. 404. But the conflict of decisions has been set at rest by sub-sec. (7) which is newly inserted. See the *Set. Com. Rep.* in the preliminary note

BREACH AND FORFEITURE

15. Surety-bond must be construed strictly.—See Note 3 to s 499 (i) *Bond not warranted by law cannot be enforced*—When a person was ordered to execute a bond under s 110, but by mistake a bond under s. 107 was taken, held the bond was bad in law and the order forfeiting the security furnished by him was set aside. The order against sureties was also cancelled, 32 P. R. 1903. In a case under s 498, 1 P. C., there is no legal sanction for the Magistrate taking cognizance, to issue a warrant to compel the complainant's wife to attend as a witness without first requiring her to attend by a summons, as required by s 252, and it is only when the summons is neglected that severe measures can be taken. Held, that under the above circumstances the security given by a person standing surety for producing the woman in Court, is against law, and cannot be forfeited, if he fails to carry out the terms of the surety bond. Held, further that in such like cases, forfeiture of the whole sum of security is a harsh measure in the absence of anything to show that the surety was really responsible for the disappearance of the person for whose appearance he stood surety and without inquiry into the circumstances under which he failed to attend, 22 P. R. 1907 = 12 Cr. L. J. 227.

C. Cir., 18th March, 1868, No 480.

(ii) *Failure to appear on day other than fixed works no forfeiture*—Where a defendant charged with an offence bound himself to appear on a day fixed and did appear accordingly, but made default on the next day on which the case was called, held, that there was no forfeiture of recognizance, 4 M. H. C. R. App. XLIV (*Madras Rules*, pp 13 and 14). When the bond executed conditioned that the accused should attend on a specified date, and default was made on a date other than the specified date, it was held the penalty should not legally be enforced, Weir II, 663. B having bound himself by personal recognizance to appear at a Magistrate's Court on the 17th January, 1890, or until the disposal of the case, A executed a bond as surety for B's appearance at the aforesaid Court on the aforesaid date. The bond was not in accordance with Form III or XLII of Sch. V

of the Code, there being no provision in the bond for the continued attendance of *B* until otherwise directed by the Court, or for *B*'s attending on every day of the inquiry *B* failed to appear on the 3rd June, 1880 to which day the hearing had been adjourned. *He* held that the surety-bond must be construed strictly and as according to the grammatical construction of the bond, *A* did not bind himself to secure the attendance of *B* on any date other than the 17th January 1880. *A*'s bond was not forfeited. *Ratanlal* 557. A Magistrate fixed the hearing of a case on a Sunday, and on the following Monday took up the case and on account of the non-appearance of the accused ordered the forfeiture of the bonds executed by the accused and their sureties. *He* held that in the particular circumstances of the case, it was not the intention of the petitioners not to answer to their bail, and that it was the Courts duty to take to the date at which they were not bound to appear on the day following the bond is ought not therefore to have been forfeited. 2 C. W. N. 519.

(iii) *Bail to appear before a Court other than fixed courts is voidable*—When the surety-bond guaranteed that the accused should appear before a Deputy Magistrate before whom the case was pending but the case was subsequently transferred to the Court of the District Magistrate before whom the accused failed to appear *He* held that the non-appearance of the accused at the Court of the District Magistrate was no breach of the condition of the bond, which only guaranteed, the appearance of the accused before the Deputy Magistrate. 30 C. 107. Where the understanding in a bail bond was to produce the accused in the Sessions Court on every date that may be fixed by the Court or wherever required and in case of default and subsequently the District Magistrate called on the sureties to produce the accused before him and on their failure to do so declared the bond forfeited, *He* held that the sureties were not bound to produce before the District Magistrate, in the words "wherever required" meant only that a requisition might be made by the Court of Sessions for the production of the accused in that Court, 35 C. 748. A bail-bond providing only for the production of certain accused persons before the Sessions Court on a certain date is complied with by the appearance of the accused before such Court on such date, and the sureties are not bound to produce them subsequently before the District Magistrate. A bail-bond to produce the accused in the Sessions Court on a given date fixed for the hearing on appeal, or whenever required is also complied with by the attendance of the accused during the hearing and though a requisition might be made by the Court of Sessions for the subsequent production in that Court, the sureties are not bound to produce them thereafter before the District Magistrate. A bail-bond should contain a clear provision for the production of the accused before the Court or officer who is to take measures to secure their surrender and to recommit them to jail in terms of the warrant.—*Graham* *Arrest and Order or Orders (Originals) of the High Court of the 1st July 119 referred to*. Where a surety conditioned that he would be responsible for the continued presence of an accused person at one Court. *And* it was held that the surety was released from liability under his recognizance by the permission which the Court at A—*And* gave the accused with the surety's consent of leaving that place on business and also by subsequent transfer of the case to another Court—the Court at Gra. 13 W. R. 53. A bail bond by which the sureties bind themselves to be responsible for the appearance of the accused, during the preliminary inquiry in a case cannot be forfeited if the accused abscond after the preliminary inquiry and during the trial at the Sessions. 9 W. R. 85, 48 A. L. J. 631, 2 Rang. 551.

(iv) *Bail to appear before a Court other than fixed courts is voidable*—Every bond taken under the provisions of the Code to secure the performance of a promise must necessarily include a money penalty in the event of such promise. A document which does not provide for penalty or forfeiture of any kind is mere waste paper. 17 C. P. L. R. 113 or 1 C. L. J. 354.

(v) *Bail to appear before a Court other than fixed courts is voidable*—Where the condition of bail-bond, given by the accused and by the surety was that the accused should appear when called upon it was held that the accused and the surety were entitled to reasonable notice of the time at which the former would be required to attend.—*W. H. C. P. L. R. 44 C. W. N. 187, 5 M. H. C. R. Appx. XV, 4 M. H. C. R. Appx. XLV*. The surety is always allowed a fixed time within which to produce the accused. 1555 A. W. N. 41.

(vi) *Bail to appear before a Court other than fixed courts is voidable*—There is nothing illegal in requiring defendants on bail to execute recognizance to appear from time to time as they may be required until the close of the trial. Before proceeding to enforce the penalty it is not necessary to give them notice.—(*H. C. P. L. R. 114 C. W. N. 187, 1 A. 1880*). There is nothing illegal in requiring accused persons to execute recognizance to appear on every day from the date of the execution of the recognizance until the close of the trial, 6 M. H. C. R. Appx. XXXVIII. A person executed a bail for appearing at the first inquiry or at other times required. He appeared on the first day mentioned in the bond and was verbally directed to appear on a subsequent day. He failed to comply with the verbal direction to attend at a certain time and place. It was held that there was

no illegality in the forfeiture of his recognizance, *Weir II*, 653. The liability under a bond conditioned for the appearance in Court 'up to the conclusion of the case,' does not cease until the accused appears for receiving sentence and not when the Judge finds that the case against the accused is proved, 32 P. R. 1914 = 16 Cr. L. J. 74.

16. *Sureties to a bail-bond discharged on suicide of accused.*—Where an accused has committed suicide, the sureties are not liable for the default of his appearance, and the fact that the sureties did not take steps to prevent the accused from committing suicide, even though such possibility may have passed through their mind, does not amount to such neglect or default as to make them liable on the bond, 37 M. 156; 16 C. W. N. 550 = 13 Cr. L. J. 592. The principle laid down in *Merrick v. Vander*, 6 Term Rep. 50 and *Falkner v. Critico*, 13 East 457 and *Robertson v. Pitterson* 7 East 405 followed, see also 18 Bom. L. R. 683 = 17 Cr. L. J. 393.

17. *What amounts to a breach of bond for keeping the peace.*—See Notes 112 and 113 at p 210. "It has frequently been held that a bond to keep the peace cannot be forfeited except on proof of the commission of an offence involving a breach of the peace and that the use of the word 'probably' in Form X, Sch. V, limits forfeiture to cases in which a breach of the peace is the probable and not merely the possible result of the act of the person bound over. Thus a conviction for theft or for wrongful confinement and extortion will not justify a forfeiture of such bond (18 W. R. 63; 19 W. R. 43), nor will a conviction for the abduction of a woman (7 P. R. 1906). In the present case a secret attempt to poison a person cannot reasonably be regarded as an offence which would probably result in a breach of the peace, 22 P. R. 1912 = 47 P. W. R. 1914 = 262 P. L. R. 194 = 15 Cr. L. J. 605. Before a recognizance can be forfeited, it must be proved that the accused person has either personally broken the peace, or abetted some other person or persons in breaking it. The mere fact that the accused is a servant of one of the two rival parties for whose benefit the breach took place is not sufficient, 11 W. R. 52. A person bound down to keep the peace, some time afterwards, wrongfully confined and extorted a sum of money from two ryots, who were supposed to have committed theft on his lands. For this offence he was fined, and his recognizance was forfeited. Held, that the matter ought to have ended with the fine, and the order as to forfeiture of recognizance was bad as no breach of the peace had occurred, for the ryots had offered no resistance, 19 W. R. 43. See also 18 W. R. 63. In 7 P. R. 1906 = 4 Cr. L. J. 278, a person was bound over to keep the peace, or, not to do any act which would cause a breach of the peace. He, however, committed the offence of abduction within the period covered by the bond. Held, that the bond was not liable to forfeiture, the possible consequence of the offence committed being too remote to render the offender liable to forfeit his bond."

18. *What amounts to breach of bond for good behaviour.*—See s. 121 and Note 111 at p 209. The powers of determining the extent, if any, to which a conviction should justify the rigorous measure of forfeiture, should be reasonably and moderately exercised, 7 P. W. R. 1914 = 62 P. L. R. 1914 = 15 Cr. L. J. 435. The man who stands surety for another should always be treated in a considerate manner and it is contrary to all principles of justice that he should be held liable for a sudden act of violence, especially when he himself belongs to another village and has no possible opportunity of controlling the every-day life of the offender. When men stand surety in respect of s. 110 they undertake liability for such good conduct only on the part of the person for whom they stand surety as is indicated by the circumstances under which the security was demanded. No man would ever undertake to be a surety if he was thereby compelled to undergo liability for any conceivable form of offence committed by the person for whom he stood surety, 15 P. R. 1913 = 14 Cr. L. J. 575. In this case A was required to give security for being suspected as a thief and receiver of stolen property, and B stood as his surety. A was subsequently convicted on a serious charge for an offence under s. 326, I P. C., held that B's bond should not be forfeited. See also 16 P. R. 1912 = 11 Cr. L. J. 393. A person who stands surety for good behaviour was convicted under the action under this section, although he had exercised the discretion conferred on him by sub-sec. (5) of this section, 1906 A. W. N. 13 = 3 Cr. L. J. 91. Good behaviour includes peace and he that is bound to be of good behaviour, is therein also bound to keep the peace, (4 Staph. Comm. 376). See s. 121 and Notes thereunder.

18-A. *Bond may be in one district and breach in another.*—See Note 114 at p. 210

19. *Compounding of offence will not prevent forfeiture.*—A Magistrate is not prevented from taking steps under this section in cases in which a breach of the peace has been committed and the parties acting privately had compounded the offence, 26 A. 202.

20. Is it necessary to take action immediately after breach?—See Note 116 at p 211 If on failure of

recognizance, the Magistrate ought, at the time of making the order in respect of the second alleged offence, to take into consideration the fact that there is an outstanding recognizance, and determine once for all whether he will proceed on it or not. If he does not make any order for forfeiture of the recognizance, it must be taken that he is determined not to proceed on it for that particular breach, and he cannot after the expiration of the period covered by the recognizance, and after making an order for such second charge re-consider and add to such order by directing the forfeiture of the recognizance, 1 C. L. R. 134; also 3 C. L. R. 406, 25 C. 440. He cannot proceed piecemeal by passing a sentence and subsequently passing an order for forfeiture. When he orders forfeiture, he should inflict lighter punishment than he would otherwise inflict 26 P. R. 1904. But in 26 A. 202 these Rulings were entirely disapproved of, and it was held that a Magistrate who convicts a person (already bound over under Chapter VII) of an offence involving a breach of the peace and passes an appealable sentence, may very well wait until the period of appeal has expired or when an appeal has been filed, till it is decided, before he proceeds to take action under this section. Also when a Magistrate so convicting is unaware of the fact of the accused being bound over, he can institute proceedings under this section only when he becomes aware of the execution of the recognizance bonds. Cases may also occur in which subsequent proceedings taken after the lapse of a considerable time may be held bad. In view of the conflict of views on this point, a Full Bench of the Punjab Chief Court considered the point again and held that when convicting a person of an offence involving the forfeiture of the bond for the peace, if a Magistrate, who has knowledge of the fact that the person before him, has by his conduct forfeited his bond, does not make any order for forfeiture, he must be taken to have decided not to take action on the bond in respect of that particular breach of the peace and that he cannot thereafter re-consider and add to his order by directing forfeiture of the recognizance, 13 P. R. 1913 = 7 P. W. R. 1913 = 14 Cr. L. J. 67 approving of 26 P. R. 1904 = 1 Cr. L. J. 1100, 6 P. W. R. 1915 = 95 P. L. R. 1915 = 16 Cr. L. J. 194. See also 32 P. R. 1903. In 44 A. 657 it was held that where proceedings for the forfeiture of a bond for keeping the peace have been commenced before the expiry of the period for which the bond was given the fact that such period has expired is no bar to their continuance, (26 A. 202 referred to)

21. Does the bond continue to be in force after it is once forfeited?—Further breach within the period covered by the bond—When a bond for good behaviour is broken and the punishment for such breach is completely suffered before the period named in the bond expires, the sureties, when paying the forfeiture should be asked, whether they agree to the bond continuing in force, and if they do not agree, the Magistrate should proceed under s 126 (3) and demand fresh security, 1904 U. B. R. 13. In 4 C. W. N. 121, there was, however, an *obiter dictum* that a security to keep the peace once given is sufficient for that purpose so long as it remains in force, in respect of every act of the person bound over breaking any of its conditions. But, having regard to the language of Sch. V, No 11, this view is not correct, because the terms of the bond are "*in case of making default*" and not "*in every case of making default*."

Partial enforcement of bond extinguishes it wholly—See Note 118 at p 211. The forfeiture of a part only of the amount of a bond operates as a remission of the balance, and therefore the right of the State to recover such balance is at an end, and it cannot be regarded as forming the penalty of a new bond. A furnished security in Rs 150 for his good behaviour for three years. He committed a breach of the bond and Rs 25 of the penalty were forfeited. He again committed an assault under s 352, I P C, within the said three years, and the Magistrate proceeded to forfeit Rs 25 of the aforesaid bond. Held that his order was bad in law, 11 P. R. 1889.

22. Are both principal and surety liable to pay on forfeiture of bond?—See Note 117 at p. 211. A person who executes a bail bond for the appearance of an accused is not a security in regard to the accused's bond, but has himself undertaken to produce the accused or in default to forfeit a sum of money. Therefore on forfeiture of the bond, the surety is not discharged by the fact that the property of the accused has been sold under s. 88 and forfeited to the Government and the amount of the accused's own bail bond has been recovered, 10 Cr. L. J. 294 (M). Upon the forfeiture of a bond by a person to keep the peace for a term (s 107) the surety is liable to pay the amount specified in the bond in addition to the penalty paid by the principal. The object of requiring sureties is not to ensure the recovery of the bond from the principal, but to serve as an additional security for the principals keeping the peace (see 20 A. 206). This is not a case of ordinary suretyship for the

payment of money, 36 C. 562 dissenting from 1903 U. B. R. (Cr. P. C.) 31 = 2 Cr. L. J. 443, where it is held that when the amount of the bond has been collected from the person bound over, there is no warrant for making a fresh demand on the sureties. The sureties required by s. 107 or s. 110 are merely sureties in the ordinary sense of the term. They undertake that the principal will be of good behaviour, and in case of a breach, the principal and sureties are jointly and severally liable for the sum named in the bond and no more. The penalty is not required to be paid twice over. See also 25 P. R. 1894. In my opinion the sureties to such are ordinary sureties. When A promises in a bond to pay Rs. 10 to B on a certain contingency arising, and C and D subscribe an undertaking to be sureties for A it can only mean that B, at most is entitled to a penalty of Rs. 10 which he can recover on the said contingency arising from anyone or all of three persons concerned, it is left to the option of the Government to select from among the three men that one against whom it will proceed, or it pleases, it may proceed against all three or any two and recover such fractions from each as it may think fit, 225 P. L. R. 1911 = 12 Cr. L. J. 404.

22-A. Forfeiture of bond against surety where principal is not bound.—One R. K. was arrested in Gwalior under warrant issued at Montgomery. He was released on bail on C. S. standing surety for him. He failed to appear before the Magistrate at Montgomery, and that officer forfeited C. S.'s security. The arrest of R. K. was thereafter found by the High Court to have been illegal and C. S. then applied for revision of the order of forfeiture, held, that although R. K. the principal, was under the circumstances not liable on his bond the surety C. S. was not free from liability on that account. 5 128 of the Contract Act only explains the quantum of a surety's obligation when the terms of the contract do not limit and has no reference to the nature of the obligation of the principal, 2 Lat. 204 (19 B. 597 *followed*).

23. Order for imprisonment cannot be made before attachment and sale of property.—The words "and cannot be recovered by such attachment and sale" indicate that it is not competent to a Magistrate to direct that in default of payment, the person whose recognizance is forfeited should be imprisoned, without first ordering an attachment and sale of his moveable property, 10 C. L. R. 571.

24. Recovery of penalty is no bar to prosecution under Penal Code.—There is nothing in this section which prevents an accused person who has forfeited his bail-bond by default of appearance, from being proceeded against under s. 174, I P. C., notwithstanding his surety has paid the penalty mentioned in the recognizance, 10 W. R. 4 = 1 B. L. R. Cr. 1.

25. Liability of representative of deceased surety.—Sub-sec. (6) by which 'the estate of the deceased in the hands of his representatives will be liable where the liability has accrued before his death is new'. It was held the words "person bound" do not include the representative of a deceased surety, and such representative is not liable to be proceeded against in a summary proceeding under Chapter XLII, 23 P. R. 1894.

26. Portion of penalty may be remitted.—Revision.—The High Court it was formerly held had no power to reduce the amount of recognizances which have been forfeited, but in the case of hardship the matter should be referred to Government, 3 C. 757 = 2 C. L. R. 408; also 8 C. L. R. 72, 19 W. R. 1; Ratanlal 20; 2 P. R. 1883. But all these cases are no longer law, being decided under the old Codes. Now, the present Code (sub-

ARVER, J, in Cr. Rev. Case No. 77 of 1907, *Madras High Court*. See Note 2 to s. 515. In 6 P. R. 1915 = 16 Cr. L. J. 287, the High Court revised the order directing the forfeiture of a bond and ordered a part only of the penalty to be levied.

27. Contract by principal to indemnify his surety is illegal.—An indemnity bond executed by the accused in favour of his surety cannot be enforced, the consideration being illegal, 32 B. 449 following *Hermen v. Jeuchner*, 15 Q. B. D. 581. Money deposited with the surety by the principal for such a purpose cannot be recovered back, 1 A. 751.

AMERICAN LAW AND CASES

28. Analogous law under the New York Code.—Compare ss. 593, 594, 595 and 597 of the N. Y. Cr. Pro. C. Therein it is laid down that—(s. 593). If, without sufficient excuse, the defendant neglect to appear for arraignment, or for trial or judgment, or upon any other occasion where his presence in Court may be lawfully required, or to surrender himself in execution of the judgment, the Court must direct the fact to entered upon its minutes, the undertaking of his bail or the money deposited instead of

be, is thereupon forfeited. (S 594) If, at any time before the final judgment of the Court, the defendant appear and satisfactorily excuse his neglect, the Court may direct the forfeiture of the undertaking, or deposit to be discharged, upon such terms as are just (S 595) If the forfeiture be not discharged, the district attorney may, at any time after the adjournment of the Court, proceed against any surety upon his undertaking, such proceeding shall be by action only (S 597) After the forfeiture of the undertaking or deposit as provided in this Article, the Court directing the forfeiture may remit the forfeiture, or any part thereof, upon such terms as are just. It will be seen that the above procedure refers to principal, *i. e.* defendant and his surety, and the remedy for enforcement of forfeiture of bail is by action With these exceptions the law is the same as that laid down in this section.

29. Forfeiture of the bond.—Bastardy proceedings instituted against the defendant were adjourned from 28th May to 7th June On that day the defendant appeared and the hearing proceeded throughout the day, and were adjourned by consent to 26th June, on which day the defendant failed to appear At the time of the first adjournment a bond with two sureties was given which recited the proceedings and the adjournment to 7th June It was conditioned to be void, if the said defendant should personally be and appear before the Justice at the time and place aforesaid, and not depart therefrom without the leave of the Justices On the second adjournment, the defendant and one of the sureties were present. It was stated by Counsel for the two parties, in their presence that the bond was to be held good. *Held*, that the sureties were not discharged from liability by the second adjournment.—*People v Mithan*, 100 N. Y. 273; 4 N. Y. Cr. Rep. 127; but see *People v Swales*, 33 Hun 208 It a party, bound by a recognizance, be subsequently arrested on a Bench warrant, before a forfeiture and he escapes his bail is discharged. *People v Slager*, 10 Wend. 431. An arrest on a Bench warrant after a forfeiture does not release the bail, *People v Annable*, 7 Hill, 33. A recognizance is forfeited though the defendant appear, if he depart before the conclusion of the trial. *People v McCoy*, 59 Barb. 73. It is no defence to an action on a recognizance for appearance that no indictment was found against the principal at such Court. *Champlain v People*, 2 N. Y. 82. A party under recognizance to appear may be called upon on any day during the continuance of the Court without notice. *People v Blankman*, 17 Wend 252. If the defendant be called at any stage of the trial, and fail to appear and answer, the recognizance may be declared forfeited. *People v Pettry*, 2 Hill 523. There is a breach of the recognizance if the defendant, though corporally present, does not answer when called. *People v Wigfus*, 5 Den. 58.

30. Defence to forfeiture.—It is a good defence to an action on a recognizance for a person's appearance to answer a criminal charge that he had been arrested and committed to jail in another country. *People v Bartlet*, 3 Hill, 870. It is a valid excuse for non appearance of the principal that he had enlisted as a soldier in the United States. *People v Chusney*, 44 Barb. 118. When recognizance is conditioned for the appearance of the defendant on a certain day, and from time to time as directed by the Justice, and proceedings are adjourned at a time when the defendant is not present, there cannot be a forfeiture of the recognizance at a subsequent adjourned day. *People v Scott*, 67 N. Y. 585

31. Remission of forfeiture.—A judgment on a forfeited recognizance will not be discharged because of the illness of the surety at the time the recognizance was forfeited. *People v Muhan*, 14 Daly 333. A judgment entered against surety and principal respectively on a forfeited recognizance will be cancelled on motion where it appears that, subsequent to the forfeiture, the accused person had appeared, was tried and paid the fine imposed. *People v Bossemecker*, 27 Week Dig 337. A judgment entered on a forfeited recognizance taken in a special sessions in a prosecution for assault and battery will be vacated where it is shown that the complainant appeared and acknowledged satisfaction for the injury and requested the discharge of the defendant, *People v Grossman*, 5 N. Y. Sup. 446 To warrant the discharge of a judgment upon a forfeited recognizance, it must be shown to the Court that the accused did not escape conviction through the absence of the prosecutor and witness.—*People v Flegenheiser*, 15 State Rep 376.

* **514-A.** When any surety to a bond under this Code becomes insolvent or dies, or when any bond is forfeited under the provisions of section 514, the Court, by whose order such bond was taken, or a Presidency Magistrate or Magistrate of the first class, may order the person from whom such security was demanded to furnish fresh security in accordance with the directions of the original order, and, if such security is not furnished, such Court or Magistrate may proceed as if there had been a default in complying with such original order

Procedure in case of insolvency or death of surety or when a bond is forfeited.

Bond required from a minor

* **514-B.** When the person required by any Court or officer to execute a bond is a minor, such Court or officer may accept in lieu thereof a bond executed by a surety or sureties only

Appeal from and revision of orders under s. 514

515. All orders passed under section 514 by any Magistrate other than a Presidency Magistrate or District Magistrate shall be appealable to the District Magistrate, or, if not so appealed may be revised by him

Notes.—1 First-class Magistrate not competent to hear appeal.—A first-class Magistrate not being a District Magistrate has no jurisdiction to hear an appeal against the order of a second-class Magistrate enforcing the penalty on forfeiture of a bond under s. 514. *Ratanlal 255*; a Sessions Judge is not competent to hear the appeal *2 M 169*. See s. 570 (a) as to the result of a Magistrate not duly authorized revising an order under s. 514. See also 15 P. R. 1903

2. High Court may revise District Magistrate's orders.—The cases in 3 C. 757 = 2 C. L. R. 403 and 19 W. R. 1 decided under the Codes of 1861 and 1872 are no longer of any authority. The jurisdiction of the High Court under ss. 439 and 423 (c) is very wide and gives it the power to revise orders under this section. This general power is not taken away by the power of revision given to the District Magistrate by the section as the jurisdiction of a superior Court cannot be taken away except by express words or necessary implication (see 4 B. 624) 5 C. L. R. 179 = 13 Cr. L. J. 31. See also 15 P. R. 1903 = 2 Cr. L. J. 131 and Note 26 to s. 514

Power to direct levy of amount due on certain recognizances

516. The High Court or Court of Session may direct any Magistrate to levy the amount due on a bond to appear and attend at such High Court or Court of Session

Note.—Scope of section.—Section 516 is only concerned with the power to direct the levy of the amount due and not with the forfeiture which is a condition precedent to the levy. The procedure on forfeiture is defined by s. 514. A power to try the forfeiture of the bond cannot be delegated under this section. *14 C. W. N. 259 = 10 Cr. L. J. 248.*

CHAPTER XLIII

OF THE DISPOSAL OF PROPERTY

† **516-A.** When any property regarding which any offence appears to have been committed or which appears to have been used for the commission of any offence is produced before any Criminal Court during any inquiry or trial, the Court may make such order as it thinks fit for the proper custody of such property pending the conclusion of the inquiry or trial and if the property is subject to speedy or natural decay, may after recording such evidence as it thinks necessary order it to be sold or otherwise disposed of

Note.—Section 516-A is a new section enabling the Court to pass orders for the custody or disposal of property during an inquiry whereas under the old law under s. 517 an order for the disposal of property could only be made on the conclusion of an inquiry or trial.

517. (1) When an inquiry or a trial in any Criminal Court is concluded the Court may make such order as it thinks fit for the disposal ‡ by destruction confiscation or delivery to any person claiming to be entitled to possession thereof or otherwise § of any property or document produced before it or in its custody or regarding which any offence appears to have been committed or which has been used for the commission of any offence

Order for disposal of property regarding which offence committed.

* Sect on 514 B was inserted by Act XVIII of 1923

† Sect on 516 A was inserted by Act XVIII of 1923 s. 141

‡ The words — were inserted by *ibid*

(2) When a High Court or a Court of Session makes such order and cannot through its own officers conveniently deliver the property to the person entitled thereto, such Court may direct that the order be carried into effect by the District Magistrate

* "(3) When an order is made under this section such order shall not, except where the property is livestock or subject to speedy and natural decay, and save as provided by sub-section (4), be carried out for one month, or, when an appeal is presented, until such appeal has been disposed of"

† "(4) Nothing in this section shall be deemed to prohibit any Court from delivering any property under the provisions of sub-section (1) to any person claiming to be entitled to the possession thereof, on his executing a bond with or without sureties to the satisfaction of the Court, engaging to restore such property to the Court if the order made under this section is modified or set aside on appeal"

Explanation †.—In this section the term "property" includes, in the case of property regarding which an offence appears to have been committed, not only such property as has been originally in the possession or under the control of any party, but also any property into or for which the same may have been converted or exchanged and anything acquired by such conversion or exchange, whether immediately or otherwise

Note.—Amendments.—Sub-sec. (1) is amended so as to make it clear that the phrase "disposal of property" means disposal by destruction, confiscation, etc. See 28 C. W. N. 1094.

Under sub-sec. (3) the period of one month is allowed for the presentation of an appeal or an application for revision where this is allowed

Sub-sec. (4) which is newly added enables the Court to restore the property to the possession of any person claiming it.

Notes—1. Scope of section as enlarged Magistrate may deal with any property mentioned therein irrespective of commission of any offence.—To enable a Court to act under this section, the property or document in question (a) must be produced before it, or (b) be in its custody, or (c) it must appear that an offence has been committed regarding it, or (d) it must have been used for the commission of any offence, and one of these conditions at least, must exist in an inquiry or trial in such Court. The operation of this section has been enlarged so as to enable a Magistrate to pass orders for the disposal of any property produced before him—*Statement of Objects and Reasons*. Under the previous Codes, the words "any property" were held to include as well property voluntarily produced before the Magistrate by a witness in the case, as property seized by the Police or found on the person of the accused, 12 B. H. C. R. Cr. Ca. 217. Under s. 517 of the Code of 1882, the Magistrate could make "such order as it thinks fit for the disposal of any document or other property produced before it regarding which any offence appears to have been committed or which has been used for the commission of any offence." See 24 C. 499; 1 B. 630; 46 P. R. 1833; 10 B. 197; 14 C. 834. And it had further been held that the application of that section must be limited to the offence actually under investigation in an inquiry or trial. See Ratanlal 500. Under the present Code the scope of the section, as stated above is very much enlarged though the marginal note is left as it was. The words "or in its custody or" are newly inserted. Under the provisions of this section as it now stands amended, the Magistrate has now power to pass an order regarding the property produced before, or in the custody of the Court, even though no offence has been committed in respect of it, 34 C. 347. An order may be passed now, under this section, even though there has been no conviction or offence proved in which the property produced has been used, if it appears to the Court that any offence has been committed, irrespective of the charge or the result of it, Weir II, 666; 16 M. L. J. (Sh. N.), 4; 11 Cr. L. J. 138 (M.). 1893 A. W. N. 61; 16 Cr. L. J. 811. The Rulings in Ratanlal 500 and 981 and 46 P. R. 1833 are no longer law. The Ruling in 30 C. 690, though under the present Code, seems to be erroneous, being based upon the Rulings

* Sub-sec. (3) was substituted for the original sub-sec. (3) by Act XVIII of 1923, s. 142

† Sub-sec. (4) was inserted by Act XVIII of 1913, s. 142

‡ Cf. The Lottery Act XXIV and XXV Vict. Chap. 86 s. 1

under the previous Codes. In that case in acquitting the accused, the Magistrate made an order, directing the idol, in respect of which the alleged offence was said to have been committed, to be delivered to the person in whose possession it was found. The Sessions Judge dismissed the appeal from this order, on the ground that the order, was not one under this section, as no offence was committed in respect of it. In revision, it was contended that the idol was practically in the custody of the Court, as the Magistrate who entertained the complaint, passed a provisional order, delivering the idol to the petitioner, on his giving security and directing him to produce it before the Court, whenever called upon to do so—an order not justified by the Code, 7 C. W. N. 522. The High Court erroneously held that no offence having been committed, the order directing the restoration of the idol was not an order under this section and was therefore not appealable under s. 520. The High Court did not deal with the question of the custody of the Court. The High Court has power also, under s. 423 (1) (d) to make any consequential or incidental order that may be just or proper. Therefore it might well pass an order under this section read with s. 430 as a Court of Revision, and thus exercise, in any event, the powers of an Appellate Court. See also 8 C. W. N. 719; 9 C. W. N. 533 = 2 Cr. L. J. 269. In 34 C. 936 it has been held that the first part of s. 517 appears to have reference to cases of offences relating to property or relating to documents, *eg.*, where the Court directs as in cases of theft, or criminal misappropriation or offences of similar description that the property which is stolen or misappropriated be restored to its owner and the last words of the section—“*which has been used for the commission of any offence*” must refer to cases of the same nature, *i.e.*, to instruments like guns and swords produced in Court.

2. Scope of ss. 517 and 523.—s. 523 applies only to cases where the Police act *pro motu* and does not provide a procedure alternative to that provided by s. 517. See 17 B. 743; 22 B. 844, 2 A. 276; 1 B. 630. FULTON, J., however, in 26 B. 552, was of opinion that s. 523 applied equally whether the seizure by the Police is made under a Magistrate's warrant or without a warrant. See Notes to s. 523.

3. When sample is produced in Court, whole bulk taken to be produced.—When a portion of salt earth, salt or other article in bulk is produced and received in evidence as a sample of the bulk, the whole bulk is to be taken to have been produced before the Court, within the meaning of this section, Weir II, 670.

IN RESPECT OF WHAT PROPERTY OR DOCUMENT ORDER MAY BE MADE.

4. Does section deal with immovable property?—This section does not apply to immovable property. If the word ‘property’ comprehends both moveable and immovable property, s. 517 then becomes much more comprehensive in its meaning than s. 522 which would thus be superfluous (33 C. 372 *referred to*), 18 C. W. N. 1146 = 15 Cr. L. J. 175; see also 36 C. 44; 1900 A. W. N. 81. In 4 L. B. R. 229 = 7 Cr. L. J. 490, it was however held that the word ‘property’ includes immovable property.

5. Disposal of property found in accused's possession as to which no offence is committed.—In a case of criminal breach of trust, a Magistrate directed by his order that out of the money and ornaments recovered by the Police, the sum equal to the amount embezzled by the defendant (accused) should be made over to the complainant and the balance should remain with the Police until further orders pending the disposal of the other case—*vide* s. 517. Held, that there was nothing to show upon the record that any offence was committed in regard to the property found by the Police on the person of the accused or that it was used for the commission of any offence and that the Magistrate had no authority to make the order he did, 24 C. 499; Weir II, 665. But the correctness of this ruling may be doubted having regard to the enlarged scope of the present section, Weir II, 665. See also 9 C. W. N. 549 and 22 B. 844; 34 C. 347 *dissenting from* 30 C. 690; 11 Bom. L. R. 16 = 9 Cr. L. J. 162. In Ratanlal 536, it was laid down that, where an offence appears to have been committed regarding the money produced in a case, the Magistrate is entitled to refrain from making an order under this section, but if necessary, proceedings may be taken under s. 523 42 M. 9.

6. Property remotely connected with the offence committed cannot be dealt with.—A boat illegally used for hire in contravention of *Bombay Act II of 1884* cannot be sold under this section. Neither this section nor the *Bombay Public Ferry Act of 1884* does warrant such sale, Ratanlal 688. A man may use a *lathe* or other instrument for committing an offence and doubtless such a weapon can be dealt with under this section. But boats which were used by the accused in going to commit the theft or in escaping from pursuit, cannot be dealt with under this section. If it could be so regarded one might conceive a unlawful trade, would be its in publication, but the Printing Press in which seditious matters have been printed, cannot be said to be property which has been used for the commission of an offence within the meaning of this section, the Press being but a remote instrument,

34 C. 985. The accused was convicted of the offence of rash driving under s 279, I. P. C., and the convicting Magistrate passed an order under this section that the cart, pony and harness which the accused was driving should be sold and the sale-proceeds paid over to complainant as compensation, *held* the order was illegal. **9 P. L. R. 1904 = 1 Cr. L. J. 38.** See also **37 P. W. R. 1907 = 8 Cr. L. J. 411; 8 C. W. N. 887; 4 P. L. R. 1904, 5 N. L. R. 59 = 9 Cr. L. J. 539.**

Property falsely alleged to be stolen—The petitioner falsely charged A with having stolen certain articles which were subsequently found in the petitioner's possession. The petitioner was convicted under s 182 I. P. C., and the Magistrate directed the articles to be sold and the proceeds credited to Government. The High Court set aside the order and directed them to be restored to the petitioner, **9 C. W. N. 897 = 2 Cr. L. J. 273.** See also **9 M. 448** *Contra* **24 M. L. J. 1, Note 12 (1).**

7. Money given as bribe to public servant may be dealt with.—A public servant was convicted under s 161, I. P. C., and the Magistrate passed an order under s 418, Act X of 1872, in respect of money produced by one of the witnesses and alleged to have been given as a bribe. The High Court set aside this order, remarking that the section was inapplicable as it merely authorized the Magistrate to declare the ownership of the property which had been the subject of an offence, **Weir II, 665.** This was under the 1872 Code, but now the order of the Magistrate would be right as the money given as bribe may be considered as property which has been used for the commission of an offence **Weir II, 665 (footnote)**. See also **Weir II, 666** and the confiscation order made in the ruling printed at **Weir I, 834.**

8 Disposal of property to which original may have been converted or exchanged.—In view of the explanation, the objection that the coins directed to be returned are not the identical coins sold is unsustainable, **4 S. L. 253 = 12 Cr. L. J. 397.** The words 'conversion' and 'exchange' must be taken in their ordinary sense. They apply to such acts as the melting down of gold and silver ornaments and the exchange of notes for cash. Where, therefore, A obtained a decree against B fraudulently on a forged note and in execution of the decree purchased B's garden and took possession thereof and was subsequently convicted of forgery and cheating, *held* that it was not open to the convicting Court to direct restoration of the garden to B as it could not be said that the garden was property acquired by the conversion or exchange of the forged promissory note into or for a decree, **4 Bur. L. T. 211 = 12 Cr. L. J. 473.**

9. No order as to thing not in existence when offence committed.—A Magistrate has no authority to make an order under this section in respect of a thing which was not in existence when the offence was committed, e.g., an innocent purchaser of a stolen cow cannot be ordered to deliver up the calf which he got while the cow was in his possession **10 M. 25.**

WHEN ORDER MAY BE MADE.

10 Order may be made only when there has been enquiry or trial.—When an order directing delivery of property is made by a Magistrate without any criminal proceedings before him or any other Magistrate, but merely on the application of the person in whose favour such order is made, such an order is entirely without jurisdiction and this section cannot apply to the case, **6 C. L. J. 707 = 6 Cr. L. J. 402.** Similarly, in **5 C. L. J. 229 = 5 Cr. L. J. 147**, an order passed by a Magistrate directing delivery of property to the complainant, merely upon a complaint that some accused persons were detaining it unlawfully is illegal. The High Court, as a Court of Revision, set aside such an order, but declined to make a further order for restoration, on the ground that it would be illegal to do so.

(i) No order may be made when accused dies before trial.—When a person charged before a Magistrate with criminal breach of trust in respect of certain jewels, died before trial, and before any evidence was recorded and the alleged owner of the jewels which were recovered by the Police from the pledges and sent to the Magistrate along with the charge-sheet, applied to be put in possession of them under this section and s 523 after inquiry as to their ownership, *held*, that this section did not apply to the case and further that as there was no evidence or finding about ownership, s 523 did not apply and that the Magistrate was not bound to hold an inquiry simply to determine the ownership of the jewels. The case not coming therefore either under this section or s 523 there was nothing to authorize the Magistrate to depart from the general rule that property taken under the authority of the law, for a particular purpose should on the fulfilment of the purpose go back to the custody whence it was taken, **29 M. 375**, where **23 B 844** and **17 B 748** are referred to.

(ii) No order where trial is barred under s 403.—Where the trial of a person is barred under s 403 it is not open to the Magistrate to pass an order regarding the disposal of property under this section as such

an order could only be made "when an inquiry or trial in a Criminal Court is concluded." The trial having been barred by s. 403 there was no inquiry or trial at all within the meaning of s. 517, 4 L. B. R. 279 = 7 Cr. L. J. 490.

(iii) *No order when complaint is dismissed*.—A Magistrate cannot pass any order under this section when dismissing the complaint under s. 203 as it cannot be said that there was any enquiry or trial before him, 25 M. L. J. 1 = 14 Cr. L. J. 27. Section 517 applies only when an inquiry or trial is concluded.

(i) *Can any order be made when accused is absconding?*—See 25 B. 552.

11. *Order ought not to be made before conclusion of inquiry or trial.*—An order under this section cannot be made before the conclusion of the trial. *A* was charged with theft in respect of gold and silver ornaments of *B* and *C* with having dishonestly received and disposed of them, under ss. 411 and 414, I. P. C. In the course of an investigation the Police seized from *D* ingots of gold and silver into which they alleged *D* had converted the ornaments which had been pledged to him by *C*. On *A*'s conviction the Magistrate ordered the gold and silver ingots to be made over to *B*. The proceedings against *C* were adjourned and subsequently *C* was convicted. On *D*'s application for revision of Magistrate's order regarding disposal of gold and silver ingots, *held*, that the order was illegal and that the Magistrate should pass fresh order according to law, Ratanlal 497. He must make the order at the time of passing judgment, 19 W. R. 3. But in 25 B. 552, a summons was issued for the appearance of two accused persons and certain property was produced on a search-warrant issued by the Magistrate. No further proceedings were taken against one of these persons, but he claimed the property seized as his own. It was *held* that he was entitled to an immediate inquiry, whether the property belonged, as alleged, to the complainant and formed the subject of the offence under trial or was in possession of that accused person as his own. But see the new s. 516 (a) which enables a Court to make an order of disposal during an inquiry or trial.

11-A.—*Order can be made only after conclusion of trial and not on subsequent application.*—Under s. 517 of the Code an order for the disposal of property can only be made upon the conclusion of an inquiry or trial and not on the application of a person subsequent to the conclusion of such trial. The applicant has his remedy by means of a civil suit, 4 Lah. 460. See also 46 M. 162 holding that an order under this section must be made either at the time of disposing of the appeal or so soon thereafter that it may be treated as part of the appeal proceedings.

WHAT ORDERS MAY BE MADE

12. *Does 'disposal' include 'destruction' or 'forfeiture'?* See now sub-sec. (1) as amended which expressly includes destruction or confiscation, etc., under "disposal."

(i) *Order for disposal will include an order for forfeiture or confiscation*.—Ratanlal 492. The nature of the order to be passed for the disposal is not specified. If the property has been used for the commission of an offence it is impossible to suppose that the Legislature intended that it should be returned to the owner who would be the person guilty of the offence. If the property is the subject of the offence as in cases of theft, misappropriation etc. the proper order of course would be to direct it to be returned to the person from whom it was stolen or to the owner whose property was appropriated. The policy of the law as laid down in various enactments with respect to property used in the commission of an offence shows the order under this section may be according to the nature of the case either for the destruction of the property or for its forfeiture. A similar interpretation should be placed on s. 523. The power to order restoration is discretionary and the Court is not bound to exercise it. On principle the view taken in Weir 1, 534, apparently expressed in 9 M. 448 and 8 C. W. N. 887 = 1 Cr. L. J. 849 appears to be sounder than the contrary view expressed in, 34 C. 986; 9 C. W. N. 897 = 2 Cr. L. J. 273 and 19 M. L. J. 234 = 9 Cr. L. J. 149. 'Disposal' is a comprehensive word which would include forfeiture. An examination of the history of the section also shows that the powers of the Courts have been gradually widened. Where it was found *A* that had foisted certain articles into the accused's house for the purpose of bringing a false case of theft and brought a complaint in the investigation of which the articles were seized but the complaint itself was dismissed *held* the Magistrate had jurisdiction under s. 523 if not under s. 517 to direct the articles to be forfeited, 24 M. L. J. 1 = 14 Cr. L. J. 27.

(ii) *Contra.*—The word 'disposal' does not include either confiscation or destruction of property.—Under this section a Criminal Court has no power to direct forfeiture of property 34 C. 986; 37 P. W. R. 1907 = 6 Cr. L. J. 411. A Court cannot under this section direct the confiscated article to be sold or destroyed, 19 M. L. J. 234 = 9 Cr. L. J. 149. The object of the section is to enable the Magistrate to direct the property to be given to some person to whom it appears to belong or to allow it to continue in the possession of the person in whose possession it was found or to make some order of that character. Where, therefore, the

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accused was convicted under s 182, I P C, "or giving false information accusing B of theft of certain jewels, which were found on search in the accused's own house, and the Magistrate passed an order confiscating the jewels and directed them to be sold and a portion of the the proceeds be paid to B as compensation," and in making the said order, the Magistrate professed to act under this section. *Held*, this section was never intended to authorize the disposal of property in that manner and the orders regarding confiscation and payment of compensation were set aside as illegal, 9 C. W. N. 597. Where a person was convicted of seditious publication under ss 124-A and 153-A and the Press was directed to be confiscated and the Government contended that the Court had power to order confiscation inasmuch part of the Press was produced before it and the rest was in its custody and if confiscation is not legally permissible, destruction might and should be ordered, *held* that Chapter XLIII of the Code does not contemplate an order of such a nature. Penal laws are not to be extended in their scope. The Code of Criminal Procedure is a body of adjective law and such cannot readily be interpreted as authorizing the infliction of a suffering or an encroachment of natural liberty or rights. In these circumstances it would be strange indeed if the Legislature which in ss 62, 121, etc., of the Penal Code and in numerous other sections of other Acts has expressly provided for imposing penalty of confiscation upon persons convicted of specified offences, intended by using the general word 'disposal' to authorize the infliction of that punishment not merely on the offender under trial but also on others who may not even be before the Court. No distinction can be drawn between confiscation and destruction 5 N. L. R. 59 = 9 Cr. L. J. 539.

13. Section invests Magistrate with a discretionary power which must be exercised judicially.—Section 517 invests the Magistrate with a discretionary power and it is a rule of law that such power must be exercised judicially, *ie*, according to sound principles of law and not in an arbitrary manner. But what that means is, not that the order is in the opinion of the higher tribunal of revision an improper one which it would not have passed but that, having regard to the materials before the Court exercising the discretion that discretion was exercised in a legal manner. Now, if there were no materials whatever before him the Magistrate ought to have returned the property to the person from whom it was produced. But if there were some materials, then the Magistrate's discretion came into operation, and it was for him to say what order ought to be passed having regard to all the facts in the case. Where there was a quarrel amongst the members of a joint Hindu family and the Magistrate, although holding that no offence was committed passed an order directing the return of the property to the complainant, *held* this discretion ought not to be interfered with 11 Bom. L. R. 16 = 9 Cr. L. J. 162. See also 17 Bom. L. R. 922 = 16 Cr. L. J. 783. It should be exercised in favour of the person entitled to the possession of property before Court, so long as there is anyone entitled to the possession of the property, Government has no claim to it, 2 Bom. L. R. 768.

(i) *Magistrate cannot on mere suspicion order forfeiture of property*—A Magistrate acting under this section cannot, on mere suspicion that an offence has been committed with respect to property produced during the trial of a criminal case, order forfeiture of the property, and he is only justified in so doing after having made a separate judicial inquiry in which the complainant has had an opportunity of explaining any suspicious circumstances, *Ratanlal* 492. But when the accused was convicted of an offence under s 241, I P C, and a counterfeit rupee which, it was not shown had been delivered or attempted to be delivered to anyone having been found in his possession, the Magistrate ordered its destruction. *Held*, that even if the order was not strictly covered by the terms of this section, the order should not be interfered with, *Weir* II, 669.

(ii) *Generally in cases of acquittal, property should be restored to the person from whom it is taken*—After an accused has been acquitted of the offence of theft or burglary, the proper order to make is to direct that the property found in the possession of the accused should be restored to him. The complainant in that case could go to the Civil Court, file a suit and secure an order of injunction, 18 C. W. N. 959 = 15 Cr. L. J. 164. When the accused are acquitted of the offence charged any property seized by the Police during the investigation of the case from them, must be restored to them when no offence is found to have been committed in respect of it, 1 C. W. N. 581; 16 M. L. J. (S. N.), 24, especially, in the absence of a finding in the case that it belonged to somebody else 3 M. L. T. R. 334. Where a second-class Magistrate found that no offence had been committed in respect of certain property, and ordered the property to be restored to the accused from whom it had been taken by the Police, it was *held* the order was in accordance with this section and s. 523, *Weir* II, 669 and 538. When the accused is discharged under s 253 no offence is proved against him, therefore the pre requisites of an order under this section being wanting the property should be restored to the accused from whom it was taken, *Weir* II, 665 and 666. In 1 B. 630 followed in 9 M. 448; 24 C. 499; 14 C. 834; 10 B. 197; 17 B. 748; 22 B. 844 and 1896 A. W. N. 58, it was *held* that upon general principles, on the acquittal or discharge of the accused, property should generally be restored to the person from whom it is taken, 14 C. P. 60, or to the accused, *Weir* II, 665 and 666, but that when such property

is delivered by Police under the illegal order of a Magistrate the High Court has no power to order its restoration. This defect is now removed by additions made to s 520. But having regard to the changes introduced in the sections, the decision in 30 C. 690 seems to be incorrect, and the order based on the general proposition that *property in respect of which no offence has been committed*, should be restored to the person in whose possession it was found, is not an order under this section, though this section in Norway precludes the passing of such an order, Weir II, 688. See 20 C. W. N. 1302.

(iii) *In special cases Magistrate may order property to be delivered to person other than the one in whose possession it was found*—Even where a party is charged with theft and that charge is dismissed or the party is discharged, an order can be made under this section for the delivery of the subject matter of the alleged theft to some party other than the party in whose possession the property was found at the date of the alleged offence, Mad. Cr. Rev. Case 477 of 1905 referred to, 34 M. 94. Where a person was accused of dishonestly receiving stolen property, knowing it to be stolen, and was discharged by the Magistrate on the ground that there was no evidence that the property was stolen held that the Magistrate was competent, believing that the property was stolen, to make an order under s 418, Act X of 1872 regarding its disposal and to refuse to restore it to the accused, 2 A. 278 j of 9 M. 345. Where a Magistrate convicted a person of the dishonest receipt of certain stolen bangles, and the bangles were on the same day ordered to be restored to the owner, and on appeal the accused was acquitted, the Appellate Court finding that though the appellant had clearly displayed the most gross want of common caution in buying such articles from a comparative stranger, it was not proved that he knew or had reason to believe the bangles were stolen. It was held that under the circumstances the Magistrate was right in refusing the application and leaving the applicant to his remedy in a Civil Court, 1893 A. W. N. 61. Similarly, where a Magistrate finds the property belongs to the complainant in a case of theft, but acquits the accused on the ground that there was no dishonest intention on the part of the accused, he has jurisdiction to order that the property should be given over to the complainant, 16 M. L. J. (Sh. N.) 4 followed in 11 Cr. L. J. 138 (M.). But where property belonging to the estate of a deceased person, was found with a person who was acquitted by the Magistrate of having dishonestly taken it, so as to amount to theft, it was held, that the Magistrate was not competent to order it to be given to the heirs of the deceased person and his order was cancelled, 1 B. 630. See 14 C. 834. It was further held that the High Court had no power to direct restitution of property, already delivered by the Police under an illegal order of the District Magistrate. In 8 B. 335, where the accused was acquitted of having cut down and stolen wood belonging to the complainant, on the ground that he acted under a misapprehension that the land on which the trees grew belonged to him, the High Court refused to interfere with the Magistrate's order directing the wood to be given to the complainant because he was really entitled to the possession of it.

(iv) *Magistrate has no discretion when accused convicted*.—Where a Magistrate finds that the complainant was assaulted and forcibly dispossessed of a bungalow and its contents by the accused and convicts the accused under s 323, I P. C., held it was the duty of the Magistrate to pass orders under this section and s 522 directing restoration of the bungalow and its contents to the complainant, 35 C. 44.

(v) *Property not to be returned when person in whose possession it was found disclaims it*.—A Magistrate is not justified in ordering that the property should be delivered to the accused when he disclaims the property. The Court should retain the property until one or other of the parties has established his right to it. If it has been paid or delivered, the Court has power to call upon the recipient to return it 37 P. W. R. 1913 = 14 Cr. L. J. 598.

(vi) *Proper order when there is a bona fide dispute and property perishable*.—A complaint of theft in respect for certain fallen trees was dismissed as there was a bona fide dispute about the ownership but the Magistrate directed the trees to be delivered to the complainant on revision the order was set aside and the High Court ordered that the wood should be sold and the proceeds should be retained by the Court until they were shown to be payable to one or other of the parties, either in virtue of a decree of Court or in virtue of an agreement amongst themselves, 16 Bom. L. R. 951 = 2 Bom. Cr. Ca. 289 = 16 Cr. L. J. 111. After attachment of certain trees, proceedings under s 145 were dropped, and the Magistrate directed the produce to be delivered to one of the parties though there was a dispute to the ownership. Held the proper order was to retain the produce in the custody of the village officers until one party or the other obtained the order of a Civil Court, and if the property was perishable or difficult to be kept in safe custody, it might be sold and the sale-proceeds kept in deposit, pending the same event, 16 Cr. L. J. 104 (M).

(vii) *When two innocent parties claim, the negligent party must suffer*.—See 21 A. 630, in Note 16 (iii).

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the ornaments in deposit with him as trust, and to produce them whenever required. In the meanwhile, the complainant was directed to have his claim proved in a competent Court. *Held* that there was no section of the law, which enabled a Magistrate to make the order demanding security, for the production of the articles when required. If the Magistrate thought that a criminal offence had been committed, he ought to have proceeded to direct their production under s 84 or, if necessary, take steps under s 86, if he did not intend to take proper steps, the only course open to him was to leave it to the Civil Court to take such steps as it might think fit to secure the property. Also the order having been made in a matter which had come before the Magistrate in his judicial capacity, could not be regarded as an executive order merely, and that as a judicial order it was made without jurisdiction, 7 C. W. N. 522, but *see* Weir II, 665.

18. Proper order when currency notes or current coin is produced before Court.—Property in a bank note passes like that in cash by delivery and party taking it *bona fide* and for value is entitled to retain it as against a former owner from whom it has been stolen. (*Multer v. Race*, 5 M. L. Cases 445.) A currency note was changed at the Government Treasury by one M, who was subsequently convicted of stealing it from S. The note was produced in evidence in the Sessions Court, which directed it to be given to S from whom it was stolen. On petition from the Treasury Officer to revise the order of the Sessions Court, the High Court gave the following judgment:—"The question is whether the Salem Treasury or the person from whom the note was stolen is entitled to the currency note. The Sessions Judge has decided the case upon an illustration drawn from the new Contract Act embodying a very old rule of law, that possession by the taker in good faith is no defence against the owner of a chattel whose possession was lost through theft. The decision is inapplicable to the case, for money (and a note of this kind is in legal view money) does not stand upon the footing of other chattels. (*Foster v. Green*, 6 H. and N. 793.) In the language of English law the property passes by mere delivery, and in the interests of commerce and the security of human dealing nothing short of fraud in taking an instrument payable to the bearer will engraft an exception upon the rule, (*Goodman v. Harvey*, 4 Ad. and E. 870.) Here the treasury was bound to cash the notes and the original owner has no claim against it. The order must be reversed." 7 M. H. C. R. 233; also 3 C. 379 = 1 C. L. R. 339 and 1 N.-W. P. H. C. R. 293, where it was *held*, that the change of currency note for cash is the exchange of money in one form for money in another form, and either form being legal tender, it is impossible to say that one is the price of the other. This case was *approved* in 19 C. 52 at p. 62. *See* also 20 W. R. 33; 16 P. R. 1898; 9 F. R. 1873, 3 B. L. R. 153 = 13 Cr. L. J. 21; 17 Bom. L. R. 922 = 16 Cr. L. J. 783. Currency notes must generally be returned to the person from whom they were taken, 1911 (2) M. W. N. 370 = 12 Cr. L. J. 400. But in Weir II, 670 and 440, it was *held* that an order of a Magistrate directing that money obtained by the Police from the person to whom the same has been lent by a thief or receiver, should be paid over to the owner, is not in contravention of this section.

(i) *Rule as to money applies only to current coin*—Where *Bubashai* coin came before the Court as part of the stolen property and no custom is set up to show that it is current coin or legal tender in British India, it was *held* that the rule enunciated in the preceding note relating to the current coin of the realm, does not apply and the Court is at liberty, under this section, to award the same to the complainant, from whom they were stolen, 23 B. 702.

(ii) *The rule that title to money passes by mere delivery is however limited to cases where receipt of money is bona fide*—*See* 4 B. L. R. 255 = 12 Cr. L. J. 397. An objection that the coins are not the identical coins stolen is unsustainable in view of the explanation.

(iii) *Rule as to currency notes modified, when the question is which of two innocent parties is to suffer*—The petitioner, a dealer in hides, received the right halves of two currency notes from another dealer in hides, as security for the payment of the price of skins delivered to the latter, who promised to give the other halves which had already been given to the respondent. It was found, that owing to the negligent conduct of the respondent, in having allowed the owner to retain the right halves with him he committed fraud on the petitioner. The Magistrate after convicting the owner of the currency notes for cheating, ordered the return of the right halves to the petitioner. The Court of Session, acting under s 520 annulled the order and directed the petitioner to hand them over to the respondent. *Held*, that the petitioner was entitled to recover the half notes originally made over to him from the respondent or to obtain compensation from the respondent, if he had parted with them inasmuch as it was owing to the negligence of the respondent that the owner of the currency note had committed fraud on the petitioner. Where a Subordinate Court makes an order under s 529 directing the disposal of any property, regarding which an offence has been committed, the High Court can interfere in revision against that order, "and make any further order that may be just," 27 A. 830, where 1898 A. W. N. 40 is *followed*. The jurisdiction of the High Court, as a Court of Criminal Revision to consider the rights of the parties and make this order, seems open to doubt, *Contra*, *see* 9 C. W. N. 549.

17. Proper order when third parties are involved—

(1) *Rights of the pledgee of stolen property*—A Magistrate should not make an order for delivery to the owner or complainant, of property regarding which an offence has been committed, without giving the person (pledgee) from whom the property was taken an opportunity of being heard. An appeal lies from such order, and the Magistrate should not under sub-sec. (3) of this section, allow his order to be carried out until the period allowed for presenting such appeal has passed. When, however, the evidence disclosed a *prima facie* case, of a certain jewel having been obtained from the owner by means of an offence or fraud within the meaning of s. 178, Prov (2) *Indian Contract Act*, and being pledged subsequently to another person, the Court declined to interfere with the order of the Magistrate, directing the return of the jewel to the owner without hearing the person with whom the jewel was pledged. In such a case, the pawn-broker from whom the jewel was taken, was held to have the right to bring a suit in the Civil Court to enforce his lien on the jewel, 4 L. B. R. 13 = 6 Cr. L. J. 125. But where certain jewels were given to the accused to sell, but she did not sell them and her niece pawned them, and the Police seized the jewels from the pawnee and returned them to the owner under orders of the Magistrate, who convicted the accused of criminal breach of trust, *held* the question as to the validity of the pledge, and the question whether the circumstances were such as to raise a reasonable presumption that the pawner as acting improperly ought to be left to a Civil Court, and the possession of the jewels ought not to be transferred in consequence of the Police having seized them. The owner having given the jewels to be disposed of for money, he is not entitled to the assistance of a Criminal Court in recovering them from a pawnee to whom they were so disposed of, 3 Bar L. T. 111 = 12 Cr. L. J. 88; 4 L. B. R. 25 = 6 Cr. L. J. 135, where 27 M. 424 and 12 B. L. R. 42 are referred to. *M* obtained a pair of diamonds worth Rs. 80,000 promising to return them the same day but instead of doing so, he pawned them with *C* for Rs 4,000. *M* was convicted of criminal breach of trust and *C* was directed to return the diamonds to *M*. It was contended on the authority of 4 L. B. R. 25 = 6 Cr. L. J. 135, that the order for the return of the diamonds was wrong as they were not obtained by means of an offence or fraud, *held* following 4 L. B. R. 13 = 6 L. B. R. 125, that the order was justifiable in the circumstances of the case, 3 Bar. L. T. 111 = 12 Cr. L. J. 88, but if the articles were given to a broker for sale and he sells the jewels but misappropriates the proceeds and is convicted of criminal breach of trust of the money, the purchaser of the jewels is protected by s 108 (except) to the *Contract Act*, and is entitled to have the jewels returned to him, 4 Bar. L. T. 170 = 12 Cr. L. J. 467. See also Weir II, 672.

(ii) *Refund of prize money obtained by cheating*—Where a person was convicted of cheating under s 420 I P C, by falsely pretending to be the winner of a lottery prize and dishonestly inducing the lottery officials to pay the prize to him he may be directed to refund the money to the lottery officials under this section, 13 Cr. L. J. 555 (Bar)

(iii) *To purchaser in market overt no protection in India*.—Under s. 108, *Indian Contract Act*, a seller cannot give to a buyer a better title than he himself has. *Held* therefore the real owner of a stolen buffalo, was entitled to recover it from the possession of an honest purchaser who acquired it *bona fide* after it had been bought and sold in market overt, 2 P. R. 1908 = 6 P. W. R. 1908 = 7 Cr. L. J. 279; but see 7 and 8 P. R. 1872.

18 Court competent to direct joint delivery.—Where it is found that subject matter of the offence belongs partly to the accused who has been discharged and partly to him and another jointly, it is not illegal to pass an order to deliver the property to both on their joint receipt, 34 M. 94.

EXECUTION OF ORDERS.

19. Defect of order as to finality.—An order after trial, made by a Criminal Court for the restoration of property under this section, is conclusive as to the immediate right to possession, 9 B. 131. The only effect of the order is that it determines which of the parties shall be left to sue in the Civil Courts, 95 P. L. R. 1911 = 12 Cr. L. J. 400. The real owner may proceed against the holder of the property. It is not for the Criminal Court to consider whether such person is entitled to retain such possession, 17 B. 748, and thus assume the functions of a Civil Court, 1 B 630, Ratanlal 500, 29 M. 375.

20. Order should not be carried out at once but kept in abeyance.—See sub-sec. (3). The intention of the Legislature is that even if the Magistrate directs restoration, the order should not be carried out at once but kept in abeyance till the order becomes really final either by there being no appeal or by any final

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order by a Court of final jurisdiction, 18 C. W. N. 859 = 15 Cr. L. J. 184. When an order directing delivery of possession to one party is set aside by a higher tribunal, that order carries with it the incident of restoration which the Magistrate is bound to carry out, 18 C. W. N. 1167 = 15 Cr. L. J. 222.

21. Responsibility of Magistrate returning property before appeal time has expired.—When a Magistrate in acquitting the accused returned the money produced before him, before the expiry of the appeal time, and the accused on being called upon, subsequent to the disposal of the appeal to refund it, did not do so, it was *held* the District Magistrate should report the matter to Government, in order that the Subordinate Magistrate who was clearly responsible, might be called upon to make good the amount.—*M H C. Pro* 784 J, dated 22nd March 1894. If in such a case, the amount is not made good the remedy is by civil suit against the Sub-Magistrate, accused or both.—*Mad. G O* No 830 J, dated 14th June, 1904. The amount may also be recovered under s 547 as if it were a fine, 19 A. 112.

22. Magisterial control ends when property is handed over.—When a Magistrate hands over property to anyone of the parties his control *qua* Magistrate ceases. If he takes again the same property from such person for the inspection of the Appellate Court, it does not come into his possession as property seized by the Police or property over which he had any power of disposal, 1897 A. W. N. 26.

23. Counterfeit coins to be sent to Bombay Mint.—When any counterfeit coin has been ordered to be confiscated by a Court acting under the provisions of ss. 517, 523 and 524, the Court should send the same to the Mint at Bombay or to the nearest treasury or sub-treasury officer, to be remitted by him to the Mint.—*Bom H C Cr. Cir.*, p. 77

POWERS OF APPELLATE AND REVISIONAL COURTS.

24. Appellate Court can make an order under this section even when first Court does not do so.—*See* Note 87 at p 1026. An Appellate Court is entitled in an appeal from a conviction and in other cases, to make any amendment or any consequential or incidental order that may be just or proper. Thus, an order directing the restoration of property which was found to have belonged to the complainant, but the restoration of which was not ordered by the Court of First Instance, is a consequential or incidental order within the meaning of s. 423 (1) (d), 3 A. L. J. 770 = 4 Cr. L. J. 370. *See also* 6 C. W. N. 713. Under s. 520 the Appellate Court has the same powers as the Court which tried the case to pass an order under this section directing the parties to get their claim established in a Civil Court, 35 A. 374 where 9 C. W. N. 549 = 2 Cr. L. J. 269 is *followed*, 22 B. 844, is no longer good law as it was passed under the old Code, but in *Weir II*, 674, it was held that the Appellate Court is not competent to pass any order under this section when the first Court fails to do so. *See* Note 87 at p 1026 and *see* 39 C. 1050.

25. High Court may in revision pass an order under this section.—*See* 15 Cr. L. J. 555 (Bur) and Note 66 to s. 439

26. Powers of Appeal and Revisional Courts to deal with orders made under this section.—*See* s. 520 and notes thereto

518. In lieu of itself passing an order under section 517, the Court may direct the property to be delivered to the District Magistrate, or to a Sub-Divisional Magistrate who shall in such cases deal with it as if it had been seized by the Police and the seizure had been reported to him in the manner hereinafter mentioned

Order may take form of reference to District or Sub-Divisional Magistrate

Notes.—1. 'Manner hereinafter mentioned.'—*See* s. 523

2. Scope of the section.—An order under this section can be made only in respect of property (a) regarding which an offence appears to have been committed, or (b) which has been used for the commission of an offence, or (c) which has been produced before a superior Court, or (d) which has been in the custody of such superior Court, *Ratanlal* 496. In 14 C. W. N. 215, the High Court set aside an order of a Sessions Judge made under s. 517 without an inquiry as to the ownership of a sum of money found with an acquitted person and *held*, that an order under s. 518 ought to have been made

519. * When any person is convicted of any offence which includes, or amounts to theft or receiving stolen property, and it is proved that any other person has bought the stolen property from him without knowing, or having reason to believe, that the same was stolen, and that any money has on his arrest been taken out of the possession of the convicted person, the Court may, on the application of such purchaser and on the restitution of the stolen property to the person entitled to the possession thereof, order that out of such money a sum not exceeding the price paid by such purchaser be delivered to him.

Payment to innocent purchaser of money found on accused

Note.—Compensation not to be given out of fine imposed on convicted person.—Where no money is found in the possession of the person convicted as the thief or receiver of stolen property, it is not open to a Magistrate to grant compensation to the innocent purchaser out of the fine imposed on the convicted person *Weir II, 671*. See also 3 Bom. L. R. 449 and 764. On the conviction of an accused under s 380, I P C, out of the fine imposed, Rs. 28 were ordered to be paid to one B, an innocent mortgagee who had advanced money to the accused on the stolen property held, that ss 519 and 545 were not applicable to the case as no injury was caused to the mortgagee by the offence committed, *Ratanlal 631; Weir II, 672*. See Note 16 to s 517 as to the proper order to be made when the interests of pledgees are concerned

520. Any Court of appeal, confirmation, reference or revision may direct any order under section 517, section 518, or section 519, passed by a Court subordinate thereto, to be stayed pending consideration by the former Court, and may modify, alter or annul such order and make any further orders that may be just

Stay of order under sections 517, 518 or 519

Notes.—1. Enlarged scope of this section.—This section is amended by the addition of the words “and make any further orders that may be just” It “will enable a superior Court to give effect to an order setting aside the order of the Court of First Instance, if that order has been carried out by directing the restitution of property”—*Statement of Objects and Reasons* See also 5 S. L. R. 153 = 13 Cr. L. J. 21.

Cases superseded owing to enlarged scope of s. 517—Owing to the enlarged scope of s 517, the Rulings in 9 W. R. 57; 1 B. 630; 8 B. 575; 14 C. 834; 22 B. 844 are no longer law The Ruling in 30 C. 690 though made in 1903, did not take into consideration, the alteration of the language of s 517 and the addition made to this section. The jurisdiction of Courts of Revision is now undoubted by reason or the concluding words of this section See Note in 8 C. W. N. at p. 43 and 9 C. W. N. 549 = 2 Cr. L. J. 269.

1-A. Application under this section in no sense an application by way of appeal.—*Held*, that the petitioner's application was in no sense an application by way of appeal from the order of the Magistrate, but an independent application to the Sessions Judge with a view to his taking action under ss. 517, 520 of the Code and no period of limitation is prescribed for such an application. 4 Lah. 49.

2. “Court of appeal” means the Court to which appeals ordinarily lie.—These words are not necessarily limited to a Court before which an appeal is pending It may very often happen that the question of the propriety of an order under s 517 may, in no way, concern the convicted person, and it is unreasonable to construe this section in a way as shall make the power of the Judge to modify alter or annul a Magistrate's order affecting one person, contingent on the accident whether another person has or has not chosen to appeal, 3 C. 379 = 1 C. L. R. 339; 9 M. 443; 2 A 276. The words ‘Court of Appeal’ merely imply the Court to which appeals would ordinarily lie, and do not mean that an appeal must lie in the particular case in which an order has been passed as to property, 50 P. L. R. 1911 = 12 Cr. L. J. 400. In *Weir II, 679*, a second class Magistrate discharged certain persons accused of theft and ordered the delivery of property to them. Though there was no appeal pending, the District Magistrate reversed the order so far as the delivery of property was concerned, and finding that the property had been taken from the possession of the complainant ordered it to be delivered to him *Held*, that the District Magistrate had jurisdiction under this section to set aside the order passed by the second-class Magistrate under s. 517, 42 M. L. J. 401; 44 M. L. J. 36. But see 42 B. 664 dissenting from 9 M. 443; 46 A. 623 follows 42 B. 664.

3. Appellate Court not entitled to act, when order of Subordinate Court not one under ss. 517—519.—When property is not disposed of by a Magistrate under this section, a Sessions Judge has no jurisdiction to

* Cf. the Criminal Law (Amendment) Act, 20 and 31 Vict c 85 a 9 from which this sect. has been taken.

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hear an appeal against the order of the Magistrate and revise the same, 10 B. 197; 1 B. 830. Since an order directing the restoration of property *in respect of which no offence has been committed* to the person in whose possession the property is found, is not an order under this section, it is not appealable, 22 B. 844; 14 C. 834 followed in 30 C. 690. But the correctness of this last Ruling was seriously doubted in 9 C. W. N. 843 = 2 Cr. L. J. 269 on the ground that 30 C. 690 does not advert to the alterations in the language of this section and the addition made to s. 520. In this last case, though the elephant was found to belong to Z, still as the persons whom he charged with having committed an offence in respect of it were acquitted to that offence and they claimed the elephant and denied his ownership the elephant was made over to one of the accused, especially as the elephant was found in his possession. In an appeal from a conviction, Appellate Court has no jurisdiction to pass any order under this section, when no order has been passed under s. 517 by the Subordinate Court which convicted the accused, Weir II, 674. See Note 24 at p. 1257.

4. **Sub-Divisional Magistrate not entitled to hear an appeal under this section.**—A Sub-Divisional Magistrate has no jurisdiction to hear an appeal under this section, as he is authorized under s. 407 only to hear appeals preferred by accused persons from conviction *M H C Cr Re* 525 of 1903, followed in *Cr Rev*, Case 84 of 1903. 42 M. L. J. 401; 44 M. L. J. 56; 46 M. 162.

5. **District Magistrate's power to set aside order for restoring property.**—Where property has been restored to the accused on their acquittal a District Magistrate has no authority to reverse the order for its restoration. He should, if he wished to review a Subordinate Magistrate's proceedings, make an order for staying the execution till the disposal of the review and any reference thereon under s. 520, 8 B. 575.

6. **The section contemplates but one appeal.**—A Sessions Court is not a Court of Appeal from a District Magistrate (first-class Magistrate) in respect of an order already passed by the latter, under this section on appeal from a second-class Magistrate though under s. 438 it might report the matter to the High Court. *M H C Cr Re*, 236 of 1904. Where a Sessions Court in appeal annuls the order of the trying Magistrate for delivering the property to the complainant, the remedy against such an order is by a petition for revision and not by way of appeal, 1893 A. W. N. 40.

6-A. **District Sessions Judge not a court of appeal, reference or revision with regard to an order of a second class Magistrate.**—In a theft case a second-class Magistrate convicted the accused, and directed the subject-matter to be handed over to the complainant. On appeal the Sub-Divisional Magistrate acquitted the accused and declined to interfere with the order of disposal. The Sessions Judge, on appeal directed the subject matter to be handed over to the accused. Held the Sessions Judge's order was unauthorized by s. 520 as he was not a Court of Appeal confirmation, etc., with reference to the orders of the second-class or the Sub-Divisional Magistrate. 47 M. L. J. 481.

7. **During pendency of appeal none of the other Courts competent to act.**—If an appeal against an acquittal or conviction included an objection to an order under s. 517 or s. 518 or s. 519, then, during the pendency of the appeal, the concurrent jurisdiction of the other Courts specified in this section would be suspended, owing to seizure thereof by the Court of Appeal, 1904 C. P. L. R. 107, neither under this section nor under s. 439, will the High Court exercise its revisional jurisdiction, except as a Court of last resort, 1897 C. P. L. R. 47; 1904 C. P. L. R. 17. The fact that by reason of the extent of the sentences inflicted, appeals lie to the High Court, will not, however, in the least divest the Sessions Court of the relation in which it stands to the Magistrate's Court for the purposes of this section.

8. **Power of Appellate Court where property erroneously disposed of.**—In making an order under this section for restitution the Court is not restricted by the terms of s. 517 or by any limited definition that may be given to the word restitution, it can make any order that may be just. Where, therefore currency notes or current coin were erroneously disposed of under s. 517 and the notes and coin are changed before the passing of the Appellate order the repayment of an equivalent may be ordered 5 B. L. R. 153 = 13 Cr. L. J. 21. The intention of the Legislature in adding the words 'and make just' was obviously to enable a superior Court to give effect to an order setting aside the order of the Court of First Instance if that order has been carried out by directing the restitution of the property. In this case if a Magistrate, contrary to the provisions of the last paragraph of this section, hands over the property to the complainant and a Sessions Judge on appeal annuls the conviction, he (the Judge) cannot direct the Magistrate to dispose of the property as if it were unclaimed. The proper order in such a case would be to direct the Magistrate to return the property to the person from whom he had received it 1897 A. W. N. 25. This will authorize the Magistrate to recover it from the complainant, if necessary, by a civil suit, 19 A. 112.

9. **Notice must be given.**—An order regarding disposal of property should not be passed without giving notice to the opposite party, 35 B. 253. See also 17 Cr. L. J. 207 (Bar.), 46 M. 162.

10 Court of revision has jurisdiction to act under this section only when there is neither appeal nor confirmation against the conviction.—Where the case is one in which an appeal lies, any party aggrieved by an order as to the disposal of property must go to the Court of Appeal. In such a case a Court of revision has no jurisdiction to interfere with an order as to disposal of property. It is only when there is neither an appeal nor a confirmation that a Court of revision or reference can act under this section 35 B 253. Where the Appellate Court in dealing with an appeal against the sentence has left untouched an order passed under ss 517–519 there exists no bar to an application for revision of that order being made in any one of the Courts mentioned in s. 520 17 C P. L. R. 107 = 1 Cr L J 764, 42 B 664.

11 High Court's powers of revision.—Where a Sessions Court in appeal annuls the order of a trying Magistrate for delivering the property to the complainant the remedy against such an order is by a petition for revision and not by way of appeal 1899 A W N 40. The words 'any proceeding' in s. 435 are wide enough to empower the High Court to revise an order of a Magistrate made under this section. *Weir II*, 669 in 1535. Any order made under s. 517 may be revised by the High Court either under s. 520 or in virtue of the powers conferred on it by s. 439 read with ss 435 and 423 (d) 18 C. W. N 859 = 15 Cr L J 184. See also 36 C. 44; 27 A 415. The High Court will not interfere where the case is one in which an appeal lies, 35 B. 253. See Notes 21 22 to s. 439 43 M L J 87.

12 Illegal orders under s. 517 liable to be set aside under this section.—When proceedings initiated under s. 145 (1) are cancelled on the ground that there is no likelihood of a breach of the peace the Magistrate has no jurisdiction to allow one of the parties to reap the crops to the exclusion of the other. Such an order if passed under s. 517 is fit to be set aside under this section 3 C. L. J. 573 = 3 Cr L J 466.

521. (1) On a conviction under the Indian Penal Code, sections 292 293 501 or section 502, the Court may order the destruction of all the copies of the thing in respect of which the conviction was had and which are in the custody of the Court or remain in the possession or power of the person convicted.

(2) The Court may, in like manner on a conviction under the Indian Penal Code sections 272 273 274 or section 275 order the food drink drug or medical preparation in respect of which the conviction was had to be destroyed.

Notes.—1 It was proposed to add a clause to the effect that if conviction is set aside on appeal or otherwise the order under sub-sec. (1) shall become void but as similar provision is substantially made in cl. (d), s. 423 (1) the addition was omitted.

2 Scope of the section referred to.—S. 292 I P C., deals with sale of obscene books, s. 293 with having them in possession s. 501 with printing etc. defamatory matter and s. 502 with selling defamatory s. 272 with adulterating food s. 273 selling noxious food s. 274 adulterating any drug, etc., and s. 275 with selling an adulterated drug etc.

3. Other provisions of law which provide forfeiture.—See ss. 263 (2) 126 and 127 of the Penal Code. So also s. 24 of the Arms Act XI of 1878 s. 15 of the Alibars Act I of 1886 s. 10 of the Explosives Act IV of 1884, s. 41 of the Madras Forest Act V of 1882, ss. 52 and 84 of the Indian Forest Act VII of 1878, s. 9 of the Merchandise Marks Act IV of 1889, s. 4 of the Metal Tokens Act I of 1889, s. 17 of the Ancient Monuments Act VII of 1904, s. 12 of the Opium Act I of 1878 s. 17 of the Petroleum Act VII of 1873 s. 7 of the Pans Act I of 1904, s. 29 of the Madras Salt Act IV of 1889 s. 12 of the Indian Salt Act VII of 1837 s. 3 of the Madras Nuisances Act III of 1889 and ss. 45 46 48 and 51 of the Excise Act XII of 1896.

522. (1) Whenever a person is convicted of an offence attended by criminal force* or show of force or by criminal intimidation† and it appears to the Court that by such force* or show of force or criminal intimidation† any person has been dispossessed of any immovable property, the Court may, if it thinks fit * when convicting such person or at any time within one month from the date of the conviction† order† the person dispossessed† to be restored to the possession of the same.

* The words in — were inserted by Act XLIII of 1923

† The words — were substituted for the words "such person" by the

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1728-1729, long, 1730-1731, less prolonged, 1732-1733, short; 1734-1735, obscure (see remark p 1741) the fall, there, then, the good of it; first; now as in row, ch as in chin

(2) No such order shall prejudice any right or interest to or in such immovable property which any person may be able to establish in a civil suit

“(3) An order under this section may be made by any Court of appeal, confirmation, reference or revision”

1. **Duty of Magistrate to pass orders in favour of party dispossessed**—Where a party was found to have been assaulted and forcibly dispossessed of a bungalow and its contents by the opposite party who was in consequence convicted under s 323, I P C., *held* that it was the duty of the Magistrate to pass orders under ss 522 and 517 directing restoration to the petitioner of the bungalow and its contents, 36 C. 34.

CONDITIONS PRECEDENT FOR ACTING UNDER THIS SECTION.

2. **There must be a conviction.**—To dispossess a person of property and to replace him by another under this section, it is necessary that there should have been a conviction of an offence. Consequently an order passed under s 145, directing the possession of a house to be given through the Police is illegal and cannot be enforced under this section, as there was no conviction of an offence, 37 A. 654. When the case is one of civil but not criminal trespass, a Magistrate is not warranted in passing an order under this section. When, during the absence of the complainant, the accused took possession of a house in her occupation and established there a boy, alleged to be the adopted son of the complainant's father, *held* no order could be passed for delivery of possession of the house to the complainant, as the accused could not be convicted by the Magistrate under s 448, I P C. The house was ordered to be restored to the accused who were found in possession of it, 12 C. W. N. 269 = 7 C. L. J. 175.

3. **Offence of which accused is convicted must be attended by criminal force.**—To justify an order under this section, the Court must find (i) that the offence of which the accused was convicted was attended by criminal force and (ii) that some person had been dispossessed of such property by the use of such force. Where, therefore, a person was convicted of criminal trespass (s 447, I P C.), it was held *following* 25 C. 434 and 27 C. 174, that the Magistrate was not justified in making the order restoring the property, 25 A. 341. Where the accused dispossessed the complainant of his garden by breaking open the padlock of the gate, but used no force or violence and were convicted of the offence of criminal trespass, *held* the Court could not order restoration under s 522, 13 C. W. N. 1146 = 13 Cr. L. J. 175. In 26 M. 49, WHITE, C.J., was of opinion that to satisfy condition (i), it is not necessary that criminal force must form an ingredient of the offence of which the person is convicted. It is enough if the offence though not involving the use of criminal force as an ingredient, is yet attended by the use of criminal force. When therefore the petitioner was convicted of criminal trespass under s 477, I P C., and the Magistrate made an order under this section directing that the complainant must be restored to possession, without finding that such trespass was attended by criminal force or that the complainant was dispossessed by such force, *held* on revision the order was made without jurisdiction. In 31 C. 691 it was *held* by the Full Bench *overruling* 25 C. 434 and cases like *3 C. W. N. 432* that followed it, that if criminal force was used by the accused by reason of which a party was dispossessed an order could be made under this section *even though the criminal force was not an ingredient of the offence of which the accused was convicted*. In this case, the accused was convicted under ss 341 and 114, I P C., for wrongfully restraining a person by the erection of a hut and the Magistrate made an order for the removal of the obstruction. The offence was, on the finding of the Lower Appellate Court attended by criminal force and the complainant was dispossessed by the reason of the obstruction complained of. Still the Full Bench (MACLEAN, C.J., PRINSEP and GHOSE, JJ) *held*, that the Magistrate had no jurisdiction to order the removal of the hut. The dispensing Judges (AMEER ALI and BRETT, JJ) *held*, that on conviction, the Court had an inherent power to make the order for removal of the obstructions, though not under this section.

(i) **The 'force' used must be to 'a person'**—The term 'force' is defined in s 349, I P C., as being applicable to force when used in connection with the human body. Under this section, delivery of immovable property may be made to the person who has been dispossessed of it when the accused is convicted of an offence attended by criminal force. Where therefore the accused were convicted of rioting under s 147, I P C., with the common object of destroying the complainant's fencing and raising of a new fencing on the complainant's land, it was *held* that violence herein was caused to the fencing and not to any person and therefore this section did not apply, as there was no use of criminal force to any individual, 18 C. W. N. 1150 = 15 Cr. L. J. 720.

(ii) *Finding of use of criminal force necessary to support order*—The foundation of an order under this section should be the finding of the Court to the effect that the person in whose favour the order is made has been dispossessed of specific immovable property by the use of criminal force, which force formed a material ingredient in the matter of a criminal conviction. And when such a finding has been arrived at, the order should be in terms to restore to the person who had been so dispossessed the property from which he had been dispossessed, 23 W. R. 54. In 3 L. R. R. 20 = 2 Cr. L. J. 377, applicants were convicted of criminal trespass. There was no finding or allegation that criminal force had been used in the commission of criminal trespass. Subsequently the complainant made an application to the Magistrate for restoration or possession of land in respect of which the trespass was committed and the Magistrate, purporting to act under this section and without calling on the accused to show cause, ordered the possession of the land to be restored to the complainant. *Held*, that where there is no finding or allegation that criminal force has been used in the commission of criminal trespass, an order under this section, restoring the possession of immovable property to the complainant cannot legally be passed. See also 7 C. L. J. 175 = 12 C. W. N. 269, 16 P. R. 1919 (Cr.).

(iii) *Mere show of force will not do but there must be actual use of it*—The words "attended by criminal force" mean not the *show* of criminal force as defined in ss 349 and 353, I P C., but the actual use of it. Therefore, where the accused was convicted under s 243, I P C., and the Magistrate made an order under this section for restoring possession of certain property to the opposite party, *held*, that the order for restoration was bad in law, 25 C. 434, 5 C. W. N. 289 and 290. But 25 C 434 has been doubted in 11 C. W. N. 467 = 5 Cr. L. J. 278, where it was *held* that under this section whenever an accused is convicted of an offence attended by a show of force the Court has power to order the person who has been dispossessed by the accused of any immovable property by such show of criminal force, to be restored to the possession of the same.

An essential ingredient of s 522 is that the offence of which the person is convicted must have been attended by criminal or, at the least, by the show of criminal force. 21 A. L. J. 543.

4. *Where dispossession is not the result of criminal force, order for restoration bad*—Where the accused was convicted of rioting and an order was passed under this section to the effect that one of the witnesses be put in possession of certain land until ousted by a Court of competent jurisdiction, *held*, that as there was no evidence proving that the witness had been dispossessed by criminal force, the order of the Magistrate was bad, Weir II, 674, and not warranted by law 1 C. W. N. 256, 4 C. W. N. 57 and 2 C. W. N. 167 and if the Magistrate assumed to act under s 145 the order should not have been embodied in his judgment, but should have formed the subject of separate proceedings. A Magistrate exercising jurisdiction given by this section must be satisfied and show clearly upon his judgment that dispossession has taken place by reason of the exercise of criminal force as defined in s 350 I P C., 25 C 434 followed see 27 C 174. But see 11 C. W. N. 467 = 5 Cr. L. J. 278. See also 26 M 39; 23 B. 494.

5. *Action may be taken, even though dispossession was under a claim of title*—When it was found that the complainant was all along in possession of a plot of land which he had sowed with paddy, and the accused had failed in certain previous proceedings before the Assistant Superintendent of Survey to get this plot included in his holding *held* the accused going upon the land with a body of men and ploughing up the paddy seedling in spite of the remonstrances of the complainant's servants, constituted offences under ss 447 and 426, I P C., even though he did so under a claim of title to the land. That under the circumstances the fact that the accused set up a title to the land, did not make the case against him one of a civil nature, and take it outside the jurisdiction of a Criminal Court, 11 C. W. N. 467 = 5 Cr. L. J. 278.

6. *Order may be made even when third parties are dispossessed*—The object of the provisions of this section is to enable the Criminal Court by a summary order, to restore the state of things which existed at the time of the dispossession by the convicted persons. If, in so restoring possession third parties are dispossessed they must be left to seek their remedy in the Civil Court and sub-sec (2) provides that any right or interest they may have in the property shall not be affected. Thus in 5 C. W. N 374, an auction purchaser was put in possession of a house by dispossessing a tenant subsequently, the accused forcibly dispossessed the auction purchaser and the tenant re-entered. On the complaint of the auction purchaser, the accused were convicted and the Magistrate directed the purchaser to be restored to the possession of the house, and ordered the tenant to vacate. It was contended that the order against the tenant was bad, as he was no party to the criminal proceedings. *Held* the order was good as the auction-purchaser was entitled to be restored to the actual

possession of the house which he held at the time of his ejection, and the Magistrate could not go behind the state of affairs at the time of the forcible ejection which led to the criminal proceedings. The ruling in 23 B. 494 was in this case referred to and explained.

7. Section does not apply when there has been no dispossession.—This section is the only provision which enables a Magistrate to restore a dispossessed party, and the power can only be exercised in cases in which there has been a conviction of an offence, attended by criminal force, and dispossession has been effected by means of such criminal force, *Weir II, 93. See 15 C. W. N. 399 = 15 Cr. L. J. 302.* *N* obtained possession in September, 1896, of a certain field in execution of his decree against *R*. On September 27th, 1897, *N* brought a complaint against *R* of criminal trespass under s. 447, I P. C., in which he stated that *R* had illegally entered upon possession of the land about a month and a half before, and sowed it with rice, and when *N* went to the field *R* pushed him out and refused to vacate the land or pass a *kadulyat*. A third-class Magistrate found that *N* had obtained possession through a Civil Court and convicted *R* of the offence charged. On the application of *N*, dated 18th November, 1897, the same Magistrate passed an order under this section directing *N* to be put in possession of the land, but ordered the crops to be attached. Later on as *R* had disclaimed all interest in the crop, the Magistrate directed that, after deducting expenses, the crops should be given to *N*. At this stage one *P* intervened and claimed the crops as his, but his objection was overruled and possession of the land was made over to *N* on 29th January, 1898. *Held* reversing all the orders of the Magistrate passed subsequent to the date of the conviction of *R*, that (1) all that the words "is convicted in this section mean is, that there must be a conviction first had, and then the order can be made, (2) that an application for possession made shortly after the conviction may be considered to be a continuation of former proceedings and (3) that as the accused *R* had possession both prior to and at the time force was used, the dispossession was, therefore, not made by force, and that the order passed under this section was bad, 23 B. 494. *Contra see* 4 C. W. N. 303 as to points (1) and (2) and 5 C. W. N. 374, where this Ruling is discussed.

8. No jurisdiction to proceed under this section, when neither party is found to be in possession.—Where neither party is found to be in actual possession, no order could be passed under this section directing restoration of the property, *Weir II, 673.*

WHEN ORDER SHOULD BE MADE.

9. Order need not be simultaneous with conviction.—An order under this section restoring possession of immovable property to a complainant can only be made simultaneously with the order of conviction and not subsequent thereto, 4 C. W. N. 303. There is nothing in the Code which requires that an order under this section should be contained in the judgment convicting the accused or be passed before the judgment is signed. It may be an independent order and made subsequent to the date of the conviction. But it must be immediate, that is, directly arising out of the proceedings without any fresh decision on facts not before adjudicated upon being imported. The word "simultaneously" used in the judgment in 4 C. W. N. 303, must be taken to mean "immediate," 23 B. 494 and 23 W. R. 54 followed, 14 Cr. L. J. 172 (C.). In this case an order passed four days after the conviction of the accused was upheld. *See also* 23 C. 1050 and Note 8. The complainant promptly after the dismissal by the High Court of the revision petition against a conviction, applied for an order for possession, but the accused having filed a civil suit, no order was passed on the application until after the disposal of the suit, that is, about 20 months after the conviction when the application was renewed, *Held*, that the Magistrate had discretion to pass an order for possession under s. 522. It is not necessary for him to pass such an order simultaneously with the conviction, and there is no illegality if he passes such order at any time after the conviction if the cause of delay is fully explained to his satisfaction and the complainant moves the Court promptly after the cause of delay has ceased, 15 P. R. 1914 = 14 P. W. R. 1914 = 15 Cr. L. J. 275 following 23 B. 494 and 14 Cr. L. J. 172, and dissenting from 4 C. W. N. 303.

10. Notice to accused not necessary.—Under the law as it now stands, no notice is necessary to the accused inasmuch as the order for restoration of possession arises immediately out of the findings of the Magistrate in his judgment and is amenable to appeal, 14 Cr. L. J. 172. In this case an order passed four days after the conviction of the accused without any notice to the accused but without any fresh materials was held to be competent as the accused had not been produced. Although the order was made without notice requiring that a Magistrate who passes an order proposed to make the order an opportunity of showing exercise of judicial discretion, 3 L. B. R. 20 = 2 Cr. L. J. 377.

APPEAL AND REVISION

11 Under the new amendment an order under this section may be made by any Court of appeal, confirmation, reference and revision—Under the new amendment to s 522 by the addition of clause (3) an order under this section may be made by any Court of appeal confirmation reference and revision **45 A 92** and therefore the decisions in **39 C 137** and **1050** disapproving **23 B 495** are no longer good law *See also 4 Pat 439*

12 Power of Lower Court to direct restitution when order is reversed—A Criminal Court is empowered to restore possession to a party who has been dispossessed by its order under this section when such order has been set aside as illegal by superior authority **5 P R 1895** In a case in which the accused had been convicted of offences under ss 352 and 448 I P C the prosecutor had obtained an order under this section from the convicting Magistrate restoring possession of property the subject of the offence under s. 448 I P C. The accused having been acquitted on appeal applied for restoration of possession. The Appellate Magistrate referred the case to the High Court. On a preliminary objection that the High Court had no power to order restoration of property *held* reading together s. 423 (1) (d) and this section the High Court had the power to order restoration of property and this as a result of the amendment by the present Code of s. 423 of the 1882 Code in order for restitution of possession being a consequential or incidental order **27 A 415**. Where the High Court set aside an order of the Magistrate under this section directing possession of a garden to be delivered to a party which had been carried out and on the opposite party applying for restitution the Magistrate refused the prayer on the ground that he had no jurisdiction to direct the Police to restore the possession of the party *held* that the order of the High Court carried with it the incident of restoration and the Magistrate ought to restore possession through the Police **18 C. W N 1147 = 15 Cr L J 222** The Rulings in **5 Bom L R 23** and **5 C. W 250**, denying the power of restitution to the High Court when once the order of the Magistrate has been carried out seem to be of doubtful authority *See Note 11 above*

13. Period of limitation for civil suit at the instance of party dispossessed—Under Art. 47 of Sch II of the *Limitation Act* XV of 1877 now I. of 1908 a suit to set aside an order under this section must be brought within three years from the date on which it was passed **43 M L J 372**

523. (1) The seizure by any Police-officer of property taken under section 51 or alleged or suspected to have been stolen or found under circumstances which create suspicion of the commission of any offence shall be forthwith reported to a Magistrate who shall make such order as he thinks fit respecting the disposal of such property or the delivery of such property to the person entitled to the possession thereof or if such person cannot be ascertained respecting

Procedure by Police upon seizure of property taken under section 51 or stolen

the custody and production of such property

(2) If the person so entitled is known the Magistrate may order the property to be delivered to him on such conditions (if any) as the Magistrate thinks fit. If such person is unknown the Magistrate may detain it and shall in such case issue a proclamation specifying the articles of which such property consists and requiring any person who may have a claim thereto to appear before him and establish his claim within six months from the date of such proclamation

Procedure where owner of property seized unknown

Notes—*See* s. 170 (2) for power of Police to send articles and also s. 23 of Act V of 1861

1 Provisions of the Codes of 1872 and 1882 compared—The provisions of this section are wider than the corresponding provisions of the 1872 Code (ss. 415 and 416), and they enable the Magistrate to inquire into the ownership of property seized by the Police and deliver it to the person entitled to it instead of to the persons from whom it is taken **8 B 338 followed in Ratanlal 365** In the 1872 Code the Court was not expressly given powers to pass orders respecting property used for the commission of any offence under s. 415 of 1872 Code there was no provision giving him a general power of disposal of the property *See 1 C. W N 561 and 30 C 694*

2. Section applies to all cases where there has been no inquiry or trial—*See* Note 10 to s. 517 Section 523 contains a general provision applicable to all cases where there has been no inquiry or trial. If therefore there are grounds for suspecting that the property seized was used for fabricating false evidence against the accused in the case the Magistrate must be held to have jurisdiction to pass an order directing its restoration **24 M L J 1 = 14 Cr L J 27**

3. Magistrate's power to deal with property seized under a search-warrant.—This section does not apply to property which is produced before a Court in the course of an inquiry or trial under a search-warrant issued by itself under s. 97. To such property s. 517 alone would apply. The scope of this section must be confined to property seized by Police of their own motion in the exercise of their powers conferred on them by law, *e.g.*, ss. 51, 54, 164 and 165. The power of disposal of such property is conferred upon the Magistrate, 17 B. 743. But the correctness of this Ruling has been doubted by FULTON, J., in 26 B. 532, who was of opinion that the words "seized by the Police," apply equally, whether the seizure is made by a Magistrate's warrant or without such a warrant.

4. Standing crops not covered by this section.—Standing crops are not such property as are referred to in this section, 23 B. 974.

5. Discretion given by the words 'make such order as it thinks fit,' must be exercised judicially.—The discretion given by these words must be judicially exercised and in the absence of anything to show the title to the property, it should be ordered to be delivered to the person in whose possession it had been at the time of attachment 5 Bom. L. R. 25; 8 B. L. R. 141 = 16 Cr. L. J. 133; 17 Bom. L. R. 79 = 3 Bom. Cr. C. 12 = 16 Cr. L. J. 207. *See* also 4 L. B. R. 14 = 6 Cr. L. J. 125. The Rulings in 1 B. 630 and 14 C. 834, to the effect that when the High Court finds that property has been disposed of without exercising a sound judicial discretion in the matter, the High Court has no power to order restitution, seem to be of doubtful value when s. 439 is read with s. 423 (1) (d). A Magistrate, after discharging the accused, passed an order in respect of the property before him to the effect that part of it should be given to the accused on his furnishing security for Rs. 100, and the rest to be kept in the custody of the Police. *Held* that this section was not applicable and the order was (*vide* 1 B. 630) wrong, and the property must be restored to the accused *B. H. C. Cr. Aul. 24th April, 1894*. But the fact that the accused had been in possession of the property when the charge was made is not conclusive. A Magistrate is competent in the exercise of his discretion to order the property which was in the possession of the Police to be made over to the complainant. The Magistrate had to apply his mind to the question as to who was entitled to the possession of the property and if on such materials as were placed before him he comes to the conclusion that the complainant was a Court of Revision will not interfere 12 Bom. L. R. 232 = 11 Cr. L. J. 339. It is open to a Magistrate to disbelieve the evidence of the claimant and proceed under sub-sec. (2), 16 Cr. L. J. 254 (M.). *See* Note 1 to s. 524.

6. Is Magistrate not competent to attach conditions to delivery of property?—A Magistrate has no jurisdiction under this section to make an order in favour of a party conditioned on his furnishing security. If the Magistrate did not think fit to take the proper steps under the law to secure the production of property before the Court the only course that was open to him when he referred the complaint to the Civil Court, was to leave it to the Civil Court to take such steps as it might think fit for the production of the property in question 7 C. W. N. 522. In *Weir II, 676*, a Sessions Judge on appeal acquitted the accused who had been convicted by a Deputy Magistrate of the offence of theft of money alleged to belong to a Railway Company and directed that the money found on their person be handed over to the Deputy Magistrate to be dealt with under this section. The Deputy Magistrate rejected the claim of the accused and directed the sum to be paid to the Agent of the Railway Company on his executing a bond binding himself to produce the money before any Court when required, *held* that the order of the Deputy Magistrate must be set aside as the procedure laid down in this section was not followed. But in connection with a case of theft, certain property alleged to have been stolen was seized by the Police, but the case completely broke down upon investigation and a counter-case of rioting was brought. Before final orders could be passed in the counter case both the parties pressed the Magistrate to pass an immediate order to save the property from possible loss or decay and the Magistrate thereupon ordered that the property should be delivered to one of the parties on certain terms. *Held* that the Magistrate had jurisdiction to make the order under this section 5 C. W. N. 415.

7. Magistrate must confine inquiry to right to possession and not decide title.—*See* Note 9.

8. Does disposal of property include destruction or forfeiture of property?—The Code has under ss. 517 and 523 given a general power to the Court to direct the destruction or forfeiture of any property used for the commission of any offence. The Court would no doubt be slow to pass an order for forfeiture in cases of mere suspicion under s. 523 but it would have less hesitation in refusing to restore property to the owner who is suspected to have used it for the commission of an offence. The power to order restoration is discretionary and the Court is not bound to exercise it. If the offence be one relating to property, the proper order would, of course, be to return it to the owner or person in possession. But this cannot be the proper

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h, h, l, o long; h, g, k, s, p, r, t, d, b, v, f, i, u, v, short; p, s, t, q, obscure (see remark p 1081), for all these terms, for, too, but, for, own as in copy change in it

order when the offence suspected is one committed by the person who is the owner or possessor of the property and who has used it for the commission of the offence. The right order in such a case must be to direct the destruction or forfeiture of the property according to its nature, 24 M. L. J. 1 = 14 M. L. T. 431 = 1913 M. W. N. 851 = 14 Cr. L. J. 27. See, however, Note 13 to s. 517.

9. Court may direct forfeiture in first instance even when claimant may be ascertained—Certain money and other articles were seized by the Police in consequence of a complaint of theft preferred by one R against one V. The Police, after a preliminary investigation, came to the conclusion that the case was false and that the articles seized were probably foisted by or his men into V's house. Thereupon R made a complaint before the second class Magistrate. The Magistrate dismissed the complaint under s. 203, and directed under s. 517, that the articles seized by the Police should be forfeited to Government, as they were used for concocting a false case against V. Held, that the order of forfeiture was valid although the Magistrate had no jurisdiction to pass the order under s. 517, he had power under s. 523 to pass an order regarding the disposal of property seized by a Police-officer, which was 'alleged or suspected to have been stolen or found under circumstances which create suspicion of the commission of any offence'. It was argued that it is only if the person entitled to possession cannot be ascertained and no one establishes his title to possession after notice given by the Magistrate that an order can be passed that the property should be at the disposal of Government. Held, the contention could not be accepted. Section 523, cl (1) gives the Magistrate power either to deliver the property to the person entitled to its possession, or to pass such order as he deems fit respecting its disposal. If he adopts the first alternative, he has to find out the person entitled to possession, and if no one succeeds in establishing his title to possession, the property would be at the disposal of Government. If he adopts the second alternative, the section does not specifically state what the nature of the order regarding the disposal should be. If an order that the property should be at the disposal of Government would be proper in the circumstances of the case there is nothing in the section which prevents him from passing such order, 24 M. L. J. 1 = 14 M. L. T. 431 = 1913 M. W. N. 851 = 14 Cr. L. J. 27. See, however, Note 13 to s. 517.

10. Is Magistrate bound in every case to hold an inquiry?—See Note 5. Where a person charged with criminal breach of trust in respect of certain jewels died before trial, and the alleged owner of the jewels which were recovered by the Police applied to be put in possession, held, that s. 517 did not apply. The section did not apply, and that the Magistrate was not bound to hold an inquiry simply to determine the ownership of the jewels, 29 M. 375. Clause (2) of this section does not require a Magistrate to make any inquiry at all. He proceeds on such materials as are available before him and he has to decide the question, not who was in possession at the time the property was seized by the Police but who was entitled to possession. The observation of TELANG, J., in 17 B. 748, which suggested that the Magistrate was bound to hold an inquiry before making his order was a mere *obiter dictum* and found no support in the section itself, 5 B. L. R. 3 = 12 Cr. L. J. 108. In 17 B. 748 it was, however, held a Magistrate is bound to institute an inquiry under this section before making any order touching the right, not of property, but of possession to the property seized by Police. The Magistrate does not decide the question of title but merely decides the question of possession, 12 Bom. L. R. 232. Where things are produced before a Magistrate under a search-warrant, he is bound to proceed and satisfy himself whether the things produced are the things which it is necessary or desirable should be kept in custody, and when a third party appears before him and alleges that the things are his, the Magistrate is bound to hear the party and restore the thing to the owner. There is a power inherent in every Court to satisfy itself that the things produced before it under a search-warrant, are the things which it is necessary or desirable should be kept in custody. When the Magistrate has not made such an inquiry about the things brought before him under a search-warrant issued by him, the High Court cannot, however, cancel the warrant and order restoration of property, 20 B. 552.

Disposal of property without taking evidence is legal—Where certain property was alleged to be stolen and its seizure by the Police was reported to the Magistrate, and there was no question as to the property having been taken from the complainant's possession, held, that the Magistrate's order delivering the property to the complainant without any enquiry was legal under this section, and that such order did not conclude the right of any person, Ratanlal 365. See 4 Lah. 38 in which case it was held, that it is not incumbent on a Magistrate to hold a judicial inquiry on oath before passing an order under s. 523. Such an order can be passed on Police reports and papers alone without any independent inquiry regarding the ownership of the property, 4 Lah. 38.

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11. Evidence of ownership—Confession made to Police-officer.—Statements made to the Police by accused persons as to the ownership of property which is the subject matter of the proceedings against them are admissible as evidence with regard to the ownership of the property in an inquiry held by the Magistrate under this section, 9 B. 131.

12. Magistrate not bound to take evidence till after lapse of six months from date of proclamation.—It is not intended that any final steps should be taken by a Magistrate acting under this section, or that he is bound to take any final steps, to ascertain whether the property belongs to the person in whose possession it was found, until after expiry of the six months mentioned in the sections, but when the proclamation has been issued and the six months have expired then the provisions of s. 524 come in, and the person in whose possession it was found can come forward and show that it is his own, 22 G. 761. But this Ruling was *distinguished* in 3 L. B. R. 197 = 4 Cr. L. J. 203, where it was *held* that in disposing of property seized by the Police, if the Magistrate finds that the person entitled to possession is known, he can lawfully adjudicate on the claims of that person without issuing any proclamation. If he has issued proclamation, that need not invalidate his order for immediate delivery of the property to such a known person. When the Magistrate finds that a claim which has been made is proved provided no other claimants appear, he should before pronouncing final orders, wait until the expiry of the six months specified in the proclamation. A Sub-Divisional Magistrate on appeal acquitted the accused of an offence under s. 414, 1 P. C., but made no order for the disposal of the sum of Rs. 61 produced in the case. On reference it was *held* that proceedings might be taken under this section, Ratanlal 535. See also 26 B. 552.

13. Magistrate bound to summon claimants witnesses.—The petitioner was charged with the theft of certain money found in his house and acquitted. Proclamation having been made for claimants to come in and claim the property, no one appeared, whereupon the petitioner preferred his claim and asked the Magistrate to summon certain witnesses, but the Magistrate refused to do so and disallowed his claim, *held*, that the Magistrate was bound to summon the witnesses named by the petitioner, 18 W. R. 3; 2 A. 276.

14. No order can be made as to property already restored.—A District Magistrate cannot treat property already restored or which ought to have been restored by a Subordinate Magistrate as subject to an order under this section, 8 B. 575.

15. No power to review an order already made.—Where once a Magistrate passes an order restoring possession of property, he has no authority to set aside his previous order subsequently, but an order under this section is subject to revision under s. 439 by the High Court, 4 Bom. L. R. 12.

16. Remedy of real owner is to sue the holder of property.—The Magistrate may in the inquiry proceed on such evidence as is available and make an order for handing the property to the person he thinks entitled. This does not conclude the right of any person. The real owner may proceed against the holder of articles for damages as for conversion. Where the Magistrate made an order for the delivery of property upon the mere evidence of a confession of the accused to the Police, that the property was stolen from the adjudged owner, the High Court declined to interfere with the Magistrate's order 9 B. 139; Ratanlal 365. See also *Bullock v Dunlop* L. R. 2 Ex. Div. 43, *Drover v Child* L. R. 1 Ex. Div. 172. In 40 B. 200 = 17 Bom. L. R. 979 the case in 9 B. 131 was *followed*. 5 Pat. L. J. 321.

17. Appeal and Revision—See s. 524 (2) and Note 50 to s. 439.

524. (1) If no person within such period establishes his claim to such property, and if the person in whose possession such property was found is unable to show that it was legally acquired by him, such property shall be at the disposal of the Government, and may be sold under the orders of the Presidency Magistrate, District Magistrate or Sub-Divisional Magistrate, or of a Magistrate of the first class empowered by the Local Government in this behalf.

Procedure where no claimant appears within six months.

(2) In the case of every order passed under this section, an appeal shall lie to the Court to which appeals against sentences of the Court passing such order would lie.

Notes.—1. Construction of 'unable to show it was legally acquired by him.'—See Note 5 to s. 523. The burden imposed on the possessor by this section, is discharged by the general presumption in favour of every

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man's innocence and the special presumption enunciated in s 110, *Indian Evidence Act*, when such person adduces evidence of possession and no claimant appears. There must be some reasonable ground for the "allegation or suspicion" and the mere fact the person in possession belongs to a criminal tribe, cannot be regarded as a sufficient ground—*Sind Sadar Ret* 52 of 1904. Although there may be a reasonable doubt as to the property having been honestly acquired by the person from whose possession it was seized, unless the evidence clearly shows that that person's claim is a false one or that his witnesses have conspired to support a false claim the proper and safest course is to follow the presumption laid down in s 110 of the *Evidence Act* and to hold that the person in possession is the owner, in the absence of proof to the contrary. The words 'unable to show that it was legally acquired by him,' in this section do not reverse this presumption. In the absence of proof or title to the property produced, it was ordered to be delivered to the person in whose possession it had been at the time of attachment, 8 S. L. R. 141 = 15 Cr. L. J. 133. In 17 Bom. L. R. 79 = 3 Bom. Cr. Ca. 12 = 16 Cr. L. J. 207, in similar circumstances the High Court, setting aside the order directing the property to be at the disposal of the Government observed as follows—The principal ground on which the Magistrate based his order was that K himself gave an account of how he acquired his wealth, which seemed to the Magistrate to be manifestly untrue. I think the spirit of our criminal law and its provisions both indicate quite clearly that inquisitorial inquiries into the private affairs and concerns of any person are not to be made, except possibly in rare instances unless there is something specific against that person. The circumstance that K gave an account of how he had acquired his property, which did not satisfy the Magistrate is no good reason for maintaining the order which he has made.

2 Confiscation by Government—The procedure prescribed by this and the preceding sections must be followed before making an order to confiscate the property, 9 W. R. 13. In 19 B 688 a bag of money was pointed out by a person, who was convicted of theft, and it was given to the owner. Close by another bag of money and a gold ring was found buried. The Magistrate issued a proclamation under s 523, whereupon a person claimed it as owner of the soil in which it was found. The claim was rejected, and an order under this section was passed placing it at the disposal of Government. He then sued the Secretary of State to recover this property on the ground that it was treasure trove, but on appeal the suit was dismissed.

3. Magistrate empowered by the Local Government in this behalf.—See s 529 (h) as to validity of sale by Magistrate not duly empowered. In Madras (*Gaz*, 1873, p 599) all Magistrates of the first class have been empowered to act under this section also in the United Provinces (*All Man*, 202), so too in the Punjab (*Punjab Gaz*, 1883 Pt. 1, p 52) Bombay (*Bom. Gaz* 1873, p 16), provided that they are not Honorary Magistrates when a special order is required in each case.

4 Appeal under this section is a regular appeal on the merits.—The appeal allowed by sub-sec (2) is an appeal in the full sense of Chapter XXXI and must be governed by its provisions, when an appeal to the Court of Session from an order passed under this section by a District Magistrate, was treated as a sort of miscellaneous application and was summarily disposed of in favour of the appellant the claimant to the property concerned, in an *ex parte* manner by the Sessions Judge, neither notice of the appeal having been served on the Government nor the procedure of Chapter XXXI followed in any respect; the order of the Sessions Judge was set aside and the case sent for re-trial, 1881 A. W. N. 130.

525. If the person entitled to the possession of such property is unknown or absent and the property is subject to speedy and natural decay, * "or if the Magistrate"

Power to sell perishable property to whom its seizure is reported, is of opinion that its sale would be for the benefit of the owner, † "or that the value of such property is less than 10 rupees" the Magistrate may, at any time, direct it to be sold, and the provisions of sections 523 and 524 shall, as nearly as may be practicable, apply to the net proceeds of such sale.

Notes—1. Proceedings of Magistrates not empowered—If any Magistrate not being empowered by law to sell property under s. 524 or s. 525 erroneously in good faith sells it, his proceedings shall not be set aside on the ground of his not being so empowered s 529, cl (h)

* The words "— were substituted for the words "or the Magistrate" by Act XLIII of 1923 1

† The words "— were inserted by s 11

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CHAPTER XLIV.

OF THE TRANSFER OF CRIMINAL CASES

High Court may
transfer case or itself
try it.

526. (1) Whenever it is made to appear to the High Court—

(a) that a fair and impartial inquiry or trial cannot be had in any Criminal Court subordinate thereto or

(b) that some question of law of unusual difficulty is likely to arise or

(c) that a view of the place in or near which any offence has been committed may be required for the satisfactory inquiry into or trial of the same or

(d) that an order under this section will tend to the general convenience of the parties or witnesses or

(e) that such an order is expedient for the ends of justice or is required by any provision of this Code

it may order—

(i) that any offence be inquired into or tried by any Court not empowered under sections 177 to 184 (both inclusive) but in other respects competent to inquire into or try such offence

(ii) that any * particular case or appeal or class of † cases or appeals be transferred from a Criminal Court subordinate to its authority to any other such Criminal Court of equal or superior jurisdiction

(iii) that any * particular case or appeal be transferred to and tried before itself or

(iv) that an accused person be committed for trial to itself or to a Court of Session

(2) When the High Court withdraws for trial before itself any case from any Court other than the Court of a Presidency Magistrate, it shall, except as provided in section 267 observe in such trial the same procedure which that Court would have observed if the case had not been so withdrawn

(3) The High Court may act either on the report of the Lower Court or on the application of a party interested or on its own initiative

(4) Every application for the exercise of the power conferred by this section shall be made by motion which shall except when the applicant is the Advocate-General be supported by affidavit or affirmation

(5) When an accused person makes an application under this section the High Court may direct him to execute a bond with or without sureties conditioned that he will if ‡ ' so ordered pay § ' any amount which the High Court has power under this section to abide by way of costs to the person opposing the application

Notice to Public
Prosecutor of applica-
tion under this section

(6) Every accused person making any such application shall give to the Public Prosecutor notice in writing of the application together with a copy of the grounds on which it is made and no order shall be made on the merits of the application unless at least twenty four hours have elapsed between the giving of such notice and the hearing of the application

* The word *such* was omitted by *ibid*

† The word *criminal* was omitted by Act XVII of 1923

‡ The words *so ordered* were substituted for the word *convicted* by *ibid*

§ The words *—* were substituted for the words *the costs of the prosecutor* by *ibid*

(6-A)* Where any application for the exercise of the power conferred by this section is dismissed the High Court may, if it is of opinion that the application was frivolous or vexatious order the applicant to pay by way of costs to any person who has opposed the application any expenses reasonably incurred by such person in consequence of the application.

(7) Nothing in this section shall be deemed to affect any order made under section 197

(8)† If in the course of any inquiry or trial, or before the commencement of the hearing of any appeal, the Public Prosecutor, the complainant or the accused notifies to the Court before which the case or appeal is pending his intention to make an application under this section in respect of such case or appeal, the Court shall adjourn the case or postpone the appeal for such a period as will afford a reasonable time for the application to be made and an order to be obtained thereon.

(9)‡ Notwithstanding anything hereinbefore contained, a Judge presiding in a Court of Session shall not be required to adjourn a trial under sub-section (8) if he is of opinion that the person notifying his intention of making an application under this section has had a reasonable opportunity of making such an application and has failed without sufficient cause to take advantage of it.

Referring to the amendment of this section the Select Committee say—

"We have found s. 526 somewhat difficult to deal with. One class of opinions presses for greater safeguards against frivolous vexatious or dilatory applications for transfer. Another class deprecates any measure which makes it so much more difficult to obtain. We think it is unavoidable to retain in the Code some provision for the compulsory adjournment of a case when an intention to apply for a transfer has been notified. But we recognise that the provisions of the section as they stand have lent themselves to gross abuse, and therefore we feel that greater safeguards are necessary. For these reasons in the first place, we maintain the principle of the new subsec. (6-A) which enables the High Court to award costs in dismissing an application. We have, however, modified it to this extent, that it will enable the High Court in cases where it is of opinion that the application was frivolous or vexatious to award such amount by way of reasonable costs in the High Court and the Court below as it thinks fit. We think the last sentence of new sub-sec. (6-A) was superfluous. In view of the provisions of s. 547

We consider that the new subsec. (8) proposed by the Bill was unsatisfactory in several respects. The opening words of the sub-section contemplated notification at any stage of the case provided that it was made before the commencement of a day's hearing. But words occurring later to the sub-section indicated that its application was confined to a notification made before the accused was called upon to enter on his defence. The proviso therefore which dealt with an intention to apply for a transfer formed after the accused had entered on his defence was not a true proviso to the sub-section. We considered whether sub-sec. (8) should not refer to an application made at any stage and whether in such case discretion as to an adjournment should not be left with the Court except when the applicant gave security in which case the adjournment should be compulsory. On the whole, however, we have decided in favour of rejecting the proposal to provide for a bond. Apart from other objections we think it was calculated to enhance the delays already involved by s. 528. Our amendment of the Bill therefore provides for a compulsory adjournment at any stage of the case except that a Sessions Court may refuse to adjourn when it is of opinion that the application has been unreasonably delayed.

It was suggested to us that we should add a new clause to s. 526 providing for transfer of a case when the accused has reasonable ground for apprehending that he will not get a fair and impartial trial. We think, however, that the Rulings of the High Courts are quite clear on the point and that it would be a mistake to amend the section.

Note.—Amendments.—The word criminal is now omitted from subsec. (2) of cl. (c) in order to make it clear that the power to transfer is not only limited to criminal cases but it also extends to other miscellaneous proceedings under the Code.

* (6-A) was inserted by Act XIII of 1924

† Sub-sections (6) and (8) were substituted for sub-section (8)

Magistrate refused to adjourn a case to allow the accused to move the High Court for a transfer and convicted the accused, *held*, the conviction was illegal and the case was transferred to the file of another Magistrate for re-trial, 21 M. L. J. 755 = 12 Cr. L. J. 407.

II.—CONDITIONS PRECEDENT TO EXERCISE OF JURISDICTION.

5 Subordinate Courts should be properly seized of the case.—The High Court cannot, under this section, transfer a case which is not properly before a Subordinate Court of competent jurisdiction to receive and try it. *Per* BIRDWOOD, J., in 10 B. 274. See also 9 A. 191 = L. R. 13 I. A. 134 at p. 144; 9 M. 356; 6 C. 30; 8 B. 312 may be distinguished, nor where the Magistrate apparently has no jurisdiction, 7 Bom. L. R. 105. The High Court cannot transfer a case taken up by Magistrate who had no jurisdiction, 3 Bom. L. R. 121. The Magistrate should inform the complainant that he has no jurisdiction, and take bail from the accused for appearance before the proper Court. The High Court cannot transfer a case committed to a wrong Sessions Court, 36 M. 387. See Notes 7 and 8 at p. 446.

6. Transfer cannot be made after disposal of case.—This section contemplates the transfer of a case before disposal, or interference on behalf of persons aggrieved or injured by an order of the Magistrate. It is not intended to give power to interfere in order to set aside an acquittal, 2 C. 290 at p. 292. An order of transfer cannot operate as cancelling an order of discharge, 1 Bom. L. R. 782. In 19 M. 375 an order of transfer made by the High Court on December 4, did not in fact reach the Judge till after December 5 when judgment was pronounced convicting the accused, the conviction was upheld.

7. Order for transfer of appeals to be filed in future is bad.—A District Magistrate having sanctioned the prosecution of certain accused persons for having escaped from a quarantine camp, the Sessions Judge asked the High Court to pass an order that all appeals arising out of the proceedings in which the District Magistrate had sanctioned the prosecution should not be heard by him, but transferred to some other Court. *Held*, that it was doubtful whether the High Court had jurisdiction to make such an order. It could transfer actually existing appeals only, but could not direct that appeals that might be filed in future should, when filed not be heard by the authority to which they might be presented, Ratanlal 973.

8. District authorities to be moved before approaching the High Court.—Ordinarily the High Court does not transfer a case pending before a Subordinate Magistrate, unless the party applying for the transfer has moved the District Magistrate before going to the High Court, 6 Bom. L. R. 437; 11 A. L. J. 741 = 14 Cr. L. J. 555.

III.—PROCEEDINGS LIABLE TO BE TRANSFERRED.

9. "Criminal Case," what it means.—Under the old law there was a conflict of decisions as to the meaning of the words "criminal case" appearing in sub-sections (ii) and (iii) of clause (e). And it was doubted for instance, whether a case under Chap VIII could be called a criminal case. But under the present amendment the word "criminal" has been deleted from sub-section (2) of cl. (e), and now s. 526 would include all proceedings under the Code. For instance, in the following cases it was held that the term "criminal case" may be understood as distinguished from a civil case, or in other words, a criminal case is one over which a Criminal Court exercises jurisdiction—*Per* GHOSE J., in 23 C. 709; 34 A. 533. In 23 C. 709, TAYLOR, J., remarked "I am of opinion that 'case' and 'criminal case' as used in the Code of Criminal Procedure are not co-extensive. 'Criminal case' is intended to be used in a limited sense and does not apply to every case cognizable by a Criminal Court." See 25 B. 179 and Note 12 below. In 4 M. H. C. R. Appx. XL, the Madras High Court *held* that the term 'criminal case' meant 'any case *prima facie* criminal'. In the new Bill it is proposed to omit the word 'criminal'. A Division Bench of the Chief Court followed the judgment of TAYLOR J., and *held* that a proceeding under s. 110 is not a 'criminal case' inasmuch as a criminal case is not the same as a case cognizable by a Criminal Court, and in every criminal case there must be a person charged with the commission of an offence, 5 P. R. 1914 = 154 P. L. R. 1914 = 15 Cr. L. J. 563. In 8 S. L. R. 215 = 18 Cr. L. J. 249, the Judges while following 24 B. 527 were of opinion that the words 'criminal case' should not be restricted to cases arising out of and dealing with some crime already committed and referred to the interpretation put on the words 'criminal cause or matter' in s. 47 of the Judicature Act by the English Courts. 'The general rule of construction adopted is either that the subject matter of the proceeding is of a criminal nature or the proceeding is one in which a penalty by way of punishment is sought or can be enforced in case of disobedience'.

In the Calcutta High Court there has been vacillation. In 33 C. 152, doubts were expressed whether a proceeding under s. 145 was a criminal case. In 2 C. L. J. 614 = 3 Cr. L. J. 83 it was *held* that a

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| <p>Wm. A. B. C. D. E. F. G. H. I. J. K. L. M. N. O. P. Q. R. S. T. U. V. W. X. Y. Z.</p> | | | |

proceeding under s. 145 is a criminal proceeding and a Magistrate has power to transfer the same under ss 192 and 215. In 23 C. 709 the power of the High Court to transfer under s. 526 was doubted but the case was transferred under s. 15 of the Charter Act. In 18 C. W. N. 393 = 15 Cr. L. J. 359 it was held that s. 526 has no application to proceedings under Chap XII while the same Bench held in 41 C. 719 that s. 526 applied to proceedings under s. 107. See Note 9 above.

10. *Cases under Chap. VIII.*—In 19 A. 291, it was held the High Court could not transfer, when the Magistrate had acted under s. 117, but s. 117 has now been amended. That the Magistrate acted on private information in calling upon a person to show cause under s. 110 is no good ground for the transfer of the case from his file. There is no limit to the nature or the source of information on which a Magistrate initiates proceedings under that section, 27 A. 172. See Note 9 above.

(i) *Cases under s. 107 may be transferred.*—The High Court has power under this section to transfer proceedings under s. 107 from one district to another, 32 A. 642. It is true that every case that is governed by the Code need not necessarily be a 'criminal case' but it does not from that follow that only such cases are criminal as relate to offences already committed or said to have been committed. Cases under s. 107 are subject to cl. (8) and a Magistrate errs in refusing an adjournment, 41 C. 719. In 8 S. L. R. 215 = 16 Cr. L. J. 249, the Judges stated they were disposed to agree with 41 C. 719 rather than with 5 P. R. 1914. But as a rule, it would not be proper to transfer any preventive proceeding from one district to another. It must be an extremely exceptional case that would justify the interference of the High Court with the jurisdiction of the Magistrate of the District taking preventive action within his boundaries and imposing such foreign and extraneous duty on the Magistrate of another District, 17 C. W. N. 836 = 14 Cr. L. J. 382. See also 31 C. 350. See Note 9 above.

(ii) *Transfer of good behaviour cases.*—It may now be taken as settled that proceedings under s. 110 are liable to be transferred from one district to another, 23 C. 709; 32 A. 642; 1 S. L. R. 98 = 8 Cr. L. J. 356; 11 C. W. N. 231, 1 P. R. 1913; 12 A. L. J. 263 = 15 Cr. J. 363.

(iii) *Cannot such proceedings be transferred to another District?*—It was held in 16 A. 9 and 30 A. 47 that though under this section, a criminal case may be transferred to a Magistrate not having local jurisdiction, but otherwise competent to inquire into or try the case, yet proceedings under s. 110 cannot be transferred to any Court outside the district within which such proceedings have been lawfully instituted. The reasoning in these cases was followed in 34 M. 186.

Contra.—The Punjab Chief Court held that it had no jurisdiction either under s. 526 or under s. 33 or the Punjab Courts Act to transfer proceedings under s. 110 from the Court of one Magistrate to the Court of another Magistrate, 5 P. R. 1914 = 154 P. L. R. 1914 = 15 Cr. L. J. 563. The case in 25 B. 179 and the judgment of TAYLOR, J., in 28 C. 709 followed. See also the referring judgment of RATTIGAN, J. reported as a footnote to 15 Cr. L. J. 563, where it was pointed out that in the case in 1 P. R. 1913 = 13 Cr. L. J. 746, it was assumed without any argument that s. 526 applied to a case under s. 110. See Note 9 above.

11. *Proceedings under s. 145.*—Under the old law there was a conflict of opinion as to whether proceedings under s. 145 were criminal proceedings, but now under the new amendment by the omission of the word "criminal," proceedings under s. 145 are liable to be transferred under this section. (See Note 9, *supra*.) The Madras, Allahabad and Oudh Courts have held that proceedings under s. 145 may be transferred, 26 M. 183; 34 A. 533; 11 O. C. 61 = 7 Cr. L. J. 423. The Bombay High Court has, however, held that it has no power under this section to direct the transfer of proceedings instituted under s. 145, as they do not come under the provisions of this section, 25 B. 179. The case proceeds on a strict construction of the language of the section "any criminal case or appeal." The word "criminal" governs the word "appeal" as well as the word "case." A criminal case, like a criminal appeal must arise out of and deal with some crime already committed. Hence this section does not confer any power to transfer proceedings under s. 145 which neither contemplates an inquiry or trial into an offence, nor does it deal with a crime committed, but is concerned only with the prevention of offences. The Bombay view was followed in 8 S. L. R. 215 = 16 Cr. L. J. 249. See also 5 P. R. 1914 = 15 Cr. L. J. 563. For the Calcutta view, see Note 9.

11-A. *An inquiry under Act XIII of 1859 (Workman's Breach of Contract Act)* is not outside the purview of s. 526 of the Code. (See preliminary note to s. 526) 43 A. 700.

12. *No power to transfer case under the Legal Practitioners Act.*—The Chief Court has no power to order the transfer of a proceeding under s. 14 of the Legal Practitioners Act (XVIII of 1879) from one Court to another, such proceeding being neither a civil proceeding nor a criminal proceeding, though it partakes of the

latter character, as being penal, neither s 25 of the *Civil Procedure Code*, 1882, nor s. 526 is applicable to proceedings of this kind, 41 P. R. 1888. But it is submitted that this is not good law in view of the omission of the word "criminal" from section 526. See Note 9, *supra*.

13. High Court not competent to transfer inquiry under s. 3 of Extradition Act, 1903.—See 33 C. 550 (footnote) = 15 C. W. N. 735, Note 11 at appendix, p. xvi.

14. Power to transfer case from one Presidency Magistrate to another.—The power conferred by this section is only to transfer from one Criminal Court to another, and consequently the High Court, under this section, has no power to transfer a case pending before one Presidency Magistrate to the file of another Presidency Magistrate, both being Judges presiding over the same Court, 13 M. L. J. 69. In 38 M. 739, it is, however, laid down that the High Court is competent to transfer a case from the file of the Chief Presidency Magistrate to the file of another Presidency Magistrate as they are Courts of equal jurisdiction. In 10 Bom. L. R. 201, the point was not raised, but the High Court transferred a case on the ground that the Presidency Magistrate was biased.

IV.—GROUNDS FOR TRANSFER.

15. Duty of the High Court to create and maintain confidence in the administration of justice.—It seems to be generally supposed that, when allegation of bias is made, the transfer is granted under sub-sec. (a) of s. 20, cl. (1), but except in those very rare cases when the Court itself is convinced that a fair and impartial inquiry cannot be had, the transfer is made under sub-sec. (e). One of the most important duties of a High Court is to create and maintain confidence in the administration of justice, and this can only be done by giving to every citizen an assurance that, so far as practicable, he will never be forced to undergo a trial by a Judge or Magistrate, when he has reasonable apprehensions of the litigant, and not because the judicial officer is adjudged to be incapable of properly performing his duty. Magistrates should not fail to remember that it is their duty no less to preserve an outward appearance of impartiality than to maintain the internal freedom from bias which is incumbent on all judicial officers and that if they allow their executive zeal to appear to outrun their judicial discretion, their action is certain to attract the delay consequent on an application to this Court. 1 S. L. R. 8 = 9 Cr. L. J. 251. C was arrested on a warrant charged with an indictable offence, and brought before E, a Justice of the Peace, who had been asked by the Crown Solicitor to take the depositions. E sat in a room in the Police station, and on the request of the Crown Solicitor made an order excluding all persons except representatives of the accused. Several other Justices for the county endeavoured to enter the room, but were refused admission. C's solicitor applied to E to admit the other Magistrates but E refused to do so, giving as a reason that he was guided by the Crown and directed by the Crown not to allow the other Magistrates to be present. C having applied for a writ of prohibition to prohibit E from proceeding further in the matter on the ground of bias—*Held*, while entirely acquitting E of any moral blame, that a reasonable public might think that the expression used by E implied that in making his order he was acting by the direction of the Crown and not exercising his own discretion, and that the writ of prohibition should be granted, *Rex v. Emerson*, (1913) 2 Ir. R. 377—K. B. D. See also *R. v. O'Grady*, 7 Cox C. C. 247.

16. If otherwise transfer is necessary, the High Court cannot take into consideration—

(i) *The effect its order would have on the reputation and authority of the Magistrate*—In dealing with an application under this section the High Court has only to determine whether good grounds for transfer have been made out to its satisfaction. While making an order, it cannot take into consideration, the effect its order would have on the reputation and authority of the Magistrate concerned. When the application for transfer is based on the ground that the applicant will not have a fair and impartial trial, the apprehension, to justify the transfer, must be shown to be reasonable, and if there be not sufficient grounds for the apprehension, the High Court will not transfer the case merely in deference to the susceptibilities of the accused, 10 C. W. N. 411 = 3 Cr. L. J. 379.

(ii) *Accused getting benefit of trial by jury*—In transferring a case, no consideration should be had to the fact that by the transfer to a particular district the accused will have the benefit of the trial by jury, where previously he had none. The real question is that of convenience of parties—*Per* WOODROFFE and COLE, JJ., 8 C. L. J. 59 = 8 Cr. L. J. 121.

17. It is the duty of the Magistrates to conduct themselves properly so as to inspire confidence in parties that nothing but justice will be done.—Next to the importance of deciding a case fairly and impartially, it

Born Died ()
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 English chemist and physicist

the importance of conducting oneself in such a manner as to inspire in the minds of the parties a confidence that nothing but absolute justice would be done to them and if by reason of the words or conduct of a Magistrate or Judge before whom a case is pending, any party reasonably apprehends that there is a bias against him, in the mind of the officer concerned, it would be expedient for the ends of justice to transfer the case from his file though there may not be actual bias, 28 C. 709, which follows 25 C. 727; 8 C. W. N. 75.

18. Reasonable apprehension in the mind of the accused that he will not have a fair and impartial trial is the proper test.—In dealing with applications for transfer, what the Court has to consider is not merely the question whether there has been any real bias in the mind of the presiding Judge against the accused, but also the further question whether incidents may not have happened which, though they may be susceptible of explanation and may have happened without there being any real bias in the mind of the Judge are nevertheless such as are calculated to create in the mind of the accused a reasonable apprehension that he may not have a fair and impartial trial. Of course, it is not every apprehension of this sort that should be taken into consideration, but where the apprehension is of a reasonable character, then notwithstanding that there may be no real bias in the matter, the fact of the incidents having taken place being calculated to raise such reasonable apprehension, ought to be a ground for allowing transfer. Where a Magistrate after releasing the accused on bail, still required him to report himself to the authorities at a certain place, and when he applied for leave to go to *Calcutta* and *Chabassa*, he was allowed to go only to the latter place, an order of transfer was held justifiable, 23 C. 495 followed in 19 A. 64, approved in 25 B. 179. See also 10 C. W. N. 441 = 3 Cr. L. J. 779; 9 C. W. N. 619, 36 C. 804, 18 C. 247; 25 C. 727; 128 C. 297; 28 C. 709; 8 C. W. N. 75. What has to be considered is whether the circumstances alleged would create in the mind of the applicant a reasonable apprehension of not getting a fair and impartial trial in the Court of the Magistrate. The position of an accused person is always one of great anxiety and suspense, and incidents, though susceptible of an explanation and which would perhaps pass unnoticed but for the trial he is undergoing alarm him and lead him to think that his guilt is already believed and that his conviction is a foregone conclusion, (19 A. 64 followed). In this case it was alleged by the accused who was a Mahant and of some standing that the District Magistrate had cancelled his license for arms and refused to see him when he called to pay his respects, it was held that these incidents were likely to lead the accused to believe and to infer that the District Magistrate was displeased with him and the case was transferred, 35 A. 5. In this case it was noted that 19 A. 64 had been followed in various other cases by the Allahabad High Court. In both these cases there were some incidents which had taken place from which it appeared that the Magistrate trying the case might be biased against the accused. Where no such incidents have been put forward, the transfer of a case should not necessarily be ordered, simply because an accused person thinks that he would not get an impartial trial, but the real question to be considered is whether on the facts disclosed in the application for transfer there arises a reasonable inference that the Magistrate who is seized of the case may be prejudiced willingly or unwillingly against the accused, 12 A. L. J. 33 = 14 Cr. L. J. 686, 15 Cr. L. J. 368 (A.). In 4 P. W. R. 1913 = 14 Cr. L. J. 286, however the case was transferred as the accused was under the *bona fide* impression that he may not have an impartial trial before the District Magistrate though the Chief Court held there were no good grounds for transfer and the suggestions made against the District Magistrate were held to be groundless and without justification.

19 It is not necessary to prove actual bias on the part of the Magistrate.—When the application is grounded on bias on the part of the Magistrate, it is not necessary to prove actual bias, but it is sufficient to show circumstances which may raise a reasonable apprehension in the mind of an accused person, that he will not have a fair and impartial trial and this, though the circumstances susceptible of explanation, have happened without any real bias in the mind of the Magistrate, *Weir II*, 678; 21 M. L. J. (Sh. N.) 59. Where there is fear in the minds of the parties that they would not receive a fair and unprejudiced trial and that fear is reasonable and founded upon distinct incidents which would really give rise to reasonable apprehension, there is good ground for transfer, although there is really no bias in the mind of the Court from which the transfer is sought 28 C. 297, where 23 C. 495 and 18 C. 247 are followed.

20 But apprehension must be reasonable and based on actual incidents.—[It is not sufficient for the accused merely to allege that he will not get a fair trial, but he must lay before the High Court the facts which give rise to this belief in his mind, and if these facts are found such that they will reasonably give rise to this belief, a transfer ought to be made, 10 O. C. 165 = 6 Cr. L. J. 254, where 23 C. 495 is referred to. In 35 A. 239, *SIR GEORGE KNOX* considered the case in 6 C. 491, 19 A. 64, and *Sergeant v. Dale* and held following 12 A. L. J. 23 = 14 Cr. L. J. 686, that a transfer of cases should not be ordered simply because an accused person thinks that he would not get an impartial trial, but the real question is whether on the facts disclosed in the applicatio

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and affidavits there arises a reasonable apprehension that the Magistrate who is seized of the case may be prejudiced willingly or unwillingly against the accused and referred to *Leeson v Medical Council*, 43 Ch D 366 at p. 384, *Reg v Myer*, (1875) 1 Q B D. 173—177, *R v Handsley*, (1882) 8 Q. B. D. 383 and *Allinson v General Council of Medical Education and Registration*, (1894) 1 Q. B. 750—758 and was of opinion that *Sergeant v Dale* was a peculiar case and stood quite by itself. Where the incidents suggested are incidents in accordance with law and seem to be a judicious exercise of the discretion vested in the Court and the Judge was apparently upholding the order and dignity of the Court it cannot be inferred from them that there is any danger of the inquiry being unfair or partial.

21. Reasonableness must be viewed from the standard of the accused—Abstract reasonableness is not the standard—On an application being made for adjournment to enable the accused to move the High Court under this section, the Magistrate gave out that he could go on till the accused were called on to answer on their defence and so he continued the examination of certain prosecution witnesses, and further, in his explanation to the High Court stated, that his reason for examining these witnesses before allowing the application for adjournment, was that he was apprehensive that the case might be settled amicably out of Court, and that the witnesses might not afterwards be available, and if available, might not speak the truth against the accused. *Held per MITRA, J.*, (HOLMWOOD, J., *contra*), that inasmuch as the order of the Magistrate, on the petition for postponement, and his explanation to the High Court, displayed an anxiety on his part that the accused, is really guilty, should not escape punishment they were calculated to raise not unnaturally, in the mind of the accused an apprehension that they might not have a fair and impartial trial before him; and as such apprehension was not in the peculiar circumstances of the case foolish or unfounded, the case should be transferred to some other Magistrate for trial. What is a reasonable apprehension should be decided in each case with reference to the incidents of the case and surrounding circumstances, and in determining whether an application is reasonable, it is the duty of the Court, by placing itself in the position of the accused to consider the fact and circumstances attending his position. Abstract reasonableness ought not to be the standard, 33 C. 1183, where 10 C. W. N. 441 is referred to and explained and 18 C. 453, 29 C. 211 and 8 C. W. N. 77 followed. If the words used by and the actions of a judicial officer though susceptible of explanation and traceable to a superior sense of duty, are calculated to create in the mind of the accused a reasonable apprehension, the case should be transferred, 33 C. 1183, where 31 C. 713 is followed. Confidence in the administration of justice is an essential element in good Government, and a reasonable apprehension of a failure of justice in the mind of the accused should be taken into consideration on an application for transfer. See 1 B. R. 8 = 9 C. L. J. 251, Note 17 above. In matters like these, to use the word of LUSH, J., in *Sergeant v Dale*, (1877) 2 Q B D 855, "the law, in laying down this strict rule, has regard not so much perhaps to the motives which might be supposed to bias the Judge as to the susceptibilities of the litigant parties. One important object, at all events, is to clear away everything which might engender suspicion and distrust of the tribunal, and so to promote the feelings of confidence in the administration of justice which is essential to social order and security." It has therefore to be seen whether there is anything in the case likely to create in the mind of the accused a reasonable apprehension that they may not have a fair and impartial trial. To decide that, regard must be had to the degree of their intelligence and their standard of honesty and impartiality, both probably fairly low. Though the facts alleged may be insufficient to raise in the mind of the Court even the shadow of an apprehension that the accused would not get a fair and impartial trial in the Court of the particular Magistrate, yet if they have raised a very real fear of injury in the minds of the accused, which is not unreasonable having regard to their standard of honesty and if the case ought to be transferred, 10 N. L. R. 15 = 15 Cr. L. J. 196; 6 Lah. 396.

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s. 558 and

ate is personally interested in case is good ground for transfer.—See s 487 and

ing been interest in the case.—Where the District Magistrate's letter showed that
ad interest in the matter which had led up to proceedings being taken under s. 107
part in the inquiry and had himself instituted the proceedings and was more
ed's guilt, held that the proceedings ought to be transferred to another district
12, 20 C. 837. Though transfer of trial granted where there is reason to suppose
e a fair trial yet in 2 B. R. 58, 11 C. L. J. 11 Court refused the application although
Magistrate had shown great care and discretion in dealing with the
it, and failed to do so. Where a District Magistrate

Born Feb. 20, 1893
 American novelist
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admitted in his reply to an application for transfer of a case that he has taken a keen personal interest in the case and was satisfied of the applicant's guilt, *held* sufficient ground for transfer, 32 A. 642

(ii) *Complainant or his Mukhtyar being servant or relation of Magistrate*—Where the trying Magistrate is the master of the complainant, it is expedient that the complaint should be referred to another Magistrate, though the fact of such relationship may not deprive the Magistrate of jurisdiction, 9 B. 172; (1911) 2 M. W. N. Jour. 110; 21 M. L. J. 755—12 Cr. L. J. 407. See, however, the remarks of JESU, J. in *Sergeant v Dale*, L. R. 2 Q. B. D. 538 and 20 C. 857. In 28 C. 297, the fact that the Magistrate is a relative of the Sub-Inspector of the Police or that he is in private life guardian of a person who has a claim to the estate whose manager or agent is the Magistrate is a friend of the accused, was *held* to be a sufficient ground for transfer, 29 C. W. N. 845.

(iii) *Magistrate being in another capacity interested in result of case*—In 8 C. W. N. 77, an application was made by the complainant on the ground that the accused were interested in the *Bethia Ray*, an estate under the management of the District Magistrate, as Collector and Agent to the Court of Wards. The application was granted in order to prevent persons from having an apprehension that there might be some bias in the mind of the Magistrate inclining him to look with favour upon the interests of any party. See also the remarks of PHEAR, J. in 7 B. L. R. 240 at p. 269—15 W. R. 69. Where the only officers in the district, competent to hear an appeal were or had been members of the Road Cess Committee, whose money formed the subject of the charge preferred, the appeal which lay to the District Magistrate was transferred to the Sessions Judge, 6 C. L. R. 279. See also 7 C. 322—9 C. L. R. 193. But, the mere fact that the District Magistrate, in his capacity as Collector, is concerned in the management of an estate under the Court of Wards is no ground for asking for a transfer from the district of a case instituted by a servant of the estate against the tenants of the estate and pending before a Subordinate Magistrate in the district, especially where there was not even a suggestion that the Collector as such Manager, knew of the institution of the proceedings, 28 C. 297.

(iv) *That the Magistrate has acted as arbitrator previously is ground for transfer*.—Where a Magistrate has dealt with the dispute in an informal manner as private arbitrator, it is desirable that the case should be transferred as his previous informal knowledge would necessarily hamper him at every turn, 18 C. L. J. 150—14 Cr. L. J. 802

(v) *But interest must be substantial enough to make it likely that he has a bias*—A Magistrate having surrendered some goods which had been seized in a case pending before him, was served with a notice of action, and the party apprehending that his conduct had created a bias in the mind of the Magistrate applied for a transfer of his case. *Held*, that before such application could be granted, it must be established that the Magistrate had such substantial interest in the result of the hearing as to make it likely that he has a real bias in the matter, *Ratanlal* 635.

23. *That Magistrate is to be summoned as a witness may be ground for transfer*.—The mere fact that a Magistrate trying a criminal case may be summoned as a witness for the defence is not of itself a reason for the transfer of the case from the Court of such Magistrate, but it may be a reason for such Magistrate committing the case to the Court of Session instead of (in the case of a conviction) passing final order himself, 1897 A. W. N. 17. The fact that the evidence of the Magistrate is necessary and material to the defence, must be supported by affidavit to that effect 1886 A. W. N. 257. See also 3 C. W. N. 278. In an application for transfer of a criminal case, the petitioner alleged that the evidence of the trying Magistrate would be required by the accused, touching certain matters connected with the case. *Held*, that inasmuch as the Magistrate was bound under s. 257 to issue a summons, unless he considered that the application for summons was made for the purpose of vexation or delaying or defeating the ends of justice, it was not proper to leave the decision of the case to the Magistrate whose evidence was required and the case was accordingly transferred, 26 A. 538. In 5 C. W. N. 856, it appeared that the Magistrate was present on the occasion when the Police made a search, and in that connection probably became aware of some of the facts connected with the case, and it also appeared that the Police brought up before him one of the accused for the purpose of his examination being recorded, it was *held* that it was expedient to transfer the case. See also 15 Cr. L. J. 543 (O). But it is not expedient to order a transfer, unless it is clearly shown that the evidence of the Magistrate is really essential for the accused defence, and that there is likelihood that he can give evidence which would aid the accused in his defence. An application for transfer of a case pending before the Magistrate on the

that the Magistrate is a necessary witness for the defence must be strictly scrutinized, as otherwise it would be open to any accused person to obtain a transfer of a case from a Magistrate whom he did not want to try the case, merely on this particular ground, 8 S. L. R. 170 = 16 Cr. L. J. 222. In 13 Cr. L. J. 368 (A) KNOX, J., refused an application for transfer based on the allegation that the Magistrate may be called as a witness as the objection was not put forward at the earliest date of the case.

24 Onus of proving necessity for transfer—(i) Onus of showing improper motive of Magistrate—In order to support an application for transfer of a case, the applicant must show that he has reason to believe that the Magistrate is likely to be prejudiced or influenced by any improper motive in the decision of the case. If this is not done, the High Court will support the Magistrate. It is highly improper to throw gratuitously a slight on the Magistrate by the transfer of a case from his Court, Ratanlal 323. See also 6 B. H. C. R. Cr. Ca. 60; 1887 A. W. N. 139. Ordinarily, where there are grounds for suspecting bias, though there may not be actual bias, the accused is entitled to a transfer, but when he attempts to procure that transfer by making false charges of corruption, etc., against the Magistrate, he loses the right, 2 L. B. R. 220.

(ii) When application is opposed by accused, the prosecution must bring forward the very best evidence to prove that a fair trial cannot be had in the district—Before the transfer of a case from one Criminal Court to another can be made in cases in which the accused objects to the transfer, the prosecution must bring forward the very best evidence to prove that a fair trial cannot be had in the district in which the case is ordinarily triable, 6 C. 491. Having regard to sub-sec. (5), a complainant very often makes an application without any notice to the Public Prosecutor. In such cases, the High Court should direct notice to the accused, even where the clearest case for a transfer is made out.

25. Incidents held to create reasonable apprehension that fair trial cannot be had—

(i) Cumulative effect of incidents to be taken into account—Though none of the circumstances alleged by the accused as grounds of a transfer, taken by itself shows that there is any bias on the part of a Magistrate, yet, if having regard to all the various matters alleged taken together, the accused may, not unreasonably apprehend that he may not have a fair trial, the case should be transferred 9 C. W. N. 619 = 2 Cr. L. J. 339. That the accused was arrested without a warrant, that his medical certificates were not accepted, that he was not informed of the charge for many days, that his request to reserve cross-examination was disallowed, that his prayers for production of certain documents was rejected and that the names of some of his witnesses were struck out, held though these facts by themselves did not show bias or prejudice in the mind of the Magistrate yet these taken with the fact of several criminal proceedings prior to the present proceedings would be likely to give rise to an apprehension in the accused's mind that he is not likely to have a fair and impartial trial and the case was transferred 12 A. L. J. 736 = 16 Cr. L. J. 56; 20 A. L. J. 911.

(ii) Local inspection with partisan of complainant—Where during the pendency of a case against the accused for the alleged cutting of a hand, the Magistrate went to the scene of occurrence, accompanied by the partisan of the complainant and held a local inquiry into a matter which, though not the subject of complaint against the accused could nevertheless be imagined by the accused to be such, 12 C. W. N. 768 = 7 Cr. L. J. 510.

(iii) Magistrate conducting inquiry not making entries daily as required by the rules—It appeared that the Magistrate, after the receipt of the order of the High Court staying all further proceeding in the case, placed on the record a letter received from a medical officer. Held that the Magistrate had acted with impropriety and showed some bias against the accused, that further proceedings should not, therefore, be taken before the said Magistrate and the case should be transferred to another Magistrate, 2 C. W. N. 639.

(iv) Persistence in going on with case after communication of the issue of a rule—A refusal to adjourn to enable the accused to apply to the High Court and persistence in going on with the case in spite of the communication of the issue of a rule nisi for transfer by telegram are sufficient to justify a transfer, 11 C. W. N. 507 = 5 Cr. L. J. 291; 1 S. L. R. 37 = 9 Cr. L. J. 275, 18 C. W. N. 1031 = 13 Cr. L. J. 788. Where the zeal of the executive officer had outstripped the judicial impartiality of the trying Magistrate, and where he hurried on the inquiry, preliminary to commitment in spite of his knowledge that a rule had been granted by the High Court

to stay proceedings, *held* that this haste to press the inquiry on coupled with his action in the earlier investigation of the case suggested that the mind of the trying Magistrate was not free from some bias in the matter and that he did not approach the case with judicial impartiality so essential to the administration of justice. Consequently, the ends of justice required that the case should be transferred to some other Magistrate. **2 C. W. N 498.** See also **1 B. L. R. 89 = 9 Cr. L. J. 251; 11 C. W. N 507 = 5 Cr. L. J. 291; 5 C. W. N 110;** but see **19 M. 375**. See Notes 54-55.

(v) *Making a witness a co-accused*—In **7 Bom. L. R. 472**, a person whose name appeared as an accused in the complaint was examined as a witness against the other accused and after he had given evidence to a certain extent he was made a co-accused and tried along with the others. *held* that the procedure adopted was highly calculated to intimidate the other witnesses and the action of the Magistrate was improper.

(vi) *Issuing non-bailable warrants in a petty case and exacting heavy bail*.—Where a Subordinate Magistrate in a case of petty theft of four bamboos worth one rupee issued non-bailable warrants in the first instance and afterwards exacted very heavy bail from the accused these were held to be sufficient grounds for transfer as the accused had been given occasion reasonably to apprehend that they would not have a fair trial before the Magistrate. The accused were however directed to pay the costs of the complainant before the trying Magistrate. **8 C. W. N 889;** but where a Magistrate acted *bona fide* from a mistaken view of the law it was held to be no sufficient ground for transfer. **8 C. W. N 838**.

(vii) *Issuing a warrant in a summons case unnecessarily*.—In **18 C. 247**, it was *held* that if there are circumstances shown which may reasonably lead the petitioner to believe that the Magistrate has to some extent prejudged the case against him and will in consequence be prejudiced against him there ought to be a transfer and a transfer was granted where in a summons case the Magistrate had issued a warrant without any apparent reason and there was reason to believe that in other proceedings connected with the case the Magistrate had formed an opinion unfavourable to the accused. See also **14 C. W. N 246**.

(viii) *Not allowing the accused to re-call and cross-examine prosecution witnesses*.—In **7 C. L. J. 240 = 7 Cr. L. J. 313**, the fact the Magistrate did not allow the accused to re-call and further cross-examine under s. 256 the witnesses for the prosecution was held to be sufficient ground not only for annulling the conviction but also for ordering the re-trial by another Magistrate. See also s. 256 and Notes thereunder.

(ix) *Taking proceedings under s. 107 against one party alone*.—In **11 C. W. N 121 = 4 Cr. L. J. 456**, two parties had both applied to the Land Registration Court for the registration of their names as proprietors of an estate and pending these proceedings a Magistrate instituted proceedings against one of the parties alone under s. 107 and it being represented that the proceedings under s. 107 against one party would prejudice that party in the Land Registration proceedings and when further some of this party were appointed Special Constables also *held* that in consequence of the order the parties might have a reasonable apprehension that they would not have a fair and impartial trial and the High Court therefore transferred the case. **10 C. W. N 82**.

(x) *Dismissing a complaint even without hearing the prosecution witnesses*.—Where a Magistrate followed the unusual and illegal procedure of acquitting the accused on a consideration of the complainant's statement alone and without examining his witnesses although they had been summoned the High Court set aside the order of acquittal and having regard to the fact that the Magistrate had formed a decided opinion before hearing the evidence for the prosecution directed the District Magistrate to transfer the case for trial to another Magistrate. **20 M. 398**.

(xi) *Insisting on the appearance of pardanashin accused*.—The case was transferred from the Magistrate who had refused to dispense with the personal appearance of pardanashin ladies belonging to a respectable family. The High Court gave them the permission and transferred the case. **15 Cr. L. J. 281 = 17 C. W. N 1245.**

(xii) *Magistrate putting questions to witnesses prejudicial to accused*.—See **12 A. L. J. 50 = 15 Cr. L. J. 234**, in Note 31.

(xiii) *Reasonable apprehension in the mind of the petitioner that his movements were unduly restricted*.—The High Court transferred the case having regard to the fact that on account of the order of the Superintendent of the Police that the petitioner was to be allowed facilities for insuring his movements only on application to him there might be a reasonable apprehension in the mind of the petitioner that his movements were unduly restricted. **23 C. W. N 481.**

(xiv) *Fixing a single day for trial and then another day after an adjournment*.—Ordinarily a Sessions trial once begun should be continued *de die in diem*.

Consequently where a Sessions Judge fixed one day for a Sessions case which could not be finished in a single day but the Judge was willing to grant an adjournment to another date, *held*, that this constituted a ground for the transfer of the case, 47 A. L. J. 485.

(xv) Where it appeared that the Civil Surgeon had been discussing the case at the Local Club with the officers of the station including the Sessions Judge, *held*, that this fact by itself was sufficient to justify an order for transfer of the case, 19 A. L. J. 948.

(xvii) *Magistrate trying to persuade the parties to compromise*—Where a Magistrate has interested himself in a case pending before him in the way of obtaining the settlement by the parties, it is to the interest of both the parties and only fair to the Magistrate himself that he should not hear the case 47 A. 411 = 23 A. L. J. 191.

26. Incidents held not sufficient to prove any bias.—(i) *That a Magistrate has in matters left to his discretion decided in a particular way*—Magistrate refusing to issue summons to 200 witnesses, 36 A. 239; or disallowing a question *Ibid.*; or increasing the bail when after proceeding in the inquiry the case becomes more serious, 4 P. W. R. 1912 = 12 Cr. L. J. 474; or refusing bail, 4 Bur. L. T. 113 = 12 Cr. L. J. 277; or refusing to grant adjournment for moving the High Court for transfer when the application has been delayed for two months 48 A. R. 42 = 11 Cr. L. J. 800.

(ii) *Bona fide mistake of law is no ground for transfer*—A Magistrate heard the evidence for the prosecution and, without disbelieving it, decided that it did not amount to the offence charged *held* that assuming that an error of law had been committed, the High Court has no power to issue a *mandamus* to the Magistrate to commit the defendants. It is not a case where the Magistrate has declined jurisdiction, 2 C. 278. Where in certain proceedings the Magistrate has decided in favour of the defendant, *held*, that the fact that the Magistrate was intimidated by the defendant and therefore there was not sufficient ground for transfer, 37 A. 172.

(iii) *Complainant is a man of importance at the place of trial*—The mere fact that the complainant is a man of importance at the place where trial is taking place is not a sufficient reason to justify the transfer of a case to another Court, Ratanlal 475

(iv) *Police activity*—See 15 W. R. 69 = 7 B. L. R. 240.

(v) *Allegation that justice more likely to be done if case heard by another officer who did not know the parties, no ground*—Section 528 (c) of the Code is no authority for the transfer of a case from one Court to another when the ground alleged is that the transfer would be in the interest of justice if the trial were held by a Court which knew nothing about either party, 16 A. L. J. 490

27. That Magistrate expressed strong view in preliminary inquiry in a Sessions case is no ground for transfer of the case to another Court—*strong view*

28. When is formation of a previous opinion in another case a ground for transfer?—See 487 and Notes under Heading XXIII—Where a Sessions Judge in his explanation to the High Court indicated that he had taken a very strong view of the case against the accused, and that he had in a great measure formed a very strong opinion of his guilt and also in view of the fact that it might be desirable to examine the Sessions Judge as a witness at the trial of the accused the High Court transferred the case to another Court, 3 C. W. R. 278

(i) *That sanction is given by the Judge is no ground for transfer of an appeal from conviction*—See 27 C. 452 and 15 Bom. L. R. 104 = 14 Cr. L. J. 190 and Notes 257 and 258

(ii) *That in a counter case between the same parties the Judge has formed a decisive opinion on the same evidence which is to be produced in the pending case is a good ground for transfer*—In 4 C. W. R. 821 where the complainant applied for transfer of his case, on the ground that the complaint was regarding facts

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forming the substance of the defence in another case which had already been tried by the same Magistrate, *held*, that the case should be transferred as the Magistrate had necessarily been compelled to express his opinion on the evidence which formed the evidence for the defence in that case, and that was the evidence on which the complainant in the present case would rely. In two cases in which charges and counter-charges had been made, a Magistrate heard the prosecution evidence in one case and then without hearing the defence evidence in that case interposed the other case, heard the prosecution evidence in that case and on that evidence discharged the accused in that case. In his order of discharge, he expressed himself in decided terms as to the guilt of the prosecuting party in the latter case, who were the accused in the former case. *Held*, that the course adopted by the Magistrate was likely to prejudice the accused in the former case. Although the evidence which the accused in the former case addressed as prosecutors in the latter case may be substantially the same as that which would have been adduced in their behalf if the former case had proceeded in the ordinary way and the evidence for the defence in that case had been heard, it does not follow that evidence which when adduced on behalf of the prosecution is insufficient to sustain a charge, will, if adduced on behalf of the defence with reference to the same charge, be also insufficient. Such prejudging of the accused's guilt is sufficient ground for transfer, 30 M. 233. This Ruling was *followed* in (1910) M. W. N. 743 = 11 Cr. L. J. 702, where a case and a counter-case were filed before a Magistrate who in giving judgment in one, prejudged the other, and the latter case was therefore taken away from his hands. Where, in a case of rioting, the question of possession was of all importance and the Magistrate had in two previous cases expressed rather a decisive opinion upon the question of possession, *held*, that it was expedient for the ends of justice that the case should be transferred, 8 C. W. N. 641. STEPHEN, J., doubted the correctness of this principle but felt bound to follow the practice of the High Court.

(iii) *But opinion expressed in a judgment in another case based on evidence judicially recorded is not ipso facto a sufficient ground for transfer*—The mere fact that in another case, on other evidence, the Judge may have come to a particular conclusion is not in itself a sufficient ground for transfer, 36 C. 904 *following* 1 C. W. N. 526, where it was *held* that the fact that a strong opinion was expressed by the Sessions Judge in a counter case of rioting is not a sufficient ground for transferring a case. So also in 33 A. 553 it was *held* *following* Cr. Mis. Case No 141 of 1909 that the fact the Judge had already in a cross-case against the other party in an alleged riot come to the decision that the present applicants were the aggressors and the other party were acting in self-defence, was not a sufficient ground for transfer. But where certain remarks in a judgment in a counter-case were relied on as showing bias, *held*, that when a judgment has been formed on evidence judicially recorded, it is impossible to take that judgment as an indication of extra judicial bias and prejudice forming grounds for transfer, 18 C. W. N. 910. The impressions recorded in the judgment are impressions derived from evidence and however erroneous, are not to be classed as instances of personal bias which is regarded as disqualifying 6 Bom. L. R. 1092. Interest or bias is not to be inferred from the opinions formed on evidence judicially recorded 18 L. R. 37 = 9 Cr. L. J. 275, nor is the fact that the Magistrate has discharged a cross-case between the same parties *per se* a sufficient ground, but if the order of discharge is based on the evidence which he had heard in both the cases there will be a sufficient ground for transfer, 5 B. L. R. 264 = 13 Cr. L. J. 532.

(iv) *That the Judge sitting on the civil side has in a case of perjury or forgery formed an opinion on the evidence is not by itself a sufficient ground for transfer*—As a general rule, the High Court does not exercise its power of transfer in a case of forgery or perjury only on the ground, that the Judge who is to try the case has actually formed an opinion that the document is forged or the perjury was committed when sitting on the civil side of his Court. But when the transfer can be made without risk of any improper interference with the course of justice, and without much inconvenience to the parties and witnesses, it is not only a fair concession to the person charged, but is a means of relieving the Judge from a position which he would desire to avoid 5 M. H. C. R. 212; 6 B. 479, 14 A. 354; 16 C. 766 (F B) *overruling* 16 C. 121; 18 B. 380. See also s. 480.

(v) *Trial and conviction of one batch, no bar to same Magistrate trying another batch of accused under similar circumstances*—The fact that the Magistrate had tried and convicted one set of persons does not disqualify such Magistrate from conducting a supplementary trial, where another batch of persons is put on their trial for identically the same set of circumstances, 31 C. 745. See also 11 C. W. N. 262; 12 A. L. J. 33 = 18 Cr. L. J. 666, and four others were put up for trial, the former under s. 411, I P C., and the latter under s. 411, I P C. The case could not be transferred, 15 Cr. L. J. 253 (A).

(vi) *That the Judge himself directs the committal when dealing with an appeal*—Where an Appellate Judge after hearing arguments came to the conclusion that the offence, if one was committed at all, was of a graver nature than the accused was convicted of, and setting aside the convictions, committed them for trial on charges of graver character, and the accused applied for transfer on the grounds of justice. *Held*, that the Judge was simply performing his duties as Sessions Judge and that there was nothing to show that the accused would not have a fair and impartial trial, 15 Cr. L. J. 637 (A.)

29. *That Magistrate is influenced by extra-judicial information may be sufficient ground*.—During the trial of the accused for an offence under the *Gambling Act*, incidentally in the course of the discussion as to the conduct of a witness, the Magistrate remarked that the name of the accused was notorious as that of a man who advertised for persons to join him in gambling, *held* on an application for transfer, *per* BARRY, J.,—"that the case must be transferred. That the impression given expression to by the Magistrate was based on materials which did not constitute part of the evidence in the case and the Magistrate's statement of the impression was calculated to give rise to reasonable apprehension on the part of the accused, and possible on the part of the witnesses that the conduct and result might in some measure be influenced by the pre-possession, unfavourable to the accused, instead of depending solely on the evidence adduced. The position of an accused person must always be one of great anxiety and expense and it is not right that he should be placed in such a position should be enhanced by any suggestion in the mind of the Magistrate who is

necessity of removing any impression from the Court, which is not based on any evidence in the trial.' *Per* ASTON, J.—"It is important that parties should have confidence in the Court before which they appear. It is also important that nothing should be done to encourage any want of confidence when there is no sufficient foundation for that want of confidence. There was nothing in the incident referred to, to suggest ground for such want of confidence, so as to give the accused cause to apprehend that he will not have a fair and impartial trial." But the learned Judge concurred in the order of transfer, because he held that by the use of the expression 'that it is undesirable that the Magistrate should proceed with the trial' in the judgment of BARRY, J., an incident giving cause for apprehension had been created 6 Bom. L. R. 856. See also 11 C. W. N. 262 and 10 C. W. N. 16. Where a Magistrate was found to be acting on information got out of Court and that he permitted rumours relating to the accused in a pending case before him to reach him out of Court and allowed his mind to be influenced by such rumours, *held* the case should be transferred, 19 A. 64. Where a Magistrate on the bare authority of a Police clerk asked a witness whether the accused had been challenged in any bad-mash case *held*, that the question was improper and it gave a sufficient cause to the accused to apprehend that a fair and impartial trial will not be had and was a good ground for transfer, 12 A. L. J. 50 = 15 Cr. L. J. 234. When the Magistrate has acted as a private arbitrator in the case he should not subsequently try the case 18 C. L. J. 150 = 14 Cr. L. J. 602. See also 33 A. 5.

30. *That case is causing considerable excitement in the district is not necessarily a ground for transfer*.—In 8 C. 491 an application was made based on the affidavit of the District Magistrate, the Court held it was not a sufficient reason for transfer that the case was causing considerable excitement in the district and most of the inhabitants of the districts had their sympathies enlisted on the one side or the other. Clause (e) refers to the expediency of justice and not to any expediency from a political point of view. Therefore the fact, that certain classes of the inhabitants of a town or district are excitable people and have not much patience and that it is necessary to allay their irritation to prevent possible consequences is not a ground for transfer. It is no doubt the duty of the Court to have all due regard for the importance of securing the confidence of the public generally, and of every section of the community interested in the result, in particular in the fairness and impartiality of the trial that is going to be held, but it is equally its duty to see that no undue regard is shown to the abnormal susceptibilities of any section of the public, from an apprehension of ulterior consequences. If that were done it would result in the obvious injustice of showing greater consideration to the less peaceful than to the more peaceful. 25 C. 727. See also 15 W. R. 69 = 7 B. L. R. 240. In 8 M. 32, the High Court transferred an appeal to itself as the accused was an old public servant holding an important post and the case was one containing allegations against him of the letter under s. 182, I P C. that one of the witnesses for the

31. *That a fair and impartial jury cannot be secured is a ground for transfer*.—The jury in a case triable by jury constitute a part and an important part of the tribunal. It would not, therefore, be quite

reasonable to say where doubt is entertained as to the fairness and impartiality of the jury, that the trial should nevertheless go on before such a jury, because an erroneous verdict may, in the end be set right by the High Court. The importance of having a fair and impartial jury ranks very much higher than the convenience of parties and witnesses and the convenience of the Court in having a local inspection. Where, therefore, to such officers, as the District Magistrate and the Sessions Judge emphatically express their belief that it will be next to impossible to expect a fair and impartial trial, if the case be heard before a jury chosen from a particular district, the bare expression of such belief, quite apart from the foundations thereof must shake the confidence of the parties. An order for transfer in such cases, is expedient for the ends of justice under cl. (c) of sub-sec (1). *The importance of securing the confidence of parties in the fairness and impartiality of the tribunal is next only to the importance of securing a fair and impartial tribunal*, 25 C. 727. But before an order is made for transfer against the wish of the accused, the Court ought to require the very best evidence that a fair trial cannot be had, in other words, that the jury cannot be trusted to do their duty impartially, 6 C. 491. But see 7 B. L. R. 240.

32. Other grounds for transfer.—(i) *Question of law of unusual difficulty*—Sub-sec (1)(b).—As the Code allows appeals and revision applications from convictions and there are several exceptions even to the finality of a verdict of a jury, the rulings relating to the circumstances under which the writ of *certiorari* would be granted in England are not applicable to the circumstances of this country. See the remarks of PHEAR, J., in 7 B. L. R. 240 at p. 269 = 13 W. R. 69. See also 7 Bom. L. R. 637 at p. 639 on this point.

(ii) *When a view of the place is required*—See sub-sec. (1)(c).—A personal inspection by a Magistrate of the locality, to test the correctness of evidence, does not disqualify him from deciding the case, by making him a witness. See s. 556, 13 P. R. 1801. Though a local inspection may be highly desirable, the Magistrate should be careful, not to allow anyone on either side to say anything to him which might prejudice his mind one way or the other, 19 A. 302. See 13 P. R. 1901; 21 C. 920; 19 M. 263; 37 C. 340; as to the duties of a Magistrate in making a local investigation, see also 12 C. W. N. 743 = 7 Cr. L. J. 510; and see Note 19-20 to s. 556.

(iii) *Convenience of parties, transfer for*—Sub-sec (1)(d).—On committal of the accused to the Court of Sessions at Ratanagiri, the Sessions Judge, holding that he had no jurisdiction to try the case without an order of the High Court as all the acts constituting the alleged offences with which the accused was charged, were committed, if at all, in Bombay, reported the case under this section. Held, that as the complainant chose to lay his complaint in the district, and as the accused wished to be tried there, the High Court might order that the trial should proceed before the Sessions Judge, 2 Bom. L. R. 304. And so where the convenience of numerous witnesses for the defence outweighed that of the prosecution witnesses who were few in number, the High Court made an order for the transfer of the case to itself, and directed under s. 267 that the trial before it be by jury under the circumstances of the case, Ratanal 977.

(iv) *Expedient for ends of justice*—Sub-sec (1)(e).—See Note 17 et seq.—It is desirable that a case relating to a mosque between Hindus and Muhammadans should be tried by the District Magistrate or some other European Magistrate, 1 P. W. R. 1915 = 127 P. L. R. 1915 = 16 Cr. L. J. 213.

(v) *But a Magistrate's ignorance of the vernacular in which the exhibits are written is no ground for transfer*—That a Magistrate does not possess the amount of scholarship in Telugu and Sanskrit which is necessary to understand correctly without the aid of translation the book in respect of which the charge is lodged and others to which it may be necessary to refer for comparison, is not a ground for transfer as it is a difficulty which is necessarily of common occurrence, (1911) 2 M. W. N. 80 = 10 M. L. M. T. 518 = 12 Cr. L. J. 451. In 16 Cr. L. J. 73 (A), a case was transferred as the Magistrate before whom the case was pending did not know English and there was good deal of evidence, oral and documentary, in English to be adduced in the case.

(vi) *Unnecessary delay on the part of the Magistrate, good ground for transfer*—Unnecessary delay in the disposal of a simple case is a good ground for transferring it, Weir 11, 679. In 8 M. L. T. 222 = 11 Cr. L. J. 833, the High Court characterized the delay as scandalous and upheld the transfer even pending made without notice. In 12 A. L. J. 362 = 15 Cr. L. J. 363, a case under s. 110 was transferred as it was much to be feared that if it remained in the hands of that Magistrate it would be some months before the case would be brought to a close.

(vii) *That all the pleaders have been engaged*.—The opposite party engaging all lawyers available at the place is a good ground for transfer, 7 A. L. J. (8h. N.) 86. See also 1 C. W. N. 426 and 25 C. 727 where the difficulty in procuring legal aid was referred to.

(viii) *That the Magistrate is lenient to the accused*.—A transfer is not justified on the ground the Magistrate's action in releasing an accused person on bail shows a tendency to treat the undue leniency, 22 B. 449.

33. When transfer is required by some provision of law.—*See, e.g.*, ss 191, 449 (2), 487 and 556.

34. Grounds for transfer of appeals under Letters Patent.—As to the reasons which will sometimes induce the High Court to transfer a case under *Letters Patent*, see 6 M. 32. See also 1 B. L. R. O. Cr. 15 and 9 C. 397.

35. Defamatory statements in application for transfer whether absolutely privileged.—It was held that a defamatory statement made in bad faith in an application for the transfer of a case is not privileged. The English Common Law doctrine of absolute privilege has no application to the Indian moussul, 40 C. 433, where 36 M. 216 was dissented from. But see 17 C. W. N. 449 = 14 Cr. L. J. 61 as also 38 C. 880 at p. 883 and 37 M. 110.

V.—SUB-SECTIONS (2) TO (7)—PRACTICE.

36. Delay in applying for transfer strongly condemned.—“The impression appears to have got abroad that the processes and orders of moussul Courts can be ignored if the parties chance to telegraph to their legal advisers either that an order has been passed by this Court or that they are ill. We must protest against this practice which has become common in this Court, to file these petitions of transfer on the last day when the parties are given a fortnight or three weeks to move. It is the absolute duty of parties to come to us as soon as possible and we shall be in future unable to stay proceedings ordinarily unless sufficient time is given to issue a rule and obtain in explanation.” 17 C. W. N. 536 = 14 Cr. L. J. 332. An application for transfer ought to be put forward at the earliest possible opportunity after the occurrence of whatever facts or circumstances are alleged as affording reasonable basis for such application, 15 Cr. L. J. 556 (A), 13 Cr. L. J. 368.

37. Commitment under sub-sec. (1) (iv) not liable to be quashed.—When a case has been committed under the orders of the High Court under this section, to a Court of Session, the Sessions Judge should dispose of the case according to law. Such an order is not subject to revision and Sessions Judge cannot refer the case under s. 215, to the High Court. Section 215 does not apply to a commitment under this section or s. 436, and an order under sub-sec. (1) (iv) made by the High Court itself it is not subject to revision, 27 M. 55.

38. To whom the case may be transferred.—(i) *Case must be transferred to a competent Court.*—The High Court transferred a case under s. 110 to a District Magistrate with instructions to make it over to some other Magistrate and the District Magistrate made over the case to a second-class Magistrate who was not competent to conduct proceedings under ss. 110 to 119. The second-class Magistrate made an order directing security. *Held*, the order was bad. The High Court under s. 526 had power to transfer the case to another Criminal Court of equal or superior jurisdiction and could not have transferred the case to the second-class Magistrate and what the High Court cannot do the District Magistrate to whom the selection of the Magistrate was left could not do. In 25 A. 151, the transfer was made to a first-class Magistrate who was competent to complete the proceedings, 37 A. 20.

(ii) *To a special Magistrate.*—The High Court may ask the Local Government to appoint a special Magistrate, see 4 B. L. R. Ap. 1, 20 W. R. 23 = 11 B. L. R. Ap. VIII.

(iii) *Interpretation of order of transfer of criminal case by High Court to District Magistrate.*—When a criminal case is transferred by an order of the High Court from a Court subordinate to a District Magistrate, to the Court of a District Magistrate, if it is intended that the District Magistrate shall have power to transfer the case to a Subordinate Court, that intention will be expressed in the order of the High Court. If no such intention is expressed, it will be understood that, in the case of a transfer from a Court subordinate to a District Magistrate to a District Magistrate's Court, that District Magistrate's Court, is expected to try the case itself, but when the transfer is from the Court of one District Magistrate to the Court of another District Magistrate, it will be understood that, unless the contrary is directly expressed, the Magistrate of the Court to which the transfer is made has power and jurisdiction to apply s. 192 and to transfer the case to the Court of any Magistrate subordinate to him who may be competent to try it 19 A. 249.

39. Scope of sub-sec. (3).—Sub-section (3) will enable a High Court to pass an order for the transfer of a case on a reference made by an inferior Court with the consent of the parties concerned without a formal motion or affidavit, and will generally in such cases extend the powers of a High Court.—*Statement of Objects and Reasons*

40. Notice to accused and complainant of proposed transfer.—When a Court reports a case to the High Court for transfer under sub-sec. (3) it shall give notice to the accused and the complainant (if any) of

Honorable

{ Madeline (măd lēn) Madelon (măd lēn); It. [Thē'ō'dā (rō'dā), (Gr.) A rose

K.

Kāth'n rīne, { (Gr.) The same as CATHARINE
 Kāth'er rīne {
 Kē tū'rah (Heb.) Incense
 Kē t'rah (Heb.) Cassia

L.

Lāur'ā (Lat.) A laurel fr. Laure (lon) It. &

P.

V.

one of VALENTINE Lat. 10;
 It. Valeria (vā lē'rē ā),

W.

Lū'cy (Lat.) Feminine of LUCIUS Fr. Lucie
 Lū'cy (Lat.) Feminine of LUCIUS Fr. Lucie
 Lū'cy (Lat.) Feminine of LUCIUS Fr. Lucie
 Lū'cy (Lat.) Feminine of LUCIUS Fr. Lucie

Wē'ly (Gr.) A variation of MARY, from MARY
 Wē'ly (Gr.) A variation of MARY, from MARY

Mā'bel (Lat.) A cow
 Mā'bel (Heb.)
 Mā'bel (Heb.)
 Mā'bel (Heb.)

Mā'bel (Heb.)
 Mā'bel (Heb.)
 Mā'bel (Heb.)
 Mā'bel (Heb.)

Mā'bel (Heb.)
 Mā'bel (Heb.)
 Mā'bel (Heb.)
 Mā'bel (Heb.)

the application and forward along with its report any objections that may be made to the proposed transfer—
Para 78, *Bom. H C Cr Cir*, p 50

41. Procedure—Application for transfer by Government.—Application by the Government or by a Sessions Judge or District Magistrate for the exercise by the High Court of its power of transferring criminal cases under s. 526 (3) must be made to the Court, through the Government Pleader or some other qualified person specially empowered in that behalf. Before granting such application, the High Court will require to be satisfied that the person against whom the criminal case is pending has received such notice of the intention to apply as would enable him to appear and be heard on the application.—*Bom. H C Cr Cir*, p. 60. See also 1894 A. W. N. 154.

42. Any party interested—A person alleging himself to be a complainant, but who in fact is not the complainant and from whose hands the prosecution has been taken away by order of the Magistrate, is not a party interested within the meaning of sub-sec. (3), 5 *Bom. L. R.* 889.

43. Sub-section (4)—Manner of moving the High Court.—The provision of sub-sec. (4) as to the manner in which an application shall be made by a private party, follows the Ruling in 1 C. 219 (F.B.) = 23 W. R. 27. See also 8 C. 63.

44. Practice—Affidavit by District Magistrate as regards impartiality of Subordinate Magistrate when improper.—In 25 B. 179 the petitioner moved the High Court to transfer the case under s. 145 to some other Magistrate. Among the grounds on which the impartiality of the trying Magistrate was impugned were (1) that he had already inquired into and reported subject of the dispute in question, and also that he dispute. The Magistrate of the District made a Magistrate whose impartiality is impugned will not be influenced by the relations in which he admittedly stands to one of the parties interested. On this the Court remarked "It is somewhat difficult to understand the basis of no means as an affidavit under the sanction of an oath, should have felt no hesitation in making a statement which is not one as to facts, but as to his personal opinion, which in the circumstances can only rest upon conjecture as to the mental attitude of another officer"

45. Affidavit not to be made by accused.—An application for transfer by the accused in a criminal case is a criminal proceeding within the meaning of s. 5 of the *Indian Oaths Act X of 1873*, *Weir II*, 686; I, 176. Where an affirmation was wrongly administered to the accused and an affidavit was sworn to by him in support of such application for transfer, *held*, that the affidavit was a nullity and that the accused could not be punished under s. 193 or s. 199, I P C., for making any false statement in that affidavit. See sub-sec. (4) of s. 342 and Notes thereto and also 23 A. 331.

46. Costs of the complainant.—In 8 C. W. N. 589, where the case was transferred at the instance of the accused, he was ordered to pay all the costs incurred by the complainant, before the Magistrate from whom the case was transferred. In 8 P. W. R. 1911 = 12 Cr. L. J. 274 an order directing the accused to pay costs was held to be improper and unjustifiable and was set aside on revision. But when an order for transfer was made at the instance of the accused, and the complainant alleged that he was poor and the transfer would subject him to expenses which he could not afford, an order was made that the Crown should pay the expenses of the witnesses, 8 C. W. N. 75.

47. Power of High Court to re-entertain application for transfer.—A judgment of a Divisional Judge

VI.—ADJOURNMENT OF HEARING ON NOTIFICATION OF INTENTION TO TRANSFER. THE HIGH COURT—SUB-SEC. (8).

48. Application can be made at any time of the hearing.—Under s. 526 (8) the application for adjournment had to be made before the commencement of the hearing.

present amendment in the case of an inquiry or trial an application for adjournment can be made at any time it is only in the case of an appeal that an application for adjournment must be made before the commencement of the hearing even under the section as amended

43-A. A complainant can apply for transfer even in a cognizable case.—A complainant even in a cognizable case is entitled to apply for transfer under section 526, but his rights are subordinate to those of the Crown, and in the case of conflict between the two, the right of the latter must prevail, 6 Lah. 541.

49. Accused is entitled to have a reasonable time to apply to the High Court for transfer.—Under the old section it was doubtful whether the Court was bound to adjourn after an application for transfer was made under s. 526, but now it is made clear that the Court shall adjourn the case or postpone the appeal on an application for adjournment under sub-sec. (8). (See preliminary note to this section and the Report of the Select Committee, *supra*) It is only under sub-sec. (9), that the Sessions Court may under circumstances refuse an adjournment. The words "*The Court shall exercise the power of postponement, etc.*" are no doubt obligatory, 15 C. 435; but the obligation is not necessarily and under all circumstances to grant a postponement, but only to give the party a reasonable time for obtaining the orders of the High Court. The postponement is no part of the essence of the obligation. By itself a postponement might be either useless, if it were far too short a time, or superfluous, if there was sufficient time without any postponement. The essence of the obligation is that the party should have a reasonable time to move the High Court and obtain its orders. If he has such reasonable time when the application is made, there is no obligation to grant any further time. Also the Sessions Judge is not wrong in refusing to adjourn a case on the strength of a telegram said to have been received by accused's vakil, to the effect the High Court had transferred the case, 19 M. 375; *contra*, see Note 54 below. In *Weir II*, 686 an adjournment for six days was held to be not a reasonable time to allow for making an application to the High Court and obtaining an order thereon. The effect of the Rulings in 15 C. 435, 19 M. 375 and 29 C. 211 appears to be that the party, after he has notified to the Lower Court his intention to apply for a transfer, is entitled to have a reasonable time before the accused is called on for his defence, to enable him to make the application to the High Court for transfer and this is irrespective of the fact, that he might have notified to the Lower Court at an earlier date and made his application to the High Court before. But the Lower Court is not bound to make a special order of adjournment for the sole purpose of enabling the accused to make the application for transfer, if he has a sufficient opportunity of so doing between the time when he notifies his intention and the time he is called on to enter on his defence, 6 C. W. N. 715. Where an appellant applied at the earliest possible moment for an adjournment to enable him to move the High Court for a transfer of his appeal but the Magistrate disregarded the same and dismissed his appeal *held* the refusal of an adjournment was most unreasonable and *following* 19 M. 375, the appellate order was set aside, 16 Cr. L. J. 244 (M). Where an application under sub-sec. (8) was made and refused, but the Judge after examining some prosecution witnesses adjourned the case to a subsequent date, *held* that the proceedings subsequent to the refusal were not bad, inasmuch as the accused had ample opportunity to move the High Court between the date of their application and the date of their being called on to enter on their defence. The Magistrate can therefore, well examine the complainant's witnesses even after a notification has been made under sub-sec. (8) 6 C. W. N. 717.

50. Magistrate ought to act on telegram informing him of issue of rule for transfer.—*Bias.*—After framing charges against the accused the accused applied to the Magistrate to postpone the proceedings in order to enable them to move the High Court to transfer the case. The Magistrate not only refused the application but cancelled their bail and ordered them to be kept in confinement. Against this order a rule was granted by the High Court and the Magistrate was shown the telegram to that effect by the *mukhtyar* of the accused who asked for postponement. The Magistrate refused the application, examined another witness and committed the accused though he was not present. *Held*, that it was most injudicious of the Magistrate to proceed with the case after he had been credibly informed that a rule was issued by the High Court, and his precipitate action indicated his bias against the accused, therefore the case should be transferred to some other Magistrate, 5 C. W. N. 110, and that the commitment made should be quashed. If the Court entertained any reasonable doubt as to the genuineness of the telegram, it could easily satisfy itself by telegraphing to the Registrar of the High Court or the Court may ask the pleader making the application to verify the telegram and satisfy the Court as to whether the vakil in the High Court was acting under instructions in the case. See also 2 C. W. N. 436; 11 C. W. N. 507; 16 C. W. N. 1031 = 13 Cr. L. J. 766. But in *Ratanlal* 46, the High Court ordered the transfer of a case on the 26th January, 1871, and on the 27th a telegram was shown to the Magistrate,

Highly
Capable of mischief or crime.
[Incapable of mischief or crime.
maule, soft and paltry,
only when

[Lat] The love of country
uchenus sola [It] Two how's
[Fr] From the strong to the
[Lat] Sweet "Home" or

[Lat] Out of the depths
[Fr] A last resource

they try out
Dum visum stultis visum in conferta currunt [Lat]
Dum visum stultis visum in conferta currunt [Lat]

Culpam parr premittit coites [Lat] Punishment
follows elcas upon crime
Cum bona vendi [Lat] With kind permission
Cum gravis sit [Lat] With a p
some a ignorance
Cum privilegio [Lat] With priv
Cumque cunctis [Lat] another

E.

The holy wist r of the

ster
water
and
swing outline
tion, volume
swelcano [It]

arboor

4 hour

out of

confusion
ing
do not purchase
Also, the 2nd
wing elapsed
The heart bears

to

is

is

migrant

another

et

and he adjourned the further proceedings till the 30th, to allow the order of the High Court to reach him. The order was despatched on the 27th, but reached the Magistrate only on the 31st January. On the 30th the Magistrate disposed of the case by convicting the accused. *Held*, that though the Magistrate did not act discreetly in not waiting sufficiently for the order of the High Court there was no illegality in his proceedings. *See also* 19 M. 375; 15 C. 435. Where, upon the High Court having issued a rule staying further proceedings, the petitioner sent a telegram which was laid before the trying Magistrate, but the petitioner having failed to appear on the date previously fixed, the Magistrate issued a warrant upon the petitioner. *Held*, that the sending of the telegram did not in any way absolve the obligation of the petitioner to appear before the Court on the date fixed, and the issue of the warrant upon the petitioner was no ground for transfer of the case, 17 C. W. N. 536 = 14 Cr. L. J. 382.

51. Proceedings after application for adjournment whether void—As it is the duty of a Magistrate to grant an adjournment when an application is made to him under this section, and as he has no power to proceed with the hearing of the case until a reasonable postponement has been granted, all the subsequent proceedings after his refusal are unwarranted by law and ought to be set aside, 8 C. W. N. 77; 1 S. L. R. 38 = 9 Cr. L. J. 274; 3 S. L. R. 155 = 10 Cr. L. J. 570; 24 P. L. R. 1908 = 1 Cr. L. J. 109; 42 P. W. R. 1912 = 25 P. L. R. 1912 = 13 Cr. L. J. 746. Where a Magistrate in spite of an application under sub-sec. (8) proceeded with the case and committed the accused to the Court of Session, the commitment was quashed, as the Magistrate disregarded the express direction contained in sub-sec. (8) of this section, *Wells II*, 685; 21 M. L. J. 755 = 12 Cr. L. J. 407. The Oudh Chief Court in 15 Cr. L. J. 507 set aside a conviction and directed a re-trial before another Magistrate where the trial Judge disregarded the application of the accused under sub-sec. (8) and tried and convicted the accused. In 16 Cr. L. J. 24 (M) when an appeal was heard and dismissed without giving the applicant an opportunity to move for a transfer the dismissal was set aside. But *see* 31 C. 715 where it was held, disapproving of 15 C. 435, 29 C. 211 and 6 C. W. N. 717 on this point, that a mere refusal to grant an adjournment, does not render subsequent proceedings necessarily illegal. Otherwise, it would be in the power of every accused person to delay and thereby possibly to defeat justice, by making an application, no matter how frivolous, groundless or illusory it might be. *See also* 35 M. 701 where the Judges said that they should find much difficulty in agreeing with 29 C. 211 if it were necessary to decide the question. It is at least competent to the Magistrate to proceed with the trial up to the point at which the accused would be called upon for their defence, 6 C. W. N. 717, where a conviction was sought to be set aside on the ground of non-compliance with sub-sec. (8), it was held that subsequent proceedings were not void, if the application was not *bona fide*, the accused having had sufficient time to move the High Court, if he cared to, without the adjournment applied for. But *see now* sub-sec. (8) as amended, and it is now compulsory to adjourn on an application under that section. *See Note 49, supra*.

52. Impropriety of application for stay of proceedings on pretence of moving High Court for transfer.—In 3 C. W. N. 758, an application was made on the 23rd May to the trying Magistrate to stay proceedings on the ground that the petitioner was about to apply to the High Court to transfer his case to another Magistrate. The proceedings were accordingly stayed, and an application was made to the High Court on the 12th June, but it contained no reference to the application of transfer, nor was the Court asked to transfer the case to another Magistrate. Where legal advisers of the accused obtained an order from the Magistrate staying proceedings which otherwise they could never have obtained, except on misrepresentation, the High Court strongly condemned such proceedings. An application for transfer should be made with due diligence or at the earliest possible moment 8 C. W. N. 77; 19 M. 375; 31 C. 715; 8 C. W. N. 910.

53. Magistrate not bound to adjourn, pending application for transfer to superior Magistrate.—There is no duty cast on a Magistrate to adjourn a case because an application is being made to a superior Magistrate for transfer. That duty is confined to cases where the application is to be to the High Court, (1912) M. W. N. 1121 = 13 Cr. L. J. 823.

- * 526-A. (1) Where any person subject to the Naval Discipline Act or to the Army Act or to the Air Force Act is accused of any offence such as is referred to in proviso (a) to section 41 of the Army Act, the Advocate-General shall, if so instructed by the competent authority, apply to the High Court for the committal or transfer of the case to that High Court and thereupon

High Court to transfer for trial to itself in certain cases.

to give him

I.

Ich dien [I er] I serve
Ich Red [Fr] A fixed or definite [s]
I erm somme [Lat] Meaning the same
Ich est [Lat] That is — abbreviated to e
Ich graut omie [Lat] All of that sort.
Ichonens [Lat] A fit man, a man of know
ability — at 1 That most true phrase

name
and a
if r a
is wa
him
he
res
a while
no bet
not the
ved fy a
the best
he would
agot that
is counts
ore a n r
art of the
breast from the bottom of the heart.
Impart *Morte* [Lat] With unequal strength
Imperium in imperio [Lat] A government within
a government
Impleat [Lat] By implication on
Immol [Fr] Expoliated rade
a sense of sadness
sk mind imbecile
ordinal perform couple
o what dost thou not
ality
the point of death
white
is next to heaven
trust, or recove menda
g incredulous I cannot
In dubio [Lat] In matters of doubt.
In dubio [Lat] In doubt
In equilibro [Lat] In equilibrium; equal y kal
In equit de [Lat]
In esse [Lat] In being
Innate *elementis fort* [Lat] Clemency belongs to
the brave

the High Court shall order that the case be committed for trial to or be transferred to itself and shall thereafter proceed to try the case by jury

(2) The Governor General in Council may by Notification in the *Gazette of India* declare any officer to be the competent authority for the purpose of issuing instructions under sub-sec (1) in regard to any class of cases specified in the notification

527. (1) The Governor General in Council may by Notification in the *Gazette of India* direct the transfer of any particular criminal case or appeal from one High Court to another High Court or from any Criminal Court subordinate to one High Court to any other Criminal Court of equal or superior jurisdiction subordinate to another High Court whenever it appears to him that such transfer will promote the ends of justice or tend to the general convenience of parties or witnesses

(2) The Court to which such case or appeal is transferred shall deal with the same as if it had been originally instituted in or presented to such Court

Notes—1 For the power of the Government to specify any Court for the trial of a public servant irrespective of jurisdiction see s. 197 (2) and Notes 25 and 26 at p. 560 and see s. 178 for power of Local Government to order cases to be tried in different Sessions divisions

2 Refusal of the Governor General under this section, no violation of the principles of natural justice—In a criminal case pending before the High Court at Bombay certain comments were made in the Bombay local press against the prisoners at the bar and consequently an application was made to the Governor General for the transfer of the case to some other High Court but which application was refused and the accused were tried with a special jury before the High Court at Bombay. Held by the Privy Council that such refusal of the Governor General who had the advantage of being in the country and judging of the real state of public feeling, did not constitute any violation of the principles of natural justice to enable the Privy Council to entertain a petition for special leave to appeal. 28 Bom L R = 49 M L J 834

Sessions Judge may withdraw cases from Assistant Sessions Judge

*** 528.** (1) Any Sessions Judge may withdraw any case from or recall any case which he has made over to any Assistant Sessions Judge subordinate to him

(2) Any Chief Presidency Magistrate District Magistrate or Sub-Divisional Magistrate may withdraw any case from or recall any case which he has made over to any Magistrate subordinate to him and may inquire into or try such case himself or refer it for inquiry or trial to any other such Magistrate competent to inquire into or try the same

Power to authorize District Magistrate to withdraw classes of cases.

(3) The Local Government may authorize the District Magistrate to withdraw from any Magistrate subordinate to him either such classes of cases as he thinks proper or particular classes of cases

(4) Any Magistrate may recall any case made over by him under s. 192 sub-sec. (2) to any other Magistrate and may inquire into or try such case himself

(5) A Magistrate making an order under this section shall record in writing his reasons for making the same

(6) The head of a village under the Madras Village Police Regulation 1816 or the Madras Village Police Regulation 1821 is a Magistrate for the purposes of this section

* This section was substituted by Act XVIII of 1913

† Original sub-sec. (1) (2) and (3) were re-numbered (2) (3) and (5) respectively by 16 of 1913

‡ The sub-section was inserted by 8 of 1913

§ The sub-section was substituted for original sub-sec. (4) after it was re-numbered as sub-sec. (6) by 16 of 1913

world will be (thus)
A gift worthy of
[Lat.] A voice!
I am to change
necessary change
being changed.
A picture is
in context.

an unequal match
either by nature
[Lat.] Neither
is not permitted
either really nor

the water spread
Magister et dominus [Lat.] Master of the cere
tunics
Magistratus induat virum [Lat.] Magistracy indi
cates the man
Magna civitas magna solitudo [Lat.] A great city
in a great desert
Magna spes altera Roma [Lat.] Another hope of
great Rome
Magna est veritas et prevalet
mightily and it will prevail
Magna est vis consuetudinis
force of habit
Magna inter crucem sustine
the cross
Magna inter opes iope [Lat]
of great wealth
Magna inanis umbra
pounce
Magna bonum [Lat.] A gr
Magna est vestigia parva noma [Lat]
is itself a great lineage
Magna opus [Lat.] A great work
Magna Apollo [Lat.] Great Apollo one
authority
Magna [Fr.] Fasting fish diet
Magna de justitia [Fr.] The hand of justice
Magna [Fr.] Deporting it, carriage
Magna le droit [Fr.] Ma niam the right
Magna de campagne [Fr.] A country set
Magna de vite [Fr.] Fr. vito hosp. tal
Magna de vite [Fr.] The town house
Magna de vite [Fr.] A home-ward

Magna modo [Lat.] In a be
Magna mortuum, fadati [La
than be observed
Magna [Fr.] Lucian
Magna (a se) [Lat.] Mad in
Magna prole [Lat.]
because prohibited

Notes.—1. See s. 192 for powers of a District Magistrate, etc., to transfer cases which he has taken cognizance of, s. 346 (2) for power to transfer cases referred to him, s. 476 (2) for power of a Magistrate of the first class to transfer cases sent to him by civil, etc., Courts, under sub-sec. (1), and s. 407 for transfer of appeals.

2. Concurrent jurisdiction of the District and Sub-Divisional Magistrates.—Where a District Magistrate cancelling the order of a Sub-Divisional Magistrate which directed the transfer of a case, from the file of one Sub-Magistrate, to that of another Sub-Magistrate, directed its re-transfer, *held*, that the action of the District Magistrate in entertaining virtually an appeal against an order of the Sub-Divisional Magistrate passed under this section, was clearly illegal. In the matter of a transfer under this section, the District and Sub-Divisional Magistrates have co-ordinate authority over Magistrates subordinate to the Sub-Divisional Magistrate, and the order passed by the District Magistrate thought proper he can act under ss. 435 and 436 in a case from the file of the Magistrate to another Magistrate, 26 M. 130; 13 C. 1. The reasons which induced the Sub-Magistrate to transfer the case, are in his opinion insufficient. *Contra*, see 14 M. 399. A Magistrate who is subordinate to a Sub-Divisional Magistrate is also subordinate within the meaning of this section, to the District Magistrate, 14 M. 399. But see 40 M. 791 where 14 M. 399 is followed and 26 M. 130 is dissented from.

2-A. Additional Chief Presidency Magistrate subordinate to the Chief Presidency Magistrate.—In 28 C. W. N. 903 it is held that the Additional Chief Presidency Magistrate is subordinate to the Chief Presidency Magistrate and that the latter had power under s. 528 to make the order which he did withdrawing the case to his file.

2-B. Whether in a case transferred by a District Magistrate, the Sub-Divisional Magistrate can

3. To what proceedings, section applies.—The provisions of this section are applicable to cases under ss. 107, 110, 117, 133, 144, 145, 147 and 483 — 8 C. 831; 22 C. 693; 23 C. 709; 5 C. W. N. 686; 23 P. R. 1902; 26 M. 188, 31 C. 350; 35 C. 243, 24 A. 151; 1 B. L. R. 2 = 9 Cr. L. J. 246 and 37 C. 91 at p. 100. Under the very general terms of sub-sec. (1) a District Magistrate has jurisdiction to transfer to his own Court proceedings under s. 483 pending before a Magistrate subordinate to him, 5 P. R. 1905. Also a proceeding under s. 145 is a criminal case and a District Magistrate has power to transfer it both under this section and s. 192 (1). Even if he had no power, s. 529 (f) will cure the defect, 2 C. L. J. 614 = 3 Cr. L. J. 83; where 25 B. 179 is disapproved of and see Notes 163 to 165 at p. 306 and Note 3 at p. 485.

Complaint may be transferred.—The term 'case' includes a proceeding upon a complaint as soon as the complaint has been received by the Magistrate who takes the cognizance of the offence complained of. A person who apprehends that a complaint made against him will not be impartially tested by the Magistrate is entitled to have the case transferred even before the Magistrate decides to issue process, 7 N. L. R. 97 = 12 Cr. L. J. 437.

4. Transfer must be to Magistrate competent to inquire into or try the case.—A District Magistrate is not competent to transfer a case under s. 107 to a Magistrate of the second class who has no jurisdiction to hear the case, 37 A. 20, see Note 127 at p. 212. A District Magistrate cannot transfer a case to a Magistrate who is gazetted to the Office of the Chairman of a Municipal Board and takes charge of that office as he is thereby divested of his territorial jurisdiction as Magistrate and he is no longer subordinate to the District Magistrate, 36 A. 513.

5. Power to call for proceedings at any stage—Limitations on power of transfer.—A District Magistrate has authority to call up to his own Court any criminal case without limitation as to the stage of proceeding at which it may be called. If the District Magistrate having, in the exercise of his authority, withdrawn any case, finds that it did not come within the jurisdiction of his magistracy, he would not merely be competent, but bound to refuse to proceed further with the case, 24 W. R. 4.

(i) When Sessions Court directs further inquiry by particular Magistrate, District Magistrate has no power to transfer.—Where a Sessions Judge remands a case dismissed under s. 203 by a Deputy Magistrate and

directs him to hold further inquiry, the case cannot after remand be transferred by the District Magistrate from the file of the Deputy Magistrate, 11 C. W. N. 315 = 5 Cr. L. J. 112. See also 8 C. L. J. 241 = 5 Cr. L. J. 306

(iv) *Can case sent up under s. 349 be transferred?*—A Taluk Magistrate in convicting the accused submitted the records and forwarded the accused to the Head Assistant Magistrate for enhancement of sentence, but the District Magistrate at that stage transferred the case to the Joint Magistrate. *Held* that the transfer by the District Magistrate was not irregular, *Weir II*, 690. In 33 B. 719 it was held that a Sub-Divisional Magistrate to whom a case is sent under s. 349 has no power to transfer it. See Note 9 (a) at p. 899

(v) *Section has no application to case disposed of*—When a case has been disposed of by a competent authority it could not be withdrawn by the District Magistrate, to his own file under s. 528, 17 C. W. N. 431 = 17 C. L. J. 608 = 14 Cr. L. J. 123.

(vi) *Magistrate to whom case is transferred cannot re-transfer it*—Where a District Magistrate has referred a case for trial to a Sub-Divisional Magistrate, the latter has no power to transfer it, 35 A. 166; 12 A. L. J. 277 = 15 Cr. L. J. 357.

6. *Highly inexpedient to transfer a case at a late stage.*—Where a number of witnesses had been examined in a case and the case was at a stage, when apparently all that remained to be done was for the Magistrate either to commit or discharge the accused, *held*, that a transfer at that stage could not be made, *Weir II*, 691. It is highly inexpedient to transfer a case after the prosecution has closed and the defence has begun without giving notice to the complainant, or recording any reason for such transfer

7. *Order of transfer had when opinion unfavourable to prosecution is expressed*—Where a District Magistrate transferred a case to another Magistrate, after the Magistrate, before whom it was, had taken the evidence for the prosecution and had expressed an opinion that the evidence for the prosecution was not sufficient to support the charge the High Court set aside the order of transfer, remarking that the District Magistrate did not exercise proper discretion in this matter and replaced the case on the file of the original Magistrate, 5 B. L. R. Appx XLY = 14 W. R. 12. The Police sent up some only of several persons charged with rioting and these were tried and convicted. On the complainant applying for process against the others the trying Magistrate refused process but the District Magistrate transferred the case to his own file and issued warrants against these. It was contended that after the trying Magistrate refused process, there was no case pending in respect of with any order of transfer could be made. *Held following* 4 C. W. N. 239, that the order of the Deputy Magistrate refusing to issue warrants against persons not sent up by the Police, did not finally dispose of the case, so as to remove it from his file altogether, but it was still a pending case and even if it be not considered still pending, the District Magistrate could take cognizance of it afresh under s. 190 5 C. W. N. 438. See Note 7 at p. 471 and Notes 4—6 at pp. 580-581

8. *Good reasons to be recorded for transfer.*—The powers conferred by this section as regards a District Magistrate's authority to withdraw cases from Subordinate Magistrates are very wide and undefined the section merely requiring the Magistrate making in order of transfer to record his reasons, but it is not intended that the power should be exercised without due discretion and really good reasons when the interests of justice demand a transfer, 13 P. R. 1899, 23 A. 421, 34 C. 918; *Ratanlal* 590. In a case against some policemen before a Deputy Magistrate the Deputy Magistrate was about to frame charges, when the District Magistrate withdrew the case to his file and dismissed it, because he thought the Police were protected by their warrants. *Held* as no grounds existed for taking the case away from the Deputy Magistrate, it ought to have been left with him to be disposed of and it was for the Deputy Magistrate to determine whether the Police were protected by the warrants or not 30 C. 693. Where a District Magistrate made an order of transfer without any reason and without giving notice to the opposite party *held*, that he did not exercise his discretion in a reasonable and proper manner, and the High Court, in revision, set aside his order, *Weir II*, 686; 16 Cr. L. J. 626 (M)

(i) *Transfer—Magistrate collecting evidence in local investigation*—In a case arising out of disputed boundaries of land, the accused were charged with rioting, mischief, trespass and theft. In the course of his investigation the trying Magistrate held a local inquiry extending over five days, during which he made a number of notes and appeared to have made a very careful and conscientious local investigation of the locality such as would properly be made by a person whose duty it was to get at the facts with a view to lay the same before some tribunal, and during such investigation it appeared that he acquired a large amount of information with reference to the occurrence on which he had to arrive at a judicial determination, but which by reason of the way in which it was acquired, he could not properly or legally consider, in arriving at an ultimate decision of the case. It was also suggested that the notes so made should be put on the record and the Magistrate tender himself, while trying the case as witness to be cross-examined by either the prosecution or the

defence. *Held* that such a course could not be allowed, and that the Magistrate ought not to try the case, but that it must be transferred to some other first-class Magistrate for disposal, 21 C. 920. *See* 20 W. R. 76. *See* also Notes 19—26 to S 556.

(ii) *Personal allegations against Magistrates must be strictly proved.*—When personal allegations are made against a trying Magistrate in support of an application to transfer a case to another Court, a District Magistrate should not interfere unless such allegations are clearly established, *Ratanlal* 590, and the Magistrate afforded an opportunity to explain, 5 Bom. L. R. 23.

9. *Effect of omission to record reasons*—A complaint originally filed before a Deputy Magistrate was transferred to the Court of the District Magistrate. No notice was served on the complainant of the transfer and no reasons were stated for such transfer. The District Magistrate called for a private report from the accused, who was a Sub-Inspector of Police. *Held*, (i) that by virtue of a Government Order, the District Magistrate having been directed to withdraw all cases in which complaints have been made against a Police officer, the omission to record reasons therefor, was a mere irregularity and did not vitiate the subsequent proceedings, (ii) that no notice to the complainant was necessary, (iii) the Magistrate having placed the private report on the record and acted thereupon, his action was not illegal 23 A. 421. In 34 C. 918 it was *held* that although under sub-sec. (3) of this section, an officer transferring cases from one Court to another ought to record his reasons for it, his omission to do so, being only an irregularity, was not a material ground for setting aside the order of transfer, *followed* in 9 Cr. L. J. 310 (M); 3 P. R. 1910 = 35 P. W. R. 1909 = 11 Cr. L. J. 150. The mere omission to record reasons does not invalidate the subsequent proceedings, 7 N. L. R. 97 = 12 Cr. L. J. 437. In 16 Cr. L. J. 626 (M.) the order of transfer was set aside as it did not comply with sub-sec. (3).

10. *Power of transfer should be exercised with discretion*—*Notice to opposite party.*—A Magistrate of a district should exercise the powers conferred on him by this section only when it is absolutely necessary for the interests of justice that he should do so, and when one of the parties to a case applies to have it withdrawn from the Magistrate inquiring into or trying it and referred to another Magistrate, the Magistrate should give the other party notice of such application and an opportunity of showing cause why such application should not be granted, 3 A. 749, 8 C. 393 = 10 C. L. R. 239. He is not justified in transferring a case on the ground that the complainant is a man of importance at the place where the case was, before transfer, *Ratanlal* 474.

11. *Notice of transfer must be given to parties*—When a case is transferred to another Magistrate notice of transfer should be given to the complainant as well as the accused, 3 C. W. N. 283; 3 A. 749; 22 B. 549, 8 C. 393 = 10 C. L. R. 239, 1897 U. B. R. 392; 7 C. W. N. 114; 23 P. R. 1902; 14 C. P. L. R. 190. Where a case was transferred without notice to the opposite party for the reason that the grounds of the application were directed against the Magistrate, and he had been served with a notice, *held*, that although this section under which the order was made does not provide for the giving of notice to the opposite party, on the general principle that when an application for transfer is made by one party, notice should be given to the party affected before an order of transfer is made and for this reason, the order was set aside, 7 C. W. N. 114; 5 B. L. R. 190 = 13 Cr. L. J. 32. But if the opposite party has acquiesced in the order he cannot be heard to complain 7 N. L. R. 97 = 12 Cr. L. J. 437; 21 Bom. L. R. 276; 39 M. L. J. 714.

Although it is desirable that notice should be given to the accused person before a case is transferred under s. 528, yet omission to give such notice is a mere irregularity and is not a sufficient ground for setting aside the order of transfer 2 Pat. 333. *See* also 6 Lah 561.

12. *Order of transfer without notice to accused, Illegal.*—Order of transfer ought not to be made *ex-parte*, i.e., on representations of complainant only, but notice should be given to accused before making a final order, as it might operate to the prejudice of the accused, *Ratanlal* 653, 474, 460 and 877. When all the prosecution witnesses have been examined it is only right that notice should be given to the accused before a transfer is ordered and an order made without transfer will be set aside, 6 M. L. T. 14 = 9 Cr. L. J. 407; *Weir* II, 636. *See* also 23 P. R. 1902. In a case of theft a Magistrate released the accused on bail. Thereupon the District Magistrate transferred the case to another Magistrate on the ground that the reasons given in the Magistrate's order did not justify the release, and that the Magistrate's action showed a tendency to treat the accused with undue leniency. *Held* that the order of transfer was illegal as it was passed apparently *ex proprio moto* and certainly without any notice being given to the accused 22 B. 549; also 1 Bom. L. R. 347. *See* the matter discussed in 6 Bom. L. R. 356. Where no order of transfer was passed as required by this section and a letter from the District Magistrate to the Superintendent of Police was the only intimation of transfer and no notice was given to the accused of the proposed transfer *held*, that the transfer was illegal, *Weir* II, 631.

13. Cases where notice held unnecessary.—Where the delay in the disposal of a case which was a very simple one, was extraordinary, an order of transfer made under this section was held not bad, even though no notice was given to the accused to show cause against the making of the order, *Weir II*, 692; 8 M. L. T. 222 = 11 Cr. L. J. 533. Again, notice to the other side was held not necessary, when the order for transfer was in effect made at the request of the Magistrate and not on the application of a party, such a case being treated as an exception to the general rule, than an order should not be made under this section, without notice to the other side, 24 M. 317. Also, where a District Magistrate had withdrawn a case without notice, and no further proceedings had been taken by him, the High Court refused to interfere in revision, as it was still open to the District Magistrate to consider any objection made to him, a course calculated to ensure an early decision of the matters in dispute to the convenience of the parties and in the interests of justice, 20 C. 313. No notice is necessary where a District Magistrate *suo motu* transfers or withdraws a case on administrative grounds, 3 P. R. 1910 = 33 P. W. R. 1909 = 11 Cr. L. J. 150.

14. Power to transfer cases from the file of village headmen in Madras.—Sub-sec. (6) supersedes the decision in 15 M. 94, where it was held that a Village Munsiff not being Magistrate under this Code, a Joint Magistrate has no powers under this section to withdraw a case from his file and transfer it for disposal to a second-class Magistrate. But the expression "head of a village, under Madras Regulation IV of 1821," means the Village Magistrate acting under that regulation, and therefore the power of transfer conferred by sub-sec. (4) applies only to cases of petty theft, etc., covered by that regulation and the district authorities have no jurisdiction to transfer a complaint of insult or using abusive language preferred to a village headman under Regulation XI of 1816 26 M. 394. The High Court alone has the power under s. 29 of its *Letters Patent* to transfer a case under this regulation from the file of a Village Magistrate to that of any other Magistrate. Cf. 10 Bom. L. R. 630 = 8 Cr. L. J. 141 (Bombay Village Police Patel).

15. Power of a District Magistrate to transfer to an Additional District Magistrate.—S. 12 does not make an Additional District Magistrate appointed under s. 10 (2) subordinate to the District Magistrate, who therefore, has no power under this section to transfer cases to the former, 34 C. 918.

16. District Magistrate specially authorized.—In Bengal (*Calcutta Gazette*, 1873, p. 63) and Assam (*Man*, p. 184) District Magistrates have been specially authorized to act under sub-sec. (2) of this section. So also in the United Provinces (*N W P Gazette*, 1873, p. 3), in the Punjab (*Gazette*, 1873, p. 75, *Gazette*, 1883, p. 53) and in British Burma (*Gazette*, 1873, Pt. II, p. 5).

17. Proceedings of Magistrate not empowered to transfer.—Where a Magistrate transfers erroneously and in good faith when he is not so empowered his proceedings are not void—s. 529, cl. (f), 35 C. 243. If any Magistrate who is not empowered by law to withdraw a case and try it, does so erroneously in good faith, his proceedings shall not be set aside merely on the ground of his not being so empowered—s. 529, cl. (f).

18. On transfer of case, proceedings need not be re-commenced.—S. 350 applies to all cases transferred from the file of one Magistrate to another. A Magistrate may therefore act upon the evidence already recorded and proceedings need not be re-commenced. See Note 3 at p. 901. An order of commitment for trial by the Magistrate to whose Court the case has been transferred on the evidence recorded by the Magistrate from whose Court the case was transferred should not be interfered with, 36 A. 815.

19. Magistrate to whom case is transferred must proceed from the stage at which the proceedings were.—(1) *Not entitled to dismiss under s. 203.*—After he has withdrawn a case the Magistrate is bound to proceed from the stage at which the proceedings were. He cannot summarily dismiss the complaint under s. 203, when process has been issued for the attendance of the accused after examination of the complainant, 10 B. L. R. Appx. XXIX = 19 W. R. 28. See Note 12 at p. 903 (ii) *cannot cancel charge already framed*—See Note 13-A at p. 903.

20. After transferring case, District Magistrate cannot take part in it.—When a case has been once made over by a District Magistrate to a Subordinate Magistrate for trial, he has no jurisdiction to do anything more in the matter so long as transfer to the Sub-Magistrate is in existence. He may withdraw the case from the file of the Sub-Magistrate if he thinks fit, 3 B. L. R. Appx. CL1 = 12 W. R. 53; also 16 W. R. 40 = 7 B. L. R. 513. On a case being transferred to a Subordinate Magistrate, the District Magistrate has no power to dismiss it, nor to grant sanction for prosecution of complainant 3 C. W. N. 490, nor to issue proceedings for the apprehension of the absconding accused 27 C. 979. When once a District Magistrate makes over a case for disposal to a Subordinate Magistrate, it is out of his hands and he is not competent to pass any order relating to it other than an order such as may be made by him under (Revision) Chapter XXII. Therefore it is not competent to

him in such a case to direct the trial of certain persons complained against 30 C. 419 Nor can he take proceedings under s. 476 *see* Note 23 at p. 1146 but he may re-transfer the case to his own file 9 Cr. L. J. 310 (M) *See* Note 6 at p. 486 Note 7 at p. 471 Notes 63-64 at pp. 508-509

21 Limitations to District Magistrate's power of interference with cases pending before Subordinate Magistracy.—Where upon a Police report cognizance was taken of an offence and the case made over to a Subordinate Magistrate who discharged the only person who was apprehended and brought to trial out of several accused and the District Magistrate upon the representation of the District Superintendent of Police issued warrants against the other persons so that they might be tried it was *held* that the warrants were issued without jurisdiction for as long as the case connected with that offence remained with the Subordinate Magistrate, no other Magistrate was competent to deal with it. The District Magistrate if he thought fit to issue the warrants himself ought to have withdrawn the case from the Magistrate 27 C. 979 In another case the Police sent up a charge-sheet against certain persons and they were convicted by a Deputy Magistrate. An application for process against others in a referred charge-sheet was refused by the trying Magistrate as unnecessary *Held* that a subsequent order by the Joint Magistrate for the issue of process against these persons was without jurisdiction. When no reservation is made in the order transferring a case to another Magistrate it should be concluded that the whole case had been made over 32 C. 783 A Police Sub-Inspector filed a complaint before a Sub-Divisional Magistrate of an offence under s. 397 I P C. The facts also disclosed an offence under s. 4 (b) of the *Explosives Act* VI of 1908 but for want of Government sanction under s. 7 of that Act the Magistrate could not take cognizance of the offence. Subsequently after obtaining sanction the Police Superintendent filed a complaint before the Additional District Magistrate *held* the latter had jurisdiction to take cognizance of the offence and issue process in spite of the fact that he did not withdraw the original case to his own file and the proceedings of the District Magistrate cannot be set aside unless they had occasioned a failure of justice having regard to ss 529 (e) 530 (k) and 531 39 C. 119 *See* Note 7 at p. 471 Note 6 at p. 486 Notes 4 and 5 at pp. 580-581

22 Magistrates not to act on so-called affidavits of accused persons.—When an accused person applies for the transfer of the case pending against him to some other Court supporting the application by his own affidavit he cannot or at least ought not to be prosecuted under s. 193 I P C. in respect of statements made therein 23 A. 331, 19 A. 200 *followed* *See* s. 342 (4) and Note 47 to s. 526

23 Revision.—The High Court cannot revise an order made by the District Magistrate dismissing an application under s. 528 1 Rang. 632

* CHAPTER XLIV-A

SUPPLEMENTARY PROVISIONS RELATING TO EUROPEAN AND INDIAN BRITISH SUBJECTS AND OTHERS

528-A. (1) Where in any case to which the provisions of Chapter XXXIII do not apply any person claims to be dealt with as an European or Indian British subject or where any person claims to be dealt with as an European (other than an European British subject) or an American he shall state the grounds of such claim to the Magistrate before whom he is brought for the purpose of the inquiry or trial and such Magistrate shall inquire into the truth of such statement and allow the person making it a reasonable time within

Procedure of claim of a person to be dealt with as European or Indian British subject or as European or American

which to prove that it is true and shall then decide whether he is or is not an European British subject or an Indian British subject or an European or an American as the case may be, and shall deal with him accordingly

(2) When any such claim is rejected by the Magistrate and the person by whom it was made is committed by the Magistrate for trial before the Court of Session and such person repeats the claim before such Court such Court shall after such further inquiry, if any, as it thinks fit decide the claim and shall deal with such person accordingly

(3) When any Court before which any person is tried rejects any such claim as aforesaid the decision shall form a ground of appeal from the sentence or order passed in such trial

[illegible]

Note.—This section corresponds to the old s. 458 with certain modifications.

Preliminary Note.—The scope of ss. 528-A and 528-B is lucidly interpreted in a judgment of *MUKERJI J.*, in **51 C. 980**. Sub-sec. (1) of s. 528-A applies to all cases before all Magistrates either in Presidency towns or in the mofussil to which the special provisions of Chapter XXXIII do not apply. Sub-sec. (2) contemplates such cases only in which the Magistrate commits the claimant to trial to the Court of Session after rejection of the claim.

A Court of Session is distinct from the High Court in the exercise of its ordinary original criminal jurisdiction and s. 528-B relates to any case to which s. 528-A (1) is applicable, i.e., to all cases before all Magistrates either in Presidency towns or in the mofussil to which the special provisions of Chapter XXXIII do not apply.

A claim before the Magistrate to be dealt with under the procedure of Chapter XXXIII or as an Indian under s. 528-A is quite distinct from the claim before the High Court or the Court of Session for trial by majority of Indian jurors under s. 275 of the Code.

Where a Presidency Magistrate rejects the claim and proceeds to trial the decision in the matter is a ground of appeal to the High Court. If, however, after such rejection he commits the case the claim cannot be repeated in the High Court exercising original criminal jurisdiction nor can a claim be made in such cases under s. 275 but the Magistrate's decision could be subject to the revisional powers of the High Court.

When no claim is put forward before a Mofussil or Presidency Magistrate s. 528-B bars its assertion thereafter.

Note.—Omission to make a claim under s. 528-A does not affect the question of appeal under s. 449 (1) (c).—The omission to make a claim under s. 528-A does not affect the question of appeal under s. 449 (1) (c) if the conditions under ss. 443 (1) (A) and 443 (1) (B) exist, and it is not necessary to show that a claim was made before and found by the Presidency Magistrate. Ss. 528-A and 528-B have no application to s. 449. There is no provision in the Code for an enquiry by a Presidency Magistrate or on a trial in the High Court to consider the question whether a case should be tried under Chapter XXXIII. The proper time to raise such a question is on an application for leave to appeal under s. 449 (1) (c). **52 C. 347.**

Notes.—1. **Opportunity should be given to accused to plead status.**—An accused person ought to have an opportunity of pleading that he is an European British subject. The mere statement of a prisoner that he is an European British subject made before the Court after trial has been completed cannot be acted upon as the Court is *functus officio* **5 W. R. 53**. If the accused gives proof or produces documents which although not amounting to full legal proof of his status satisfy the Court that he is really an European British subject the Magistrate without putting the prisoner fully to complete his proof by strict legal evidence adopt the procedure. In *refoy, Taylor and Bell*, **219**. The plea must be substantiated by ample evidence, if the Court is not otherwise satisfied *re Thomas Turnbull* **6 M. H. C. R. 7**, *Grant* **12 B. 581**.

2. **Magistrate must decide status of accused before proceeding with trial.**—*B*, who was charged before a competent Magistrate claimed to be dealt with as an European British subject. He did not state the grounds of such claim. The Magistrate, without deciding whether *B* was or was not an European British subject, proceeded with the case and dealt with him as if he was not an European British subject and sentenced him to rigorous imprisonment and fine. On remand from the High Court, the Magistrate decided that *B* was an European British subject. *Held*, that the trial of *B* was void for want of jurisdiction, and the High Court could not proceed with *B*'s appeal on the merits with a view in the event of its deciding that the offence of which *B* was charged had been established to the reduction of the sentence passed upon him by the Magistrate to one which he was competent to pass under s. 446 *Berrill* **4 A. 141**.

3. **Appeal.**—An appeal does not lie separately against a decision that an accused person is not an European British subject but it can be made a ground of appeal if he is convicted.

4. **Is re-trial necessary where claim as to status wrongly disallowed?**—In *Berrill* **4 A. 141**, where the Magistrate's finding that the accused was not an European British subject was held to be erroneous the conviction was quashed and proceedings *de novo* were ordered. In *George Powell* **27 A. 387** the case in **4 A. 141** was distinguished on the ground that in that case the sentence exceeded the powers of a District Magistrate in the case of European British subjects and it was *held* that a re-trial would not be necessary when the sentence was not beyond the competency of the trial Magistrate in the case of European British subjects.

5. **Accused not entitled to trial by jury, unless he specifically claims it.**—An accused person pleaded before a District Magistrate that he was an European British subject but did not claim to be tried by jury under s. 451. The Magistrate found against the plea and tried and convicted him under his ordinary powers.








ARBITRARY SIGNS

USED IN

WRITING AND PRINTING.

I. ASTRONOMICAL

1. SUN, GREATER PLANETS, ETC

 or  The Sun
 or  The Moon
 or  The Earth
 or  Mars

star the emblem of Amphitrite, the wife of Neptune, the god of the sea, *g* a plum, or an apple, and a star the emblem of Lomonon the goddess who presided over fruit trees, *h* an ancient pharos or beacon, the emblem of Leucothea a sea goddess who was the protectress of sailors, *f*, a cross, as the symbol of Fides, or Faith

3. SIGNS OF THE ZODIAC

On appeal the Sessions Judge found that he was an European British subject and directed a new trial by jury. *Held* that the order of the Sessions Judge was wrong as the accused had not claimed to be tried by jury and as the sentence passed was one which the District Magistrate was competent to pass on an European British subject the Sessions Judge was directed to hear the appeal on the merits. *George Powell* 27 A. 397, 5 P. R. 1885. See Note 3 to s. 454.

528-B. If in any such case an European or Indian British subject or an European (other than an European British subject) or an American does not claim to be dealt with as such by the Magistrate before whom he is tried or by whom he is committed or if when such claim has been made before and rejected by the committing Magistrate it is not repeated before the Court to which such person is committed he shall be held to have relinquished his right to be dealt with as an European British subject or an Indian British subject or an European or an American as the case may be and shall not assert it in any subsequent stage of the case.

Note.—This is the old s. 454 with certain modifications.

1. Accused is bound to make a claim under this section.—Failure to make a claim amounts to a relinquishment. *Alexander Ruffe* 6 P. R. 1912 = 24 P. W. R. 1912 = 13 Cr. L. J. 197. An European British subject can under s. 454 relinquish his rights to be dealt with as such. Where the Magistrate explained to the accused his rights under ss. 447 and 450 and then asked him if he claimed to be dealt with as such and the accused stated he did not claim the rights held that he had relinquished the rights. *Barindra* 37 C. 467 at pp. 483–486 and p. 518. See Note 2.

(i) *Accused loses right of appeal to High Court.*—The accused an European British subject was tried before the City Magistrate of Karachi and convicted of criminal breach of trust under s. 409 I. P. C. and sentenced to six months' simple imprisonment. At the trial he waived his right to be tried as an European British subject held that the accused was not subject to the revisional jurisdiction of the Bombay High Court, not having been tried under the special procedure laid down for the trial of European British subjects and that the Sadar Court in Sindh which under *Bombay Act* XII of 1866 was the Highest Court of Appeal in all civil and criminal matters in Sindh had the revisional powers of a High Court in the present case by virtue of the latter part of s. 4 cl. (j) of the Code. *Grant* 12 B. 561. The jurisdiction of a non-Presidency High Court is not ousted unless and until the accused has definitely claimed to be tried as an European British subject. 7 N. L. R. 93 = 12 Cr. L. J. 438. Until such claim has been made and allowed they remain liable to the jurisdiction of the High Court of the Province for the purposes of revision of order made against them. (*E v Daris Nagp* 17 Cr. Rev. 260 of 1907). See also 17 P. R. 1878.

Even a second-class Magistrate has jurisdiction.—When an accused person has relinquished his privilege to be dealt with as an European British subject he loses all the benefit of the special procedure laid down in this Chapter. *Bartlett* 16 M. 308.

2. *Waiver of privilege must be absolute—effect of such waiver.*—The waiver of privilege must be an absolute giving up of all the right with reference to this Chapter which an European British subject has and the word *dealt with as such before the Magistrate* means everything contained in the Chapter—that is to say the tribunal having the cognizance of the case the procedure and also the punishment to which the accused would be liable. There can be no waiver by an accused person of an objection to the jurisdiction which is not personal to himself. No person can by waiver or consent enable a Magistrate or a Judge to try a case which he is disqualified to try by some circumstance not personal to the accused. *Quiroz* 6 C. 83 at p. 87 = 6 C. L. R. 463. Where an European British subject waives his right to be dealt with as such by the Magistrate before whom he is tried he thereby loses all the benefits of the special procedure provided for him under this Chapter including the right to have the proceeding in his case reviewed by a Presidency High Court if another Court exercises the highest revisional jurisdiction under the Code in cases other than those against European British subjects in the place where he is tried. *Grant* 12 B. 561, *Aully* 7 N. L. R. 93 = 12 Cr. L. J. 438.

3. *Waiver may be revoked.*—In *Sterling's case* 1 P. R. 1903 = 4 P. W. R. 1903 = 136 P. L. R. 1903 = 7 Cr. L. J. 274 the Punjab Chief Court, held that the waiver was not irrevocable and if the withdrawal of the waiver was made promptly shortly after the waiver had been made and if substantially nothing had been done in the interval on the abandonment of the privilege the withdrawal of the waiver should be allowed. 17 P. R. 1878 and 31 A. 511 referred to. See Note 3 to s. 451.

$\sqrt{}$ or $\sqrt[n]{}$ Root, —indicating, when used without a figure placed above it, responding power, or an inverse operation: as a^{-1} , a^{-2} , a^{-3} , a^{-4} , &c., which respectively equivalent to $\frac{1}{a^1}$, $\frac{1}{a^2}$, $\frac{1}{a^3}$, $\frac{1}{a^4}$, &c.

The sine of x that is $\sin x$ is equivalent to $\frac{y}{r}$, which is equivalent to $\frac{1}{\sec x}$

f or F Function, function of, as, $y = f(x)$ that is, y is, or equals, a function of x .

Various other letters of signs are frequently used by mathematicians.

V. MEDICAL

APOTHECARIES' WEIGHTS

ounce, \mathfrak{z} ss half a drachm, \mathfrak{z} iss one drachm and a half \mathfrak{z} j two drachms &c.
 scruple, as \mathfrak{ss} half a scruple, \mathfrak{ss} one scruple and a half \mathfrak{ss} half a scruple, \mathfrak{ss} one scruple and a half \mathfrak{ss} half a scruple, &c.

PHARMACEUTICAL MEASURES

fluidrachm, or \mathfrak{z} fluidrachm, \mathfrak{z} fluidrachm, or \mathfrak{z} fluidrachm, &c.

Fluxion differential

V response, — used in Roman Catholic service books
 V versicle — used in service-books in the Roman Catholic church to denote the part recited or sung by the priest, or person who presides at the office or service
 V versicle used in Roman Catholic service books to divide each verse of a

($\frac{1}{2}$) A symbol

FINANCIAL AND COMMERCIAL


g g, \$, 100
 100

VIII. MUSICAL.




Staff; the five lines with the four spaces between them, used to indicate the relative position of notes in the scale, as regards pitch.

Fig. When these are not sufficient, other lines are added above or below them, according to the necessities of the case, and are called *leger lines*, or *added lines*. See **LEGER** in the Dictionary.




When many notes of the same kind are to be used, an abbreviated notation is sometimes employed. The strokes — , = , ≡ , &c. placed over a note, or written across the stem of it, signify that it is to be divided into quavers, semi quavers, demisemiquavers, &c. respectively, as in the following examples where *q* signifies quaver, and *p*, performed.



These marks are also used to direct the repetition of groups of notes preceding them in the same measure, as,



3 , 4 , 5 , &c. are marks placed over groups of notes, and used to indicate that 3, 4, 5, &c. notes (all equal), are to be performed in the time of 2, 4, 6, &c. notes of the same kind respectively, as,



which are performed in the same time as p , and respectively




Fig. When three dots or strokes may be at the end of the stem of a note, to indicate that the note is to be performed in the same time as the note preceding it.




Fig. When three dots or strokes may be at the end of the stem of a note, to indicate that the note is to be performed in the same time as the note preceding it.

Fig. Double flat, — used to lower a note, already flatted, a half step.

Fig. Single flat, as used after a double flat.

Fig. Sharp, — used to indicate that the note before which it is placed is to be sounded higher by a half step than the same note without it. It is applied in the same way as the flat.



Fig. An embellishment consisting of two appoggiaturas, moving by regular degrees to the principal note, as,

Fig. or **Fig.** Accentiatura — an embellishment very similar to the appoggiatura




Fig. Turn — indicating an embellishment consisting of the note over which the character is written, of a note above it and the semitone below it performed in quick succession generally as a triplet, as,

Fig. When the note above is flatted the character is written b , when the note below is sharpened, it is written \sharp .

Fig. It may also be written with the natural sign (\natural) in place of either of these, when the corresponding note should have that sign placed before it.

Fig. Inverted turn, consisting of the same notes as the turn, performed in reverse order, as,




Fig. Trill, shake, — indicating that the note to which it belongs is to be rapidly alternated with the note above. A wavy line (~~~~~) is often added after it, indicating how far the shake is to be extended, as,




Fig. Appoggiato, — used in piano music, to denote that the notes of the chord before which it is written are not to be struck simultaneously, but in quick succession.

Fig. Pause, or hold — indicating that the note or rest over or under which it is placed is to be prolonged at the pleasure of the performer. It is sometimes placed over the close of a strain to denote that the strain which it ends forms the conclusion of the piece; as



— indicates a gradual decrease followed by a gradual increase of sound.

> *Sforzando* or *Forzando* — in beating that the note or chord, over or under which it is placed is to be struck with a force and an emphasis which are immediately diminished, — written also *f*, or *sf*, or indicated by the abbreviation *fz* or *sf*

* \textcircled{f} , \textcircled{sf} or \textcircled{fz} Characters used in music for the piano forte, directing the use of the peddle. The last two are less frequently used.

f forte with a loud sound
ff fortissimo with a sound louder than forte
fff fortississimo a still louder sound the loudest the voice or instrument is capable of producing
fz *Sforzando* or *Forzando* — indicating that the note is to be struck with force

m mezzo
mf mezzo-forte
p piano

pp *Pianissimo* is sometimes used to denote a very low or soft sound, softer than *pianissimo*
ff, or *fff* *Rinforzando* or *Sforzando* the same as *fz*, or *sf*
sf *Sforzando*, or *Forzando* See *y* and *z*

IX. TYPOGRAPHICAL

1. MARKS OF PUNCTUATION

| | | |
|---------------|-----------------------|-------------------|
| Comma | Acute Accent | Ellipsis |
| Semicolon | Grave Accent | Ellipsis, also |
| Colon | French or Grave | Enders |
| Exclamation | Circumflex or Upsilon | Ellipsis |
| Interrogation | The Long or Macron | Asterisk |
| Interrogation | The Short or Breve | Dagger or Obelisk |
| Interrogation | Paras | Double Dagger |
| Interrogation | Cedilla | Section |
| Interrogation | Cæter | Parallels |
| Interrogation | Quotation Marks | Paragraph |
| Interrogation | Brace | Indica |
| Interrogation | | or Asterism |

For an explanation of the various purposes for which these marks are

2. CORRECTION OF THE PRESS

Δ, or *Υ* (*delete*) Delete, take out, or expunge
9 Turn a reversed letter
7 A space or more space between words, letters or lines

SPECIMEN OF A CORRECTED PROOF SHEET

THE CROWNING OF PETERLIN

Nothing can be conceived more affecting or noble than that ceremony. The superb palaces and porticoes by which he had rolled the fiery chariots of Mars and had Caesar had long moldered into dust. The laureled faces the golden eagles, the shouting Legions the cap of three and the pictured cities were in lead wanting to his victorious procession. The scepter had passed away from Rome. But she still retained the mightier influence of an empire intellectual, and was now to enter the reward of an intellectual triumph. To the man who had extended the dominion of her ancient language, who had erected the trophies of philosophy and imagination in the halls of ignorance and barbarism, whose exultations were the arts of adorning the enriched by the influence of his song — whose spells were the tremors of ancient genius — the Eternal City offered the *glorious* and *unfading* tribute of her gratitude. Amid the ruined monuments of ancient, and the loftiest efforts of modern art, he who had restored the broken link between the two ages of human civilization was crowned with the wreath which he had deserved from the moderns who owed to him their refinement, — from the ancients who owed to him their *glory*. Never was a coronation so august witnessed by western master or scholar.

MACAULAY

reduced from obscurity and diary

FOIE

Where the explanation of the letters or figures in the cut is not given under the cut itself, it may be found under the same cut in the body of the work. For index to the classified heads of arrangement, see p. x

Dibble, p 370 S Stand, p 1253.

Grafting, p. 653

a, electric grating; b, spiral grating; c, whip or comb grating; d, saddle grating; e, slide grating.



inarching p 67

Layers, p 753.

Одобрено в 1974

Oneonville Training, 1974

Pan and Horizontal Training, p. 1401

Figure 1 consists of two anatomical diagrams. Diagram (a) shows the external view of the female genital tract, including the vulva and clitoris. Diagram (b) shows the internal view of the female genital tract, including the vagina and uterus.

Men Abdominal Region, p. 3.

Above the line *bb* (2), epibranchial region;
 below *c* *bb* (2), epibranchial region; space
 between *bb* and *c* (2), umbilical region;
 space outside ventral hula, upper part
 (4), hypochondriac region; right and
 left of umbilical (2), lumbar regions (2,
 2); right and left of hypogastric region
 (4), iliac region; region of the pelvis (1)
 17, pelvis.

Aorta, p. 81

Digestive Apparatus of Man p. 373.

m. esophagus; & pancreas;
stomach; & spleen; & colon;
ladder intestine; & rectum;
appendage to stomach; &
colon; & larger intestine; &

Far p 423

Feb 24

Ball and Sock
Joint n. 104




Heart and Lungs, p. 914.

Section of Heart, n. 614.

Upper P.P. polmonary arteries; A aorta; H right auricle and vena cava; lower P.P. polmonary veins; m, mitral valves; A, left ventricle; s septum; r right ventricle; v, vena cava inferior; m, tricuspid valve; n, right auricle; o polmonary veins.

Facial Angles, p. 420
European, African, monkey

Skeleton of Perch,
p. 1237



10

Skeleton of Man p 127 Bony System

Arterial System

(1955)

ANATOMY, PHYSIOLOGY, &c.—Continued.



p. 1207



Hand, p. 601.



Larynx, p. 747



Pericardium, p. 670

1. *acrophilus* 2. *proctos* for *Boone* ear-
to *radial* & *trachea* 3. *constrictor*
4. *larynx* 5. *trachea* 6. *trachea* 7. *trachea*
8. *trachea* 9. *trachea* 10. *trachea*
11. *trachea* 12. *trachea* 13. *trachea*
14. *trachea* 15. *trachea* 16. *trachea*
17. *trachea* 18. *trachea* 19. *trachea*
20. *trachea* 21. *trachea* 22. *trachea*
23. *trachea* 24. *trachea* 25. *trachea*
26. *trachea* 27. *trachea* 28. *trachea*
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86. *trachea* 87. *trachea* 88. *trachea*
89. *trachea* 90. *trachea* 91. *trachea*
92. *trachea* 93. *trachea* 94. *trachea*
95. *trachea* 96. *trachea* 97. *trachea*
98. *trachea* 99. *trachea* 100. *trachea*



Larynx, p. 747



Esophagus, p. 1272



Teeth, p. 1202



Trachea, p. 1204
a. *trachea* b. *trachea* c. *trachea* d. *trachea*
e. *trachea* f. *trachea* g. *trachea* h. *trachea*
i. *trachea* j. *trachea* k. *trachea* l. *trachea*
m. *trachea* n. *trachea* o. *trachea* p. *trachea*
q. *trachea* r. *trachea* s. *trachea* t. *trachea*
u. *trachea* v. *trachea* w. *trachea* x. *trachea*
y. *trachea* z. *trachea*

ANTIQUITIES.—DRESS, UTENSILS, &c.



Amphora, p. 47



Ark of the Covenant, p. 74



Androsphinx, p. 51



Ampulla, p. 47



Ampyx, p. 47



Ballista, p. 194



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Gauntlet, p. 571



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Corium, p. 224



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Faeces, p. 407

ANTIQUITIES, DRESS, Etc.—Continued.



Gladiator, p 71




Scutum, p 1188.



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p 1355.



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Arachnid (My gale fodena), p 70.



Garden Spider, p 70



Geometric Net of Garden Spider, p 171



Scorpion, p 1182.



Epinure of a Spider magnified, p 171.



Nest of Trap door Spider, p 1690



Tarantula, p 1354.


ARCHITECTURE.



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Annulet, p 54.




Amphitheater, p



Greek Doric.



Roman Doric.



Corinthian Doric Abacus, p 1



Abbey p 2.



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Balcony, p 103




Arch, p 71
K, keystone; S, spring; L, impost, or pinnaband; C, chord, or span of arch; C, C, column.



Flemish Bond, p 150



Bracket, p 187



Buttress, p 179



Bucrania, p 171



Capitals, p 184.

1, Gothic; 2, Composite; 3, Tuscan; 4, Ionic; 5, Doric; 6, Corinthian.




Cantilever, p 192.



Castellated, p 253.



Caryatid, p 211



Catherine wheel Window, p 26.



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PICTORIAL ILLUSTRATIONS FOR ARCHITECTURE—Continued



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Band p 105



Battlement p 111



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Composite Order p 253



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
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
Gable p 553



French Gothic Window Tourney Cathedral p 591




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Groined Arch p 501




Gutta p 484



Column p 243

1 8 at 4, cyma recta 5 corona 4 ovolo 3 coveletto 2 1/2 upper fascia 7 lower arc 4 abacus 5 ovolo 2 1/2 cyma recta 3 1/2 11 scotia 12 5 14 arc 13 15, base 16 pilaster 17, 18 base 19, base.



Dome, p 323 def. 1



Cyma Recta p 525



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Entablature p 431

ARCHITECTURE—Continued



Hammer beam Roof p 604.



Haunch p 611
A A, haunches of an arch.




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Lattice work, p 755.



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
Hood molding p 656
a, b, hood moldings



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
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Moresque Arch
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Moresque Moorish Archway p 859



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
Pavil on p 909




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Pitch of a Roof p 992.
A B C D E F
G H I J K L M N
O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z




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Mutule p 871



Oriel p 921




Pedestal p 962



Pendent p 964.




Pendent p 964.




Pendent p 964.



Pendent p 964.




Pendent p 964.



Pendent p 964.



Niche p 885.




Ovolo p 934.



Patera p 956



Pendent p 964.




Pendent p 964.



Pendent p 964.




Pendent p 964.



Pendent p 964.




Pendent p 964.



Pendent p 964.



Pendent p 964.



Pendent p 964.

ARCHITECTURE—Continued



French Roof



Gable Roof



Hip Roof



Conical Roof



Curb Roof



Mansard Roof



Gambrel Roof



Shed Roof

Roofs p 1147



Scroll p 1193



Ruffle p 1233



Spandrel p 1264



Spire p 1272



Straight-arch p 1294



Stall p 1285



Torus p 1793



Steeple p 1293



Ancient Terminus p 1360



Tower p 1398



King post Truss p 1420



Queen post Truss p 1420



Britannia Tubular Bridge p 1422



Turnstile p 1427



Turret p 1427



Veranda p 1407



Tuscan Order p 1427



Watch tower p 1420



Elizabethan Window p 1417

ART, OBJECTS OF, ORNAMENTS, INSTRUMENTS, &c



Arabesque p 69



Arcograph p 2



Bust p 178



Caduceus p 133



Caper p 211



Cornucopia p 107



Estel p 410



Fountain p 509



Hermes p 624



Line of Beauty p 178




Palette p 840



Monogram p 845



Mosaic p 861



Near Perspective p 974

A horizontal line opposite the eye is called a horizon line.



Verminated p 1429




Volute of Co. with an Ionic Cap to a p 1454





Silhouette p 1230

Silhouette Instrument p 1230
a slender rod; c pin; d a small frame; e foot board.

Parquetry, p 940



Portland Vase p 1015




Vase p 1463.

ASTRONOMY.



Aquarius and Sign p 62



Apelles p 60



Armillary Sphere p 75



Aries and Sign p 74



Cancer and Sign p 109



Capricornus and Sign p 135



Comet, p 254.

Eclipse p 477
S sun; E, earth; M moon.

Moon, Phases of p 857



Mural Circle p 865.

A. hat or in crescent. A C D F F
way in which the circle is stretched.

Gemini and Sign p 143




Leo and Sign p 165.



Libra and Sign p 170




Orion, p 922.




Saturn and Rings



Sagittarius and Sign p 1162.



Pisces, and Sign p 907.

Penumbra p 947
S sun; M, moon; C H B, C D L, penumbra.


Reflecting Circle, p 1105




Sextant p 1219



Scorpio, and Sign p 1182.



The Constellations Seasons Equinoxes &c



The Ecliptic Summer and Winter Solstices Equinoxes, &c., p 1130.



Zones of the Earth



Taurus and Sign, p 114.



Virgo and Sign p 1



Elihouette p 1230

Elihouette Instrument, p 1230
a, b, c, d, e, f, g, h, i, k, l, m, n, o, p, q, r, s, t, u, v, w, x, y, z, small frame, a, foot board.

Parquetry p 950



Portland Vase p 1015.



Vase p 1463.

ASTRONOMY.



Aquarius and Sign p 60



Apex p 60




Armillary Sphere p 75



Aries and Sign p 4



Cancer and Sign p 179



Capricornus and Sign p 195



Comet, p 264

Ellipse p 47
S sun, E, earth, M moon.

Moon Phases of p 507



Moral Circle p 863.

A wall of mirrors, A C D E F F wall in which the circle is a sector.



Gemini and Sign p 563.



Leo and Sign p 765



Libra, and Sign p 770



Orion p 922.



Saturn and Rings



Sagittarius and Sign p 1163.



Scorpio and Sign p 921.

Penumbra p 967
S sun, M moon, C H B, C D L, penumbra.


Reflexing Circle p 1105




Sextant p 1210



Scorpio and Sign p 1163.



The Constellations Seasons Equinoxes &c



The Earth's Summer and Winter Solstices Equinoxes &c., p 1190



Zones of the Earth p 1337




Taurus and Sign p 124.





Taurus and Sign p 124.



BOTANY—Continued.



BOTANY — Continued



BOTANY—Continued.



a, b, drupe of peach c, nut, filbert d, achene of pine e, f, capsule of poppy g, capsule of
drumstick

BOTANY—Continued



Runners p 1133



Sarcotose Stem p 1171






Soredia p 1400

Scat red f ves
1 118


Scutelliform Leaf p 1187

Seed p 1194
A v n fana ro-
mone seed B a aA 34 35 m
ch xB
P 35 36
ch xSeed p 1194
A v n fana ro-
mone seed B a aA v n fana ro-
mone seed B a aA v n fana ro-
mone seed B a aA v n fana ro-
mone seed B a aA v n fana ro-
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mone seed B a aA v n fana ro-
mone seed B a aStrobilus of Zamia
p 1309Stipule
p 1309Stipe
p 1313Tendril
p 1313Testal
Root
p 1313Ternate Leaf
p 1303Triandrous
Flower
p 1411Triandrous
Stems
p 1303Triandrous
Leaf
p 1411Thalamus
p 1370Thyrsus
p 1332Toothed Corolla
p 1393Triandrous
Flower
p 1411Triandrous
Leaf
p 1411Triandrous
Flower
p 1411Triandrous
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p 1411Triandrous
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Flower
p 1411

CARPENTRY, JOINERY, AND MASONRY.



CRUSTACEANS.



CRUSTACEANS—Continued



Parthenops horrida p 852.



Furze-crab p 1064



Scyllarian p 1199



Shrimp p 1224



Thelphusian p 1372.



Sea-crawfish p 1138



Xantho-floridus p 1531

DOMESTIC ECONOMY — UTENSILS, FURNITURE, &c



Andiron p 61



Basin p 115



Buffet p 17



Candelabrum p 130



Censer p 203



Colander p 249



Extinguisher p 456



Ewer p 422



Go-cart p 47



Console table p 27



Spit p 174.




Slate p 178



Gong p 679



Smoke-jack p 1243



Spinning wheel, p 1272.

DRESS, ORNAMENTS, INSIGNIA, &c



Armlet p 70



Clog p 210



Coronet, p 110



Basque p 112



Blouse p 114



Ornamental Bracelet p 157



Chemise p 222



Collar of Garter p 659




Pullover, p 943.



Mitt, p 819



Sundial p 1168



Snow-shoe p 141



Scot. h. h. gilland r w th F. h. bag p 61



Grimace or Palmer's Scar p 1185



Gaiter p 654



Jack boot p 12



Pot p 128



Spur p 109



Perule p 75



Star of Garter p 650



Trefoil knot p 1419




Victoria p 144



Vase p 1430.

FLAGS, BANNERS IN
SIGNIA, &c



Banners p 107



Coronet of a Duke p 206



Colors p 232



Crescent p 312



Crown p 317



Decorat on p 342



Devil e p 346



Flag p 317



Mace p 197



Exco ssation Gen falon p 379



American Jack p 122



Eng sh Jack p 122



Oriflams p 322



Mural Crown p 303



Pasha's Standard p 921



Pennant p 665




Scepter p 1178



Standard p 1236

GEOGRAPHY TERMS IN



GAMES AMUSEMENTS, &c.



Ball and ring p 113




Dice p 370



Draughts, or p 411



Dumb bell, p 413



Grace Hoop and S S ho p 412



Leap

GAMES, AMUSEMENTS, &c — Continued.



Saw-saw, p 1185




Tangram p 1333

For Fandango Tennis Court Ball &c, see these words in the Vocabulary

HERALDRY.

COLORS AND TINCTURES DESCRIBED BY LINES DOTS &c



Yellow White Red Blue Green Purple Black Orange Marry Ermine
OR ARGENT GULES AZURE VERT PURPURE SAULE. TENNIS SAULE NEFAL.

Beside these Tinctures there are nine Roundels or Roundlets used in Her
aldry the names of which are sufficient in blazoning to denote their color
without expressing the name. They are as follow:

| | | |
|----------|--------------|----------|
| Peasants | which are of | Or |
| Lilies | | Argent. |
| Tortoise | | Gules |
| Hors | | Az re |
| Tommes | | Vert |
| Go pes | | Purpure |
| Pelleis | | Saule |
| Orange | | Tennis |
| Grass | | Sanguine |

* Some heraldists describe this by horizontal, in place of perpendicular with a diagonal line.



Accosted p 12 Adressed p 18 Affrontee p 18 Allerion p 37 Annul t p 53




Argent p 73 Aspectant p 81 Azure p 89 Bevis p 123 Biscorporate p 131



Bordure p 152 Bottony p 154 Chaboch p 152 Canton p 153 Cheeky p 221



Chevron p 223 Chl f p 223 Cloche p 238 Close p 241 Combatant p 244



Compos p 263 Corded p 293 Cottised p 300 Couchant p 300



Courant p 304 Crescent p 312 Crest p 312 Crestlet p 316



They are p 317 Disarmed p 391 Normen p 405

Embattled 432 Empalement 442 Engoiled 448 Enrailed 461 Ermine 461



Engrailed 448 Escaloped 463 Faint 464 Fess 467 Flanch 468



Fleur-de-lis p 421 Flotant p 423 Fourchee 429 Fracted p 429



Fretted p 443 Fusil p 452 Gardant p 458 Argent 462, Dure 461 464



Gore p 480 Gules p 496 Gyron p 499



Hatchment p 510



Impalement 661 Increscent 678 Inescut con 683 Inflamed 699 Interfretted 704



Inverted p 710 Issuant p 720 Issuant p 725 Label p 716 Lattice p 716



Lodged p 751 Lozenge p 752 Martlet p 815 Mascle p 816 Naisant p 816

Naisant p 815 Pale p 819 Pall p 840 Paly p 812 Party per Pale p 812

INSECTS, LARVÆ, PUPÆ, &c. — Continued.

ICHTHYOLOGY.



Libellula, p 769
Dragon-fly



One of the Lucanids
p 792.



Moth, p 861
Feather-winged Moth.



Necrophore p 879



Abdominal p 3.
The Parr



Asanopterygian, p 9
Parr.



Acipenser p 14.
Sturlet.



Locust, p 84.



Mantis p 810



Mole-cricket p 851.



Angler p 82.
Sea-devil.



Apodal p 82.
Swordfish.



Neuropter p 852.
Caddis-fly



Papilio p 945.



Pupa, p 1062.
Pupa and Caterpillar of
a common butterfly



Barbel, p 108



Bellows fish p 123.



Pterophorus Insect, p 1057



Rhiptier p 1136.



Silk worm Moth p 1230



Ocellated Blenny, or Butterfy-
fish p 144



Donlin, p 150.



Scarab, p 1177



Silk worm Pupa,
p 1230



Silk worm p 1230.



Spanish Fly p 1265



Bream p 161.



Common Carp p 199



Sphinx p 170.



Spring tail p 173.



Stag beetle p 1281



One of the Chimerichthys p 224.
King of the Harriage.



Chub, p 201.



Scurpion, p 1307



Termite or White
Ant, p 1305.



Wasp,
p 164.



White egg
p 1314.



Cod, p 27.



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Dab, p 330



Flying Gurnard, p 330



Grayling p 657.



Grampus, p 534.

Rhodon p 376
Globe-fish.

Dolphin, p 403



Oadgon, p 635.



Gurnard p 597



Dace, p 330




Dorco, p 405



Gymnote, p 699



Haddock, p 621.



Hake, p 602.




Halibut, p 603.



Drum fish, p 418




Dugong p 418



Heterocerat, p 674

Homocerat
tail of a fish,
p 634.

Father fisher, p 429

Flus p 512
1 ventral; 2 anal & caudal; 4
pectoral; 5 first dorsal; 6 second
dorsal.


Flounder, p 524.




Flying fish, p 576



Gar fish, or Sea pike, p 458



Goby, p 517



Hound fish, p 641



Lump fish p 703.



Lamprey p 710



Lirg p 716




Loach, p 732.



Olfthead p 502




Globe fish p 574



Mackerel, p 729




Malapterurus Electricus, p 804.



Goli+ ray, p 572



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Manatus, p 506.



Miller's Thumb, p 824.

ICHTHYOLOGY—Continued



Moon fish p 637



Minnow p 841.



Mullet, p 866



Narwhal p 65



Opah or King fish p 913




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Pilot fish p 985.



Pike p 986



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Pipe fish, v. 990



Porpoise p 1014.



Starry Ray p 1090



Lesser Weaver or Sting fish p 1062.




Remora, p 1113.



Roach p. 1163.



Todd p 1154.



Salmon p. 1176.



Saw fish p 1174.



Sculpin p 1187



Sea-mouse 1190



Shad p 1211.



Hammer headed Shark p 1214.



White Shark p 1214.



Long nosed Skate p 1237




Sly Silurus p 1231.




Sk pper p 1239



Suckieba k p 1297



Smelt, p 1247



Sturgeon p 1312



Short Fun fish p 1326.



Sole p 1326.



Torpedo or Cramp fish p 1326.



ICHTHYOLOGY—Continued



Sword fish p 1349



Torak p 1395



Tench p 1392



Trichurus p 1411



Thornback p 1377



Top-knot p 1394



Common Trout p 1418



Tunny p 1424




Turbot p 1425



Umbrina p 1433



Whiting p 1511




Wolf fish or Sea wolf p 1 22



Whiting p 1511



Red or Three-spotted Wrasse p 1523




Whiting p 1504

LOCOMOTIVE ENGINE, AND RAILROAD MACHINERY



Brake p 159, Car wheel p 207
 A spindle, B pin of the axle, C chain, D axle, E rod, F flag, G hub, H drag bar p 429



Draw head p 412, Railway Frog p 545
 A buff, B spring, C drawing, D buff, E axle, F pin, G coupling pin.



Locomotive p 31
 For explanation of the letters see Locomotive in the body of the work.



Loco and loco p 1265



Loco and loco p 613




Cross Sections of Rails p 1082




Locomotive Steam Engine p 100




Hand-drawn Way p 1109



Safety-saw p 1240




Loco and loco p 1419
 A truck-frame, B axle-guard, C swing-beam, D axle, E double spring.




Loco and loco p 1417

MATHEMATICS—INCLUDING ALGEBRA GEOMETRY, TRIGONOMETRY, CONIC SECTIONS, &c.



Abacus p 1, Abacus, p 8, Acute Ang p 17



Angle p 5, Arc p 71, Alternate Ang p 81



Circle p 227, A.C. & B. chords, Circle p 231, Curve p 234

MATHEMATICS, GEOMETRY &c.—Continued



Cone p 170



Diagonal, p 308



(1)



(2)



(3)



Co-ord nates p 221




Cylinder p 323



Diameter p 309



Diamond p 309



Diagonal Scale p 305



Ellipse p 435




Dodecahedron p 401



Evolute p 471



Equilateral Tri- gle p 459



Ephemeroid p 456



Hexagon p 635



Hyperbola, p 612



Right Ang e p 1140




Isosceles Tri- angle p 721



Incidence p 63



Interior Angle p 66



Lenses p 764



Obtuse An- gle p 904



Knots p 839



Oblique Lines p 901



Octagon p 908



Oval p 929



Parallel Lines p 947



Parallelogram p 947



Perspective p 974




Pentagon p 906



Perpend ular p 972




Pyramid p 107




Polygons p 1009




Radius p 1081



Scalene Trian- gle p 1176



Semic ircle p 1199



Tangent, p 1352



Tetrahedron p 1309



Truncate p 1430



Quadrant p 1069



Quadrilateral p 1090



Rectangle p 1100



Re-entering An- gle p 1104



Angle of Reflection p 1105



Rhomb p 1137



Rhomboid p 1137



Sector p 1193



Segment of a C ircle p 1195



Sub-tangent, p 1219



Stereograph p 1295



Tetrahedron p 1309



Trapezium p 1406



Triangles p 1411



1 equilateral triangle 2 isosceles triangle 3 right-angled triangle 4 obtuse-angled triangle 5 scalene triangle



c c c Tangents p 1355


MECHANICAL POWERS



Inclined Plane p 974




Lever p 974




Pulley p 974

MECHANICAL POWERS—Continued.



Lever p 767 F power F fulcrum W weight.



Fall and Tackle Pulleys p 1006



Six Mechanical Powers p 823



a b c Wedge p 1962



Wheel and Axle p 1366 A wheel B axle or axis.

MECHANICS, MACHINERY, &c



Air Chamber p 500



Anvil p 61



Axle in Peritrochlo p 99




Angle bar or iron p 10



Axle box p 99



Balance or Scales p 103



Roman Balance, p 103 A B beams D scales E weight.



Watch balance p 123




Bell p 123



Bell crank, p 123



Bevel gear p 123




Buff p 173




Carriage Bolt p 149



Bolt and Nut p 143 A bolt B head nut C check



Brush wheel p 102




Blocks p 142 a double block b triple block c line block d long block e hook block f match block



Canvas p 187 a canvas bag b canvas wheel c canvas cover



Carrier p 260 a face-plate b carrier



Center of a Planer p 211



Chain-wheel p 214



Chuck Wheel, p 229



Chaffed Wheel p 224



Clock valves p 201



Clamps p 230



Clutch p 245



Collar p 229 A B collar



Cog wheel p 243



Coupling p 300



Cutter p 300




Counter balance p 301



Crane p 308



Cranks p 300 1, 2 single crank 3 double crank 4, bell crank.



Dead center p 330



Cupola of Furnace p 228



Modern Draw Bridge p 411



Differential Motion p 224 A axis B cylinder C key



Drill press p 414



Crown wheel p 317



Dash pot, p 363




Derrick Crane, p 363


MECHANICS, MACHINERY, &c — Continued.



Drift, p. 413.



Eccentric of Steam engine p. 435



Escapements p. 443



Expansion Joint, p. 439



Flange, p. 519



Epicycloidal Wheel p. 446



Foliot p. 515



Flask p. 519



Fan wheel p. 498



Friction Clutch p. 544



Four way Cock p. 539



Friction Tube p. 544




Friction Wheels p. 544



Friction Cones p. 544.



Frictional Gear p. 544.

Fusse p. 552.
F fusse, L barrel.


Giffard Injector p. 569



Glas p. 570

Reverberator Air Furnace 551
a, sub-pit; b, door; c, hearth; d, chimney; e, vent.

Gallows bit p. 556

Gland p. 572.
a, gland; b, packing.Gudgeon p. 575.
a, wooden shaft; b, gudgeon.

Indicator p. 581




Governor p. 582.


AB, centrifugal balls; DF, DF, connecting rods and levers; F, fulcrum; E, A, P, ball rods; N, U, levers; M, side.



C. Hie-wheel, p. 584.



Heart wheel, p. 613.



Hiltner's Screw, 623.



Jack screw p. 577



Fig. 1.




Fig. 2.

Hydraulic Presses p. 645



Key seat p. 737



Knuckle Joint 744

A, pin; B, thimble; C, spoke-ends.



Lantern and Spur wheels p. 741



Lewis or Lewis son p. 763


a, a, movable parts; b, welder; c, bolt; e, ball ring bolt.



Lifting Jack p. 722



Link motion p. 777



Loom p. 787



Lug p. 793



Mandrel p. 807



Mandrel p. 799

M mandrel; F, yoke.



Man hole p. 805



Nut, p. 827



Rack and Pinion 1090.



Miter wheels p. 817



Pallet, p. 943

A, anchor; B, escapement; C, pallet.



Oil cup p. 909



Pile-driver, 967



Pendulums p. 963

a, common pendulum; b, gnomon mechanism.



Piston p. 901



Pitch line p. 901



Post mill, p. 1017



Pedometer p. 922



Perpetual screw 973



Plow hook p. 974



Plow bar p. 974.




Pistons p. 907

a, cross-head and pin; b, a, right; c, left; d, pin.



Pin, p. 903.

MECHANICS, MACHINERY, &c.—Continued.



Sun and Planet Wheels,
p. 1325
a, sun-wheel; b, planet-wheel;
c, connecting-rod.



Suspension bridge, p. 1334.




Swivel joint,
p. 1340



Tap-bolt, 1353



Swivel and Chain, p. 1340



Tilt hammer, p. 1355
a, wheel; b, upright shaft; c, fly-wheel; d, frame-work; e, lever; f, cushion; g, nail.




Toggle Joint,
p. 1330



Trammel, p. 1401



Trundle, or Wallower, 1420



Universal Joint, Single and
Double p. 1445.
(1) a, shaft; b, double joint;
(2) a, b, shafts; c, pinions; d, some-
thing link.



Valve gear,
p. 1461



Washer, p. 1424.



Windlass, p. 1517



Water gauge,
p. 1436



Winch, p. 1515.




Windmill, p. 1517



Amice, p. 45



Battle ax, p. 114.



Arquebuse, p. 76



Back piece, 101.



Beaver, p. 118



Casque, p. 202.



Cresset, p. 312.



Barbacane, p. 108




Buskin, p. 178



Coat of Mail, 213




Gorget, p. 151.



Donjon, p. 404
1, moat; 2, drawbridge; 3, wicket;
4, gate; 5, bul-
wark; 6, ba-
le; 7, draw-
bridge; 8, wicket;
9, gate.



Valley, p. 1436



Drawbridge, p. 411



Halberd, p. 602.



Hauberk, p. 611.



Helmet, 612.



Helmet, 612.

MIDDLE AGES—DAYS OF CHIVALRY, &c.
ARMOR, DRESS, &c.

Abacus, p. 1.




Acrotium, p. 14.



Alceter Armor, p. 27.



Alceter, p. 22.



Alceter, p. 22.



Alceter, p. 22.



Alceter, p. 22.




Alceter, p. 22.



Alceter, p. 22.



Alceter, p. 14.



Alceter, p. 73.

MIDDLE AGES—ARMOR, DRESS, &c—Continued



Conferring Knighthood
p 74.



Loebaber Ax
p 783



Martel de fer
p 815



Cost of Mail,
p 822



Morion p 89



Parleur and
vise p 929



Quiver p 103



Sallet or Salade
p 1165



Tunard p 1346


MILITARY TERMS—ARMS, PROJECTILES,
WEAPONS, &c

Abatis p 2.

a, abatis b, banquet c, breas h, dit, or interior e, p, ed int, o, crest
f, g, h, i, j, k, l, m, n, o, p, q, r, s, t, u, v, w, x, y, z, aa, ab, ac, ad, ae, af, ag, ah, ai, aj, ak, al, am, an, ao, ap, aq, ar, as, at, au, av, aw, ax, ay, az, ba, bb, bc, bd, be, bf, bg, bh, bi, bj, bk, bl, bm, bn, bo, bp, bq, br, bs, bt, bu, bv, bw, bx, by, bz, ca, cb, cc, cd, ce, cf, cg, ch, ci, cj, ck, cl, cm, cn, co, cp, cq, cr, cs, ct, cu, cv, cw, cx, cy, cz, da, db, dc, dd, de, df, dg, dh, di, dj, dk, dl, dm, dn, do, dp, dq, dr, ds, dt, du, dv, dw, dx, dy, dz, ea, eb, ec, ed, ee, ef, eg, eh, ei, ej, ek, el, em, en, eo, ep, eq, er, es, et, eu, ev, ew, ex, ey, ez, fa, fb, fc, fd, fe, ff, fg, fh, fi, fj, fk, fl, fm, fn, fo, fp, fq, fr, fs, ft, fu, fv, fw, fx, fy, fz, ga, gb, gc, gd, ge, gf, gh, gi, gj, gk, gl, gm, gn, go, gp, gq, gr, gs, gt, gu, gv, gw, gx, gy, gz, ha, hb, hc, hd, he, hf, hg, hh, hi, hj, hk, hl, hm, hn, ho, hp, hq, hr, hs, ht, hu, hv, hw, hx, hy, hz, ia, ib, ic, id, ie, if, ig, ih, ii, ij, ik, il, im, in, io, ip, iq, ir, is, it, iu, iv, iw, ix, iy, iz, ja, jb, jc, jd, je, jf, jg, jh, ji, jj, jk, jl, jm, jn, jo, jp, jq, jr, js, jt, ju, jv, jw, jx, jy, jz, ka, kb, kc, kd, ke, kf, kg, kh, ki, kj, kk, kl, km, kn, ko, kp, kq, kr, ks, kt, ku, kv, kw, kx, ky, kz, la, lb, lc, ld, le, lf, lg, lh, li, lj, lk, ll, lm, ln, lo, lp, lq, lr, ls, lt, lu, lv, lw, lx, ly, lz, ma, mb, mc, md, me, mf, mg, mh, mi, mj, mk, ml, mm, mn, mo, mp, mq, mr, ms, mt, mu, mv, mw, mx, my, mz, na, nb, nc, nd, ne, nf, ng, nh, ni, nj, nk, nl, nm, nn, no, np, nq, nr, ns, nt, nu, nv, nw, nx, ny, nz, oa, ob, oc, od, oe, of, og, oh, oi, oj, ok, ol, om, on, oo, op, oq, or, os, ot, ou, ov, ow, ox, oy, oz, pa, pb, pc, pd, pe, pf, pg, ph, pi, pj, pk, pl, pm, pn, po, pp, pq, pr, ps, pt, pu, pv, pw, px, py, pz, qa, qb, qc, qd, qe, qf, qg, qh, qi, qj, qk, ql, qm, qn, qo, qp, qq, qr, qs, qt, qu, qv, qw, qx, qy, qz, ra, rb, rc, rd, re, rf, rg, rh, ri, rj, rk, rl, rm, rn, ro, rp, rq, rr, rs, rt, ru, rv, rw, rx, ry, rz, sa, sb, sc, sd, se, sf, sg, sh, si, sj, sk, sl, sm, sn, so, sp, sq, sr, ss, st, su, sv, sw, sx, sy, sz, ta, tb, tc, td, te, tf, tg, th, ti, tj, tk, tl, tm, tn, to, tp, tq, tr, ts, tt, tu, tv, tw, tx, ty, tz, ua, ub, uc, ud, ue, uf, ug, uh, ui, uj, uk, ul, um, un, uo, up, uq, ur, us, ut, uu, uv, uw, ux, uy, uz, va, vb, vc, vd, ve, vf, vg, vh, vi, vj, vk, vl, vm, vn, vo, vp, vq, vr, vs, vt, vu, vv, vw, vx, vy, vz, wa, wb, wc, wd, we, wf, wg, wh, wi, wj, wk, wl, wm, wn, wo, wp, wq, wr, ws, wt, wu, wv, ww, wx, wy, wz, xa, xb, xc, xd, xe, xf, xg, xh, xi, xj, xk, xl, xm, xn, xo, xp, xq, xr, xs, xt, xu, xv, xw, xx, xy, xz, ya, yb, yc, yd, ye, yf, yg, yh, yi, yj, yk, yl, ym, yn, yo, yp, yq, yr, ys, yt, yu, yv, yw, yx, yy, yz, za, zb, zc, zd, ze, zf, zg, zh, zi, zj, zk, zl, zm, zn, zo, zp, zq, zr, zs, zt, zu, zv, zw, zx, zy, zz.




Ambulan e Cart, p 42.



Arms ong Gun p 75
H re-A ree C t u n n



Air gun p 32.



Carrier gate p 110



Barshot p 110




Battery Wagon p 114




Battery p 112.


A, baton B, batterie C, batterie D, batterie E, batterie F, batterie G, batterie H, batterie I, batterie J, batterie K, batterie L, batterie M, batterie N, batterie O, batterie P, batterie Q, batterie R, batterie S, batterie T, batterie U, batterie V, batterie W, batterie X, batterie Y, batterie Z, batterie AA, batterie AB, batterie AC, batterie AD, batterie AE, batterie AF, batterie AG, batterie AH, batterie AI, batterie AJ, batterie AK, batterie AL, batterie AM, batterie AN, batterie AO, batterie AP, batterie AQ, batterie AR, batterie AS, batterie AT, batterie AU, batterie AV, batterie AW, batterie AX, batterie AY, batterie AZ, batterie BA, batterie BB, batterie BC, batterie BD, batterie BE, batterie BF, batterie BG, batterie BH, batterie BI, batterie BJ, batterie BK, batterie BL, batterie BM, batterie BN, batterie BO, batterie BP, batterie BQ, batterie BR, batterie BS, batterie BT, batterie BU, batterie BV, batterie BW, batterie BX, batterie BY, batterie BZ, batterie CA, batterie CB, batterie CC, batterie CD, batterie CE, batterie CF, batterie CG, batterie CH, batterie CI, batterie CJ, batterie CK, batterie CL, batterie CM, batterie CN, batterie CO, batterie CP, batterie CQ, batterie CR, batterie CS, batterie CT, batterie CU, batterie CV, batterie CW, batterie CX, batterie CY, batterie CZ, batterie DA, batterie DB, batterie DC, batterie DE, batterie DF, batterie DG, batterie DH, batterie DI, batterie DJ, batterie DK, batterie DL, batterie DM, batterie DN, batterie DO, batterie DP, batterie DQ, batterie DR, batterie DS, batterie DT, batterie DU, batterie DV, batterie DW, batterie DX, batterie DY, batterie DZ, batterie EA, batterie EB, batterie EC, batterie ED, batterie EE, batterie EF, batterie EG, batterie EH, batterie EI, batterie EJ, batterie EK, batterie EL, batterie EM, batterie EN, batterie EO, batterie EP, batterie EQ, batterie ER, batterie ES, batterie ET, batterie EU, batterie EV, batterie EW, batterie EX, batterie EY, batterie EZ, batterie FA, batterie FB, batterie FC, batterie FD, batterie FE, batterie FF, batterie FG, batterie FH, batterie FI, batterie FJ, batterie FK, batterie FL, batterie FM, batterie FN, batterie FO, batterie FP, batterie FQ, batterie FR, batterie FS, batterie FT, batterie FU, batterie FV, batterie FW, batterie FX, batterie FY, batterie FZ, batterie GA, batterie GB, batterie GC, batterie GD, batterie GE, batterie GF, batterie GH, batterie GI, batterie GJ, batterie GK, batterie GL, batterie GM, batterie GN, batterie GO, batterie GP, batterie GQ, batterie GR, batterie GS, batterie GT, batterie GU, batterie GV, batterie GW, batterie GX, batterie GY, batterie GZ, batterie HA, batterie HB, batterie HC, batterie HD, batterie HE, batterie HF, batterie HG, batterie HI, batterie HJ, batterie HK, batterie HL, batterie HM, batterie HN, batterie HO, batterie HP, batterie HQ, batterie HR, batterie HS, batterie HT, batterie HU, batterie HV, batterie HW, batterie HX, batterie HY, batterie HZ, batterie IA, batterie IB, batterie 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TZ, batterie UA, batterie UB, batterie UC, batterie UD, batterie UE, batterie UF, batterie UG, batterie UH, batterie UI, batterie UJ, batterie UK, batterie UL, batterie UM, batterie UN, batterie UO, batterie UP, batterie UQ, batterie UR, batterie US, batterie UT, batterie UY, batterie UZ, batterie VA, batterie VB, batterie VC, batterie VD, batterie VE, batterie VF, batterie VG, batterie VH, batterie VI, batterie VJ, batterie VK, batterie VL, batterie VM, batterie VN, batterie VO, batterie VP, batterie VQ, batterie VR, batterie VS, batterie VT, batterie VU, batterie VV, batterie VW, batterie VX, batterie VY, batterie VZ, batterie WA, batterie WB, batterie WC, batterie WD, batterie WE, batterie WF, batterie WG, batterie WH, batterie WI, batterie WJ, batterie WK, batterie WL, batterie WM, batterie WN, batterie WO, batterie WP, batterie WQ, batterie WR, batterie WS, batterie WT, batterie WU, batterie WV, batterie WW, batterie WX, batterie WY, batterie WZ, batterie XA, batterie XB, batterie XC, batterie XD, batterie XE, batterie XF, batterie XG, batterie XH, batterie XI, batterie XJ, batterie XK, batterie XL, batterie XM, batterie XN, batterie XO, batterie XP, batterie XQ, batterie XR, batterie XS, batterie XT, batterie XU, batterie XV, batterie XW, batterie XX, batterie XY, batterie XZ, batterie YA, batterie YB, batterie YC, batterie YD, batterie YE, batterie YF, batterie YG, batterie YH, batterie YI, batterie YJ, batterie YK, batterie YL, batterie YM, batterie YN, batterie YO, batterie YP, batterie YQ, batterie YR, batterie YS, batterie YT, batterie YU, batterie YV, batterie YW, batterie YX, batterie YY, batterie YZ, batterie ZA, batterie ZB, batterie ZC, batterie ZD, batterie ZE, batterie ZF, batterie ZG, batterie ZH, batterie ZI, batterie ZJ, batterie ZK, batterie ZL, batterie ZM, batterie ZN, batterie ZO, batterie ZP, batterie ZQ, batterie ZR, batterie ZS, batterie ZT, batterie ZU, batterie ZV, batterie ZW, batterie ZX, batterie ZY, batterie ZZ.



Bayonets p 115
a, sword bayonet b, companion bayonet.




Bascule Bridge p 111



Bateau p 113
a, a, b, bateau A, b, h, balle e c, chaise.




Block house (U S 1790) p 142.




Calisson and Limber p 183.



Blunderbuss p 145




Broadsword p 156




Bombs p 149



Breech s ght for
Cannon p 162



Cin e or
shot p 191



Cannon p 191
A, cannon B, first re-fore C, second
re-fore D, base E, swell of barrel
F, variation G, pan-lane H, base of
base of the breech.



Carronade p 200




Cartridge box
p 1



Chaqueta p 201




Chaqueta p 214.



A B see me e. A gun at B was d fire
through the embrasure a the wall a gu
at the end of the a hole a the p
sout B p the a B scarp wa, the su
face of which is the scarp a, the scarp.



Chapau B as
p 217



Cheval de frise p 222




Co umbid p 233




Daggers p 331




Cross bow p 216



Cutliss p 237















Exanlet, p. 455.




Fascine p 416



MILITARY TERMS—WEAPONS, &c —Continued





MILITARY TERMS—WEAPONS, &c.—Continued



El oulier Straps as indicating rank in the United States Navy p 1223



MOLLUSKS



MOLLUSKS—Continued



Univalve p 1445

Wen le-
trap p 1505.

Whelk p 1507

MUSICAL INSTRUMENTS




Accord on p 12



Zolian Harp p 25.




Bagpipe p 102



Bassoon p 112.



Hunter's Bugle p 172



Viol p 147



Castanet p 232.




Clarinet p 230




Clarinet, p 230.

Conch na
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
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
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
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
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
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


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WEBSTER'S UNABRIDGED DICTIONARY
ORNITH

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


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Redpoll p 1116



Redpoll p 1116

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
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


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
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Differential Thermometer p. 377



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Cryophorus p. 239



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Discharge Jar p. 250




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
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
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
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











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
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
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
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
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For explanation see body of the
Work.

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88 a black & white
89 a black & white
90 a black & white
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98 a black & white
99 a black & white
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
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Kestrel p 1203



Kestrel p 1209




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
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
Zebu or Indian Ox, p 1268



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Zebu or Indian Ox, p 1268



Zebu or Indian Ox, p 1268

RACES OF MEN.



American



Arab



Australian



Caucasian



European



Mongolian




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
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
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
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Snake p 123.



Snake p 123.



Snake p 123.




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SHIPS AND NAUTICAL AFFAIRS


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of a stock


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
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Galleon p 100


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A fu lock
C fu lock


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
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A keelson
C keelson

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Masted of a ship p 604



Masted of a ship p 604



Masted of a ship p 604




Masted of a ship p 604

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
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


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
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Yawl p 1532




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
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Mast and Stay p 1234

A ship's mast and stay are the main supports of the sails. The mast is the central pole, and the stay is the rope or cable that supports the mast. They are essential for the ship's stability and the ability to set and trim the sails.





Anchor p 1217



Ship's propeller p 1222

SHIPS AND NAUTICAL AFFAIRS



SHIPS AND NAUTICAL AFFAIRS.—Continued.



Prow of Ancient Galley, p. 1055




Balisea, p. 1069



Sheet anchor, p. 1217.



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


Ship, ground plan of p. 1219



Sella p. 1164.

son's Post, top m. 1. 25, mizen topmast 10 11 25, mizen royal 24, mizen sky sail 25, mizen-panker p. 1165



Full rigged ship, p. 1219



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Fluke, p. 1234



Fluke, p. 1234



Fluke, p. 1234



Fluke, p. 1234



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Tiller, p. 1235.



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
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


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


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
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
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Tree, p. 1244.



Tree, p. 1244.

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W. o. p 1313

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
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
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Jump-seat p 731
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Skelton Buggy p 114



Wagonette p 117

ARMS OF THE STATES OF THE AMERICAN UNION.



MAINE



NEW HAMPSHIRE



VERMONT




NEW YORK



CONNECTICUT



NEW JERSEY



VIRGINIA



WEST VIRGINIA



NORTH CAROLINA



SOUTH CAROLINA



GEORGIA



FLORIDA



ALABAMA



MISSISSIPPI



LOUISIANA



TEXAS



ARKANSAS



TENNESSEE



KENTUCKY



OHIO



MICHIGAN



INDIANA



ILLINOIS



MISSOURI



IOWA



WISCONSIN



MINNESOTA



KANSAS



CALIFORNIA



OREGON



NEVADA



DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA



IDAHO



UTAH



COLORADO





WYOMING




MONTANA

TREES AND THEIR FRUITS—Continued.



VEHICLES FOR LAND AND AERIAL LOCOMOTION





MAINE




NEW HAMPSHIRE



VERMONT



MASSACHUSETTS



NEW JERSEY




WEST VIRGINIA



NORTH CAROLINA



SOUTH CAROLINA



GEORGIA




MISSISSIPPI



LOUISIANA



TEXAS



ARKANSAS



OHIO



MICHIGAN



INDIANA



ILLINOIS



WISCONSIN



MINNESOTA



KANSAS



CALIFORNIA



OREGON




NEVADA




IDaho



UTAH




WASHINGTON



MONTANA




WYOMING




COLORADO

THE ARMS OF VARIOUS NATIONS, ROYAL PERSONAGES, ETC.




1. United States 2. Russia; 3. France; 4. Spain; 5. Savoy 6. Great Britain 7. Portugal; 8. Sweden 9. Belgium; 10. East India Company; 11. Prussia;
 12. Prince Albert; 13. Holland 14. Prince of Wales; 15. Austria 16. Denmark; 17. Ionian Isles; 18. Sardina 19. Greece; 20. Turkey; 21. Brazil; 22. Tu-
 rkey; 23. Mexico; 24. Naples 25. Papal States; 26. Switzerland; 27. Venezuela 28. Hanover,


FLAGS OF VARIOUS NATIONS.



STATIONARY AND LOCOMOTIVE STEAM-ENGINES.




STATIONARY STEAM ENGINE, WITH PARTS NAMED.




LOCOMOTIVE STEAM-ENGINE, WITH PARTS NAMED.


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